CN111369251A - Block chain transaction supervision method based on user secondary identity structure - Google Patents

Block chain transaction supervision method based on user secondary identity structure Download PDF

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CN111369251A
CN111369251A CN202010154432.3A CN202010154432A CN111369251A CN 111369251 A CN111369251 A CN 111369251A CN 202010154432 A CN202010154432 A CN 202010154432A CN 111369251 A CN111369251 A CN 111369251A
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transaction
john
bob
anonymous
identity
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CN111369251B (en
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谢涛
李洪波
熊挺
李浩海
谢琛
周荣豪
李慎纲
李竞
刘一炜
王宝来
谢瑾
肖菁
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National University of Defense Technology
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    • G—PHYSICS
    • G06—COMPUTING; CALCULATING OR COUNTING
    • G06Q—INFORMATION AND COMMUNICATION TECHNOLOGY [ICT] SPECIALLY ADAPTED FOR ADMINISTRATIVE, COMMERCIAL, FINANCIAL, MANAGERIAL OR SUPERVISORY PURPOSES; SYSTEMS OR METHODS SPECIALLY ADAPTED FOR ADMINISTRATIVE, COMMERCIAL, FINANCIAL, MANAGERIAL OR SUPERVISORY PURPOSES, NOT OTHERWISE PROVIDED FOR
    • G06Q20/00—Payment architectures, schemes or protocols
    • G06Q20/38—Payment protocols; Details thereof
    • G06Q20/382—Payment protocols; Details thereof insuring higher security of transaction
    • G06Q20/3821—Electronic credentials
    • G06Q20/38215—Use of certificates or encrypted proofs of transaction rights
    • G—PHYSICS
    • G06—COMPUTING; CALCULATING OR COUNTING
    • G06Q—INFORMATION AND COMMUNICATION TECHNOLOGY [ICT] SPECIALLY ADAPTED FOR ADMINISTRATIVE, COMMERCIAL, FINANCIAL, MANAGERIAL OR SUPERVISORY PURPOSES; SYSTEMS OR METHODS SPECIALLY ADAPTED FOR ADMINISTRATIVE, COMMERCIAL, FINANCIAL, MANAGERIAL OR SUPERVISORY PURPOSES, NOT OTHERWISE PROVIDED FOR
    • G06Q20/00—Payment architectures, schemes or protocols
    • G06Q20/38—Payment protocols; Details thereof
    • G06Q20/382—Payment protocols; Details thereof insuring higher security of transaction
    • G06Q20/3825—Use of electronic signatures
    • G—PHYSICS
    • G06—COMPUTING; CALCULATING OR COUNTING
    • G06Q—INFORMATION AND COMMUNICATION TECHNOLOGY [ICT] SPECIALLY ADAPTED FOR ADMINISTRATIVE, COMMERCIAL, FINANCIAL, MANAGERIAL OR SUPERVISORY PURPOSES; SYSTEMS OR METHODS SPECIALLY ADAPTED FOR ADMINISTRATIVE, COMMERCIAL, FINANCIAL, MANAGERIAL OR SUPERVISORY PURPOSES, NOT OTHERWISE PROVIDED FOR
    • G06Q20/00—Payment architectures, schemes or protocols
    • G06Q20/38—Payment protocols; Details thereof
    • G06Q20/382—Payment protocols; Details thereof insuring higher security of transaction
    • G06Q20/3829—Payment protocols; Details thereof insuring higher security of transaction involving key management
    • G—PHYSICS
    • G06—COMPUTING; CALCULATING OR COUNTING
    • G06Q—INFORMATION AND COMMUNICATION TECHNOLOGY [ICT] SPECIALLY ADAPTED FOR ADMINISTRATIVE, COMMERCIAL, FINANCIAL, MANAGERIAL OR SUPERVISORY PURPOSES; SYSTEMS OR METHODS SPECIALLY ADAPTED FOR ADMINISTRATIVE, COMMERCIAL, FINANCIAL, MANAGERIAL OR SUPERVISORY PURPOSES, NOT OTHERWISE PROVIDED FOR
    • G06Q20/00—Payment architectures, schemes or protocols
    • G06Q20/38—Payment protocols; Details thereof
    • G06Q20/383—Anonymous user system
    • G—PHYSICS
    • G06—COMPUTING; CALCULATING OR COUNTING
    • G06Q—INFORMATION AND COMMUNICATION TECHNOLOGY [ICT] SPECIALLY ADAPTED FOR ADMINISTRATIVE, COMMERCIAL, FINANCIAL, MANAGERIAL OR SUPERVISORY PURPOSES; SYSTEMS OR METHODS SPECIALLY ADAPTED FOR ADMINISTRATIVE, COMMERCIAL, FINANCIAL, MANAGERIAL OR SUPERVISORY PURPOSES, NOT OTHERWISE PROVIDED FOR
    • G06Q20/00—Payment architectures, schemes or protocols
    • G06Q20/38—Payment protocols; Details thereof
    • G06Q20/40—Authorisation, e.g. identification of payer or payee, verification of customer or shop credentials; Review and approval of payers, e.g. check credit lines or negative lists
    • G06Q20/401—Transaction verification
    • G06Q20/4014—Identity check for transactions

Abstract

The invention discloses a block chain transaction supervision method based on a user secondary identity structure, which comprises the following steps: the two parties of the transaction firstly sign own anonymous transaction by using a private key of a public key cryptosystem (PKI) CA certificate of the two parties of the transaction to form mutual commitment to the transaction; the two transaction parties encrypt the digital signature and the CA certificate by using the generated public key of the anonymous account of the other party and send the encrypted digital signature and the CA certificate to the other party; the two transaction parties decrypt the received encrypted commitment signature of the other party and verify the decrypted commitment signature by using the public key of the CA certificate of the other party; and judging whether the verification is established, if so, finishing the down-link transaction, and otherwise, terminating the down-link transaction process. The invention combines the primary real-name identity with the secondary anonymous identity, realizes the under-chain bidirectional authenticable signature and verification of the point-to-point transaction content through the primary real-name identity, and simultaneously realizes the on-chain public tracking and verification of the transaction content authenticity through the secondary anonymous identity.

