CN111628869A - Node for storing n by base station and base station bidirectional authentication method - Google Patents

Node for storing n by base station and base station bidirectional authentication method Download PDF

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Publication number
CN111628869A
CN111628869A CN202010463431.7A CN202010463431A CN111628869A CN 111628869 A CN111628869 A CN 111628869A CN 202010463431 A CN202010463431 A CN 202010463431A CN 111628869 A CN111628869 A CN 111628869A
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base station
node
value
identifier
random number
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CN111628869B (en
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张庆全
乐斌
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Chuang Neng Electric Technology Nantong Co ltd
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Nantong Huaxin Minfu Industrial Technology Co ltd
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    • HELECTRICITY
    • H04ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04LTRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
    • H04L9/00Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols
    • H04L9/32Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols including means for verifying the identity or authority of a user of the system or for message authentication, e.g. authorization, entity authentication, data integrity or data verification, non-repudiation, key authentication or verification of credentials
    • H04L9/3271Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols including means for verifying the identity or authority of a user of the system or for message authentication, e.g. authorization, entity authentication, data integrity or data verification, non-repudiation, key authentication or verification of credentials using challenge-response
    • H04L9/3273Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols including means for verifying the identity or authority of a user of the system or for message authentication, e.g. authorization, entity authentication, data integrity or data verification, non-repudiation, key authentication or verification of credentials using challenge-response for mutual authentication
    • HELECTRICITY
    • H04ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04WWIRELESS COMMUNICATION NETWORKS
    • H04W12/00Security arrangements; Authentication; Protecting privacy or anonymity
    • H04W12/06Authentication
    • HELECTRICITY
    • H04ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04LTRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
    • H04L2209/00Additional information or applications relating to cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communication H04L9/00
    • H04L2209/80Wireless

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  • Engineering & Computer Science (AREA)
  • Computer Security & Cryptography (AREA)
  • Computer Networks & Wireless Communication (AREA)
  • Signal Processing (AREA)
  • Mobile Radio Communication Systems (AREA)

Abstract

The invention discloses a node of a base station for storing n and a base station mutual authentication method, aiming at searching a more effective implementation scheme of network delay tolerance, comprising the following steps: acquiring a base station identifier, a base station random number and a base station n value which are issued by a base station; connecting the base station identifier, the base station random number, the base station n value, the node identifier and the node key to generate a node response value; sending the node response value, the node identifier and the base station n value to a base station, and receiving a base station response value returned by the base station; and generating a base station response verification value through the node identifier, the node key and the base station random number, judging whether the base station response verification value is consistent with the base station response value, and if so, authenticating that the base station passes. The invention adopts the base station n value to realize the network delay tolerance, and simultaneously adopts the base station random number to participate in the bidirectional authentication of the node and the base station, thereby not only solving the problem of inconsistent communication of all nodes, but also effectively preventing replay attack.

Description

Node for storing n by base station and base station bidirectional authentication method
Technical Field
The invention relates to the field of wireless communication, in particular to a node for storing n by a base station and a base station mutual authentication method.
Background
Wireless communication systems are widely deployed to provide various types of communication content such as voice, video, packet data, messaging, broadcast, and so on. These systems may be multiple-access systems capable of supporting communication with multiple users by sharing the available system resources (e.g., time, frequency, and power). Examples of such multiple-access systems include code division multiple-access systems, time division multiple-access systems, frequency division multiple-access systems, and orthogonal frequency division multiple-access systems. In general, a wireless multiple-access communication system may include several base stations, each supporting communication for multiple user devices simultaneously. A base station may communicate with devices on the downlink and uplink. Each base station has a coverage area, which may be referred to as a coverage area of a base station or cell.
Devices in proximity to each other may also communicate directly via device-to-device or proximity-based service communication. However, because of the large number of network nodes and node forwarding delays, it may not be possible to guarantee that all nodes are consistent, and at the same time, devices participating in device-to-device discovery communications may be subject to replay attacks.
