CN111861683A - Data transaction device, method, equipment and medium - Google Patents
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Abstract
The application discloses a data transaction device, method, device and medium, comprising: the auction data acquisition module is used for acquiring data to be auctioned and the reserve price of each binding data in the data to be auctioned; the auction price acquisition module is used for acquiring the auction price of the auctioneer for the binding data; the auction data traversing module is used for traversing the data to be auctioned layer by layer from the first data layer, screening out the auction participants of which the auction prices are greater than or equal to the corresponding reserved prices in the current data layer, determining the target distribution mode of the current data layer and calculating the payment prices of the auction participants according to the target distribution mode; the traversal stop control module is used for stopping traversal when a preset traversal stop condition is reached; and the data final distribution module is used for determining a final distribution mode and a final payment price according to the traversal result and distributing the binding data to the auction participants according to the final distribution mode. The method can avoid multi-anonymous identity bidding attack and guarantee fairness and high efficiency of data transaction.
Description
Technical Field
The present application relates to the field of big data technologies, and in particular, to a data transaction apparatus, method, device, and medium.
Background
Although with the explosion of the big data industry, data trading in the big data market is also receiving wide attention and research. However, the problem of how to make data traded fairly and efficiently between the owner and the user of the data and to make appropriate pricing is far from being solved. In recent years, a large number of sensors, smart devices, and the internet, which has been developed at a high speed, generate a huge amount of data every day, and the large data has been remarkably grown in its scale and application. For example, social media platforms collect social information and large amounts of multimedia files for millions of users each day. With the explosive growth of data, how to promote the sufficient sharing of data in various fields to realize the intrinsic value of big data becomes a problem to be solved urgently. As an integral part of the incentive mechanism for data sharing, big data transactions play an important role in facilitating data sharing. In recent years, the rise of large data trading platforms has been catalyzed by the growing trading of data. Some third-party data transaction platforms have millions of data sets generated from various fields, and users of the platforms can conduct data transaction on the platforms. However, the existing big data market is still in the initial development stage, and it faces the difficulty of how to price the data. Therefore, there is a need to find a suitable method for pricing big data to realize the prosperous development of big data market and data sharing.
In the current research on pricing of data transactions, the auction mechanism has recently gained a lot of attention. As a new pricing method, the auction mechanism exhibits great potential in resolving pricing and ensuring fair and efficient data transactions. However, in the context of the internet, auction mechanisms face the severe challenge of multiple anonymous identity bidding attacks. By multi-anonymous identity bidding attacks, it is meant that an attacker can use multiple anonymous identities to increase their revenue. For example, a user may register multiple email accounts to participate in an auction, affecting the outcome of the auction in a particular combination to obtain higher revenue. Since it is almost impossible to identify the identity of each participant on the internet, such attacks are difficult to detect, affecting the fairness of data transactions between the data owner and the data consumer.
Disclosure of Invention
In view of this, an object of the present application is to provide a data transaction apparatus, method, device and medium, which can avoid multi-anonymous identity bidding attack, thereby ensuring fairness and high efficiency of data transaction. The specific scheme is as follows:
in a first aspect, the present application discloses a data transaction apparatus, comprising:
The auction data acquisition module is used for acquiring data to be auctioned and the reserve price of each binding data in the data to be auctioned; the data to be auctioned is obtained by data layering of a target data set by an auctioneer according to a data layer protocol, and in the data to be auctioned, a first data layer comprises a binding data set, the only element in the binding data set is the target data set, a union set of a plurality of elements in the binding data set in any data layer outside the first data layer exists in a data layer lower than the data layer, and any binding data does not exist in two different data layers at the same time;
the auction price acquisition module is used for acquiring the auction price of the auctioneer aiming at the binding data;
the auction data traversing module is used for traversing the data to be auctioned layer by layer from the first data layer; the auction data traversing module comprises an auction user screening submodule, an allocation mode determining submodule and a payment price calculating submodule, wherein the auction user screening submodule is used for screening auction users of which the auction prices are larger than or equal to the corresponding reserve prices in the current data layer, the allocation mode determining submodule is used for determining a target allocation mode corresponding to the current data layer, and the payment price calculating submodule is used for calculating the payment price corresponding to the screened auction users according to the target allocation mode; the payment price is a difference value between a first payment price and a second payment price, the first payment price is the sum of auction prices of the current auction participants in a target distribution mode corresponding to the current auction participants not participating in the auction, and the second payment price is the sum of auction prices of other auction participants except the current auction participants in the target distribution mode corresponding to the current auction participants participating in the auction;
The traversal stop control module is used for stopping traversal when a preset traversal stop condition is reached;
and the data final distribution module is used for determining a final distribution mode and a final payment price according to the traversal result and distributing the binding data to the corresponding auction players according to the final distribution mode.
Optionally, the traversal stop control module is specifically configured to stop traversal if the number of the bidders having the auction prices greater than or equal to the corresponding reserve prices in the current data layer reaches a preset threshold.
Optionally, the data final allocation module is specifically configured to, if a unique first bidder having an auction price greater than or equal to the corresponding reserve price exists in any one data layer, and in a subsequent traversal process, if a second bidder other than the first bidder exists in another data layer, allocate corresponding binding data to the first bidder, and determine a final auction price of the first bidder according to the auction price of the first competitor and a payment price calculated in the traversal process of each layer;
Wherein the first and second bidders are not preset bidders.
