CN111628959A - Large-scale unmanned aerial vehicle group security authentication mechanism based on random label - Google Patents

Large-scale unmanned aerial vehicle group security authentication mechanism based on random label Download PDF

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CN111628959A
CN111628959A CN201911145089.XA CN201911145089A CN111628959A CN 111628959 A CN111628959 A CN 111628959A CN 201911145089 A CN201911145089 A CN 201911145089A CN 111628959 A CN111628959 A CN 111628959A
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unmanned aerial
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CN111628959B (en
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钱红燕
刘亮君
胡峰
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Nanjing University of Aeronautics and Astronautics
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    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
    • H04L63/00—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security
    • H04L63/08—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security for authentication of entities
    • H04L63/0807—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security for authentication of entities using tickets, e.g. Kerberos
    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
    • H04L9/00—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols
    • H04L9/06—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols the encryption apparatus using shift registers or memories for block-wise or stream coding, e.g. DES systems or RC4; Hash functions; Pseudorandom sequence generators
    • H04L9/0643—Hash functions, e.g. MD5, SHA, HMAC or f9 MAC
    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
    • H04L9/00—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols
    • H04L9/08—Key distribution or management, e.g. generation, sharing or updating, of cryptographic keys or passwords
    • H04L9/0861—Generation of secret information including derivation or calculation of cryptographic keys or passwords
    • H04L9/0869—Generation of secret information including derivation or calculation of cryptographic keys or passwords involving random numbers or seeds
    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
    • H04L9/00—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols
    • H04L9/32—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols including means for verifying the identity or authority of a user of the system or for message authentication, e.g. authorization, entity authentication, data integrity or data verification, non-repudiation, key authentication or verification of credentials
    • H04L9/321—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols including means for verifying the identity or authority of a user of the system or for message authentication, e.g. authorization, entity authentication, data integrity or data verification, non-repudiation, key authentication or verification of credentials involving a third party or a trusted authority
    • H04L9/3213—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols including means for verifying the identity or authority of a user of the system or for message authentication, e.g. authorization, entity authentication, data integrity or data verification, non-repudiation, key authentication or verification of credentials involving a third party or a trusted authority using tickets or tokens, e.g. Kerberos
    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
    • H04L9/00—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols
    • H04L9/32—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols including means for verifying the identity or authority of a user of the system or for message authentication, e.g. authorization, entity authentication, data integrity or data verification, non-repudiation, key authentication or verification of credentials
    • H04L9/3236—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols including means for verifying the identity or authority of a user of the system or for message authentication, e.g. authorization, entity authentication, data integrity or data verification, non-repudiation, key authentication or verification of credentials using cryptographic hash functions
    • H04L9/3239—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols including means for verifying the identity or authority of a user of the system or for message authentication, e.g. authorization, entity authentication, data integrity or data verification, non-repudiation, key authentication or verification of credentials using cryptographic hash functions involving non-keyed hash functions, e.g. modification detection codes [MDCs], MD5, SHA or RIPEMD
    • G—PHYSICS
    • G05—CONTROLLING; REGULATING
    • G05D—SYSTEMS FOR CONTROLLING OR REGULATING NON-ELECTRIC VARIABLES
    • G05D1/00—Control of position, course, altitude or attitude of land, water, air or space vehicles, e.g. using automatic pilots
    • G05D1/10—Simultaneous control of position or course in three dimensions
    • G05D1/101—Simultaneous control of position or course in three dimensions specially adapted for aircraft
    • G05D1/104—Simultaneous control of position or course in three dimensions specially adapted for aircraft involving a plurality of aircrafts, e.g. formation flying
    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04B—TRANSMISSION
    • H04B7/00—Radio transmission systems, i.e. using radiation field
    • H04B7/14—Relay systems
    • H04B7/15—Active relay systems
    • H04B7/185—Space-based or airborne stations; Stations for satellite systems
    • H04B7/18502—Airborne stations
    • H04B7/18506—Communications with or from aircraft, i.e. aeronautical mobile service

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  • General Engineering & Computer Science (AREA)
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  • Mobile Radio Communication Systems (AREA)
  • Small-Scale Networks (AREA)

Abstract

The invention discloses a large-scale unmanned aerial vehicle group security authentication mechanism based on random labels, which adopts specific Hash and mapping processes, adds two random labels on a large-scale unmanned aerial vehicle group to verify between unmanned aerial vehicles and between the unmanned aerial vehicles and a ground station in real time, thereby protecting the reliability of the whole mobile ad hoc network. According to the determined label distributed to each unmanned aerial vehicle by the ground station, the uncertain label is calculated by adopting a matching method for verification, and the label has safety and unpredictability, so that an adversary can hardly deduce the uncertain label needing verification by the determined label. The invention has the advantages that: compared with the existing encryption algorithm, the Hash and the mapping encryption process can protect the confidential information carried by the unmanned aerial vehicle more simply and effectively, reduce the complexity of the algorithm, improve the efficiency of the whole task process and have practical feasibility.

