CN111835510A - ETC safety management method - Google Patents
ETC safety management method Download PDFInfo
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- CN111835510A CN111835510A CN202010465654.7A CN202010465654A CN111835510A CN 111835510 A CN111835510 A CN 111835510A CN 202010465654 A CN202010465654 A CN 202010465654A CN 111835510 A CN111835510 A CN 111835510A
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- 238000007726 management method Methods 0.000 title claims abstract description 50
- 230000006378 damage Effects 0.000 claims abstract description 7
- 238000012545 processing Methods 0.000 claims description 17
- 238000012795 verification Methods 0.000 claims description 7
- 238000012360 testing method Methods 0.000 claims description 6
- 238000013144 data compression Methods 0.000 claims description 3
- 238000000034 method Methods 0.000 claims description 3
- 230000005540 biological transmission Effects 0.000 abstract description 5
- 238000004891 communication Methods 0.000 description 2
- 238000012986 modification Methods 0.000 description 2
- 230000004048 modification Effects 0.000 description 2
- 230000009286 beneficial effect Effects 0.000 description 1
- 230000007547 defect Effects 0.000 description 1
- 238000013461 design Methods 0.000 description 1
- 230000007717 exclusion Effects 0.000 description 1
- 230000004807 localization Effects 0.000 description 1
- 238000011084 recovery Methods 0.000 description 1
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- H—ELECTRICITY
- H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
- H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
- H04L9/00—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols
- H04L9/08—Key distribution or management, e.g. generation, sharing or updating, of cryptographic keys or passwords
- H04L9/0861—Generation of secret information including derivation or calculation of cryptographic keys or passwords
- H04L9/0869—Generation of secret information including derivation or calculation of cryptographic keys or passwords involving random numbers or seeds
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- G—PHYSICS
- G06—COMPUTING; CALCULATING OR COUNTING
- G06F—ELECTRIC DIGITAL DATA PROCESSING
- G06F21/00—Security arrangements for protecting computers, components thereof, programs or data against unauthorised activity
- G06F21/30—Authentication, i.e. establishing the identity or authorisation of security principals
- G06F21/31—User authentication
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- H—ELECTRICITY
- H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
- H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
- H04L63/00—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security
- H04L63/08—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security for authentication of entities
- H04L63/083—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security for authentication of entities using passwords
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- H—ELECTRICITY
- H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
- H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
- H04L9/00—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols
- H04L9/08—Key distribution or management, e.g. generation, sharing or updating, of cryptographic keys or passwords
-
- H—ELECTRICITY
- H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
- H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
- H04L9/00—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols
- H04L9/30—Public key, i.e. encryption algorithm being computationally infeasible to invert or user's encryption keys not requiring secrecy
-
- H—ELECTRICITY
- H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
- H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
- H04L9/00—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols
- H04L9/32—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols including means for verifying the identity or authority of a user of the system or for message authentication, e.g. authorization, entity authentication, data integrity or data verification, non-repudiation, key authentication or verification of credentials
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- Engineering & Computer Science (AREA)
- Computer Security & Cryptography (AREA)
- Computer Networks & Wireless Communication (AREA)
- Signal Processing (AREA)
- Theoretical Computer Science (AREA)
- Computing Systems (AREA)
- Computer Hardware Design (AREA)
- General Engineering & Computer Science (AREA)
- Software Systems (AREA)
- Physics & Mathematics (AREA)
- General Physics & Mathematics (AREA)
- Storage Device Security (AREA)
Abstract
The invention discloses an ETC safety management method.A password management module is arranged in ETC equipment and comprises a password algorithm, a key management module, a password protocol and a role management module, wherein the password algorithm selects an SM4 symmetric password algorithm, an SM2 asymmetric password algorithm and an SM3 hash password algorithm; the key management comprises key types, key generation and storage, key updating and revocation and key destruction, the key types comprise management keys and application keys, the management keys comprise key protection keys, device keys and administrator authentication keys, the application keys comprise user work keys, key encryption keys and session keys, and the role management comprises administrators and user roles. According to the invention, the password management module is arranged in the ETC, the data transmission is encrypted and decrypted by adopting a password algorithm, and the identity of an administrator is authenticated, so that the safety of the data transmission can be ensured.