Disclosure of Invention
In order to find a more effective implementation scheme of network delay tolerance, the invention provides a node for storing n by a base station and a base station bidirectional authentication method.
The first scheme is as follows:
a node and base station mutual authentication method for base station storage n is provided, which comprises the following steps:
acquiring a base station identifier, a base station random number and a base station n value used for representing the base station random number, wherein the base station random number is updated according to preset fixed time;
connecting the base station identifier, the base station random number, the base station n value, the node identifier and the node key to generate a node response value;
sending the node response value, the node identifier and the base station n value to the base station, and receiving a base station response value returned by the base station;
and generating a base station response verification value through the node identifier, the node key and the base station random number, judging whether the base station response verification value is consistent with the base station response value, and if so, authenticating that the base station passes.
Preferably, the step of concatenating the base station identifier, the base station random number, the base station n value, the node identifier, the node key, and generating the node response value includes the steps of:
connecting the base station identifier, the base station random number and the base station n value with a node identifier and a node key;
and generating a node response value by using a hash algorithm on the connected base station identifier, base station random number, base station n value, node identifier and node key.
Preferably, the generating a base station response verification value by the node identifier, the node key and the base station random number comprises the following steps:
and connecting the node identifier, the node key and the base station random number and generating a base station response verification value by using a hash algorithm.
Preferably, the obtaining the base station identifier, the base station random number and the base station n value used for representing the base station random number issued by the base station includes the following steps:
and acquiring a base station identifier, a base station random number and a base station n value for representing the base station random number, which are issued by a base station, through a wireless access point.
Scheme II:
a node and base station mutual authentication method for base station storage n is provided, which comprises the following steps:
broadcasting a base station identifier, a base station random number and a base station n value, receiving a node response value, a node identifier and a base station n value sent by a node, and generating a node response verification value based on the base station identifier, the node identifier, a node key, the base station random number and the base station n value;
judging whether the node response verification value is consistent with the node response value or not, and if so, authenticating the node to pass;
and generating a base station response value based on the node identifier, the node key and the base station random number, and returning the base station response value to the node.
Preferably, the broadcasting of the base station identifier and the base station random number includes the steps of:
the base station broadcasts a base station identifier, a base station random number and a base station n value;
and the wireless access point receives the base station identifier, the base station random number and the base station n value, and forwards and broadcasts the base station identifier, the base station random number and the base station n value.
Preferably, the generating a node response verification value based on the base station identifier, the node key, the base station random number, and the base station n value includes the steps of:
connecting the base station identifier, the node key, the base station random number and the base station n value;
and generating a node response verification value by using a hash algorithm on the connected base station identifier, node key, base station random number and base station n value.
Preferably, the generating a base station response value based on the node identifier, the node key and the base station random number comprises the following steps:
concatenating the node identifier, the node key, and the base station random number and generating a base station response value using a hash algorithm.
Preferably, the broadcasting of the base station identifier, the base station random number and the base station n value is preceded by the following steps:
and setting the difference value of the n value of the legal base station according to the network delay parameter.
The third scheme is as follows:
a node and base station mutual authentication method for base station storage n is provided, which comprises the following steps:
the method comprises the steps that a base station broadcasts a base station identifier, a base station random number and a base station n value, receives a node response value, a node identifier and a base station n value sent by a node, and generates a node response verification value based on the base station identifier, the node identifier, a node key, the base station random number and the base station n value; judging whether the node response verification value is consistent with the node response value or not, and if so, authenticating the node to pass; generating a base station response value based on the node identifier, the node key and the base station random number, and returning the base station response value to the node;
a node acquires a base station identifier, a base station random number and a base station n value used for representing the base station random number, wherein the base station random number is updated according to preset fixed time; connecting the base station identifier, the base station random number, the base station n value, the node identifier and the node key to generate a node response value; sending the node response value, the node identifier and the base station n value to the base station, and receiving a base station response value returned by the base station; and generating a base station response verification value through the node identifier, the node key and the base station random number, judging whether the base station response verification value is consistent with the base station response value, and if so, authenticating that the base station passes.