Optionally, the allocation mode determining sub-module is specifically configured to determine the target allocation mode according to a preset data allocation protocol;
wherein the data distribution protocol comprises: binding data in any one binding data set can only be distributed to the same auction player; two binding data belonging to different binding sets of the data are prohibited from being allocated to the same auction player; any data not belonging to the binding data is assigned to the preset auction participants.
Optionally, the allocation manner determining sub-module is specifically configured to determine the allocation manner according to a formula
Determining the target distribution mode corresponding to the current data layer;
wherein G is*SG for determining the target distribution modeiI represents the ith layer of data, N is a set of auction participants, and N comprises all auction participants, sigmax∈N∪{0}Vx(G) For the sum of the payment prices of the bidders in distribution mode G, V is used when bidder x is not allocated any datax(G)＝0。
In a second aspect, the present application discloses a data transaction method, comprising:
acquiring data to be auctioned and a reserve price of each binding data in the data to be auctioned; the data to be auctioned is obtained by data layering of a target data set by an auctioneer according to a data layer protocol, and in the data to be auctioned, a first data layer comprises a binding data set, the only element in the binding data set is the target data set, a union set of a plurality of elements in the binding data set in any data layer outside the first data layer exists in a data layer lower than the data layer, and any binding data does not exist in two different data layers at the same time;
Acquiring an auction price of an auctioneer for the binding data;
traversing the data to be auctioned layer by layer from a first data layer, screening the auctioneers of which the auction prices are greater than or equal to the corresponding reserved prices in the current data layer, determining a target distribution mode corresponding to the current data layer, and calculating the payment price corresponding to the screened auctioneers according to the target distribution mode; the payment price is a difference value between a first payment price and a second payment price, the first payment price is the sum of auction prices of the auction participants in a target distribution mode corresponding to the situation that the current auction participants do not participate in the auction, and the second payment price is the sum of auction prices of other auction participants except the current auction participants in the target distribution mode corresponding to the situation that the current auction participants participate in the auction;
stopping traversing when a preset traversing stopping condition is reached;
and determining a final distribution mode and a final payment price according to the traversal result, and distributing the binding data to the corresponding auction participants according to the final distribution mode.
Optionally, when a preset traversal stop condition is reached, stopping traversal includes:
And if the number of the auction participants of which the auction prices are greater than or equal to the corresponding reserve price in the current data layer reaches a preset threshold value, stopping traversing.
Optionally, the determining a final distribution manner and a final payment price according to the traversal result includes:
if a unique first bidder with a price greater than or equal to the corresponding reserve price exists in any data layer and the price of a second bidder other than the first bidder exists in another data layer in the following traversal process, distributing corresponding binding data to the first bidder, and determining the final price of the first bidder according to the price of the first competitor and the payment price calculated in the traversal process of each layer;
wherein the first and second bidders are not preset bidders.
In a third aspect, the present application discloses a data trafficking device comprising a processor and a memory; wherein the content of the first and second substances,
the memory is used for storing a computer program;
the processor is used for executing the computer program to realize the data transaction method.
In a fourth aspect, the present application discloses a computer readable storage medium holding a computer program, wherein the computer program when executed by a processor implements the aforementioned data transaction method.
It can be seen that the data transaction device disclosed in the present application includes: the auction data acquisition module is used for acquiring data to be auctioned and the reserve price of each binding data in the data to be auctioned; the data to be auctioned is obtained by data layering of a target data set by an auctioneer according to a data layer protocol, and in the data to be auctioned, a first data layer comprises a binding data set, the only element in the binding data set is the target data set, a union set of a plurality of elements in the binding data set in any data layer outside the first data layer exists in a data layer lower than the data layer, and any binding data does not exist in two different data layers at the same time; the auction price acquisition module is used for acquiring the auction price of the auctioneer aiming at the binding data; the auction data traversing module is used for traversing the data to be auctioned layer by layer from the first data layer; the auction data traversing module comprises an auction user screening submodule, an allocation mode determining submodule and a payment price calculating submodule, wherein the auction user screening submodule is used for screening auction users of which the auction prices are larger than or equal to the corresponding reserve prices in the current data layer, the allocation mode determining submodule is used for determining a target allocation mode corresponding to the current data layer, and the payment price calculating submodule is used for calculating the payment price corresponding to the screened auction users according to the target allocation mode; the payment price is a difference value between a first payment price and a second payment price, the first payment price is the sum of auction prices of the current auction participants in a target distribution mode corresponding to the current auction participants not participating in the auction, and the second payment price is the sum of auction prices of other auction participants except the current auction participants in the target distribution mode corresponding to the current auction participants participating in the auction; the traversal stop control module is used for stopping traversal when a preset traversal stop condition is reached; and the data final distribution module is used for determining a final distribution mode and a final payment price according to the traversal result and distributing the binding data to the corresponding auction players according to the final distribution mode. Therefore, data layering is carried out according to a data layer protocol, then data to be auctioned are traversed layer by layer in the transaction process, the final distribution mode and the final payment price are determined, and multi-anonymous identity bidding attack can be avoided, so that fairness and high efficiency of data transaction are guaranteed.
Drawings
In order to more clearly illustrate the embodiments of the present application or the technical solutions in the prior art, the drawings needed to be used in the description of the embodiments or the prior art will be briefly introduced below, it is obvious that the drawings in the following description are only embodiments of the present application, and for those skilled in the art, other drawings can be obtained according to the provided drawings without creative efforts.
FIG. 1 is a schematic diagram of a data transaction apparatus according to the present disclosure;
FIG. 2 is a flow chart of a data transaction method disclosed herein;
FIG. 3 is a block diagram of a data transaction device disclosed herein;
fig. 4 is a structural diagram of an electronic terminal disclosed in the present application.
