CN111314877B - Wireless sensor network source position safety route design method based on irregular ring - Google Patents
Wireless sensor network source position safety route design method based on irregular ring Download PDFInfo
- Publication number
- CN111314877B CN111314877B CN202010213424.1A CN202010213424A CN111314877B CN 111314877 B CN111314877 B CN 111314877B CN 202010213424 A CN202010213424 A CN 202010213424A CN 111314877 B CN111314877 B CN 111314877B
- Authority
- CN
- China
- Prior art keywords
- node
- ring
- nodes
- network
- base station
- Prior art date
- Legal status (The legal status is an assumption and is not a legal conclusion. Google has not performed a legal analysis and makes no representation as to the accuracy of the status listed.)
- Expired - Fee Related
Links
- 230000001788 irregular Effects 0.000 title claims abstract description 69
- 238000000034 method Methods 0.000 title claims abstract description 26
- 238000013461 design Methods 0.000 title claims description 6
- 238000012544 monitoring process Methods 0.000 claims abstract description 15
- 101100172874 Caenorhabditis elegans sec-3 gene Proteins 0.000 claims description 6
- 101150092843 SEC1 gene Proteins 0.000 claims description 6
- 238000005265 energy consumption Methods 0.000 claims description 5
- 238000004422 calculation algorithm Methods 0.000 claims description 3
- 238000004364 calculation method Methods 0.000 claims description 3
- 238000004891 communication Methods 0.000 abstract description 15
- 230000006855 networking Effects 0.000 abstract description 3
- 238000005295 random walk Methods 0.000 description 6
- 238000010586 diagram Methods 0.000 description 5
- 230000000694 effects Effects 0.000 description 2
- 241001465754 Metazoa Species 0.000 description 1
- 241000251737 Raja Species 0.000 description 1
- 230000005540 biological transmission Effects 0.000 description 1
- 230000015572 biosynthetic process Effects 0.000 description 1
- 230000007547 defect Effects 0.000 description 1
- 238000007363 ring formation reaction Methods 0.000 description 1
- 238000004088 simulation Methods 0.000 description 1
- 238000012795 verification Methods 0.000 description 1
Images
Classifications
-
- H—ELECTRICITY
- H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
- H04W—WIRELESS COMMUNICATION NETWORKS
- H04W4/00—Services specially adapted for wireless communication networks; Facilities therefor
- H04W4/30—Services specially adapted for particular environments, situations or purposes
- H04W4/38—Services specially adapted for particular environments, situations or purposes for collecting sensor information
-
- H—ELECTRICITY
- H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
- H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
- H04L45/00—Routing or path finding of packets in data switching networks
- H04L45/14—Routing performance; Theoretical aspects
-
- H—ELECTRICITY
- H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
- H04W—WIRELESS COMMUNICATION NETWORKS
- H04W40/00—Communication routing or communication path finding
- H04W40/02—Communication route or path selection, e.g. power-based or shortest path routing
-
- H—ELECTRICITY
- H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
- H04W—WIRELESS COMMUNICATION NETWORKS
- H04W40/00—Communication routing or communication path finding
- H04W40/24—Connectivity information management, e.g. connectivity discovery or connectivity update
Abstract
The invention discloses a method for designing a source position safety route of a wireless sensor network based on an irregular ring, which is characterized by comprising the following steps: 1) defining a network model; 2) an irregular ring is established and ring node information is made available to nodes in the network. The method has the characteristic of automatic networking, is suitable for a monitoring communication system with key protection objects, can be widely applied to a wireless monitoring system, can ensure the safety and reliability of the monitored objects and the communication system network, and has practicability.
Description
Technical Field
The invention relates to the field of wireless sensor network security communication, which is mainly applied to wireless sensor networks such as target tracking, biological medical treatment, wild animal monitoring and the like, and relates to an application occasion for protecting the security communication of a monitored object, in particular to a method for designing a source position security route of a wireless sensor network based on an irregular ring.
Background
As a main component of IoT (Internet of Things, IoT for short), wireless sensor networks have been widely applied in the fields of target tracking, smart medical treatment, wildlife monitoring, smart agriculture, and the like. When the wireless sensor network is deployed in a severe field environment or an unmanned area, the security problem of the sensor network is particularly prominent due to the particularity of a self communication mechanism and the limitation of node resources. The lack of an effective security mechanism has been a major obstacle for sensor network applications. The source node position information of the wireless sensor network is closely related to the identity information of the monitored object, and due to the openness of wireless communication, an attacker tracks and positions the source node through monitoring, interception and other means. Thus, providing source location privacy protection in wireless sensor networks has become a challenging task.