Compared with the prior art, the node and base station bidirectional authentication method for storing n by the base station has the following technical effects:
the node and base station bidirectional authentication method for storing n by the base station realizes network delay tolerance by adopting the value of the base station n, and simultaneously adopts the base station random number to participate in the bidirectional authentication of the node and the base station, thereby not only solving the problem of inconsistent communication of all nodes, but also effectively preventing replay attack.
Additional aspects and advantages of the invention will be set forth in part in the description which follows, and in part will be obvious from the description, or may be learned by practice of the invention.
Drawings
The foregoing and/or additional aspects and advantages of the present invention will become apparent and readily appreciated from the following description of the embodiments, taken in conjunction with the accompanying drawings of which:
fig. 1 is a schematic view of an application scenario of a node storing n at a base station and a base station bidirectional authentication method according to an embodiment of the present invention;
fig. 2 is a schematic flow chart of a node storing n at a base station and a bidirectional authentication method for the base station according to an embodiment of the present invention;
fig. 3 is a flowchart illustrating a method for bidirectional authentication between a node storing n at a base station and the base station according to another embodiment of the present invention.
Detailed Description
In order to make the technical solutions of the present invention better understood, the technical solutions in the embodiments of the present invention will be clearly and completely described below with reference to the drawings in the embodiments of the present invention.
In some of the flows described in the present specification and claims and in the above figures, a number of operations are included that occur in a particular order, but it should be clearly understood that these operations may be performed out of order or in parallel with the order in which they occur, the order of the operations being 202, 204, etc. merely to distinguish between various operations, the order of which does not itself represent any order of performance. Additionally, the flows may include more or fewer operations, and the operations may be performed sequentially or in parallel. It should be noted that, the descriptions of "first", "second", etc. in this document are used for distinguishing different messages, devices, modules, etc., and do not represent a sequential order, nor limit the types of "first" and "second" to be different.
The technical solutions in the embodiments of the present invention will be clearly and completely described below with reference to the drawings in the embodiments of the present invention, and it is obvious that the described embodiments are only a part of the embodiments of the present invention, and not all of the embodiments. All other embodiments, which can be derived by a person skilled in the art from the embodiments given herein without making any creative effort, shall fall within the protection scope of the present invention.
Referring to fig. 1, fig. 1 is a schematic view illustrating an application scenario of a node storing n of a base station and a base station bidirectional authentication method according to an embodiment of the present invention, as shown in fig. 1, the embodiment of the present invention is applied to an authentication process of a node 100 and a base station 200, and the embodiment of the present invention will be explained below by taking fig. 1 as an example.
Referring to fig. 2, fig. 2 is a schematic flow chart illustrating a method for bidirectional authentication between a node storing n and a base station according to an embodiment of the present invention, and it should be noted that fig. 2 is implemented by taking a node 100 as an execution subject, as shown in fig. 2, the method for bidirectional authentication between a node storing n and a base station according to an embodiment of the present invention includes steps S101 to S107, which are specifically as follows:
step S101: and acquiring a base station identifier, a base station random number and a base station n value for representing the base station random number, wherein the base station random number is updated according to preset fixed time.
In some embodiments, the difference of the n values of the base stations is set according to a network delay parameter, such as a size of a network, a delay tolerance, and the like, which is not limited in this embodiment of the present invention.
In some embodiments, the obtaining a base station identifier, a base station random number and a base station n value for characterizing the base station random number issued by a base station includes the following steps:
and monitoring and receiving the identifier of the base station, the n value of the base station and the random number of the base station in the network to be accessed.
It should be noted that, in some embodiments, in a complex wireless network, the base station identifier, the base station random number, and the base station n value used for representing the base station random number issued by the base station may also be acquired by the wireless access point.
