CN111784477A - Order agriculture three-way decision inducing method based on evolutionary game - Google Patents
Order agriculture three-way decision inducing method based on evolutionary game Download PDFInfo
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Abstract
The invention discloses an order agricultural three-way decision induction method based on an evolutionary game, which comprises the following steps of (1) establishing a three-way income game model: (2) determining the part of the income influence parameters which are invariable in the induction process, and taking the part as a non-variable; (3) determining a variable part of the profit influence parameters in the induction process, and taking the variable part as a variable; (4) starting the game, judging whether the probabilities of the three parties adopting positive decision behaviors are all 1, if so, outputting an induction result, and ending the game; otherwise, the variable parameters are changed and the game is played again. By utilizing the influence of different factors on the game induction result under the evolutionary game, parameters influencing the behavior of three parties in the operation of an order agricultural system can be effectively and quantitatively recommended, so that the three parties can be promoted to take active measures to complete transactions on the premise of ensuring the benefits of the three parties.
Description
Technical Field
The invention relates to the field of game methods, in particular to an order agriculture three-way decision inducing method based on an evolutionary game.
Background
With the development of agricultural technologies and the penetration of the internet in the agricultural field, many novel agricultural modes including order agriculture are tried in various regions of China, but are limited by frequent noncompliance of market participants, the agricultural market has large fluctuation, the default rate of order agriculture is high, the situation enables the society to have strong distrust for order agriculture, a lot of difficulties are brought to the popularization of order agriculture, and the order agriculture market in China is in the development bottleneck. At present, research on order agricultural modes at home and abroad mainly focuses on theoretical analysis on the aspects of avoiding risks, optimizing strategies in the process and the like, an evolutionary game system aiming at the overall market structure and comprising governments, farmers and enterprises is not constructed, the influence of various market income influence factors on the behavior decision of participants cannot be simulated, and guidance meeting the maximum benefit on the behaviors of the market participants cannot be conducted.
In recent years, domestic and foreign research achievements mainly focus on aspects of mode innovation, risk avoidance, three-party game and the like, certain achievements are obtained in the aspect of mutual game of market behavior subjects, and corresponding models are mainly established. On the basis of the research, a plurality of documents take the games of all parties participating in the order agricultural market as a main line, and a multi-party game model is constructed from the aspect of a mathematical model through simulation and research is developed. Fei Ye, Qiang Lin et al constructed a contractual agricultural supply chain model consisting of an agricultural enterprise and multiple risk aversive farmers. Yield and demand uncertainty and farmer risk are analyzed to circumvent optimal decisions on yield, wholesale price and retail price. Hongjun Peng et al, based on a three-level contractual agriculture consisting of risk aversive farmers, risk neutral suppliers and risk neutral distributors, used CVaR standards to describe risk evasion behaviors of farmers, derive optimal strategies, perform sensitivity analysis, and investigate the influence of government subsidies and other factors. The above method has several problems:
1. the established models are developed by taking the aspects of risk avoidance and supply chain optimization as cuts, and due to the fact that research action bodies lack comprehensiveness and the induction function of order agriculture three-way actions, the optimal solution is difficult to obtain for the structure optimization of an order agriculture market;
2. and since the above method focuses on after risk creation, no game is played from the market structure before risk creation;
3. the method is limited to theoretical research and cannot be applied to actual agricultural production cooperation of orders.
Disclosure of Invention
The invention aims to solve the problems in the prior art and provides an order agriculture three-way decision induction method based on an evolutionary game.
The method of the invention comprises the following steps:
(1) establishing a three-party income game model, combining three-party income under each behavior decision combination according to income parameters of three parties of governments, enterprises and agricultural cooperative agencies to obtain an income matrix, and establishing a three-party complex braking force system according to the income matrix:
(2) determining the part of the income influence parameters which are invariable in the induction process, and taking the part as a non-variable;
(3) determining a variable part of the profit influence parameters in the induction process, and taking the variable part as a variable;
(4) starting the game, judging whether the probabilities of the three parties adopting positive decision behaviors are all 1, if so, outputting an induction result, and ending the game; otherwise, the variable parameters are changed and the game is played again.
