CN111464314A - Quantum synchronization bidirectional identity authentication method based on single photon - Google Patents

Quantum synchronization bidirectional identity authentication method based on single photon Download PDF

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CN111464314A
CN111464314A CN202010253992.4A CN202010253992A CN111464314A CN 111464314 A CN111464314 A CN 111464314A CN 202010253992 A CN202010253992 A CN 202010253992A CN 111464314 A CN111464314 A CN 111464314A
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CN111464314B (en
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赵怡静
张兴兰
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Beijing University of Technology
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Abstract

The invention discloses a quantum synchronization bidirectional identity authentication method based on single photons, which belongs to the technical field of quantum communication. In a specific authentication stage, a particle for communication is prepared by an initiator according to a novel efficient code in shared information, and the particle is used for full-course bidirectional authentication. And sending a single photon to Bob by Alice once, carrying out eavesdropping detection according to the recovered shared character string information after Bob measurement, then sequentially and singly transmitting the converted particles back to a channel, and comparing the converted particles with a published operator after Alice receives and measures the particles to finish eavesdropping detection. The method improves the coding efficiency, effectively avoids identity denial behavior and has a considerable eavesdropping detection rate.

Description

Quantum synchronization bidirectional identity authentication method based on single photon
Technical Field
The invention designs the fields of quantum communication, quantum identity authentication and the like, and particularly relates to a method for retrieving answers of simple question sentences by using a knowledge graph, and a method for matching relation question sentences with relation similarity in the knowledge graph by using a bidirectional attention coding network; a method for adding the problem intention in relation detection is provided.
Background
The prior art commonly used in the industry today is based on Quantum Key Distribution (Quantum Key Distribution) strategy in BB84 protocol proposed by Bennett and Brassard to improve and transform protocols in the aspects of Quantum Secure Direct Communication (QSDC), Quantum Identity Authentication (QIA), and the like. The importance of quantum identity authentication as an important component of quantum communication and an implementation part of quantum cryptography-related protocols is self-evident. While quantum field research has received extensive attention in recent years, quantum cryptography has infinite potential and bright prospect, and various aspects and fields of quantum cryptography are greatly developed, but the discussion of quantum identity authentication and the proposal of a complete protocol are not focused. The theoretical achievements of quantum cryptography are not numerous, the quantum cryptography has a distance from the real practical application, and the improvement on the whole quantum communication and quantum cryptography theoretical system has more possibility that the quantum cryptography can be developed in a balanced manner in the future so as to step into the application stage.
The problems existing in the prior art are as follows:
most of the existing quantum identity authentication protocols can only complete one-way authentication after one-time particle preparation, and the completion of two-way authentication requires multiple particle preparation and communication establishment. Under the current experimental conditions, the quantum manipulation technology and the quantum storage are far from meeting the technical conditions required by a partial quantum identity authentication protocol. In addition, security and efficiency of a method for encoding quantum information are urgently improved.
The difficulty and significance for solving the technical problems are as follows:
the invention can complete the authentication of both parties at one time and almost simultaneously finish the authentication. The strategy of determining the measuring machine by adopting one-bit coding is adopted for the coding of the identity authentication information, so that the efficiency is improved and the safety is ensured.
In order to apply the method to the existing experimental conditions, the method reduces the preparation times of the quantum bit, avoids partial equipment errors, replaces a complex quantum manipulation technology, uses simple quantum spin, and reduces unnecessary quantum storage through synchronous authentication.
Disclosure of Invention
Aiming at the problems in the prior art, the invention provides a bidirectional synchronous quantum identity authentication method based on single photons, which is suitable for one-time particle preparation in a quantum key distribution protocol or quantum secure direct communication between two users and simultaneously carries out quantum identity authentication on the two users and the two users, thereby avoiding eavesdropping risk brought by multiple communication establishment, avoiding the need of multiple particle preparation in two-time authentication between the two communication parties and avoiding superposed equipment errors. Moreover, in the stage of sharing character strings and establishing communication before the protocol begins, the implementation strategy in the quantum environment is discussed, and various unsafe factors in the classical channel are avoided. Under the guarantee of basic properties of quantum mechanics, the whole protocol guarantees unconditional safety of the protocol due to the principles of non-clonability and quantum inaccuracy measurement.
