CN111832023B - SQL injection detection method and device based on C/S architecture - Google Patents

SQL injection detection method and device based on C/S architecture Download PDF

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CN111832023B
CN111832023B CN202010662451.7A CN202010662451A CN111832023B CN 111832023 B CN111832023 B CN 111832023B CN 202010662451 A CN202010662451 A CN 202010662451A CN 111832023 B CN111832023 B CN 111832023B
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injection detection
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CN111832023A (en
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刘佛福
李辉
林友钦
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Fujian Reliable Cloud Computing Technology Co.,Ltd.
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Xiamen Biebeyun Co ltd
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    • G—PHYSICS
    • G06—COMPUTING; CALCULATING OR COUNTING
    • G06F—ELECTRIC DIGITAL DATA PROCESSING
    • G06F21/00—Security arrangements for protecting computers, components thereof, programs or data against unauthorised activity
    • G06F21/50—Monitoring users, programs or devices to maintain the integrity of platforms, e.g. of processors, firmware or operating systems
    • G06F21/57—Certifying or maintaining trusted computer platforms, e.g. secure boots or power-downs, version controls, system software checks, secure updates or assessing vulnerabilities
    • G06F21/577—Assessing vulnerabilities and evaluating computer system security
    • G—PHYSICS
    • G06—COMPUTING; CALCULATING OR COUNTING
    • G06F—ELECTRIC DIGITAL DATA PROCESSING
    • G06F21/00—Security arrangements for protecting computers, components thereof, programs or data against unauthorised activity
    • G06F21/50—Monitoring users, programs or devices to maintain the integrity of platforms, e.g. of processors, firmware or operating systems
    • G06F21/55—Detecting local intrusion or implementing counter-measures
    • G06F21/56—Computer malware detection or handling, e.g. anti-virus arrangements
    • G06F21/562—Static detection
    • G06F21/563—Static detection by source code analysis
    • G—PHYSICS
    • G06—COMPUTING; CALCULATING OR COUNTING
    • G06F—ELECTRIC DIGITAL DATA PROCESSING
    • G06F21/00—Security arrangements for protecting computers, components thereof, programs or data against unauthorised activity
    • G06F21/50—Monitoring users, programs or devices to maintain the integrity of platforms, e.g. of processors, firmware or operating systems
    • G06F21/55—Detecting local intrusion or implementing counter-measures
    • G06F21/56—Computer malware detection or handling, e.g. anti-virus arrangements
    • G06F21/566—Dynamic detection, i.e. detection performed at run-time, e.g. emulation, suspicious activities
    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
    • H04L63/00—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security
    • H04L63/10—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security for controlling access to devices or network resources
    • H04L63/101—Access control lists [ACL]
    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
    • H04L63/00—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security
    • H04L63/14—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security for detecting or protecting against malicious traffic
    • H04L63/1441—Countermeasures against malicious traffic
    • H04L63/1466—Active attacks involving interception, injection, modification, spoofing of data unit addresses, e.g. hijacking, packet injection or TCP sequence number attacks

Abstract

The invention discloses a SQL injection detection method and a device thereof based on a C/S architecture, under the current complex network environment, the company data face various safety problems, wherein the common SQL injection is one of the safety problems which are required to be detected and processed in time every day. The invention mainly aims to provide a method which can quickly check out conventional SQL injection and adopt active strategies to process corresponding SQL injection threats and aims to improve the safety of the whole system.

Description

SQL injection detection method and device based on C/S architecture
Technical Field
The invention relates to the technical field of information security, in particular to attack detection aiming at Structured Query Language (SQL).
Background
The structured query language SQL injection vulnerability attack is one of the most popular and hot hacking methods in the Internet at present. An attacker inserts an SQL command into a query character string of a Web form submission or a page request to cheat a server to execute a malicious SQL command so as to acquire the management user authority of the database, and the server is controlled to be a system to acquire important information or confidential files by promoting the management authority of the database to the management authority of an operating system.