The invention has the following beneficial technical effects:
(1) the evolutionary game model established by the invention has comprehensive parameter range, contains various factors influencing the income change in order agricultural markets by governments, agricultural cooperative agencies and enterprises, and has more accurate depiction on the behaviors of three parties in the evolutionary game. Meanwhile, the model can directly modify parameter data according to actual acquisition conditions and data to enable the model to adapt to the actual conditions of current research, so that the induction method has universality and has a certain decision induction function on different types of order agricultural systems under different conditions.
(2) The data importing step has strong operability, the data acquired from an order agricultural system can be directly imported into the evolutionary game model for evolutionary game induction analysis, and the operation is simple and easy.
(3) The invention clearly divides the income influencing factors into two parts according to the properties: the variable profit influence parameters and the invariable profit influence parameters enhance the pertinence of the induced behaviors and improve the efficiency of the evolutionary game through the division of the parameters.
(4) The game process of the invention is provided with the contrast group, the result is induced under the condition that the contrast group is taken as the parameter, the simulation result is compared with the contrast group, and the influence of the parameter on the evolutionary game system after being changed can be clearly known. And changing the profit influence parameters from 30% to 150% of the profit parameter values, changing the parameters at a speed of 10% each time, observing the change condition of the simulation result, and collecting the change range of the parameters as the recommendation range under the condition that the three-party decision in the simulation result is (1, 1, 1). After this operation is performed for each variable benefit influencing parameter, a selectable range of variation of each parameter under the condition of the example can be obtained, namely the induction result. The output variable parameter value range is applicable to governments, enterprises and agricultural cooperative three parties in order agricultural induction game systems, and in order to promote strategy recommendation of three parties for realizing active market attitude on the premise of guaranteeing benefits, the three parties can adjust own strategies according to induction results.
Drawings
FIG. 1 is a flow chart of the present invention;
FIG. 2 shows the induction results under the initial conditions;
FIG. 3 shows the simulation results when subsidies to agricultural cooperative were 30% of the original;
FIG. 4 shows the simulation results for the initial 40% subsidy of the agricultural cooperative;
FIG. 5 shows the results of the simulation of the initial 50% subsidy to the agricultural cooperative;
FIG. 6 shows the results of the simulation of the initial 60% subsidy to the agricultural cooperative;
FIG. 7 shows the results of the simulation of 70% of the initial subsidies to the agricultural cooperative;
FIG. 8 shows the results of the 80% initial subsidy to the agricultural cooperative;
FIG. 9 shows the results of the simulation of 90% of the initial subsidies to the agricultural cooperative;
FIG. 10 shows the results of the simulation of the initial 110% subsidy to the agricultural cooperative;
FIG. 11 shows the results of the simulation of the initial 120% subsidy to the agricultural cooperative;
FIG. 12 is the results of the simulation for the initial 130% subsidy of the agricultural cooperative;
FIG. 13 shows the results of the initial 140% simulation of the subsidy of the agricultural cooperative;
fig. 14 shows the simulation results when subsidies to agricultural cooperative were 150% of the initial subsidies.
Detailed Description
The following detailed description of embodiments of the present invention will be made with reference to the accompanying drawings and examples.