Description
The technical field is as follows:
the invention belongs to the technical field of ETC (electronic toll collection) safety management, and particularly relates to an ETC safety management method.
Background art:
in recent years, the state vigorously advances policy implementation, deepens toll road system reform, and ETC systems are rapidly deployed and widely applied nationwide.
However, the ETC system based on wireless communication is just like the communication developed rapidly and the information security transmission encountered in the wide application of computer network, and faces huge information security problems, on one hand, the security defects from the network itself, such as insecurity of network protocol and insufficient protection measures of service data, and on the other hand, human factors, such as poor management, cause hacking. The network information security is related to the security of national ownership and the stability of society, and is related to the security of public and private property and personal privacy. The degree of informatization of the current society is continuously improved, the problem of network information safety is getting more and more severe, and a large amount of important data stored and transmitted in the network needs to be effectively protected.
In order to ensure the data security of the ETC system, sensitive data needs to be transmitted and stored in an encryption mode. The safety solution scheme based on ZYNQ framework design and applicable to the ETC system draws attention to the localization trend of commercial passwords, focuses on the key application industry of the ETC system, and effectively solves the safety problem of the ETC system.
The information disclosed in this background section is only for enhancement of understanding of the general background of the invention and should not be taken as an acknowledgement or any form of suggestion that this information forms the prior art already known to a person skilled in the art.
The invention content is as follows:
the present invention is directed to providing an ETC security management method, which overcomes the above-mentioned drawbacks of the prior art.
In order to achieve the purpose, the technical scheme adopted by the invention is as follows:
a password management module is arranged in an ETC device, the password management module comprises a password algorithm, a key management, a password protocol and a role management, and the password algorithm selects an SM4 symmetric password algorithm, an SM2 asymmetric password algorithm and an SM3 hash password algorithm; the key management comprises key types, key generation and storage, key updating and revocation and key destruction, the key types comprise management keys and application keys, the management keys comprise key protection keys, device keys and administrator authentication keys, the application keys comprise user work keys, key encryption keys and session keys, and the role management comprises administrators and user roles.
The SM4 symmetric cryptographic algorithm has a key length of 128 bits and a packet length of 128 bits, and is used for encrypting and decrypting data and protecting the key; the SM2 asymmetric cryptographic algorithm has a secret key length of 256 bits, and is used for generating a signature, verifying the signature and distributing a symmetric cryptographic algorithm secret key; the SM3 hash cipher algorithm is used to compress messages of arbitrary length into message digests.
The key protection key is used for encrypting and storing a key; the device key is used for issuing an administrator certificate and verifying the identity of the administrator; the administrator authentication key is used for administrator identity authentication and operation signature; the user work key is stored and accessed in an index mode; the key encryption key is used for protecting a session key; the session key is used for data encryption and decryption and data compression operation of the right key.
The destroying of the secret key comprises two modes of destroying by a software mode and destroying by a manual mode.
The password module carries out correctness verification on a password algorithm before starting, and the verification method comprises the following steps:
1) encrypting and decrypting the test case data, and if the processing result is matched with the expected result, continuing to send the random data D for encrypting and decrypting; if the processing result is not matched with the expected result, an alarm prompt is sent out;
2) if the processing result is equal to the random data D, the random data is used for encryption and decryption again for more than 100 times, if the processing result is equal to the random data every time, the test is ended, and if the processing result is not equal to the random data, an alarm prompt is sent out.
The cryptographic protocol is as follows:
1) during initialization, the intelligent password key generates a pair of SM2 keys as an administrator authentication key, the administrator authentication key is stored in the intelligent password key, and the private key of the intelligent password key is not allowed to be exported;
2) deriving a public key of an administrator authentication key from the intelligent password key, signing by using an equipment key of the password module to generate an administrator certificate, storing the administrator certificate in the password module, and simultaneously writing the administrator certificate into the intelligent password key;
3) when the identity is authenticated, the password module reads the administrator certificate from the intelligent password key, verifies the legality of the certificate by using the equipment key, and checks whether the certificate exists in the password module;
4) the password module generates a random number and requires the intelligent password key to sign the random number;
5) the intelligent password key signs the random number by using a private key of the administrator authentication key and returns a signature result;
6) the password module verifies the correctness of the signature result by using a public key of the administrator authentication key;
7) all the steps are passed, and the identity of the administrator is legal.
