CN111291375B - Application program evaluation method and device, computer equipment and storage medium - Google Patents
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Abstract
Description
技术领域technical field
本申请涉及计算机技术领域,特别是涉及一种应用程序评估方法、装置、计算机设备和存储介质。The present application relates to the field of computer technology, and in particular, to an application evaluation method, apparatus, computer device and storage medium.
背景技术Background technique
随着计算机技术的发展,应用程序的开发变得常见起来,在开发应用程序时,有必要对应用程序的安全等级进行评估,以此确定应用程序的研发保证等级,其中,应用程序的安全等级用于表征应用程序发生失效对系统运行安全或任务完成造成影响的程度,通常情况下,应用程序的安全等级越高,应用程序的研发保证等级就越高,研发保证等级越高意味着投入应用程序研发的人力物力资源越高,反之,应用程序的安全等级越低,应用程序的研发保证等级也就越低。With the development of computer technology, the development of application programs has become common. When developing an application program, it is necessary to evaluate the security level of the application program to determine the research and development assurance level of the application program. Among them, the security level of the application program is It is used to characterize the degree to which the failure of the application has an impact on the safety of system operation or the completion of tasks. Generally, the higher the security level of the application, the higher the R&D assurance level of the application, and the higher the R&D assurance level means the application The higher the human and material resources for program development, on the contrary, the lower the security level of the application, the lower the application development assurance level.
常见的,可以根据应用程序产生故障时对整个系统及人员的影响程度大小,人为地为应用程序确定一个安全等级,然后根据应用程序的安全等级得到应用程序的研发保证等级。Commonly, a security level can be artificially determined for the application program according to the degree of impact on the entire system and personnel when the application program fails, and then the R&D assurance level of the application program can be obtained according to the security level of the application program.
然而,相关技术在确定应用程序的安全等级时考虑的因素较为简单,因此得到的安全等级不精确,继而导致最终得到的应用程序的研发保证等级会存在不精确的问题。However, the related technology considers relatively simple factors when determining the security level of an application program, so the obtained security level is imprecise, which in turn leads to the problem of inaccuracy in the research and development assurance level of the finally obtained application program.
发明内容SUMMARY OF THE INVENTION
基于此,有必要针对上述技术问题,提供一种精确的应用程序评估方法、装置、计算机设备和存储介质。Based on this, it is necessary to provide an accurate application evaluation method, apparatus, computer equipment and storage medium for the above technical problems.
第一方面,提供一种应用程序评估方法,该方法包括:In a first aspect, an application evaluation method is provided, the method comprising:
根据应用程序的危险等级确定该应用程序的每个顶层功能模块的第一研发保证等级,该危险等级包括该应用程序失效后引发的危险后果的严重性等级、该应用程序接触外部危险事件的频度等级和该外部危险事件发生的概率等级中的至少一个,在该应用程序中,每个该顶层功能模块与至少一个子功能模块相对应,每个该顶层功能模块依赖于该顶层功能模块对应的各该子功能模块;The first R&D assurance level of each top-level functional module of the application is determined according to the danger level of the application, where the danger level includes the severity level of the dangerous consequences caused by the failure of the application, the frequency of the application being exposed to external dangerous events At least one of the degree level and the probability level of the occurrence of the external dangerous event, in the application program, each of the top-level function modules corresponds to at least one sub-function module, and each of the top-level function modules depends on the top-level function module. each of the sub-function modules;
对于每个该顶层功能模块,建立该顶层功能模块对应的依赖关系树,该依赖关系树包括该顶层功能模块与该顶层功能模块对应的各该子功能模块之间的依赖关系;For each of the top-level functional modules, a dependency tree corresponding to the top-level functional module is established, and the dependency tree includes the dependencies between the top-level functional module and each of the sub-functional modules corresponding to the top-level functional module;
对于每个该顶层功能模块,根据该第一研发保证等级以及该依赖关系树,确定该顶层功能模块对应的各该子功能模块的第二研发保证等级。For each top-level functional module, according to the first R&D assurance level and the dependency tree, a second R&D assurance level of each sub-function module corresponding to the top-level functional module is determined.
在其中一个实施例中,该根据应用程序的危险等级确定该应用程序的每个顶层功能模块的第一研发保证等级,包括:In one embodiment, the first R&D assurance level of each top-level functional module of the application is determined according to the risk level of the application, including:
获取危险等级矩阵表;Get the risk level matrix table;
通过查询该危险等级矩阵表确定该应用程序的危险等级;Determine the hazard level of the application by querying the hazard level matrix table;
根据该应用程序的危险等级确定该应用程序的每个顶层功能模块的该第一研发保证等级。The first R&D assurance level of each top-level functional module of the application is determined according to the danger level of the application.
在其中一个实施例中,该依赖关系包括串联依赖关系,该串联依赖关系用于表征保证该顶层功能模块正常工作的前提为该顶层功能模块对应的所有子功能模块正常工作,该根据该第一研发保证等级以及该依赖关系树,确定该顶层功能模块对应的各该子功能模块的第二研发保证等级,包括:In one of the embodiments, the dependency relationship includes a serial dependency relationship, and the serial dependency relationship is used to represent that the premise of ensuring the normal operation of the top-level functional module is that all sub-function modules corresponding to the top-level functional module work normally. According to the first The R&D assurance level and the dependency tree determine the second R&D assurance level of each sub-function module corresponding to the top-level functional module, including:
将该第一研发保证等级作为该顶层功能模块对应的各该子功能模块的第二研发保证等级。The first R&D guarantee level is used as the second R&D guarantee level of each sub-function module corresponding to the top-level functional module.
在其中一个实施例中,该依赖关系包括并联依赖关系,该并联依赖关系用于表征保证该顶层功能模块正常工作的前提为保证该顶层功能模块对应的任一该子功能模块正常,该根据该第一研发保证等级以及该依赖关系树,确定该顶层功能模块对应的各该子功能模块的第二研发保证等级,包括:In one of the embodiments, the dependency relationship includes a parallel dependency relationship, and the parallel dependency relationship is used to represent that the premise of ensuring the normal operation of the top-level functional module is to ensure that any sub-function module corresponding to the top-level functional module is normal. The first R&D assurance level and the dependency tree determine the second R&D assurance level of each sub-function module corresponding to the top-level functional module, including:
将该第一研发保证等级作为该顶层功能模块对应的各该子功能模块中至少一个子功能模块的第二研发保证等级;或者,Use the first R&D guarantee level as the second R&D guarantee level of at least one sub-function module in each of the sub-function modules corresponding to the top-level functional module; or,
将第三研发保证等级作为该顶层功能模块对应的各该子功能模块中至少两个子功能模块的第二研发保证等级,该第三研发保证等级低于该第一研发保证等级。A third R&D guarantee level is used as the second R&D guarantee level of at least two sub-function modules in each of the sub-function modules corresponding to the top-level functional module, and the third R&D guarantee level is lower than the first R&D guarantee level.
在其中一个实施例中,该依赖关系包括串并联依赖关系和并串联依赖关系,该串并联依赖关系和该并串联依赖关系用于表征保证该顶层功能模块正常工作的前提为保证该顶层功能模块对应的各该子功能模块中处于串联关系的子功能模块全部正常工作,并且处于并联关系的任一该子功能模块正常工作,该根据该第一研发保证等级以及该依赖关系树,确定该顶层功能模块对应的各该子功能模块的第二研发保证等级,包括:In one of the embodiments, the dependency includes a series-parallel dependency and a parallel-series dependency, and the series-parallel dependency and the parallel-series dependency are used to represent the premise of ensuring that the top-level functional module works normally. All the sub-function modules in the series relationship in the corresponding sub-function modules work normally, and any sub-function module in the parallel relationship works normally, the top level is determined according to the first R&D guarantee level and the dependency tree. The second R&D assurance level of each sub-function module corresponding to the functional module includes:
将该顶层功能模块的该第一研发保证等级作为该顶层功能模块对应的各该子功能模块中处于并联关系的子功能模块中至少一个子功能模块的第二研发保证等级,或者,将第三研发保证等级作为该顶层功能模块对应的各该子功能模块中处于并联关系的子功能模块中至少两个子功能模块的第二研发保证等级,该第三研发保证等级低于该第一研发保证等级;The first R&D guarantee level of the top-level functional module is taken as the second R&D guarantee level of at least one sub-function module in the sub-function modules in the parallel relationship among the sub-function modules corresponding to the top-level functional module, or the third R&D guarantee level The R&D guarantee level is used as the second R&D guarantee level of at least two sub-function modules in the sub-function modules in parallel relationship among the sub-function modules corresponding to the top-level functional module, and the third R&D guarantee level is lower than the first R&D guarantee level ;
将该第一研发保证等级作为该顶层功能模块对应的各该子功能模块中处于串联关系的子功能模块的第二研发保证等级,或者,将第四研发保证等级作为该顶层功能模块对应的子功能模块中处于并联关系下的串联关系中至少一个子功能模块的第二研发保证等级,该第四研发保证等级为该顶层功能模块对应的子功能模块中处于并联关系的子功能模块中最高的研发保证等级。Use the first R&D guarantee level as the second R&D guarantee level of the sub-function modules in the series relationship among the sub-function modules corresponding to the top-level functional module, or use the fourth R&D guarantee level as the sub-function corresponding to the top-level functional module. The second R&D guarantee level of at least one sub-function module in the series relationship in the parallel relationship among the functional modules, and the fourth R&D guarantee level is the highest among the sub-function modules in the parallel relationship among the sub-function modules corresponding to the top-level functional module. R&D Assurance Level.