With the increasingly common occurrence of SQL injection, a detection method for SQL injection attacks becomes a hotspot of research in the industry. The traditional SQL injection detection and prevention method has a mode of minimizing the user authority for a database or a server, or uses a verifier to check user input data by using a predetermined rule. SQL injection detection can be divided into static and dynamic ways, and the focus of static analysis is to verify user input types in order to reduce the chance of SQL injection attacks, but Web applications need to be rewritten. For example, JDBC-Checker uses a Java string parser to verify user input types and prevent SQL injection attacks, but fails to detect anomalies if malicious input data is all of the correct type or syntax. The dynamic analysis is corresponding to the analysis performed after the Web application is scanned, and can locate the vulnerability from the SQL injection attack without performing any modification operation on the Web application. Such as a parss open source program, which uses a predetermined attack code scan and determines whether an HTTP response is successful, it can not only discover SQL injection attacks and other vulnerabilities in Web applications, but dynamic analysis methods do not require modification of the Web application relative to static analysis, but the discovered vulnerabilities must be fixed manually by developers and are not effectively detectable for types of vulnerabilities without predefined code attacks.
Disclosure of Invention
Aiming at the problems in the existing static analysis and dynamic analysis, the invention provides a SQL injection detection method and a device based on the combination of the static analysis and the dynamic analysis of a C/S architecture.
The SQL injection detection method specifically comprises the following steps:
receiving data submitted by a client; executing SQL injection detection on the data at the WebServer end, checking a blacklist stored at the WebServer end, and judging whether the IP address of the user side webpage is in the blacklist; if yes, access to all the requested URL addresses is prohibited; if not, detecting data submitted by the client based on a preset SQL injection detection algorithm, wherein the preset SQL injection detection algorithm is a detection algorithm combining static analysis and dynamic analysis; if the detection result is legal, allowing the website to be normally accessed; and if the detection result is illegal, forbidding to access all the requested URL addresses, updating the blacklist of the WebServer end, and adding the IP address to the blacklist.
Further, the detecting the data submitted by the client based on the preset SQL injection detection algorithm further includes: defining a function f for deleting the attribute value of the SQL query statement in the data; if the FQ is an SQL query, FDQ ═ F (FQ) refers to an SQL query in which the FQ deletes the string value after' ═ or in parenthesis.
Further, the detecting the data submitted by the client based on the preset SQL injection detection algorithm further includes: in the running process of the Web application program, traversing all fixed SQL query statements in the Web application program, wherein for each fixed SQL query statement FIX _ SQLi, the following steps are carried out: and f (FIX _ SQLi), obtaining the corresponding dynamic SQL query statement DYN _ SQLi.
The intermediate result is calculated according to the following formula:
result＝FIX_SQLi⊕DYN_SQLi
wherein ≧ is an exclusive-or operation; and judging whether the intermediate result is zero, if the result is 0, indicating that the data is normal, and otherwise, indicating that the data is abnormal.
Preferably, the deleting the attribute value of the SQL query statement in the data further includes: defining a function DelettFirst () for extracting and deleting a first character in an input SQL query statement and returning the character; defining two state constants IS _ START and IS _ END, representing the starting and ending states of the "'" symbol in the SQL query statement; defining an intermediate state variable Current _ Status, wherein the initialization value IS IS _ END; if the initial SQL query statement SQL is not empty, then the following operations are performed in a loop:
step S1, let temporary variable char ═ deletfrist (sql);
step S2, judging whether char is a "'" symbol, if yes, adding char into the variable output to be output and executing step S3, returning to step S1, otherwise, executing step S4;
step S3, determining whether the character before char IS a backslash "\", if yes, making Current _ Status ═ IS _ START, and returning to step S1;
step S4, judging whether the Current _ Status IS equal to IS _ END, if yes, adding char into the variable output to be output, returning to step S1, otherwise, executing step S5;
step S5, judging whether the previous character of char is a reverse slash' \\ \ or not, if yes, adding char into a variable output to be output;
and returning the variable output after the loop is finished as the SQL query statement after the attribute value is deleted.
Drawings
In order to more clearly illustrate the embodiments of the present invention or the technical solutions in the prior art, the drawings needed in the embodiments will be briefly described below, and it is obvious that the drawings in the following description are only some embodiments of the present invention, and it is obvious for those skilled in the art to obtain other drawings without creative efforts.
FIG. 1 is a flow chart of a current common SQL injection attack;
fig. 2 is a flow chart of SQL injection detection according to an embodiment of the invention.