Description

Large-scale unmanned aerial vehicle group security authentication mechanism based on random label
Technical Field
The invention belongs to the field of network communication, and particularly provides a large-scale unmanned aerial vehicle group security authentication mechanism based on a random tag, which is used for ensuring that the large-scale unmanned aerial vehicle group is difficult to intercept and decipher confidential information when executing tasks.
Background
The mobile ad hoc network technology is widely used for current unmanned aerial vehicle flight, and in the existing encryption algorithm design, the security of secret information transmitted from a transmitting unmanned aerial vehicle to the unmanned aerial vehicle is not generally considered, and most researches only consider the fixed position and the fixed quantity of the unmanned aerial vehicle, only a communication model in one direction is from the ground to the air, and the unmanned aerial vehicle can freely and flexibly move in a three-dimensional space.
A hash function, also known as a hashing algorithm, is a method of creating a small digital "fingerprint" from any kind of data. The hash function compresses a message or data into a digest so that the amount of data becomes small, fixing the format of the data. This function mixes the data shuffled and recreates a fingerprint called a hash value (or hash value). The hash value is typically represented by a short string of random letters and numbers. And a specific Hash and mapping process is adopted, and two random labels are added on a large-scale unmanned aerial vehicle cluster to carry out verification between unmanned aerial vehicles and between the unmanned aerial vehicles and a ground station in real time, so that the reliability of the whole mobile ad hoc network is protected. According to the determined label distributed to each unmanned aerial vehicle by the ground station, the uncertain label is calculated by adopting a matching method for verification, and the label has safety and unpredictability, so that an adversary can hardly deduce the uncertain label needing verification by the determined label.
Disclosure of Invention
The invention provides a large-scale unmanned aerial vehicle group security authentication mechanism based on random labels, aiming at the potential safety hazard intercepted and captured when most of the existing unmanned aerial vehicle group executes tasks.
The technical scheme of the invention is as follows:
a large-scale unmanned aerial vehicle group security authentication mechanism based on random labels comprises the following steps:
s1: when the unmanned aerial vehicle cluster controls a starting station A from the ground, the A allocates a determining label (label) 1, 2 and 3 to each unmanned aerial vehicle;
s2: after flying for a period of time, each unmanned aerial vehicle generates an uncertain label (label) 1 based on corresponding label1 through hashing, and performs inter-group authentication mutually;
s3: in the flight process of the unmanned aerial vehicle swarm, when the unmanned aerial vehicle swarm encounters the relay station B, the relay station B knows the mode of the ground station generating the close 2 as the relay station and the ground station are communicated with each other; therefore, the unmanned plane generates a label2 (hash, mapping) according to the label2, and the relay station B verifies the label 2; subsequent relay stations validate the ciabel 3, ciabel 4.
Further, a large-scale unmanned aerial vehicle group security authentication mechanism based on a random tag, where the step S1 specifically is:
s101: the unmanned plane pre-loads a plurality of mapping schemes, generates an uncertain label (label) by combining a plurality of local labels, selects discontinuous and disorganized header bits for each part label, and maps the discontinuous and disorganized header bits to the discontinuous and disorganized bits in the label;
s102: we store the mapping as an m-level tree; the internal nodes map to bits in each entry accordingly; leaf nodes correspond to partial tags.
Further, a large-scale unmanned aerial vehicle group security authentication mechanism based on a random tag, where the step S2 specifically is:
s201: let PktclabelIndicates the header marked with the label,
Figure BSA0000195361620000024
representing bits in the labeled tag, the length of which is represented by a 64-bit value; the ulabel generated by one UAV is validated by the other UAV, validating the formula as follows:
ulabel＝Hash(Sample(Pktclabel))；
wherein Hash (-) represents the SHA-256 Hash algorithm we employ;
s202: in that
Figure BSA0000195361620000025
Filling the tail end, firstly filling the first bit to 1, and then filling all bits to 0 to ensure that
Figure BSA0000195361620000026
The length satisfies that the remainder after modulus 512 is 448, and then the length is obtained
Figure BSA0000195361620000027
Handle
Figure BSA0000195361620000028
Is supplemented to
Figure BSA0000195361620000029