在其中一个实施例中,该依赖关系包括表决关系,该表决关系用于表征保证该顶层功能模块正常的前提为保证该顶层功能模块对应的各该子功能模块中预设数量的子功能模块正常,该根据该第一研发保证等级以及该依赖关系树,确定该顶层功能模块对应的各该子功能模块的第二研发保证等级,包括:In one embodiment, the dependency relationship includes a voting relationship, and the voting relationship is used to represent that the premise of ensuring that the top-level functional module is normal is to ensure that a preset number of sub-functional modules in the sub-functional modules corresponding to the top-level functional module are normal. , the second R&D guarantee level of each sub-function module corresponding to the top-level functional module is determined according to the first R&D guarantee level and the dependency tree, including:
将该顶层功能模块的第一研发保证等级作为该顶层功能模块对应的各该子功能模块中处于表决器位置的子功能模块的第二研发保证等级;Taking the first R&D guarantee level of the top-level functional module as the second R&D guarantee level of the sub-function module at the voter position in each of the sub-function modules corresponding to the top-level functional module;
将该顶层功能模块的第一研发保证等级作为该顶层功能模块对应的各该子功能模块中未处于表决器位置的至少一个子功能模块的第二研发保证等级,或者,将第三研发保证等级作为该顶层功能模块对应的子功能模块中未处于表决器位置的至少两个子功能模块的该第二研发保证等级,该第三研发等级低于该第一研发保证等级。The first R&D guarantee level of the top-level functional module is taken as the second R&D guarantee level of at least one sub-function module that is not in the position of the voter in each of the sub-function modules corresponding to the top-level functional module, or the third R&D guarantee level As the second R&D guarantee level of at least two sub-function modules that are not in the voter position among the sub-function modules corresponding to the top-level functional module, the third R&D guarantee level is lower than the first R&D guarantee level.
在其中一个实施例中,该根据该第一研发保证等级以及该依赖关系树,确定该顶层功能模块对应的各该子功能模块的第二研发保证等级之后,该方法还包括:In one embodiment, after determining the second R&D assurance level of each of the sub-function modules corresponding to the top-level functional module according to the first R&D assurance level and the dependency tree, the method further includes:
确定该应用程序未能避开危险事件的概率等级;Determine the probability level that the application fails to avoid hazardous events;
根据该应用程序未能避开危险事件的概率等级调整该第二研发保证等级。The second R&D assurance level is adjusted according to the probability level that the application fails to avoid the hazardous event.
在其中一个实施例中,该根据该应用程序未能避开危险事件的概率等级调整该第二研发保证等级,包括:In one embodiment, the second R&D assurance level is adjusted according to the probability level that the application program fails to avoid the dangerous event, including:
当该应用程序未能避开危险事件的概率等级属于预设等级范围内时,将该第二研发保证等级的级别调高。When the probability level of the application program failing to avoid the dangerous event falls within the preset level range, the level of the second R&D guarantee level is increased.
第二方面,提供一种应用程序评估装置,该装置包括:In a second aspect, an application evaluation device is provided, the device comprising:
第一确定模块,用于根据应用程序的危险等级确定该应用程序的每个顶层功能模块的第一研发保证等级,该危险等级包括该应用程序失效后引发的危险后果的严重性等级、该应用程序接触外部危险事件的频度等级和该外部危险事件发生的概率等级中的至少一个,在该应用程序中,每个该顶层功能模块与至少一个子功能模块相对应,每个该顶层功能模块依赖于该顶层功能模块对应的各该子功能模块;The first determination module is used to determine the first R&D assurance level of each top-level functional module of the application program according to the risk level of the application program, where the risk level includes the severity level of the dangerous consequences caused by the failure of the application program, the application program At least one of the frequency level of exposure of the program to an external dangerous event and the probability level of the occurrence of the external dangerous event, in the application program, each of the top-level functional modules corresponds to at least one sub-functional module, and each of the top-level functional modules Depends on each of the sub-function modules corresponding to the top-level function module;
建立模块,用于对于每个该顶层功能模块,建立该顶层功能模块对应的依赖关系树,该依赖关系树包括该顶层功能模块与该顶层功能模块对应的各该子功能模块之间的依赖关系;A building module is used to establish, for each of the top-level functional modules, a dependency tree corresponding to the top-level functional module, where the dependency tree includes the dependencies between the top-level functional module and each of the sub-function modules corresponding to the top-level functional module ;
第二确定模块,用于对于每个该顶层功能模块,根据该第一研发保证等级以及该依赖关系树,确定该顶层功能模块对应的各该子功能模块的第二研发保证等级。The second determining module is configured to, for each top-level functional module, determine the second R&D assurance level of each sub-function module corresponding to the top-level functional module according to the first R&D assurance level and the dependency tree.
在其中一个实施例中,该第一确定模块具体用于,获取危险等级矩阵表;通过查询该危险等级矩阵表确定该应用程序的危险等级;根据该应用程序的危险等级确定该应用程序的每个顶层功能模块的该第一研发保证等级。In one of the embodiments, the first determining module is specifically configured to obtain a risk level matrix table; determine the risk level of the application program by querying the risk level matrix table; determine the risk level of the application program according to the risk level of the application program The first R&D assurance level of a top-level functional module.
在其中一个实施例中,该依赖关系包括串联依赖关系,该串联依赖关系用于表征保证该顶层功能模块正常工作的前提为该顶层功能模块对应的所有子功能模块正常工作,该第二确定模块具体用于,将该第一研发保证等级作为该顶层功能模块对应的各该子功能模块的第二研发保证等级。In one of the embodiments, the dependency relationship includes a serial dependency relationship, and the serial dependency relationship is used to represent that the premise of ensuring that the top-level functional module works normally is that all sub-functional modules corresponding to the top-level functional module work normally, and the second determining module Specifically, the first R&D guarantee level is used as the second R&D guarantee level of each sub-function module corresponding to the top-level functional module.
在其中一个实施例中,该依赖关系包括并联依赖关系,该并联依赖关系用于表征保证该顶层功能模块正常工作的前提为保证该顶层功能模块对应的任一该子功能模块正常,该第二确定模块具体用于,将该第一研发保证等级作为该顶层功能模块对应的各该子功能模块中至少一个子功能模块的第二研发保证等级;或者,将第三研发保证等级作为该顶层功能模块对应的各该子功能模块中至少两个子功能模块的第二研发保证等级,该第三研发保证等级低于该第一研发保证等级。In one of the embodiments, the dependency relationship includes a parallel dependency relationship, and the parallel dependency relationship is used to represent that the premise of ensuring the normal operation of the top-level functional module is to ensure that any sub-function module corresponding to the top-level functional module is normal, and the second The determining module is specifically used to take the first R&D guarantee level as the second R&D guarantee level of at least one sub-function module in each of the sub-function modules corresponding to the top-level functional module; or, take the third R&D guarantee level as the top-level function The second R&D guarantee level of at least two sub-function modules in each of the sub-function modules corresponding to the module, and the third R&D guarantee level is lower than the first R&D guarantee level.
在其中一个实施例中,该依赖关系包括串并联依赖关系和并串联依赖关系,该串并联依赖关系和该并串联依赖关系用于表征保证该顶层功能模块正常工作的前提为保证该顶层功能模块对应的各该子功能模块中处于串联关系的子功能模块全部正常工作,并且处于并联关系的任一该子功能模块正常工作,该第二确定模块具体用于,将该顶层功能模块的该第一研发保证等级作为该顶层功能模块对应的各该子功能模块中处于并联关系的子功能模块中至少一个子功能模块的第二研发保证等级,或者,将第三研发保证等级作为该顶层功能模块对应的各该子功能模块中处于并联关系的子功能模块中至少两个子功能模块的第二研发保证等级,该第三研发保证等级低于该第一研发保证等级;将该第一研发保证等级作为该顶层功能模块对应的各该子功能模块中处于串联关系的子功能模块的第二研发保证等级,或者,将第四研发保证等级作为该顶层功能模块对应的子功能模块中处于并联关系下的串联关系中至少一个子功能模块的第二研发保证等级,该第四研发保证等级为该顶层功能模块对应的子功能模块中处于并联关系的子功能模块中最高的研发保证等级。In one of the embodiments, the dependency includes a series-parallel dependency and a parallel-series dependency, and the series-parallel dependency and the parallel-series dependency are used to represent the premise of ensuring that the top-level functional module works normally. All the sub-function modules in the series relationship in the corresponding sub-function modules work normally, and any sub-function module in the parallel relationship is in normal operation. A research and development assurance level is used as the second research and development assurance level of at least one sub-function module in the sub-function modules in the parallel relationship among the sub-function modules corresponding to the top-level functional module, or a third research and development assurance level is used as the top-level functional module. Corresponding to the second R&D guarantee level of at least two sub-function modules in the sub-function modules in a parallel relationship among the sub-function modules, the third R&D guarantee level is lower than the first R&D guarantee level; the first R&D guarantee level As the second research and development assurance level of the sub-function modules in the series relationship among the sub-function modules corresponding to the top-level functional module The second R&D guarantee level of at least one sub-functional module in the series relationship of the top-level functional modules, and the fourth R&D guarantee level is the highest R&D guarantee level among the sub-functional modules in the parallel relationship among the sub-functional modules corresponding to the top-level functional module.
在其中一个实施例中,该依赖关系包括表决关系,该表决关系用于表征保证该顶层功能模块正常的前提为保证该顶层功能模块对应的各该子功能模块中预设数量的子功能模块正常,该第二确定模块具体用于,将该顶层功能模块的第一研发保证等级作为该顶层功能模块对应的各该子功能模块中处于表决器位置的子功能模块的第二研发保证等级;将该顶层功能模块的第一研发保证等级作为该顶层功能模块对应的各该子功能模块中未处于表决器位置的至少一个子功能模块的第二研发保证等级,或者,将第三研发保证等级作为该顶层功能模块对应的子功能模块中未处于表决器位置的至少两个子功能模块的该第二研发保证等级,该第三研发等级低于该第一研发保证等级。In one embodiment, the dependency relationship includes a voting relationship, and the voting relationship is used to represent that the premise of ensuring that the top-level functional module is normal is to ensure that a preset number of sub-functional modules in the sub-functional modules corresponding to the top-level functional module are normal. , the second determination module is specifically used to take the first R&D guarantee level of the top-level functional module as the second R&D guarantee level of the sub-function module located at the voter position in each of the sub-function modules corresponding to the top-level functional module; The first R&D guarantee level of the top-level functional module is taken as the second R&D guarantee level of at least one sub-function module that is not in the position of the voter among the sub-function modules corresponding to the top-level functional module, or the third R&D guarantee level is taken as The second R&D guarantee level of at least two sub-function modules that are not in the voter position among the sub-function modules corresponding to the top-level functional module, and the third R&D guarantee level is lower than the first R&D guarantee level.