One aspect of the technical scheme adopted by the invention has the following beneficial effects:
according to the invention, a password management module is arranged in the ETC, an SM4 symmetric password algorithm, an SM2 asymmetric password algorithm and an SM3 hash password algorithm are adopted to carry out encryption and decryption processing on data transmission, and the correctness of the password algorithm is verified, so that the correctness of the algorithm is ensured; in addition, the password protocol management is adopted to authenticate the identity of the administrator, so that the safety of the protocol can be ensured.
Description of the drawings:
FIG. 1 is a flow of verification of correctness of a cryptographic algorithm according to the present invention.
The specific implementation mode is as follows:
the following detailed description of specific embodiments of the present invention is provided, but it should be understood that the scope of the present invention is not limited by the specific embodiments.
Throughout the specification and claims, unless explicitly stated otherwise, the word "comprise", or variations such as "comprises" or "comprising", will be understood to imply the inclusion of a stated element or component but not the exclusion of any other element or component.
As shown in fig. 1, in an ETC security management method, a cryptographic management module is embedded in an ETC device, the cryptographic management module includes a cryptographic algorithm, a key management, a cryptographic protocol and a role management, and the cryptographic algorithm is selected from an SM4 symmetric cryptographic algorithm, an SM2 asymmetric cryptographic algorithm and an SM3 hash cryptographic algorithm; the key management comprises key types, key generation and storage, key updating and revocation and key destruction, the key types comprise management keys and application keys, the management keys comprise key protection keys, device keys and administrator authentication keys, the application keys comprise user work keys, key encryption keys and session keys, and the role management comprises administrators and user roles.
The SM4 symmetric cryptographic algorithm has a key length of 128 bits and a packet length of 128 bits, and is used for encrypting and decrypting data and protecting the key; the SM2 asymmetric cryptographic algorithm has a secret key length of 256 bits, and is used for generating a signature, verifying the signature and distributing a symmetric cryptographic algorithm secret key; the SM3 hash cipher algorithm is used to compress messages of arbitrary length into message digests.
The key protection key is used for encrypting and storing a key; the device key is used for issuing an administrator certificate and verifying the identity of the administrator; the administrator authentication key is used for administrator identity authentication and operation signature; the user work key is stored and accessed in an index mode; the key encryption key is used for protecting a session key; the session key is used for data encryption and decryption and data compression operation of the right key.
The key destruction comprises two modes of software mode destruction and manual mode destruction, when the key is destroyed in a specific software mode, the password module is provided with a key removal command, and the specified key can be removed in a software mode by means of the command; when the secret key is destroyed manually, the cipher module is provided with a secret key destroying switch, and all the ciphers in the secret key storage component can be eliminated by pressing the secret key destroying switch.
The password module carries out correctness verification on a password algorithm before starting, and the verification method comprises the following steps:
1) encrypting and decrypting the test case data, and if the processing result is matched with the expected result, continuing to send the random data D for encrypting and decrypting; if the processing result is not matched with the expected result, an alarm prompt is sent out;
2) if the processing result is equal to the random data D, the random data is used for encryption and decryption again for more than 100 times, if the processing result is equal to the random data every time, the test is ended, and if the processing result is not equal to the random data, an alarm prompt is sent out.