Detailed Description
The technical solutions in the embodiments of the present application will be clearly and completely described below with reference to the drawings in the embodiments of the present application, and it is obvious that the described embodiments are only a part of the embodiments of the present application, and not all of the embodiments. All other embodiments, which can be derived by a person skilled in the art from the embodiments given herein without making any creative effort, shall fall within the protection scope of the present application.
In the current research on pricing of data transactions, the auction mechanism has recently gained a lot of attention. As a new pricing method, the auction mechanism exhibits great potential in resolving pricing and ensuring fair and efficient data transactions. However, in the context of the internet, auction mechanisms face the severe challenge of multiple anonymous identity bidding attacks. Therefore, the data transaction scheme is provided, multi-anonymous identity bidding attack can be avoided, and fairness and high efficiency of data transaction are guaranteed.
Referring to fig. 1, an embodiment of the present application discloses a data transaction apparatus, including:
an auction data obtaining module 11, configured to obtain data to be auctioned and a reserve price of each binding data in the data to be auctioned; the data to be auctioned is obtained by data layering of a target data set by an auctioneer according to a data layer protocol, a first data layer of the data to be auctioned comprises a binding data set, the only element in the binding data set is the target data set, a union set of a plurality of elements in the binding data set in any data layer outside the first data layer exists in a data layer lower than the data layer, and any binding data does not exist in two different data layers simultaneously.
In a specific embodiment, before conducting the auction, the auctioneer needs to determine the data layer and the reserve price r (S) of each binding data element S in the target data set M according to the data layer protocol.
Specifically, in the present embodiment, N ═ 1,2, … N } may be set as the set of bidders. Assuming that W is the size of the original auction data set, the present embodiment sets M ═ 2 as the target data set that is the valid data set that can be auctioned0,21,…,2mW, the elements in M are part of the original data W and satisfy 2m≤W≤2m+1. These different sized data sets may be obtained by randomly sampling from the original data set, or by extracting data from the original data set based on certain characteristics. Setting a binding data set as S ═ { e | e ∈ M }, and setting a binding data set as
And satisfy
S 'belongs to D and S is not equal to S', has
It holds that one data layer is defined as SDi＝{Di1,Di2…, i denotes the ith layer data and specifies that the data layer satisfies the following three conditions, namely the data layer protocol: SD1＝{{M}}That is, in the first data layer, only one binding data set D ═ M } is included, and only one element of the binding data set is the entire valid data set M;
and | D' | is more than or equal to 2, Su＝US∈D'S, then
And SDjSo that Djl∈SDjAnd Su∈DjlThe method comprises the following steps that (1) in a data layer with the number of layers larger than 1, a union set of a plurality of elements in any data binding set is determined to appear in a lower data layer; 
For the
Satisfy the requirement of
I.e. no single bundle data is present in the other data layer.
And the auction price acquisition module 12 is used for acquiring the auction price of the auctioneer aiming at the binding data.
In a specific embodiment, the bidder bids with the binding data as the minimum unit, and the bid price of the bidder x for the binding data S is set to B (x, S).
An auction data traversal module 13, configured to traverse, layer by layer, the data to be auctioned from a first data layer; the auction data traversing module comprises an auction user screening submodule, an allocation mode determining submodule and a payment price calculating submodule, wherein the auction user screening submodule is used for screening auction users of which the auction prices are larger than or equal to the corresponding reserve prices in the current data layer, the allocation mode determining submodule is used for determining a target allocation mode corresponding to the current data layer, and the payment price calculating submodule is used for calculating the payment price corresponding to the screened auction users according to the target allocation mode; the payment price is a difference value between a first payment price and a second payment price, the first payment price is the sum of auction prices of the current auction participants in the target distribution mode corresponding to the current auction participants not participating in the auction, and the second payment price is the sum of auction prices of other auction participants except the current auction participants in the target distribution mode corresponding to the current auction participants participating in the auction.
The distribution mode determining submodule is specifically configured to determine the target distribution mode according to a preset data distribution protocol; the data distribution protocol comprises: binding data in any one binding data set can only be distributed to the same auction player; two binding data belonging to different binding sets of the data are prohibited from being allocated to the same auction player; any data not belonging to the binding data is assigned to the preset auction participants.
Specifically, this embodiment may define one allocation pattern G ═ G0,g1,…,gm+1In which g ispThe bidder who wins the data p is an effective allocation if the following three conditions are satisfied, i.e., the data allocation protocol is satisfied.
Has gp＝gqThe method comprises the following steps that (1) the establishment is established, namely binding data in one binding data set can be only distributed to the same auction player;
s 'is E D and S is S', for
Has gp≠gqOr gp＝gqWhen the number of the binding data is 0, two binding data belonging to different binding data sets cannot be allocated to the same auction player unless both binding data are allocated to the auction player No. 0, namely a preset auction player;
if it is not
Is provided with
Then there is gpIf the data of a certain size does not belong to any bundle data, it is assigned to the auctioneer No. 0.
That is, the embodiment of the present application may set a virtual auction owner 0 who evaluates a bundled data S to be equal to the reserve price r (S) of S, where the reserve price is a predetermined price, meaning that the data owner does not sell the data at a price lower than the price.
