CN111614648B - Industrial Internet of things active eavesdropping resistant physical layer secure transmission method - Google Patents

Industrial Internet of things active eavesdropping resistant physical layer secure transmission method Download PDF

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CN111614648B
CN111614648B CN202010406181.3A CN202010406181A CN111614648B CN 111614648 B CN111614648 B CN 111614648B CN 202010406181 A CN202010406181 A CN 202010406181A CN 111614648 B CN111614648 B CN 111614648B
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physical layer
orthogonal
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secure transmission
eavesdropping
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CN111614648A (en
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杜清河
申宁
欧奕杰
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Shaanxi Ruiyuan Wutong Intelligent Technology Co.,Ltd.
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Xian Jiaotong University
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    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
    • H04L63/00—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security
    • H04L63/04—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security for providing a confidential data exchange among entities communicating through data packet networks
    • H04L63/0428—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security for providing a confidential data exchange among entities communicating through data packet networks wherein the data content is protected, e.g. by encrypting or encapsulating the payload
    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
    • H04L63/00—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security
    • H04L63/14—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security for detecting or protecting against malicious traffic
    • H04L63/1441—Countermeasures against malicious traffic
    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
    • H04L9/00—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols
    • H04L9/06—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols the encryption apparatus using shift registers or memories for block-wise or stream coding, e.g. DES systems or RC4; Hash functions; Pseudorandom sequence generators
    • H04L9/0618—Block ciphers, i.e. encrypting groups of characters of a plain text message using fixed encryption transformation
    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
    • H04L63/00—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security
    • H04L63/16—Implementing security features at a particular protocol layer

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Abstract

The application belongs to the technical field of wireless communication, and particularly relates to an active eavesdropping resistant physical layer secure transmission method for an industrial Internet of things. The traditional physical layer secure transmission scheme only aims at a passive eavesdropping mode, and once an eavesdropper acquires a key, the eavesdropper can eavesdrop without being discovered by a legal user; but also has poor effect in dealing with active eavesdropping attack. The application provides an active eavesdropping resistant physical layer secure transmission method for an industrial Internet of things, which comprises the following steps: the method comprises the steps that a legal receiving node initiates orthogonal encryption distribution of security parameters; authenticating the orthogonal characteristic parameters to enable the information source node to recover the security parameters; the information source node transmits encrypted data of security parameters; and the recovery of the data is completed by the legal receiving node. And the condition that an eavesdropper cannot acquire data information in a passive eavesdropping and active deception mode is ensured.

Description

Industrial Internet of things active eavesdropping resistant physical layer secure transmission method
Technical Field
The application belongs to the technical field of wireless communication, and particularly relates to an active eavesdropping resistant physical layer secure transmission method for an industrial Internet of things.
Background
The wireless communication system has the characteristics of space openness, topological structure time-varying property, broadcast property and the like, so that the communication content is easy to eavesdrop. The traditional cryptography encryption mode depending on the computational complexity faces elimination due to continuous improvement of computer computing power, the physical layer secure communication technology does not depend on the computational complexity, and meanwhile, the method has the advantages of small computational overhead, short time delay and greater advantage in practical application.
An OFDM pilot signal physical layer authentication system based on independent check coding is proposed, and spoofing attack is resisted through an interaction protocol and pilot signal design. But the scheme depends on a large-scale antenna to a certain extent, and is difficult to apply to an industrial Internet of things system with low cost and large quantity. The Physical Layer (Physical Layer) is the lowest Layer in the OSI model of computer networks. The physical layer provides for the creation, maintenance, and removal of physical links required for the transmission of data, while providing mechanical, electrical, functional, and regulatory features. In brief, the physical layer ensures that the original data can be transmitted over a variety of physical media. Both local area networks and wide area networks belong to layer 1 and layer 2.
The traditional physical layer secure transmission scheme only aims at a passive eavesdropping mode, and once an eavesdropper acquires a key, the eavesdropper can eavesdrop without being discovered by a legal user; but also has poor effect in dealing with active eavesdropping attack.