The Source Location Privacy (SLP) concept was originally proposed by ozturn. Ozturk designs a security mechanism for protecting the privacy of the source position, and a source position privacy security scheme based on a random walk phantom route; li et al propose the RSIN scheme, which has mainly two phases: in the first stage, one intermediate node is randomly selected, a source node forwards a data packet to the intermediate node, in the second stage, the intermediate node forwards the data packet to a ring node, the data packet is forwarded on the ring, and then the data packet is sent to a base station node, in the scheme, the ring node consumes more energy than other nodes, and the life cycle of a network is reduced; tan et al propose path extension method PEM scheme, this scheme utilizes the dynamic false source to induce the attacker to keep away from the real source node, the efficiency of protecting the source node is lower when the source node is close to the base station node in this scheme, the more false source nodes in this scheme, the larger the energy consumption; raja proposes an SLP-R scheme which is divided into three stages: the first stage is reverse random walk, a source node randomly forwards a data packet to a direction far away from a sink node for a certain hop number, the second stage is routing in the same depth, the node forwards data to nodes with the same hop number (the hop number from a base station is the same), and the third stage node forwards the data packet to the sink node.
Disclosure of Invention
The invention aims to provide a source position secure routing design method of a wireless sensor network based on an irregular ring, aiming at the defects of the prior art. The method has the characteristic of automatic networking, is suitable for a monitoring communication system with key protection objects, can be widely applied to a wireless monitoring system, can ensure the safety and reliability of the monitored objects and the communication system network, and has practicability.
The technical scheme for realizing the purpose of the invention is as follows:
a wireless sensor network source location secure routing design method based on irregular rings comprises the following steps:
1) defining a network model: the wireless sensor network model is composed of a base station node (BS) and N sensor nodes, the sensor nodes collect data and send the data to the BS when sensing a monitored object, the sensor nodes are called Source Nodes (SN), and supposing that the source nodes in the network stop sending data packets when the monitored object cannot be monitored within a period of time, the network model meets the following conditions:
1-1) sensor nodes in the network are uniformly distributed, the sensor nodes are isomorphic, namely the sensor nodes have the same configuration, and the computing power, the storage and the energy consumption resources of each sensor node are the same;
1-2) the node of the base station is the only final destination of the data packet, the base station is positioned in a network center, and the node in the network can obtain the position information and the ID of the base station;
1-3) an irregular ring is established in the network, nodes in the irregular ring are called ring nodes, the ring nodes broadcast own positions and node IDs to the whole network, and non-ring nodes in the network can obtain the positions and the IDs of the ring nodes;
1-4) the sensor node in the network can obtain the position information and ID of the neighbor sensor node;
1-5) assuming that the data packet is encrypted to ensure that the actual content of the data packet is not available to unauthorized users;
1-6) assuming that the base station has sufficient capability to resist attack by an attacker;
an attacker of the network model satisfies the following conditions:
1-7) an attacker has monitoring equipment with sufficient energy, storage capacity and calculation capacity, and determines the last sensor node for sending information according to the strength of a received signal and the arrival angle of the signal;
1-8) an attacker adopts passive attack, and the attacker cannot interfere with the normal operation of the network;
1-9) an attacker uses an attack mode combining eavesdropping and hop-by-hop tracing;
1-10) the attacker listens at the current node position, and if no data packet is received within a specified time, the attacker rolls back to the previous node and continues to listen at the node, and in addition, the attacker stores all accessed node information to avoid forming a loop;
1-11) the attacker moves to the event source when receiving the information packet, and the moving distance is related to the monitoring distance of the attacker;
2) establishing an irregular ring and making ring node information available to nodes in the network: the process is as follows:
2-1) firstly taking a base station node as a center, dividing a network into n sectors, setting the distance between a mixed ring and the base station as a parameter dsmin, constructing an n-bit linked list Link, wherein each node of the linked list is composed of a distance value which is more than the dsmin from the base station and an arbitrary angle value in one sector, the destination node of the first node Link _ n1 in the linked list is the second node Link _ n2 in the linked list, because the sensor node only has the information of adjacent nodes, the Link _ n1 node is routed to the Link _ n2 node according to the relative position information, the Link _ n2 node may not exist, but the last node adjacent to Link _ n2 can judge whether the node exists, if the last node does not exist, the Link _ n2 node, and so on, the destination node of the last node in the linked list is Link _ n1, and the path passed by the node forms an irregular ring, broadcasting ring nodes into the network so that non-ring nodes in the network can obtain ring node information, namely:
s1: dividing the network into k (k =1,2, …, n) sectors by taking the base station as a center, wherein the central angle of each sector is the angular range [ (k-1) × 2 pi/n, k × 2 pi/n ] of each sector;
s2: selecting a position of each sector as (d, angle), wherein d is the distance from a base station node, angle represents the central angle of a connecting line between a node in the sector and the base station node, d > dsmin, and after the position selection of each sector is completed, forming a linked list Link with n nodes;