Advantageous effects
Aiming at the syntactic characteristics of the SQL query statement, the attribute values found in the SQL query statement generally consist of the following forms: name ═ abc '(variable ═ string value') or index ═ 1 (variable ═ digital value). The SQL injection detection method provided by the application is combined with two modes of static analysis and dynamic analysis, the attribute values in SQL query are deleted in the static analysis, each SQL query statement is dynamically analyzed in the Web application running process, whether abnormity exists or not is judged by utilizing XOR operation, and the accuracy and the efficiency of the detection result are effectively improved. In addition, before the SQL query statement detection step combining the static analysis and the dynamic analysis, a blacklist mechanism is firstly used for screening obvious malicious websites and dynamically updating the blacklist, and after the blacklist mechanism is screened, an SQL injection detection algorithm is further used for detection, so that not only are unnecessary malicious detection steps reduced, but also the accuracy of SQL injection detection is further improved.
Detailed Description
The technical solutions in the embodiments of the present invention will be clearly and completely described below with reference to the drawings in the embodiments of the present invention, and it is obvious that the described embodiments are only a part of the embodiments of the present invention, and not all of the embodiments. All other embodiments that can be derived by one of ordinary skill in the art from the embodiments given herein are intended to be within the scope of the present invention.
SQL Injection (SQL Injection) vulnerability attacks are one of the most popular hacking methods on the web today. The attacker finally deceives the server to execute the malicious SQL command by inserting the SQL command into the query character string of the Web form submission or the page request. In order to acquire the management user authority of the database, the management user authority of the database is promoted to the management authority of the operating system, the operating system of the server is controlled, and important information or confidential files are acquired. Fig. 1 shows a currently common SQL injection attack flow.
As shown in fig. 2, the SQL injection detection apparatus based on the C/S architecture according to the embodiment of the present invention includes a receiving module and a detection module.
The receiving module is used for receiving data submitted by the client;
the detection module is positioned at the WebServer end and used for executing SQL injection detection on the data at the WebServer end; the detection module comprises a blacklist judgment module and an SQL injection detection algorithm module;
the blacklist judging module is used for checking a blacklist stored by the WebServer end, judging whether the IP address of the webpage of the user end is in the blacklist or not, and if so, forbidding to access all the requested URL addresses;
if not, detecting the data submitted by the client by the SQL injection detection algorithm module based on a preset SQL injection detection algorithm, wherein the preset SQL injection detection algorithm is a detection algorithm combining static analysis and dynamic analysis;
if the detection result is legal, allowing the website to be normally accessed;
and if the detection result is illegal, forbidding to access all the requested URL addresses, updating the blacklist of the WebServer end, and adding the IP address to the blacklist.
Further, the detecting the data submitted by the client based on the preset SQL injection detection algorithm further includes: defining a function f for deleting the attribute value of the SQL query statement in the data; if the FQ is an SQL query, FDQ ═ F (FQ) refers to an SQL query in which the FQ deletes the string value after' ═ or in parenthesis.
Further, the detecting the data submitted by the client based on the preset SQL injection detection algorithm further includes: in the running process of the Web application program, traversing all fixed SQL query statements in the Web application program, wherein for each fixed SQL query statement FIX _ SQLi, the following steps are carried out: and f (FIX _ SQLi), obtaining the corresponding dynamic SQL query statement DYN _ SQLi.
The intermediate result is calculated according to the following formula:
Figure BDA0002579115460000061
wherein
Figure BDA0002579115460000062
Is an exclusive or operation; and judging whether the intermediate result is zero, if the result is 0, indicating that the data is normal, and otherwise, indicating that the data is abnormal.
Algorithm 1 is a pseudo-code example of the SQL injection detection algorithm proposed by the present invention:
defining N to represent the total number of fixed SQL query statements in the Web application, FIX _ SQLi to represent the ith statement, DYN _ SQLi ═ f (FIX _ SQLi) to represent the dynamic SQL query statement generated by the ith statement, and f () to be a function for deleting the attribute values in the SQL query statement.