Disclosure of Invention
1. Technical problem to be solved
Based on a traditional physical layer secure transmission scheme, only aiming at a passive eavesdropping mode, once an eavesdropper acquires a key, the eavesdropper can eavesdrop without being discovered by a legal user; and the problem that the effect is not good when active eavesdropping attack is responded, and the application provides an active eavesdropping resistant physical layer secure transmission method for the industrial Internet of things.
2. Technical scheme
In order to achieve the above object, the present application provides a secure transmission method of an active eavesdropping resistant physical layer of an industrial internet of things, including the following steps:
step 1): the method comprises the steps that a legal receiving node initiates orthogonal encryption distribution of security parameters;
step 2): authenticating the orthogonal characteristic parameters to enable the information source node to recover the security parameters;
step 3): the information source node initiates and encrypts data transmission by using security parameters;
step 4): and the recovery of the data is completed by the legal receiving node.
Another embodiment provided by the present application is: the orthogonal encryption matrix R generated by the legal receiving node B based on a small amount of common information seeds in the step 1)BThe locally generated U random security parameters thetaB＝[θ1，θ2，...，θU]TAnd mapping the K subcarriers to carry out encrypted transmission.
Another embodiment provided by the present application is: the orthogonal encryption matrix RBIs a K × U order matrix of the form
Figure GDA0002964433040000021
Wherein r isB，u，u＝1，2，...U is U (K/U) multiplied by 1 vectors, and is selected by A and B through a small amount of common information seed and a safety protocol; rBθBIs a K multiplied by 1 vector, the K element of which is the signal of the K subcarrier to be modulated by Bob; each 0 in the formula is an all zero vector of (K/U). times.1.
Another embodiment provided by the present application is: the random security parameter θB＝[θB，1，θB，2，...，θB，U]T，
Figure GDA0002964433040000022
Is a random complex number with U independent amplitudes of 1, each time generated by B, and with uniformly distributed phases between (0, 2 pi), K being required to be divisible by U.
Another embodiment provided by the present application is: the orthogonal encryption matrix R generated by the information source node A based on the same common information seed as the legal receiving node B in the step 2)BPerforming maximum likelihood estimation on the received signal to obtain estimates of U security parameters
Figure GDA0002964433040000023
Another embodiment provided by the present application is: the information source node in the step 3) utilizes the U safety parameters recovered in the step 2)
Figure GDA0002964433040000024
And carrying out packet encryption transmission on the sending information.
Another embodiment provided by the present application is: the U safety parameters in the step 3)
Figure GDA0002964433040000025
And carrying out packet encryption transmission on the sending information.
Another embodiment provided by the present application is: the encrypted transmission form is
Figure GDA0002964433040000026
Wherein the content of the first and second substances,
Figure GDA0002964433040000027
is paired by the source node A in said step 2)
Figure GDA0002964433040000028
Maximum likelihood estimation of (2); symbol
Figure GDA0002964433040000029
Is a K × 1 complex baseband data symbol.
Another embodiment provided by the present application is: and the legal receiving node decrypts and recovers the data in the step 3) by using the security parameter theta generated in the step 1).
3. Advantageous effects
Compared with the prior art, the active eavesdropping resistant physical layer secure transmission method for the industrial Internet of things has the beneficial effects that:
the application provides a physical layer security transmission method for resisting active eavesdropping, which is a physical layer security transmission method for resisting active eavesdropping based on orthogonal characteristic parameter authentication.
According to the active eavesdropping resistant physical layer safety transmission method, a small amount of common information between a legal receiving node and an information source node is utilized, the legal receiving node encrypts a group of random parameters to be sent to the information source node by utilizing orthogonal characteristic parameters, and the information source node conducts constellation diagram rotation encryption on information to be sent by utilizing the random parameters sent by the legal receiving node. Through the orthogonal characteristic parameter encryption, the data information can be ensured to be correctly recovered by a legal receiving node, and meanwhile, an eavesdropper can not acquire the data information in a passive eavesdropping and active cheating mode.
According to the active eavesdropping resistant physical layer secure transmission method, the mode that the orthogonal encryption matrix is used for encrypting the secure parameters in the stages of the step 1) and the step 2) can effectively resist active cheating attacks.