Description

Block chain transaction supervision method based on user secondary identity structure
Technical Field
The invention relates to the technical field of blockchain, in particular to a blockchain transaction supervision method based on a user secondary identity structure.
Background
The block chain is used as a basic technology of the bit currency, has the characteristics of decentralization, middleman removal, trust removal, anonymity, openness, traceability, distributed type, non-tampering and the like, and has wide revolutionary application in the fields of digital currency, cross-border payment, financial science and technology, intelligent contracts, security transactions, electronic commerce, Internet of things, social communication, file storage, evidence storage and right confirmation, share rights crowd funding and the like. The user of the centralized system must register public identity, the user has no independent control right on own identity and privacy information, and the centralized system has no privacy protection problem. A fully decentralized blockchain is a non-third party based untrusted network (trustless) and may be referred to as a consensus network. Thus, a fully decentralized blockchain may employ anonymous identities, with users having autonomous control over their true identity and private information. If the blockchain is not completely decentralized, trust relationships between users must be established based on public (registered) identities. Thus, anonymity of the user account is an optional attribute of a completely decentralized blockchain network, and you can choose to have their public identity or not. The anonymous digital economy, like the cash trading market, can facilitate commercial transactions by protecting individual privacy. Public digital economies like Taobao network blooms, the network owner providing the business service must legally register the public business identity. Thus, a digital economic entity includes a transaction account number for which an individual must have a publicly registered identity and anonymity. How to ensure that own transaction keeps anonymity on a transaction-unrelated party, but the authenticity of the transaction can be publicly traced and verified on a chain, and meanwhile, real-name identity is adopted for a transaction-related party to carry out chain authentication, so that the problem of chain real-name traceability (KYC) of the transaction-related party is solved, and a default \ illegal evidence for cryptographically preventing repudiation and testability can be provided for the transaction-related party, so that the method is a key problem which needs to be solved when a blockchain technology is applied to a ground practice in a real e-commerce scene.
The block chain network adopts the public account book to record all transactions, anyone can trace back and verify the authenticity of any transaction on the account book at any time, but an irrelevant party of any transaction must never trace and evidence the public real-name identity of a relevant party of the transaction in law. When a party to a transaction violates a law, such as default, money laundering, drug selling, or smuggling, the regulatory authorities can legally disclose criminal evidence by cryptographically repudiation-proof techniques. However, anonymous privacy protection of users of existing blockchain networks conflicts with the real-name regulatory requirements of transaction breach/crime pursuit.
Disclosure of Invention
In order to solve the technical problems, the invention provides a block chain transaction supervision method based on a user secondary identity structure, which is simple in algorithm, safe and reliable.
The technical scheme for solving the technical problems is as follows:
a block chain transaction supervision method based on a user secondary identity structure combines a primary real-name identity with a secondary anonymous identity, realizes under-chain bidirectional authenticable signature and verification of point-to-point transaction contents through the primary real-name identity, and simultaneously realizes on-chain tracking and verification of authenticity of public transaction contents through the secondary anonymous identity, and comprises the following steps:
the method comprises the following steps: the two parties of the transaction firstly sign own anonymous transaction by using the private key of the CA certificate of the two parties of the transaction to form mutual commitment to the transaction;
step two: the two transaction parties encrypt the digital signature and the CA certificate by using the generated public key of the anonymous account of the other party and send the encrypted digital signature and the CA certificate to the other party;
step three: the two transaction parties decrypt the received encrypted commitment signature of the other party and verify the decrypted commitment signature by using the public key of the CA certificate of the other party;
step four: judging whether the verification is established or not, and if the verification is established, finishing the down-link transaction; otherwise, the off-link transaction process is terminated.
According to the block chain transaction supervision method based on the user secondary identity structure, the primary real-name identity is represented by a CA certificate of a user account management App designed based on a public key cryptosystem, and the secondary anonymous identity is represented by a user anonymous account designed based on an asymmetric cryptosystem.
In the block chain transaction supervision method based on the user secondary identity structure, the CA certificate of the App is managed by the user account designed based on the public key cryptosystem, and the CA certificate is stored on a block chain public account and issued by a CA mechanism or an intelligent contract or a CA certificate issued by the CA mechanism and stored on a central server; the user anonymous account designed based on the asymmetric cryptosystem is generated by a cryptographic hash value of one public key or a mixture of a plurality of public keys belonging to the anonymous account.
In the above block chain transaction supervision method based on the user secondary identity structure, in the first step, when the anonymous account number of the transaction initiator is generated by a password hash value mixed by a plurality of public keys, signatures of all private keys of the anonymous account number of the transaction initiator on the anonymous transaction content are provided.