Step S103: and connecting the base station identifier, the base station random number, the base station n value, the node identifier and the node key and generating a node response value.
Specifically, the step of connecting the base station identifier, the base station random number, the base station n value, the node identifier, the node key and generating the node response value comprises the following steps:
connecting the base station identifier, the base station random number and the base station n value with the node identifier and the node key;
and generating a node response value by using a hash algorithm on the connected base station identifier, the base station random number, the base station n value, the node identifier and the node key.
A hash algorithm is a function that compresses a message of arbitrary length to a message digest of some fixed length. For example, assuming that the base station identifier is BaseID, the base station random number is rnd (n), the node identifier is NodeID, the node key is NodeKey, and the node response value is nodeses, the node response value is calculated as follows:
NodeRES=Hash(BaseID+NodeID+NodeKey+RND(n)+n)。
step S105: and sending the node response value, the node identifier and the base station n value to the base station, and receiving the base station response value returned by the base station.
Step S107: and generating a base station response verification value through the node identifier, the node key and the base station random number, judging whether the base station response verification value is consistent with the base station response value, and if so, authenticating that the base station passes.
In detail, the generating of the base station response verification value by the node identifier, the node key and the base station random number includes the steps of:
the node identifier, the node key and the base station random number are connected and a hash algorithm is used to generate a base station response verification value.
For example, assuming that the response verification value of the bs is NodeRET, the calculation method is as follows:
NodeRET=Hash(NodeID+NodeKey+RND(n))。
compared with the prior art, the node and base station mutual authentication method for storing n by the base station has the following technical effects:
the node and base station bidirectional authentication method for storing n by the base station in the embodiment of the invention adopts the value of the base station n to realize network delay tolerance, and simultaneously adopts the base station random number to participate in the bidirectional authentication of the node and the base station, thereby not only solving the problem of inconsistent communication of all nodes, but also effectively preventing replay attack.
Based on the same inventive concept as the node and base station bidirectional authentication method for storing n by the base station in the embodiment of the invention, another embodiment of the invention provides a node and base station bidirectional authentication method for storing n by the base station.
Referring to fig. 3, fig. 3 is a schematic flow chart illustrating a bidirectional authentication method for a node storing n and a base station according to another embodiment of the present invention, and it should be noted that fig. 3 is implemented by a base station 200, as shown in fig. 3, the bidirectional authentication method for a node storing n and a base station according to an embodiment of the present invention includes steps S202 to S206, which are specifically as follows:
step S202: broadcasting a base station identifier, a base station random number and a base station n value, receiving a node response value, a node identifier and a base station n value sent by a node, and generating a node response verification value based on the base station identifier, the node identifier, a node key, the base station random number and the base station n value.
Step S204: and judging whether the node response verification value is consistent with the node response value, and if so, authenticating the node to pass.
In some embodiments, broadcasting the broadcast base station identifier and the base station random number comprises the steps of:
the base station broadcasts a base station identifier, a base station random number and a base station n value;
the wireless access point receives the base station identifier, the base station random number and the base station n value, and forwards and broadcasts the base station identifier, the base station random number and the base station n value.
In some embodiments, generating the node response verification value based on the base station identifier, the node key, the base station random number, and the base station n value comprises:
connecting the base station identifier, the node key, the base station random number and the base station n value;
and generating a node response verification value by using a hash algorithm on the connected base station identifier, the node key, the base station random number and the base station n value.
For example, assuming that the node response verification value is BaseRES, it is calculated as follows:
BaseRES=Hash(BaseID+NodeID+NodeKey+RND(n)+n)
if the node response verification value BaseRES is identical to the node response value nodese, the base station 200 authenticates that the node 100 passes.
Step S206: and generating a base station response value based on the node identifier, the node key and the base station random number, and returning the base station response value to the node.