According to the active eavesdropping resistant physical layer security transmission method, the eavesdropping node can send signals in the same form for decoy, and when the eavesdropping node cannot acquire the seed of the common information, the probability that the used orthogonal encryption matrix is the same as the orthogonal encryption matrix adopted by the legal receiving node is extremely low.
According to the active eavesdropping resistant physical layer security transmission method, orthogonal encryption of security parameters can ensure that the information source nodes are slightly influenced by cheating attacks when being recovered.
According to the active eavesdropping resistant physical layer secure transmission method, the constellation diagram is encrypted in a grouping mode by adopting random parameters in the stages of step 3) and step 4), and passive eavesdropping can be effectively resisted. Assuming that the eavesdropping node adopts a one-dimensional search scheme to recover the constellation diagram encrypted by a single security parameter, the probability of recovering the correctness in the QPSK modulation mode is
Figure GDA0002964433040000031
The same probability as a blind guess; assuming that the eavesdropping node recovers the constellation diagram by adopting an exhaustion method, the retrieval space of the eavesdropping node in single transmission is 4USeed combination, i.e. the probability that all U safety parameters are completely recovered to be correct is
Figure GDA0002964433040000032
According to the active eavesdropping resistant physical layer security transmission method, the number of security parameters is larger, namely, the number of encrypted packets is larger, the larger the space required to be searched by the eavesdropping node through passive eavesdropping is, and the smaller the correct recovery probability is.
According to the active eavesdropping resistant physical layer security transmission method, the potential of the orthogonal vector base is reduced due to the fact that the number of security parameters is increased, and the probability of successful eavesdropping node tricking attack is increased.
According to the active eavesdropping resistant physical layer safety transmission method, under the condition that the common information seeds are leaked, the eavesdropping node needs to realize active eavesdropping through power suppression and pilot frequency attack, a legal user can detect that the error rate is greatly increased in the process, so that the transmission process is interrupted or the current information seeds are abandoned, and detection and blocking of an eavesdropper are realized.
Drawings
FIG. 1 is a system model schematic of the present application;
FIG. 2 is a schematic diagram of a legal user communication in the secure communication protocol of the present application;
fig. 3 is a simulation experiment result of the relative power of the eavesdropper and the bit error rate of the user in different attack modes in the embodiment of the application.
Detailed Description
Hereinafter, specific embodiments of the present application will be described in detail with reference to the accompanying drawings, and it will be apparent to those skilled in the art from this detailed description that the present application can be practiced. Features from different embodiments may be combined to yield new embodiments, or certain features may be substituted for certain embodiments to yield yet further preferred embodiments, without departing from the principles of the present application.
Referring to fig. 1 to 2, the present application provides an active eavesdropping resistant physical layer security technique based on orthogonal feature parameter authentication, which is suitable for using an OFDM system, where the OFDM system employs K subcarriers. The source node is called Alice, and the shorthand symbol is A; the legal receiving node is called Bob, and the abbreviation symbol is B; the eavesdropping node is called Eve, and the notation is E. Symbol hij，kI, j ∈ a, B, E, K ═ 1, 2. All links are quasi-static fading channels, i.e. hij，kThe time slot is kept unchanged in a time slot with the time length T, and the time slots are independently changed. Assuming that the channel is frequency-selective fading, i.e. all channel fading coefficients
Figure GDA0002964433040000041
Are different and statistically independent from each other. Assuming that the channels are not reciprocal, i.e. hij，k≠hji，k. Suppose that the receiver of node j obtains the channel coefficient h by channel estimationij，k. The assumption from the source node to the legitimate receiving node is fully open, i.e. the eavesdropping node Eve also knows these protocols and formats. The transmission of Alice to Bob in one time slot is divided into two phases. The first stage has a time length of T1The second stage has a time length of T2Satisfy T ═ T1+T2. Based on a small amount of shared information seed between a receiving node and an information source node, the scheme comprises the following steps:
s1, the orthogonal encryption distribution of the security parameters is initiated by a legal receiving node. Orthogonal encryption matrix R generated by legal receiving node B based on small amount of common information seedBThe locally generated U random security parameters thetaB＝[θB，1，θB，2，...，θB，U]TAnd mapping the K subcarriers to carry out encrypted transmission. That is, Bob sends a signal of
Figure GDA0002964433040000042
Wherein the content of the first and second substances,
Figure GDA0002964433040000043
is a random complex number with U independent amplitudes of 1 generated by B each time and evenly distributed phases between (0, 2 pi), and K is required to be evenly divisible by U; r isB，uU is 1, 2., U, which is U (K/U) × 1 vectors, selected by a and B through seed and security protocols; rBθBIs a K multiplied by 1 vector, the K element of which is the signal of the K subcarrier to be modulated by Bob; each 0 in the formula is an all zero vector of (K/U). times.1.