The block chain transaction supervision method based on the user secondary identity structure,assume customer John's public identity certificate as CAJohnThe public key is pubKJohnThe private key is priKJohn(ii) a The public identity certificate of the network commodity sales shop owner Bob is CABobThe public key is pubKBobThe private key is priKBob(ii) a Suppose that
Figure BDA0002403583050000031
Is an anonymous account number, shorthand, of the customer John
Figure BDA0002403583050000032
By a randomly generated public key
Figure BDA0002403583050000033
Generated by cryptographic hashing, the corresponding private key being
Figure BDA0002403583050000034
Figure BDA0002403583050000035
Is another anonymous account number, shorthand, of customer John
Figure BDA0002403583050000036
Two randomly generated public keys
Figure BDA0002403583050000037
And
Figure BDA0002403583050000038
is generated by cryptographic hashing, with a corresponding private key of
Figure BDA0002403583050000039
And
Figure BDA00024035830500000310
assuming anonymous account numbers
Figure BDA00024035830500000311
N digital encryption currencies exist, and n is more than or equal to p; suppose that
Figure BDA00024035830500000312
Is an anonymous account number, brief note, of a network shop owner Bob
Figure BDA00024035830500000313
By a randomly generated public key
Figure BDA00024035830500000314
Generated by cryptographic hashing, the private key being
Figure BDA00024035830500000315
The block chain network transaction steps for customer John to purchase item G in p digital cryptocurrency from network owner Bob are as follows:
1) customer John's anonymous account with himself
Figure BDA0002403583050000041
To another anonymous account of oneself
Figure BDA0002403583050000042
Sending p digital cryptocurrency John via anonymous account
Figure BDA0002403583050000043
Signs the contents of the transaction, i.e. calculates
Figure BDA0002403583050000044
sign is a signature operation symbol; the signature on the transaction is actually a signature on the cryptographic hash value of the transaction content itself,
Figure BDA0002403583050000045
refers to a simplified representation containing a transaction hash signature value and a transaction file, i.e. representing an anonymous account number
Figure BDA0002403583050000046
To anonymous account numbers
Figure BDA0002403583050000047
P digital cryptocurrency are sent out,
Figure BDA0002403583050000048
representation by private key
Figure BDA0002403583050000049
For transaction
Figure BDA00024035830500000410
The signature of (3), the following are similar;
2) customer John's anonymous account with himself
Figure BDA00024035830500000411
Anonymous account number to store owner Bob
Figure BDA00024035830500000412
Sending p digital encryption currencies; john through anonymous account
Figure BDA00024035830500000413
A private key of
Figure BDA00024035830500000414
Partially signing, i.e. computing, transaction content
Figure BDA00024035830500000415
Then will be
Figure BDA00024035830500000416
Are sent together to
Figure BDA00024035830500000417
3) The shop owner Bob receives
Figure BDA00024035830500000418
And
Figure BDA00024035830500000419
after the information, record
Figure BDA00024035830500000420
Then the identity certificate CA is published by the userBobPrivate key priKBobTo pair
Figure BDA00024035830500000421
Signing, i.e. calculating commitment signatures
Figure BDA00024035830500000422
Then the signature value SignBobPublic identity certificate CA of shop owner BobBobMerchant Bob anonymous account number
Figure BDA00024035830500000423
Of (2) a public key
Figure BDA00024035830500000424
And a nonce generated instantaneously by BobBobConcatenating to obtain a sequence of messages
Figure BDA00024035830500000425
With the anonymous account number of the customer John
Figure BDA00024035830500000426
Of (2) a public key
Figure BDA00024035830500000427
Encryption
Figure BDA00024035830500000428
Obtaining an encrypted ciphertext
Figure BDA00024035830500000429
Enc is an encryption operation symbol; then the encrypted ciphertext is encrypted
Figure BDA00024035830500000430
Anonymous account number sent to customer John
Figure BDA00024035830500000431
4) Customer John receives the invitationCipher text
Figure BDA0002403583050000051
After the information, the account number is anonymous through the user
Figure BDA0002403583050000052
Private key of
Figure BDA0002403583050000053
To pair
Figure BDA0002403583050000054
Performing decryption, i.e. calculation
Figure BDA0002403583050000055
To obtain
Figure BDA0002403583050000056
As a store owner Bob to the transaction
Figure BDA0002403583050000057
The verifiable chain promissory signature of (1), Dec is a decryption operation symbol, and is the inverse operation of encryption operation Enc; using public real-name certificates CABobPublic key publicKBobSigning commitments
Figure BDA0002403583050000058
Performing authentication, i.e. verifying
Figure BDA0002403583050000059
Figure BDA00024035830500000510
If the verification is true, continuing the next step; otherwise, terminating the down-link transaction process;
5) customer John with anonymous account number
Figure BDA00024035830500000511
Another private key of
Figure BDA00024035830500000512
For transaction
Figure BDA00024035830500000513
The content being partially signed, i.e. calculated
Figure BDA00024035830500000514
Note the book
Figure BDA00024035830500000515
Figure BDA00024035830500000516
Is that the customer John is through an anonymous account number
Figure BDA00024035830500000517
Reconciled transactions
Figure BDA00024035830500000518
The complete commitment of; note the book
Figure BDA00024035830500000519
Figure BDA00024035830500000520
Is that the customer John is through an anonymous account number
Figure BDA00024035830500000521
And
Figure BDA00024035830500000522
reconciled transactions
Figure BDA00024035830500000523
The complete commitment of;
6) customer John publishes certificate CA by himselfJohnPrivate key priKJohnTo pair
Figure BDA00024035830500000524
Signing, i.e. calculating commitment signatures
Figure BDA00024035830500000525
Sign value SignJohnPublic certificate CA with customer JohnJohnAnd a random number nonce generated immediately by customer JohnJohnConcatenating to obtain a sequence of messages
Figure BDA00024035830500000526
And using the anonymous account number of the network shop owner Bob
Figure BDA00024035830500000527
Of (2) a public key
Figure BDA00024035830500000528
To pair
Figure BDA00024035830500000529
Encrypted to obtain
Figure BDA00024035830500000530
Figure BDA00024035830500000531
Will encrypt the result
Figure BDA00024035830500000532
Anonymous account number sent to network store owner Bob
Figure BDA00024035830500000533
7) The network shop owner Bob receives
Figure BDA0002403583050000061
After the information, the account number is anonymous through the user
Figure BDA0002403583050000062
Private key of
Figure BDA0002403583050000063
To pair
Figure BDA0002403583050000064
Performing decryption, i.e. calculation
Figure BDA0002403583050000065
Get SignJohn||CAJohn||nonceJohnAs a customer John's pair transaction
Figure BDA0002403583050000066
Verifiable commitment signature of (a); using public certificates CAJohnPublic key pubKJohnSign the acceptance SignJohn||CAJohn||nonceJohnPerforming authentication, i.e. verifying
Figure BDA0002403583050000067
If the verification is true, continuing the next step; otherwise, terminating the down-link transaction process;
8) the network owner Bob initiates a shipping program for the item G purchased by the customer John.
In the block chain transaction monitoring method based on the user secondary identity structure, in the step 3), the block chain transaction monitoring method is implemented
Figure BDA0002403583050000068
The encryption of (c) may use the public key of any anonymous account number of the customer John that the network store owner Bob knows.
The block chain transaction supervision method based on the user secondary identity structure further comprises the step that one of the two transaction parties carries out duty following on the real-name identity of the default/illegal party under the condition that the other party violates/violates a law, and supposing that the customer John and the network store owner Bob successfully complete the under-chain transaction program for the commodity G through the block chain, but the network store owner Bob does not start the delivery program of the commodity G; in the case that the customer John cannot receive the commodity G, the real-name identity tracing program for the network store owner Bob is started, and the steps are as follows:
step 1: the public real-name certificate CA of the network store owner Bob that the customer John will save in step 4) of the transaction programBobAnd its signed commitment to the transaction
Figure BDA0002403583050000069
Sent together to intelligence responsible for blockchain transaction supervisionAn issuing authority of a contract or public key CA certificate;
step 2: the supervisor checks the real name certificate CA of the network shop owner Bob through the certificate revocation listBobPerforming temporary suspension and informing the shop owner to complete the transaction process, starting a delivery program of the purchased commodity G or returning the order of the customer John on the commodity G by p cryptocurrency, or directly deducting p cryptocurrency from the block chain network transaction security deposit of the network shop owner Bob to the customer John; and the penalty is used for maintaining the normal operation cost of the supervisory program according to the scene intensity.