在其中一个实施例中,该装置还包括调整模块,该调整模块用于,确定该应用程序未能避开危险事件的概率等级;根据该应用程序未能避开危险事件的概率等级调整该第二研发保证等级。In one embodiment, the device further includes an adjustment module, the adjustment module is used to determine the probability level that the application program fails to avoid the dangerous event; adjust the first probability level according to the probability level that the application program fails to avoid the dangerous event 2. R&D guarantee level.
在其中一个实施例中,该调整模块具体用于,当该应用程序未能避开危险事件的概率等级属于预设等级范围内时,将该第二研发保证等级的级别调高。In one embodiment, the adjustment module is specifically configured to increase the level of the second R&D guarantee level when the probability level of the application program failing to avoid the dangerous event falls within a preset level range.
第三方面,提供一种计算机设备,包括存储器和处理器,该存储器存储有计算机程序,该处理器执行该计算机程序时实现上述第一方面任一所述的应用程序评估方法。In a third aspect, a computer device is provided, including a memory and a processor, where the memory stores a computer program, and when the processor executes the computer program, the application program evaluation method described in any one of the above-mentioned first aspect is implemented.
第四方面,提供一种计算机可读存储介质,其上存储有计算机程序,该计算机程序被处理器执行时实现上述第一方面任一所述的应用程序评估方法。In a fourth aspect, a computer-readable storage medium is provided, on which a computer program is stored, and when the computer program is executed by a processor, implements the application program evaluation method described in any one of the above-mentioned first aspect.
上述应用程序评估方法、装置、计算机设备和存储介质,通过根据应用程序的危险等级确定该应用程序的每个顶层功能模块的第一研发保证等级,该危险等级包括该应用程序失效后引发的危险后果的严重性等级、该应用程序接触外部危险事件的频度等级和该外部危险事件发生的概率等级中的至少一个,在该应用程序中,每个该顶层功能模块与至少一个子功能模块相对应,每个该顶层功能模块依赖于该顶层功能模块对应的各该子功能模块;然后对于每个该顶层功能模块,建立该顶层功能模块对应的依赖关系树,该依赖关系树包括该顶层功能模块与该顶层功能模块对应的各该子功能模块之间的依赖关系;最后对于每个该顶层功能模块,根据该第一研发保证等级以及该依赖关系树,确定该顶层功能模块对应的各该子功能模块的第二研发保证等级。因为本申请提供的应用程序评估方法,在对应用程序的研发保证等级进行评估时,充分考虑到了影响应用程序危险等级的各种影响因素,并且根据应用程序中功能模块之间的依赖关系确定各个功能模块的研发保证等级,使得最终对于应用程序研发保证等级的评估更加精确。The above-mentioned application evaluation method, device, computer equipment and storage medium, by determining the first R&D assurance level of each top-level functional module of the application according to the danger level of the application, where the danger level includes the danger caused by the failure of the application At least one of a severity level of consequences, a frequency level of exposure of the application to an external dangerous event, and a probability level of the occurrence of the external dangerous event, in the application, each of the top-level functional modules is associated with at least one sub-functional module. Correspondingly, each of the top-level functional modules depends on each of the sub-function modules corresponding to the top-level functional module; then for each of the top-level functional modules, a dependency tree corresponding to the top-level functional module is established, and the dependency tree includes the top-level function. The dependencies between the modules and the sub-functional modules corresponding to the top-level functional modules; finally, for each of the top-level functional modules, according to the first R&D assurance level and the dependency tree, determine the corresponding top-level functional modules. The second R&D assurance level for sub-function modules. Because of the application evaluation method provided in this application, when evaluating the R&D assurance level of an application, various influencing factors that affect the risk level of the application are fully considered, and each application is determined according to the dependencies between the functional modules in the application. The R&D assurance level of functional modules makes the final evaluation of the application development assurance level more accurate.
附图说明Description of drawings
图1为一个实施例中应用程序评估方法的应用环境图;1 is an application environment diagram of an application evaluation method in one embodiment;
图2为一个实施例中应用程序评估方法的流程示意图;2 is a schematic flowchart of an application evaluation method in one embodiment;
图3为一个实施例中应用程序评估方法中确定该应用程序的每个顶层功能模块的第一研发保证等级的方法的流程示意图;3 is a schematic flowchart of a method for determining a first R&D assurance level of each top-level functional module of an application in an application evaluation method according to an embodiment;
图4为一个实施例中串联依赖关系的依赖树图;FIG. 4 is a dependency tree diagram of concatenated dependencies in one embodiment;
图5为一个实施例中并联依赖关系的依赖树图;5 is a dependency tree diagram of parallel dependencies in one embodiment;
图6为一个实施例中串并联依赖关系的依赖树图;6 is a dependency tree diagram of a series-parallel dependency in one embodiment;
图7为一个实施例中并串联依赖关系的依赖树图;FIG. 7 is a dependency tree diagram of parallel and concatenated dependencies in one embodiment;
图8为一个实施例中表决关系的依赖树图;8 is a dependency tree diagram of a voting relationship in one embodiment;
图9为一个实施例中应用程序评估方法中调整第二研发保证等级的方法的流程示意图;9 is a schematic flowchart of a method for adjusting a second R&D assurance level in an application evaluation method according to an embodiment;
图10为一个实施例中应用程序评估装置的结构框图;10 is a structural block diagram of an apparatus for evaluating an application program in one embodiment;
图11为另一个实施例中应用程序评估装置的结构框图;11 is a structural block diagram of an apparatus for evaluating an application program in another embodiment;
图12为一个实施例中计算机设备的内部结构图。Figure 12 is a diagram of the internal structure of a computer device in one embodiment.
具体实施方式Detailed ways
为了使本申请的目的、技术方案及优点更加清楚明白,以下结合附图及实施例,对本申请进行进一步详细说明。应当理解,此处描述的具体实施例仅仅用以解释本申请,并不用于限定本申请。In order to make the purpose, technical solutions and advantages of the present application more clearly understood, the present application will be described in further detail below with reference to the accompanying drawings and embodiments. It should be understood that the specific embodiments described herein are only used to explain the present application, but not to limit the present application.
随着计算机技术的发展,应用程序的开发变得常见起来。例如,在机载系统的开发中,新一代机载系统已经成为典型的应用程序密集型系统,机载应用程序承担着飞行控制、动力控制、航电综合、任务规划、安全告警等核心功能,对飞行安全和任务完成具有重要影响。与此同时,机载应用系统失效引起的系统安全问题日益增加,据统计,现代机载装备中,由软件引发的故障已经占到故障总数的70%以上。关键应用程序一旦发生故障或失效,轻则导致任务失败,重则设备损坏乃至人员伤亡。因此,在我国机载应用程序的研制过程中,已将应用程序安全等级作为重点关注对象。With the development of computer technology, application development has become common. For example, in the development of airborne systems, a new generation of airborne systems has become a typical application-intensive system. Airborne applications undertake core functions such as flight control, power control, avionics integration, mission planning, and safety alerts. It has a significant impact on flight safety and mission completion. At the same time, the system security problems caused by the failure of the airborne application system are increasing day by day. According to statistics, in the modern airborne equipment, the failure caused by the software has accounted for more than 70% of the total number of failures. Once a critical application fails or fails, it can lead to mission failure, equipment damage and even casualties. Therefore, in the development process of my country's airborne applications, the application security level has been the focus of attention.
在开发应用程序时,有必要对应用程序的安全等级进行评估,以此确定应用程序的研发保证等级。其中,应用程序的安全等级用于表征应用程序发生失效对系统运行安全或任务完成造成影响的程度,通常情况下,应用程序的安全等级越高,应用程序的研发保证等级就越高,研发保证等级越高意味着投入应用程序研发的人力物力资源越高,反之,应用程序的安全等级越低,应用程序的研发保证等级也就越低。When developing an application, it is necessary to evaluate the security level of the application to determine the R&D assurance level of the application. Among them, the security level of the application is used to represent the degree to which the failure of the application affects the system operation safety or task completion. Generally, the higher the security level of the application, the higher the research and development assurance level of the application. The higher the level, the higher the human and material resources invested in the research and development of the application. Conversely, the lower the security level of the application, the lower the level of guarantee for the research and development of the application.
常见的,可以根据应用程序产生故障时对整个系统及人员的影响程度大小,人为地为应用程序确定一个安全等级,然后根据应用程序的安全等级得到应用程序的研发保证等级。Commonly, a security level can be artificially determined for the application program according to the degree of impact on the entire system and personnel when the application program fails, and then the R&D assurance level of the application program can be obtained according to the security level of the application program.
然而,相关技术在确定应用程序的安全等级时考虑的因素较为简单,因此得到的安全等级不精确,继而导致最终得到的应用程序的研发保证等级会存在不精确的问题。However, the related technology considers relatively simple factors when determining the security level of an application program, so the obtained security level is imprecise, which in turn leads to the problem of inaccuracy in the research and development assurance level of the finally obtained application program.
本申请提供的应用程序评估方法,可以应用于如图1所示的应用环境中。其中,终端101可以但不限于是各种个人计算机、笔记本电脑、智能手机、平板电脑和便携式可穿戴设备。The application evaluation method provided in this application can be applied to the application environment shown in FIG. 1 . Wherein, the terminal 101 can be, but is not limited to, various personal computers, notebook computers, smart phones, tablet computers and portable wearable devices.
