CN111585752B - A Semi-Quantum Dialogue Method Based on Identity Authentication - Google Patents

A Semi-Quantum Dialogue Method Based on Identity Authentication Download PDF

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CN111585752B
CN111585752B CN202010345424.7A CN202010345424A CN111585752B CN 111585752 B CN111585752 B CN 111585752B CN 202010345424 A CN202010345424 A CN 202010345424A CN 111585752 B CN111585752 B CN 111585752B
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王明明
刘俊丽
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Xian Polytechnic University
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    • H04ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
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    • HELECTRICITY
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    • H04LTRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
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    • H04L63/083Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security for authentication of entities using passwords
    • HELECTRICITY
    • H04ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04LTRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
    • H04L9/00Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols
    • H04L9/08Key distribution or management, e.g. generation, sharing or updating, of cryptographic keys or passwords
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Abstract

本发明公开了一种基于身份认证的半量子对话的方法,首先量子方和经典方预先共享一个随机二进制串,然后量子方制备量子比特,然后将量子方身份序列和秘密消息通过量子比特对经典方进行发送;然后经典方对发送的身份序列和秘密消息进行身份认证,然后对经典方的身份序列和秘密消息进行编码和安全检测,并反馈给量子方;最后量子方接受反馈的信息,对经典方的身份进行认证,然后检测信道的安全性,最后量子方和经典方分别解码对方的秘密消息,使用单光子源和单光子探测器实现,技术比较成熟,同时经典方的实现不需要使用量子寄存器。身份认证使本协议可有效抵抗中间人攻击、模仿攻击等恶意攻击。

Figure 202010345424

The invention discloses a semi-quantum dialogue method based on identity authentication. First, the quantum party and the classical party share a random binary string in advance, and then the quantum party prepares qubits, and then passes the quantum party's identity sequence and secret information to the classical party through the qubits. Then the classical party performs identity authentication on the sent identity sequence and secret message, and then encodes and security checks the classical party’s identity sequence and secret message, and feeds it back to the quantum party; finally, the quantum party accepts the feedback information and The identity of the classical party is authenticated, and then the security of the channel is checked. Finally, the quantum party and the classical party decode each other’s secret message respectively, using a single photon source and a single photon detector. The technology is relatively mature, and the implementation of the classical party does not need to use Quantum registers. Identity authentication enables this protocol to effectively resist malicious attacks such as man-in-the-middle attacks and imitation attacks.

Figure 202010345424

Description

一种基于身份认证的半量子对话方法A Semi-Quantum Dialogue Method Based on Identity Authentication

技术领域technical field

本发明属于量子保密通信技术领域,涉及一种基于身份认证的半量子对话的方法。The invention belongs to the technical field of quantum secret communication, and relates to a semi-quantum dialogue method based on identity authentication.

背景技术Background technique

近年来,量子计算以超强的计算能力对基于计算复杂性的传统密码学产生了巨大威胁。同时,量子密码学利用量子力学原理,可以实现理论上的无条件安全通信。自产生以来,量子密码学在理论和实验方面都引起了研究者的广泛研究,并产生了许多有趣的分支,如量子密钥分发(Quantum key distribution,QKD)[1-4],量子秘密共享(quantum secretsharing,QSS)[5-7],量子安全直接通信(Quantum secure direct communication,QSDC)[8-10],量子身份认证(Quantum Identity Authentication,QIA)[11-13]等。In recent years, quantum computing has posed a huge threat to traditional cryptography based on computational complexity with its super computing power. At the same time, quantum cryptography uses the principles of quantum mechanics to achieve theoretically unconditional secure communication. Since its inception, quantum cryptography has attracted extensive research by researchers both theoretically and experimentally, and has produced many interesting branches, such as quantum key distribution (Quantum key distribution, QKD) [1-4], quantum secret sharing (quantum secretsharing, QSS) [5-7], quantum secure direct communication (Quantum secure direct communication, QSDC) [8-10], quantum identity authentication (Quantum Identity Authentication, QIA) [11-13], etc.

QKD致力于通过量子信号传输在两个远程通信者之间建立一串随机密钥。QSDC与QKD的区别是,在QSDC的通信过程中通信双方不需要事先生成密钥,而是通过直接建立量子信道的方式进行通信,直接完成秘密消息的安全传输。自QSDC提出以来,基于不同量子资源的QSDC协议纷纷被提出来[8-10,14,15],相关的实验也得到了证明[16-18]。随着QSDC的发展,Nguyen等人于2004年首次提出双向的QSDC协议[19],在该协议中发送方和接收方可以同时交换他们的秘密消息,因此该协议也被称为量子对话(Quantum Dialogue,QD)。自那之后,QD就引起了国内外学者的广泛研究。遗憾的是,2008年,Tan等人[20]和Gao等人[21]指出,早期的QD协议[19,22-27]存在“经典相关”或“信息泄露”等问题,也就是说,任何窃听者都可以从合法用户的经典通信中提取有关传输的秘密消息的信息。鉴于此,学者们又提出了许多可以克服“经典相关”或“信息泄露”等问题的QD协议[28-46]。值得注意的是,量子身份认证(QIA)是QD的一个重要课题,通信双方可通过量子身份认证来验证对方的身份,从而有效抵抗通信过程中的中间人攻击和模仿攻击等问题,提高协议的安全性。鉴于此,许多具有身份认证功能的QD协议也被提出来[32,35,37,40,43,46-48]。QKD aims to establish a string of random keys between two remote communicators through quantum signal transmission. The difference between QSDC and QKD is that in the communication process of QSDC, the two parties do not need to generate keys in advance, but communicate by directly establishing a quantum channel to directly complete the secure transmission of secret messages. Since QSDC was proposed, QSDC protocols based on different quantum resources have been proposed [8-10,14,15], and related experiments have been proved [16-18]. With the development of QSDC, Nguyen et al first proposed a two-way QSDC protocol [19] in 2004, in which the sender and receiver can exchange their secret messages at the same time, so this protocol is also called quantum dialogue (Quantum Dialogue). Dialogue, QD). Since then, QD has attracted extensive research by domestic and foreign scholars. Unfortunately, in 2008, Tan et al. [20] and Gao et al. [21] pointed out that early QD protocols [19, 22–27] suffer from problems such as “classical correlation” or “information leakage”, that is, Any eavesdropper can extract information about transmitted secret messages from legitimate users' classical communications. In view of this, scholars have proposed many QD protocols that can overcome the problems of "classical correlation" or "information leakage" [28-46]. It is worth noting that quantum identity authentication (QIA) is an important topic of QD. Both parties in communication can verify the identity of each other through quantum identity authentication, so as to effectively resist problems such as man-in-the-middle attacks and imitation attacks in the communication process, and improve the security of the protocol. sex. In view of this, many QD protocols with identity authentication functions have also been proposed [32,35,37,40,43,46-48].