The allocation mode determining submodule is specifically used for determining the allocation mode according to a formula
Determining the target distribution mode corresponding to the current data layer;
wherein G is*SG for determining the target distribution modeiI represents the ith layer of data, N is a set of auction participants, and N comprises all auction participants, sigmax∈N∪{0}Vx(G) For the sum of the payment prices of the bidders in distribution mode G, V is used when bidder x is not allocated any datax(G)＝0。
That is, in the embodiment of the present application, a target allocation manner may be determined from an allocation manner set of any data layer determined according to a data allocation protocol, where the target allocation manner is an allocation manner that maximizes social surplus. Social surplus is the sum of the profits of all the people participating in the auction.
And a payment price calculation sub-module for calculating a payment price according to a formula
Determining a payment price P for an auction player xxWherein, in the step (A),
and determining a distribution mode for maximizing the social surplus when the bidder x in the ith layer of data does not participate in the auction.
And the traversal stop control module 14 is used for stopping traversal when a preset traversal stop condition is reached.
In a specific implementation manner, if the number of the bidders having the auction prices greater than or equal to the corresponding reserve prices in the current data layer reaches a preset threshold, the traversal is stopped. For example, the number reaches 2, and the statistics of the number do not include the preset bidder. Otherwise, entering the next layer to continue traversing.
And the data final distribution module 15 is used for determining a final distribution mode and a final payment price according to the traversal result, and distributing the binding data to the corresponding auction players according to the final distribution mode.
In a specific embodiment, the data final allocating module 15 is specifically configured to, if a unique first bidder having an auction price greater than or equal to the corresponding reserve price exists in any one data layer, and in a subsequent traversal process, if an auction price of a second bidder other than the first bidder exists in another data layer and is greater than or equal to the corresponding reserve price, allocate corresponding binding data to the first bidder, and determine a final auction price of the first bidder according to the auction price of the first competitor and a payment price calculated in the traversal process of each layer; wherein the first and second bidders are not preset bidders.
That is, the present implementation may begin with a first level data layer and perform a level traversal algorithm to determine at which level to distribute data. And finally how to distribute, for the ith layer data, the flow of the hierarchical traversal algorithm is as follows: if there is and only one bidder x offering is greater than or equal to the reserve price R (S) of a certain binding data S, i.e. the price 
B (x, S) gtoreqR (S). In such a wayIn this case, the allocation algorithm of the i-th layer is executed to determine the allocation pattern Gi *And the payment price P of the bidder xx(ii) a Meanwhile, a recursive hierarchical traversal algorithm for executing the i +1 layer is used to obtain another distribution mode Gi+1 *And x's payment price Px', the result that will make the auctioneer x more profitable will eventually be selected. It should be noted that, when the algorithm of the i +1 th layer is executed recursively, even if a new bidder appears, that is, the bid of more than two bidders is greater than or equal to the sum of the reserve prices of certain binding data, only data is finally allocated to x, that is, at the i th layer, other bidders have lost the qualification for auction; for the ith layer data, if more than two bidders bid more than or equal to the reserve price of a plurality of binding data, namely
With B (x, S)x)≥R(Sx)，B(y,Sy)≥R(Sy) If yes, the allocation algorithm can be directly executed to determine the target allocation mode and the payment prices of all the auction participants; otherwise, executing the hierarchy traversal algorithm of the (i + 1) th layer. And if only the preset auction price of the auctioneer meets the condition that the auction price is larger than or equal to the reserve price for the ith layer data, executing the hierarchy traversal algorithm of the (i + 1) th layer.
In addition, in this embodiment, the revenue function of the auction player x is UxE-P, where E is the actual valuation of the data assigned to him by the bidder x and P is the payment price for these data. The data owner's revenue function is
Wherein P isxThe price paid for bidder x, C is the cost of collecting data for the data owner, and is a constant.
For example, the data to be auctioned includes: a first data layer level1[ { (A, B, C) } ]; a second data layer level2[ { (A, B) }, { (B, C) }, { (A, C) } ]; a third data layer level3[ { (A), (B), (C) } ]. Where a, B, C are elements in M, bound data is identified with (), e.g., bound data (a), a set of bound data is identified with { }, and SD is identified with [ ]. Table one is the price that the bidder is auctioning for all the bundled data.
Assuming that the reserve prices of A, B and C are all 50, the bid of the bidder 0 is the reserve price, and the hierarchy traversal algorithm calls: the first layer has no other bidders except for No. 0 bid higher than the binding data (a, B, C), can only be allocated to the bidder No. 0, and executes the next layer of algorithm, and the second layer also has no other bidders except for No. 0 bid higher than the binding data (a, B), (B, C), (a, C), and executes the next layer of algorithm; in the third layer, when the bids of the bidders 1, 2 and 3 are all higher than certain binding data (a, B or C), a is allocated to 1, B is allocated to 2, and C is allocated to 3, so that the total bid amount of them is 60+60+ 60-180, which is the maximum value, and therefore, such allocation mode G is the optimal allocation mode. Calculating the payment prices of all the auction participants: for person 1, if he is not participating in the auction, the allocation at this level should be a to 0, B to 2, C to 3, with the sum of the bids of the other people than person 1 being 50+60+ 60-170; if he participates in the auction, the total bid amount of other persons except the person 1 is 0+60+60 to 120 according to the distribution mode of distributing A to 1, B to 2 and C to 3, and 0 represents that the bid amount of the person 0 is 0. Therefore, the payment price of the auction person 1 is 170-.