Specifically, generating the base station response value based on the node identifier, the node key, and the base station random number includes the steps of:
the node identifier, the node key, and the base station random number are connected and a hash algorithm is used to generate a base station response value.
For example, assuming that the base station response value is BaseRET, the calculation method is as follows:
BaseRET=Hash(NodeID+NodeKey+RND(n))
as described above, when the base station response value BaseRET is consistent with the base station response verification value NodeRET, the node 100 authenticates that the base station 200 passes.
In some embodiments, since there are many network nodes and node forwarding delay may cause that the base station random number rnd (n) cannot guarantee all nodes to be consistent, n is set to indicate which base station random number rnd (n), and the base station 200 may set the difference between n to be legal according to the network size and delay. I.e. before broadcasting the base station identifier, the base station random number and the base station n value, the following steps are included:
and setting the difference value of the n value of the legal base station according to the network delay parameter.
Compared with the prior art, the node and base station mutual authentication method for storing n by the base station in another embodiment of the invention has the following technical effects:
in another embodiment of the invention, the node and base station bidirectional authentication method for storing n by the base station adopts the value of the base station n to realize network delay tolerance, and simultaneously adopts the base station random number to participate in the bidirectional authentication of the node and the base station, thereby not only solving the problem of inconsistent communication of all nodes, but also effectively preventing replay attack.
Based on the same inventive concept as the node and base station bidirectional authentication method for storing n by a base station in the embodiment of the present invention, another embodiment of the present invention provides a node and base station bidirectional authentication method for storing n by a base station, which includes the following steps:
the method comprises the steps that a base station broadcasts a base station identifier, a base station random number and a base station n value, receives a node response value, a node identifier and a base station n value sent by a node, and generates a node response verification value based on the base station identifier, the node identifier, a node key, the base station random number and the base station n value; judging whether the node response verification value is consistent with the node response value or not, and if so, authenticating the node to pass; generating a base station response value based on the node identifier, the node key and the base station random number, and returning the base station response value to the node;
a node acquires a base station identifier, a base station random number and a base station n value used for representing the base station random number, wherein the base station random number is updated according to preset fixed time; connecting the base station identifier, the base station random number, the base station n value, the node identifier and the node key to generate a node response value; sending the node response value, the node identifier and the base station n value to the base station, and receiving a base station response value returned by the base station; and generating a base station response verification value through the node identifier, the node key and the base station random number, judging whether the base station response verification value is consistent with the base station response value, and if so, authenticating that the base station passes.
It should be noted that, the technical concept of providing a node and base station bidirectional authentication method for storing n by a base station according to another embodiment of the present invention is the same as that of providing a node and base station bidirectional authentication method for storing n by a base station according to another embodiment of the present invention, and therefore, the explanation thereof may refer to the above description, and will not be repeated herein.
Compared with the prior art, the node and base station mutual authentication method for storing n by the base station in the further embodiment of the invention has the following technical effects:
in another embodiment of the invention, the node and base station bidirectional authentication method for storing n by the base station adopts the value of the base station n to realize network delay tolerance, and simultaneously adopts the base station random number to participate in the bidirectional authentication of the node and the base station, thereby not only solving the problem of inconsistent communication of all nodes, but also effectively preventing replay attack.
The foregoing is only a partial embodiment of the present invention, and it should be noted that, for those skilled in the art, various modifications and decorations can be made without departing from the principle of the present invention, and these modifications and decorations should also be regarded as the protection scope of the present invention.

Claims (10)

1. A node and base station mutual authentication method for storing n by a base station is characterized by comprising the following steps:
acquiring a base station identifier, a base station random number and a base station n value used for representing the base station random number, wherein the base station random number is updated according to preset fixed time;
connecting the base station identifier, the base station random number, the base station n value, the node identifier and the node key to generate a node response value;
sending the node response value, the node identifier and the base station n value to the base station, and receiving a base station response value returned by the base station;
and generating a base station response verification value through the node identifier, the node key and the base station random number, judging whether the base station response verification value is consistent with the base station response value, and if so, authenticating that the base station passes.
