CN111505669A - GNSS deception detection method and system using double antennas - Google Patents
GNSS deception detection method and system using double antennas Download PDFInfo
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- CN111505669A CN111505669A CN202010373752.8A CN202010373752A CN111505669A CN 111505669 A CN111505669 A CN 111505669A CN 202010373752 A CN202010373752 A CN 202010373752A CN 111505669 A CN111505669 A CN 111505669A
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- G—PHYSICS
- G01—MEASURING; TESTING
- G01S—RADIO DIRECTION-FINDING; RADIO NAVIGATION; DETERMINING DISTANCE OR VELOCITY BY USE OF RADIO WAVES; LOCATING OR PRESENCE-DETECTING BY USE OF THE REFLECTION OR RERADIATION OF RADIO WAVES; ANALOGOUS ARRANGEMENTS USING OTHER WAVES
- G01S19/00—Satellite radio beacon positioning systems; Determining position, velocity or attitude using signals transmitted by such systems
- G01S19/01—Satellite radio beacon positioning systems transmitting time-stamped messages, e.g. GPS [Global Positioning System], GLONASS [Global Orbiting Navigation Satellite System] or GALILEO
- G01S19/13—Receivers
- G01S19/20—Integrity monitoring, fault detection or fault isolation of space segment
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- G—PHYSICS
- G01—MEASURING; TESTING
- G01S—RADIO DIRECTION-FINDING; RADIO NAVIGATION; DETERMINING DISTANCE OR VELOCITY BY USE OF RADIO WAVES; LOCATING OR PRESENCE-DETECTING BY USE OF THE REFLECTION OR RERADIATION OF RADIO WAVES; ANALOGOUS ARRANGEMENTS USING OTHER WAVES
- G01S19/00—Satellite radio beacon positioning systems; Determining position, velocity or attitude using signals transmitted by such systems
- G01S19/01—Satellite radio beacon positioning systems transmitting time-stamped messages, e.g. GPS [Global Positioning System], GLONASS [Global Orbiting Navigation Satellite System] or GALILEO
- G01S19/13—Receivers
- G01S19/21—Interference related issues ; Issues related to cross-correlation, spoofing or other methods of denial of service
- G01S19/215—Interference related issues ; Issues related to cross-correlation, spoofing or other methods of denial of service issues related to spoofing
Abstract
The invention discloses a GNSS deception detection method and a GNSS deception detection system by utilizing double antennas, wherein the method comprises the following steps: s10, placing the two antennas on any plane and forming a baseline vector; s20, receiving GNSS signals of two antennas respectively, and generating carrier phase data and ephemeris data; s30, calculating an observed value of a baseline vector according to the carrier phase data and the ephemeris data, and calculating an estimated value of the baseline vector according to the observed value of the baseline vector and the baseline length; s40, calculating the sum of squares of errors between the observed value of the baseline vector and the estimated value of the baseline vector; and S50, setting a threshold value according to the error square sum to judge whether a deception signal exists in the current signal. The invention can detect single deception signal or multiple direction deception signals, can carry out real-time monitoring, and has the advantages of simplicity, feasibility and low cost.
Description
Technical Field
The invention relates to the technical field of deception detection, in particular to a GNSS deception detection method and a GNSS deception detection system using double antennas.
Background
With the continuous development of satellite navigation technology, GNSS technology has been widely applied in many fields such as location services, weather forecasting, transportation, system time service, and emergency rescue. However, GNSS signals are very susceptible to interference because of their very low signal power to the ground. In 12 months 2011, iran claimed to capture an elevated and confidential U.S. drone using GPS spoofing jamming technology. In the subsequent verification test, an attacker successfully uses the low-cost GNSS deception device to guide the unmanned aerial vehicle in the hovering state to dive towards the ground. In another test, an attacker successfully induced a full passenger yacht to deviate from the course without any warning being issued by the yacht. Therefore, research on anti-spoofing of GNSS is urgently needed.
