CN111585752B - Identity authentication-based semi-quantum conversation method - Google Patents

Identity authentication-based semi-quantum conversation method Download PDF

Info

Publication number
CN111585752B
CN111585752B CN202010345424.7A CN202010345424A CN111585752B CN 111585752 B CN111585752 B CN 111585752B CN 202010345424 A CN202010345424 A CN 202010345424A CN 111585752 B CN111585752 B CN 111585752B
Authority
CN
China
Prior art keywords
quantum
party
classical
sequence
qubit
Prior art date
Legal status (The legal status is an assumption and is not a legal conclusion. Google has not performed a legal analysis and makes no representation as to the accuracy of the status listed.)
Active
Application number
CN202010345424.7A
Other languages
Chinese (zh)
Other versions
CN111585752A (en
Inventor
王明明
刘俊丽
Current Assignee (The listed assignees may be inaccurate. Google has not performed a legal analysis and makes no representation or warranty as to the accuracy of the list.)
Xian Polytechnic University
Original Assignee
Xian Polytechnic University
Priority date (The priority date is an assumption and is not a legal conclusion. Google has not performed a legal analysis and makes no representation as to the accuracy of the date listed.)
Filing date
Publication date
Application filed by Xian Polytechnic University filed Critical Xian Polytechnic University
Priority to CN202010345424.7A priority Critical patent/CN111585752B/en
Publication of CN111585752A publication Critical patent/CN111585752A/en
Application granted granted Critical
Publication of CN111585752B publication Critical patent/CN111585752B/en
Active legal-status Critical Current
Anticipated expiration legal-status Critical

Links

Images

Classifications

    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
    • H04L9/00—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols
    • H04L9/08—Key distribution or management, e.g. generation, sharing or updating, of cryptographic keys or passwords
    • H04L9/0816—Key establishment, i.e. cryptographic processes or cryptographic protocols whereby a shared secret becomes available to two or more parties, for subsequent use
    • H04L9/0852—Quantum cryptography
    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
    • H04L63/00—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security
    • H04L63/08—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security for authentication of entities
    • H04L63/083—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security for authentication of entities using passwords
    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
    • H04L9/00—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols
    • H04L9/08—Key distribution or management, e.g. generation, sharing or updating, of cryptographic keys or passwords
    • H04L9/0816—Key establishment, i.e. cryptographic processes or cryptographic protocols whereby a shared secret becomes available to two or more parties, for subsequent use

Landscapes

  • Engineering & Computer Science (AREA)
  • Computer Security & Cryptography (AREA)
  • Computer Networks & Wireless Communication (AREA)
  • Signal Processing (AREA)
  • Physics & Mathematics (AREA)
  • Electromagnetism (AREA)
  • Theoretical Computer Science (AREA)
  • Computer Hardware Design (AREA)
  • Computing Systems (AREA)
  • General Engineering & Computer Science (AREA)
  • Optical Communication System (AREA)

Abstract

The invention discloses a method of half quantum conversation based on identity authentication, which comprises the steps that firstly, a quantum party and a classical party share a random binary string in advance, then the quantum party prepares a quantum bit, and then a quantum party identity sequence and secret information are sent to the classical party through the quantum bit; then the classical party carries out identity authentication on the sent identity sequence and the secret message, then carries out coding and safety detection on the identity sequence and the secret message of the classical party, and feeds back the identity sequence and the secret message to the quantum party; and finally, the quantum party receives the feedback information, authenticates the identity of the classical party, detects the safety of a channel, finally decodes the secret information of the other party by the quantum party and the classical party respectively, and is realized by using a single photon source and a single photon detector, so that the technology is mature, and meanwhile, the classical party is realized without using a quantum register. The identity authentication enables the protocol to effectively resist malicious attacks such as man-in-the-middle attack, imitation attack and the like.

