CN111405573B - Cognitive radio auction method based on improved bilateral price auction model - Google Patents

Cognitive radio auction method based on improved bilateral price auction model Download PDF

Info

Publication number
CN111405573B
CN111405573B CN202010234343.XA CN202010234343A CN111405573B CN 111405573 B CN111405573 B CN 111405573B CN 202010234343 A CN202010234343 A CN 202010234343A CN 111405573 B CN111405573 B CN 111405573B
Authority
CN
China
Prior art keywords
transaction
seller
user
spectrum
price
Prior art date
Legal status (The legal status is an assumption and is not a legal conclusion. Google has not performed a legal analysis and makes no representation as to the accuracy of the status listed.)
Active
Application number
CN202010234343.XA
Other languages
Chinese (zh)
Other versions
CN111405573A (en
Inventor
岳文静
鲁康
陈志�
Current Assignee (The listed assignees may be inaccurate. Google has not performed a legal analysis and makes no representation or warranty as to the accuracy of the list.)
Nanjing University of Posts and Telecommunications
Original Assignee
Nanjing University of Posts and Telecommunications
Priority date (The priority date is an assumption and is not a legal conclusion. Google has not performed a legal analysis and makes no representation as to the accuracy of the date listed.)
Filing date
Publication date
Application filed by Nanjing University of Posts and Telecommunications filed Critical Nanjing University of Posts and Telecommunications
Priority to CN202010234343.XA priority Critical patent/CN111405573B/en
Publication of CN111405573A publication Critical patent/CN111405573A/en
Application granted granted Critical
Publication of CN111405573B publication Critical patent/CN111405573B/en
Active legal-status Critical Current
Anticipated expiration legal-status Critical

Links

Images

Classifications

    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04W—WIRELESS COMMUNICATION NETWORKS
    • H04W16/00—Network planning, e.g. coverage or traffic planning tools; Network deployment, e.g. resource partitioning or cells structures
    • H04W16/14—Spectrum sharing arrangements between different networks
    • G—PHYSICS
    • G06—COMPUTING; CALCULATING OR COUNTING
    • G06Q—INFORMATION AND COMMUNICATION TECHNOLOGY [ICT] SPECIALLY ADAPTED FOR ADMINISTRATIVE, COMMERCIAL, FINANCIAL, MANAGERIAL OR SUPERVISORY PURPOSES; SYSTEMS OR METHODS SPECIALLY ADAPTED FOR ADMINISTRATIVE, COMMERCIAL, FINANCIAL, MANAGERIAL OR SUPERVISORY PURPOSES, NOT OTHERWISE PROVIDED FOR
    • G06Q30/00—Commerce
    • G06Q30/06—Buying, selling or leasing transactions
    • G06Q30/08—Auctions
    • Y—GENERAL TAGGING OF NEW TECHNOLOGICAL DEVELOPMENTS; GENERAL TAGGING OF CROSS-SECTIONAL TECHNOLOGIES SPANNING OVER SEVERAL SECTIONS OF THE IPC; TECHNICAL SUBJECTS COVERED BY FORMER USPC CROSS-REFERENCE ART COLLECTIONS [XRACs] AND DIGESTS
    • Y02—TECHNOLOGIES OR APPLICATIONS FOR MITIGATION OR ADAPTATION AGAINST CLIMATE CHANGE
    • Y02D—CLIMATE CHANGE MITIGATION TECHNOLOGIES IN INFORMATION AND COMMUNICATION TECHNOLOGIES [ICT], I.E. INFORMATION AND COMMUNICATION TECHNOLOGIES AIMING AT THE REDUCTION OF THEIR OWN ENERGY USE
    • Y02D30/00—Reducing energy consumption in communication networks
    • Y02D30/70—Reducing energy consumption in communication networks in wireless communication networks