The traditional receiver autonomous integrity detection (RAIM) only considers the consistency of pseudo-range and is not enough to cope with the advanced spoofing attack method. For the existing GNSS spoofing technology, various detection methods have been proposed at present. The spoof detection method based on the multi-antenna array has become one of the most effective spoof detection methods due to its unique geometric spatial characteristics. However, this method is either based on the assumption that all spoofed signals come from the same direction, or requires multi-antenna attitude resolution to obtain attitude information. For the former, since real signals come from different directions, when a single antenna broadcasts multiple deception signals, the deception signals can be effectively detected. However, when only a single spoof signal exists or spoof signals from multiple directions exist, the method cannot effectively distinguish the spoof signal from the real signal; for the latter, in order to achieve an arrival angle consistent with the true signal, the spoofed signal must be strictly phase-synchronized with the true signal, and the coordinate information of the antenna array needs to be known in advance. Which is almost impossible to implement under the current technical conditions, is a very efficient and capable method for rapidly detecting complex spoof signals. But the hardware cost is very high due to the need for auxiliary equipment or more than four antennas to acquire attitude information.
Therefore, it is desirable to provide a spoof detection method capable of detecting a single spoof signal or spoofs from multiple directions.
Disclosure of Invention
In view of the shortcomings of the prior art, the invention aims to provide a GNSS spoofing detection method using dual antennas, which can detect a single spoofing signal or a plurality of directional spoofing signals. The technical scheme is as follows:
a GNSS spoofing detection method utilizing dual antennas comprising the steps of:
s10, placing the two antennas on any plane and forming a baseline vector;
s20, receiving GNSS signals of two antennas respectively, and generating carrier phase data and ephemeris data;
s30, calculating an observed value of a baseline vector according to the carrier phase data and the ephemeris data, and calculating an estimated value of the baseline vector according to the observed value of the baseline vector and the baseline length;
s40, calculating the sum of squares of errors between the observed value of the baseline vector and the estimated value of the baseline vector;
and S50, setting a threshold value according to the error square sum to judge whether a deception signal exists in the current signal.
As a further improvement of the present invention, the step S30 specifically includes:
s31, constructing a carrier phase double-difference observation equation by using the carrier phase data and the ephemeris data
Wherein the content of the first and second substances,
is a carrier phase double difference matrix, H is a direction cosine matrix, Δ XBAIs an observed value of the baseline vector, nrBAIs zero-mean white gaussian noise, λ is the wavelength;
s32, calculating an observed value delta X of the baseline vectorBA；
S33, constructing iteration equation b'n+1＝bn'+XnWherein b'n+1And bn' Baseline vector estimates for the nth and n +1 iterations, respectively, b'n+1＝[Δxn+1,Δyn+1,Δzn+1]T，bn'＝[Δxn,Δyn,Δzn]TInitial value of iterative equation is observed value delta X of base line vectorBA，XnIs the residual of the n-th estimation,Xn＝[xn,yn,zn]T；
s34, simultaneous carrier phase double-difference observation equation and base length expression, and calculating residual error by least square methodXn；
And S35, obtaining a stable value after multiple iterations, namely the estimated value of the baseline vector calculated by the baseline length.
As a further improvement of the invention, the base length expression is
Linear by first-order Taylor expansion to obtain
Wherein lXn＝[lxn,lyn,lzn]T，
As a further improvement of the present invention, the S32 specifically includes: calculating an observed value delta X of a baseline vector according to a least square methodBA。
As a further improvement of the present invention, the step S50 specifically includes:
s51, calculating a chi-square distribution function of the error square sum;
s52, setting a threshold value according to the chi-square distribution function;
and S53, comparing the sum of squared errors with a set threshold value, and when the sum of squared errors is greater than the set threshold value, determining that a deception signal exists in the current signal.
As a further improvement of the present invention, the step S52 specifically includes: and setting a threshold value under the condition of meeting a certain false alarm rate by utilizing a Neyman-Pearson criterion according to a chi-square distribution function.
As a further improvement of the invention, the two antennas have the same type, and the ionosphere and troposphere errors corresponding to the two antennas are equal.