Description

Semi-quantum conversation method based on identity authentication
Technical Field
The invention belongs to the technical field of quantum secret communication, and relates to a semi-quantum conversation method based on identity authentication.
Background
In recent years, quantum computing has created a great threat to traditional cryptography based on computational complexity with superior computational power. Meanwhile, quantum cryptography can realize theoretically unconditional secure communication by using the quantum mechanics principle. Since its inception, quantum cryptography has led researchers to extensive research both in theory and experiment, and has yielded many interesting branches, such as Quantum Key Distribution (QKD) [1-4], quantum Secret Sharing (QSS) [5-7], quantum Secure Direct Communication (QSDC) [8-10], quantum Identity Authentication (QIA) [11-13], and so on.
QKD addresses the establishment of a random series of keys between two remote communicants through quantum signaling. The difference between QSDC and QKD is that during the communication process of QSDC, both parties do not need to generate a secret key in advance, but communicate by directly establishing a quantum channel, and the secure transmission of secret messages is directly completed. Since QSDC was proposed, QSDC protocols based on different quantum resources were proposed [8-10,14,15], and related experiments were also proved [16-18]. With the development of QSDC, nguyen et al first proposed a bi-directional QSDC protocol in 2004 [19] in which both the sender and receiver can exchange their secret messages simultaneously, hence the protocol is also known as Quantum Dialog (QD). Since then, QDs have led to extensive research by both domestic and foreign scholars. Unfortunately, in 2008, tan et al [20] and Gao et al [21] indicated that early QD protocols [19,22-27] suffered from problems of "classical correlation" or "information leakage", i.e., any eavesdropper could extract information about the transmitted secret message from the classical communication of a legitimate user. In view of this, the scholars have proposed a number of QD protocols [28-46] that overcome the problems of "classical correlation" or "information leakage". It is worth noting that Quantum Identity Authentication (QIA) is an important subject of QD, and two communication parties can verify the identity of the other party through quantum identity authentication, so as to effectively resist man-in-the-middle attacks and simulation attacks in the communication process, and improve the security of the protocol. In view of this, many QD protocols with authentication functions have been proposed [32,35,37,40,43,46-48].
In order to realize the quantum cryptography protocol, saving the quantum resources and the classical resources used in the quantum cryptography protocol is a considerable problem. In early practical quantum networks, it was possible that not every participant had expensive quantum resources and skilled quantum state manipulation techniques. Based on this fact, in 2007, boyer et al [49] proposed a novel idea (i.e., the BKM2007 protocol) that could reduce the quantum capacity of one of the participants. Since the operations performed by the receiver throughout the protocol are similar to the classical operations, which is also known as the semi-quantum Key Distribution (SQKD) protocol, the receiver is referred to as the "classical party" and the Z-base is referred to as the classical base. In 2009, boyer et al extended the original half-quantum key distribution protocol with a measurement retransmission and randomization strategy [50]. Thereafter, various SQKD protocols have been proposed [51-55]. Besides SQKD, the idea of half quantum is also applied to other half quantum secret communication protocols, such as half quantum secret sharing [56-59], half quantum information segmentation [60], half quantum secret comparison [61], half quantum identity authentication [62,63], half quantum secure direct communication [41,64-68] and half quantum conversation [41-43], etc.;
in the aspect of semi-quantum conversation, the first SQD protocol was proposed by Shukla et al [41] in 2017 based on Bell states. Ye et al [42] in 2018 proposed a single photon based SQD protocol. In the same year, liu et al [43] proposed an SQD protocol with identity authentication function based on logical qubits, and two classical players of the protocol can implement message exchange in noisy environments by delegating quantum computation to one quantum player. In the three half-quantum conversation protocols described above, classical parties need to have the capability to store qubits, i.e., quantum memory is essential to classical players, which is very challenging to them in real life. Aiming at the problems, the invention provides a method of half quantum conversation based on identity authentication, wherein a classical party does not need to use quantum storage, and the realization of communication is simplified. Meanwhile, the system has the functions of identity authentication and message authentication, and can resist man-in-the-middle attacks and ensure the integrity of messages.
Disclosure of Invention
The invention aims to provide a method for half-quantum conversation based on identity authentication, which realizes bidirectional communication and authentication of a quantum party and a classical party.