Landscapes

  • Business, Economics & Management (AREA)
  • Engineering & Computer Science (AREA)
  • Accounting & Taxation (AREA)
  • Finance (AREA)
  • Physics & Mathematics (AREA)
  • Economics (AREA)
  • Marketing (AREA)
  • Strategic Management (AREA)
  • Development Economics (AREA)
  • General Business, Economics & Management (AREA)
  • General Physics & Mathematics (AREA)
  • Entrepreneurship & Innovation (AREA)
  • Theoretical Computer Science (AREA)
  • Computer Networks & Wireless Communication (AREA)
  • Signal Processing (AREA)
  • Management, Administration, Business Operations System, And Electronic Commerce (AREA)

Abstract

The invention discloses a cognitive radio auction method based on an improved bilateral price calling auction model, wherein in a buying and selling stage, all cognitive users and main users are organized by intermediary organizations to conduct auctions on frequency spectrums in a centralized mode, both trading parties are subjected to price offering within a set time, a target trading volume and price are determined, price offering sets of the buying parties are arranged from high to low in sequence by using a rule of 'high-low matching', and price offering of the selling parties is arranged from low to high. And then determining that the buyer and the seller enter a transaction set from the quotation set according to the clearing rule, and carrying out transaction by the two parties in the transaction set. In the redemption stage, the master user puts forward a redemption application to the intermediary institution, and gives the master user a certain penalty of procedure charge according to the transaction duration. The method can solve monopoly of a spectrum trading market, can enable the cognitive user to quote according to real valuation, can also maintain the use right of the master user to the idle spectrum, can maximize the utility income, and can effectively improve the utilization rate of the spectrum.