s3: nodes in the linked list are connected in sequence, the last node in the linked list is connected with the first node in the linked list, all nodes in the linked list and routing nodes in the process of searching the nodes in the linked list form an irregular ring, and the ring nodes broadcast;
2-2) selecting intermediate nodes: determining a selection area of an intermediate node, firstly setting a distance parameter dr, defining a range with the base station as a center and the distance being less than dr as a dangerous area, setting a distance parameter dmin for avoiding the intermediate node to be near a source node, defining an area with the source node as the center and the distance being less than dmin as a visible area, excluding the visible area and the dangerous area from the selection area of the intermediate node, then, connecting the base station node and the source node as a reference line by taking the base station node as an origin, and dividing the network into 3 areas: sec1, sec2 and sec3, each area being the same, optionally selecting one of two areas adjacent to the source node, wherein the visible area and the danger area are excluded, and randomly selecting an intermediate node in the selected area, specifically:
s1: defining a range with the radius dr around a base station as a dangerous area;
s2: defining a range with the radius dmin around a source node as a visible area;
s3: dividing the network into three areas with equal areas;
s4: randomly selecting one of two regions adjacent to the source node;
s5: deleting nodes in the danger area and nodes in the visible area in the selected area;
s6: randomly selecting an intermediate node in the area;
s7: according to the relative position information of the intermediate node, the source node forwards the data packet to the intermediate node;
2-3) forwarding of packets to irregular rings and forwarding on rings stage: firstly, selecting an intermediate node to reach a node in an irregular ring, namely an access node of the ring, wherein the network is divided into three regions, the node in the irregular ring also belongs to the three regions, the irregular ring node in the region is randomly selected as the access node of the irregular ring in the region which is closest to the intermediate node, namely the region with the smallest angle, in the other two regions outside the region where the intermediate node is located, the node in the network can obtain the node information in the irregular ring, the intermediate node can forward a data packet to the access node through relative position information, if the distance from the intermediate node to the access node is clockwise, the access node forwards data in the irregular ring in a clockwise direction, if the distance from the intermediate node to the access node is anticlockwise, the access node forwards the data in the irregular ring in the anticlockwise direction, and if the angle between the node in the irregular ring and a base station node and the access node is larger than a threshold value beta, the beta values are uniformly distributed between 0 and (1 pi/2), the ring node stops selecting the next hop ring node, and at the moment, the data packet is sent to the base station node through the shortest path routing algorithm, which specifically comprises the following steps:
s1: selecting an area which is closest to the intermediate node, namely, has the smallest angle from the other two areas outside the area where the intermediate node is located, and randomly selecting an irregular ring node from the areas as an access node;
s2: the intermediate node forwards the data to the access node according to the relative position information;
s3: the direction from the intermediate node to the access node is anticlockwise, and data is transmitted in the irregular ring anticlockwise;
s4: the direction from the intermediate node to the access node is clockwise, and the data is forwarded clockwise in the irregular ring;
s5: randomly generating an angle threshold value beta;
s6: the angles among the base station node, the access node and the nodes on the ring are smaller than a threshold value beta, and the next ring node is selected as a forwarding node;
s7: otherwise, stopping selecting the next ring-jumping node, and sending the data packet to the base station node;
s8: and (6) ending.
In the technical scheme, the intermediate node is randomly selected, so that an attacker cannot judge the position of a source node, irregular annular routing, relatively uniform energy distribution of network nodes and an angle of increasing the routing even if the attacker traces back to the intermediate node, and the source node forwards a data packet to the randomly selected intermediate node and then to a base station node through an irregular loop route (RSIR).
The main advantages of the technical scheme are as follows:
(1) an attacker cannot judge the position of the source node even tracing the intermediate node by randomly selecting the intermediate node, so that the position privacy of the source is protected;
(2) irregular annular routing increases the angle of the path, so that an attacker cannot judge the direction of the source node from the angle;
(3) the source node can be effectively protected from privacy even if it is close to the base station.
The method has the characteristic of automatic networking, is suitable for a monitoring communication system with key protection objects, can be widely applied to a wireless monitoring system, can ensure the safety and reliability of the monitored objects and the communication system network, and has practicability.
Drawings
FIG. 1 is a schematic view showing the formation of an irregular ring in the embodiment;
FIG. 2 is a diagram illustrating the selection of an intermediate node in an embodiment;
FIG. 3 is a diagram illustrating an embodiment of an irregular ring forwarding packet;
FIG. 4 is a schematic flow chart of a method of an embodiment;
FIG. 5 is a diagram illustrating the effect of distance from a source node to a BS on the network security period in an embodiment;
FIG. 6 is a schematic diagram illustrating the effect of source node-to-BS distance on the life cycle of the network in an embodiment;
fig. 7 is a schematic diagram illustrating the influence of the distance from the source node to the BS on the acquisition probability.
Detailed Description
The invention will be further elucidated with reference to the drawings and examples, without however being limited thereto.