The specific key is generated and stored as follows:
1) key protection key: the 128-bit symmetric key consists of two components, is generated by the cryptographic module during original initialization or recovery initialization, one component is stored in the boot UKEY, and the other component is stored in a security chip of the cryptographic module;
2) device key: the signature key pair is generated by a cipher module when equipment is initialized, the cipher module is in a ready state after the key is generated, a public key of the equipment can be led out to apply for a certificate to CA at any time in the state, the equipment encryption key pair is generated by a key management center, a private key of the equipment is protected by the equipment signature public key through a digital envelope and can be downloaded into the cipher module, the equipment key is encrypted by a key protection key, and an encrypted ciphertext is stored in FLASH of the cipher module;
3) administrator authentication key: the asymmetric key of the SM2 algorithm, one for each administrator, is generated by the intelligent password key, is stored in the intelligent password key and is used for administrator identity authentication and operation signature;
4) the application key is: the signature key pair is generated by a cryptographic module, a public key can be derived and signed by CA, and the encryption key pair is generated by a key management center, wherein a private key is protected by a corresponding signature public key through a digital envelope and downloaded into the cryptographic module, and a user key is encrypted by a key protection key and stored in FLASH of the cryptographic module;
5) key encryption key: the key encryption key is generated by a key management center, encrypted and protected by a public key of an equipment encryption key of a cryptographic module, downloaded into the cryptographic module, encrypted by a key protection key and stored in FLASH of the cryptographic module;
6) session key: and according to the temporary generation of the password operation, the password operation is packaged in a digital envelope and transmitted along with the message, and the password operation is deleted after the password operation is used up, and the session key is not stored in the password module.
The cryptographic protocol is as follows:
1) during initialization, the intelligent password key generates a pair of SM2 keys as an administrator authentication key, the administrator authentication key is stored in the intelligent password key, and the private key of the intelligent password key is not allowed to be exported;
2) deriving a public key of an administrator authentication key from the intelligent password key, signing by using an equipment key of the password module to generate an administrator certificate, storing the administrator certificate in the password module, and simultaneously writing the administrator certificate into the intelligent password key;
3) when the identity is authenticated, the password module reads the administrator certificate from the intelligent password key, verifies the legality of the certificate by using the equipment key, and checks whether the certificate exists in the password module;
4) the password module generates a random number and requires the intelligent password key to sign the random number;
5) the intelligent password key signs the random number by using a private key of the administrator authentication key and returns a signature result;
6) the password module verifies the correctness of the signature result by using a public key of the administrator authentication key;
7) all the steps are passed, and the identity of the administrator is legal.
According to the invention, a password management module is arranged in the ETC, the SM4 symmetric password algorithm, the SM2 asymmetric password algorithm and the SM3 hash password algorithm are adopted to carry out encryption and decryption processing on data transmission, and the password protocol management is adopted to carry out authentication on the identity of an administrator, so that the safety of the protocol can be ensured.
The foregoing descriptions of specific exemplary embodiments of the present invention have been presented for purposes of illustration and description. It is not intended to limit the invention to the precise form disclosed, and obviously many modifications and variations are possible in light of the above teaching. The exemplary embodiments were chosen and described in order to explain certain principles of the invention and its practical application to enable one skilled in the art to make and use various exemplary embodiments of the invention and various alternatives and modifications as are suited to the particular use contemplated. It is intended that the scope of the invention be defined by the claims and their equivalents.
Claims (6)
1. An ETC safety management method is characterized in that: a password management module is arranged in the ETC equipment, the password management module comprises a password algorithm, key management, a password protocol and role management, and the password algorithm is selected from an SM4 symmetric password algorithm, an SM2 asymmetric password algorithm and an SM3 hash password algorithm; the key management comprises key types, key generation and storage, key updating and revocation and key destruction, the key types comprise management keys and application keys, the management keys comprise key protection keys, device keys and administrator authentication keys, the application keys comprise user work keys, key encryption keys and session keys, and the role management comprises administrators and user roles.
2. The ETC security management method according to claim 1, wherein: the SM4 symmetric cryptographic algorithm has a key length of 128 bits and a packet length of 128 bits, and is used for encrypting and decrypting data and protecting the key; the SM2 asymmetric cryptographic algorithm has a secret key length of 256 bits, and is used for generating a signature, verifying the signature and distributing a symmetric cryptographic algorithm secret key; the SM3 hash cipher algorithm is used to compress messages of arbitrary length into message digests.
3. The ETC security management method according to claim 1, wherein: the key protection key is used for encrypting and storing a key; the device key is used for issuing an administrator certificate and verifying the identity of the administrator; the administrator authentication key is used for administrator identity authentication and operation signature; the user work key is stored and accessed in an index mode; the key encryption key is used for protecting a session key; the session key is used for data encryption and decryption and data compression operation with the key.