Figure BDA0002579115460000063
Figure BDA0002579115460000071
Preferably, the deleting the attribute value of the SQL query statement in the data further includes: defining a function DelettFirst () for extracting and deleting a first character in an input SQL query statement and returning the character; defining two state constants IS _ START and IS _ END, representing the starting and ending states of the "'" symbol in the SQL query statement; defining an intermediate state variable Current _ Status, wherein the initialization value IS IS _ END; if the initial SQL query statement SQL is not empty, then the following operations are performed in a loop:
step S1, let temporary variable char ═ deletfrist (sql);
step S2, judging whether char is a "'" symbol, if yes, adding char into the variable output to be output and executing step S3, returning to step S1, otherwise, executing step S4;
step S3, determining whether the character before char IS a backslash "\", if yes, making Current _ Status ═ IS _ START, and returning to step S1;
step S4, judging whether the Current _ Status IS equal to IS _ END, if yes, adding char into the variable output to be output, returning to step S1, otherwise, executing step S5;
step S5, judging whether the previous character of char is a reverse slash' \\ \ or not, if yes, adding char into a variable output to be output;
and returning the variable output after the loop is finished as the SQL query statement after the attribute value is deleted.
Algorithm 2 gives the execution code for the function f:
Figure BDA0002579115460000081
Figure BDA0002579115460000091
the following shows, as an example, the result after the above function f is executed, Nomal _ SQL stands for normal SQL query statement, and AbNomal _ SQL stands for abnormal SQL query statement:
FIX_SQL＝SELECT*FROM user WHERE userid＝’$id’AND pass＝’$password’DYN_SQL＝f(FIX_SQL)＝f(SELECT*FROM user WHERE userid＝’$id’AND pass＝’$password’)＝SELECT*FROM user WHERE userid＝”AND pass＝”
Nomal_SQL＝SELECT*FROM user WHERE userid＝’root’AND\pass＝’admin’SQL1＝f(Nomal_SQL)＝f(SELECT*FROM user WHERE userid＝’root’AND pass＝’admin’)＝SELECT*FROM user WHERE userid＝”AND pass＝”
AbNomal_SQL＝SELECT*FROM user WHERE userid＝’1’or‘1＝1’—‘AND pass＝’admin’
SQL2＝f(AbNomal_SQL)＝f(SELECT*FROM user WHERE id＝’1’or‘1＝1’—‘AND pass＝’admin’)＝SELECT*FROM user WHERE id＝”or“—‘’admin
the function of f () is applied no matter in normal SQL query statements or in abnormal SQL query statements, and for normal SQL query statements, the two statements before and after deletion of the attribute value should be logically the same, so that a logical xor operator can be used to determine whether the SQL statement is normal.
Finally, it should be noted that: it should be understood that the above examples are only for clearly illustrating the present application and are not intended to limit the embodiments. Other variations and modifications will be apparent to persons skilled in the art in light of the above description. And are neither required nor exhaustive of all embodiments. And obvious variations or modifications of this type are intended to be covered by the present invention.

Claims (6)

1. A SQL injection detection method based on a C/S architecture is characterized in that:
receiving data submitted by a client;
executing SQL injection detection on the data at the WebServer end, checking a blacklist stored at the WebServer end, and judging whether the IP address of the user side webpage is in the blacklist;
if yes, access to all the requested URL addresses is prohibited;
if not, detecting data submitted by the client based on a preset SQL injection detection algorithm, wherein the preset SQL injection detection algorithm is a detection algorithm combining static analysis and dynamic analysis;
if the detection result is legal, allowing the website to be normally accessed;
if the detection result is illegal, forbidding to access all the requested URL addresses, updating a blacklist of the WebServer end, and adding the IP address to the blacklist; the detecting the data submitted by the client based on the preset SQL injection detection algorithm further comprises the following steps: defining a function f for deleting the attribute value of the SQL query statement in the data; if the FQ is an SQL query statement, then FDQ ═ F (FQ), which is the SQL query statement after the FQ deletes the character string value 'after' or in parenthesis;
the detecting the data submitted by the client based on the preset SQL injection detection algorithm further comprises the following steps: in the running process of the Web application program, traversing all fixed SQL query statements in the Web application program, wherein for each fixed SQL query statement FIX _ SQLi, the following steps are carried out: f (FIX _ SQLi), obtaining a corresponding dynamic SQL query statement DYN _ SQLi;
the intermediate result is calculated according to the following formula:
result＝FIX_SQLi⊕DYN_SQLi
wherein ≧ is an exclusive-or operation;
and judging whether the intermediate result is zero, if the result is 0, indicating that the data is normal, and otherwise, indicating that the data is abnormal.
