CN111246462A - Method, system and equipment for safely transmitting data between terminal and electric energy meter - Google Patents

Method, system and equipment for safely transmitting data between terminal and electric energy meter Download PDF

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CN111246462A
CN111246462A CN202010075354.8A CN202010075354A CN111246462A CN 111246462 A CN111246462 A CN 111246462A CN 202010075354 A CN202010075354 A CN 202010075354A CN 111246462 A CN111246462 A CN 111246462A
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terminal
electric energy
energy meter
data
channel
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CN111246462B (en
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林国营
廖建平
唐捷
彭策
招景明
曾争
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Guangdong Electric Power Science Research Institute Energy Technology Co Ltd
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Guangdong Electric Power Science Research Institute Energy Technology Co Ltd
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    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04W—WIRELESS COMMUNICATION NETWORKS
    • H04W12/00—Security arrangements; Authentication; Protecting privacy or anonymity
    • H04W12/03—Protecting confidentiality, e.g. by encryption
    • H04W12/033—Protecting confidentiality, e.g. by encryption of the user plane, e.g. user's traffic
    • G—PHYSICS
    • G06—COMPUTING; CALCULATING OR COUNTING
    • G06Q—INFORMATION AND COMMUNICATION TECHNOLOGY [ICT] SPECIALLY ADAPTED FOR ADMINISTRATIVE, COMMERCIAL, FINANCIAL, MANAGERIAL OR SUPERVISORY PURPOSES; SYSTEMS OR METHODS SPECIALLY ADAPTED FOR ADMINISTRATIVE, COMMERCIAL, FINANCIAL, MANAGERIAL OR SUPERVISORY PURPOSES, NOT OTHERWISE PROVIDED FOR
    • G06Q50/00—Systems or methods specially adapted for specific business sectors, e.g. utilities or tourism
    • G06Q50/06—Electricity, gas or water supply
    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04W—WIRELESS COMMUNICATION NETWORKS
    • H04W12/00—Security arrangements; Authentication; Protecting privacy or anonymity
    • H04W12/02—Protecting privacy or anonymity, e.g. protecting personally identifiable information [PII]
    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04W—WIRELESS COMMUNICATION NETWORKS
    • H04W12/00—Security arrangements; Authentication; Protecting privacy or anonymity
    • H04W12/04—Key management, e.g. using generic bootstrapping architecture [GBA]
    • H04W12/041—Key generation or derivation
    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04W—WIRELESS COMMUNICATION NETWORKS
    • H04W12/00—Security arrangements; Authentication; Protecting privacy or anonymity
    • H04W12/12—Detection or prevention of fraud
    • H04W12/121—Wireless intrusion detection systems [WIDS]; Wireless intrusion prevention systems [WIPS]
    • H04W12/122—Counter-measures against attacks; Protection against rogue devices
    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04W—WIRELESS COMMUNICATION NETWORKS
    • H04W4/00—Services specially adapted for wireless communication networks; Facilities therefor
    • H04W4/30—Services specially adapted for particular environments, situations or purposes
    • H04W4/35—Services specially adapted for particular environments, situations or purposes for the management of goods or merchandise

Abstract

The invention discloses a method, a system and equipment for safely transmitting data between a terminal and an electric energy meter, wherein the method comprises the following steps: acquiring performance indexes in a communication channel between the electric energy meter and the terminal, and establishing a communication channel model; generating a key in a communication channel model, binding the key and data and encrypting to obtain encrypted data; and generating coding information containing beam forming and artificial noise, distributing transmitting power for the beam forming and the artificial noise in the coding information, and coding the encrypted data by the coding information according to the distributed transmitting power. The invention adopts beam forming and artificial noise to encode the encrypted data, the beam forming and the artificial noise depend on the randomness of a communication channel, when the distance of an eavesdropper is more than half wavelength of a legal receiver, the channel is completely independent, the eavesdropper is difficult to crack the beam forming of a transmitting end, and meanwhile, the artificial noise can further deteriorate the eavesdropping channel, so that the eavesdropper is difficult to acquire the encrypted data.