Watch 1
| (A) | (B) | (C) | (A,B) | (B,C) | (A,C) | (A,B,C) | |
| Person to be auctioned 1 | 60 | 30 | 30 | 90 | 60 | 90 | 120 |
| Auction players 2 | 30 | 60 | 30 | 90 | 90 | 60 | 120 |
| Auction player 3 | 30 | 30 | 60 | 60 | 90 | 90 | 120 |
| Person in auction 0 | 50 | 50 | 50 | 100 | 100 | 100 | 150 |
For example, the data to be auctioned includes: a first data layer level1[ { (A, B) } ]; a second data layer level2[ { (A) }, { (B) } ]; where a, B are elements in M, bound data is identified with (), e.g., bound data (a), a set of bound data is identified with { }, and SD is identified with [ ]. And the second table is the auction price of the auctioneer for all the binding data.
Watch two
| (A) | (B) | (A,B) | |
| Person to be auctioned 1 | 80 | 0 | 110 |
| Auction players 2 | 0 | 80 | 80 |
| Auction player 3 | 60 | 0 | 60 |
| Person in auction 0 | 50 | 50 | 100 |
Assuming that the reserve prices of A and B are both 50, the bid of the bidder 0 is the reserve price, and the hierarchical traversal algorithm calls: in the first layer, the auction owner 1 is the only one who bids more than 100 for the binding data (a, B), and the allocation algorithm of the i-th layer is executed to determine an allocation pattern G and the payment price of the auction owner 1: the distribution of the binding data (a, B) to the bidder 1 is the best way to distribute; then he should have a corresponding payment of 100-0-100 (when auction person 1 does not participate a, B is given number 0, so 100); then, recursively executing a second layer of algorithms, in which the bids of the auction participants 1, 2, 3 are all larger than a certain binding data (A or B), and obtaining an allocation mode of allocating A to 1 and B to 2; the payment of the auction player 1 is: the recursive call stops when (80+60) - (80+0) ═ 60, and the third layer is not entered because the preset traversal stop condition is satisfied. There are two consequences, from which a more beneficial solution for the auctioneer 1 needs to be selected, the revenue function of the auctioneer needs to be used: ux is E-P where E is the real estimate of the data assigned to him by the auctioneer x and P is the payment price for these data. The first result U110-. By incentive compatible, it is meant that the auctioneer does not hide their own motivation for the actual valuation of the goods, i.e. they give their own actual quotes.
It should be noted that the present embodimentThe payment price Px of an auction x for a certain binding data S assigned to it is not less than the reserve price r (S) of S. And (3) proving that:
considering another effective assignment G in SG, the only difference from G is that S is assigned to the auction player No. 0, so the formula sigma can be deducedx≠yVy(G)＝∑x≠yVy(G*) + R (S) due to
Is a distribution mode for maximizing social surplus when the auction participants x do not participate in the auction, so a formula can be obtained
This can be deduced:
on the basis, the characteristic that the multi-anonymous identity bidding attack is prevented is achieved, namely, any one bidder cannot improve the yield of the bidder through the multiple anonymous identities. And (3) proving that: assuming that an auctioneer x applies for two anonymous identities x 'and x', bound data S are respectively auctioned at layer ix'And Sx”The corresponding payment price is Px'And Px”. As can be seen from the foregoing, there is Px'≥R(Sx') And Px”≥R(Sx”). According to the data layer protocol, it is known that there is a bundled data set D in a lower data layer jjContaining the union of the two binding data, i.e.
So that S is Sx'∪Sx”Since it has been assumed that x is auctioned to binding data S at layer ix'And Sx”According to the hierarchy traversal algorithm, at the jth layer, the bidding price of any auction player is not larger than or equal to any binding The reserve price of the data. If the binding data S are directly auctioned on the j-th layer by the assumption that x is the payment price of the binding data S
Where M is a set containing data of all sizes, it should be noted that if an auction partner x only bids on S, only one person bids more than the reserve price in the j-th layer, and all data are assigned to auction partner 0 under the condition that x does not participate, so that some data are assigned
In the case of x participation, R (S) sigma is subtractedx≠yVy(G*) R (m) -r(s). Thus, it can be deduced that: px＝R(S)＝R(Sx')+R(Sx”)≤Px'+Px”The data S needed by the auctioneer x is separately auctioned by the auctioneer x through a plurality of anonymous identities, and the price needed to be paid is not lower than that needed by the direct auction S, which means that the x has no incentive for carrying out the multi-anonymous identity auction attack and the card is over.
Further, the present embodiment may satisfy the incentive compatibility property that any bidder cannot earn higher revenue by placing bids other than their true valuation. And (3) proving that: the discussion can be divided into two cases.
Case 1: bidder x wants to obtain a higher profit by raising his bid. Suppose that data is distributed at layer i when x's bid is his true valuation. After x raises its own bid, if it is still distributed in the data layer i, it can be known from the above price payment calculation formula that the payment price of x is independent of the bid of x, so obviously the payment price of x remains unchanged, and x does not obtain higher profit; after x raises its own bid, if the allocation is performed in a lower data layer j because x raises its bid, for any binding data S in the j-th layer, x must make its true estimate less than the reserve price r (S) of S, otherwise, when x bids as true estimate, allocation is performed in the j-th layer without falling to the i-th layer, which is inconsistent with the assumption. And the payment price Px of the bidder x to S is more than or equal to R (S) and more than the real valuation of x to S, which means that x can only obtain a negative benefit by increasing the bid. Thus, x has no incentive to raise its own bid.