The invention adopts the technical scheme that a method for semi-quantum conversation based on identity authentication specifically comprises the following steps:
step 1, a quantum party and a classical party share a random binary string in advance, then the quantum party prepares a quantum bit, and then a quantum party identity sequence and a secret message are sent to the classical party through the quantum bit;
step 2, the classical party performs identity authentication on the identity sequence and the secret message sent in the step 1, then performs encoding and security detection on the identity sequence and the secret message of the classical party, and feeds back the identity sequence and the secret message to the quantum party;
and 3, the quantum party receives the information fed back in the step 2, authenticates the identity of the classical party, detects the safety of a channel, and finally decodes the secret message of the other party by the quantum party and the classical party respectively.
The invention is also characterized in that:
wherein the specific implementation mode of the step 1 comprises the following steps:
step 1.1, a quantum party and a classical party share a random binary string in advance, and then the quantum party prepares a quantum bit;
step 1.2, the qubits prepared in step 1 are classified;
step 1.3, the quantum party sends the identity sequence and the secret message by combining the quantum bit classified in the step 1.2;
wherein the random binary string in step 1.1 is K = { K = 1 ,k 2 ,…,k 2L Where L =2 (n + L) (1 + δ), n is ID A And ID B Length, ID of A Is a classical square identity sequence, ID B Is a quantum square identity sequence, ID A ＝{a 1 ,a 2 ,…,a n }，ID B ＝{b 1 ,b 2 ,…,b n In which a is i ,b i ∈{0,1},i∈{1,2,…,n}；
l is M A And M B Length of (C), M A Being a secret message of a classical party, M B Is a secret message of the quantum party,
Figure BDA0002470016600000041
δ>0 is a fixed parameter;
wherein the specific content of the quantum bit prepared by the quantum party in the step 1.1 is as follows:
quantum method for preparing L =2 (n + L) (1 + delta) single photon composition sequence A according to K, if (K) 2i-1 ,k 2i ) = (0, 0), quantum-square preparation |0>The ith qubit as sequence A; if (k) 2i-1 ,k 2i ) = (0, 1), quantum method preparation |1>The ith qubit as sequence A; if (k) 2i-1 ,k 2i ) = (1, 0), quantum preparation | +>The ith qubit as sequence A; if (k) 2i-1 ,k 2i ) =1, quantum preparation | ->The ith qubit as sequence A; wherein i ∈ (1, 2, \8230;, L); finally, dividing the sequence A into two subsequences A Z And A X Wherein A is Z Represents all |0 s in sequence A>And |1>；A X Represents all | +in the sequence A>And | ->Wherein | A Z |>(n+l)；
The specific content of the quantum bit classification in step 1.2 is as follows: a is to be Z Into two setsClosing box
Figure BDA0002470016600000042
And
Figure BDA0002470016600000043
the division method is A Z Is divided into sets
Figure BDA0002470016600000044
For AUTH qubits, for encoding the identity sequences ID of the classical party and the quantum party A And ID B (ii) a Dividing even numbered qubits into sets
Figure BDA0002470016600000045
For ENCODE qubits, secret messages M for encoding classical and quantum parties A And M B ；
Quantum prescription A z The remaining qubits in are defined as
Figure BDA0002470016600000046
A is prepared from X Is marked as
Figure BDA0002470016600000051
Figure BDA0002470016600000052
And
Figure BDA0002470016600000053
collectively referred to as CTRL qubits, for detecting the security of the quantum channel;
the specific content of the step 1.3 is as follows: set of quantum parties
Figure BDA0002470016600000054
Encodes his identity sequence ID B If b is i =0, rest, if b i =1, quantum side will qubit flip, i.e. quantum side will
Figure BDA0002470016600000055
The ith qubit in (a) is prepared as
Figure BDA0002470016600000056
The quantum is as follows
Figure BDA0002470016600000057
Up-coding secret message M B If, if
Figure BDA0002470016600000058
Is laid aside if
Figure BDA0002470016600000059
The quantum square will flip the qubit, i.e. the quantum square will
Figure BDA00024700166000000510
The ith qubit in (a) is prepared as
Figure BDA00024700166000000511
Where j is the position of the qubit in sequence A;
the specific content of the step 2 is as follows:
step 2.1, measuring each AUTH quantum bit by the classical method, and recording the measurement result as
Figure BDA00024700166000000512
Detection of
Figure BDA00024700166000000513
Whether or not to correspond to the ID at the corresponding position B Matching with K, if the error rate exceeds the preset threshold value P t The classical party terminates the protocol;
if the detection is normal, the identity sequence ID is coded on the detected result state by the classical party A Then return them to the quantum party;
step 2.2, the classical party measures each ENCODE qubit and records the measurement as
Figure BDA00024700166000000514
If the measurement result of the ith ENCODE qubit
Figure BDA00024700166000000515
Is |0>If the measurement result is 0, the measurement result of the ith ENCODE qubit
Figure BDA00024700166000000516
Is |1>The measurement result is represented as 1; then the classical party according to K and M A Preparing new ENCODE qubit, i.e. preparing the ith ENCODE qubit
Figure BDA00024700166000000517
Wherein j is the position of the qubit in A, the classical party returning the ENCODE qubit to the quantum party;