We get a list of messages;
s203: we split the message list into 16 large 32-bit end words W0，W1，...，W15The remaining 48 words W16，W17，...，W63Iteratively obtained by the following formulas:
Wt＝σ1(Wt-2)+Wt-7+σ0(Wt-2)+Wt-16；
s204: the algorithm based on 32-bit word operations utilizes 6 logic functions:
Figure BSA0000195361620000031
Figure BSA0000195361620000032
Figure BSA0000195361620000033
Figure BSA0000195361620000034
Figure BSA0000195361620000035
Figure BSA0000195361620000036
through mapping iteration, we get H1(ii) a By analogy, we get the last Hn, which is the last 256-bit message digest, i.e. the ulbel we need;
s205: if the unmanned aerial vehicle satisfies: firstly, the data packet comes from a correct previous hop node; secondly, the data packet carries the correct label generated by the unmanned aerial vehicle; the inter-cluster detection passes;
s206: if not, the system triggers an alarm with the universal wildcard rule.
Further, a large-scale unmanned aerial vehicle group security authentication mechanism based on a random tag, where the step S3 specifically is:
s301: the drone generates a label by combining several partial labels; for each partial tag, we select the discontinuous and shuffled header bits and map them to the discontinuous and shuffled bits in the ulabel; we store the mapping as an m-level tree; the internal nodes map to bits in each entry accordingly; leaf nodes correspond to partial tags;
s302: if the ulabel satisfies: firstly, the message serial number of the packet header is an h-bit string corresponding to a p-bit part label; secondly, the next hop is used for detecting the MPR sequence number; the unmanned aerial vehicle passes the detection of the ground station;
s303: if not, the system triggers an alarm with the universal wildcard rule.
The invention has the technical advantages that:
1. the information security of the unmanned aerial vehicle cluster system is protected under the condition of no high calculation amount and communication overhead;
2. the mobile unmanned aerial vehicle can also generate an uncertain label and carry out group verification and ground station verification by adopting two schemes of hashing and mapping;
3. compared with the existing encryption algorithm, the method can protect the confidential information carried by the unmanned aerial vehicle more simply and effectively, reduce the complexity of the algorithm, improve the efficiency of the whole task process, and has practical feasibility.
Drawings
FIG. 1 is a block diagram of the mechanism of the present invention.
Fig. 2 is a label iteration diagram.
Fig. 3 is a probability distribution of probability labels generated by (a) hashing.
FIG. 4 is a probability distribution of probability labels generated by the mapping of (b).
Fig. 5 is a time delay comparison with the original OLSR.
Fig. 6 is a graph of throughput for the present invention.
Detailed Description
The invention is further described with reference to the following figures and detailed description.
The invention designs a large-scale unmanned aerial vehicle group security authentication mechanism based on random labels according to the technical characteristics of hash and mapping generation of the random labels, and mainly solves the following two problems:
(1) the unmanned aerial vehicle cluster belongs to a mobile ad hoc network and has high dynamic property, so that the safety of the unmanned aerial vehicle cluster is difficult to be effectively ensured, and key information is easy to intercept and acquire in the task execution process.
(2) In the existing encryption algorithm, the consideration that the unmanned aerial vehicle which protects key information and supplements can be verified immediately is lacked.
The main idea of the invention is as follows: the Hash encryption algorithm and the mapping scheme are combined to realize the maximization of information security of the unmanned aerial vehicle cluster system under the condition of not high calculation amount and communication overhead.
Specifically, a large-scale unmanned aerial vehicle group security authentication mechanism based on random tags comprises the following steps:
s1: when the unmanned aerial vehicle cluster controls a starting station A from the ground, the A allocates a determining label (label) 1, 2 and 3 to each unmanned aerial vehicle;
s101: the unmanned plane pre-loads a plurality of mapping schemes, generates an uncertain label (label) by combining a plurality of local labels, selects discontinuous and disorganized header bits for each part label, and maps the discontinuous and disorganized header bits to the discontinuous and disorganized bits in the label;
s102: we store the mapping as an m-level tree; the internal nodes map to bits in each entry accordingly; leaf nodes correspond to partial tags.
S2: after flying for a period of time, each unmanned aerial vehicle generates an uncertain label (label) 1 based on corresponding label1 through hashing, and performs inter-group authentication mutually;
