CN111611603B - Safe volume production control equipment of SATA interface - Google Patents
Safe volume production control equipment of SATA interface Download PDFInfo
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- CN111611603B CN111611603B CN202010375180.7A CN202010375180A CN111611603B CN 111611603 B CN111611603 B CN 111611603B CN 202010375180 A CN202010375180 A CN 202010375180A CN 111611603 B CN111611603 B CN 111611603B
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- G—PHYSICS
- G06—COMPUTING; CALCULATING OR COUNTING
- G06F—ELECTRIC DIGITAL DATA PROCESSING
- G06F21/00—Security arrangements for protecting computers, components thereof, programs or data against unauthorised activity
- G06F21/60—Protecting data
- G06F21/602—Providing cryptographic facilities or services
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- G—PHYSICS
- G06—COMPUTING; CALCULATING OR COUNTING
- G06F—ELECTRIC DIGITAL DATA PROCESSING
- G06F21/00—Security arrangements for protecting computers, components thereof, programs or data against unauthorised activity
- G06F21/70—Protecting specific internal or peripheral components, in which the protection of a component leads to protection of the entire computer
- G06F21/71—Protecting specific internal or peripheral components, in which the protection of a component leads to protection of the entire computer to assure secure computing or processing of information
- G06F21/72—Protecting specific internal or peripheral components, in which the protection of a component leads to protection of the entire computer to assure secure computing or processing of information in cryptographic circuits
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- Y—GENERAL TAGGING OF NEW TECHNOLOGICAL DEVELOPMENTS; GENERAL TAGGING OF CROSS-SECTIONAL TECHNOLOGIES SPANNING OVER SEVERAL SECTIONS OF THE IPC; TECHNICAL SUBJECTS COVERED BY FORMER USPC CROSS-REFERENCE ART COLLECTIONS [XRACs] AND DIGESTS
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- Y02P—CLIMATE CHANGE MITIGATION TECHNOLOGIES IN THE PRODUCTION OR PROCESSING OF GOODS
- Y02P90/00—Enabling technologies with a potential contribution to greenhouse gas [GHG] emissions mitigation
- Y02P90/02—Total factory control, e.g. smart factories, flexible manufacturing systems [FMS] or integrated manufacturing systems [IMS]
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Abstract
The invention discloses a safe volume production control device of an SATA interface, which comprises a safe chip and an EMMC chip, wherein an RSA module, an AES module, an SMX module, the SATA module, the EMMC interface and an on-chip flash are arranged in the safe chip, and the EMMC interface is connected with the EMMC chip; host binding information, a signature private key, authority information, mass production firmware and a dll/lib interface are stored in the on-chip flash; the flash uses the ID of safety chip to encrypt the storage as the seed in the piece, and the volume production instrument sets up in the host computer, and the host computer passes through the private instruction communication with volume production controlgear to the host computer just can call the safe interface of encrypting in dll/lib after passing through the authority authentication, and the volume production firmware is read with the mode of encrypting after calling dll/lib interface, thereby realizes treating the safety of volume production equipment, controllable production. The invention prevents firmware from being stolen, ensures that the production of the product is controllable and the quality is controllable, and thus inhibits piracy.
Description
Technical Field
The invention relates to safe mass production control equipment for SATA interfaces, belonging to the technical field of chip safe production.
Background
With the progress and large-scale popularization of intelligent electronic equipment, piracy of processing, producing and refreshing the original factory firmware through a copy board is achieved nowadays. Especially, a large amount of pirated products enter the market, the product quality cannot be guaranteed, the benefits of the original product factories are easily damaged, and for safe products, the safety of enterprises, industries and even countries can be damaged under the condition.
Disclosure of Invention
The technical problem to be solved by the invention is to provide a safe volume production control device of the SATA interface, which prevents firmware from being stolen, ensures that the production of products is controllable and the quality of the products is controllable, and thus inhibits piracy.
In order to solve the technical problem, the technical scheme adopted by the invention is as follows: a safe volume production control device of an SATA interface comprises a safe chip and an EMMC chip, wherein an RSA module, an AES module, an SMX module, the SATA module, the EMMC interface and an on-chip flash are arranged in the safe chip, and the EMMC interface is connected with the EMMC chip; host binding information, a signature private key, authority information, mass production firmware and a dll/lib interface are stored in the on-chip flash; the piece is interior flash and is encrypted the storage with the ID of safety chip as the seed, and the volume production instrument sets up in the host computer, and the host computer passes through the private instruction communication with volume production controlgear to the host computer just can call the safe interface of encrypting in dll/lib after passing through the authority authentication, and the volume production instrument calls dll/lib interface after and reads the volume production firmware of volume production controlgear with encrypted mode, thereby realize treating the safety of volume production equipment, controllable production.