step 2.3, the classical party reflects each CTRL qubit to the quantum party without modification;
the concrete content of the step 3 is as follows:
and 3.1, the quantum side sequentially stores the quantum bits returned by the classical side according to the return sequence, then extracts the AUTH and CTRL quantum bits returned by the classical side and measures through the prepared quantum state base, and the measurement results are respectively expressed as
Figure BDA0002470016600000061
And
Figure BDA0002470016600000062
will be provided with
Figure BDA0002470016600000063
With the corresponding ID A Comparing with K, if the error rate is lower than P t Confirming the identity of the classical party to measure, otherwise, the quantum party terminates the protocol and publishes error information by the authenticated classical channel;
in the same way, will
Figure BDA0002470016600000064
Comparing with K, if the error rate is lower than P t Quantum accuracyThe channel is considered to be safe to carry out the next operation, otherwise, the protocol is terminated, and error information is published by the authenticated classical channel;
step 3.2, quantum square K and
Figure BDA0002470016600000065
decoding to obtain a message to be sent to him by the classical party, of
Figure BDA0002470016600000066
Wherein
Figure BDA0002470016600000067
The ith measurement of the ENCODE qubit, measured by the classical party, j representing the position of the ENCODE qubit in sequence a,
Figure BDA0002470016600000068
an ith secret message sent to Alice for Bob;
k for classical prescription and
Figure BDA0002470016600000069
decode to get the message that the quantum party is to send to her
Figure BDA00024700166000000610
Figure BDA00024700166000000611
Wherein
Figure BDA00024700166000000612
The ith measurement result of the ENCODE qubit measured for the classical party;
wherein, in step 1, when the classical party receives the sequence code sent by the quantum party, a wavelength filter is placed in front of the quantum bit receiving device.
The beneficial effects of the invention are:
the identity authentication-based semi-quantum conversation method is realized by using a single photon source and a single photon detector, the technology is mature, and a quantum register is not needed for the realization of a classical party. The identity authentication enables the protocol to effectively resist malicious attacks such as man-in-the-middle attack, imitation attack and the like.
Drawings
Fig. 1 is a flow chart of the work flow of the semi-quantum conversation system based on the identity authentication in the semi-quantum conversation method based on the identity authentication of the invention.
Detailed Description
The present invention will be described in detail below with reference to the accompanying drawings and specific embodiments.
The two communication parties are a classical party Alice and a quantum party Bob, and the Alice and the Bob want to exchange secret messages of each other safely by using single photons
Figure BDA0002470016600000071
And
Figure BDA0002470016600000072
alice and Bob share their identity sequence IDs A ＝{a 1 ,a 2 ,…,a n And ID B ＝{b 1 ,b 2 ,…,b n In which a is i ,b i Belongs to {0,1}, i belongs to {1,2, \8230;, n }; meanwhile, alice and Bob share a random binary string K = { K ] in advance 1 ,k 2 ,…,k 2L Where L =2 (n + L) (1 + δ), n is ID A And ID B L is M A And M B Length of (d), δ>0 is a fixed parameter, assuming that the quantum channel is lossless and noise-free.
The invention provides a method of semi-quantum conversation based on identity authentication, which is implemented according to the following steps as shown in figure 1:
step 1, a quantum party and a classical party share a random binary string in advance, then the quantum party prepares a quantum bit, and then the quantum party identity sequence and a secret message are sent to the classical party through the quantum bit:
step 1.1, a quantum party and a classical party share a random binary string in advance, and then the quantum party prepares a quantum bit:
quantum recipe L =2 (n + L) (1 + δ) prepared according to KA single photon constituting the sequence A, if (k) 2i-1 ,k 2i ) = (0, 0), quantum-square preparation |0>The ith qubit as sequence A; if (k) 2i-1 ,k 2i ) = (0, 1), quantum-square preparation |1>The ith qubit as sequence A; if (k) 2i-1 ,k 2i ) = (1, 0), quantum side preparation | +>The ith qubit as sequence A; if (k) 2i-1 ,k 2i ) =1, quantum preparation | ->The ith qubit as sequence A; wherein i ∈ (1, 2, \8230;, L); finally, dividing the sequence A into two subsequences A Z And A X Wherein A is Z Represents all |0 s in sequence A>And |1>；A X Represents all | +in sequence A>And | ->In order to make the communication proceed smoothly, | A Z |>(n+l)；
Step 1.2, the qubits prepared in step 1 are classified:
a is to be Z Into two sets
Figure BDA0002470016600000073
And
Figure BDA0002470016600000074
the division method is A Z Is divided into sets
Figure BDA0002470016600000081
For AUTH qubits, for encoding the identity sequences ID of the classical party and the quantum party A And ID B (ii) a Dividing the even number of qubits into sets
Figure BDA0002470016600000082
For ENCODE qubits, secret messages M for encoding classical and quantum parties A And M B (ii) a Until one set is full, the rest quanta bits are all divided into another set