As a further development of the invention, the base length is less than 10 λ.
The invention also aims to provide a GNSS spoofing detecting system utilizing dual antennas, which can detect single spoofing signals or multiple direction spoofing signals. The technical scheme is as follows:
a GNSS spoofing detection system utilizing dual antennas, comprising:
the two antennas are placed on any plane and form a baseline vector;
the two receivers are used for respectively receiving the GNSS signals of the two antennas and generating carrier phase data and ephemeris data;
the signal processing unit comprises an observation value calculation module of a baseline vector, an estimation value calculation module of the baseline vector, an error square sum calculation module and a judgment module;
the observation value calculation module of the baseline vector is used for calculating the observation value of the baseline vector according to the carrier phase data and the ephemeris data;
the baseline vector estimated value calculation module is used for calculating the baseline vector estimated value according to the baseline vector observed value and the baseline length;
the error square sum calculation module is used for calculating the error square sum between the observed value of the baseline vector and the estimated value of the baseline vector;
the judging module is used for judging whether a deception signal exists in the current signal according to the error square sum and a set threshold value.
As a further improvement of the invention, the GNSS receiver further comprises a reference oscillator, and the reference oscillator is used for driving the two receivers to synchronously receive the GNSS signals.
The invention has the beneficial effects that:
the invention uses the GNSS deception detection method of the double antennas to form a baseline vector through the two antennas, the observed value of the baseline vector is obtained by calculation according to the carrier phase data and the ephemeris data, the estimated value of the baseline vector is calculated according to the observed value of the baseline vector and the length of the baseline, the sum of squares of errors between the observed value of the baseline vector and the estimated value of the baseline vector is calculated, and whether deception signals exist in the current signals or not is judged according to the sum of squares of errors.
The foregoing description is only an overview of the technical solutions of the present invention, and in order to make the technical means of the present invention more clearly understood, the present invention may be implemented in accordance with the content of the description, and in order to make the above and other objects, features, and advantages of the present invention more clearly understood, the following preferred embodiments are described in detail with reference to the accompanying drawings.
Drawings
FIG. 1 is a flow chart of a GNSS spoofing detection method utilizing dual antennas in a preferred embodiment of the present invention;
FIG. 2 is a schematic diagram of a GNSS spoofing detection system utilizing dual antennas in a preferred embodiment of the present invention.
Detailed Description
The present invention is further described below in conjunction with the following figures and specific examples so that those skilled in the art may better understand the present invention and practice it, but the examples are not intended to limit the present invention.
As shown in fig. 1, a GNSS spoofing detection method using dual antennas in the embodiment of the present invention includes the following steps:
step S10, place two antennas on an arbitrary plane and construct a baseline vector. The two antennas have the same model, and the errors of the ionosphere and the troposphere corresponding to the two antennas can be considered to be equal, so the ionosphere and the troposphere errors can be eliminated by using a carrier phase double difference method. In the present embodiment, the antenna is a commercial low-cost GNSS antenna. Preferably, the baseline vector length is less than 10 λ.
And S20, receiving GNSS signals of the two antennas respectively, and generating carrier phase data and ephemeris data. Specifically, two GNSS receivers respectively receive GNSS signals of two antennas. Preferably, the two receivers are driven by the reference oscillator to synchronously receive the GNSS signal, so that the purpose of synchronous output is achieved.
And S30, calculating an observed value of the baseline vector according to the carrier phase data and the ephemeris data, and calculating an estimated value of the baseline vector according to the observed value of the baseline vector and the baseline length. The method specifically comprises the following steps:
s31, constructing a carrier phase double-difference observation equation by using the carrier phase data and the ephemeris data
Wherein the content of the first and second substances,
is a carrier phase double difference matrix, H is a direction cosine matrix, Δ XBAIs an observed value of the baseline vector, nrBAIs zero-mean white gaussian noise and λ is the wavelength.