In the block chain transaction supervision method based on the user secondary identity structure, in the step that one of two transaction parties violates/violates the law, and the other party undertakes responsibility for the real-name identity of the violated/violated party, there is a violation behavior of the customer John on the network store owner Bob:
a double-flower transaction is generated immediately after customer John completes the off-chain transaction step
Figure BDA0002403583050000071
And sends it to the blockchain network, which invalidates the customer John's commitment to the network store owner Bob's payment, and a brief
Figure BDA0002403583050000072
Wherein
Figure BDA0002403583050000073
Is an anonymous account number of customer John; when the network store owner Bob encounters a double-flower attack of the customer John, the public identity certificate CA of the customer is utilizedJohnAnd its pair transaction
Figure BDA0002403583050000074
Under-chain commitment signature SignJohnThe real-name identity accountability program for the customer John is started, and the real-name identity accountability program for the customer John is the same as the real-name identity accountability program for the network store owner Bob.
According to the block chain transaction supervision method based on the user secondary identity structure, two parties conducting transactions through the block chain network do not need to wait for the transaction of the block chainThe record and confirmation of the transaction is carried out after the transaction process, namely, when the transaction parties successfully complete the down-link transaction step and do not find the default/illegal event, the transaction parties can carry out anonymous transaction
Figure BDA0002403583050000075
And sending to the blockchain network.
The invention has the beneficial effects that:
1. the invention combines the primary real-name identity with the secondary anonymous identity, realizes the under-chain bidirectional authenticable signature and verification of the point-to-point transaction content through the primary real-name identity, and simultaneously realizes the on-chain tracking and verification of the authenticity of the public transaction content through the secondary anonymous identity.
2. Blockchain network anonymous accounts may facilitate commercial transactions by protecting individual privacy, and legitimate registration public identities may provide traceability of network violations/violations. The block chain secondary identity structure in the invention has dual identity information of the user public registration identity and the anonymous transaction account number, thereby promoting commercial transaction and protecting the legal rights and interests of participants.
3. The user with the primary public CA certificate can realize point-to-point anonymous value/message transmission through the secondary anonymous account, only two interactive parties can carry out cryptology anti-repudiation under-chain authentication on the real-name identity through a CA certificate system, and the public block chain account book can realize on-chain tracing verification on the authenticity of any transaction/interactive content.
4. The user secondary identity structure can ensure the necessary privacy protection rights among digital economic behavior individuals, and meanwhile, when one party is in default or illegal, the other party can carry out effective anti-repudiation evidence-raising on the digital economic behavior individuals in the cryptographic sense, thereby providing digital criminal evidence with legal efficacy for anonymous account behavior supervision and criminal tracing services of a block chain network.
5. The public key CA certificates of both transaction parties and the signature of the public identity commitment of the transaction do not need to be recorded on the public account book of the block chain, and only the public key CA certificate of the other party and the signature of the public key CA certificate on the commitment of the transaction need to be stored by the transaction related party under the chain.
6. The block chain network of the invention can adopt the public account book of the traditional mode (bitcoin) to record all transactions, anyone can trace and verify the authenticity of any transaction on the account book at any time, and an irrelevant party of any transaction does not permit to track and obtain the public real-name identity of a relevant party of the transaction.
7. In the invention, both sides of the block chain network downlink transaction process are carried out through the secondary identity structure of the user, the record and confirmation of the transaction by the block chain network are not required to be waited, the record and confirmation process of the transaction is submitted by both sides for post-processing, and the efficient downlink transaction process, namely the transaction is firstly carried out and then the record is carried out.
8. In the invention, the secondary identity structure can solve the basic problem of deep human society. In the construction of a decentralized social network platform, on the basis of how to protect the freedom of the personal online talk and creation behaviors (including audio, video, pictures, characters and other digital creative products), the method simultaneously ensures that the personal digital creative works obtain copyright protection evidences with cryptographic significance and evidence or source-tracing evidences for propagating illegal contents in the propagation process, and a secondary identity structure can provide deep technical support.
Drawings
FIG. 1 is a block chain network secondary identity structure of the present invention.
Fig. 2 is a schematic diagram of a secondary identity structure of a blockchain network node John according to the present invention.
FIG. 3 is a diagram illustrating a secondary identity structure of a blockchain network node Bob according to the present invention.
FIG. 4 is a diagram of a customer John's single public key account with the present invention
Figure BDA0002403583050000091
Transferring P digital currencies to a Dual public Key Account
Figure BDA0002403583050000092
A schematic diagram of a payment requiring double signature verification is generated.
FIG. 5 illustrates a customer John using dual public key account according to the present invention
Figure BDA0002403583050000093
Primary account number to store
Figure BDA0002403583050000094
Sending P digital currencies for use
Figure BDA0002403583050000095
Schematic diagram of partial commitment signature.
FIG. 6 is a diagram illustrating a store owner Bob sending a verifiable encrypted blockchain transaction chain commitment signature to customer John in accordance with the present invention.
FIG. 7 is a diagram illustrating customer John decrypting and verifying a commitment signature under the blockchain transaction chain in accordance with the present invention.
FIG. 8 illustrates a customer John using dual public key account according to the present invention
Figure BDA0002403583050000096
Primary account number to store
Figure BDA0002403583050000097
Sending P digital currencies for use
Figure BDA0002403583050000098
Schematic diagram of partial commitment signature.
FIG. 9 is a diagram illustrating a customer John sending a verifiable encrypted blockchain transaction chain commitment signature to a merchant Bob in accordance with the present invention.
FIG. 10 is a diagram of a store owner Bob decrypting and verifying a commitment signature under a blockchain transaction chain in accordance with the present invention.