rB，uFrom a fixed set of perfect orthogonal vectors
Figure GDA0002964433040000051
Selecting, wherein the set internal vector satisfies:
Figure GDA0002964433040000052
Figure GDA0002964433040000053
s2, quadratureAnd (5) authenticating the characteristic parameters, and recovering the security parameters by the information source node. The information source node Alice carries out correlation operation and maximum likelihood estimation on the received signals based on the orthogonal encryption matrix generated by the same common information seed to obtain the estimation of U safety parameters
Figure GDA0002964433040000054
If no other interference exists, the signal received by Alice in the first stage is:
Figure GDA0002964433040000055
wherein the content of the first and second substances,
Figure GDA0002964433040000056
for node i, i belongs to { A, B, E }, the complex baseband signal received on the kth subcarrier at the r stage; on the basis of the above-mentioned technical scheme,
Figure GDA0002964433040000057
is a K × 1 received signal vector;
Figure GDA0002964433040000058
i, j belongs to { A, B, E }, and represents a channel fading coefficient from a node i to a node j;
Figure GDA0002964433040000059
is complex base band Gaussian white noise received by a node i receiver on each subcarrier at the r stage and the variance is sigma2。
Alice receives with a maximum likelihood receiver
Figure GDA00029644330400000510
Wherein the content of the first and second substances,
Figure GDA00029644330400000511
is Alice to θB(ii) an estimate of (d); alice can know R through seed and security protocolB；
Figure GDA00029644330400000512
Is RBThe conjugate transpose of (c).
And S3, encrypting data transmission by the security parameters, and initiating by the source node. The source node uses the U security parameters recovered in S2
Figure GDA00029644330400000513
And carrying out packet encryption transmission on the sending information. The signal transmitted by Alice in the second stage is
Figure GDA00029644330400000514
Wherein, the symbol
Figure GDA00029644330400000515
Complex baseband data symbols of K × 1; i isK/UIs an identity matrix of order K/U.
And S4, recovering the data, and completing by the legal receiving node. The legitimate receiving node decrypts and restores the data of S3 using the security parameter θ generated in S1. The information received by Bob in the second stage is:
Figure GDA00029644330400000516
wherein the content of the first and second substances,
Figure GDA00029644330400000517
for node i, i belongs to { A, B, E }, the complex baseband signal received on the kth subcarrier at the r stage; on the basis of the above-mentioned technical scheme,
Figure GDA00029644330400000518
is a K × 1 received signal vector;
Figure GDA00029644330400000519
i, j is belonged to { A, B, E }, and represents the channel fading coefficients from the node i to the node j；
Figure GDA00029644330400000520
Is complex base band Gaussian white noise received by a node i receiver on each subcarrier at the r stage and the variance is sigma2。
Bob employs locally generated ΘBMaximum likelihood reception of received information
Figure GDA0002964433040000061
Wherein
Figure GDA0002964433040000062
Examples
An active eavesdropping resistant physical layer security technology based on orthogonal characteristic parameter authentication is suitable for an OFDM-QPSK system, and the OFDM adopts K subcarriers. The system model is shown in fig. 1 and includes three nodes: the source node Alice, the legal receiving node Bob and the eavesdropping node Eve are respectively abbreviated as A, B, E hereinafter. A bidirectional wireless connection link is arranged between Alice and Bob, and bidirectional wireless connection capability is also arranged between Alice and Eve; and Bob and Eve are far away from each other, have no direct path, and can not listen to the signal that both sides sent each other. The bidirectional transmission between any pair of nodes is in time division duplex mode. The transmission of Alice to Bob in one time slot is divided into two phases. The first stage has a time length of T1The second stage has a time length of T2Satisfy T ═ T1+T2。