Case 2: bidder x wants to obtain a higher profit by lowering his bid. Suppose that when x bids for his true valuation, data is distributed at layer i, and the gain obtained is Ui. After x lowers its own bid, if it is still distributed in the data layer i, the payment price of x is independent of the bid of x, so obviously the payment price of x remains unchanged, and x does not obtain higher profit; when x lowers its own bid, it is the only one bidder that has a bid greater than or equal to the reserve price r (S) of a bundle of data S and lowers its own bid below r (S) to allow the auction to distribute and receive the avails U at a higher data level jj. The following is divided into two cases: x can still be assigned to the data. In such a case, when the bid of x is the real estimate, the first condition of the hierarchical traversal algorithm is satisfied at the ith layer, and the algorithm recursively calculates to the jth layer to obtain the profit U of the auction man xj', and satisfy Ui≥Uj'. Since x is paid independently of x's bid, the price paid at x at level j is unchanged, so there is Uj＝Uj'≤UiX does not yield higher yields. x is not assigned to data. The gain for x is then 0. In summary, x has no incentive to lower its own bid. After the syndrome is confirmed.
The present embodiments may provide a system model for big data trading markets based on an auction mechanism. It consists of a total of three physical objects: data owners, data consumers, and third party platforms that act as auctioning parties. Specifically, the data owner holds various types of data from various fields, and can roughly be classified into three types: crowd sensing data, social data, and sensory data. A data consumer is a business or organization that has the ability to purchase large amounts of data from the hands of the data owner. The third-party platform can be a big data exchange, and provides a place where data transaction can be carried out for a data owner and a data consumer. The system model is a sealed one-sided auction model including one data owner as a seller and a plurality of data consumers as auctioneers. By sealed is meant that the bidder is not aware of any information about the bid by any other bidder than himself. Unilateral means that the auction has a "one-to-many" market structure, i.e., only one seller or only one auctioneer. In such auctions, the bidders bid on data of interest to them and submit bids in a sealed fashion to a third party platform that is the auctioning seller. Thereafter, the auctioneer may calculate the outcome of the auction, including the winner and the corresponding price paid, with the goal of maximizing social surplus. Crowd sensing refers to forming an interactive and participatory sensing network through the existing mobile equipment of people and releasing a sensing task to an individual or a group in the network to complete the sensing, so that professionals or the public are helped to collect data, analyze information and share knowledge.
It can be seen that the data transaction device disclosed in the embodiment of the present application includes: the auction data acquisition module is used for acquiring data to be auctioned and the reserve price of each binding data in the data to be auctioned; the data to be auctioned is obtained by data layering of a target data set by an auctioneer according to a data layer protocol, and in the data to be auctioned, a first data layer comprises a binding data set, the only element in the binding data set is the target data set, a union set of a plurality of elements in the binding data set in any data layer outside the first data layer exists in a data layer lower than the data layer, and any binding data does not exist in two different data layers at the same time; the auction price acquisition module is used for acquiring the auction price of the auctioneer aiming at the binding data; the auction data traversing module is used for traversing the data to be auctioned layer by layer from the first data layer; the auction data traversing module comprises an auction user screening submodule, an allocation mode determining submodule and a payment price calculating submodule, wherein the auction user screening submodule is used for screening auction users of which the auction prices are larger than or equal to the corresponding reserve prices in the current data layer, the allocation mode determining submodule is used for determining a target allocation mode corresponding to the current data layer, and the payment price calculating submodule is used for calculating the payment price corresponding to the screened auction users according to the target allocation mode; the payment price is a difference value between a first payment price and a second payment price, the first payment price is the sum of auction prices of the current auction participants in a target distribution mode corresponding to the current auction participants not participating in the auction, and the second payment price is the sum of auction prices of other auction participants except the current auction participants in the target distribution mode corresponding to the current auction participants participating in the auction; the traversal stop control module is used for stopping traversal when a preset traversal stop condition is reached; and the data final distribution module is used for determining a final distribution mode and a final payment price according to the traversal result and distributing the binding data to the corresponding auction players according to the final distribution mode. Therefore, data layering is carried out according to a data layer protocol, then data to be auctioned are traversed layer by layer in the transaction process, the final distribution mode and the final payment price are determined, and multi-anonymous identity bidding attack can be avoided, so that fairness and high efficiency of data transaction are guaranteed.
Referring to fig. 2, an embodiment of the present application discloses a data transaction method, including:
step S11: acquiring data to be auctioned and a reserve price of each binding data in the data to be auctioned; the data to be auctioned is obtained by data layering of a target data set by an auctioneer according to a data layer protocol, a first data layer of the data to be auctioned comprises a binding data set, the only element in the binding data set is the target data set, a union set of a plurality of elements in the binding data set in any data layer outside the first data layer exists in a data layer lower than the data layer, and any binding data does not exist in two different data layers simultaneously.
Step S12: and acquiring the auction price of the auctioneer for the binding data.
Step S13: traversing the data to be auctioned layer by layer from a first data layer, screening the auctioneers of which the auction prices are greater than or equal to the corresponding reserved prices in the current data layer, determining a target distribution mode corresponding to the current data layer, and calculating the payment price corresponding to the screened auctioneers according to the target distribution mode; the payment price is a difference value between a first payment price and a second payment price, the first payment price is the sum of auction prices of the auction participants in a target distribution mode corresponding to the situation that the current auction participants do not participate in the auction, and the second payment price is the sum of auction prices of other auction participants except the current auction participants in the target distribution mode corresponding to the situation that the current auction participants participate in the auction.
In a specific implementation manner, the present embodiment may determine the target allocation manner according to a preset data allocation protocol;
wherein the data distribution protocol comprises: binding data in any one binding data set can only be distributed to the same auction player; two binding data belonging to different binding sets of the data are prohibited from being allocated to the same auction player; any data not belonging to the binding data is assigned to the preset auction participants.