Description

Method, system and equipment for safely transmitting data between terminal and electric energy meter
Technical Field
The invention relates to the technical field of data transmission security, in particular to a method, a system and equipment for safely transmitting data between a terminal and an electric energy meter.
Background
At present, in an electric power system, an acquisition terminal is connected with a plurality of electric energy meters through an electric power transmission line, and in order to ensure the safety of data transmission, a traditional method is mainly to encrypt the transmitted data through a symmetric key or an asymmetric key. The symmetric encryption algorithm uses the same secret key for encryption and decryption, has high efficiency and is mainly used for encrypting data. The asymmetric encryption algorithm, also called a public key encryption algorithm, uses a pair of public key and private key to realize encryption and decryption, has high complexity, and is mainly used for key distribution. However, as the computing power of computers is continuously increased, some existing key generation schemes are at risk of being deciphered.
In summary, some key generation schemes in the prior art have the disadvantage of being decoded during data transmission.
Disclosure of Invention
The invention provides a method, a system and equipment for safely transmitting data between a terminal and an electric energy meter, which solve the technical problem that some key generation schemes are decoded in the data transmission process in the prior art.
The invention provides a method for safely transmitting data between a terminal and an electric energy meter, which comprises the following steps:
acquiring performance indexes in a communication channel between the electric energy meter and the terminal, and establishing a communication channel model according to the performance indexes;
generating a key in a communication channel model, binding the key and data and encrypting to obtain encrypted data;
generating coding information containing beam forming and artificial noise according to the channel characteristics of the communication channel model, distributing transmitting power for the beam forming and the artificial noise in the coding information, and coding the encrypted data according to the distributed transmitting power by the coding information.
Preferably, the expression formula of the communication channel model is as follows:
Figure BDA0002378356470000021
wherein k is1,k2P is a delay parameter, f is a signal transmission frequency, d is a cable length, and v is θr/c，θrIs the dielectric constant of the insulating material, c is the speed of light, g is the weighting factor, and e is the base of the natural logarithm.
Preferably, the process of generating the key in the communication channel model includes: channel measurement, channel quantization, channel negotiation, and privacy enhancement.
Preferably, the specific processes of the channel measurement, the channel quantization, the channel negotiation and the security enhancement are as follows:
and (3) channel measurement: the electric energy meter and the terminal mutually send training signals to carry out channel estimation, and a channel frequency domain response estimation sample value is obtained;
channel quantization: quantizing the channel frequency domain response estimation sample values into binary initial bit strings by using a threshold value;
channel negotiation: the terminal and the electric energy meter exchange parity check information again to enable the sequences of the initial bit strings to be consistent, and the consistent initial bit string sequences are used as key sequences;
and (3) secret enhancement: the key sequence is converted into a secure key.
Preferably, in the process of security enhancement, a one-way Hash function is used to convert the key sequence into a secure key.
Preferably, the transmission power is allocated to beamforming and artificial noise in the coding information, and the specific process of coding the encrypted data according to the allocated transmission power by the coding information is as follows:
determining the security capacity of the terminal and the communication capacity of an eavesdropper;
obtaining the data transmission safety rate between a single electric energy meter and the terminal according to the safety capacity of the terminal and the communication capacity of an eavesdropper;
the method comprises the following steps of establishing a data transmission optimization model by taking the sum of data transmission safety rates between all electric energy meters and a terminal as a target and under the condition that the transmitting power of the electric energy meters is kept unchanged:
solving a data transmission optimization model to obtain the power distributed to beam forming by the transmitting power of the electric energy meter and the power of artificial noise;
the encoding information encodes the encrypted data according to power allocated to beamforming and power allocated to artificial noise.
Preferably, the security capacity of the terminal and the communication capacity of the eavesdropper are determined according to shannon's theory.
Preferably, the method for solving the data transmission safety rate between the single electric energy meter and the terminal is as follows:
Figure BDA0002378356470000031
wherein R isiFor a safe rate of data transmission between a single power meter and a terminal,
Figure BDA0002378356470000032
in order to be a safe capacity of the terminal,
Figure BDA0002378356470000033
is the communication capacity of an eavesdropper.
A data security transmission system between a terminal and an electric energy meter comprises a communication channel model building module, an encrypted data generating module and an encrypted data coding module;
the communication channel model building module is used for obtaining performance indexes in a communication channel between the electric energy meter and the terminal and building a communication channel model according to the performance indexes;
the encrypted data generation module is used for generating a key in the communication channel model, binding the key and data and encrypting to obtain encrypted data;
the encrypted data coding module is used for generating coding information containing beam forming and artificial noise according to the channel characteristics of the communication channel model, distributing transmitting power for the beam forming and the artificial noise in the coding information, and coding the encrypted data according to the distributed transmitting power by the coding information.