Further, the private instruction uses the designated LBA range as an identifier, and is divided into a write instruction and a read instruction, the data content of the first data packet and the last data packet of each instruction includes specific identification information h, and the data content with the legal identification information indicates that the instruction is a correct instruction for reading and writing the mass production control device.
Further, cipher text transmission is adopted in a data transmitting stage of the private instruction, a and b are generated in the first data packet, c = a xor b is calculated, n is generated by calculating the data packet plaintext m and c each time data is transmitted, n = m xor c is calculated, and after a receiving party receives n, m = n xor c is calculated to obtain the plaintext m.
Further, the process of the mass production tool reading the mass production firmware of the safe mass production control equipment in an encrypted manner is as follows: a1, the mass production control equipment generates random numbers; a2, calling an interface in dll/lib by a mass production tool to read a group of random numbers; a3, the mass production tool calls an interface in dll/lib to read the RSA signature private key and sign a random number, and sends the random number to mass production control equipment; a4, the mass production control equipment reads an RSA signature public key signature preset in the mass production control equipment; a5, after the signature verification is successful, the equipment where the mass production tool is located is reliable, dll/lib pre-stored information is consistent with mass production control equipment information, and safe connection between the mass production control equipment and the mass production tool is established; a6, the mass production tool generates a group of RSA key pairs including a public key r _ pub and a private key r _ pn, and sends the public key r _ pub to mass production control equipment; a7, the mass production control equipment generates a group of key keys for encrypting the mass production firmware and generating a sequencing factor x; a8, the mass production control equipment encrypts keys and x through the public key r _ pub to obtain s _ keys, and a9, the mass production tool decrypts the s _ keys by using the public key r _ pub to obtain keys and x; a10, encrypting mass production firmware stored in mass production control equipment by AES by using keys, and transmitting the firmware out of order according to x; a11, reading a mass production firmware ciphertext through AES decryption by using a key, and reordering mass production firmware according to x; a12, decrypting to obtain correct mass production firmware, and burning the mass production firmware into the equipment to be mass produced.
Further, the process of authority authentication is as follows: the method comprises the steps that a host where a volume production tool is located needs to be bound when volume production control equipment is used for the first time, a CPU serial number, a hard disk serial number and a mainboard serial number of the host are stored in a flash chip, then, during volume production each time, host information where the volume production tool is located and the host stored in the flash chip are compared, whether the host is bound or not is detected, if the host is bound, dll/lib in the volume production control equipment is read, loading is carried out in the memory, after authorization information is input, a dll/lib password interface can be opened, and subsequent volume production firmware reading safety volume production control equipment in an encrypted mode is carried out.
Furthermore, after the mass production control equipment is bound with the host, mass production firmware is not allowed to be updated, and after the host is unbound, all information of flash in the chip is destroyed and needs to be injected again, so that the mass production control equipment can be reused.
Furthermore, the EMMC chip is used for recording mass production information, after each mass production, a mass production tool can automatically acquire relevant information of mass production equipment, and data stored in the EMMC chip is encrypted and stored through an AES hardware module of mass production control equipment.
The invention has the beneficial effects that: the invention ensures the safety of mass production firmware through mass production control equipment with an SATA interface, the equipment comprises the functions of binding of an equipment host, encrypted communication, out-of-order transmission, automatic destruction, mass production recording and the like, the interface encryption of the mass production control equipment is called and stored in Flash in a piece of the mass production control equipment, dll/lib is ensured to be in one-to-one correspondence with the mass production control equipment through a signature mechanism, the equipment can be used as basic equipment for safety mass production and is adaptive to manufacturers to ensure the permission of products, and the safety of production can be greatly improved in industries and fields with higher safety requirements, such as military industry, finance, business secrets and other fields with higher requirements on safety, and the scheme is safe and flexible and has wider market prospect.
Drawings
FIG. 1 is a schematic block diagram of the present apparatus;
FIG. 2 is a flow chart of safe mass production;
FIG. 3 is a functional block diagram of an on-chip flash;
FIG. 4 is a flow diagram of a private write instruction;
FIG. 5 is a flow chart of a private read instruction.
Detailed Description
The invention is further described with reference to the following figures and specific embodiments.