The protocol includes a preparation phase and an authentication phase. The preparation stage introduces the premise that two parties carry out identity authentication communication, including the specific coding mode of shared information and particles before verification and the matching rule of the codebook sequence and quantum state operation. The authentication phase introduces and explains the behaviors initiated by the identity authentication parties and the related data in detail according to the laying of the preparation phase. And the specific flow diagrams are given according to the sequence. Next, specific steps are given, wherein the step five is a preparation phase of the whole protocol, and the step six is an identity authentication phase.
Step one, Alice sends a communication request to a trusted third party Charlie, and the sent request information at least comprises identity information of Alice and ID information of a communication object Bob requested to be established.
And step two, the Charlie verifies whether the received user information is legal or not, and returns a time stamp, a shared information string K and a shared password string C to the legal user. The password of the password string is generated in a one-way function containing a random number, at the initial stage of establishing communication, the random number is input to the one-way function by Charlie and is calculated, and the final corresponding code of the password in the password string consists of 0 and 1.
And step three, Charlie sends a communication bill Ticket to the requested party Bob, wherein the bill has the encrypted IDs of the two communication parties besides the timestamp, and can also be understood as qualified information of the communication user. And meanwhile, Charlie shares the character string information K and the password string C to Bob.
And step four, after receiving the information of the third party Charlie, the Bob holds the communication bill and actively provides bill information to Alice to indicate that the communication is agreed to be established.
And fifthly, after receiving the bill information of the Bob, the Alice decrypts the bill information to judge the legality of the bill information, sends information to Charlie to confirm that the communication is successfully established, and starts an identity authentication process with the Bob.
Step six, Alice prepares single photon state, namely vector information Q according to the shared character string Ki，Qi∈(|0),|1>,|+>,|->)
And the seven Alice sequentially corresponds to the password string C to perform X or Z operation on the prepared particles. And when the corresponding bit of the password string is 0, performing Z operation on the particles according to the preparation sequence: qi'＝Z×Qi
When the corresponding bit of the password string is 1, performing X operation according to the preparation sequence of the particles: qi'＝X×Qi
Step eight Bob is to receive the bit information QiCarrying out reverse Z or X operation according to the one-time pad, and carrying out reverse Z operation when the corresponding bit of the pad is 0; when the corresponding bit of the codebook is 1, inverse X operation is carried out to obtain Qii,
Step nine Bob selects a proper measuring base F, F ∈ ({ | 0) according to the first bit, namely the successful bit, of the shared character string K>，|1>}；{|+>，|->0) when the work bit is 0, select the measurement basis 0>，|1>Is selected when the success bit is 1 { | +>，|->Q pairiiMeasurement is carried out to obtain a result Qii’
Step ten Bob through Qii' recovering a message character K according to the following principlei', if Ki’＝KiProceed to the next step, otherwise terminate the communication. Recovery is according to the following formula:
Figure BDA0002436544620000032
Figure BDA0002436544620000033
Figure BDA0002436544620000034
Figure BDA0002436544620000035
step eleven Bob obtains the random number sequence R, R by using basic quantum physicsiCorresponding to the position information in the shared codebook, so as to select different operators to transform photons, wherein the selected operator series is recorded as a set U, Ui∈ { Z, X }. converting to obtain a series of AND Qii' Photonic information Q with different appearancebiBob will QbiIs transmitted back to Alice over the channel,
step twelve Bob sequentially transmits information QbiFollowed by publication of the random number R over the open channeli-1(1<i≤n+1)，
Thirteen step, Alice receives the information and selects a proper measurement basis to measure the converted single photon according to the character string K
Fourteen, after receiving the information, the measurement is completed, and then Alice passes Qai' comparison with encoded information Q of character string KiObtaining the selected unitary operation calculator group Ui'. Measurement result Q of Aliceai’∈{|0>,|1>,|+>,|->Thus by comparison of Qai' and QiObtain operator UiThe procedure of' should follow the following table.
TABLE 1 qubit transform and operator Compare Table
Figure BDA0002436544620000031
Figure BDA0002436544620000041
Step fifteen Alice comparison Ui' and Bob disclose the operator U of the R bit of the random numberiIf U is presenti’＝UiThe communication is continued. Otherwise, the channel is abandoned.
According to the steps, Alice and Bob almost complete identity authentication of each other at the same time, and identity repudiation can be performed.