Quantum prescription A z The remaining qubits in are defined as
Figure BDA0002470016600000083
A is prepared from X Is marked as
Figure BDA0002470016600000084
Figure BDA0002470016600000085
And
Figure BDA0002470016600000086
collectively known as CTRL qubits, for detecting the security of the quantum channel.
Step 1.3, the quantum party sends the identity sequence and the secret message by combining the quantum bit classified in the step 1.2:
quantum in set
Figure BDA0002470016600000087
Wherein his identity sequence ID is encoded B If b is i Not to operate, if b i =1, quantum side flip quantum bit (K and ID) B Combined these qubits can be generated directly in step 1.1), i.e. the quantum party will
Figure BDA0002470016600000088
The ith qubit in (a) is prepared as
Figure BDA0002470016600000089
The quantum is as follows
Figure BDA00024700166000000810
Up-coding secret message M B If, if
Figure BDA00024700166000000811
On the shelf, if
Figure BDA00024700166000000812
The quantum square will flip the qubit (by flipping K and M) B In combination, qubits can also be generated directly in step 1.1), i.e. the quantum square will
Figure BDA00024700166000000813
The ith qubit in (a) is prepared as
Figure BDA00024700166000000814
Where j is the position of the qubit in sequence A;
bob sends sequence a to Alice, and in order to prevent trojan horse attacks, alice needs to put a wavelength filter in front of her qubit receiving device;
step 2, the classical party carries out identity authentication on the identity sequence and the secret message sent in the step 1, then carries out coding and safety detection on the identity sequence and the secret message of the classical party, and feeds back the identity sequence and the secret message to the quantum party, and Alice is in the quantum site for each quantum bit that arrives
Figure BDA00024700166000000815
Perform identity authentication on
Figure BDA00024700166000000816
Performs message encoding on the rest
Figure BDA00024700166000000817
And
Figure BDA00024700166000000818
the safety detection is carried out, and the specific contents are as follows:
step 2.1, measuring each AUTH qubit by the classical method, and recording the measurement result as
Figure BDA00024700166000000819
Detection of
Figure BDA0002470016600000091
Whether or not to correspond to the ID at the corresponding position B Matching with K, if the error rate exceeds the preset threshold value P t The classical party terminates the protocol;
if the detection is normal, the classical party codes the identity sequence ID on the detected result state A Then, howeverThen returning them to the quantum side;
step 2.2, the classical party measures each ENCODE qubit and records the measurement as
Figure BDA0002470016600000092
If the measurement result of the ith ENCODE qubit
Figure BDA0002470016600000093
Is |0>If the measurement result is 0, the measurement result of the ith ENCODE qubit
Figure BDA0002470016600000094
Is |1>The measurement result is expressed as 1, and after the ith ENCODE qubit is measured, the classical equation is based on K and M A Preparing new ENCODE qubit, i.e. preparing the ith ENCODE qubit as
Figure BDA0002470016600000095
Where j is the position of the qubit in A, the classical party returning the ENCODE qubit to the quantum party;
step 2.3, the classical party reflects each CTRL qubit to the quantum party without modification;
and 3, the quantum party receives the information fed back by the step 2, authenticates the identity of the classical party, detects the security of a channel, and finally decodes the secret message of the other party by the quantum party and the classical party respectively, wherein the specific contents are as follows:
and 3.1, sequentially storing the qubits returned by the classical party by the quantum party according to the return sequence, extracting AUTH and CTRL qubits returned by the classical party, and measuring by the prepared quantum state basis, wherein the measurement results are respectively expressed as
Figure BDA0002470016600000096
And
Figure BDA0002470016600000097
will be provided with
Figure BDA0002470016600000098
With corresponding ID A Comparing with K, if the error rate is lower than P t Confirming the identity of the classical party to measure, otherwise, the quantum party terminates the protocol, and publishes error information by the authenticated classical channel, and returns to the first step;
in the same way, will
Figure BDA0002470016600000099
Comparing with K, if the error rate is lower than P t The quantum side confirms that the channel is safe to carry out the next operation, otherwise, the protocol is terminated, error information is published by the authenticated classical channel, and the first step is returned;
step 3.2, quantum prescription with K and
Figure BDA0002470016600000101
decoding results in a message to be sent to him by the classical party, of
Figure BDA0002470016600000102
Wherein
Figure BDA0002470016600000103
The ith measurement of the ENCODE qubit, measured by the classical party, j representing the position of the ENCODE qubit in sequence a,
Figure BDA0002470016600000104
an ith secret message sent to Alice for Bob;
k for classical prescription and
Figure BDA0002470016600000105
decoding to get the message that the quantum party is to send to her
Figure BDA0002470016600000106
Figure BDA0002470016600000107
Wherein
Figure BDA0002470016600000108
The ith measurement of an ENCODE qubit measured for the classical party.