为了实现量子密码协议,节约量子密码协议中所使用的量子资源和经典资源是值得考虑的问题。在早期的实用量子网络中,可能并不是每一个参与者都具有昂贵的量子资源和熟练的量子态操作技术。基于这个事实,2007年,Boyer等人[49]提出了一个新颖的想法(也就是BKM2007协议),可以降低其中一个参与者的量子能力。由于接收者在整个协议中所做的操作类似于经典操作,该协议也被称为半量子密钥分发(Semiquantum KeyDistribution,SQKD)协议,接收者被称为“经典方”,Z基被称为经典基。2009年,Boyer等人用测量重发和随机化策略扩展了原始的半量子密钥分发协议[50]。此后,多种SQKD协议被提出来[51-55]。除SQKD之外,半量子的思想也被应用到其他半量子保密通信协议中,如半量子秘密共享[56-59]、半量子信息分割[60]、半量子私密比较[61]、半量子身份认证[62,63]、半量子安全直接通信[41,64-68]和半量子对话[41-43]等;In order to realize the quantum cryptography protocol, it is worth considering to save the quantum resources and classical resources used in the quantum cryptography protocol. In the early practical quantum network, not every participant may have expensive quantum resources and skilled quantum state manipulation techniques. Based on this fact, in 2007, Boyer et al. [49] proposed a novel idea (i.e., the BKM2007 protocol) to reduce the quantum power of one of the participants. Since the operation done by the receiver in the whole protocol is similar to the classical operation, the protocol is also called the Semiquantum Key Distribution (SQKD) protocol, the receiver is called the "classical party", and the Z base is called Classic base. In 2009, Boyer et al. extended the original semi-quantum key distribution protocol [50] with measurement retransmission and randomization strategies. Since then, various SQKD protocols have been proposed [51-55]. In addition to SQKD, half-quantum ideas have also been applied to other half-quantum secure communication protocols, such as half-quantum secret sharing [56-59], half-quantum information partitioning [60], half-quantum private comparison [61], half-quantum Identity authentication [62,63], semi-quantum secure direct communication [41,64-68] and semi-quantum dialogue [41-43], etc.;

半量子对话方面,2017年Shukla等人[41]基于Bell态提出了第一个SQD协议。2018年Ye等人[42]提出了一个基于单光子的SQD协议。同年,Liu等人[43]基于逻辑量子比特提出了一个具有身份认证功能的SQD协议,协议的两个经典玩家通过将量子计算委托给一个量子玩家可以实现噪声环境下的消息交换。在上述三个半量子对话协议中,经典方都需要具有存储量子比特的能力,也就是说,量子存储器对经典玩家来说必不可少,在现实生活中,这对他们来说非常具有挑战性。针对上述的问题,本发明提出了一种基于身份认证的半量子对话的方法,其中经典方不需要使用量子存储,简化了通信的实现。同时,具备身份认证和消息认证功能,可以抵抗中间人攻击的同时,保证消息的完整性。In terms of semi-quantum dialogue, Shukla et al. [41] proposed the first SQD protocol based on the Bell state in 2017. In 2018 Ye et al. [42] proposed a single-photon-based SQD protocol. In the same year, Liu et al. [43] proposed an SQD protocol with identity authentication function based on logical qubits. Two classical players of the protocol can exchange messages in a noisy environment by entrusting quantum computing to a quantum player. In the above three semi-quantum dialogue protocols, the classical party needs to have the ability to store qubits, that is to say, quantum memory is essential for classical players, which is very challenging for them in real life . In view of the above problems, the present invention proposes a semi-quantum dialogue method based on identity authentication, in which the classical party does not need to use quantum storage, which simplifies the realization of communication. At the same time, it has identity authentication and message authentication functions, which can resist man-in-the-middle attacks and ensure the integrity of messages.

发明内容Contents of the invention

本发明的目的是提供一种基于身份认证的半量子对话的方法,实现量子方和经典方的双向通信和认证。The purpose of the present invention is to provide a method of semi-quantum dialogue based on identity authentication, to realize two-way communication and authentication between the quantum party and the classical party.

本发明所采用的技术方案是,一种基于身份认证的半量子对话的方法,具体包括以下步骤:The technical solution adopted in the present invention is a method of semi-quantum dialogue based on identity authentication, which specifically includes the following steps:

步骤1,量子方和经典方预先共享一个随机二进制串,然后量子方制备量子比特,然后将量子方身份序列和秘密消息通过量子比特对经典方进行发送;Step 1, the quantum party and the classical party share a random binary string in advance, then the quantum party prepares qubits, and then sends the quantum party’s identity sequence and secret message to the classical party through the qubits;

步骤2,经典方对经步骤1发送的身份序列和秘密消息进行身份认证,然后对经典方的身份序列和秘密消息进行编码和安全检测,并反馈给量子方;Step 2, the classical party authenticates the identity sequence and secret message sent in step 1, and then encodes the classical party’s identity sequence and secret message and performs security checks, and feeds back to the quantum party;

步骤3,量子方接受经步骤2反馈的信息,对经典方的身份进行认证,然后检测信道的安全性,最后量子方和经典方分别解码对方的秘密消息。In step 3, the quantum party accepts the information fed back in step 2, authenticates the identity of the classical party, and then checks the security of the channel. Finally, the quantum party and the classical party decode each other’s secret message respectively.