Drawings
Fig. 1 is a flow chart of the communication establishment in the preparation phase.
Figure 2 is a flow chart of an authentication phase.
Detailed Description
The present invention will be described in further detail below with reference to specific embodiments and with reference to the attached drawings.
The flow charts 1 and 2 of the method of the present invention are shown, and the example is that the trusted third party is Charlie, and Alice actively initiates identity authentication with Bob.
The method mainly comprises the following steps of:
step 1 authentication initiation phase
Step 1.1, Alice sends request information to Charlie, wherein the request information comprises ID information of Alice, ID information of a communication object Bob which is requested to be established, and a request authentication form, namely an identity authentication form.
Step 1.2, Charlie receives a request of Alice containing ID information, verifies that the IDs of an initiator and a requested party are legal, and returns a bill (Ticket) to double senders, namely Alice and Bob, wherein the bill information comprises the IDs of two communication parties, a timestamp and a shared information string K are used for preparing a quantum bit, and a shared password string C is used for carrying out secondary encryption on the quantum bit.
Step 1.3 Bob actively provides the authentication information in the bill to Alice to indicate agreement to establish communication after receiving the bill information.
And step 1.4, after the bill returned by the Bob is decrypted by the Alice, the information of the decrypted bill is judged to be legal, the Charlie communication is informed to be established, and the identity authentication is started.
Turning further to fig. 2, in fig. 2, Alice and Bob need to follow the following principles and procedures on the premise of successfully initiating authentication.
Step 2, authentication phase
Preparing knowledge: the quantum logic gates in a quantum computer are implemented by unitary transforms, corresponding to the gates of a classical computer. Quantum logic gates are common one-bit gates of a fundamental stone for realizing quantum parallel computation and comprise a phase gate and a Pauli gate, and when the Pauli gate acts on a bit, the generated operation is exemplified by X
Figure BDA0002436544620000051
Figure BDA0002436544620000052
And the X, Z operator formally is used when we perform corresponding operations in the protocol. The results of the particle manipulation for the different states are given in the following table:
table 2X, Z action four particle results table
Figure BDA0002436544620000053
Step 2.1, Alice prepares single photon state vector information Q according to the shared character string KiIf the information of the shared character string is 0001001110, Alice needs to prepare QiThe information is { |0>,|1>,|0>,|->,|+>}
And 2.2, sequentially corresponding to the password string C by Alice to perform X or Z operation on the prepared particles. When the code string is encoded at 10010, the operation required is X, Z, Z, X, Z. Operated QiIs { |1>，-|1>,|0>,-|->,|->And sending the information to Bob by Alice in sequence.
Step 2.3 Bob will receive the bit information Qi' reverse Z or X operations from the one-time pad to get information Qii。
Step 2.4 Bob selects proper measuring base in the communication according to the first position of each two-bit character in the shared character stringThe efficacy bits are 00011 in sequence, and when the efficacy bits are 0, the measurement basis { |0 is selected>，|1>Is selected when the success bit is 1 { | +>，|->Q pairiiMeasurement is carried out to obtain a result Qii’
Step 2.5 Bob by Qii', recovering the message character Ki', if Ki’＝KiThe eavesdropping is not detected and the next step is continued, otherwise the communication is terminated. I.e. Q by BobiiIs { |0>,|1>,|0>,|->,|+>And then authentication can be continued.
Step 2.6 Bob proceeds to this step to prove that Alice's qubits have been measured completely correctly, and then according to the random number RiAnd (3) selecting different operators to transform the photons, and assuming that the operator series set U selected by the random sequence R is { Z, X, X, Z, Z }. Photon information Q is obtained after conversionbiIs { |0 in sequence>,|0>|1>,|+>,|->Bob will QbiAre individually transmitted back to Alice in turn over the channel,
step 2.7 Bob transmits back each bit, and then publishes the position information on which the last transmitted bit was based when selecting the transform operation, i.e. the corresponding bit of the R sequence, via the public channel.
Step 2.8 according to the principle that the eigenvalue is not changed, Alice measures the particles received in sequence and selects a proper measuring base according to the character string K to obtain Qai’，Qai’∈{|0>,|1>,|+>,|->}。
Step 2.9 Alice passes Q after the measurement is completed after receiving the informationai' comparison with encoded information Q of character string KiOperator U can be completely recoveredi'. Compare U in sequencei' and Bob disclose the operator U of the R bit of the random numberiIf U of the biti’＝UiIndicating that no eavesdropping was detected, i.e. Alice sent the next bit of particles. Otherwise, the authentication fails. When no eavesdropping is detected in the whole process, the two parties are successfully authenticated.
The above description is only exemplary of the present invention and should not be taken as limiting, and any modifications, equivalents, improvements, etc. that are made within the spirit and the principle of the present invention should be included in the scope of the present invention.