Description

Cognitive radio auction method based on improved bilateral price auction model
Technical Field
The invention relates to the technical field of radio communication, in particular to a cognitive radio auction method based on an improved bilateral price-calling auction model.
Background
With the increasing of wireless devices and the continuous development of wireless services, such as internet of vehicles and internet of things, limited unlicensed frequency bands have been unable to meet the demand of frequency spectrum resources which are rapidly increasing day by day, and the scarcity of frequency spectrum is also one of the bottlenecks which restrict the development of wireless networks gradually. Furthermore, the conventional static spectrum allocation strategy has the problem of low utilization rate of spectrum resources. The main reason is that the licensed band is not fully utilized. If the idle authorized frequency band can be utilized, spectrum access opportunities are provided for more users, the demand pressure of spectrum resources can be greatly relieved, and the utilization rate of the authorized frequency band can be greatly improved. In such a situation, cognitive radio technology is a function of its operation. The cognitive radio technology has the characteristics of flexibility, intelligence and reconfiguration, and the core idea is that an authorized user opens the use of an authorized frequency band, and an unauthorized user searches and utilizes idle spectrum resources on the premise of not influencing the communication of the authorized user.
Auctions in economics refer to any trading or exchange mechanism with specific rules. The auction can be viewed as an incomplete information game because the users participating in the auction need to decide on the optimal bidding strategy to maximize personal utility values, and the information between users tends to be opaque. Meanwhile, auction design can also be regarded as a mechanism design problem, and reasonable auction rules need to be formulated to achieve certain goals, such as maximizing seller profit, maximizing resource utilization rate, and the like. Auctions can also be viewed as a means of market adjustment by adjusting prices to achieve equilibrium of supply and demand for goods in the market.
Traditional spectrum allocation is long-term and has a certain monopoly nature, and government functional organizations allocate precious spectrum resources to large-scale users such as operators and equipment providers for a long time through auctions. From which governments can obtain reasonable economic compensation. However, with the increasing popularity of wireless devices and APPs, the demand for wireless spectrum resources has increased dramatically. Conventional spectrum auction mechanisms lack sufficient flexibility to cope with the emerging market demands of complexity and variety. A mature auction mechanism is introduced into the cognitive radio frequency spectrum resource management, so that the utilization rate of the authorized frequency band can be improved.
The improved bilateral bid auction model consists essentially of the following steps: 1) the quote sets of the buyer and the seller are determined. 2) And determining that the buyer and the seller enter the collection of the transaction set from the quotation set. 3) The transaction set rules are matched. 4) Forming a balanced transaction.
Disclosure of Invention
The purpose of the invention is as follows: the invention provides a cognitive radio auction method based on an improved bilateral price auction model, which converts the channel capacity of a cognitive user into satisfaction through a utility function from the perspective of the channel capacity of the cognitive user, and formulates a matching transaction set rule of buyers and sellers by combining with the knowledge of an auction theory. And (3) combining game theory related knowledge, in order to balance the benefits of both parties, encouraging both parties to really quote, so as to mobilize the enthusiasm of potential traders for carrying out spectrum trading, and selecting the average value of the quotes of both parties as the final trading price. In order to ensure that the transaction of the whole system is safely and effectively carried out, a spectrum redemption mechanism is established in the interest of authorized users.
The technical scheme is as follows: in order to achieve the purpose, the invention adopts the technical scheme that:
a cognitive radio auction method based on an improved bilateral price auction model comprises the following steps:
step S1, the spectrum transaction bidirectional intermediary mechanism makes an application, and the spectrum manager respectively performs qualification audit on both sides;
step S2, for the buyer and the seller meeting the access qualification, the quotation set is admitted; determining the set of two parties entering the transaction set from the quotation set, comprising the following steps:
s2.1, adjusting a quotation set; both sides of the transaction quote in the set time, determine the target transaction amount and price, submit their own quote, supply and demand, transmitting power and channel gain information; and arranging the buyer's quotation sets in the order from high to low by adopting a high-low matching rule as follows:
b*＝{b1,b2,b3,...,be,...,bmin which b is1≥b2≥b3≥...≥be≥...≥bm；
The seller's offer set is ranked from low to high as follows:
s*＝{s1,s2,s3,...,sf,...,snin which s is1≤s2≤s3≤...≤sf≤...≤sn；
S2.2, confirming a transaction set; the rule of clearing is determined as follows:
when s isf≤be<sf+1,be+1<sf≤beThen, the first e buyers of the buyer quotation in the sequence and the first f sellers of the seller quotation enter a transaction set; according to the clearing rule of the quotation set entering the transaction set, the transaction set at the moment is B*＝{b1,b2,b3,...,be}；S*＝{s1,s2,s3,...,sf}；
Step S3, determining that the buyer and the seller match the transaction set rule; after the transaction set is determined, according to the priority order, the first buyer with the highest price quotation has the priority selection, and the seller which best meets the own interests is selected to carry out transaction according to the frequency spectrum purchase quantity of the current cognitive user, the ideal communication capacity, the supply quantity of the seller, the transaction cost of the unit frequency spectrum and the price quotation of the seller within the specified time;