Referring to fig. 1, the present invention comprises the steps of:
(1) establishing a three-party income game model:
based on the actual market situation and the position of each party in the model and the mutual influence relationship among the parties, setting income parameters of three parties of government, enterprise and agricultural cooperative, as the initial value of the model running in the natural state, including:
government revenue I, social benefit I' under active government supervision, and cost k for active government supervision1Government governance cost k for misbehaviours2Policy subsidies r for government payments to agricultural collaborators and enterprises1、r2Penalty j charged by the government to agricultural collaborators and enterprises1、j2The income under the normal condition of the agricultural cooperative is Q1And the income under the normal condition of the enterprise is Q2The additional income obtained by the two parties when the agricultural cooperative society and the enterprise cooperate is delta E respectively1、ΔE2The input cost of the agricultural cooperative is C1The investment cost of the enterprise is C2"cost of risk of both agricultural and enterprise'1、C'2。
There are two types of government behavioral decisions: actively supervising the market (1), not actively supervising the market (0);
there are two types of behavioral decisions for enterprises: purchasing enough agricultural products (1) in time and not purchasing enough agricultural products (0) in time;
there are two types of agricultural cooperative behavioral decisions: submitting qualified agricultural products (1) according to the protocol in time, and submitting the qualified agricultural products (0) according to the protocol in time;
behavior selection matrix
The meanings are given in the following table:
and determining the three-party income under each behavior decision combination to obtain an income matrix S.
The correspondence between the revenue matrix and behavior selection is shown in the following table:
establishing a three-party copy driving system based on a profit matrix, wherein the three-party copy driving system comprises a profit function, an average profit expectation function and a copy dynamic equation under two decision results of the three parties;
① expected yield S when agricultural cooperative11The undesirable yield is S12Average expected profit is
S11＝yz(Q1+ΔE1+r1-C1)+y(1-z)(Q1+ΔE1-C1)+(1-y)z(Q1+r1-C1-C′1)+(1-y)(1-z)(Q1-C1-C′1)
S12＝yz(Q1-j1)+y(1-z)Q1+(1-y)z(Q1-j1)+(1-y)(1-z)Q1
The expected profit is S when the enterprises cooperate21The undesirable yield is S22Average expected profit is
S21＝zx(Q2+ΔE2+r2-C2)+x(1-z)(Q2+r2-C2-C′2)+(1-x)(1
-z)(Q2-C2-C′2)
S22＝zx(Q2-j2)+x(1-z)(Q2)+(1-x)z(Q2-j2)+(1-x)(1-z)(Q2)
Expected profit in government cooperation is S31The undesirable yield is S32Average expected profit is
S31＝xy(I+I′-k1-r1-r2)+x(1-y)(I+j2-k1-k2-r1)
+(1-x)y(I+j1-k1-k2-r2)+(1-x)(1-y)(I+j1+j2-k2)
S32＝xy(I)+x(1-y)(I-2k2)+(1-x)(1-y)(I-2k2)
Solving a replication dynamic equation F (x) of the decision revenue of the government, the enterprise and the cooperative:
agricultural cooperative:
an enterprise:
government:
constructing a three-party copy driving system;
wherein x, y and z respectively represent the probability of taking positive decision-making actions by agricultural cooperative, enterprises and governments.
(2) Determining an invariable part of the revenue influence parameters in the induction process, importing the part of the parameters into an induction system, taking the part of the parameters as a non-variable to help complete the induction process, and enabling the numerical value not to change any more; such parameters include: government revenue, social benefits under active government regulation, regulatory costs paid by active government regulation, and government governance costs for undesirable activities.
(3) Determining a variable part of the profit influence parameters in the induction process, and taking the variable part as a variable; such parameters include: government policy subsidy, government penalties for noncompliance, corporate social extra revenue, corporate social investment cost sum, corporate social noncompliance risk cost.
(4) And (4) starting a game:
and constructing a play game model, importing the value of the income parameter, and analyzing the factors influencing the three-party decision according to the model. The method comprises the following specific steps:
a. leading the initial value of the income parameter to obtain an original simulation result, and taking the result as a comparison group of the simulation result of the next step;
b. modifying the initial three-way behavior decision selection probability, carrying out a simulation experiment, and recording a simulation result;
c. and keeping the initial behavior selection probability unchanged, modifying various variable income influence factors one by one, then performing a simulation experiment again, recording the change of the three-party behavior selection tendency relative to a control group after modifying a certain factor, and analyzing the influence of the factor on the three-party behavior selection.