Claims (3)

1. The quantum synchronization bidirectional identity authentication method based on the single photon is characterized in that: the method comprises the following steps of,
step 1.1, Alice sends an identity authentication request to a third party Charlie, wherein the sent request information comprises ID information of both communication parties;
step 1.2, the third party Charlie verifies whether the received user information is legal or not, and returns a time stamp, a shared information string K and a shared password string C to the legal user;
step 1.3, the third party Charlie sends a communication bill Ticket to the requested party Bob, and the bill has the encrypted IDs of both communication parties except the timestamp, namely the qualified information of the communication user; meanwhile, Charlie shares character string information K and password string C to Bob;
step 1.4, after receiving the information of the third party Charlie, the requested party Bob holds a communication bill and actively provides bill information to Alice to indicate that the establishment of communication is agreed;
step 1.5, after receiving the bill information of the requested party Bob, Alice decrypts the bill information to judge the validity of the bill information, sends information to a third party Charlie to confirm that the communication is successfully established, and starts an identity authentication process with the requested party Bob.
2. The single photon-based quantum synchronization bidirectional identity authentication method according to claim 1, characterized in that:
alice and the requested party Bob share the secret key string K (K) from the public trusted third party in advance1,K2,K3,……,Kn) The single photon quantum state coding principle corresponding to the character string is as follows:
00, 01 share a set of measurement bases, 10, 11 share a set of measurement bases; if the efficacy character string is 0, selecting a vertical orthogonal base, otherwise, selecting a non-vertical orthogonal base to pass once, and determining measurement by bit information; single-light string QiCorresponds to KiSituation is shown in table
Character string coding table
Figure FDA0002436544610000011
3. The single photon-based quantum synchronization bidirectional identity authentication method according to claim 1, characterized in that: in the bidirectional authentication, both authentication parties complete authentication at the same time, and an authentication protocol uses a symmetric password in a quantum environment to effectively defend a repudiation behavior; the method comprises the following specific steps:
step 3.1, Alice and Bob share a password string, the password string is generated in a one-way function containing a random number, the random number is input into the one-way function by a trusted third party Charlie and calculated every time communication is established, and the final corresponding code of the password in the password string is composed of 0 and 1; for a 0-to-Z operation in a cryptographic string (pauli operator Z)
Figure FDA0002436544610000012
) 1 corresponds to X (paul operator X)
Figure FDA0002436544610000013
) Operating;
step 3.2, Alice prepares single photon state vector information Q according to the shared character string Ki，Qi∈(|0),|1>,|+>,|->)
3.3, sequentially corresponding to the password string, the Alice performs X or Z operation on the prepared particles; and when the corresponding bit of the password string is 0, performing Z operation on the particles according to the preparation sequence:
Figure FDA0002436544610000021
when the corresponding bit of the password string is 1, performing X operation according to the preparation sequence of the particles:
Figure FDA0002436544610000022
step 3.4 Bob will receive the bit information QiCarrying out reverse Z or X operation according to the shared codebook C, and carrying out reverse Z operation when the corresponding bit of the codebook is 0; when the corresponding bit of the codebook is 1, inverse X operation is carried out to finally obtain Qii；
Step 3.5 Bob selects a proper measuring base F ∈ ({ | 0) according to the first position of each two-bit string in the shared string K>，|1>}；{|+>，|->0) and when the corresponding bit in the character string is 0 or 1, 0 { |0 is selected respectively>，|1>},{|+>，|->Measurement and Qii’；
Step 3.6 Bob by Qii', deducing a character Ki', if Ki’＝KiProceeding to the next step, otherwise terminating the communication;
step 3.7 Bob generates a random number sequence R by itself, according to RiOperation U for selecting corresponding position in a codebook as position informationiOperating the particles of the previous step to obtain QbiBob will QbiTransmitting the data back to Alice;
step 3.8 Bob transmits information Q in turnbiFollowed by publication of the random number R over the open channeli-1(1<i≤n+1)；
Step 3.9, Alice measures the converted single photon by the measurement basis indicated in the received information K to obtain Qai’,Qai’∈{|0>,|1>,|+>,|->Comparing Q recorded at the beginning of authenticationiTo obtain the selected operator Ui’；
Step 3.10 Alice compares Ui' and Bob disclose the operator U of the R bit of the random numberiIf U is presenti’＝UiContinuing the communication; otherwise, authentication fails.
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