2. The node-to-base station mutual authentication method of base station storage n according to claim 1, wherein said concatenating the base station identifier, base station random number, base station n value and node identifier, node key and generating node response value comprises the steps of:
connecting the base station identifier, the base station random number and the base station n value with a node identifier and a node key;
and generating a node response value by using a hash algorithm on the connected base station identifier, base station random number, base station n value, node identifier and node key.
3. The node-to-base station mutual authentication method of base station storage n according to claim 1, wherein said generating a base station response verification value by said node identifier, node key and base station random number comprises the steps of:
and connecting the node identifier, the node key and the base station random number and generating a base station response verification value by using a hash algorithm.
4. The method for bidirectional authentication between a node storing n and a base station according to claim 1, wherein the step of obtaining the base station identifier, the base station random number and the base station n value used for representing the base station random number issued by the base station comprises the following steps:
and acquiring a base station identifier, a base station random number and a base station n value for representing the base station random number, which are issued by a base station, through a wireless access point.
5. A node and base station mutual authentication method for storing n by a base station is characterized by comprising the following steps:
broadcasting a base station identifier, a base station random number and a base station n value, receiving a node response value, a node identifier and a base station n value sent by a node, and generating a node response verification value based on the base station identifier, the node identifier, a node key, the base station random number and the base station n value;
judging whether the node response verification value is consistent with the node response value or not, and if so, authenticating the node to pass;
and generating a base station response value based on the node identifier, the node key and the base station random number, and returning the base station response value to the node.
6. The node-to-base station mutual authentication method of base station storage n of claim 5, wherein said broadcasting a broadcast base station identifier and a base station random number comprises the steps of:
the base station broadcasts a base station identifier, a base station random number and a base station n value;
and the wireless access point receives the base station identifier, the base station random number and the base station n value, and forwards and broadcasts the base station identifier, the base station random number and the base station n value.
7. The base station storing n node-to-base station mutual authentication method of claim 5, wherein said generating a node response verification value based on said base station identifier, node key, base station random number and base station n value comprises the steps of:
connecting the base station identifier, the node key, the base station random number and the base station n value;
and generating a node response verification value by using a hash algorithm on the connected base station identifier, node key, base station random number and base station n value.
8. The node-to-base station mutual authentication method of base station storage n according to claim 5, wherein said generating a base station response value based on said node identifier, node key and base station random number comprises the steps of:
concatenating the node identifier, the node key, and the base station random number and generating a base station response value using a hash algorithm.
9. The node-to-base station mutual authentication method of base station storage n according to claim 5, wherein said broadcasting base station identifier, base station random number and base station n value is preceded by the steps of:
and setting the difference value of the n value of the legal base station according to the network delay parameter.
10. A node and base station mutual authentication method for storing n by a base station is characterized by comprising the following steps:
the method comprises the steps that a base station broadcasts a base station identifier, a base station random number and a base station n value, receives a node response value, a node identifier and a base station n value sent by a node, and generates a node response verification value based on the base station identifier, the node identifier, a node key, the base station random number and the base station n value; judging whether the node response verification value is consistent with the node response value or not, and if so, authenticating the node to pass; generating a base station response value based on the node identifier, the node key and the base station random number, and returning the base station response value to the node;
a node acquires a base station identifier, a base station random number and a base station n value used for representing the base station random number, wherein the base station random number is updated according to preset fixed time; connecting the base station identifier, the base station random number, the base station n value, the node identifier and the node key to generate a node response value; sending the node response value, the node identifier and the base station n value to the base station, and receiving a base station response value returned by the base station; and generating a base station response verification value through the node identifier, the node key and the base station random number, judging whether the base station response verification value is consistent with the base station response value, and if so, authenticating that the base station passes.
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