在一个实施例中,如图2所示,提供了一种应用程序评估方法,以该方法应用于图1中的终端101为例进行说明,包括以下步骤:In one embodiment, as shown in FIG. 2 , a method for evaluating an application program is provided, and the method is applied to the terminal 101 in FIG. 1 as an example for description, including the following steps:
步骤201,终端根据应用程序的危险等级确定该应用程序的每个顶层功能模块的第一研发保证等级,该危险等级包括该应用程序失效后引发的危险后果的严重性等级、该应用程序接触外部危险事件的频度等级和该外部危险事件发生的概率等级中的至少一个,在该应用程序中,每个该顶层功能模块与至少一个子功能模块相对应,每个该顶层功能模块依赖于该顶层功能模块对应的各该子功能模块。
在本步骤中,为了精确地对应用程序的危险等级进行评估,需要综合考虑三个方面的因素。分别是应用程序失效后引发的危险后果的严重性等级(本申请中用C表示)、应用程序接触外部危险事件的频度等级(本申请中用F表示)和外部危险事件发生的概率等级(本申请中用W表示)。现对上述三个级别进行详细说明。In this step, in order to accurately assess the risk level of the application, it is necessary to comprehensively consider three factors. They are the severity level of the dangerous consequences (denoted by C in this application), the frequency level of the application program's exposure to external dangerous events (denoted by F in this application), and the probability level of the occurrence of external dangerous events (denoted by F in this application), respectively. Denoted by W in this application). The above three levels will now be described in detail.
一、应用程序失效后引发的危险后果的严重性等级C1. The severity level C of the dangerous consequences caused by the failure of the application
1)可采用功能危险评估(英文:FHA)方法,分析应用程序失效所引发的系统危险事件(英文:FC)。依据系统功能和所处的任务阶段,分析FC对系统造成的后果影响;1) The functional hazard assessment (English: FHA) method can be used to analyze the system hazard events (English: FC) caused by the failure of the application program. According to the system function and the task stage, analyze the consequences of FC on the system;
2)依据危险事件后果影响情况,结合表1,定量评估应用程序引发的危险事件后果严重性等级C(分为A、B、C、D和E五个级别)。2) According to the impact of the consequences of dangerous events, combined with Table 1, quantitatively evaluate the severity level C of the consequences of dangerous events caused by the application (divided into five levels of A, B, C, D and E).
二、应用程序接触外部危险事件的频度等级F2. The frequency level of application exposure to external dangerous events is F
1)采用概率风险评估法(英文:PRA)和区域安全性分析(英文:ZSA),分析应用程序可能接触到的外部危险事件类别。结合应用程序运行特征和体系结构,确定应用程序运行时与外界危险事件相交互的可能性,即频度值;1) Use probabilistic risk assessment method (English: PRA) and regional safety analysis (English: ZSA) to analyze the categories of external dangerous events that the application may come into contact with. Combined with the running characteristics and architecture of the application, determine the possibility that the application will interact with the external dangerous events, that is, the frequency value;
2)依据应用程序运行时与外界危险源相交互的频率值,结合表2,定量评估应用程序接触外部危险事件的频度等级F(分为H、M、O和L四个级别)。2) According to the frequency value of the interaction between the application program and the external danger source when the application program is running, combined with Table 2, quantitatively evaluate the frequency level F (divided into H, M, O and L four levels) of the application program contacting external hazardous events.
三、外部危险事件发生的概率等级W3. Probability level W of external dangerous events
1)通过经验数据统计分析、专家经验或者异常激励发生条件仿真等方式,获得外部危险事件的发生概率近似评估值W;1) Obtain the approximate evaluation value W of the occurrence probability of external dangerous events through statistical analysis of empirical data, expert experience or simulation of abnormal excitation conditions;
2)依据外部危险事件发生概率近似评估值W,结合表3,确定“危险事件发生概率W”(分为1、2、3、4和5五个级别)。2) According to the approximate evaluation value W of the probability of occurrence of external dangerous events, combined with Table 3, determine the "probability of occurrence of dangerous events W" (divided into five levels of 1, 2, 3, 4 and 5).
表1Table 1
表2Table 2
表3table 3
在得到应用程序失效后引发的危险后果的严重性等级C、应用程序接触外部危险事件的频度等级F和外部危险事件发生的概率等级W之后。可以根据其中至少一个等级确定应用程序每个顶层功能模块的第一研发保证等级。一般来说,危险等级越高,对应的研发保证等级也越高。After obtaining the severity level C of the dangerous consequences caused by the failure of the application program, the frequency level F of the application program's exposure to external dangerous events, and the probability level W of the occurrence of external dangerous events. The first R&D assurance level of each top-level functional module of the application may be determined according to at least one of the levels. Generally speaking, the higher the risk level, the higher the corresponding R&D guarantee level.
步骤202,终端对于每个该顶层功能模块,建立该顶层功能模块对应的依赖关系树,该依赖关系树包括该顶层功能模块与该顶层功能模块对应的各该子功能模块之间的依赖关系。Step 202: For each top-level functional module, the terminal establishes a dependency tree corresponding to the top-level functional module, where the dependency tree includes the dependency between the top-level functional module and each sub-function module corresponding to the top-level functional module.
在应用程序中,一般有多个功能模块,其中一些是顶层功能模块,顶层功能模块所实现的功能需要依靠子功能模块。可以理解为,应用程序的一些基本功能的实现需要以其他功能的实现为前提。所以可以根据应用程序的功能划分,建立各个功能模块之间的依赖关系树。In an application, there are generally multiple functional modules, some of which are top-level functional modules, and the functions implemented by the top-level functional modules need to rely on sub-functional modules. It can be understood that the realization of some basic functions of the application requires the realization of other functions as a prerequisite. Therefore, a dependency tree between each functional module can be established according to the functional division of the application.
步骤203,终端对于每个该顶层功能模块,根据该第一研发保证等级以及该依赖关系树,确定该顶层功能模块对应的各该子功能模块的第二研发保证等级。Step 203: For each top-level functional module, the terminal determines a second R&D assurance level of each sub-function module corresponding to the top-level functional module according to the first R&D assurance level and the dependency tree.
本步骤中,在确定了顶层功能模块的研发保证等级后,根据事先确定好的依赖关系树,为顶层功能模块对应的各个子功能模块分配相应的研发保证等级。一般来说,在一个依赖关系树中,顶层功能模块的研发保证等级是最高的,其对应的子功能模块的研发保证等级应该等于或者适当低于顶层功能模块的第一研发保证等级。In this step, after the research and development assurance level of the top-level functional module is determined, a corresponding research and development assurance level is assigned to each sub-function module corresponding to the top-level functional module according to the pre-determined dependency tree. Generally speaking, in a dependency tree, the R&D assurance level of the top-level functional module is the highest, and the R&D assurance level of its corresponding sub-function module should be equal to or appropriately lower than the first R&D assurance level of the top-level functional module.
上述应用程序评估方法中,通过根据应用程序的危险等级确定该应用程序的每个顶层功能模块的第一研发保证等级,该危险等级包括该应用程序失效后引发的危险后果的严重性等级、该应用程序接触外部危险事件的频度等级和该外部危险事件发生的概率等级中的至少一个,在该应用程序中,每个该顶层功能模块与至少一个子功能模块相对应,每个该顶层功能模块依赖于该顶层功能模块对应的各该子功能模块;然后对于每个该顶层功能模块,建立该顶层功能模块对应的依赖关系树,该依赖关系树包括该顶层功能模块与该顶层功能模块对应的各该子功能模块之间的依赖关系;最后对于每个该顶层功能模块,根据该第一研发保证等级以及该依赖关系树,确定该顶层功能模块对应的各该子功能模块的第二研发保证等级。因为本申请提供的应用程序评估方法,在对应用程序的研发保证等级进行评估时,充分考虑到了影响应用程序危险等级的各种影响因素,并且根据应用程序中功能模块之间的依赖关系确定各个功能模块的研发保证等级,使得最终对于应用程序研发保证等级的评估更加精确。In the above application evaluation method, the first R&D assurance level of each top-level functional module of the application is determined according to the danger level of the application, where the danger level includes the severity level of the dangerous consequences caused by the failure of the application, the At least one of a frequency level of exposure of an application to an external dangerous event and a probability level of the occurrence of the external dangerous event, in the application, each top-level function module corresponds to at least one sub-function module, and each top-level function module corresponds to at least one sub-function module. The module depends on each of the sub-function modules corresponding to the top-level function module; then for each of the top-level function modules, a dependency tree corresponding to the top-level function module is established, and the dependency tree includes the top-level function module corresponding to the top-level function module. The dependencies between the sub-functional modules; finally, for each of the top-level functional modules, according to the first R&D assurance level and the dependency tree, determine the second R&D of each of the sub-functional modules corresponding to the top-level functional module Guaranteed level. Because of the application evaluation method provided in this application, when evaluating the R&D assurance level of an application, various influencing factors that affect the risk level of the application are fully considered, and each application is determined according to the dependencies between the functional modules in the application. The R&D assurance level of functional modules makes the final evaluation of the application development assurance level more accurate.
在本申请实施例中,请参考图3,提供了一种应用程序评估方法中确定该应用程序的每个顶层功能模块的第一研发保证等级的方法,该方法包括:In the embodiment of the present application, referring to FIG. 3, a method for determining the first R&D assurance level of each top-level functional module of the application program in an application program evaluation method is provided, and the method includes:
步骤301,终端获取危险等级矩阵表。
本步骤中,可以根据上述步骤201中提供的三个表格建立危险等级矩阵表(如表4所示)。表4中将危险等级分为五个级别,分别以小写的a、b、c、d、e分别表示。字母越小,则危险风险等级越高;决定危险等级的核心因素是“应用程序失效后引发的危险后果的严重性等级C”;此外,“应用程序接触外部危险事件的频度等级F”以及“外部危险事件发生的概率等级W”对危险等级起到调整的作用。In this step, a risk level matrix table (as shown in Table 4) may be established according to the three tables provided in the foregoing
表4Table 4
步骤302,终端通过查询该危险等级矩阵表确定该应用程序的危险等级。
步骤303,终端根据该应用程序的危险等级确定该应用程序的每个顶层功能模块的该第一研发保证等级。
本步骤中,可以参考表5中给出的危险等级和研发保证等级的对应关系为每个顶层功能匹配到相应的第一研发保证等级。In this step, each top-level function can be matched to the corresponding first R&D assurance level with reference to the corresponding relationship between the hazard level and the R&D assurance level given in Table 5.
表5table 5
在本申请实施例中,提供了五种顶层功能模块和子功能模块之间的依赖关系。具体包括:串联依赖关系、并联依赖关系、串并联依赖关系、并串联依赖关系和表决关系。下面将对这五种依赖关系进行详细说明。In this embodiment of the present application, five kinds of dependencies between top-level functional modules and sub-functional modules are provided. Specifically, it includes: series dependency, parallel dependency, series-parallel dependency, parallel-series dependency, and voting relationship. These five dependencies are described in detail below.