Assuming that the prefix length of OFDM is larger than the delay spread of the multipath signal, the baseband equivalent signal received by the receiver has no intersymbol interference (ISI) and intercarrier interference (ICI). Symbol hij，kI, j ∈ a, B, E, K ═ 1, 2. All links are quasi-static fading channels, i.e. hij，kThe time slot is kept unchanged in a time slot with the time length T, and the time slots are independently changed. Assuming that the channel is frequency selectiveFading, i.e. all channel fading coefficients
Figure GDA0002964433040000063
Are different and statistically independent from each other. Assuming that the channels are not reciprocal, i.e. hij，k≠hji，k. Suppose that the receiver of node j obtains the channel coefficient h by channel estimationij，k. The assumption from the source node to the legitimate receiving node is fully open, i.e. the eavesdropping node Eve also knows these protocols and formats. It is reasonable to assume that there is a small amount of security information seed (a few bits) between Alice and Bob. Based on the above assumptions, the present solution comprises the following steps:
s1, the orthogonal encryption distribution of the security parameters is initiated by a legal receiving node. Orthogonal encryption matrix R generated by legal receiving node B based on small amount of common information seedBThe locally generated U random security parameters thetaB＝[θB，1，θB，2，...，θB，U]TAnd mapping the K subcarriers to carry out encrypted transmission. That is, Bob sends a signal of
Figure GDA0002964433040000064
Wherein the content of the first and second substances,
Figure GDA0002964433040000065
is a random complex number with U independent amplitudes of 1 generated by B each time and evenly distributed phases between (0, 2 pi), and K is required to be evenly divisible by U; r isB，uU is 1, 2., U, which is U (K/U) × 1 vectors, selected by a and B through common information seed and security protocol; rBθBIs a K multiplied by 1 vector, the K element of which is the signal of the K subcarrier to be modulated by Bob; each 0 in the formula is an all zero vector of (K/U). times.1.
rB，uFrom a fixed set of perfect orthogonal vectors
Figure GDA0002964433040000071
Selecting, wherein the set internal vector satisfies:
Figure GDA0002964433040000072
Figure GDA0002964433040000073
and S2, authenticating the orthogonal characteristic parameters, and recovering the security parameters by the information source node. The information source node Alice carries out correlation operation and maximum likelihood estimation on the received signals based on the orthogonal encryption matrix generated by the same common information seed to obtain the estimation of U safety parameters
Figure GDA0002964433040000074
If no other interference exists, the signal received by Alice in the first stage is:
Figure GDA0002964433040000075
wherein the content of the first and second substances,
Figure GDA0002964433040000076
for node i, i belongs to { A, B, E }, the complex baseband signal received on the kth subcarrier at the r stage; on the basis of the above-mentioned technical scheme,
Figure GDA0002964433040000077
is a K × 1 received signal vector;
Figure GDA0002964433040000078
i, j belongs to { A, B, E }, and represents a channel fading coefficient from a node i to a node j;
Figure GDA0002964433040000079
is complex base band Gaussian white noise received by a node i receiver on each subcarrier at the r stage and the variance is sigma2。
Alice receives with a maximum likelihood receiver
Figure GDA00029644330400000710
Wherein the content of the first and second substances,
Figure GDA00029644330400000711
is Alice to θB(ii) an estimate of (d); alice can know R through seed and security protocolB；
Figure GDA00029644330400000712
Is RBThe conjugate transpose of (c).
And S3, encrypting data transmission by the security parameters, and initiating by the source node. The source node uses the U security parameters recovered in S2
Figure GDA00029644330400000713
And carrying out packet encryption transmission on the sending information. The signal transmitted by Alice in the second stage is
Figure GDA00029644330400000714
Wherein, the symbol
Figure GDA00029644330400000715
Complex baseband data symbols of K × 1; i isK/UIs an identity matrix of order K/U.