s201: let PktclabelIndicates the header marked with the label,
Figure BSA0000195361620000057
representing bits in the labeled tag, the length of which is represented by a 64-bit value; the ulabel generated by one UAV is validated by the other UAV, validating the formula as follows:
ulabel＝Hash(Sample(Pktclabel))；
wherein Hash (-) represents the SHA-256 Hash algorithm we employ;
s202: in that
Figure BSA00001953616200000512
Filling the tail end, firstly filling the first bit to 1, and then filling all bits to 0 to ensure that
Figure BSA0000195361620000058
The length satisfies that the remainder after modulus 512 is 448, and then the length is obtained
Figure BSA0000195361620000059
Handle
Figure BSA00001953616200000510
Is supplemented to
Figure BSA00001953616200000511
We get a list of messages;
s203: we split the message list into 16 large 32-bit end words W0，W1，...，W15The remaining 48 words W16，W17，...，W63Iteratively obtained by the following formulas:
Wt＝σ1(Wt-2)+Wt-7+σc(Wt-2)+Wt-16；
s204: the algorithm based on 32-bit word operations utilizes 6 logic functions:
Figure BSA0000195361620000051
Figure BSA0000195361620000052
Figure BSA0000195361620000053
Figure BSA0000195361620000054
Figure BSA0000195361620000055
Figure BSA0000195361620000056
through mapping iteration, we get H1(ii) a By analogy, we get the last Hn, which is the last 256-bit message digest, i.e. the ulbel we need;
s205: if the unmanned aerial vehicle satisfies: firstly, the data packet comes from a correct previous hop node; secondly, the data packet carries the correct label generated by the unmanned aerial vehicle; the inter-cluster detection passes;
s206: if not, the system triggers an alarm with the universal wildcard rule.
S3: in the flight process of the unmanned aerial vehicle swarm, when the unmanned aerial vehicle swarm encounters the relay station B, the relay station B knows the mode of the ground station generating the close 2 as the relay station and the ground station are communicated with each other; therefore, the unmanned plane generates a label2 (hash, mapping) according to the label2, and the relay station B verifies the label 2; the subsequent relay station verifies the ciabel 3, ciabel 4.. until the task is completed;
s301: the drone generates a label by combining several partial labels; for each partial tag, we select the discontinuous and shuffled header bits and map them to the discontinuous and shuffled bits in the ulabel; we store the mapping as an m-level tree; the internal nodes map to bits in each entry accordingly; leaf nodes correspond to partial tags;
s302: if the ulabel satisfies: firstly, the message serial number of the packet header is an h-bit string corresponding to a p-bit part label; secondly, the next hop is used for detecting the MPR sequence number; the unmanned aerial vehicle passes the detection of the ground station;
s303: if not, the system triggers an alarm with the universal wildcard rule.
In the specific implementation:
the invention performs the simulation of the flight process of the unmanned aerial vehicle as shown in fig. 1 in the OMNet + + software, and performs the performance test on the proposed mechanism. We call the generation and authentication functions in the file/hash. OMNeT + + processes arriving packets by calling a generate function in the ProcessCalcket (-) and discards processed packets by calling a validate function in the PacketCallback (-).
FIG. 2 shows an iterative process of the mapping scheme, where the red field grid represents the pair divided by 232And then the rest is taken.
Fig. 3 and 4 show probability distributions of probability labels generated by (a) hashing and (b) mapping. It can be seen that the uncertainty labels generated by drones approximate a normal distribution, which well limits the scope of random inference by attackers.
In order to embody the advantages of the random tag security mechanism provided by the invention, the unmanned aerial vehicle performance under the existing common OLSR protocol is compared. As can be seen from fig. 5, the original OLSR requires 0.54s on average to process bits in a packet, while the protocol enhanced by the mechanism requires 0.24 s.
FIG. 6 shows that the throughput of the mechanism proposed by the present invention has a minimum rate of 1000 bits/s, an average rate mostly stabilized around 5000 bits/s, and a peak value sometimes reached 19000 bits/s. This also fully demonstrates the feasibility of this mechanism.
In conclusion: the large-scale unmanned aerial vehicle cluster security authentication mechanism based on the random label not only can protect information carried by the unmanned aerial vehicle, but also can complete tasks more efficiently.
While the preferred embodiments of the present invention have been illustrated and described in detail, it is not intended to limit the invention to the exact details shown and described, and various equivalents (e.g., in number, shape, location, etc.) may be substituted for elements thereof without departing from the spirit and scope of the present invention.