And, in particular embodiments, according to a formula
Determining the target distribution mode corresponding to the current data layer;
wherein G is*SG for determining the target distribution modeiI represents the ith layer of data, N is a set of auction participants, and N comprises all auction participants, sigmax∈N∪{0}Vx(G) For the sum of the payment prices of the bidders in distribution mode G, V is used when bidder x is not allocated any datax(G)＝0。
Step S14: and when a preset traversal stop condition is reached, stopping traversal.
In a specific implementation manner, if the number of the bidders having the auction prices greater than or equal to the corresponding reserve prices in the current data layer reaches a preset threshold, the traversal is stopped.
Step S15: and determining a final distribution mode and a final payment price according to the traversal result, and distributing the binding data to the corresponding auction participants according to the final distribution mode.
In a specific embodiment, if a unique first bidder with a price greater than or equal to the corresponding reserve price exists in any data layer and the price of a second bidder other than the first bidder exists in another data layer in a subsequent traversal process, distributing corresponding binding data to the first bidder, and determining a final price of the first bidder according to the price of the first competitor and the payment price calculated in the traversal process of each layer;
wherein the first and second bidders are not preset bidders.
Therefore, the data to be auctioned and the reserve price of each binding data in the data to be auctioned are obtained in the embodiment of the application; the data to be auctioned is obtained by data layering of a target data set by an auctioneer according to a data layer protocol, and in the data to be auctioned, a first data layer comprises a binding data set, the only element in the binding data set is the target data set, a union set of a plurality of elements in the binding data set in any data layer outside the first data layer exists in a data layer lower than the data layer, and any binding data does not exist in two different data layers at the same time; acquiring an auction price of an auctioneer for the binding data; traversing the data to be auctioned layer by layer from a first data layer, screening the auctioneers of which the auction prices are greater than or equal to the corresponding reserved prices in the current data layer, determining a target distribution mode corresponding to the current data layer, and calculating the payment price corresponding to the screened auctioneers according to the target distribution mode; the payment price is a difference value between a first payment price and a second payment price, the first payment price is the sum of auction prices of the auction participants in a target distribution mode corresponding to the situation that the current auction participants do not participate in the auction, and the second payment price is the sum of auction prices of other auction participants except the current auction participants in the target distribution mode corresponding to the situation that the current auction participants participate in the auction; stopping traversing when a preset traversing stopping condition is reached; and determining a final distribution mode and a final payment price according to the traversal result, and distributing the binding data to the corresponding auction participants according to the final distribution mode. Therefore, data layering is carried out according to a data layer protocol, then data to be auctioned are traversed layer by layer in the transaction process, the final distribution mode and the final payment price are determined, and multi-anonymous identity bidding attack can be avoided, so that fairness and high efficiency of data transaction are guaranteed.
Referring to fig. 3, an embodiment of the present application discloses a data transaction apparatus, which includes a processor 21 and a memory 22; wherein, the memory 22 is used for saving computer programs; the processor 21 is configured to execute the computer program to implement the data transaction method disclosed in the foregoing embodiment.
For the specific process of the data transaction method, reference may be made to the corresponding contents disclosed in the foregoing embodiments, and details are not repeated herein.
Referring to fig. 4, an embodiment of the present application discloses an electronic terminal 20, which includes a processor 21 and a memory 22 disclosed in the foregoing embodiments. For the steps that the processor 21 can specifically execute, reference may be made to corresponding contents disclosed in the foregoing embodiments, and details are not described herein again.
Further, the electronic terminal 20 in this embodiment may further specifically include a power supply 23, a communication interface 24, an input/output interface 25, and a communication bus 26; the power supply 23 is configured to provide a working voltage for each hardware device on the terminal 20; the communication interface 24 can create a data transmission channel with an external device for the terminal 20, and a communication protocol followed by the communication interface is any communication protocol applicable to the technical solution of the present application, and is not specifically limited herein; the input/output interface 25 is configured to obtain external input data or output data to the outside, and a specific interface type thereof may be selected according to a specific application requirement, which is not specifically limited herein.
Further, the embodiment of the present application also discloses a computer readable storage medium for storing a computer program, wherein the computer program is executed by a processor to implement the data transaction method disclosed in the foregoing embodiment.
For the specific process of the data transaction method, reference may be made to the corresponding contents disclosed in the foregoing embodiments, and details are not repeated herein.
The embodiments are described in a progressive manner, each embodiment focuses on differences from other embodiments, and the same or similar parts among the embodiments are referred to each other. The method disclosed by the embodiment corresponds to the device disclosed by the embodiment, so that the description is simple, and the relevant points can be referred to the description of the method part.
The steps of a method or algorithm described in connection with the embodiments disclosed herein may be embodied directly in hardware, in a software module executed by a processor, or in a combination of the two. A software module may reside in Random Access Memory (RAM), memory, Read Only Memory (ROM), electrically programmable ROM, electrically erasable programmable ROM, registers, hard disk, a removable disk, a CD-ROM, or any other form of storage medium known in the art.
The data transaction device, method, device and medium provided by the present application are introduced in detail, and a specific example is applied in the description to explain the principle and the implementation of the present application, and the description of the above embodiment is only used to help understand the method and the core idea of the present application; meanwhile, for a person skilled in the art, according to the idea of the present application, there may be variations in the specific embodiments and the application scope, and in summary, the content of the present specification should not be construed as a limitation to the present application.