And S4, recovering the data, and completing by the legal receiving node. The legitimate receiving node decrypts and restores the data of S3 using the security parameter θ generated in S1. The information received by Bob in the second stage is:
Figure GDA00029644330400000716
wherein the content of the first and second substances,
Figure GDA00029644330400000717
for node i, i ∈ { A, B, E }, the kth subcarrier is connected in the r stageA received complex baseband signal; on the basis of the above-mentioned technical scheme,
Figure GDA0002964433040000081
is a K × 1 received signal vector;
Figure GDA0002964433040000082
i, j belongs to { A, B, E }, and represents a channel fading coefficient from a node i to a node j;
Figure GDA0002964433040000083
is complex base band Gaussian white noise received by a node i receiver on each subcarrier at the r stage and the variance is sigma2。
Bob employs locally generated ΘBMaximum likelihood reception of received information
Figure GDA0002964433040000084
Wherein
Figure GDA0002964433040000085
IK/UIs an identity matrix of order K/U.
I. And considering that the eavesdropping node adopts a decoy attack mode to carry out active eavesdropping. An eavesdropping node may transmit a signal of the same format as a legitimate receiving node by:
Figure GDA0002964433040000086
wherein the content of the first and second substances,
Figure GDA0002964433040000087
is a random complex number with U independent amplitudes of 1 generated by E each time and evenly distributed phases between (0, 2 pi), and K is required to be evenly divisible by U; r isE，uU is a number of U (K/U) × 1 vectors, customized by EEAnd selecting a safety protocol; rEθEIs a K x 1 vector with the K-th element beingEve is to modulate the signal of the k subcarrier; each 0 in the formula is an all zero vector of (K/U). times.1.
The information received by the first-stage information source node Alice is
Figure GDA0002964433040000088
Wherein
Figure GDA0002964433040000089
i, j ∈ { A, B, E }, which represents the channel fading coefficients from node i to node j.
When the Alice maximum likelihood receiver in stage S2 is
Figure GDA00029644330400000810
Seed for A and B and seed for EEDifferent from each other, so RBAnd REIn different, then rB，uAnd rE，uDifferent. By
Figure GDA00029644330400000811
The orthogonality of each element in the (A) shows that in the maximum likelihood receiver, Alice's recovered signal is only in accordance with rB，uThe carrier signal on the vector is correlated and the signal on the other vector space can be considered as noise. Therefore, the eavesdropping node cannot influence the estimation of the security parameters of the source node through the tricking attack.
And II, considering that the eavesdropping node carries out active eavesdropping by adopting a pilot frequency attack and decoy attack mode.
The pilot frequency attack means that in the channel estimation stage of Alice, Eve sends the same pilot frequency signal to induce Alice to estimate the channel information in error, so that Alice considers that the channel is HBA+HEA. Stage S2 Alice maximum likelihood receiver as
Figure GDA0002964433040000091
And III, taking passive wiretapping reception by the wiretapping node into consideration. The signal received by the eavesdropping node in the second stage is as follows:
Figure GDA0002964433040000092
wherein the content of the first and second substances,
Figure GDA0002964433040000093
for node i, i belongs to { A, B, E }, the complex baseband signal received on the kth subcarrier at the r stage; on the basis of the above-mentioned technical scheme,
Figure GDA0002964433040000094
is a K × 1 received signal vector;
Figure GDA0002964433040000095
i, j belongs to { A, B, E }, and represents a channel fading coefficient from a node i to a node j;
Figure GDA0002964433040000096
is complex base band Gaussian white noise received by a node i receiver on each subcarrier at the r stage and the variance is sigma2。
1) The case that Eve considers the self-spoofing attack to be effective:
at this point, Eve employs a maximum likelihood reception scheme similar to Bob receivers, namely:
Figure GDA0002964433040000097
wherein
Figure GDA0002964433040000098
IK/UIs an identity matrix of order K/U.
2) Case where Eve considers its own attack invalid:
at this time, Eve thinks that he cannot know the encryption parameters
Figure GDA0002964433040000099
Therefore, the received signal pair will be first of all
Figure GDA00029644330400000910
Performing linear estimation; second, reuse estimation
Figure GDA00029644330400000911
The data signal detection is completed. One encryption parameter protects a set of data (K/U) so for a parameter
Figure GDA00029644330400000912
We only need to focus on the signal of the corresponding sub-carrier.