Claims (1)

1. A method of semi-quantum conversation based on identity authentication is characterized by comprising the following steps:
step 1, a quantum party and a classical party share a random binary string in advance, then the quantum party prepares a quantum bit, then a quantum party identity sequence and a secret message are sent to the classical party through the quantum bit, and when the classical party receives a sequence code sent by the quantum party, a wavelength filter is placed in front of a quantum bit receiving device, wherein the specific implementation mode comprises the following steps:
step 1.1, a quantum party and a classical party share a random binary string in advance, and then the quantum party prepares a quantum bit; random binary string of K = { K = 1 ,k 2 ,…,k 2L Where L =2 (n + L) (1 + δ), n is ID A And ID B Length, ID of A Is a classical square identity sequence, ID B Is a quantum square identity sequence, ID A ＝{a 1 ,a 2 ,…,a n }，ID B ＝{b 1 ,b 2 ,…,b n In which a is i ,b i ∈{0,1},i∈{1,2,…,n}；
l is M A And M B Length of (C), M A Secret messages for classical parties, M B Is a secret message of the quantum party,
Figure FDA0003924590130000011
δ>0 is a fixed parameter;
the specific content of the quantum bit prepared by the quantum method is as follows:
quantum method for preparing L =2 (n + L) (1 + delta) single photon composition sequence A according to K, if (K) 2i-1 ,k 2i ) = (0, 0), quantum-square preparation |0>The ith qubit as sequence A; if (k) 2i-1 ,k 2i ) = (0, 1), quantum method preparation |1>The ith qubit as sequence A; if (k) 2i-1 ,k 2i ) = (1, 0), quantum side preparation | +>The ith qubit as sequence A; if (k) 2i-1 ,k 2i ) =1, quantum preparation | ->The ith qubit as sequence A; wherein i ∈ (1, 2, \8230;, L); finally dividing the sequence A into two subsequences A Z And A X Wherein A is Z Represents all |0 s in sequence A>And |1>；A X Represents all | +in the sequence A>And | ->Wherein | A Z |>(n+l)；
Step 1.2, the qubits prepared in step 1.1 are classified; the specific content of the classification of the qubits is as follows: a is to be Z Is divided into two sets
Figure FDA0003924590130000021
And
Figure FDA0003924590130000022
the division method is A Z Into a set
Figure FDA0003924590130000023
For AUTH qubits, for encoding the identity sequences ID of the classical party and the quantum party A And ID B (ii) a Dividing even numbered qubits into sets
Figure FDA0003924590130000024
For encodings of secret messages M of classical and quantum parties, for encodings of ENCODE qubits A And M B ；
Quantum prescription A z The remaining qubits in is defined as
Figure FDA0003924590130000025
A is prepared from X Is marked as
Figure FDA0003924590130000026
And
Figure FDA0003924590130000027
collectively known as CTRL qubits, for detecting the security of the quantum channel;
step 1.3, the quantum party sends the identity sequence and the secret message by combining the quantum bit classified in the step 1.2: quantum in set
Figure FDA0003924590130000028
Encodes his identity sequence ID B If b is i =0, rest, if b i =1, quantum party will qubit flip, i.e. quantum party will
Figure FDA0003924590130000029
The ith qubit in (a) is prepared as
Figure FDA00039245901300000210
The quantum is as follows
Figure FDA00039245901300000211
Up-coding secret message M B If, if
Figure FDA00039245901300000212
On the shelf, if
Figure FDA00039245901300000213
The quantum square will flip the qubit, i.e. the quantum square will
Figure FDA00039245901300000214
The ith qubit in (a) is prepared as
Figure FDA00039245901300000215
Where j is the position of the qubit in sequence A;