S32, calculating an observed value delta X of the baseline vectorBA. Specifically, the observed value Δ X of the baseline vector is calculated according to the least square methodBA。
S33, constructing iteration equation b'n+1＝bn'+XnWherein b'n+1And bn'Baseline vector estimates for the n and n +1 iterations, respectively, b'n+1＝[Δxn+1,Δyn+1,Δzn+1]T，bn'＝[Δxn,Δyn,Δzn]TInitial value of iterative equation is observed value delta X of base line vectorBA，XnIs the residual of the n-th estimation,Xn＝[xn,yn,zn]T。
s34, simultaneous carrier phase double-difference observation equation and base length expression, using minimum twoMultiply to calculate residualXn. Wherein, the base length d expression is:
And S35, obtaining a stable value after multiple iterations, namely the estimated value of the baseline vector calculated by the baseline length.
And S40, calculating the sum of squares of errors between the observed value of the baseline vector and the estimated value of the baseline vector.
And S50, setting a threshold value according to the error square sum to judge whether a deception signal exists in the current signal. The method specifically comprises the following steps:
and S51, calculating a chi-square distribution function of the error square sum.
And S52, setting a threshold value according to the chi-square distribution function. The method specifically comprises the following steps: and setting a threshold value under the condition of meeting a certain false alarm rate by utilizing a Neyman-Pearson criterion according to a chi-square distribution function.
And S53, comparing the sum of squared errors with a set threshold value, and when the sum of squared errors is greater than the set threshold value, determining that a deception signal exists in the current signal.
As shown in fig. 2, a GNSS spoofing detecting system using dual antennas in an embodiment of the present invention includes:
two antennas, placed in arbitrary planes and constituting a baseline vector. Wherein, two antenna models are the same, can think that the ionosphere and troposphere error that two antennas correspond are equal, therefore use carrier phase double difference method can eliminate ionosphere and troposphere error. In the present embodiment, the antenna is a commercial low-cost GNSS antenna. Preferably, the baseline vector length is less than 10 λ.
And the two receivers are used for respectively receiving the GNSS signals of the two antennas and generating carrier phase data and ephemeris data.
And the signal processing unit comprises an observation value calculation module of the baseline vector, an estimation value calculation module of the baseline vector, an error square sum calculation module and a judgment module.
And the observation value calculation module of the baseline vector is used for calculating the observation value of the baseline vector according to the carrier phase data and the ephemeris data.
And the baseline vector estimation value calculation module is used for calculating the baseline vector estimation value according to the observation value and the baseline length of the baseline vector.
The sum of squared errors calculation module is to calculate a sum of squared errors between the observed value of the baseline vector and the estimated value of the baseline vector.
The judging module is used for judging whether a deception signal exists in the current signal according to the error square sum and a set threshold value.
The calculation method and the calculation process in this embodiment specifically refer to the GNSS spoofing detection method using dual antennas in the above embodiment.
In this embodiment, the system further includes a reference oscillator, where the reference oscillator is used to drive the two receivers to synchronously receive GNSS signals, so as to achieve the purpose of synchronous output.
The antenna and the GNSS receiver adopted in the invention are commercial devices, and the cost is very low. The method does not need to redesign a special anti-deception antenna, does not need to change the existing navigation message signal structure, does not need to modify the hardware and software of the GNSS receiver, does not need to customize an antenna array installation platform, does not need to maintain any special, and does not need to acquire the coordinate information of the antenna in advance. In other words, the invention can meet the deception detection requirements of low cost, small volume, no delay and no false alarm on the basis of fully utilizing the existing equipment, and has very high popularization value.
The invention can detect single deception signal or multiple direction deception signals, can carry out real-time monitoring, and has the advantages of simplicity, feasibility and low cost.
The above embodiments are merely preferred embodiments for fully illustrating the present invention, and the scope of the present invention is not limited thereto. The equivalent substitution or change made by the technical personnel in the technical field on the basis of the invention is all within the protection scope of the invention. The protection scope of the invention is subject to the claims.