本发明的特点还在于:The present invention is also characterized in that:

其中步骤1具体实施方式包括以下步骤:Wherein the specific implementation of step 1 comprises the following steps:

步骤1.1,量子方和经典方预先共享一个随机二进制串,然后量子方制备量子比特;Step 1.1, the quantum side and the classical side share a random binary string in advance, and then the quantum side prepares qubits;

步骤1.2,将经步骤1制备的量子比特进行分类;Step 1.2, classifying the qubits prepared in step 1;

步骤1.3,量子方将身份序列和秘密消息结合步骤1.2分类后的量子比特进行发送;In step 1.3, the quantum party sends the identity sequence and secret message in combination with the qubits classified in step 1.2;

其中步骤1.1中随机二进制串为K={k1,k2,…,k2L},其中L=2(n+l)(1+δ),n是IDA和IDB的长度,IDA为经典方身份序列,IDB为量子方身份序列,IDA={a1,a2,…,an},IDB={b1,b2,…,bn},其中ai,bi∈{0,1},i∈{1,2,…,n};Wherein the random binary string in step 1.1 is K={k 1 ,k 2 ,...,k 2L }, wherein L=2(n+l)(1+δ), n is the length of ID A and ID B , ID A is the identity sequence of the classical party, ID B is the identity sequence of the quantum party, ID A ={a 1 ,a 2 ,…,a n }, ID B ={b 1 ,b 2 ,…,b n }, where a i , b i ∈ {0,1}, i ∈ {1,2,...,n};

l是MA和MB的长度,MA为经典方的秘密消息,MB为量子方的秘密消息,

Figure BDA0002470016600000041
δ>0是一个固定的参数;l is the length of M A and M B , M A is the secret message of the classical party, M B is the secret message of the quantum party,
Figure BDA0002470016600000041
δ>0 is a fixed parameter;

其中步骤1.1中量子方制备量子比特具体内容为:Wherein step 1.1 in quantum square preparation qubit specific content is:

量子方根据K制备L=2(n+l)(1+δ)个单光子组成序列A,若(k2i-1,k2i)=(0,0),量子方制备|0>作为序列A的第i个量子比特;如果(k2i-1,k2i)=(0,1),量子方制备|1>作为序列A的第i个量子比特;如果(k2i-1,k2i)=(1,0),量子方制备|+>作为序列A的第i个量子比特;如果(k2i-1,k2i)=(1,1),量子方制备|->作为序列A的第i个量子比特;其中i∈(1,2,…,L);最后将序列A分为两个子序列AZ和AX,其中AZ表示序列A中的所有|0>和|1>;AX表示序列A中的所有|+>和|->,其中|AZ|>(n+l);The quantum square prepares L=2(n+l)(1+δ) single photons to form a sequence A according to K, if (k 2i-1 ,k 2i )=(0,0), the quantum square prepares |0> as a sequence The i-th qubit of A; if (k 2i-1 ,k 2i )=(0,1), the quantum square prepares |1> as the i-th qubit of sequence A; if (k 2i-1 ,k 2i )=(1,0), quantum square preparation|+>as the i-th qubit of sequence A; if (k 2i-1 ,k 2i )=(1,1), quantum square preparation|->as sequence A The i-th qubit; where i∈(1,2,…,L); Finally, the sequence A is divided into two subsequences A Z and A X , where A Z represents all |0> and |1 in the sequence A > A X denotes all |+> and |-> in the sequence A, where |A Z |>(n+l);

其中步骤1.2中量子比特的分类具体内容为:将AZ的前(n+l)个量子比特划分为两个集合

Figure BDA0002470016600000042
Figure BDA0002470016600000043
划分方法为AZ的第奇数个量子比特划分到集合
Figure BDA0002470016600000044
为AUTH量子比特,用于编码经典方和量子方的身份序列IDA和IDB;第偶数个量子比特划分到集合
Figure BDA0002470016600000045
为ENCODE量子比特,用于编码经典方和量子方的秘密消息MA和MB;The specific content of the classification of qubits in step 1.2 is: divide the first (n+l) qubits of A Z into two sets
Figure BDA0002470016600000042
and
Figure BDA0002470016600000043
The division method is that the odd-numbered qubits of A Z are divided into sets
Figure BDA0002470016600000044
It is the AUTH qubit, which is used to encode the identity sequences ID A and ID B of the classical party and the quantum party; the even numbered qubits are divided into sets
Figure BDA0002470016600000045
is the ENCODE qubit, used to encode the secret messages M A and M B of the classical party and the quantum party;

量子方将Az中剩余的量子比特定义为

Figure BDA0002470016600000046
将AX标注为
Figure BDA0002470016600000051
Figure BDA0002470016600000052
Figure BDA0002470016600000053
统称为CTRL量子比特,用于检测量子通道的安全性;The quantum square defines the remaining qubits in Az as
Figure BDA0002470016600000046
label A X as
Figure BDA0002470016600000051
Figure BDA0002470016600000052
and
Figure BDA0002470016600000053
Collectively referred to as CTRL qubits, they are used to detect the security of quantum channels;