step 2, the classical party performs identity authentication on the identity sequence and the secret message sent in the step 1, then performs coding and security detection on the identity sequence and the secret message of the classical party, and feeds back the identity sequence and the secret message to the quantum party:
step 2.1, classical approachMeasuring each AUTH qubit, and recording the measurement result as
Figure FDA00039245901300000216
Detection of
Figure FDA00039245901300000217
Whether or not to correspond to the ID at the corresponding position B Matching with K, if the error rate exceeds the preset threshold value P t The classical party terminates the protocol;
if the detection is normal, the classical party codes the identity sequence ID on the detected result state A Then return them to the quantum party;
step 2.2, the classical party measures each ENCODE qubit and records the measurement as
Figure FDA00039245901300000218
If the measurement result of the ith ENCODE qubit
Figure FDA00039245901300000219
(i) Is |0>The measurement result is expressed as 0 if the measurement result of the ith ENCODE qubit
Figure FDA0003924590130000031
(i) Is |1>The measurement result is represented as 1; then the classical party according to K and M A Preparing new ENCODE qubit, i.e. preparing the ith ENCODE qubit as
Figure FDA0003924590130000032
Wherein j is the position of the qubit in A, the classical party returning the ENCODE qubit to the quantum party;
step 2.3, the classical party reflects each CTRL qubit to the quantum party without modification;
and 3, the quantum party receives the information fed back by the step 2, authenticates the identity of the classical party, detects the security of a channel, and finally decodes the secret message of the other party by the quantum party and the classical party respectively, which is implemented according to the following steps:
and 3.1, sequentially storing the qubits returned by the classical party by the quantum party according to the return sequence, extracting AUTH and CTRL qubits returned by the classical party, and measuring by the prepared quantum state basis, wherein the measurement results are respectively expressed as
Figure FDA0003924590130000033
And
Figure FDA0003924590130000034
will be provided with
Figure FDA0003924590130000035
With the corresponding ID A Comparing with K, if the error rate is lower than P t Confirming the identity of the classical party to measure, otherwise, the quantum party terminates the protocol and publishes error information by the authenticated classical channel;
in the same way, will
Figure FDA0003924590130000036
Comparing with K, if the error rate is lower than P t The quantum side confirms that the channel is safe to carry out the next operation, otherwise, the protocol is terminated, and error information is published by the authenticated classical channel;
step 3.2, quantum square K and
Figure FDA0003924590130000037
decoding results in a message to be sent to him by the classical party, of
Figure FDA0003924590130000038
Wherein
Figure FDA0003924590130000039
The ith measurement of the ENCODE qubit, measured by the classical party, j representing the position of the ENCODE qubit in sequence a,
Figure FDA00039245901300000310
an ith secret message sent to Alice for Bob;
k for classical prescription and
Figure FDA00039245901300000311
decoding to obtain the message to be sent by the quantum party
Figure FDA00039245901300000312
Figure FDA00039245901300000313
Wherein
Figure FDA00039245901300000314
The ith measurement result of an ENCODE qubit measured for the classical party.
CN202010345424.7A 2020-04-27 2020-04-27 Identity authentication-based semi-quantum conversation method Active CN111585752B (en)