Claims (4)

1. A large-scale unmanned aerial vehicle group security authentication mechanism based on random labels is characterized in that the method comprises the following steps:
s1: when the unmanned aerial vehicle cluster controls a starting station A from the ground, the A allocates a determining label (label) 1, 2 and 3 to each unmanned aerial vehicle;
s2: after flying for a period of time, each unmanned aerial vehicle generates an uncertain label (label) 1 based on corresponding label1 through hashing, and performs inter-group authentication mutually;
s3: in the flight process of the unmanned aerial vehicle swarm, when the unmanned aerial vehicle swarm encounters the relay station B, the relay station B knows the mode of the ground station generating the close 2 as the relay station and the ground station are communicated with each other; therefore, the unmanned plane generates a label2 (hash, mapping) according to the label2, and the relay station B verifies the label 2; subsequent relay stations validate the ciabel 3, ciabel 4.
2. The large-scale unmanned aerial vehicle group security authentication mechanism based on random tags as claimed in claim 1, wherein said step S1 specifically comprises:
s101: the unmanned plane pre-loads a plurality of mapping schemes, generates an uncertain label (label) by combining a plurality of local labels, selects discontinuous and disorganized header bits for each part label, and maps the discontinuous and disorganized header bits to the discontinuous and disorganized bits in the label;
s102: we store the mapping as an m-level tree; the internal nodes map to bits in each entry accordingly; leaf nodes correspond to partial tags.
3. The large-scale unmanned aerial vehicle group security authentication mechanism based on random tags as claimed in claim 1, wherein said step S2 specifically comprises:
s201: let PktclabelShowing the header, Sample, marked with clam
Figure FSA0000195361610000011
Representing bits in the labeled tag, the length of which is represented by a 64-bit value; the ulabel generated by one UAV is validated by the other UAV, validating the formula as follows:
ulabel＝Hash(Sample(Pktclabel))；
wherein Hash (-) represents the SHA-256 Hash algorithm we employ;
s202: at Sample
Figure FSA0000195361610000012
Filling the tail end, filling the first bit to 1, and then filling all 0 to ensure that the Sample
Figure FSA0000195361610000013
The length satisfies that the remainder after modulus taking 512 is 448, and then Sample is obtained
Figure FSA0000195361610000014
Handle Sample
Figure FSA0000195361610000015
Supplement to Sample
Figure FSA0000195361610000016
We get a list of messages;
s203: we split the message list into 16 large 32-bit end words W0，W1，...，W15Get rid of it, leave over48 words of (W) { W }16，W17，...，W6aIteratively obtained by the following formulas:
Wt＝σ1(Wt-2)+Wt-7+σ0(Wt-2)+Wt-16；
s204: the algorithm based on 32-bit word operations utilizes 6 logic functions:
Figure FSA0000195361610000021
Figure FSA0000195361610000022
Figure FSA0000195361610000023
Figure FSA0000195361610000024
Figure FSA0000195361610000025
Figure FSA0000195361610000026
through mapping iteration, we get H1(ii) a By analogy, we get the last Hn, which is the last 256-bit message digest, i.e. the ulbel we need;
s205: if the unmanned aerial vehicle satisfies: firstly, the data packet comes from a correct previous hop node; secondly, the data packet carries the correct label generated by the unmanned aerial vehicle; the inter-cluster detection passes;
s206: if not, the system triggers an alarm with the universal wildcard rule.
4. The large-scale unmanned aerial vehicle group security authentication mechanism based on random tags as claimed in claim 1, wherein said step S3 specifically comprises:
s301: the drone generates a label by combining several partial labels; for each partial tag, we select the discontinuous and shuffled header bits and map them to the discontinuous and shuffled bits in the ulabel; we store the mapping as an m-level tree; the internal nodes map to bits in each entry accordingly; leaf nodes correspond to partial tags;
s302: if the ulabel satisfies: firstly, the message serial number of the packet header is an h-bit string corresponding to a p-bit part label; secondly, the next hop is used for detecting the MPR sequence number; the unmanned aerial vehicle passes the detection of the ground station;
s303: if not, the system triggers an alarm with the universal wildcard rule.
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CN113099447A (en) * 2021-04-07 2021-07-09 南京航空航天大学 Safety authentication method for unmanned aerial vehicle group and unmanned aerial vehicle group
CN113099447B (en) * 2021-04-07 2022-05-13 南京航空航天大学 Safety authentication method for unmanned aerial vehicle group and unmanned aerial vehicle group
CN114679268A (en) * 2022-03-29 2022-06-28 湖北工业大学 Method for mutual authentication and key agreement between unmanned aerial vehicles and storable medium

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