其中步骤1.3的具体内容为:量子方在集合

Figure BDA0002470016600000054
中编码他的身份序列IDB,若bi=0,搁置,若bi=1,量子方将量子比特翻转,即量子方将
Figure BDA0002470016600000055
中的第i个量子比特制备为
Figure BDA0002470016600000056
量子方在
Figure BDA0002470016600000057
上编码秘密消息MB,若
Figure BDA0002470016600000058
搁置,若
Figure BDA0002470016600000059
量子方将将量子比特翻转,即量子方将
Figure BDA00024700166000000510
中的第i个量子比特制备为
Figure BDA00024700166000000511
其中j是该量子比特在序列A中的位置;The specific content of step 1.3 is: the quantum square is in the set
Figure BDA0002470016600000054
Encode his identity sequence ID B in it, if b i =0, put it on hold, if b i =1, the quantum party will flip the qubit, that is, the quantum party will
Figure BDA0002470016600000055
The i-th qubit in is prepared as
Figure BDA0002470016600000056
Quantum square in
Figure BDA0002470016600000057
Encode the secret message M B above, if
Figure BDA0002470016600000058
on hold, if
Figure BDA0002470016600000059
The quantum party will flip the qubit, that is, the quantum party will
Figure BDA00024700166000000510
The i-th qubit in is prepared as
Figure BDA00024700166000000511
where j is the position of the qubit in sequence A;

其中步骤2具体内容为:The specific content of step 2 is:

步骤2.1,经典方测量每一个AUTH量子比特,测量结果记为

Figure BDA00024700166000000512
检测
Figure BDA00024700166000000513
是否与相应位置上的IDB和K相匹配,若错误率超过预先设定的阈值Pt,经典方终止协议;Step 2.1, the classical party measures each AUTH qubit, and the measurement result is recorded as
Figure BDA00024700166000000512
detection
Figure BDA00024700166000000513
Whether it matches the ID B and K at the corresponding position, if the error rate exceeds the preset threshold P t , the classic party terminates the agreement;

若检测正常,经典方在检测后的结果态上编码身份序列IDA,然后将它们返回给量子方;If the detection is normal, the classical party encodes the identity sequence ID A on the result state after the detection, and then returns them to the quantum party;

步骤2.2,经典方测量每一个ENCODE量子比特,并将该测量结果记录为

Figure BDA00024700166000000514
若第i个ENCODE量子比特的测量结果
Figure BDA00024700166000000515
为|0>,测量结果表示为0,若第i个ENCODE量子比特的测量结果
Figure BDA00024700166000000516
为|1>,测量结果表示为1;然后经典方根据K和MA制备新的ENCODE量子比特,即将第i个ENCODE量子比特制备为
Figure BDA00024700166000000517
其中j是该量子比特在A中的位置,经典方将ENCODE量子比特返回给量子方;Step 2.2, the classical party measures each ENCODE qubit, and records the measurement result as
Figure BDA00024700166000000514
If the measurement result of the i-th ENCODE qubit
Figure BDA00024700166000000515
is |0>, the measurement result is expressed as 0, if the measurement result of the i-th ENCODE qubit
Figure BDA00024700166000000516
is |1>, and the measurement result is expressed as 1; then the classical party prepares a new ENCODE qubit according to K and MA, that is, the ith ENCODE qubit is prepared as
Figure BDA00024700166000000517
Where j is the position of the qubit in A, and the classical party returns the ENCODE qubit to the quantum party;

步骤2.3,经典方不加修改的将每一个CTRL量子比特反射给量子方;Step 2.3, the classical party reflects each CTRL qubit to the quantum party without modification;

其中步骤3具体内容为:The specific content of step 3 is:

步骤3.1,量子方按返回顺序依次存储经典方返回的量子比特,然后提取经典方返回的AUTH和CTRL量子比特并通过制备的量子态的基进行测量,测量结果分别表示为

Figure BDA0002470016600000061
Figure BDA0002470016600000062
Figure BDA0002470016600000063
与相应的IDA和K进行比较,若错误率低于Pt,确认经典方的身份进行测量,否则,量子方终止协议,并以认证的经典信道公布错误信息;In step 3.1, the quantum party stores the qubits returned by the classical party in turn in the order of return, and then extracts the AUTH and CTRL qubits returned by the classical party and performs measurements on the basis of the prepared quantum state. The measurement results are expressed as
Figure BDA0002470016600000061
and
Figure BDA0002470016600000062
Will
Figure BDA0002470016600000063
Compare with the corresponding ID A and K, if the error rate is lower than P t , confirm the identity of the classical party for measurement, otherwise, the quantum party terminates the agreement and publishes the error information through the authenticated classical channel;

同理,将

Figure BDA0002470016600000064
与K进行比较,如果错误率低于Pt,量子方确认信道安全进行下一步操作,否则,终止协议,以认证的经典信道公布错误信息;Similarly, will
Figure BDA0002470016600000064
Compared with K, if the error rate is lower than P t , the quantum party confirms that the channel is safe and proceeds to the next step, otherwise, terminates the agreement and publishes the error information through the authenticated classical channel;

步骤3.2,量子方用K和

Figure BDA0002470016600000065
解码得到经典方要发送给他的消息,为
Figure BDA0002470016600000066
其中
Figure BDA0002470016600000067
经典方测量的ENCODE量子比特的第i个测量结果,j表示ENCODE量子比特在序列A中的位置,
Figure BDA0002470016600000068
为Bob发送给Alice的第i个秘密消息;Step 3.2, the quantum square uses K and
Figure BDA0002470016600000065
Decode to get the message that the classic party wants to send to him, as
Figure BDA0002470016600000066
in
Figure BDA0002470016600000067
The i-th measurement result of the ENCODE qubit measured by the classical method, j represents the position of the ENCODE qubit in sequence A,
Figure BDA0002470016600000068
is the ith secret message sent by Bob to Alice;

经典方用K和

Figure BDA0002470016600000069
解码得到量子方要发送给她的消息
Figure BDA00024700166000000610
Figure BDA00024700166000000611
其中
Figure BDA00024700166000000612
为经典方测量的ENCODE量子比特的第i个测量结果;The classic formula uses K and
Figure BDA0002470016600000069
Decoded to get the message that the quantum party wants to send to her
Figure BDA00024700166000000610
Figure BDA00024700166000000611
in
Figure BDA00024700166000000612
is the i-th measurement result of the ENCODE qubit measured by the classical party;

其中步骤1中经典方在接收量子方发送的序列编码时,在量子比特接收装置前放置波长滤波器。In step 1, when the classical party receives the sequence code sent by the quantum party, a wavelength filter is placed in front of the qubit receiving device.