一、串联依赖关系(图4提供了串联依赖关系的依赖树图,图4中仅示例性地给出了三个子功能模块)1. Serial dependencies (Figure 4 provides a dependency tree diagram of serial dependencies, and only three sub-function modules are exemplarily given in Figure 4)
串联依赖关系用于表征保证该顶层功能模块正常工作的前提为该顶层功能模块对应的所有子功能模块正常工作。简单来说就是,顶层功能模块下的任一子功能模块发生失效,都将导致顶层功能模块发生失效,串联依赖关系对应的依赖树就是“或”门。当应用程序的顶层功能模块和子功能模块之间满足串联依赖关系时,确定该顶层功能模块对应的各该子功能模块的第二研发保证等级的做法具体如下:The serial dependency is used to represent that the premise of ensuring the normal operation of the top-level functional module is that all sub-function modules corresponding to the top-level functional module work normally. Simply put, the failure of any sub-functional module under the top-level functional module will cause the top-level functional module to fail, and the dependency tree corresponding to the concatenated dependency is the "OR" gate. When the tandem dependency relationship is satisfied between the top-level functional module and the sub-functional module of the application, the specific method for determining the second R&D assurance level of each sub-functional module corresponding to the top-level functional module is as follows:
终端将该第一研发保证等级作为该顶层功能模块对应的各该子功能模块的第二研发保证等级。The terminal uses the first R&D guarantee level as the second R&D guarantee level of each sub-function module corresponding to the top-level functional module.
二、并联依赖关系(图5提供了并联依赖关系的依赖树图,图5中仅示例性地给出了三个子功能模块)2. Parallel dependency relationship (Figure 5 provides a dependency tree diagram of parallel dependency relationship, and only three sub-function modules are exemplarily given in Figure 5)
并联依赖关系用于表征保证该顶层功能模块正常工作的前提为保证该顶层功能模块对应的任一该子功能模块正常,简单来说就是,顶层功能模块下所有子功能模块均发生失效,才导致顶层功能模块失效,并联依赖关系对应的依赖树是“与”门。当应用程序的顶层功能模块和子功能模块之间满足并联依赖关系时,确定该顶层功能模块对应的各该子功能模块的第二研发保证等级的做法具体如下:The parallel dependency is used to characterize the premise of ensuring the normal operation of the top-level functional module is to ensure that any sub-functional module corresponding to the top-level functional module is normal. The top-level functional module fails, and the dependency tree corresponding to the parallel dependency is an "AND" gate. When a parallel dependency relationship is satisfied between the top-level functional module and the sub-functional module of the application, the specific method for determining the second R&D assurance level of each sub-functional module corresponding to the top-level functional module is as follows:
终端将该第一研发保证等级作为该顶层功能模块对应的各该子功能模块中至少一个子功能模块的第二研发保证等级;或者,The terminal uses the first R&D guarantee level as the second R&D guarantee level of at least one sub-function module in each of the sub-function modules corresponding to the top-level functional module; or,
终端将第三研发保证等级作为该顶层功能模块对应的各该子功能模块中至少两个子功能模块的第二研发保证等级,该第三研发保证等级低于该第一研发保证等级。The terminal uses a third R&D guarantee level as the second R&D guarantee level of at least two sub-function modules in each of the sub-function modules corresponding to the top-level functional module, and the third R&D guarantee level is lower than the first R&D guarantee level.
三、串并联依赖关系和并串联依赖关系(图6提供了串并联依赖关系的依赖树图,图6中仅示例性地给出了五个子功能模块;图7提供了并串联依赖关系的依赖树图,图7中仅示例性的给出了四个子功能模块)3. The series-parallel dependency and the parallel-series dependency (Figure 6 provides a dependency tree diagram of the series-parallel dependency, only five sub-function modules are exemplarily given in Figure 6; Figure 7 provides the parallel-series dependency dependency Tree diagram, only four sub-function modules are exemplarily given in Figure 7)
该串并联依赖关系和该并串联依赖关系用于表征保证该顶层功能模块正常工作的前提为保证该顶层功能模块对应的各该子功能模块中处于串联关系的子功能模块全部正常工作,并且处于并联关系的任一该子功能模块正常工作。简单来说,串并联关系表征的是,顶层功能模块下子功能整体表现为串联关系,但在某个串联节点上,由多个子功能模块组成并联关系。显然,参与并联的子功能模块失效对顶层功能模块失效的贡献度要小于参与串联的子功能模块,串并联依赖关系对应的依赖树是“或与”门;并串联依赖关系表征的是,顶层功能模块下,子功能模块整体表现为并联关系,但在某个串联节点上,由多个子功能模块组成串联关系。显然,参与并联的子功能模块失效对顶层功能模块失效的贡献度与参与串联的子功能模块是相同的,并串联关系对应的依赖树是“与或”门。当应用程序的顶层功能模块和子功能模块之间满足串并联依赖关系或并串联依赖关系时,确定该顶层功能模块对应的各该子功能模块的第二研发保证等级的做法具体如下:The series-parallel dependency and the parallel-series dependency are used to represent the premise of ensuring the normal operation of the top-level functional module is to ensure that all sub-function modules in the series relationship among the sub-function modules corresponding to the top-level functional module work normally and are in Any of the sub-function modules in the parallel relationship work normally. To put it simply, the series-parallel relationship represents that the sub-functions under the top-level functional module appear in a series relationship as a whole, but at a certain series node, multiple sub-function modules form a parallel relationship. Obviously, the failure of the sub-functional modules participating in parallel contributes less to the failure of the top-level functional module than the sub-functional modules participating in series, and the dependency tree corresponding to the series-parallel dependency is an "OR" gate; Under the function module, the sub-function modules appear in a parallel relationship as a whole, but at a certain series node, a series relationship is formed by multiple sub-function modules. Obviously, the contribution of the failure of the sub-function modules participating in parallel to the failure of the top-level functional module is the same as that of the sub-function modules participating in the series, and the dependency tree corresponding to the series relationship is an "AND-OR" gate. When a series-parallel dependency or a parallel-series dependency is satisfied between the top-level functional module and the sub-functional module of the application, the specific method for determining the second R&D assurance level of each sub-functional module corresponding to the top-level functional module is as follows:
终端将该顶层功能模块的该第一研发保证等级作为该顶层功能模块对应的各该子功能模块中处于并联关系的子功能模块中至少一个子功能模块的第二研发保证等级,或者,将第三研发保证等级作为该顶层功能模块对应的各该子功能模块中处于并联关系的子功能模块中至少两个子功能模块的第二研发保证等级,该第三研发保证等级低于该第一研发保证等级;The terminal takes the first R&D guarantee level of the top-level functional module as the second R&D guarantee level of at least one sub-function module in the sub-function modules that are in a parallel relationship among the sub-function modules corresponding to the top-level functional module, or takes the first R&D guarantee level. The third R&D guarantee level is the second R&D guarantee level of at least two sub-function modules in the sub-function modules in the parallel relationship among the sub-function modules corresponding to the top-level functional module, and the third R&D guarantee level is lower than the first R&D guarantee level grade;
终端将该第一研发保证等级作为该顶层功能模块对应的各该子功能模块中处于串联关系的子功能模块的第二研发保证等级,或者,将第四研发保证等级作为该顶层功能模块对应的子功能模块中处于并联关系下的串联关系中至少一个子功能模块的第二研发保证等级,该第四研发保证等级为该顶层功能模块对应的子功能模块中处于并联关系的子功能模块中最高的研发保证等级。The terminal takes the first R&D guarantee level as the second R&D guarantee level of the sub-function modules in the series relationship among the sub-function modules corresponding to the top-level functional module, or uses the fourth R&D guarantee level as the corresponding top-level functional module. The second R&D guarantee level of at least one sub-function module in the series relationship in the parallel relationship among the sub-function modules, and the fourth R&D guarantee level is the highest among the sub-function modules in the parallel relationship among the sub-function modules corresponding to the top-level functional module. R&D guarantee level.
四、表决关系(图8提供了表决关系的依赖树图,图8中仅示例性地给出了三个子功能模块)4. Voting relationship (Figure 8 provides a dependency tree diagram of the voting relationship, and only three sub-function modules are exemplarily given in Figure 8)
表决关系用于表征保证该顶层功能模块正常的前提为保证该顶层功能模块对应的各该子功能模块中预设数量的子功能模块正常,简单来说就是,表决关系表征的是,由n个子功能模块及1个表决器单元(某个子功能模块)组成的表决系统。当表决器单元正常时,正常运行的子功能模块的数量不少于r(1≤r≤n),顶层功能模块的失效就不会发生,表决关系对应的依赖树是“表决”门。当应用程序的顶层功能模块和子功能模块之间满足表决关系时,确定该顶层功能模块对应的各该子功能模块的第二研发保证等级的做法具体如下:The voting relationship is used to represent that the premise of ensuring that the top-level functional module is normal is to ensure that a preset number of sub-functional modules in each sub-functional module corresponding to the top-level functional module are normal. A voting system consisting of a functional module and a voter unit (a certain sub-functional module). When the voter unit is normal, the number of sub-function modules in normal operation is not less than r (1≤r≤n), the failure of the top-level function module will not occur, and the dependency tree corresponding to the voting relationship is the "voting" gate. When the voting relationship is satisfied between the top-level functional module and the sub-functional module of the application, the method for determining the second R&D assurance level of each sub-functional module corresponding to the top-level functional module is as follows:
终端将该顶层功能模块的第一研发保证等级作为该顶层功能模块对应的各该子功能模块中处于表决器位置的子功能模块的第二研发保证等级;The terminal uses the first R&D assurance level of the top-level functional module as the second R&D assurance level of the sub-function module at the voter position among the sub-function modules corresponding to the top-level functional module;
终端将该顶层功能模块的第一研发保证等级作为该顶层功能模块对应的各该子功能模块中未处于表决器位置的至少一个子功能模块的第二研发保证等级,或者,终端将第三研发保证等级作为该顶层功能模块对应的子功能模块中未处于表决器位置的至少两个子功能模块的该第二研发保证等级,该第三研发等级低于该第一研发保证等级。The terminal takes the first R&D guarantee level of the top-level functional module as the second R&D guarantee level of at least one sub-function module that is not in the position of the voter among the sub-function modules corresponding to the top-level functional module, or the terminal uses the third R&D guarantee level. The guarantee level is used as the second R&D guarantee level of at least two sub-function modules that are not in the voter position in the sub-function modules corresponding to the top-level functional module, and the third R&D level is lower than the first R&D guarantee level.