Priority Applications (1)

Application Number Priority Date Filing Date Title
CN202010345424.7A CN111585752B (en) 2020-04-27 2020-04-27 Identity authentication-based semi-quantum conversation method

Applications Claiming Priority (1)

Application Number Priority Date Filing Date Title
CN202010345424.7A CN111585752B (en) 2020-04-27 2020-04-27 Identity authentication-based semi-quantum conversation method

Publications (2)

Publication Number Publication Date
CN111585752A CN111585752A (en) 2020-08-25
CN111585752B true CN111585752B (en) 2023-01-10

Family

ID=72111723

Family Applications (1)

Application Number Title Priority Date Filing Date
CN202010345424.7A Active CN111585752B (en) 2020-04-27 2020-04-27 Identity authentication-based semi-quantum conversation method

Country Status (1)

Country Link
CN (1) CN111585752B (en)

Citations (2)

* Cited by examiner, † Cited by third party
Publication number Priority date Publication date Assignee Title
CN107666356A (en) * 2017-10-18 2018-02-06 浙江工商大学 Requirement classical communication person based on single photon possesses half quantum dialogue method of measurement capability
CN110474770A (en) * 2019-08-23 2019-11-19 成都信息工程大学 A kind of multi-party half quantum secret sharing method and system based on single photon

Patent Citations (2)

* Cited by examiner, † Cited by third party
Publication number Priority date Publication date Assignee Title
CN107666356A (en) * 2017-10-18 2018-02-06 浙江工商大学 Requirement classical communication person based on single photon possesses half quantum dialogue method of measurement capability
CN110474770A (en) * 2019-08-23 2019-11-19 成都信息工程大学 A kind of multi-party half quantum secret sharing method and system based on single photon

Also Published As

Publication number Publication date
CN111585752A (en) 2020-08-25

Similar Documents

Publication Publication Date Title
CN109327308B (en) Quantum key distribution method and system with bidirectional identity authentication function
Cai et al. Improving the capacity of the Boström-Felbinger protocol
Deng et al. Two-step quantum direct communication protocol using the Einstein-Podolsky-Rosen pair block
Li et al. Deterministic secure quantum communication without maximally entangled states
CN106685654B (en) Quantum key distribution method with bidirectional identity authentication
Tseng et al. New quantum private comparison protocol using EPR pairs
CN109194479B (en) Measuring equipment-independent quantum key distribution method based on single photon multiple degrees of freedom
CN107359985B (en) Controlled quantum secure direct communication method based on Huffman compression coding
CN107360568B (en) Method for realizing symmetric encryption and guaranteeing wireless data secure transmission by utilizing fountain codes
Xia et al. Quantum dialogue by using the GHZ state
CN108809644B (en) Disorder high-capacity multiparty quantum key negotiation method based on high-energy level bell state
CN107493168B (en) Quanta identity authentication method and its application method during quantum key distribution
CN109150518B (en) Double-channel information transmission method oriented to quantum key distribution
CN111092664B (en) Channel capacity increasing method for quantum secure communication irrelevant to measuring equipment
CN105024801B (en) Quantum encryption communication method
CN101540760A (en) Quantum key agreement method
CN113726516A (en) Three-party quantum secure direct communication method based on independence of two degrees of freedom measurement equipment
CN109995528A (en) Bidirectional identity authentication and half quantum safety direct communication method for resisting channel noise
CN108365954B (en) Control code multiplexing method
Li et al. Improved eavesdropping detection strategy based on four-particle cluster state in quantum direct communication protocol
Yang et al. Threshold proxy quantum signature scheme with threshold shared verification
Fu-Guo et al. Eavesdropping on theping-pong'quantum communication protocol freely in a noise channel
Yan et al. Mutual semi-quantum key agreement protocol using Bell states
Huang et al. Quantum secure direct communication based on quantum homomorphic encryption
Yu-Guang et al. An efficient quantum secure direct communication scheme with authentication

Legal Events

Date Code Title Description
PB01 Publication
PB01 Publication
SE01 Entry into force of request for substantive examination
SE01 Entry into force of request for substantive examination
GR01 Patent grant
GR01 Patent grant