本发明的有益效果是:The beneficial effects of the present invention are:

本发明所采用的一种基于身份认证的半量子对话的方法使用单光子源和单光子探测器实现,技术比较成熟,同时经典方的实现不需要使用量子寄存器。身份认证使本协议可有效抵抗中间人攻击、模仿攻击等恶意攻击。The identity authentication-based semi-quantum dialogue method adopted in the present invention is realized by using a single-photon source and a single-photon detector, and the technology is relatively mature, and at the same time, the realization of the classical method does not need to use a quantum register. Identity authentication enables this protocol to effectively resist malicious attacks such as man-in-the-middle attacks and imitation attacks.

附图说明Description of drawings

图1是本发明的一种基于身份认证的半量子对话的方法中基于身份认证的半量子对话系统工作流程图。Fig. 1 is a work flow diagram of the semi-quantum dialogue system based on identity authentication in the method of semi-quantum dialogue based on identity authentication of the present invention.

具体实施方式detailed description

下面结合附图和具体实施方式对本发明进行详细说明。The present invention will be described in detail below in conjunction with the accompanying drawings and specific embodiments.

通信双方为经典方Alice和量子方Bob,Alice和Bob想要用单光子安全地交换彼此的秘密消息

Figure BDA0002470016600000071
Figure BDA0002470016600000072
Alice和Bob相互共享了各自的身份序列IDA={a1,a2,…,an}和IDB={b1,b2,…,bn},其中ai,bi∈{0,1},i∈{1,2,…,n};同时,Alice和Bob预先共享一个随机二进制串K={k1,k2,…,k2L},其中L=2(n+l)(1+δ),n是IDA和IDB的长度,l是MA和MB的长度,δ>0是一个固定的参数,假设量子信道是无损和无噪声的。The communication parties are the classical party Alice and the quantum party Bob, Alice and Bob want to use single photons to securely exchange each other's secret messages
Figure BDA0002470016600000071
and
Figure BDA0002470016600000072
Alice and Bob share their respective identity sequences ID A ={a 1 ,a 2 ,…,a n } and ID B ={b 1 ,b 2 ,…,b n }, where a i , bi ∈{ 0,1}, i∈{1,2,…,n}; meanwhile, Alice and Bob share a random binary string K={k 1 ,k 2 ,…,k 2L } in advance, where L=2(n+ l)(1+δ), n is the length of ID A and ID B , l is the length of MA and MB , δ>0 is a fixed parameter, assuming that the quantum channel is lossless and noise-free.

本发明提供了一种基于身份认证的半量子对话的方法,如图1所示,具体按以下步骤实施:The present invention provides a method of semi-quantum dialogue based on identity authentication, as shown in Figure 1, specifically implemented according to the following steps:

步骤1,量子方和经典方预先共享一个随机二进制串,然后量子方制备量子比特,然后将量子方身份序列和秘密消息通过量子比特对经典方进行发送:Step 1, the quantum party and the classical party share a random binary string in advance, then the quantum party prepares qubits, and then sends the quantum party identity sequence and secret message to the classical party through the qubits:

步骤1.1,量子方和经典方预先共享一个随机二进制串,然后量子方制备量子比特:In step 1.1, the quantum side and the classical side share a random binary string in advance, and then the quantum side prepares qubits:

量子方根据K制备L=2(n+l)(1+δ)个单光子组成序列A,若(k2i-1,k2i)=(0,0),量子方制备|0>作为序列A的第i个量子比特;如果(k2i-1,k2i)=(0,1),量子方制备|1>作为序列A的第i个量子比特;如果(k2i-1,k2i)=(1,0),量子方制备|+>作为序列A的第i个量子比特;如果(k2i-1,k2i)=(1,1),量子方制备|->作为序列A的第i个量子比特;其中i∈(1,2,…,L);最后将序列A分为两个子序列AZ和AX,其中AZ表示序列A中的所有|0>和|1>;AX表示序列A中的所有|+>和|->,为了使该通信顺利进行,其中|AZ|>(n+l);The quantum square prepares L=2(n+l)(1+δ) single photons to form a sequence A according to K, if (k 2i-1 ,k 2i )=(0,0), the quantum square prepares |0> as a sequence The i-th qubit of A; if (k 2i-1 ,k 2i )=(0,1), the quantum square prepares |1> as the i-th qubit of sequence A; if (k 2i-1 ,k 2i )=(1,0), quantum square preparation|+>as the i-th qubit of sequence A; if (k 2i-1 ,k 2i )=(1,1), quantum square preparation|->as sequence A The i-th qubit; where i∈(1,2,…,L); Finally, the sequence A is divided into two subsequences A Z and A X , where A Z represents all |0> and |1 in the sequence A > A X denotes all |+> and |-> in the sequence A, where |A Z |>(n+l);

步骤1.2,将经步骤1制备的量子比特进行分类:Step 1.2, classifying the qubits prepared in step 1:

将AZ的前(n+l)个量子比特划分为两个集合

Figure BDA0002470016600000073
Figure BDA0002470016600000074
划分方法为AZ的第奇数个量子比特划分到集合
Figure BDA0002470016600000081
为AUTH量子比特,用于编码经典方和量子方的身份序列IDA和IDB;第偶数个量子比特划分到集合
Figure BDA0002470016600000082
为ENCODE量子比特,用于编码经典方和量子方的秘密消息MA和MB;直至一个集合满了,剩余的量子比特全部划分到另外一个集合中Divide the first (n+l) qubits of A Z into two sets
Figure BDA0002470016600000073
and
Figure BDA0002470016600000074
The division method is that the odd-numbered qubits of A Z are divided into sets
Figure BDA0002470016600000081
It is the AUTH qubit, which is used to encode the identity sequences ID A and ID B of the classical party and the quantum party; the even numbered qubits are divided into sets
Figure BDA0002470016600000082
It is the ENCODE qubit, which is used to encode the secret messages MA and M B of the classical party and the quantum party; until one set is full, the remaining qubits are all divided into another set

量子方将Az中剩余的量子比特定义为

Figure BDA0002470016600000083
将AX标注为
Figure BDA0002470016600000084
Figure BDA0002470016600000085
Figure BDA0002470016600000086
统称为CTRL量子比特,用于检测量子通道的安全性。The quantum square defines the remaining qubits in Az as
Figure BDA0002470016600000083
label A X as
Figure BDA0002470016600000084
Figure BDA0002470016600000085
and
Figure BDA0002470016600000086
Collectively referred to as CTRL qubits, they are used to detect the security of quantum channels.

步骤1.3,量子方将身份序列和秘密消息结合步骤1.2分类后的量子比特进行发送:In step 1.3, the quantum party sends the identity sequence and secret message combined with the qubits classified in step 1.2:

量子方在集合

Figure BDA0002470016600000087
中编码他的身份序列IDB,若bi=0,搁置不操作,若bi=1,量子方将量子比特翻转(将K和IDB结合起来可以直接在步骤1.1中生成这些量子比特),即量子方将
Figure BDA0002470016600000088
中的第i个量子比特制备为
Figure BDA0002470016600000089
量子方在
Figure BDA00024700166000000810
上编码秘密消息MB,若
Figure BDA00024700166000000811
搁置,若
Figure BDA00024700166000000812
量子方将将量子比特翻转(通过把K和MB结合,也可以在步骤1.1中直接生成量子比特),即量子方将
Figure BDA00024700166000000813
中的第i个量子比特制备为
Figure BDA00024700166000000814
其中j是该量子比特在序列A中的位置;Quantum square in the assembly
Figure BDA0002470016600000087
Encode his identity sequence ID B in , if b i =0, put it on hold and do not operate, if b i =1, the quantum party will flip the qubits (combining K and ID B can directly generate these qubits in step 1.1) , that is, the quantum square will
Figure BDA0002470016600000088
The i-th qubit in is prepared as
Figure BDA0002470016600000089
Quantum square in
Figure BDA00024700166000000810
Encode the secret message M B above, if
Figure BDA00024700166000000811
on hold, if
Figure BDA00024700166000000812
The quantum square will flip the qubit (by combining K and MB , the qubit can also be generated directly in step 1.1), that is, the quantum square will
Figure BDA00024700166000000813
The i-th qubit in is prepared as
Figure BDA00024700166000000814
where j is the position of the qubit in sequence A;

Bob将序列A发送给Alice,为了阻止特洛伊木马攻击,Alice需要在她的量子比特接收装置前放置一个波长滤波器;Bob sends the sequence A to Alice, in order to prevent the Trojan horse attack, Alice needs to place a wavelength filter in front of her qubit receiving device;

步骤2,经典方对经步骤1发送的身份序列和秘密消息进行身份认证,然后对经典方的身份序列和秘密消息进行编码和安全检测,并反馈给量子方,对每个到达的量子比特,Alice在

Figure BDA00024700166000000815
上进行身份认证,在
Figure BDA00024700166000000816
上进行消息编码,在剩下的
Figure BDA00024700166000000817
Figure BDA00024700166000000818
上进行安全检测,具体内容如下:In step 2, the classical party authenticates the identity sequence and secret message sent in step 1, then encodes and performs security checks on the identity sequence and secret message of the classical party, and feeds back to the quantum party. For each arriving qubit, Alice is in
Figure BDA00024700166000000815
Authenticate on the
Figure BDA00024700166000000816
message encoding on the
Figure BDA00024700166000000817
and
Figure BDA00024700166000000818
Perform security checks on the Internet, the details are as follows:

步骤2.1,经典方测量每一个AUTH量子比特,测量结果记为

Figure BDA00024700166000000819
检测
Figure BDA0002470016600000091
是否与相应位置上的IDB和K相匹配,若错误率超过预先设定的阈值Pt,经典方终止协议;Step 2.1, the classical party measures each AUTH qubit, and the measurement result is recorded as
Figure BDA00024700166000000819
detection
Figure BDA0002470016600000091
Whether it matches the ID B and K at the corresponding position, if the error rate exceeds the preset threshold P t , the classic party terminates the agreement;

若检测正常,经典方在检测后的结果态上编码身份序列IDA,然后将它们返回给量子方;If the detection is normal, the classical party encodes the identity sequence ID A on the result state after the detection, and then returns them to the quantum party;