在本申请实施例中,确定了应用程序中顶层功能模块和其对应的子功能模块之间的依赖关系树后,可以自上而下对相关的子功能模块进行逐级研发保证等级的分配。上述确定该顶层功能模块对应的各该子功能模块的第二研发保证等级的具体做法满足表6中的原则1或原则2。In the embodiment of the present application, after the dependency tree between the top-level functional module and its corresponding sub-functional modules in the application is determined, the relevant sub-functional modules can be assigned a level-by-level R&D assurance level from top to bottom. The above specific method of determining the second R&D assurance level of each sub-function module corresponding to the top-level functional module satisfies Principle 1 or Principle 2 in Table 6.
表6Table 6
在本申请实施例中,请参考图9,提供了一种应用程序评估方法中调整第二研发保证等级的方法,该方法还包括:In the embodiment of the present application, please refer to FIG. 9 , a method for adjusting the second R&D assurance level in the application evaluation method is provided, and the method further includes:
步骤401,终端确定该应用程序未能避开危险事件的概率等级。
本步骤采用灵敏度分析法来确定“未能避开危险事件的概率等级(本申请中用P表示)”,对应用程序失效概率对危险事件发生概率的影响灵敏度进行评估,即评估应用程序项失效概率变化对危险事件发生概率的控制或影响程度。其主要思路是:将危险事件发生概率g(Q)看作应用程序失效概率Qi的函数,在状态点O分别将危险事件发生概率对应用程序的失效发生概率求偏导数,得到状态点O应用程序失效概率的影响灵敏度值。数值的绝对值越大,证明应用程序失效发生概率Qi对危险事件发生概率g(Q)影响越大,危险事件发生概率g(Q)对于应用程序失效发生概率Qi更敏感。In this step, the sensitivity analysis method is used to determine the "probability level of failing to avoid dangerous events (represented by P in this application)", and to evaluate the sensitivity of the application failure probability to the probability of occurrence of dangerous events, that is, to evaluate the failure of the application program item. The degree to which a change in probability controls or affects the probability of a hazardous event. The main idea is: regard the probability of occurrence of dangerous events g(Q) as a function of the probability of failure of the application program Q i , and take the partial derivatives of the probability of occurrence of dangerous events against the probability of failure of the application program at the state point O to obtain the state point O. The impact sensitivity value of the application failure probability. The larger the absolute value of the value is, it proves that the probability of occurrence of application failure Qi has a greater impact on the probability of occurrence of dangerous events g(Q), and the probability of occurrence of dangerous events g(Q ) is more sensitive to the probability of occurrence of application failures Q i .
可对影响灵敏度设置不同阈值,分别对应四个概率等级,即“很高”、“较高”、“一般”及“很低”,对应I、II、III、IV。然后计算应用程序失效对危险事件的影响灵敏度,由专家评估影响灵敏度评估值落在哪个阈值区间,进而获得对“应用程序未能避开危险事件的概率P”的评估值。Different thresholds can be set for the impact sensitivity, corresponding to four probability levels, namely "very high", "high", "normal" and "very low", corresponding to I, II, III, and IV. Then, the impact sensitivity of application failure to dangerous events is calculated, and experts evaluate which threshold range the impact sensitivity evaluation value falls in, and then obtain the evaluation value of "probability P of application failure to avoid dangerous events".
步骤402,终端根据该应用程序未能避开危险事件的概率等级调整该第二研发保证等级。
本步骤中,调整第二研发等级的基本原则是,当该应用程序未能避开危险事件的概率等级属于预设等级范围内时,将该第二研发保证等级的级别调高。In this step, the basic principle of adjusting the second R&D level is to increase the level of the second R&D guarantee level when the probability level of the application program failing to avoid dangerous events falls within the preset level range.
现针对串联依赖关系、并联依赖关系、串并联依赖关系、并串联依赖关系和表决关系下,如何根据“应用程序未能避开危险事件的概率P”对第二研发等级进行调整做具体说明:Now for the series dependency, parallel dependency, series-parallel dependency, parallel-series dependency and voting relationship, how to adjust the second R&D level according to the "probability P that the application fails to avoid dangerous events" will be explained in detail:
一、串联依赖关系1. Serial dependencies
各个子功能模块的第二研发等级与顶层功能模块的第一研发保证等级相同,不受“应用程序未能避开危险事件的概率P”的影响。The second R&D level of each sub-function module is the same as the first R&D guarantee level of the top-level functional module, and is not affected by "the probability P that the application fails to avoid dangerous events".
二、并联依赖关系2. Parallel dependencies
1)若“应用程序未能避开危险事件的概率P”评估值为“很高”,则子功能模块的第二研发保证等级应为那个与顶层功能模块的第一研发保证等级保持一致,或者子功能模块的第二研发保证等级为顶层功能模块的第一研发保证等级的下一等级;1) If the evaluation value of "probability P that the application fails to avoid dangerous events" is "high", the second R&D assurance level of the sub-function module should be the one that is consistent with the first R&D assurance level of the top-level functional module, Or the second R&D guarantee level of the sub-function module is the next level of the first R&D guarantee level of the top-level functional module;
2)若“应用程序未能避开危险事件的概率P”评估值为“较高”,则子功能模块的第二研发保证等级为顶层功能模块的第一研发保证等级的下一等级;2) If the evaluation value of "probability P that the application fails to avoid dangerous events" is "high", the second R&D assurance level of the sub-function module is the next level of the first R&D assurance level of the top-level functional module;
3)若“应用程序未能避开危险事件的概率P”评估值为“一般”或“很低”,则各子功能模块的第二研发保证等级可依据其最严重的危险等级进行适当分级,但必须满足表6中规定的分配原则。3) If the evaluation value of "Probability P of the application program failing to avoid dangerous events" is "general" or "very low", the second R&D assurance level of each sub-function module can be appropriately graded according to its most serious risk level , but must meet the allocation principles specified in Table 6.
三、串并联依赖关系Third, the series-parallel dependency
1)若子功能模块为处于串联关系的项,则其对应的第二研发保证等级,与顶层功能模块的第一研发保证等级保持一致;1) If the sub-function module is an item in a series relationship, its corresponding second R&D guarantee level is consistent with the first R&D guarantee level of the top-level functional module;
2)对于子功能模块处于并联关系的项。若“应用程序未能避开危险事件的概率P”评估值为“很高”,则子功能模块的第二研发保证等级应与顶层功能模块的第一研发保证等级保持一致,或者为顶层功能模块的第一研发保证等级的下一等级;若“应用程序未能避开危险事件的概率P”评估值为“较高”,则子功能模块的第二研发保证等级应为顶层功能模块的第一研发保证等级的下一等级;2) For the item whose sub-function module is in a parallel relationship. If the evaluation value of "probability P that the application fails to avoid dangerous events" is "high", the second R&D assurance level of the sub-function module should be consistent with the first R&D assurance level of the top-level function module, or the top-level function The next level of the first R&D assurance level of the module; if the evaluation value of "the probability P of the application program failing to avoid dangerous events" is "higher", the second R&D assurance level of the sub-function module should be the top-level function module's second level. The next level of the first R&D assurance level;
3)若“应用程序未能避开危险事件的概率P”评估值为“一般”或“很低”,则子功能模块可依据其最严重的危险等级进行适当分级,但必须满足表6中规定的分配原则。3) If the evaluation value of "probability P that the application fails to avoid dangerous events" is "general" or "very low", the sub-function module can be appropriately graded according to its most serious risk level, but it must meet the requirements in Table 6. prescribed distribution principles.
四、串并联依赖关系Fourth, the series-parallel dependency
1)对于子功能模块为处于并联关系的项。若“应用程序未能避开危险事件的概率P”评估值为“很高”,则子功能模块的第二研发保证等级应与顶层功能模块的第一研发保证等级保持一致,或者为顶层功能模块的第一研发保证等级的下一等级;若“应用程序未能避开危险事件的概率P”评估值为“较高”,则子功能模块的第二研发保证等级应为顶层功能模块的第一研发保证等级的下一等级;若“应用程序未能避开危险事件的概率P”评估值为“一般”或“很低”,则子功能模块的第二研发保证等级可依据其最严重的危险等级进行适当分级,但必须满足表6中规定的分配原则;1) For sub-function modules, it is an item in a parallel relationship. If the evaluation value of "probability P that the application fails to avoid dangerous events" is "high", the second R&D assurance level of the sub-function module should be consistent with the first R&D assurance level of the top-level function module, or the top-level function The next level of the first R&D assurance level of the module; if the evaluation value of "the probability P of the application program failing to avoid dangerous events" is "higher", the second R&D assurance level of the sub-function module should be the top-level function module's second level. The next level of the first R&D assurance level; if the evaluation value of "Probability P of the application program failing to avoid dangerous events" is "normal" or "very low", the second R&D assurance level of the sub-function module can be based on its maximum value. Severe hazard levels are appropriately graded, subject to the assignment principles specified in Table 6;
2)对于子功能模块为处于串联关系的项。若“应用程序未能避开危险事件的概率P”评估值为“很高”,则子功能模块的第二研发保证等级与处于并联关系的子功能模块的最高研发保证等级保持一致;2) For sub-function modules, it is an item in a series relationship. If the evaluation value of "probability P of the application program failing to avoid dangerous events" is "high", the second R&D assurance level of the sub-function module shall be consistent with the highest R&D assurance level of the sub-function modules in the parallel relationship;
3)若“应用程序未能避开危险事件的概率P”评估值为“较高”、“一般”或“很低”,则子功能模块可依据其最严重的危险等级进行适当分级,但必须满足表6中规定的分配原则。3) If the evaluation value of "probability P that the application fails to avoid dangerous events" is "high", "general" or "very low", the sub-function module can be appropriately graded according to its most serious risk level, but The allocation principles specified in Table 6 must be met.