step S4, determining a balanced transaction price; under the condition of sealed quotation, each cognitive user SU independently gives a bid and a required quantity, and each master user PU gives a quotation and a supply quantity; the frequency spectrum manager adapts the quotation and supply and demand quantity of a plurality of buyers and sellers; according to the respective quotations of the transaction parties, selecting the average value of the quotations of the parties as the final transaction price, namely:
Figure BDA0002430469160000021
wherein: k represents the kth transaction; bk,skQuoted prices for the buyer and the seller in the k transaction; in the case that one buyer deals with a plurality of sellers, the seller's price quotes are the minimum value of the seller in the transaction;
step S5, determining a primary user redeeming frequency spectrum mechanism; when the main user needs to use the idle spectrum according to the increase of the business, submitting a redeeming spectrum application, and paying the redeeming spectrum fee to an intermediary agency, namely:
p＝αtnps
wherein: alpha is alphatRepresents a redemption rate in relation to the time of sale, t, in the range of 0.00% to 1.50%, and if the time of sale is less than 7 days, the intermediary company will charge 1.50% of the redemption commission; n represents the amount of redeemed spectrum; p is a radical ofsRepresenting the unit frequency spectrum unit price of a main user;
further, the specific selection step of the buyer selecting the seller in the step S3 is as follows:
s3.1, determining the signal to interference and noise ratio of the current cognitive user; in a multi-channel cognitive radio model, a plurality of idle sub-channels can exist at the same time, some sub-channels may not be occupied by a master user in a specific time and region, and the sub-channels can provide spectrum access for secondary users; when the current cognitive user accesses to an idle sub-channel of a master user, the signal to interference plus noise ratio is expressed as follows:
Figure BDA0002430469160000031
wherein:
Figure BDA0002430469160000032
represents the actual power of the transmitter of secondary user i; h isiiRepresents STiTo SRiThe channel gain of (a); h isijRepresents STiTo SRjThe channel gain of (a); n isiBackground noise (assumed to be white gaussian noise); interpuRepresenting the interference of the power of the selected primary user transmitter to the secondary users, the calculation formula is as follows:
Figure BDA0002430469160000033
wherein: hiRepresenting the channel gain of primary user transmitter power to secondary users; ppuRepresenting the transmission power of a primary user transmitter;
s3.2, determining the communication capacity of the current cognitive user; according to a Shannon formula, the communication capacity of the current cognitive user is obtained as follows:
Figure BDA0002430469160000034
wherein: b represents a channel bandwidth;
s3.3, determining a utility function of the current cognitive user; the satisfaction of SU with the communication capacity is measured by the satisfaction function S as follows:
Figure BDA0002430469160000035
wherein b represents a satisfaction factor;
the utility function of an SU can be expressed as a weighted sum of the satisfaction with respect to the communication capacity and the negative gain it obtains from the PU, i.e.:
Usu＝ωpSsu-Ur
wherein: omegapEquivalent revenue representing unit satisfaction; negative earnings U of spectrum leasing feerExpressed as:
Ur＝ps+pz
wherein: p is a radical ofsRepresenting the bid of a main user on a unit frequency spectrum; p is a radical ofzRepresenting a unit spectrum transaction cost price;
s3.4, determining a seller of the current cognitive user; according to the utility function, the maximum income obtained after the current cognitive user selects each master user is calculated in sequence, namely:
Figure BDA0002430469160000041
s.t.1≤j≤M j＝1,2,...,M
wherein: m represents the number of main users;
if the current seller supply is less than the demand, the cognitive user (SU) continues to search for a seller until the demand is fully met.
Has the advantages that: the invention provides a frequency spectrum allocation system based on auction on the basis of a multi-channel cognitive radio system model, and the cost, the transaction amount, the channel capacity of a cognitive user and the like of frequency spectrum transaction are taken as auction indexes, so that monopoly can be broken well, the defect of a unilateral auction mode can be overcome, the cognitive user can be allowed to quote according to real valuation, and particularly:
(1) the improved double-side price auction theory is integrated into a cognitive radio system, thereby solving the monopoly of the system and making up the defect of a single-side auction mode.
(2) When the authorized user is selected as the seller, the multi-dimension is used as the reference index, the problem of 'high price and high price in the auction theory' is solved, each cognitive user in the system can quote according to the own valuation, and the trading system can be safely and reliably carried out.
(3) In the spectrum redemption stage, a redemption mechanism is established, and the use right of the main user to the idle spectrum is maintained.
(4) The utilization rate of the frequency spectrum and the system benefit are improved, the authorized user obtains economic benefits by renting the frequency spectrum, and the cognitive user obtains benefits by using the frequency spectrum to transmit data.
Drawings
Fig. 1 is a schematic diagram of a cognitive radio system architecture based on an improved bilateral bid auction model according to the present invention.
Fig. 2 is a flow chart of a spectrum auction execution algorithm.
Detailed Description
The present invention will be further described with reference to the accompanying drawings.
As shown in fig. 1, the cognitive radio system based on the improved bilateral price auction model mainly includes three parts, namely identity management, transaction management and ledger management. Identity management is used to register and verify identities of all authorized and cognitive users participating in buying and selling spectrum. Transaction management is used for spectrum trading and redemption, settlement and payment. The ledger management function is mainly to record each transaction information in the system.
The specific spectrum auction process is as follows:
and step S1, the frequency spectrum manager applies for the agency, initiates a frequency spectrum auction through the transaction management function, enables the identity management function by the system, and conducts qualification auditing on the frequency spectrum manager. If the audit is passed, the buyer and the seller enter a quotation set; if the audit is not passed, the transaction is terminated.