Example (b):
the method for designing the source position safety route of the wireless sensor network based on the irregular ring comprises the following steps:
1) defining a network model: the wireless sensor network model is composed of a base station node (BS) and N sensor nodes, the sensor nodes collect data and send the data to the BS when sensing a monitored object, the sensor nodes are called Source Nodes (SN), and supposing that the source nodes in the network stop sending data packets when the monitored object cannot be monitored within a period of time, the network model meets the following conditions:
1-1) sensor nodes in the network are uniformly distributed, the sensor nodes are isomorphic, namely the sensor nodes have the same configuration, and the computing power, the storage and the energy consumption resources of each sensor node are the same;
1-2) the node of the base station is the only final destination of the data packet, the base station is positioned in a network center, and the node in the network can obtain the position information and the ID of the base station;
1-3) an irregular ring is established in the network, nodes in the irregular ring are called ring nodes, the ring nodes broadcast own positions and node IDs to the whole network, and non-ring nodes in the network can obtain the positions and the IDs of the ring nodes;
1-4) the sensor node in the network can obtain the position information and ID of the neighbor sensor node;
1-5) assuming that the data packet is encrypted to ensure that the actual content of the data packet is not available to unauthorized users;
1-6) assuming that the base station has sufficient capability to resist attack by an attacker;
an attacker of the network model satisfies the following conditions:
1-7) an attacker has monitoring equipment with sufficient energy, storage capacity and calculation capacity, and determines the last sensor node for sending information according to the strength of a received signal and the arrival angle of the signal;
1-8) an attacker adopts passive attack, and the attacker cannot interfere with the normal operation of the network;
1-9) an attacker uses an attack mode combining eavesdropping and hop-by-hop tracing;
1-10) the attacker listens at the current node position, and if no data packet is received within a specified time, the attacker rolls back to the previous node and continues to listen at the node, and in addition, the attacker stores all accessed node information to avoid forming a loop;
1-11) the attacker moves to the event source when receiving the information packet, and the moving distance is related to the monitoring distance of the attacker;
2) establishing an irregular ring and making ring node information available to nodes in the network: the process is as follows:
2-1) as shown in fig. 1, firstly, taking a base station node as a center, dividing a network into n sectors, setting the distance between a mixed ring and the base station as a parameter dsmin, constructing an n-bit linked list Link, wherein each node of the linked list is composed of a distance value which is more than the dsmin from the base station and an arbitrary angle value in one sector, the destination node of a first node Link _ n1 in the linked list is a second node Link _ n2 in the linked list, because a sensor node only has the information of adjacent nodes, a Link _ n1 node is routed to a Link _ n2 node according to relative position information, the Link _ n2 node may not exist, but the last node adjacent to the Link _ n2 can judge whether the node exists, if the last node does not exist, the Link _ n2 node is formed, and so on, the destination node of the last node in the linked list is Link _ n1, and the path passed by the node forms an irregular ring, broadcasting ring nodes into the network so that non-ring nodes in the network can obtain ring node information, namely:
s1: dividing the network into k (k =1,2, …, n) sectors by taking the base station as a center, wherein the central angle of each sector is the angular range [ (k-1) × 2 pi/n, k × 2 pi/n ] of each sector;
s2: selecting a position of each sector as (d, angle), wherein d is the distance from a base station node, angle represents the central angle of a connecting line between a node in the sector and the base station node, d > dsmin, and after the position selection of each sector is completed, forming a linked list Link with n nodes;
s3: nodes in the linked list are connected in sequence, the last node in the linked list is connected with the first node in the linked list, all nodes in the linked list and routing nodes in the process of searching the nodes in the linked list form an irregular ring, and the ring nodes broadcast;
2-2) selecting intermediate nodes: as shown in fig. 2, determining a selection area of an intermediate node, first setting a distance parameter dr, defining a range with the base station as a center and the distance less than dr as a dangerous area, setting a distance parameter dmin for avoiding the intermediate node being near a source node, defining an area with the source node as a center and the distance less than dmin as a visible area, excluding the visible area and the dangerous area from the selection area of the intermediate node, and then, connecting the base station node and the source node as a reference line with the base station node as an origin to divide a network into 3 areas: sec1, sec2 and sec3, each area being the same, optionally selecting one of two areas adjacent to the source node, wherein the visible area and the danger area are excluded, and randomly selecting an intermediate node in the selected area, specifically:
s1: defining a range with the radius dr around a base station as a dangerous area;
s2: defining a range with the radius dmin around a source node as a visible area;
s3: dividing the network into three areas with equal areas;
s4: randomly selecting one of two regions adjacent to the source node;
s5: deleting nodes in the danger area and nodes in the visible area in the selected area;
s6: randomly selecting an intermediate node in the area;
s7: according to the relative position information of the intermediate node, the source node forwards the data packet to the intermediate node;
2-3) forwarding of packets to irregular rings and forwarding on rings stage: as shown in fig. 3, firstly, selecting an intermediate node to reach a node in an irregular ring, that is, an access node of the ring, because the network is divided into three regions, the node in the irregular ring also belongs to the three regions, and randomly selecting the irregular ring node in the region as the access node of the irregular ring in the region closest to the intermediate node, that is, the region with the smallest angle, in the other two regions outside the region where the intermediate node is located, the node in the network can obtain node information in the irregular ring, the intermediate node can forward a data packet to the access node through relative position information, if the intermediate node is clockwise to the access node, the access node forwards data in the irregular ring in a clockwise direction, if the intermediate node is counterclockwise to the access node, the access node forwards data in the irregular ring in a counterclockwise direction, and if the angle between the node in the irregular ring and the base station node, the access node is greater than a threshold value beta, the beta values are uniformly distributed between 0 and (1 pi/2), the ring node stops selecting the next hop ring node, and at the moment, the data packet is sent to the base station node through the shortest path routing algorithm, which specifically comprises the following steps:
s1: selecting an area which is closest to the intermediate node, namely, has the smallest angle from the other two areas outside the area where the intermediate node is located, and randomly selecting an irregular ring node from the areas as an access node;
s2: the intermediate node forwards the data to the access node according to the relative position information;
s3: the direction from the intermediate node to the access node is anticlockwise, and data is transmitted in the irregular ring anticlockwise;
s4: the direction from the intermediate node to the access node is clockwise, and the data is forwarded clockwise in the irregular ring;
s5: randomly generating an angle threshold value beta;
s6: the angles among the base station node, the access node and the nodes on the ring are smaller than a threshold value beta, and the next ring node is selected as a forwarding node;
s7: otherwise, stopping selecting the next ring-jumping node, and sending the data packet to the base station node;
s8: and (6) ending.