Example 1
The embodiment discloses a safe mass production control device with a SATA interface, as shown in fig. 1, including a security chip and an EMMC chip. In this embodiment, the security chip has a model of HX8800, and supports SATA3.0 interfaces and EMMC interfaces, and hardware supports cryptographic algorithms (SMX for short) such as SM2 and SM4, and international algorithms such as AES and RSA. As shown in fig. 1, an RSA module, an AES module, an SMX module, an SATA module, an EMMC interface, and an on-chip flash are provided in the security chip, and the EMMC interface is interconnected with the EMMC chip. The method provides a set of interface (dll/lib for short) operation mass production control equipment which can be called by an upper computer, wherein the interface is stored in Flash in a chip before leaving a factory and can be used only through specific private instruction and authority authentication. The CPU serial number, the hard disk serial number and the mainboard serial number of the machine are bound when the mass production control equipment is used for the first time. Before the mass production tool is used, a person with a certain authority needs to input a password, and then a safety encryption and decryption interface in dll/lib can be called. The mass production firmware needs to be analyzed through a certain safety mechanism, and the safety process of firmware burning is realized through methods of encrypted transmission, interference item incorporation, firmware out-of-order transmission and the like.
The device realizes the safe and controllable mass production of products to be produced through an on-chip storage management mechanism, a private instruction mechanism, a firmware safety mechanism, a dll/lib use mechanism and a production record mechanism.
The on-chip storage management mechanism means that a certain storage space (on-chip Flash) is arranged in the mass production control equipment to store host binding information, signature private key information, storage lib/dll, mass production firmware and authority information, as shown in fig. 3. This storage space is encrypted the storage with chip ID of HX8800 as the seed, the host computer information that volume production instrument place needs to be bound for the first time use, CPU serial number with the host computer, hard disk serial number and mainboard serial number storage are in the piece flash, later during the production at every turn, all compare volume production instrument place host computer information and the host computer of storage in the piece flash, whether detect for binding the host computer, volume production controlgear binds behind the host computer, the volume production firmware is not allowed to be updated, after unbinding the host computer, all information are destroyed, need reinject, volume production controlgear just can reuse.
The mass production control equipment is used as SATA equipment to be connected into a computer, and the standard SATA read-write instruction of the host is not allowed
Xu Douxie mass production control equipment only allows custom private instructions. The private instruction is divided into a write instruction (from the host to the device) and a read instruction (from the device to the host) by using a specified LBA (Logical Block Address) range as an identifier. As shown in fig. 4 and 5, the data content of the first data packet and the last data packet of each instruction includes specific identification information h, and the legal identification information is the correct instruction. And in the data sending stage, ciphertext transmission is adopted, a first data packet generates a and b, and the plaintext m and c of the data packet are calculated to generate n (n = m xor c) each time c = a xor b is calculated and data is sent. And after receiving n, the receiving party performs the same operation of m = n xor c to obtain a plaintext m. Private commands increase the concealment during transmission. The instruction identifier is used for distinguishing whether the read-write of the LBA is the read-write of the system standard SATA or the read-write of the private instruction, so that the private instruction is prevented from being triggered by mistake by the unconscious LBA read-write operation of the system.
The firmware safety mechanism is used for ensuring the safety of the mass production firmware, firstly, the mass production firmware is encrypted and stored in the HX8800 chip by taking the chip ID as a seed, the outside is difficult to crack, and the mass production control equipment is required to analyze and store the firmware of the Flash in the chip according to the ID to obtain the firmware plaintext each time. Secondly, the process that the mass production tool reads the mass production firmware in the mass production control equipment is encrypted, and the key and the sequencing factor x are randomly generated by the mass production control equipment each time and are transmitted through RSA key encryption. The mass production control equipment transmits the firmware in a segmented out-of-order mode according to x, encrypts the data packet through the key, and the mass production tool decrypts the data packet through the key and sorts the received firmware packet according to x. Each generation of keys and x greatly increases the difficulty of parsing the firmware plaintext by listening to the channel.