Step S2, for the buyer and the seller meeting the entering qualification, the quotation set is admitted; determining the set of two parties entering the transaction set from the quotation set, comprising the following steps:
s2.1, adjusting a quotation set; both sides of the transaction quote in a set time, determine the target transaction amount and price, submit the quote, supply and demand amount, transmitter transmitting power and channel gain information of the both sides; and arranging the buyer's quotation sets in the order from high to low by adopting a high-low matching rule as follows:
b*＝{b1,b2,b3,...,be,...,bmin which b1≥b2≥b3≥...≥be≥...≥bm；
The seller's offer set is ranked from low to high as follows:
s*＝{s1,s2,s3,...,sf,...,snin which s1≤s2≤s3≤...≤sf≤...≤sn；
S2.2, confirming a transaction set; the rule of clearing is determined as follows:
when s isf≤be<sf+1,be+1<sf≤beThen, the first e buyers of the buyer quotation in the sequence and the first f sellers of the seller quotation enter a transaction set; according to the clearing rule of the quotation set entering the transaction set, the transaction set at the moment is B*＝{b1,b2,b3,...,be}；S*＝{s1,s2,s3,...,sf}；
Step S3, determining that the buyer and the seller match the transaction set rule; after the transaction set is determined, the first buyer with the highest price quotation has a priority selection according to the priority order, and the seller which best meets the own interests is selected to carry out transaction according to the spectrum purchase amount of the current cognitive user, the ideal communication capacity, the supply amount of the seller, the transaction cost of the unit spectrum and the price quotation of the seller within the specified time. Because the decision is influenced in many aspects, the first buyer does not necessarily select the seller with the lowest price quotation to carry out transaction, in the invention, the primary user PU is the seller, the cognitive user SU is the buyer, and therefore the following steps are adopted for screening:
s3.1, determining the signal-to-interference-and-noise ratio of the current cognitive user; in a multi-channel cognitive radio model, a plurality of idle sub-channels can exist at the same time, some sub-channels may not be occupied by a master user in a specific time and region, and the sub-channels can provide spectrum access for secondary users; when the current cognitive user accesses to the idle sub-channel of the master user, the signal-to-interference-and-noise ratio is expressed as follows:
Figure BDA0002430469160000051
wherein:
Figure BDA0002430469160000052
represents the actual power of the transmitter of secondary user i; h isiiRepresents STiTo SRiThe channel gain of (a); h isijRepresents STiTo SRjThe channel gain of (a); n isiBackground noise (assumed to be white gaussian noise); interpuRepresenting the interference of the power of the selected primary user transmitter to the secondary users, the calculation formula is as follows:
Figure BDA0002430469160000053
wherein: hiRepresenting the channel gain of primary user transmitter power to secondary users; ppuRepresenting the transmission power of a primary user transmitter;
s3.2, determining the communication capacity of the current cognitive user; according to a Shannon formula, the communication capacity of the current cognitive user is obtained as follows:
Figure BDA0002430469160000061
wherein: b represents a channel bandwidth;
s3.3, determining a utility function of the current cognitive user; the satisfaction of SU with the communication capacity is measured by the satisfaction function S as follows:
Figure BDA0002430469160000062
wherein b represents a satisfaction factor;
the utility function of an SU can be expressed as a weighted sum of the satisfaction with respect to the communication capacity and the negative gain it obtains from the PU, i.e.:
Usu＝ωpSsu-Ur
wherein: omegapEquivalent revenue representing unit satisfaction; negative earnings U of spectrum leasing feesrExpressed as:
Ur＝ps+pz
wherein: p is a radical ofsRepresenting the bid of a main user on a unit frequency spectrum; p is a radical ofzRepresenting a unit spectrum transaction cost price;
s3.4, determining a seller of the current cognitive user; according to the utility function, the maximum income obtained after the current cognitive user selects each master user is calculated in sequence, namely:
Figure BDA0002430469160000063
s.t.1≤j≤M j＝1,2,...,M
wherein: m represents the number of main users;
if the current seller supply is less than the demand, the cognitive user (SU) continues to search for a seller until the demand is fully met.
Step S4, determining a balanced transaction price; in the case of sealed offers, each cognitive user (SU) gives independently bids and required quantities, and each Primary User (PU) gives offers and supply quantities; the frequency spectrum manager adapts the quotation and supply and demand quantity of a plurality of buyers and sellers; according to the respective quotations of the transaction parties, selecting the average value of the quotations of the parties as the final transaction price, namely:
Figure BDA0002430469160000064
wherein: k represents the k transaction; bk,skQuoted prices for the buyer and the seller in the k transaction; in the case where one buyer transacts with a plurality of sellers, the seller's offer is sold for the transactionThe minimum value of the square;
step S5, determining the redemption of the spectrum mechanism by the main user; when the main user needs to use the idle spectrum according to the increase of the business, submitting a redeeming spectrum application, and paying the redeeming spectrum fee to an intermediary agency, namely:
p＝αtnps
wherein: alpha is alphatRepresenting a redemption rate in the range of 0.00% to 1.50% related to the time t sold, the intermediary company will charge 1.50% of the redemption commission if the time t sold is less than 7 days; n represents the amount of redeemed spectrum; p is a radical ofsRepresenting the unit frequency unit price of the primary user;
the above description is only of the preferred embodiments of the present invention, and it should be noted that: it will be apparent to those skilled in the art that various modifications and adaptations can be made without departing from the principles of the invention and these are intended to be within the scope of the invention.