Detailed Description
The invention is further described below with reference to the figures and examples.
A block chain transaction supervision method based on a user secondary identity structure combines a primary real-name identity with a secondary anonymous identity, realizes under-chain bidirectional authenticatable signature and verification of point-to-point transaction contents through the primary real-name identity, and simultaneously realizes on-chain tracking and verification of authenticity of public transaction contents through the secondary anonymous identity, wherein the primary real-name identity is represented by a CA (certificate authority) certificate of a user account management (App) designed based on a public key cryptosystem, and the secondary anonymous identity is represented by a user anonymous account designed based on an asymmetric cryptosystem. The CA certificate of the user account management App designed based on the public key cryptosystem refers to a CA certificate which is stored on a block chain public account and issued by a CA mechanism or an intelligent contract or a CA certificate which is issued by the CA mechanism and stored on a central server; the user anonymous account designed based on the asymmetric cryptosystem is generated by a cryptographic hash value of one public key or a mixture of a plurality of public keys belonging to the anonymous account.
The method comprises the following steps:
the method comprises the following steps: the two parties of the transaction firstly sign own anonymous transaction by using the private key of the CA certificate of the two parties of the transaction to form mutual commitment to the transaction; when the transaction initiator anonymous account number is generated by a cryptographic hash value of a mixture of a plurality of public keys, a signature of all private keys of the transaction initiator anonymous account number on the anonymous transaction content is provided.
Step two: and the two transaction parties encrypt the digital signature and the CA certificate of the two transaction parties by using the generated public key of the anonymous account of the other party and send the encrypted digital signature and the CA certificate to the other party.
Step three: the two transaction parties decrypt the received acceptance signature encrypted by the other party and verify the decrypted acceptance signature by using the public key of the CA certificate of the other party.
Step four: judging whether the verification is established or not, and if the verification is established, finishing the down-link transaction; otherwise, the off-link transaction process is terminated.
Take the blockchain transaction process in which customer John purchases a commodity G in p digital cryptocurrency from a network owner Bob.
FIG. 1 is a schematic diagram of the structure of the secondary identity of the present invention. FIG. 2 is a secondary identity structure of block chain node John with anonymous account numbers
Figure BDA0002403583050000101
Is composed of twoRandomly generated public key
Figure BDA0002403583050000102
And
Figure BDA0002403583050000103
is generated by a cryptographic hash value, referred to as a multiple public key anonymous account number. Multiple public key anonymous account numbers can be used to construct complex payment commitments for multiple signature verification. Fig. 3 is a secondary identity structure of block link points Bob. As shown in FIGS. 2 and 3, assume that customer John's public identity certificate is CAJohnThe public key is pubKJohnThe private key is priKJohn(ii) a The public identity certificate of the network commodity sales shop owner Bob is CABobThe public key is pubKBobThe private key is priKBob(ii) a An illustrative example is a blockchain network transaction process in which customer John purchases a good G with price p digital cryptocurrency from a network owner Bob. Suppose that
Figure BDA0002403583050000104
Is an anonymous account number, shorthand, of the customer John
Figure BDA0002403583050000111
By a randomly generated public key
Figure BDA0002403583050000112
Generated by cryptographic hashing, the corresponding private key being
Figure BDA0002403583050000113
Figure BDA0002403583050000114
Is another anonymous account number, shorthand, of customer John
Figure BDA0002403583050000115
Two randomly generated public keys
Figure BDA0002403583050000116
And
Figure BDA0002403583050000117
is generated by cryptographic hashing, which may be a direct concatenation, logical operation, or other mathematical operation, with the corresponding private key being
Figure BDA0002403583050000118
And
Figure BDA0002403583050000119
assuming anonymous account numbers
Figure BDA00024035830500001110
N digital encryption currencies exist, and n is more than or equal to p; suppose that
Figure BDA00024035830500001111
Is an anonymous account number, brief note, of a network shop owner Bob
Figure BDA00024035830500001112
By a randomly generated public key
Figure BDA00024035830500001113
Generated by cryptographic hashing, the private key being
Figure BDA00024035830500001114
The data format of the transaction and the script logic of the transaction verification are similar to those of the bitcoin network, and the step of the blockchain network transaction of the customer John buying the commodity G with the price of p digital encryption currencies from the network store owner Bob is as follows:
1) customer John's anonymous account with himself
Figure BDA00024035830500001115
To another anonymous account of oneself
Figure BDA00024035830500001116
Sending p digital cryptocurrency John via anonymous account
Figure BDA00024035830500001117
Signs the contents of the transaction, i.e. calculates
Figure BDA00024035830500001118
sign is a signature operation symbol, as shown in fig. 4; the signature on the transaction is actually a signature on the cryptographic hash value of the transaction content itself,
Figure BDA00024035830500001119
refers to a simplified representation containing a transaction hash signature value and a transaction file, i.e. representing an anonymous account number
Figure BDA00024035830500001120
To anonymous account numbers
Figure BDA00024035830500001121
P digital cryptocurrency are sent out,
Figure BDA00024035830500001122
representation by private key
Figure BDA00024035830500001123
For transaction
Figure BDA00024035830500001124
The signature of (2) is the same as the following.