步骤2.2,经典方测量每一个ENCODE量子比特,并将该测量结果记录为

Figure BDA0002470016600000092
若第i个ENCODE量子比特的测量结果
Figure BDA0002470016600000093
为|0>,测量结果表示为0,若第i个ENCODE量子比特的测量结果
Figure BDA0002470016600000094
为|1>,测量结果表示为1,在测量完第i个ENCODE量子比特之后,经典方根据K和MA制备新的ENCODE量子比特,即将第i个ENCODE量子比特制备为
Figure BDA0002470016600000095
其中j是该量子比特在A中的位置,经典方将ENCODE量子比特返回给量子方;Step 2.2, the classical party measures each ENCODE qubit, and records the measurement result as
Figure BDA0002470016600000092
If the measurement result of the i-th ENCODE qubit
Figure BDA0002470016600000093
is |0>, the measurement result is expressed as 0, if the measurement result of the i-th ENCODE qubit
Figure BDA0002470016600000094
is |1>, the measurement result is expressed as 1, after measuring the i-th ENCODE qubit, the classical method prepares a new ENCODE qubit according to K and MA, that is, the i-th ENCODE qubit is prepared as
Figure BDA0002470016600000095
Where j is the position of the qubit in A, and the classical party returns the ENCODE qubit to the quantum party;

步骤2.3,经典方不加修改的将每一个CTRL量子比特反射给量子方;Step 2.3, the classical party reflects each CTRL qubit to the quantum party without modification;

步骤3,量子方接受经步骤2反馈的信息,对经典方的身份进行认证,然后检测信道的安全性,最后量子方和经典方分别解码对方的秘密消息,具体内容如下:In step 3, the quantum party accepts the information fed back in step 2, authenticates the identity of the classical party, and then checks the security of the channel. Finally, the quantum party and the classical party decode each other’s secret message respectively. The details are as follows:

步骤3.1,量子方按返回顺序依次存储经典方返回的量子比特,然后提取经典方返回的AUTH和CTRL量子比特并通过制备的量子态的基进行测量,测量结果分别表示为

Figure BDA0002470016600000096
Figure BDA0002470016600000097
Figure BDA0002470016600000098
与相应的IDA和K进行比较,若错误率低于Pt,确认经典方的身份进行测量,否则,量子方终止协议,并以认证的经典信道公布错误信息,返回第一步;In step 3.1, the quantum party stores the qubits returned by the classical party in turn in the order of return, and then extracts the AUTH and CTRL qubits returned by the classical party and performs measurements on the basis of the prepared quantum state. The measurement results are expressed as
Figure BDA0002470016600000096
and
Figure BDA0002470016600000097
Will
Figure BDA0002470016600000098
Compare with the corresponding ID A and K, if the error rate is lower than P t , confirm the identity of the classical party for measurement, otherwise, the quantum party terminates the agreement, and publishes the error information through the authenticated classical channel, and returns to the first step;

同理,将

Figure BDA0002470016600000099
与K进行比较,如果错误率低于Pt,量子方确认信道安全进行下一步操作,否则,终止协议,以认证的经典信道公布错误信息,返回第一步;Similarly, will
Figure BDA0002470016600000099
Compared with K, if the error rate is lower than P t , the quantum party confirms that the channel is safe and proceeds to the next step, otherwise, terminates the agreement, publishes the error message through the authenticated classical channel, and returns to the first step;

步骤3.2,量子方用K和

Figure BDA0002470016600000101
解码得到经典方要发送给他的消息,为
Figure BDA0002470016600000102
其中
Figure BDA0002470016600000103
经典方测量的ENCODE量子比特的第i个测量结果,j表示ENCODE量子比特在序列A中的位置,
Figure BDA0002470016600000104
为Bob发送给Alice的第i个秘密消息;Step 3.2, the quantum square uses K and
Figure BDA0002470016600000101
Decode to get the message that the classic party wants to send to him, as
Figure BDA0002470016600000102
in
Figure BDA0002470016600000103
The i-th measurement result of the ENCODE qubit measured by the classical method, j represents the position of the ENCODE qubit in sequence A,
Figure BDA0002470016600000104
is the ith secret message sent by Bob to Alice;

经典方用K和

Figure BDA0002470016600000105
解码得到量子方要发送给她的消息
Figure BDA0002470016600000106
Figure BDA0002470016600000107
其中
Figure BDA0002470016600000108
为经典方测量的ENCODE量子比特的第i个测量结果。The classic formula uses K and
Figure BDA0002470016600000105
Decoded to get the message that the quantum party wants to send to her
Figure BDA0002470016600000106
Figure BDA0002470016600000107
in
Figure BDA0002470016600000108
is the i-th measurement result of the ENCODE qubit measured by the classical party.

Claims (1)