Claims (1)

1. A cognitive radio auction method based on an improved bilateral price auction model is characterized by comprising the following steps:
step S1, the spectrum transaction bidirectional intermediary mechanism makes an application, and the spectrum manager respectively performs qualification audit on both sides;
step S2, for the buyer and the seller meeting the access qualification, the quotation set is admitted; determining the set of two parties entering the transaction set from the quotation set, comprising the following steps:
s2.1, adjusting a quotation set; both sides of the transaction quote in a set time, determine the target transaction amount and price, submit the quote, supply and demand amount, transmitter transmitting power and channel gain information of the both sides; and arranging the buyer's quotation sets in the order from high to low by adopting a high-low matching rule as follows:
b*＝{b1,b2,b3,...,be,...,bmin which b is1≥b2≥b3≥...≥be≥...≥bm；
The seller's offer set is ranked from low to high as follows:
s*＝{s1,s2,s3,...,sf,...,snin which s is1≤s2≤s3≤...≤sf≤...≤sn；
S2.2, confirming a transaction set; the rule of clearing is determined as follows:
when s isf≤be<sf+1,be+1<sf≤beThen, the first e buyers of the buyer quotation in the sequence and the first f sellers of the seller quotation enter a transaction set; according to the clearing rule of the quotation set entering the transaction set, the transaction set at the moment is B*＝{b1,b2,b3,...,be}；S*＝{s1,s2,s3,...,sf}；
Step S3, determining that the buyer and the seller match the transaction set rule; after the transaction set is determined, according to the priority order, the first buyer with the highest price quotation has the priority selection, and the seller which best meets the own interests is selected to carry out transaction according to the frequency spectrum purchase quantity of the current cognitive user, the ideal communication capacity, the supply quantity of the seller, the transaction cost of the unit frequency spectrum and the price quotation of the seller within the specified time;
specifically, the specific selection step of the buyer selecting the seller in the step S3 is as follows:
s3.1, determining the signal to interference and noise ratio of the current cognitive user; in a multi-channel cognitive radio model, a plurality of idle sub-channels can exist at the same time, some sub-channels may not be occupied by a master user in a specific time and region, and the sub-channels can provide spectrum access for secondary users; when the current cognitive user accesses to the idle sub-channel of the master user, the signal-to-interference-and-noise ratio is expressed as follows:
Figure FDA0003654388660000011
wherein:
Figure FDA0003654388660000021
represents the actual power of the transmitter of secondary user i; h isiiRepresents STiTo SRiThe channel gain of (a); h isijRepresents STiTo SRjThe channel gain of (c); n isiIs background noise; interpuRepresenting the interference of the power of the selected primary user transmitter to the secondary users, the calculation formula is as follows:
Figure FDA0003654388660000022
wherein: hiRepresenting the channel gain of primary user transmitter power to secondary users; p ispuRepresenting the transmission power of a primary user transmitter;
s3.2, determining the communication capacity of the current cognitive user; according to a Shannon formula, the communication capacity of the current cognitive user is obtained as follows:
Figure FDA0003654388660000023
wherein: b represents a channel bandwidth;
s3.3, determining a utility function of the current cognitive user; the satisfaction degree of the cognitive user SU to the communication capacity is measured by adopting a satisfaction degree function S as follows:
Figure FDA0003654388660000024
wherein b represents a satisfaction factor;
the utility function of a cognitive user SU can be expressed as a weighted sum of the satisfaction with respect to the communication capacity and the negative gain it obtains from the PU, i.e.:
Usu＝ωpSsu-Ur
wherein: omegapEquivalent revenue representing unit satisfaction; negative earnings U of spectrum leasing feerExpressed as:
Ur＝ps+pz
wherein: p is a radical ofsRepresenting the bid of a main user on a unit frequency spectrum; p is a radical ofzRepresenting a unit spectrum transaction cost price;
s3.4, determining a seller of the current cognitive user; according to the utility function, the maximum income obtained after the current cognitive user selects each master user is calculated in sequence, namely:
Figure FDA0003654388660000025
s.t.1≤j≤M j＝1,2,...,M
wherein: m represents the number of main users;
if the current supply amount of the seller is smaller than the demand amount, the cognitive user SU continues to search for the seller until the demand is completely met;
step S4, determining a balanced transaction price; under the condition of sealed quotation, each cognitive user SU independently gives a bid and a required quantity, and each master user PU gives a quotation and a supply quantity; the frequency spectrum manager adapts the quotation and supply and demand quantity of a plurality of buyers and sellers; according to the respective quotations of the transaction parties, selecting the average value of the quotations of the parties as the final transaction price, namely:
Figure FDA0003654388660000031
wherein: k represents the k transaction; bk,skQuoted prices for the buyer and the seller in the k transaction; in the case that one buyer deals with a plurality of sellers, the seller's price quotes are the minimum value of the seller in the transaction;
step S5, determining a primary user redeeming frequency spectrum mechanism; when the main user needs to use the idle spectrum according to the increase of the business, submitting a redeeming spectrum application, and paying the redeeming spectrum fee to an intermediary agency, namely:
p＝αtnps
wherein: alpha is alphatRepresents a redemption rate in relation to the time of sale, t, in the range of 0.00% to 1.50%, and if the time of sale is less than 7 days, the intermediary company will charge 1.50% of the redemption commission; n represents the amount of redeemed spectrum; p is a radical ofsAnd the unit.
CN202010234343.XA 2020-03-30 2020-03-30 Cognitive radio auction method based on improved bilateral price auction model Active CN111405573B (en)