2) As shown in FIG. 5, customer John is anonymous to his own account number
Figure BDA00024035830500001125
Anonymous account number to store owner Bob
Figure BDA00024035830500001126
Sending p digital encryption currencies; john through anonymous account
Figure BDA00024035830500001127
A private key of
Figure BDA00024035830500001128
Partial signing of transaction contentFirst name, i.e. calculation
Figure BDA00024035830500001129
Then will be
Figure BDA00024035830500001130
Are sent together to
Figure BDA00024035830500001131
3) The shop owner Bob receives
Figure BDA00024035830500001132
And
Figure BDA00024035830500001133
after the information, record
Figure BDA0002403583050000121
As shown in fig. 6, the identity certificate CA is then published by itselfBobPrivate key priKBobTo pair
Figure BDA0002403583050000122
Signing, i.e. calculating commitment signatures
Figure BDA0002403583050000123
Then the signature value SignBobPublic identity certificate CA of shop owner BobBobMerchant Bob anonymous account number
Figure BDA0002403583050000124
Of (2) a public key
Figure BDA0002403583050000125
And a nonce generated instantaneously by BobBobConcatenating to obtain a sequence of messages
Figure BDA0002403583050000126
With the anonymous account number of the customer John
Figure BDA0002403583050000127
Of (2) a public key
Figure BDA0002403583050000128
Encryption
Figure BDA0002403583050000129
Obtaining an encrypted ciphertext
Figure BDA00024035830500001210
Enc is an encryption operation symbol; then the encrypted ciphertext is encrypted
Figure BDA00024035830500001211
Anonymous account number sent to customer John
Figure BDA00024035830500001212
To pair
Figure BDA00024035830500001213
The encryption of (1) may use the public key of any anonymous account number of customer John that the network store owner Bob knows, but recommends use of the current anonymous account number
Figure BDA00024035830500001214
Of (2) a public key
Figure BDA00024035830500001215
4) As shown in FIG. 7, customer John receives the encrypted ciphertext
Figure BDA00024035830500001216
After the information, the account number is anonymous through the user
Figure BDA00024035830500001217
Private key of
Figure BDA00024035830500001218
To pair
Figure BDA00024035830500001219
Performing decryption, i.e. calculation
Figure BDA00024035830500001220
To obtain
Figure BDA00024035830500001221
As a store owner Bob to the transaction
Figure BDA00024035830500001222
The verifiable chain promissory signature of (1), Dec is a decryption operation symbol, and is the inverse operation of encryption operation Enc; using public real-name certificates CABobPublic key publicKBobSigning commitments
Figure BDA00024035830500001223
Performing authentication, i.e. verifying
Figure BDA00024035830500001224
Figure BDA00024035830500001225
If the verification is true, continuing the next step; otherwise, the off-link transaction process is terminated.
5) As shown in FIG. 8, customer John is presented with an anonymous account number
Figure BDA00024035830500001226
Another private key of
Figure BDA00024035830500001227
For transaction
Figure BDA00024035830500001228
The content being partially signed, i.e. calculated
Figure BDA00024035830500001229
Figure BDA00024035830500001230
Note the book
Figure BDA00024035830500001231
Is that the customer John is through an anonymous account number
Figure BDA0002403583050000131
Reconciled transactions
Figure BDA0002403583050000132
The complete commitment of; note the book
Figure BDA0002403583050000133
Is that the customer John is through an anonymous account number
Figure BDA0002403583050000134
And
Figure BDA0002403583050000135
reconciled transactions
Figure BDA0002403583050000136
The complete commitment of.
6) As shown in FIG. 9, customer John publishes a certificate CA by himselfJohnPrivate key priKJohnTo pair
Figure BDA0002403583050000137
Signing, i.e. calculating commitment signatures
Figure BDA0002403583050000138
Sign value SignJohnPublic certificate CA with customer JohnJohnAnd a random number nonce generated immediately by customer JohnJohnConcatenating to obtain a sequence of messages
Figure BDA0002403583050000139
And using the anonymous account number of the network shop owner Bob
Figure BDA00024035830500001310
Of (2) a public key
Figure BDA00024035830500001311
To pair
Figure BDA00024035830500001312
Encrypted to obtain
Figure BDA00024035830500001313
Figure BDA00024035830500001314
Will encrypt the result
Figure BDA00024035830500001315
Anonymous account number sent to network store owner Bob
Figure BDA00024035830500001316
7) As shown in FIG. 10, the network store owner Bob receives
Figure BDA00024035830500001317
After the information, the account number is anonymous through the user
Figure BDA00024035830500001318
Private key of
Figure BDA00024035830500001319
To pair
Figure BDA00024035830500001320
Performing decryption, i.e. calculation
Figure BDA00024035830500001321
Figure BDA00024035830500001322
Get SignJohn||CAJohn||nonceJohnAs a customer John's pair transaction
Figure BDA00024035830500001323
Verifiable commitment signature of (a); using public certificates CAJohnPublic key pubKJohnSign the acceptance SignJohn||CAJohn||nonceJohnPerforming authentication, i.e. verifying
Figure BDA00024035830500001324
Figure BDA00024035830500001325
If the verification is true, continuing the next step; otherwise, the off-link transaction process is terminated.
8) The network owner Bob initiates a shipping program for the item G purchased by the customer John.
The block chain transaction supervision method based on the user secondary identity structure further comprises the step that one of the two transaction parties carries out duty following on the real-name identity of the default/illegal party under the condition that the other party violates/violates a law, and supposing that the customer John and the network store owner Bob successfully complete the under-chain transaction program for the commodity G through the block chain, but the network store owner Bob does not start the delivery program of the commodity G; in the case that the customer John cannot receive the commodity G, the real-name identity tracing program for the network store owner Bob is started, and the steps are as follows:
step 1: the public real-name certificate CA of the network store owner Bob that the customer John will save in step 4) of the transaction programBobAnd its signed commitment to the transaction
Figure BDA0002403583050000141
Sending the information to an issuing organization of an intelligent contract or a public key CA certificate which undertakes block chain transaction supervision;
step 2: the supervisor checks the real name certificate CA of the network shop owner Bob through the certificate revocation listBobPerforming temporary suspension and informing the shop owner to complete the transaction process, starting a delivery program of the purchased commodity G or returning the order of the customer John on the commodity G by p cryptocurrency, or directly deducting p cryptocurrency from the block chain network transaction security deposit of the network shop owner Bob to the customer John; and the penalty is used for maintaining the normal operation cost of the supervisory program according to the scene intensity.
In the block chain transaction supervision method based on the user secondary identity structure, in the step that one of two transaction parties violates/violates the law, and the other party undertakes responsibility for the real-name identity of the violated/violated party, there is a violation behavior of the customer John on the network store owner Bob:
a double-flower transaction is generated immediately after customer John completes the off-chain transaction step
Figure BDA0002403583050000142
And sends it to the blockchain network, which invalidates the customer John's commitment to the network store owner Bob's payment, and a brief
Figure BDA0002403583050000143
Wherein
Figure BDA0002403583050000144
Is an anonymous account number of customer John; when the network store owner Bob encounters a double-flower attack of the customer John, the public identity certificate CA of the customer is utilizedJohnAnd its pair transaction
Figure BDA0002403583050000145
Under-chain commitment signature SignJohnThe real-name identity accountability program for the customer John is started, and the real-name identity accountability program for the customer John is the same as the real-name identity accountability program for the network store owner Bob.