At this point, assume that Eve adopts a one-dimensional search scheme, looking up such that
Figure GDA00029644330400000913
Closest to QPSK constellation
Figure GDA00029644330400000914
It is noted that the optimal solution under this problem must be four, i.e. four
Figure GDA00029644330400000915
All meet the requirement of "being closest to the QPSK constellation". Therefore, when Eve considers that the own attack is invalid, information stealing is difficult to realize through one-dimensional search.
The simulation result is shown in fig. 3, compared with the error rates of the eavesdropping node in different modes, it can be found that the error rates of Eve are not obviously improved by different attack modes; compared with the bit error rates of the legal receiving node Bob under different attacks, the bit error rate of Bob is improved as the Eve power is improved: only the influence of the decoy attack is minimum, only the influence of the pilot attack is second, and the influence of the two attack modes is maximum when the two attack modes are simultaneously used. According to the simulation experiment, the conclusion can be drawn that the eavesdropping of the information can not be realized through pilot frequency attack and decoy attack, and the active eavesdropping resistance of the application is remarkable.
Although the present application has been described above with reference to specific embodiments, those skilled in the art will recognize that many changes may be made in the configuration and details of the present application within the principles and scope of the present application. The scope of protection of the application is determined by the appended claims, and all changes that come within the meaning and range of equivalency of the technical features are intended to be embraced therein.

Claims (6)

1. An active eavesdropping resistant physical layer secure transmission method for an industrial Internet of things is characterized in that: the method comprises the following steps:
step 1): the method comprises the steps that a legal receiving node initiates orthogonal encryption distribution of security parameters;
orthogonal encryption matrix R generated by legal receiving node B based on a small amount of common information seedsBThe locally generated U random security parameters thetaB＝[θ1，θ2，...，θU]TCarrying out orthogonal encryption, and mapping U random security parameters subjected to orthogonal encryption to K subcarriers for transmission;
step 2): authenticating the orthogonal characteristic parameters to enable the information source node to recover the security parameters;
the information source node A generates an orthogonal encryption matrix R based on the same common information seeds of the legal receiving nodes BBPerforming maximum likelihood estimation on the received signal to obtain estimates of U security parameters
Figure FDA0003148594170000011
Step 3): the information source node initiates and carries out packet encryption transmission on the transmitted information by using the security parameters;
step 4): and the recovery of the data is completed by the legal receiving node.
2. The method for secure transmission of a physical layer resistant to active eavesdropping according to claim 1, wherein: the orthogonal encryption matrix RBIs a K × U order matrix of the form
Figure FDA0003148594170000012
Wherein r isB，uU is a number of vectors of U (K/U) × 1, and is selected by the source node a and the legitimate receiving node B through a common information seed and a security protocol; rBθBIs a K multiplied by 1 vector, the K element of which is the signal of the K subcarrier to be modulated by Bob; each 0 in the formula is an all-zero vector of (K/U) x 1;
orthogonal vector rB，uFrom a fixed set of perfect orthogonal vectors
Figure FDA0003148594170000016
Selecting, wherein the set internal vector satisfies:
Figure FDA0003148594170000013
Figure FDA0003148594170000014
3. the method for secure transmission of a physical layer resistant to active eavesdropping according to claim 1, wherein: the random security parameter θB＝[θB，1，θB，2，...，θB，U]T，
Figure FDA0003148594170000015
Is a random complex number with U independent amplitudes of 1, each time generated by B, and with uniformly distributed phases between (0, 2 pi), K being required to be divisible by U.
4. The method for secure transmission of a physical layer resistant to active eavesdropping according to claim 1, wherein: the U safety parameters in the step 3)
Figure FDA0003148594170000021
And carrying out packet encryption transmission on the sending information.
5. The method for secure transmission of a physical layer resistant to active eavesdropping according to claim 4, wherein: the encrypted transmission form is
Figure FDA0003148594170000022
Wherein the content of the first and second substances,
Figure FDA0003148594170000023
is paired by the source node A in the step 2)
Figure FDA0003148594170000024
Maximum likelihood estimation of (2); symbol
Figure FDA0003148594170000025
Is a K × 1 complex baseband data symbol.
6. The method for secure transmission of a physical layer resistant to active eavesdropping according to claim 1, wherein: and the legal receiving node decrypts and recovers the data in the step 3) by using the security parameter theta generated in the step 1).
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