Claims (10)
1. A GNSS deception detection method using dual antennas is characterized by comprising the following steps:
s10, placing the two antennas on any plane and forming a baseline vector;
s20, receiving GNSS signals of two antennas respectively, and generating carrier phase data and ephemeris data;
s30, calculating an observed value of a baseline vector according to the carrier phase data and the ephemeris data, and calculating an estimated value of the baseline vector according to the observed value of the baseline vector and the baseline length;
s40, calculating the sum of squares of errors between the observed value of the baseline vector and the estimated value of the baseline vector;
and S50, setting a threshold value according to the error square sum to judge whether a deception signal exists in the current signal.
2. The GNSS spoofing detecting method using dual antennas according to claim 1, wherein said step S30 specifically includes:
s31, constructing a carrier phase double-difference observation equation by using the carrier phase data and the ephemeris data
Wherein the content of the first and second substances,
is the carrier phase double difference momentArray, H is a directional cosine matrix, Δ XBAIs an observed value of the baseline vector, nrBAIs zero-mean white gaussian noise, λ is the wavelength;
s32, calculating an observed value delta X of the baseline vectorBA；
S33, constructing iteration equation b'n+1＝b'n+XnWherein b'n+1And b'nBaseline vector estimates, b ', for the n and n +1 iterations, respectively'n+1＝[Δxn+1,Δyn+1,Δzn+1]T，b'n＝[Δxn,Δyn,Δzn]TInitial value of iterative equation is observed value delta X of base line vectorBA，XnIs the residual of the n-th estimation,Xn＝[xn,yn,zn]T；
s34, simultaneous carrier phase double-difference observation equation and base length expression, and calculating residual error by least square methodXn；
And S35, obtaining a stable value after multiple iterations, namely the estimated value of the baseline vector calculated by the baseline length.
3. The GNSS spoofing detection method utilizing dual antennas of claim 2 wherein said baseline length expression is
Linear by first-order Taylor expansion to obtain
Wherein lXn＝[lxn,lyn,lzn]T，
4. The GNSS spoofing detecting method using dual antennas as claimed in claim 2, wherein said S32 specifically includes: according to the least square methodCalculating the observed value DeltaX of the baseline vectorBA。
5. The GNSS spoofing detecting method using dual antennas according to claim 1, wherein said step S50 specifically includes:
s51, calculating a chi-square distribution function of the error square sum;
s52, setting a threshold value according to the chi-square distribution function;
and S53, comparing the sum of squared errors with a set threshold value, and when the sum of squared errors is greater than the set threshold value, determining that a deception signal exists in the current signal.
6. The GNSS spoofing detecting method using dual antennas according to claim 5, wherein said step S52 specifically includes: and setting a threshold value under the condition of meeting a certain false alarm rate by utilizing a Neyman-Pearson criterion according to a chi-square distribution function.
7. The GNSS spoofing detection method using dual antennas of claim 1 wherein said two antennas are of the same type and the ionospheric and tropospheric errors corresponding to both antennas are equal.
8. The GNSS spoofing detection method utilizing dual antennas of claim 1 wherein said base line length is less than 10 λ.
9. A GNSS spoofing detection system utilizing dual antennas, comprising:
the two antennas are placed on any plane and form a baseline vector;
the two receivers are used for respectively receiving the GNSS signals of the two antennas and generating carrier phase data and ephemeris data;
the signal processing unit comprises an observation value calculation module of a baseline vector, an estimation value calculation module of the baseline vector, an error square sum calculation module and a judgment module;
the observation value calculation module of the baseline vector is used for calculating the observation value of the baseline vector according to the carrier phase data and the ephemeris data;
the baseline vector estimated value calculation module is used for calculating the baseline vector estimated value according to the baseline vector observed value and the baseline length;
the error square sum calculation module is used for calculating the error square sum between the observed value of the baseline vector and the estimated value of the baseline vector;
the judging module is used for judging whether a deception signal exists in the current signal according to the error square sum and a set threshold value.
10. The GNSS spoofing detecting system utilizing dual antennas of claim 9 further comprising a reference oscillator for driving said two receivers to synchronously receive GNSS signals.
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Application publication date: 20200807 |
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