The method sets a contrast group in the game process, induces the result under the condition that the contrast group is taken as the parameter, compares the simulation result with the contrast group, and can clearly know the influence of the parameter on the evolutionary game system after the parameter is changed. And changing the profit influence parameters from 30% to 150% of the profit parameter values, changing the parameters at a speed of 10% each time, observing the change condition of the simulation result, and collecting the change range of the parameters as the recommendation range under the condition that the three-party decision in the simulation result is (1, 1, 1). After this operation is performed for each variable benefit influencing parameter, a selectable range of variation of each parameter under the condition of the example can be obtained, namely the induction result.
And judging a simulation result according to the operation of the previous step. If the result shows that the probability of taking positive decision actions by the three parties is 1, outputting an induction result, ending the game, wherein the induction result is the type of the variable gain influence parameters and the recommended change interval; and if the result shows that the probability that a certain party takes an active decision action is not 1, changing the numerical value of the variable parameter, and playing the game again until the value range of the parameter is covered.
The output variable parameter value range is applicable to governments, enterprises and agricultural cooperative three parties in order agricultural induction game systems, and in order to promote strategy recommendation of three parties for realizing active market attitude on the premise of guaranteeing benefits, the three parties can adjust own strategies according to induction results.
And (3) carrying out simulation induction on the three-party dynamic evolution game model of 'administrative agriculture and enterprise' by using matlab software, carrying out prediction simulation on the behavior decision of the participating main body according to the induction result, and proposing a proposal on the configuration of each income influence factor in the market. The values assigned to the revenue parameters are imported in this example as follows:
initial value table of decision influencing factors:
| factors of the fact | Variables of | Initial value of factor (million yuan) |
| Government active supervision and social benefit feedback | I' | 1 |
| The government separately gives subsidies of agricultural cooperative and enterprise policy | r1r2 | 0.3；0.2 |
| Penalties charged by the government to the cooperative and to the business respectively | j1j2 | 0.5；0.3 |
| Regulatory costs paid by government active regulation | k1 | 0.2 |
| The cooperation of both the agricultural and the enterprise brings extra income | ΔE1ΔE2 | 0.4；0.6 |
| Sum of investment costs of both sides of agriculture and enterprise | C1C2 | 1；1 |
| Enterprises undertake risk cost when agricultural cooperative does not do work | C'2 | 0.5 |
| Agricultural cooperative agent bears risk cost when enterprises are not cooperative | C'1 | 0.4 |
(1) Leading the initial value of the income parameter to obtain an original simulation result, and taking the result as a comparison group of the simulation result of the next step;
(2) and keeping the initial behavior selection probability unchanged, modifying various income influence factors one by one, then performing a simulation experiment again, recording the change of the selection tendency of the three-way behavior relative to the control group after modifying a certain factor, and analyzing the influence of the factor on the selection of the three-way behavior.
The method comprises the following specific steps:
keeping the initial parameters unchanged, importing the initial values of the parameters into matlab to carry out evolutionary game simulation of a comparison group, wherein the result shows that three parties will eventually adopt cooperation attitude according to the input of the income parameters of the initial values, and the result is shown in figure 2;
and under the condition that other parameters are not changed, analyzing the influence of policy subsidies respectively given to agricultural cooperative agencies and enterprises by governments on the simulation result of the evolutionary game. The original policy subsidy r1 of the agricultural cooperative was adjusted from 30% to 150% at a rate of 10% each time. The simulation results are shown in fig. 3 to 14:
and (4) inducing conclusion: in the evolution game simulation result of the order agricultural system, the strategy selection of three parties changes along with the change of the policy subsidy of the government to the agricultural cooperative, when r1 is lower than 70% of the initial value in the process that r1 is adjusted from 30% to 150% at the speed of 10% each time, the cooperative will of the agricultural cooperative is lower, in the process that 70% r1 is gradually increased to 120% r1, the agricultural cooperative keeps the will of adopting the cooperative attitude, and the cooperative probability is 1; therefore, for the policy subsidy facing the agricultural cooperative, the induction result, namely the recommended change interval is (70% -120%), and the government can adjust the amount of the subsidy in the interval.