In this example, the network is initialized to a wireless sensor network of 5000m × 5000m, 5000 sensor nodes are randomly and uniformly deployed in the network, a base station is located at a central position of the network, the sensor nodes have a communication radius of 130m, the communication radius of an attacker is twice the communication radius of the node and 260m, the power of the node can be adjusted, the communication radius can be adjusted when no suitable neighbor node is found, the initial energy of the node is 3J, the length of an information packet is 1024 bits, the base station node is a unique receiving node of all data packets, the initial position of the attacker is around the base station, in this example, compared with a randomly selected intermediate node routing method, namely RSIN, a forward random walk routing method, namely FRW, a random walk-based position privacy protection routing method, namely a network security period of SLP-R, a network life period and a capture probability,
specifically, as shown in fig. 4, the method includes the following steps:
step 1: after the network nodes are deployed, the network is divided into n sectors with equal size in sequence by taking the base station as an origin;
step 2: selecting a node in each sector, wherein the distance from the node selected in the sector to a base station is greater than dsmin, and the angle of the node in the sector range is randomly selected;
step 3: the nodes selected in each sector are routed according to the relative position information in sequence, the nodes selected in the last sector and the nodes selected in the first sector are routed according to the relative position information, and the nodes passed by the routing path form an irregular ring;
step 4: broadcasting node position information on the irregular ring, wherein all nodes in the network can obtain the information of the nodes on the ring;
step 5: the irregular ring formation phase ends;
step 6: a source node sends a data packet;
step 7: defining a range with the radius dr around a base station as a dangerous area;
step 8: defining a range with the radius dmin around a source node as a visible area;
step 9: determining a middle node area, taking a base station node as a center, taking a connecting line of a source node and the base station node as a baseline, dividing the network into three areas, wherein the central angle of each sector is (2 pi/3), the sec1 of the sector is above the baseline, and then the counterclockwise direction is respectively sec2 and sec 3;
step 10: the adjacent sectors of the source node are sec1 and sec3, and a randomly selected intermediate node is sent to the two sectors;
step 11: judging whether the intermediate node is in the dangerous area, if so, turning to Step10, and if not, turning to Step 12;
step 12: judging whether the intermediate node is in the visible area, if so, turning to Step10, otherwise, turning to Step 13;
step 13: the source node routes the data packet to the intermediate node according to the relative position information;
step 14: the intermediate node selection phase is finished;
step 15: selecting an access node in a ring node, firstly selecting one area from the three areas as a candidate area of the access node, assuming that an intermediate node is in a sec1 area for the convenience of description, calculating a minimum angle formed by the intermediate node, the sec2 area, the link point and a base station node, and marking the angle as angle 1;
step 16: calculating the minimum angle formed by the intermediate node, the link point in the sec3 area and the base station node, and recording the angle as angle 2;
step 17: judging the sizes of the angle1 and the angle2, if the angle1 is less than the angle2, turning to Step18, otherwise, turning to Step 19;
step 18: randomly selecting an access node from ring nodes in the area of sec2, and turning to Step 20;
step 19: randomly selecting an access node from ring nodes in an area to which sec3 belongs;
step 20: the intermediate node routes the data packet to the access node on the ring according to the relative position information;
step 21: generating a random angle value β, β belonging to (0- π/2), for controlling the routing of packets in the ring node;
step 22: judging the routing direction of the data packet in the ring, if the direction from the intermediate node to the access node is clockwise, turning to Step23, otherwise, turning to Step 25;
step 23: the data packet sequentially selects nodes on the ring as next hop nodes clockwise on the ring;
step 24: if the angle between the access node and the base station node and the angle between the base station node and the current node on the ring are larger than beta, turning to Step27, otherwise, turning to Step 23;
step 25: the data packet sequentially selects nodes on the ring as next hop nodes clockwise on the ring;
step 26: if the angle between the access node and the base station node and the angle between the base station node and the current node on the ring are larger than beta, turning to Step27, otherwise, turning to Step 25;
step 27: stopping forwarding the data packet on the ring, and forwarding the data packet to the base station by the current node on the ring through the shortest path route;
step 28: the data packet arrives at the base station node;
step 29: and (6) ending.