Priority Applications (1)

Application Number Priority Date Filing Date Title
CN202010234343.XA CN111405573B (en) 2020-03-30 2020-03-30 Cognitive radio auction method based on improved bilateral price auction model

Applications Claiming Priority (1)

Application Number Priority Date Filing Date Title
CN202010234343.XA CN111405573B (en) 2020-03-30 2020-03-30 Cognitive radio auction method based on improved bilateral price auction model

Publications (2)

Publication Number Publication Date
CN111405573A CN111405573A (en) 2020-07-10
CN111405573B true CN111405573B (en) 2022-07-05

Family

ID=71429302

Family Applications (1)

Application Number Title Priority Date Filing Date
CN202010234343.XA Active CN111405573B (en) 2020-03-30 2020-03-30 Cognitive radio auction method based on improved bilateral price auction model

Country Status (1)

Country Link
CN (1) CN111405573B (en)

Families Citing this family (2)

* Cited by examiner, † Cited by third party
Publication number Priority date Publication date Assignee Title
CN114071387A (en) * 2020-07-31 2022-02-18 索尼公司 Management electronic device and method for wireless communication, computer readable medium
CN115423580B (en) * 2022-11-04 2023-02-07 国网浙江省电力有限公司金华供电公司 Bilateral price calling auction method and system for carbon transaction

Citations (3)