As shown in fig. 2, the specific process of safe mass production is as follows:
a1, a mass production tool sends a CPU serial number, a hard disk serial number and a mainboard serial number of the mass production tool to mass production control equipment, and the mass production control equipment verifies whether the CPU serial number, the hard disk serial number and the mainboard serial number are consistent with host binding information stored in the mass production control equipment or not; a2, if the verification result is always, the volume production tool reads dll/lib in the volume production control equipment, loads the dll/lib in the volume production control equipment, and inputs authorization information so that the dll/lib password interface can be opened; a3, the mass production control equipment generates random numbers; a4, calling an interface in dll/lib by a mass production tool to read a group of random numbers; a5, the mass production tool calls an interface in dll/lib to read the RSA signature private key and sign a random number, and sends the random number to mass production control equipment; a6, the mass production control equipment reads an RSA signature public key signature preset in the mass production control equipment; a7, after the signature verification is successful, the equipment where the mass production tool is located is reliable, dll/lib pre-stored information is consistent with mass production control equipment information, and safe connection between the mass production control equipment and the mass production tool is established; a8, the mass production tool generates a group of RSA key pairs including a public key r _ pub and a private key r _ pn, and sends the public key r _ pub to mass production control equipment; a10, the mass production control equipment encrypts keys and x through the public key r _ pub to obtain s _ keys, and a11, the mass production tool decrypts the s _ keys by using the public key r _ pub to obtain keys and x; a12, encrypting the mass production firmware stored in the mass production control equipment by AES by using keys, and transmitting the firmware out of order according to x; a13, reading a mass production firmware cipher text through AES decryption by using a key, and reordering mass production firmware according to x; a14, decrypting to obtain correct mass production firmware, and burning the mass production firmware into the equipment to be mass produced.
Therefore, the safety volume production process integrates authority verification and encryption reading, and the safety of the volume production firmware is ensured.
In this embodiment, the dll/lib is stored in the mass production control device, and is only loaded into the memory of the host through a specific instruction, but not stored into the file system of the host, so that it is ensured that a third party cannot obtain the content of the dll/lib. Before use, dll/lib needs to input authorization information, and the corresponding interface can be used only if the authorization information is correct. Each device of dll/lib signature keys is different, signature private keys of RSA are solidified into a program in the process of compiling dll/lib, signature verification public keys of the mass production control devices are stored in Flash in the chips, and dll/lib among the mass production control devices is guaranteed to be not universal. The authorization information of dll/lib is cracked through an exhaustion method, a destruction mechanism of the mass production control equipment is triggered, the whole mass production control equipment is destroyed, and the safety of mass production firmware is guaranteed.
To enhance the mass production management, the EMMC (a storage medium) of the mass production control equipment is used to record mass production information, and after each mass production, the mass production tool automatically writes the information related to the mass production equipment: such as time, batch, version, etc. may customize the data content. The data stored in the EMMC are stored in an encrypted mode through an AES hardware module of the mass production control equipment, and the EMMC can not acquire the plaintext when disassembled, so that each equipment can be traced back to the source and the responsible person. And the quality control of the product is enhanced.
The following situations can be avoided by using the equipment:
1. for the instruction LBA address, not including the identification information, the system write operation is called, the instruction is invalid, and the pin
For a specified LBA address, no identification information is included; and calling system reading operation, wherein the read data is invalid data.
2. If the authorization is not passed through dll/lib, the signature interface is called to prompt no authority and the instruction fails. Inputting wrong authorization information for many times, removing all information in the Flash by the mass production control equipment, and re-injecting a secret key, mass production firmware, dll/lib, authority information and the like.
3. In the process of reading the mass production firmware, using wrong keys, splicing the mass production firmware in sequence by adopting a sorting factor x, and downloading the mass production firmware into equipment, wherein the mass production firmware is invalid; and splicing the mass production firmware by using a correct key and adopting an incorrect sorting factor x sequence, and downloading the mass production firmware into the equipment, wherein the mass production firmware is invalid.
4. And removing the EMMC particles, reading the content in the EMM through a third-party chip, reading the encrypted data, and failing to analyze the content.
The invention ensures the safety of mass production firmware through mass production control equipment with an SATA interface, the equipment comprises the functions of binding of an equipment host, encrypted communication, out-of-order transmission, automatic destruction, mass production recording and the like, the interface of the mass production control equipment is called to be encrypted and stored in Flash in a piece of the mass production control equipment, dll/lib is ensured to be in one-to-one correspondence with the mass production control equipment through a signature mechanism, the equipment can be used as basic equipment for safe mass production, is adaptive to manufacturers, ensures the permission of products, and can greatly improve the safety of production in industries and fields with higher safety requirements, such as military industry, finance, business secrets and other fields with higher requirements on safety, and the scheme is safe and flexible and has wider market prospect.