4. The ETC security management method according to claim 1, wherein: the destroying of the secret key comprises two modes of destroying by a software mode and destroying by a manual mode.
5. The ETC security management method according to claim 1, wherein: the password module carries out correctness verification on a password algorithm before starting, and the verification method comprises the following steps:
1) encrypting and decrypting the test case data, and if the processing result is matched with the expected result, continuing to send the random data D for encrypting and decrypting; if the processing result is not matched with the expected result, an alarm prompt is sent out;
2) if the processing result is equal to the random data D, the random data is used for encryption and decryption again for more than 100 times, if the processing result is equal to the random data every time, the test is ended, and if the processing result is not equal to the random data, an alarm prompt is sent out.
6. The ETC security management method according to claim 1, wherein: the cryptographic protocol is as follows:
1) during initialization, the intelligent password key generates a pair of SM2 keys as an administrator authentication key, the administrator authentication key is stored in the intelligent password key, and the private key of the intelligent password key is not allowed to be exported;
2) deriving a public key of an administrator authentication key from the intelligent password key, signing by using an equipment key of the password module to generate an administrator certificate, storing the administrator certificate in the password module, and simultaneously writing the administrator certificate into the intelligent password key;
3) when the identity is authenticated, the password module reads the administrator certificate from the intelligent password key, verifies the legality of the certificate by using the equipment key, and checks whether the certificate exists in the password module;
4) the password module generates a random number and requires the intelligent password key to sign the random number;
5) the intelligent password key signs the random number by using a private key of the administrator authentication key and returns a signature result;
6) the password module verifies the correctness of the signature result by using a public key of the administrator authentication key;
7) all the steps are passed, and the identity of the administrator is legal.
Priority Applications (1)
| Application Number | Priority Date | Filing Date | Title |
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| CN202010465654.7A CN111835510A (en) | 2020-05-28 | 2020-05-28 | ETC safety management method |
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| CN202010465654.7A CN111835510A (en) | 2020-05-28 | 2020-05-28 | ETC safety management method |
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Cited By (4)
| Publication number | Priority date | Publication date | Assignee | Title |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| CN112883396A (en) * | 2021-02-27 | 2021-06-01 | 郑州信大捷安信息技术股份有限公司 | Trusted cryptographic module security management method and system |
| CN113783868A (en) * | 2021-09-08 | 2021-12-10 | 广西东信数建信息科技有限公司 | Method and system for protecting security of gate Internet of things based on commercial password |
| CN114022964A (en) * | 2021-09-24 | 2022-02-08 | 北京中交国通智能交通系统技术有限公司 | ETC application key updating method, device and system |
| CN115021927A (en) * | 2022-05-12 | 2022-09-06 | 中国科学院信息工程研究所 | Cipher machine cluster-oriented administrator identity control method and system |
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Cited By (8)
| Publication number | Priority date | Publication date | Assignee | Title |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| CN112883396A (en) * | 2021-02-27 | 2021-06-01 | 郑州信大捷安信息技术股份有限公司 | Trusted cryptographic module security management method and system |
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| CN113783868A (en) * | 2021-09-08 | 2021-12-10 | 广西东信数建信息科技有限公司 | Method and system for protecting security of gate Internet of things based on commercial password |
| CN113783868B (en) * | 2021-09-08 | 2023-09-01 | 广西东信数建信息科技有限公司 | Method and system for protecting Internet of things safety of gate based on commercial password |
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| CN114022964B (en) * | 2021-09-24 | 2024-05-17 | 北京中交国通智能交通系统技术有限公司 | ETC application key updating method, device and system |
| CN115021927A (en) * | 2022-05-12 | 2022-09-06 | 中国科学院信息工程研究所 | Cipher machine cluster-oriented administrator identity control method and system |
| CN115021927B (en) * | 2022-05-12 | 2024-04-16 | 中国科学院信息工程研究所 | Administrator identity management and control method and system for cryptographic machine cluster |
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Application publication date: 20201027 |