* Cited by examiner, † Cited by third party
Publication number Priority date Publication date Assignee Title
CN105873076A (en) * 2016-06-20 2016-08-17 闽江学院 Cognitive radio network frequency spectrum combination auction method based on bipartite graph
CN106658518A (en) * 2016-11-02 2017-05-10 桂林电子科技大学 Variable step stepping-type frequency spectrum auction method for femtocell base stations in two-layer heterogeneous network
CN107580328A (en) * 2017-08-16 2018-01-12 桂林电子科技大学 The spectrum auction method of social mutual trust is applied in a kind of femtocell isomery junction network

Family Cites Families (1)

* Cited by examiner, † Cited by third party
Publication number Priority date Publication date Assignee Title
US20020198814A1 (en) * 2001-06-22 2002-12-26 International Business Machines Corporation Online e-commerce transactions incorporating determination of end-to-end costs

Patent Citations (3)

* Cited by examiner, † Cited by third party
Publication number Priority date Publication date Assignee Title
CN105873076A (en) * 2016-06-20 2016-08-17 闽江学院 Cognitive radio network frequency spectrum combination auction method based on bipartite graph
CN106658518A (en) * 2016-11-02 2017-05-10 桂林电子科技大学 Variable step stepping-type frequency spectrum auction method for femtocell base stations in two-layer heterogeneous network
CN107580328A (en) * 2017-08-16 2018-01-12 桂林电子科技大学 The spectrum auction method of social mutual trust is applied in a kind of femtocell isomery junction network

Also Published As

Publication number Publication date
CN111405573A (en) 2020-07-10

Similar Documents

Publication Publication Date Title
Feng et al. TAHES: Truthful double auction for heterogeneous spectrums
Feng et al. TAHES: A truthful double auction mechanism for heterogeneous spectrums
Lin et al. Groupon in the air: A three-stage auction framework for spectrum group-buying
CN107370616A (en) 5G cellular network virtual resources distribution mechanisms based on combination Double Auction
CN111405573B (en) Cognitive radio auction method based on improved bilateral price auction model
Chen et al. True-MCSA: A framework for truthful double multi-channel spectrum auctions
CN110503533B (en) Heterogeneous spectrum multi-round auction method based on block chain
CN108182112A (en) The resource allocation mechanism of sensing network focusing on people based on combinational auction
Feng et al. FlexAuc: Serving dynamic demands in a spectrum trading market with flexible auction
CN106550369A (en) A kind of spectrum auction method of the two-layer heterogeneous network comprising cell
CN101662327A (en) Multiple frequency band share method of cognitive radio
Zhai et al. Truthful double auction for joint internet of energy and profit optimization in cognitive radio networks
Khairullah et al. PreDA: Preference-based double auction for spectrum allocation in heterogeneous DSA networks
CN109089266B (en) Multi-channel dynamic spectrum allocation method for preventing Sybil attack and computer program
CN107911823B (en) Multi-channel anti-policy manipulated spectrum allocation method
Rathinakumar et al. GAVEL: Strategy-proof ascending bid auction for dynamic licensed shared access
Zhang et al. Differential privacy-based double auction for data market in blockchain-enhanced internet of things
Zhang et al. Competitive auctions for cost-aware cellular traffic offloading with optimized capacity gain
Sodagari et al. Strategies to achieve truthful spectrum auctions for cognitive radio networks based on mechanism design
Wang et al. Truthful auction for resource allocation in cooperative cognitive radio networks
CN115907988A (en) Frequency spectrum block chain transaction mechanism and transaction method based on assistance of wireless environment diagram
Chouayakh et al. Multi-block ascending auctions for effective 5g licensed shared access
Feng et al. A hybrid spectrum combinational auction mechanism based on a weighted bipartite graph for energy internet in smart cities
Le et al. On a new incentive and market based framework for multi-tier shared spectrum access systems
Zhu et al. Aerm: An attribute-aware economic robust spectrum auction mechanism

Legal Events

Date Code Title Description
PB01 Publication
PB01 Publication
SE01 Entry into force of request for substantive examination
SE01 Entry into force of request for substantive examination
GR01 Patent grant
GR01 Patent grant