Claims (10)
1. A data transaction apparatus, comprising:
the auction data acquisition module is used for acquiring data to be auctioned and the reserve price of each binding data in the data to be auctioned; the data to be auctioned is obtained by data layering of a target data set by an auctioneer according to a data layer protocol, and in the data to be auctioned, a first data layer comprises a binding data set, the only element in the binding data set is the target data set, a union set of a plurality of elements in the binding data set in any data layer outside the first data layer exists in a data layer lower than the data layer, and any binding data does not exist in two different data layers at the same time;
The auction price acquisition module is used for acquiring the auction price of the auctioneer aiming at the binding data;
the auction data traversing module is used for traversing the data to be auctioned layer by layer from the first data layer; the auction data traversing module comprises an auction user screening submodule, an allocation mode determining submodule and a payment price calculating submodule, wherein the auction user screening submodule is used for screening auction users of which the auction prices are larger than or equal to the corresponding reserve prices in the current data layer, the allocation mode determining submodule is used for determining a target allocation mode corresponding to the current data layer, and the payment price calculating submodule is used for calculating the payment price corresponding to the screened auction users according to the target allocation mode; the payment price is a difference value between a first payment price and a second payment price, the first payment price is the sum of auction prices of the current auction participants in a target distribution mode corresponding to the current auction participants not participating in the auction, and the second payment price is the sum of auction prices of other auction participants except the current auction participants in the target distribution mode corresponding to the current auction participants participating in the auction;
The traversal stop control module is used for stopping traversal when a preset traversal stop condition is reached;
and the data final distribution module is used for determining a final distribution mode and a final payment price according to the traversal result and distributing the binding data to the corresponding auction players according to the final distribution mode.
2. The data transaction apparatus of claim 1,
the traversal stop control module is specifically configured to stop traversal if the number of the bidders having the auction prices greater than or equal to the corresponding reserve prices in the current data layer reaches a preset threshold.
3. The data transaction apparatus of claim 1,
the data final distribution module is specifically configured to, if a unique first bidder having a price greater than or equal to the corresponding reserve price exists in any one data layer, and in a subsequent traversal process, a price of a second bidder other than the first bidder existing in another data layer is greater than or equal to the corresponding reserve price, distribute corresponding binding data to the first bidder, and determine a final price of the first bidder according to the price of the first competitor and the payment price calculated in the traversal process of each layer;
Wherein the first and second bidders are not preset bidders.
4. The data transaction apparatus of claim 1,
the distribution mode determining submodule is specifically used for determining the target distribution mode according to a preset data distribution protocol;
wherein the data distribution protocol comprises: binding data in any one binding data set can only be distributed to the same auction player; two binding data belonging to different binding sets of the data are prohibited from being allocated to the same auction player; any data not belonging to the binding data is assigned to the preset auction participants.
5. The data transaction apparatus of claim 1,
the allocation mode determining submodule is specifically used for determining the allocation mode according to a formula
Determining the target distribution mode corresponding to the current data layer;
wherein G is*SG for determining the target distribution modeiI represents the ith layer of data, N is a set of auction participants, and N comprises all auction participants, sigmax∈N∪{0}Vx(G) For the sum of the payment prices of the bidders in distribution mode G, V is used when bidder x is not allocated any data x(G)＝0。
6. A method of data transaction, comprising:
acquiring data to be auctioned and a reserve price of each binding data in the data to be auctioned; the data to be auctioned is obtained by data layering of a target data set by an auctioneer according to a data layer protocol, and in the data to be auctioned, a first data layer comprises a binding data set, the only element in the binding data set is the target data set, a union set of a plurality of elements in the binding data set in any data layer outside the first data layer exists in a data layer lower than the data layer, and any binding data does not exist in two different data layers at the same time;
acquiring an auction price of an auctioneer for the binding data;
traversing the data to be auctioned layer by layer from a first data layer, screening the auctioneers of which the auction prices are greater than or equal to the corresponding reserved prices in the current data layer, determining a target distribution mode corresponding to the current data layer, and calculating the payment price corresponding to the screened auctioneers according to the target distribution mode; the payment price is a difference value between a first payment price and a second payment price, the first payment price is the sum of auction prices of the auction participants in a target distribution mode corresponding to the situation that the current auction participants do not participate in the auction, and the second payment price is the sum of auction prices of other auction participants except the current auction participants in the target distribution mode corresponding to the situation that the current auction participants participate in the auction;
Stopping traversing when a preset traversing stopping condition is reached;
and determining a final distribution mode and a final payment price according to the traversal result, and distributing the binding data to the corresponding auction participants according to the final distribution mode.
7. The data transaction method of claim 6, wherein stopping traversal when a preset traversal stop condition is reached comprises:
and if the number of the auction participants of which the auction prices are greater than or equal to the corresponding reserve price in the current data layer reaches a preset threshold value, stopping traversing.
8. The data transaction method of claim 6, wherein determining the final distribution mode and the final payment price according to the traversal result comprises:
if a unique first bidder with a price greater than or equal to the corresponding reserve price exists in any data layer and the price of a second bidder other than the first bidder exists in another data layer in the following traversal process, distributing corresponding binding data to the first bidder, and determining the final price of the first bidder according to the price of the first competitor and the payment price calculated in the traversal process of each layer;
Wherein the first and second bidders are not preset bidders.
9. A data transaction device comprising a processor and a memory; wherein the content of the first and second substances,
the memory is used for storing a computer program;
the processor for executing the computer program to implement the data transaction method of any one of claims 6 to 8.
10. A computer-readable storage medium for storing a computer program, wherein the computer program, when executed by a processor, implements a data transaction method according to any one of claims 6 to 8.
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