According to the block chain transaction supervision method based on the user secondary identity structure, two parties conducting transactions through the block chain network do not need to wait for the record and confirmation of the block chain to the transactions, and post-processing is conducted on the record and confirmation process of the transactions, namely when the two parties of the transactions successfully complete the down-chain transaction step and do not find an event of default/violation, both parties of the transactions conduct anonymous transactions
Figure BDA0002403583050000151
And sending to the blockchain network.

Claims (9)

1. A block chain transaction supervision method based on a user secondary identity structure is characterized in that a primary real-name identity is combined with a secondary anonymous identity, the down-chain bidirectional authenticable signature and verification of point-to-point transaction contents are realized through the primary real-name identity, and the on-chain tracking and verification of the authenticity of public transaction contents are realized through the secondary anonymous identity, and the method comprises the following steps:
the method comprises the following steps: the two parties of the transaction firstly sign own anonymous transaction by using the private key of the CA certificate of the two parties of the transaction to form mutual commitment to the transaction;
step two: the two transaction parties encrypt the digital signature and the CA certificate by using the generated public key of the anonymous account of the other party and send the encrypted digital signature and the CA certificate to the other party;
step three: the two transaction parties decrypt the received encrypted commitment signature of the other party and verify the decrypted commitment signature by using the public key of the CA certificate of the other party;
step four: judging whether the verification is established or not, and if the verification is established, finishing the down-link transaction; otherwise, the off-link transaction process is terminated.
2. The method for supervising the block chain transaction based on the secondary identity structure of the user according to claim 1, wherein the primary real-name identity is represented by a CA certificate of an account management App of the user designed based on a public key cryptosystem, and the secondary anonymous identity is represented by an anonymous account of the user designed based on an asymmetric cryptosystem.
3. The method as claimed in claim 2, wherein the CA certificate of the App is a CA certificate stored in a blockchain public account issued by a CA organization or an intelligent contract or a CA certificate stored in a central server and issued by the CA organization; the user anonymous account designed based on the asymmetric cryptosystem is generated by a cryptographic hash value of one public key or a mixture of a plurality of public keys belonging to the anonymous account.
4. The method as claimed in claim 3, wherein in the first step, when the anonymous account number of the transaction initiator is generated from a cryptographic hash value mixed by a plurality of public keys, a signature of all private keys of the anonymous account number of the transaction initiator on the content of the anonymous transaction is provided.
5. The blockchain transaction monitoring method based on user secondary identity structure as in claim 4, wherein the public identity certificate of the customer John is assumed to be CAJohnThe public key is pubKJohnThe private key is priKJohn(ii) a The public identity certificate of the network commodity sales shop owner Bob is CABobThe public key is pubKBobThe private key is priKBob(ii) a Suppose that
Figure FDA0002403583040000021
Is an anonymous account number, shorthand, of the customer John
Figure FDA0002403583040000022
Figure FDA0002403583040000023
By a randomly generated public key
Figure FDA0002403583040000024
Generated by cryptographic hashing, the corresponding private key being
Figure FDA0002403583040000025
Figure FDA0002403583040000026
Is another anonymous account number, shorthand, of customer John
Figure FDA0002403583040000027
Two randomly generated public keys
Figure FDA0002403583040000028
And
Figure FDA0002403583040000029
is generated by cryptographic hashing, with a corresponding private key of
Figure FDA00024035830400000210
And
Figure FDA00024035830400000211
assuming anonymous account numbers
Figure FDA00024035830400000212
N digital encryption currencies exist, and n is more than or equal to p; suppose that
Figure FDA00024035830400000213
Is an anonymous account number, brief note, of a network shop owner Bob
Figure FDA00024035830400000214
By a randomly generated public key
Figure FDA00024035830400000215
Generated by cryptographic hashing, the private key being
Figure FDA00024035830400000216
The block chain network transaction steps for customer John to purchase item G in p digital cryptocurrency from network owner Bob are as follows:
1) customer John's anonymous account with himself
Figure FDA00024035830400000217
To another anonymous account of oneself
Figure FDA00024035830400000218
Sending p digital cryptocurrency John via anonymous account
Figure FDA00024035830400000219
Signs the contents of the transaction, i.e. calculates
Figure FDA00024035830400000220
sign is a signature operationA symbol; the signature on the transaction is actually a signature on the cryptographic hash value of the transaction content itself,
Figure FDA00024035830400000221
refers to a simplified representation containing a transaction hash signature value and a transaction file, i.e. representing an anonymous account number
Figure FDA00024035830400000222
To anonymous account numbers
Figure FDA00024035830400000223
P digital cryptocurrency are sent out,
Figure FDA00024035830400000224
representation by private key
Figure FDA00024035830400000225
For transaction
Figure FDA00024035830400000226
The signature of (3), the following are similar;
2) customer John's anonymous account with himself
Figure FDA0002403583040000031
Anonymous account number to store owner Bob
Figure FDA0002403583040000032
Sending p digital encryption currencies; john through anonymous account
Figure FDA0002403583040000033
A private key of
Figure FDA0002403583040000034
Partially signing, i.e. computing, transaction content
Figure FDA0002403583040000035
Then will be
Figure FDA0002403583040000036
Are sent together to
Figure FDA0002403583040000037
3) The shop owner Bob receives
Figure FDA0002403583040000038
And
Figure FDA0002403583040000039
after the information, record
Figure FDA00024035830400000310
Then the identity certificate CA is published by the userBobPrivate key priKBobTo pair
Figure FDA00024035830400000311
Signing, i.e. calculating commitment signatures
Figure FDA00024035830400000312
Then the signature value SignBobPublic identity certificate CA of shop owner BobBobMerchant Bob anonymous account number
Figure FDA00024035830400000313
Of (2) a public key
Figure FDA00024035830400000314
And a nonce generated instantaneously by BobBobConcatenating to obtain a sequence of messages
Figure FDA00024035830400000315
With the anonymous account number of the customer John
Figure FDA00024035830400000316
Of (2) a public key
Figure FDA00024035830400000317
Encryption
Figure FDA00024035830400000318
Obtaining an encrypted ciphertext
Figure FDA00024035830400000319