Claims (7)
1. An order agriculture three-way decision inducing method based on an evolutionary game is characterized by comprising the following steps:
(1) establishing a three-party income game model, combining three-party income under each behavior decision combination according to income parameters of three parties of governments, enterprises and agricultural cooperative agencies to obtain an income matrix, and establishing a three-party complex braking force system according to the income matrix:
(2) determining the part of the income influence parameters which are invariable in the induction process, and taking the part as a non-variable;
(3) determining a variable part of the profit influence parameters in the induction process, and taking the variable part as a variable;
(4) starting the game, judging whether the probabilities of the three parties adopting positive decision behaviors are all 1, if so, outputting an induction result, and ending the game; otherwise, the variable parameters are changed and the game is played again.
2. The order agriculture three-way decision inducing method based on the evolutionary game as claimed in claim 1, wherein: the income parameters in the step (1) comprise government tax income I, social benefit I' under active government supervision and paying supervision cost k1Government governance cost k for misbehaviours2Policy subsidies r for government payments to agricultural collaborators and enterprises1、r2Penalty j charged by the government to agricultural collaborators and enterprises1、j2The income under the normal condition of the agricultural cooperative is Q1And the income under the normal condition of the enterprise is Q2The additional income obtained by the two parties when the agricultural cooperative society and the enterprise cooperate is delta E respectively1、ΔE2The input cost of the agricultural cooperative is C1The investment cost of the enterprise is C2"cost of risk of both agricultural and enterprise'1、C'2。
3. The order agriculture three-way decision inducing method based on the evolutionary game as claimed in claim 1 or 2, wherein: the three-party complex braking force system comprises a three-party respective income function, an average income expectation function and a duplicate dynamic equation.
4. The order agriculture three-way decision inducing method based on the evolutionary game as claimed in claim 3, wherein: the three-party respective income function and the average income expectation function are as follows:
the expected yield when the agricultural cooperative is S11The undesirable yield is S12Average expected profit is
The expected profit is S when the enterprises cooperate21The undesirable yield is S22Average expected profit is
Expectation of government cooperationBenefit is S31The undesirable yield is S32Average expected profit is
Wherein x, y and z respectively represent the probability of taking positive decision-making actions by agricultural cooperative, enterprises and governments.
5. The order agriculture three-way decision inducing method based on the evolutionary game as claimed in claim 4, wherein: the three-way complex braking force system is
6. The order agriculture three-way decision inducing method based on the evolutionary game as claimed in claim 2, wherein: the invariable income influence parameters comprise government policy subsidies, penalties are collected by the government on incoordination behaviors, extra income is generated by the cooperation of the enterprise cooperative, the sum of investment cost of the enterprise cooperative and cost of incoordination risk of the enterprise cooperative; and (3) the variable profit influence parameters comprise government policy subsidies, penalties are charged by the government for non-cooperative behaviors, extra profits are collaborated by the enterprise cooperative, the sum of investment costs of the enterprise cooperative and non-cooperative risk costs of the enterprise cooperative.
7. The order agriculture three-way decision inducing method based on the evolutionary game as claimed in any one of claims 1-6, wherein: the induction result is the type and the recommended change interval of the variable profit influence parameters.
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| CN108734621A (en) * | 2018-03-23 | 2018-11-02 | 江苏科技大学 | A kind of political affairs production, teaching & research collaborative innovation tripartite's evolutionary Game Analysis method |
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Application publication date: 20201016 |