Simulation verification:
currently, the main performance indicators for measuring the privacy security of the source location are:
1) safety period: the security period refers to the quantity of information sent by the source node when the source node sends the information to the enemy for capture;
2) the network life cycle: the reporting of event information by a node to the BS is considered a round, so the network lifetime is the number of rounds of successful transmission of information until the first node in the network dies (i.e., exhausts energy);
3) and (3) capturing probability: the probability of the attacker capturing the source node within a certain time.
The method of the embodiment is adopted to obtain:
(1) safety period: as shown in fig. 5, four methods: FRW, SLP-R, RSIN, the source position safety routing method based on irregular ring adopted in this example is RBIR, in the comparison of safety period, FRW, SLP-R compared with RSIN, RBIR, the path length is shorter, the attacker is easier to capture the source node, the safety period is shortened, the middle node is randomly selected in RSIN, so the source node and the middle node may appear on both sides of the base station, the path from the source node to the middle node is close to the periphery of the base station, the safety period is reduced, the angle constraint is carried out when the middle node is selected in RBIR, the source node and the middle node are prevented from being located on different two sides of the base station, and the safety period is improved;
(2) the network life cycle: as shown in fig. 6, in FRW, the range of the path nodes between the source node and the base station node is narrow, the nodes in the path are relatively fixed, the life cycle of the network is shortest, SLP-R increases the path length by random walk, nodes around the source node have heavy energy consumption burden when the network is sparse due to the limitation of random walk, RBIR has a longer life cycle than RSIN, both RBIR and RSIN use the intermediate node and the hybrid ring to achieve source location privacy protection, and RBIR consumes less energy in the path from the source node to the hybrid ring than RSIN because the intermediate node of RBIR is limited by the position of the source node, the hybrid ring and the position of the base station node;
(3) and (3) capturing probability: as shown in fig. 7, the higher FRW and SLP-R acquisition probabilities are due to the shorter path lengths of the two schemes, the listening radius of an attacker is twice the communication radius of the node, so that the source node is easily acquired, and the lower RBIR acquisition probability is compared with RSIN because the RBIR takes into account the possibility that the path from the source node to the intermediate node traverses the area around the base station when selecting the intermediate node, and the intermediate node and the source node are positioned on the same side of the base station by using an angle so as to avoid traversing the area around the base station, so that the acquisition probability is smaller.
Claims (1)
1. A wireless sensor network source location safety route design method based on irregular rings is characterized by comprising the following steps:
1) defining a network model: the wireless sensor network model is composed of a base station node (BS) and N sensor nodes, the sensor nodes collect data and send the data to the BS when sensing a monitored object, the sensor nodes are called Source Nodes (SN), and supposing that the source nodes in the network stop sending data packets when the monitored object cannot be monitored within a period of time, the network model meets the following conditions:
1-1) sensor nodes in the network are uniformly distributed, the sensor nodes are isomorphic, namely the sensor nodes have the same configuration, and the computing power, the storage and the energy consumption resources of each sensor node are the same;
1-2) the node of the base station is the only final destination of the data packet, the base station is positioned in a network center, and the node in the network obtains the position information and the ID of the base station;
1-3) an irregular ring is established in the network, nodes in the irregular ring are called ring nodes, the ring nodes broadcast own positions and node IDs to the whole network, and non-ring nodes in the network can obtain the positions and the IDs of the ring nodes;
1-4) the sensor node in the network obtains the position information and ID of the neighbor sensor node;
1-5) assuming that the data packet is encrypted to ensure that the actual content of the data packet is not available to unauthorized users;
1-6) assuming that the base station has sufficient capability to resist attack by an attacker;
an attacker of the network model satisfies the following conditions:
1-7) an attacker has monitoring equipment with sufficient energy, storage capacity and calculation capacity, and determines the last sensor node for sending information according to the strength of a received signal and the arrival angle of the signal;
1-8) an attacker adopts passive attack, and the attacker cannot interfere with the normal operation of the network;
1-9) an attacker uses an attack mode combining eavesdropping and hop-by-hop tracing;
1-10) the attacker listens at the current node position, and if no data packet is received within a specified time, the attacker rolls back to the previous node and continues to listen at the node, and in addition, the attacker stores all accessed node information to avoid forming a loop;
1-11) the attacker moves to the event source when receiving the information packet, and the moving distance is related to the monitoring distance of the attacker;
2) establishing an irregular ring and enabling nodes in the network to obtain ring node information: the process is as follows:
2-1) firstly taking a base station node as a center, dividing a network into n sectors, setting the distance between a mixed ring and the base station as a parameter dsmin, constructing an n-bit linked list Link, wherein each node of the linked list is composed of a distance value which is more than the dsmin from the base station and an arbitrary angle value in one sector, the destination node of the first node Link _ n1 in the linked list is the second node Link _ n2 in the linked list, because the sensor node only has the information of adjacent nodes, the Link _ n1 node is routed to the Link _ n2 node according to the relative position information, the Link _ n2 node may not exist, but the last node adjacent to Link _ n2 can judge whether the node exists, if the last node does not exist, the Link _ n2 node, and so on, the destination node of the last node in the linked list is Link _ n1, and the path passed by the node forms an irregular ring, broadcasting ring nodes to the network, so that non-ring nodes in the network obtain ring node information, that is:
s1: dividing the network into k (k =1,2, …, n) sectors by taking the base station as a center, wherein the central angle of each sector is the angular range [ (k-1) × 2 pi/n, k × 2 pi/n ] of each sector;
s2: selecting a position of each sector as (d, angle), wherein d is the distance from a base station node, angle represents the central angle of a connecting line between a node in the sector and the base station node, d > dsmin, and after the position selection of each sector is completed, forming a linked list Link with n nodes;
s3: nodes in the linked list are connected in sequence, the last node in the linked list is connected with the first node in the linked list, all nodes in the linked list and routing nodes in the process of searching the nodes in the linked list form an irregular ring, and the ring nodes broadcast;
2-2) selecting intermediate nodes: determining a selection area of an intermediate node, firstly setting a distance parameter dr, defining a range with the base station as a center and the distance being less than dr as a dangerous area, setting a distance parameter dmin for avoiding the intermediate node to be near a source node, defining an area with the source node as the center and the distance being less than dmin as a visible area, excluding the visible area and the dangerous area from the selection area of the intermediate node, then, connecting the base station node and the source node as a reference line by taking the base station node as an origin, and dividing the network into 3 areas: sec1, sec2 and sec3, each area being the same, optionally selecting one of two areas adjacent to the source node, wherein the visible area and the danger area are excluded, and randomly selecting an intermediate node in the selected area, specifically:
s1: defining a range with the radius dr around a base station as a dangerous area;
s2: defining a range with the radius dmin around a source node as a visible area;
s3: dividing the network into three areas with equal areas;
s4: randomly selecting one of two regions adjacent to the source node;
s5: deleting nodes in the danger area and nodes in the visible area in the selected area;
s6: randomly selecting an intermediate node in the area;
s7: according to the relative position information of the intermediate node, the source node forwards the data packet to the intermediate node;
2-3) forwarding of packets to irregular rings and forwarding on rings stage: firstly, selecting an intermediate node to reach a node in an irregular ring, namely an access node of the ring, wherein the network is divided into three regions, the node in the irregular ring also belongs to the three regions, the irregular ring node in the region is randomly selected as the access node of the irregular ring in the region which is closest to the intermediate node, namely the region with the smallest angle, in the other two regions outside the region where the intermediate node is located, the node in the network obtains node information in the irregular ring, the intermediate node can forward a data packet to the access node through relative position information, if the distance from the intermediate node to the access node is clockwise, the access node forwards data in the irregular ring in a clockwise direction, if the distance from the intermediate node to the access node is anticlockwise, the access node forwards the data in the irregular ring in the anticlockwise direction, and if the angles among the node in the irregular ring, the base station node and the access node are larger than a threshold value beta, the beta values are uniformly distributed between 0 and (1 pi/2), the ring node stops selecting the next hop ring node, and at the moment, the data packet is sent to the base station node through the shortest path routing algorithm, which specifically comprises the following steps:
s1: selecting an area which is closest to the intermediate node, namely, has the smallest angle from the other two areas outside the area where the intermediate node is located, and randomly selecting an irregular ring node from the areas as an access node;
s2: the intermediate node forwards the data to the access node according to the relative position information;
s3: the direction from the intermediate node to the access node is anticlockwise, and data is transmitted in the irregular ring anticlockwise;
s4: the direction from the intermediate node to the access node is clockwise, and the data is forwarded clockwise in the irregular ring;
s5: randomly generating an angle threshold value beta;
s6: the angles among the base station node, the access node and the nodes on the ring are smaller than a threshold value beta, and the next ring node is selected as a forwarding node;
s7: otherwise, stopping selecting the next ring-jumping node, and sending the data packet to the base station node;
s8: and (6) ending.