Enc is an encryption operation symbol; then the encrypted ciphertext is encrypted
Figure FDA00024035830400000320
Anonymous account number sent to customer John
Figure FDA00024035830400000321
4) Customer John receives the encrypted ciphertext
Figure FDA00024035830400000322
After the information, the account number is anonymous through the user
Figure FDA00024035830400000323
Private key of
Figure FDA00024035830400000324
To pair
Figure FDA00024035830400000325
Performing decryption, i.e. calculation
Figure FDA00024035830400000326
To obtain
Figure FDA00024035830400000327
As a store owner Bob to the transaction
Figure FDA00024035830400000328
Can verify the chainThe next committed signature, Dec is the decryption operation symbol, which is the inverse of the encryption operation Enc; using public real-name certificates CABobPublic key publicKBobSigning commitments
Figure FDA00024035830400000329
Performing authentication, i.e. verifying
Figure FDA00024035830400000330
Figure FDA00024035830400000331
If the verification is true, continuing the next step; otherwise, terminating the down-link transaction process;
5) customer John with anonymous account number
Figure FDA00024035830400000332
Another private key of
Figure FDA00024035830400000333
For transaction
Figure FDA0002403583040000041
The content being partially signed, i.e. calculated
Figure FDA0002403583040000042
Note the book
Figure FDA0002403583040000043
Figure FDA0002403583040000044
Figure FDA0002403583040000045
Is that the customer John is through an anonymous account number
Figure FDA0002403583040000046
Reconciled transactions
Figure FDA0002403583040000047
The complete commitment of; note the book
Figure FDA0002403583040000048
Figure FDA0002403583040000049
Figure FDA00024035830400000410
Is that the customer John is through an anonymous account number
Figure FDA00024035830400000411
And
Figure FDA00024035830400000412
reconciled transactions
Figure FDA00024035830400000413
The complete commitment of;
6) customer John publishes certificate CA by himselfJohnPrivate key priKJohnTo pair
Figure FDA00024035830400000414
Signing, i.e. calculating commitment signatures
Figure FDA00024035830400000415
Sign value SignJohnPublic certificate CA with customer JohnJohnAnd a random number nonce generated immediately by customer JohnJohnConcatenating to obtain a sequence of messages
Figure FDA00024035830400000416
And using the anonymous account number of the network shop owner Bob
Figure FDA00024035830400000417
Of (2) a public key
Figure FDA00024035830400000418
To pair
Figure FDA00024035830400000419
Encrypted to obtain
Figure FDA00024035830400000420
Figure FDA00024035830400000421
Will encrypt the result
Figure FDA00024035830400000422
Anonymous account number sent to network store owner Bob
Figure FDA00024035830400000423
7) The network shop owner Bob receives
Figure FDA00024035830400000424
After the information, the account number is anonymous through the user
Figure FDA00024035830400000425
Private key of
Figure FDA00024035830400000426
To pair
Figure FDA00024035830400000427
Performing decryption, i.e. calculation
Figure FDA00024035830400000428
Get SignJohn||CAJohn||nonceJohnAs a customer John's pair transaction
Figure FDA00024035830400000429
Verifiable promise signA name; using public certificates CAJohnPublic key pubKJohnSign the acceptance SignJohn||CAJohn||nonceJohnPerforming authentication, i.e. verifying
Figure FDA00024035830400000430
If the verification is true, continuing the next step; otherwise, terminating the down-link transaction process;
8) the network owner Bob initiates a shipping program for the item G purchased by the customer John.
6. The method of claim 5, wherein the method further comprises: in the step 3), the
Figure FDA00024035830400000431
The encryption of (c) may use the public key of any anonymous account number of the customer John that the network store owner Bob knows.
7. The method of claim 5, wherein the method further comprises: the method also comprises the step that one of the two transaction parties carries out tracing to the real-name identity of the default/illegal party under the condition that the other party is illegal, and the customer John and the network store owner Bob are supposed to successfully complete the offline transaction program of the commodity G through the block chain, but the network store owner Bob does not start the delivery program of the commodity G; in the case that the customer John cannot receive the commodity G, the real-name identity tracing program for the network store owner Bob is started, and the steps are as follows:
step 1: the public real-name certificate CA of the network store owner Bob that the customer John will save in step 4) of the transaction programBobAnd its signed commitment to the transaction
Figure FDA0002403583040000051
Sending the information to an issuing organization of an intelligent contract or a public key CA certificate which undertakes block chain transaction supervision;
step 2: the supervisor program is networked through certificate revocation listReal name certificate CA of merchant BobBobPerforming temporary suspension and informing the shop owner to complete the transaction process, starting a delivery program of the purchased commodity G or returning the order of the customer John on the commodity G by p cryptocurrency, or directly deducting p cryptocurrency from the block chain network transaction security deposit of the network shop owner Bob to the customer John; and the penalty is used for maintaining the normal operation cost of the supervisory program according to the scene intensity.
8. The method of claim 7, wherein the method further comprises: in the step of tracing the real-name identity of the default/illegal party by one of the two parties of the transaction under the condition of default/illegal, there is a default behavior of the customer John to the network store owner Bob:
a double-flower transaction is generated immediately after customer John completes the off-chain transaction step
Figure FDA0002403583040000052
And sends it to the blockchain network, which invalidates the customer John's commitment to the network store owner Bob's payment, and a brief
Figure FDA0002403583040000053
Wherein
Figure FDA0002403583040000054
Is an anonymous account number of customer John; when the network store owner Bob encounters a double-flower attack of the customer John, the public identity certificate CA of the customer is utilizedJohnAnd its pair transaction
Figure FDA0002403583040000055
Under-chain commitment signature SignJohnThe real-name identity accountability program for the customer John is started, and the real-name identity accountability program for the customer John is the same as the real-name identity accountability program for the network store owner Bob.
9. The user secondary identity structure based blockchain transaction of claim 7The supervision method is characterized in that two parties carrying out transaction through a blockchain network do not need to wait for the record and confirmation of the blockchain to the transaction, and carry out post-processing on the record and confirmation process of the transaction, namely when the two parties successfully complete the step of the down-chain transaction and do not find out default/illegal events, the two parties of the transaction can carry out anonymous transaction
Figure FDA0002403583040000061
And sending to the blockchain network.
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