The foregoing description is only for the basic principle and the preferred embodiments of the present invention, and modifications and substitutions by those skilled in the art according to the present invention belong to the protection scope of the present invention.
Claims (7)
1. The utility model provides a safe volume production controlgear of SATA interface which characterized in that: the security chip is internally provided with an RSA module, an AES module, an SMX module, an SATA module, an EMMC interface and an on-chip flash, and the EMMC interface is interconnected with the EMMC chip; host binding information, a signature private key, authority information, mass production firmware and a dll/lib interface are stored in the on-chip flash; the method comprises the steps that an on-chip flash is encrypted and stored by taking the ID of a safety chip as a seed, a mass production tool is arranged in an upper computer, the upper computer is communicated with mass production control equipment through a private instruction, the upper computer can call a safety encryption and decryption interface in dll/lib after passing authority authentication, and the mass production tool reads mass production firmware of the mass production control equipment in an encrypted mode after calling the dll/lib interface, so that the safe and controllable production of the mass production equipment is realized; the process of the volume production tool reading the volume production firmware of the safe volume production control equipment in an encrypted mode is as follows: a1, the mass production control equipment generates random numbers; a2, calling an interface in dll/lib by a mass production tool to read a group of random numbers; a3, the mass production tool calls an interface in dll/lib to read the RSA signature private key and sign a random number, and sends the random number to mass production control equipment; a4, the mass production control equipment reads an RSA signature public key signature preset in the mass production control equipment; a5, after the signature verification is successful, the equipment where the mass production tool is located is reliable, dll/lib pre-stored information is consistent with mass production control equipment information, and safe connection between the mass production control equipment and the mass production tool is established; a6, the mass production tool generates a group of RSA key pairs including a public key r _ pub and a private key r _ pn, and sends the public key r _ pub to mass production control equipment; a7, the mass production control equipment generates a group of key for encrypting the mass production firmware and generating a sequencing factor x; a8, the mass production control equipment encrypts keys and x through the public key r _ pub to obtain s _ keys, and a9, the mass production tool decrypts the s _ keys by using the public key r _ pub to obtain keys and x; a10, encrypting mass production firmware stored in mass production control equipment by AES by using keys, and transmitting the firmware out of order according to x; a11, reading a mass production firmware ciphertext through AES decryption by using a key, and reordering mass production firmware according to x; and a12, decrypting to obtain correct mass production firmware, and burning the mass production firmware into the equipment to be mass produced.
2. The safe mass production control equipment of the SATA interface as recited in claim 1, wherein: the private instruction takes the appointed LBA range as an identifier and is divided into a writing instruction and a reading instruction, the data contents of the first data packet and the last data packet of each instruction contain specific identification information h, and the data contents with legal identification information are represented as the instructions of the correct reading-writing mass production control equipment.
3. The safe mass production control equipment of the SATA interface as recited in claim 2, wherein: and in the stage of sending data by the private instruction, ciphertext transmission is adopted, a first data packet generates a and b, c = a xor b is calculated, when data is sent each time, plaintext m and c of the data packet are calculated to generate n, n = m xor c, and after a receiver receives n, m = n xor c is calculated to obtain the plaintext m.
4. A safe mass production control apparatus of a SATA interface as recited in claim 1, wherein: the process of authority authentication is as follows: the method comprises the steps that when the mass production control equipment is used for the first time, the information of a host where a mass production tool is located needs to be bound, a CPU serial number, a hard disk serial number and a mainboard serial number of the host are stored in a flash chip, then during each mass production, the information of the host where the mass production tool is located and the host stored in the flash chip are compared, whether the host is bound or not is detected, if the host is bound, dll/lib in the mass production control equipment is read, loading is carried out in the memory, after authorization information is input, a dll/lib password interface can be opened, and subsequent mass production firmware reading safety mass production control equipment in an encrypted mode is carried out.
5. The safe mass production control equipment of the SATA interface as recited in claim 4, wherein: after the mass production control equipment is bound with the host, mass production firmware is not allowed to be updated, after the host is unbound, all information of flash in the chip is destroyed, and the mass production control equipment can be reused after reinjection is needed.
6. The safe mass production control equipment of the SATA interface as recited in claim 1, wherein: the EMMC chip is used for recording the volume production information, after each volume production, the volume production tool can automatically output the relevant information of the volume production equipment, and the data stored in the EMMC chip is encrypted and stored through an AES hardware module of the volume production control equipment.
7. The safe mass production control equipment of the SATA interface as recited in claim 1, wherein: the type of the security chip is HX8800.
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