2. The SQL injection detection method of claim 1, wherein deleting attribute values of SQL query statements in data further comprises:
defining a function DelettFirst () for extracting and deleting a first character in an input SQL query statement and returning the character;
defining two state constants IS _ START and IS _ END, representing the starting and ending states of the "'" symbol in the SQL query statement;
defining an intermediate state variable Current _ Status, wherein the initialization value IS IS _ END;
if the initial SQL query statement SQL is not empty, then the following operations are performed in a loop:
step S1, let temporary variable char ═ deletfrist (sql);
step S2, judging whether char is a "'" symbol, if yes, adding char into the variable output to be output and executing step S3, returning to step S1, otherwise, executing step S4;
step S3, determining whether the character before char IS a backslash "\", if yes, making Current _ Status ═ IS _ START, and returning to step S1;
step S4, judging whether the Current _ Status IS equal to IS _ END, if yes, adding char into the variable output to be output, returning to step S1, otherwise, executing step S5;
step S5, judging whether the previous character of char is a reverse slash' \\ \ or not, if yes, adding char into a variable output to be output;
and returning the variable output after the loop is finished as the SQL query statement after the attribute value is deleted.
3. A device of SQL injection detection method based on the C/S architecture of claim 1, characterized in that:
the receiving module is used for receiving data submitted by the client;
the detection module is positioned at the WebServer end and used for executing SQL injection detection on the data at the WebServer end;
the detection module comprises a blacklist judgment module and an SQL injection detection algorithm module, wherein the blacklist judgment module is used for checking a blacklist stored by the WebServer end, judging whether the IP address of a webpage of a user end is in the blacklist, and if so, forbidding to access all the requested URL addresses;
if not, detecting the data submitted by the client by the SQL injection detection algorithm module based on a preset SQL injection detection algorithm, wherein the preset SQL injection detection algorithm is a detection algorithm combining static analysis and dynamic analysis;
if the detection result is legal, allowing the website to be normally accessed;
and if the detection result is illegal, forbidding to access all the requested URL addresses, updating the blacklist of the WebServer end, and adding the IP address to the blacklist.
4. The SQL injection detection apparatus according to claim 3, wherein the detecting data submitted by the client based on the preset SQL injection detection algorithm further comprises:
defining a function f for deleting the attribute value of the SQL query statement in the data; if the FQ is an SQL query, FDQ ═ F (FQ) refers to an SQL query in which the FQ deletes the string value after' ═ or in parenthesis.
5. The SQL injection detection apparatus according to claim 4, wherein the detecting data submitted by the client based on the preset SQL injection detection algorithm further comprises:
in the running process of the Web application program, traversing all fixed SQL query statements in the Web application program, wherein for each fixed SQL query statement FIX _ SQLi, the following steps are carried out: f (FIX _ SQLi), obtaining a corresponding dynamic SQL query statement DYN _ SQLi;
the intermediate result is calculated according to the following formula:
result＝FIX_SQLi⊕DYN_SQLi
wherein ≧ is an exclusive-or operation;
and judging whether the intermediate result is zero, if the result is 0, indicating that the data is normal, and otherwise, indicating that the data is abnormal.
6. The SQL injection detection apparatus of claim 4, wherein the deleting the attribute values of the SQL query statement in the data further comprises:
defining a function DelettFirst () for extracting and deleting a first character in an input SQL query statement and returning the character;
defining two state constants IS _ START and IS _ END, representing the starting and ending states of the "'" symbol in the SQL query statement;
defining an intermediate state variable Current _ Status, wherein the initialization value IS IS _ END;
if the initial SQL query statement SQL is not empty, then the following operations are performed in a loop:
step S1, let temporary variable char ═ deletfrist (sql);
step S2, judging whether char is a "'" symbol, if yes, adding char into the variable output to be output and executing step S3, returning to step S1, otherwise, executing step S4;
step S3, determining whether the character before char IS a backslash "\", if yes, making Current _ Status ═ IS _ START, and returning to step S1;
step S4, judging whether the Current _ Status IS equal to IS _ END, if yes, adding char into the variable output to be output, returning to step S1, otherwise, executing step S5;
step S5, judging whether the previous character of char is a reverse slash' \\ \ or not, if yes, adding char into a variable output to be output;
and returning the variable output after the loop is finished as the SQL query statement after the attribute value is deleted.
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