1. A method of semi-quantum conversation based on identity authentication is characterized by comprising the following steps:
step 1, a quantum party and a classical party share a random binary string in advance, then the quantum party prepares a quantum bit, then a quantum party identity sequence and a secret message are sent to the classical party through the quantum bit, and when the classical party receives a sequence code sent by the quantum party, a wavelength filter is placed in front of a quantum bit receiving device, wherein the specific implementation mode comprises the following steps:
step 1.1, a quantum party and a classical party share a random binary string in advance, and then the quantum party prepares a quantum bit; random binary string of K = { K = 1 ,k 2 ,…,k 2L Where L =2 (n + L) (1 + δ), n is ID A And ID B Length, ID of A Is a classical square identity sequence, ID B Is a quantum square identity sequence, ID A ={a 1 ,a 2 ,…,a n },ID B ={b 1 ,b 2 ,…,b n In which a is i ,b i ∈{0,1},i∈{1,2,…,n};
l is M A And M B Length of (C), M A Secret messages for classical parties, M B Is a secret message of the quantum party,
Figure FDA0003924590130000011
δ>0 is a fixed parameter;
the specific content of the quantum bit prepared by the quantum method is as follows:
quantum method for preparing L =2 (n + L) (1 + delta) single photon composition sequence A according to K, if (K) 2i-1 ,k 2i ) = (0, 0), quantum-square preparation |0>The ith qubit as sequence A; if (k) 2i-1 ,k 2i ) = (0, 1), quantum method preparation |1>The ith qubit as sequence A; if (k) 2i-1 ,k 2i ) = (1, 0), quantum side preparation | +>The ith qubit as sequence A; if (k) 2i-1 ,k 2i ) =1, quantum preparation | ->The ith qubit as sequence A; wherein i ∈ (1, 2, \8230;, L); finally dividing the sequence A into two subsequences A Z And A X Wherein A is Z Represents all |0 s in sequence A>And |1>;A X Represents all | +in the sequence A>And | ->Wherein | A Z |>(n+l);
Step 1.2, the qubits prepared in step 1.1 are classified; the specific content of the classification of the qubits is as follows: a is to be Z Is divided into two sets
Figure FDA0003924590130000021
And
Figure FDA0003924590130000022
the division method is A Z Into a set
Figure FDA0003924590130000023
For AUTH qubits, for encoding the identity sequences ID of the classical party and the quantum party A And ID B (ii) a Dividing even numbered qubits into sets
Figure FDA0003924590130000024
For encodings of secret messages M of classical and quantum parties, for encodings of ENCODE qubits A And M B
Quantum prescription A z The remaining qubits in is defined as
Figure FDA0003924590130000025
A is prepared from X Is marked as
Figure FDA0003924590130000026
And
Figure FDA0003924590130000027
collectively known as CTRL qubits, for detecting the security of the quantum channel;
step 1.3, the quantum party sends the identity sequence and the secret message by combining the quantum bit classified in the step 1.2: quantum in set
Figure FDA0003924590130000028
Encodes his identity sequence ID B If b is i =0, rest, if b i =1, quantum party will qubit flip, i.e. quantum party will
Figure FDA0003924590130000029
The ith qubit in (a) is prepared as
Figure FDA00039245901300000210
The quantum is as follows
Figure FDA00039245901300000211
Up-coding secret message M B If, if
Figure FDA00039245901300000212
On the shelf, if
Figure FDA00039245901300000213
The quantum square will flip the qubit, i.e. the quantum square will
Figure FDA00039245901300000214
The ith qubit in (a) is prepared as
Figure FDA00039245901300000215
Where j is the position of the qubit in sequence A;
step 2, the classical party performs identity authentication on the identity sequence and the secret message sent in the step 1, then performs coding and security detection on the identity sequence and the secret message of the classical party, and feeds back the identity sequence and the secret message to the quantum party:
step 2.1, classical approachMeasuring each AUTH qubit, and recording the measurement result as
Figure FDA00039245901300000216
Detection of
Figure FDA00039245901300000217
Whether or not to correspond to the ID at the corresponding position B Matching with K, if the error rate exceeds the preset threshold value P t The classical party terminates the protocol;
if the detection is normal, the classical party codes the identity sequence ID on the detected result state A Then return them to the quantum party;
step 2.2, the classical party measures each ENCODE qubit and records the measurement as
Figure FDA00039245901300000218
If the measurement result of the ith ENCODE qubit
Figure FDA00039245901300000219
(i) Is |0>The measurement result is expressed as 0 if the measurement result of the ith ENCODE qubit
Figure FDA0003924590130000031
(i) Is |1>The measurement result is represented as 1; then the classical party according to K and M A Preparing new ENCODE qubit, i.e. preparing the ith ENCODE qubit as
Figure FDA0003924590130000032
Wherein j is the position of the qubit in A, the classical party returning the ENCODE qubit to the quantum party;
step 2.3, the classical party reflects each CTRL qubit to the quantum party without modification;
and 3, the quantum party receives the information fed back by the step 2, authenticates the identity of the classical party, detects the security of a channel, and finally decodes the secret message of the other party by the quantum party and the classical party respectively, which is implemented according to the following steps:
and 3.1, sequentially storing the qubits returned by the classical party by the quantum party according to the return sequence, extracting AUTH and CTRL qubits returned by the classical party, and measuring by the prepared quantum state basis, wherein the measurement results are respectively expressed as
Figure FDA0003924590130000033
And
Figure FDA0003924590130000034
will be provided with
Figure FDA0003924590130000035
With the corresponding ID A Comparing with K, if the error rate is lower than P t Confirming the identity of the classical party to measure, otherwise, the quantum party terminates the protocol and publishes error information by the authenticated classical channel;
in the same way, will
Figure FDA0003924590130000036
Comparing with K, if the error rate is lower than P t The quantum side confirms that the channel is safe to carry out the next operation, otherwise, the protocol is terminated, and error information is published by the authenticated classical channel;
step 3.2, quantum square K and
Figure FDA0003924590130000037
decoding results in a message to be sent to him by the classical party, of
Figure FDA0003924590130000038
Wherein
Figure FDA0003924590130000039
The ith measurement of the ENCODE qubit, measured by the classical party, j representing the position of the ENCODE qubit in sequence a,
Figure FDA00039245901300000310
an ith secret message sent to Alice for Bob;
k for classical prescription and
Figure FDA00039245901300000311
decoding to obtain the message to be sent by the quantum party
Figure FDA00039245901300000312
Figure FDA00039245901300000313
Wherein
Figure FDA00039245901300000314
The ith measurement result of an ENCODE qubit measured for the classical party.
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Citations (2)

* Cited by examiner, † Cited by third party
Publication number Priority date Publication date Assignee Title
CN107666356A (en) * 2017-10-18 2018-02-06 浙江工商大学 Requirement classical communication person based on single photon possesses half quantum dialogue method of measurement capability
CN110474770A (en) * 2019-08-23 2019-11-19 成都信息工程大学 A kind of multi-party half quantum secret sharing method and system based on single photon

Patent Citations (2)

* Cited by examiner, † Cited by third party
Publication number Priority date Publication date Assignee Title
CN107666356A (en) * 2017-10-18 2018-02-06 浙江工商大学 Requirement classical communication person based on single photon possesses half quantum dialogue method of measurement capability
CN110474770A (en) * 2019-08-23 2019-11-19 成都信息工程大学 A kind of multi-party half quantum secret sharing method and system based on single photon

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