五、表决关系V. Voting relationship
1)若子功能模块处于表决器位置,则其对应的第二研发保证等级与顶层功能模块的第一研发保证等级保持一致;1) If the sub-function module is in the position of the voter, its corresponding second R&D guarantee level is consistent with the first R&D guarantee level of the top-level functional module;
2)对于子功能模块处于其余位置。若“应用程序未能避开危险事件的概率P”评估值为“很高”,则子功能模块的第二研发保证等级应与顶层功能模块的第一研发保证等级保持一致,或者为顶层功能模块的第一研发保证等级的下一等级;若“应用程序未能避开危险事件的概率P”评估值为“较高”,则子功能模块的第二研发保证等级应为顶层功能模块的第一研发保证等级的下一等级;若“应用程序未能避开危险事件的概率P”评估值为“一般”或“很低”,则子功能模块的第二研发保证等级可依据其最严重的危险等级进行适当分级,但必须满足表6中规定的分配原则。2) For the sub-function module, it is in the remaining position. If the evaluation value of "probability P that the application fails to avoid dangerous events" is "high", the second R&D assurance level of the sub-function module should be consistent with the first R&D assurance level of the top-level function module, or the top-level function The next level of the first R&D assurance level of the module; if the evaluation value of "the probability P of the application program failing to avoid dangerous events" is "higher", the second R&D assurance level of the sub-function module should be the top-level function module's second level. The next level of the first R&D assurance level; if the evaluation value of "Probability P of the application program failing to avoid dangerous events" is "normal" or "very low", the second R&D assurance level of the sub-function module can be based on its maximum value. Severe hazard classes are appropriately graded, but must meet the assignment principles specified in Table 6.
应该理解的是,虽然图2至图9的流程图中的各个步骤按照箭头的指示依次显示,但是这些步骤并不是必然按照箭头指示的顺序依次执行。除非本文中有明确的说明,这些步骤的执行并没有严格的顺序限制,这些步骤可以以其它的顺序执行。而且,图2至图9中的至少一部分步骤可以包括多个子步骤或者多个阶段,这些子步骤或者阶段并不必然是在同一时刻执行完成,而是可以在不同的时刻执行,这些子步骤或者阶段的执行顺序也不必然是依次进行,而是可以与其它步骤或者其它步骤的子步骤或者阶段的至少一部分轮流或者交替地执行。It should be understood that although the steps in the flowcharts of FIG. 2 to FIG. 9 are shown in sequence according to the arrows, these steps are not necessarily executed in the sequence shown by the arrows. Unless explicitly stated herein, the execution of these steps is not strictly limited to the order, and these steps may be performed in other orders. Moreover, at least a part of the steps in FIG. 2 to FIG. 9 may include multiple sub-steps or multiple stages. These sub-steps or stages are not necessarily executed and completed at the same time, but may be executed at different times. These sub-steps or The order of execution of the stages is also not necessarily sequential, but may be performed alternately or alternately with other steps or sub-steps of other steps or at least a portion of a stage.
在本申请实施例中,如图10所示,提供了一种应用程序评估装置500,包括:第一确定模块501、建立模块502和第二确定模块503,其中:In this embodiment of the present application, as shown in FIG. 10 , an
第一确定模块501,用于根据应用程序的危险等级确定该应用程序的每个顶层功能模块的第一研发保证等级,该危险等级包括该应用程序失效后引发的危险后果的严重性等级、该应用程序接触外部危险事件的频度等级和该外部危险事件发生的概率等级中的至少一个,在该应用程序中,每个该顶层功能模块与至少一个子功能模块相对应,每个该顶层功能模块依赖于该顶层功能模块对应的各该子功能模块;The
建立模块502,用于对于每个该顶层功能模块,建立该顶层功能模块对应的依赖关系树,该依赖关系树包括该顶层功能模块与该顶层功能模块对应的各该子功能模块之间的依赖关系;The
第二确定模块503,用于对于每个该顶层功能模块,根据该第一研发保证等级以及该依赖关系树,确定该顶层功能模块对应的各该子功能模块的第二研发保证等级。The second determining
在本申请实施例中,该第一确定模块501具体用于,获取危险等级矩阵表;通过查询该危险等级矩阵表确定该应用程序的危险等级;根据该应用程序的危险等级确定该应用程序的每个顶层功能模块的该第一研发保证等级。In this embodiment of the present application, the first determining
在本申请实施例中,该依赖关系包括串联依赖关系,该串联依赖关系用于表征保证该顶层功能模块正常工作的前提为该顶层功能模块对应的所有子功能模块正常工作,该第二确定模块503具体用于,将该第一研发保证等级作为该顶层功能模块对应的各该子功能模块的第二研发保证等级。In the embodiment of the present application, the dependency relationship includes a series dependency relationship, and the series dependency relationship is used to represent that the premise of ensuring the normal operation of the top-level functional module is that all sub-function modules corresponding to the top-level functional module work normally, and the
在本申请实施例中,该依赖关系包括并联依赖关系,该并联依赖关系用于表征保证该顶层功能模块正常工作的前提为保证该顶层功能模块对应的任一该子功能模块正常,该第二确定模块503具体用于,将该第一研发保证等级作为该顶层功能模块对应的各该子功能模块中至少一个子功能模块的第二研发保证等级;或者,将第三研发保证等级作为该顶层功能模块对应的各该子功能模块中至少两个子功能模块的第二研发保证等级,该第三研发保证等级低于该第一研发保证等级。In the embodiment of the present application, the dependency relationship includes a parallel dependency relationship, and the parallel dependency relationship is used to represent that the premise of ensuring the normal operation of the top-level functional module is to ensure that any sub-function module corresponding to the top-level functional module is normal, and the second The determining
在本申请实施例中,该依赖关系包括串并联依赖关系和并串联依赖关系,该串并联依赖关系和该并串联依赖关系用于表征保证该顶层功能模块正常工作的前提为保证该顶层功能模块对应的各该子功能模块中处于串联关系的子功能模块全部正常工作,并且处于并联关系的任一该子功能模块正常工作,该第二确定模块503具体用于,将该顶层功能模块的该第一研发保证等级作为该顶层功能模块对应的各该子功能模块中处于并联关系的子功能模块中至少一个子功能模块的第二研发保证等级,或者,将第三研发保证等级作为该顶层功能模块对应的各该子功能模块中处于并联关系的子功能模块中至少两个子功能模块的第二研发保证等级,该第三研发保证等级低于该第一研发保证等级;将该第一研发保证等级作为该顶层功能模块对应的各该子功能模块中处于串联关系的子功能模块的第二研发保证等级,或者,将第四研发保证等级作为该顶层功能模块对应的子功能模块中处于并联关系下的串联关系中至少一个子功能模块的第二研发保证等级,该第四研发保证等级为该顶层功能模块对应的子功能模块中处于并联关系的子功能模块中最高的研发保证等级。In this embodiment of the present application, the dependency includes a series-parallel dependency and a parallel-series dependency, and the series-parallel dependency and the parallel-series dependency are used to characterize the premise of ensuring the normal operation of the top-level functional module is to ensure the top-level functional module All the sub-function modules in the series relationship in the corresponding sub-function modules work normally, and any of the sub-function modules in the parallel relationship work normally, the second determination module 503 is specifically used for this top-level functional module The first R&D guarantee level is taken as the second R&D guarantee level of at least one sub-function module in the sub-function modules in a parallel relationship among the sub-function modules corresponding to the top-level functional module, or the third R&D guarantee level is taken as the top-level function The second R&D guarantee level of at least two sub-function modules in the sub-function modules in parallel relationship among the sub-function modules corresponding to the module, the third R&D guarantee level is lower than the first R&D guarantee level; the first R&D guarantee level The level is taken as the second R&D guarantee level of the sub-function modules in the series relationship among the sub-function modules corresponding to the top-level functional module, or the fourth R&D guarantee level is taken as the sub-function modules corresponding to the top-level functional module in the parallel relationship. The second R&D guarantee level of at least one sub-function module in the series relationship below is the highest R&D guarantee level among the sub-function modules in the parallel relationship among the sub-function modules corresponding to the top-level functional module.
在本申请实施例中,该依赖关系包括表决关系,该表决关系用于表征保证该顶层功能模块正常的前提为保证该顶层功能模块对应的各该子功能模块中预设数量的子功能模块正常,该第二确定模块503具体用于,将该顶层功能模块的第一研发保证等级作为该顶层功能模块对应的各该子功能模块中处于表决器位置的子功能模块的第二研发保证等级;将该顶层功能模块的第一研发保证等级作为该顶层功能模块对应的各该子功能模块中未处于表决器位置的至少一个子功能模块的第二研发保证等级,或者,将第三研发保证等级作为该顶层功能模块对应的子功能模块中未处于表决器位置的至少两个子功能模块的该第二研发保证等级,该第三研发等级低于该第一研发保证等级。In the embodiment of the present application, the dependency relationship includes a voting relationship, and the voting relationship is used to indicate that the premise of ensuring that the top-level functional module is normal is to ensure that a preset number of sub-functional modules in the sub-functional modules corresponding to the top-level functional module are normal. , the second determining
在本申请实施例中,请参考图11,提供了另一种应用程序评估装置600,该应用程序评估装置600除了包括该应用程序评估装置500包括的各模块外,可选的,该应用程序评估装置600还包括调整模块504。In this embodiment of the present application, referring to FIG. 11 , another
该调整模块504用于,确定该应用程序未能避开危险事件的概率等级;根据该应用程序未能避开危险事件的概率等级调整该第二研发保证等级。The
在本申请实施例中,该调整模块504具体用于,当该应用程序未能避开危险事件的概率等级属于预设等级范围内时,将该第二研发保证等级的级别调高。In the embodiment of the present application, the
关于应用程序评估装置的具体限定可以参见上文中对于应用程序评估方法的限定,在此不再赘述。上述应用程序评估装置中的各个模块可全部或部分通过软件、硬件及其组合来实现。上述各模块可以硬件形式内嵌于或独立于计算机设备中的处理器中,也可以以软件形式存储于计算机设备中的存储器中,以便于处理器调用执行以上各个模块对应的操作。For specific limitations on the application evaluation apparatus, reference may be made to the above limitations on the application evaluation method, which will not be repeated here. Each module in the above-mentioned application evaluation device may be implemented in whole or in part by software, hardware, or a combination thereof. The above modules can be embedded in or independent of the processor in the computer device in the form of hardware, or stored in the memory in the computer device in the form of software, so that the processor can call and execute the operations corresponding to the above modules.