Priority Applications (1)
| Application Number | Priority Date | Filing Date | Title |
|---|---|---|---|
| CN202010213424.1A CN111314877B (en) | 2020-03-24 | 2020-03-24 | Wireless sensor network source position safety route design method based on irregular ring |
Applications Claiming Priority (1)
| Application Number | Priority Date | Filing Date | Title |
|---|---|---|---|
| CN202010213424.1A CN111314877B (en) | 2020-03-24 | 2020-03-24 | Wireless sensor network source position safety route design method based on irregular ring |
Publications (2)
| Publication Number | Publication Date |
|---|---|
| CN111314877A CN111314877A (en) | 2020-06-19 |
| CN111314877B true CN111314877B (en) | 2022-04-08 |
Family
ID=71162504
Family Applications (1)
| Application Number | Title | Priority Date | Filing Date |
|---|---|---|---|
| CN202010213424.1A Expired - Fee Related CN111314877B (en) | 2020-03-24 | 2020-03-24 | Wireless sensor network source position safety route design method based on irregular ring |
Country Status (1)
| Country | Link |
|---|---|
| CN (1) | CN111314877B (en) |
Citations (2)
| Publication number | Priority date | Publication date | Assignee | Title |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| CN103338514A (en) * | 2013-07-02 | 2013-10-02 | 东南大学 | Graded geometrical constraint positioning method for large scale distributed wireless sensor network |
| CN110830995A (en) * | 2019-11-14 | 2020-02-21 | 桂林电子科技大学 | Multi-branch route design method capable of making source position of wireless sensor network safe |
Family Cites Families (1)
| Publication number | Priority date | Publication date | Assignee | Title |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| US8849926B2 (en) * | 2010-08-06 | 2014-09-30 | Simon Fraser University | System and method for self-calibrating, self-organizing and localizing sensors in wireless sensor networks |
-
2020
- 2020-03-24 CN CN202010213424.1A patent/CN111314877B/en not_active Expired - Fee Related
Patent Citations (2)
| Publication number | Priority date | Publication date | Assignee | Title |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| CN103338514A (en) * | 2013-07-02 | 2013-10-02 | 东南大学 | Graded geometrical constraint positioning method for large scale distributed wireless sensor network |
| CN110830995A (en) * | 2019-11-14 | 2020-02-21 | 桂林电子科技大学 | Multi-branch route design method capable of making source position of wireless sensor network safe |
Non-Patent Citations (3)
| Title |
|---|
| Location_Algorithm_for_WSNs_with_Mobile_Anchor_Node_Based_on_Optimzed_K-Nearest_Neighbers;王慧娇;《IEEE》;20190709;全文 * |
| 无线传感器网络位置隐私保护机制的研究与实现;徐智富;《中国优秀硕士论文电子期刊》;20140625;全文 * |
| 物联网感知层节点位置隐私保护技术的研究;张丽;《中国优秀硕士学位论文电子期刊》;20150420;全文 * |
Also Published As
| Publication number | Publication date |
|---|---|
| CN111314877A (en) | 2020-06-19 |
Similar Documents
| Publication | Publication Date | Title |
|---|---|---|
| Khalil et al. | LITEWORP: a lightweight countermeasure for the wormhole attack in multihop wireless networks | |
| Yi et al. | Puppet attack: A denial of service attack in advanced metering infrastructure network | |
| Van Tran et al. | TTM: An efficient mechanism to detect wormhole attacks in wireless ad-hoc networks | |
| Magotra et al. | Detection of HELLO flood attack on LEACH protocol | |
| CN107835510B (en) | Phantom routing-based wireless sensor network source node position privacy protection method | |
| CN110830995B (en) | Multi-branch route design method capable of making source position of wireless sensor network safe | |
| Choudhary et al. | Preventing black hole attack in AODV using timer-based detection mechanism | |
| Kaur et al. | Mitigation of blackhole attacks and wormhole attacks in wireless sensor networks using aodv protocol | |
| Karuppiah et al. | An improvised hierarchical black hole detection algorithm in Wireless Sensor Networks | |
| Dwivedi et al. | Detection and prevention analysis of wormhole attack in wireless sensor network | |
| Bhalla et al. | Security protocols for wireless sensor networks | |
| Patel et al. | Two phase wormhole detection approach for dynamic wireless sensor networks | |
| Li et al. | Enhanced location privacy protection of base station in wireless sensor networks | |
| Mohamed et al. | Wireless Sensor network security with the probability based neighbourhood estimation | |
| Dongare et al. | Optimal cluster head selection based energy efficient technique for defending against gray hole and black hole attacks in wireless sensor networks | |
| Terence | Secure route discovery against wormhole attacks in sensor networks using mobile agents | |
| CN111314877B (en) | Wireless sensor network source position safety route design method based on irregular ring | |
| Dongare et al. | Implementing energy efficient technique for defense against Gray-Hole and Black-Hole attacks in wireless sensor networks | |
| Kibirige et al. | Attacks in wireless sensor networks | |
| Dwivedi et al. | An efficient approach for detection of wormhole attack in mobile ad-hoc network | |
| Azer et al. | Immuning routing protocols from the wormhole attack in wireless ad hoc networks | |
| Terence et al. | Behavior based routing misbehavior detection in wireless sensor networks | |
| Azer et al. | Intrusion Detection for Wormhole Attacks in Ad hoc Networks: A Survey and a Proposed Decentralized Scheme | |
| Rezaei et al. | Dealing with wormhole attacks in wireless sensor networks through discovering separate routes between nodes | |
| Vijayakarthika et al. | Efficient data dissemination for secured communication in VANET |
Legal Events
| Date | Code | Title | Description |
|---|---|---|---|
| PB01 | Publication | ||
| PB01 | Publication | ||
| SE01 | Entry into force of request for substantive examination | ||
| SE01 | Entry into force of request for substantive examination | ||
| GR01 | Patent grant | ||
| GR01 | Patent grant | ||
| CF01 | Termination of patent right due to non-payment of annual fee | ||
| CF01 | Termination of patent right due to non-payment of annual fee |
Granted publication date: 20220408 |