在本申请实施例中,提供了一种计算机设备,该计算机设备可以是终端,其内部结构图可以如图12所示。该计算机设备包括通过系统总线连接的处理器、存储器、网络接口、显示屏和输入装置。其中,该计算机设备的处理器用于提供计算和控制能力。该计算机设备的存储器包括非易失性存储介质、内存储器。该非易失性存储介质存储有操作系统和计算机程序。该内存储器为非易失性存储介质中的操作系统和计算机程序的运行提供环境。该计算机设备的网络接口用于与外部的终端通过网络连接通信。该计算机程序被处理器执行时以实现一种应用程序评估方法。该计算机设备的显示屏可以是液晶显示屏或者电子墨水显示屏,该计算机设备的输入装置可以是显示屏上覆盖的触摸层,也可以是计算机设备外壳上设置的按键、轨迹球或触控板,还可以是外接的键盘、触控板或鼠标等。In an embodiment of the present application, a computer device is provided, the computer device may be a terminal, and an internal structure diagram thereof may be as shown in FIG. 12 . The computer equipment includes a processor, memory, a network interface, a display screen, and an input device connected by a system bus. Among them, the processor of the computer device is used to provide computing and control capabilities. The memory of the computer device includes a non-volatile storage medium, an internal memory. The nonvolatile storage medium stores an operating system and a computer program. The internal memory provides an environment for the execution of the operating system and computer programs in the non-volatile storage medium. The network interface of the computer device is used to communicate with an external terminal through a network connection. The computer program when executed by a processor implements an application evaluation method. The display screen of the computer equipment may be a liquid crystal display screen or an electronic ink display screen, and the input device of the computer equipment may be a touch layer covered on the display screen, or a button, a trackball or a touchpad set on the shell of the computer equipment , or an external keyboard, trackpad, or mouse.
本领域技术人员可以理解,图12中示出的结构,仅仅是与本申请方案相关的部分结构的框图,并不构成对本申请方案所应用于其上的计算机设备的限定,具体的计算机设备可以包括比图中所示更多或更少的部件,或者组合某些部件,或者具有不同的部件布置。Those skilled in the art can understand that the structure shown in FIG. 12 is only a block diagram of a partial structure related to the solution of the present application, and does not constitute a limitation on the computer equipment to which the solution of the present application is applied. Include more or fewer components than shown in the figures, or combine certain components, or have a different arrangement of components.
在本申请实施例中,提供了一种计算机设备,包括存储器和处理器,存储器中存储有计算机程序,该处理器执行计算机程序时实现以下步骤:In the embodiment of the present application, a computer device is provided, including a memory and a processor, a computer program is stored in the memory, and the processor implements the following steps when executing the computer program:
根据应用程序的危险等级确定该应用程序的每个顶层功能模块的第一研发保证等级,该危险等级包括该应用程序失效后引发的危险后果的严重性等级、该应用程序接触外部危险事件的频度等级和该外部危险事件发生的概率等级中的至少一个,在该应用程序中,每个该顶层功能模块与至少一个子功能模块相对应,每个该顶层功能模块依赖于该顶层功能模块对应的各该子功能模块;The first R&D assurance level of each top-level functional module of the application is determined according to the danger level of the application, where the danger level includes the severity level of the dangerous consequences caused by the failure of the application, the frequency of the application being exposed to external dangerous events At least one of the degree level and the probability level of the occurrence of the external dangerous event, in the application program, each of the top-level function modules corresponds to at least one sub-function module, and each of the top-level function modules depends on the top-level function module. each of the sub-function modules;
对于每个该顶层功能模块,建立该顶层功能模块对应的依赖关系树,该依赖关系树包括该顶层功能模块与该顶层功能模块对应的各该子功能模块之间的依赖关系;For each of the top-level functional modules, a dependency tree corresponding to the top-level functional module is established, and the dependency tree includes the dependencies between the top-level functional module and each of the sub-functional modules corresponding to the top-level functional module;
对于每个该顶层功能模块,根据该第一研发保证等级以及该依赖关系树,确定该顶层功能模块对应的各该子功能模块的第二研发保证等级。For each top-level functional module, according to the first R&D assurance level and the dependency tree, a second R&D assurance level of each sub-function module corresponding to the top-level functional module is determined.
在本申请实施例中,提供了一种计算机可读存储介质,其上存储有计算机程序,计算机程序被处理器执行时实现以下步骤:In the embodiment of the present application, a computer-readable storage medium is provided, on which a computer program is stored, and when the computer program is executed by a processor, the following steps are implemented:
根据应用程序的危险等级确定该应用程序的每个顶层功能模块的第一研发保证等级,该危险等级包括该应用程序失效后引发的危险后果的严重性等级、该应用程序接触外部危险事件的频度等级和该外部危险事件发生的概率等级中的至少一个,在该应用程序中,每个该顶层功能模块与至少一个子功能模块相对应,每个该顶层功能模块依赖于该顶层功能模块对应的各该子功能模块;The first R&D assurance level of each top-level functional module of the application is determined according to the danger level of the application, where the danger level includes the severity level of the dangerous consequences caused by the failure of the application, the frequency of the application being exposed to external dangerous events At least one of the degree level and the probability level of the occurrence of the external dangerous event, in the application program, each of the top-level function modules corresponds to at least one sub-function module, and each of the top-level function modules depends on the top-level function module. each of the sub-function modules;
对于每个该顶层功能模块,建立该顶层功能模块对应的依赖关系树,该依赖关系树包括该顶层功能模块与该顶层功能模块对应的各该子功能模块之间的依赖关系;For each of the top-level functional modules, a dependency tree corresponding to the top-level functional module is established, and the dependency tree includes the dependencies between the top-level functional module and each of the sub-functional modules corresponding to the top-level functional module;
对于每个该顶层功能模块,根据该第一研发保证等级以及该依赖关系树,确定该顶层功能模块对应的各该子功能模块的第二研发保证等级。For each top-level functional module, according to the first R&D assurance level and the dependency tree, a second R&D assurance level of each sub-function module corresponding to the top-level functional module is determined.
本领域普通技术人员可以理解实现上述实施例方法中的全部或部分流程,是可以通过计算机程序来指令相关的硬件来完成,所述的计算机程序可存储于一非易失性计算机可读取存储介质中,该计算机程序在执行时,可包括如上述各方法的实施例的流程。其中,本申请所提供的各实施例中所使用的对存储器、存储、数据库或其它介质的任何引用,均可包括非易失性和/或易失性存储器。非易失性存储器可包括只读存储器(ROM)、可编程ROM(PROM)、电可编程ROM(EPROM)、电可擦除可编程ROM(EEPROM)或闪存。易失性存储器可包括随机存取存储器(RAM)或者外部高速缓冲存储器。作为说明而非局限,RAM以多种形式可得,诸如静态RAM(SRAM)、动态RAM(DRAM)、同步DRAM(SDRAM)、双数据率SDRAM(DDRSDRAM)、增强型SDRAM(ESDRAM)、同步链路(Synchlink)DRAM(SLDRAM)、存储器总线(Rambus)直接RAM(RDRAM)、直接存储器总线动态RAM(DRDRAM)、以及存储器总线动态RAM(RDRAM)等。Those of ordinary skill in the art can understand that all or part of the processes in the methods of the above embodiments can be implemented by instructing relevant hardware through a computer program, and the computer program can be stored in a non-volatile computer-readable storage In the medium, when the computer program is executed, it may include the processes of the above-mentioned method embodiments. Wherein, any reference to memory, storage, database or other medium used in the various embodiments provided in this application may include non-volatile and/or volatile memory. Nonvolatile memory may include read only memory (ROM), programmable ROM (PROM), electrically programmable ROM (EPROM), electrically erasable programmable ROM (EEPROM), or flash memory. Volatile memory may include random access memory (RAM) or external cache memory. By way of illustration and not limitation, RAM is available in various forms such as static RAM (SRAM), dynamic RAM (DRAM), synchronous DRAM (SDRAM), double data rate SDRAM (DDRSDRAM), enhanced SDRAM (ESDRAM), synchronous chain Road (Synchlink) DRAM (SLDRAM), memory bus (Rambus) direct RAM (RDRAM), direct memory bus dynamic RAM (DRDRAM), and memory bus dynamic RAM (RDRAM), etc.
以上实施例的各技术特征可以进行任意的组合,为使描述简洁,未对上述实施例中的各个技术特征所有可能的组合都进行描述,然而,只要这些技术特征的组合不存在矛盾,都应当认为是本说明书记载的范围。The technical features of the above embodiments can be combined arbitrarily. In order to make the description simple, all possible combinations of the technical features in the above embodiments are not described. However, as long as there is no contradiction in the combination of these technical features It is considered to be the range described in this specification.
以上所述实施例仅表达了本申请的几种实施方式,其描述较为具体和详细,但并不能因此而理解为对发明专利范围的限制。应当指出的是,对于本领域的普通技术人员来说,在不脱离本申请构思的前提下,还可以做出若干变形和改进,这些都属于本申请的保护范围。因此,本申请专利的保护范围应以所附权利要求为准。The above-mentioned embodiments only represent several embodiments of the present application, and the descriptions thereof are specific and detailed, but should not be construed as a limitation on the scope of the invention patent. It should be pointed out that for those skilled in the art, without departing from the concept of the present application, several modifications and improvements can be made, which all belong to the protection scope of the present application. Therefore, the scope of protection of the patent of the present application shall be subject to the appended claims.
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