A data security transmission device between a terminal and an electric energy meter comprises a processor and a memory;
the memory is used for storing program codes and transmitting the program codes to the processor;
the processor is used for executing the above method for safely transmitting data between the terminal and the electric energy meter according to the instructions in the program codes.
According to the technical scheme, the invention has the following advantages:
the embodiment of the invention encodes the encrypted data by adopting beam forming and artificial noise, the beam forming and the artificial noise depend on the randomness of a communication channel, when the distance of an eavesdropper is more than half wavelength of a legal receiver, the channel is completely independent, the eavesdropper is difficult to crack the beam forming of a transmitting end, and meanwhile, the artificial noise can further deteriorate the eavesdropping channel, so that the eavesdropper is difficult to obtain the encrypted data, the safety of the encrypted data in the transmission process is greatly improved, and the encrypted data is prevented from being cracked by the eavesdropper.
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In order to more clearly illustrate the embodiments of the present invention or the technical solutions in the prior art, the drawings used in the description of the embodiments or the prior art will be briefly described below, and it is obvious that the drawings in the following description are only some embodiments of the present invention, and for those skilled in the art, other drawings can be obtained according to these drawings without inventive exercise.
Fig. 1 is a method flowchart of a method, a system, and an apparatus for securely transmitting data between a terminal and an electric energy meter according to an embodiment of the present invention.
Fig. 2 is a system structure diagram of a method, a system, and a device for securely transmitting data between a terminal and an electric energy meter according to an embodiment of the present invention.
Fig. 3 is a device structure diagram of a method, a system, and a device for securely transmitting data between a terminal and an electric energy meter according to an embodiment of the present invention.
Fig. 4 is a diagram illustrating a method, a system and a device for data secure transmission between a terminal and an electric energy meter according to an embodiment of the present invention.
Detailed Description
The embodiment of the invention provides a method, a system and equipment for safely transmitting data between a terminal and an electric energy meter, which are used for solving the technical problem that some key generation schemes are decoded in the data transmission process in the prior art.
In order to make the objects, features and advantages of the present invention more obvious and understandable, the technical solutions in the embodiments of the present invention will be clearly and completely described below with reference to the accompanying drawings in the embodiments of the present invention, and it is obvious that the embodiments described below are only a part of the embodiments of the present invention, and not all of the embodiments. All other embodiments, which can be derived by a person skilled in the art from the embodiments given herein without making any creative effort, shall fall within the protection scope of the present invention.
Aiming at the technical problem that some key generation schemes are decoded, a concept of physical layer security is provided, and from the information theory perspective, a legal channel and an eavesdropping channel are differentiated by using the randomness of the channel, mainly noise and channel fading, so that the secure communication is realized. Currently common physical layer security techniques include: beamforming, artificial noise, cooperative interference, relay selection, etc. The multi-channel technology, i.e. multi-channel communication, can enhance the secret capacity and improve the communication security compared with the single-channel condition. The most common technique in the multi-channel technique is a beam forming technique, and signals are transmitted in the direction of a legal receiving end by adjusting the phase and amplitude of transmitted signals on each channel, so that the signal-to-noise ratio of the receiving end is maximized. In addition to strengthening signals in a specific direction by using multi-channel beam forming, differential interference is introduced to further improve communication security, that is, artificial noise is transmitted while information is transmitted, and noise signals are transmitted in a null space of a receiving node of a legal user through precoding or beam forming. Such that the ideal artifact produces interference at the eavesdropper node by nulling the received information at the legitimate receiving node. Therefore, the signal-to-noise ratio of the eavesdropping node can be reduced under the condition that the signal-to-noise ratio of the legal receiving node is not changed. In practice, the power of the transmitting end is limited, and how to distribute the power between the beam forming and the transmitting artificial noise becomes a research direction. In addition, in actual communication, due to inaccuracy of estimating and quantizing a channel and error of channel feedback, channel state information cannot be completely known, so that research on physical layer security under an imperfect channel becomes a current research hotspot. When artificial noise is used to interfere with an eavesdropper, imperfect channel state information will cause degradation to the legitimate receiver channel, reducing shannon capacity of legitimate users. When beamforming is used to align the legitimate receiver channel, imperfect channel state information can cause information leakage to eavesdroppers. Based on these problems, the embodiments of the present invention propose to jointly design beamforming and artificial noise to maximize the data security transmission rate under the imperfect channel.
Referring to fig. 1, fig. 1 is a flowchart illustrating a method, a system and a device for securely transmitting data between a terminal and an electric energy meter according to an embodiment of the present invention.
The invention provides a method for safely transmitting data between a terminal and an electric energy meter, which comprises the following steps:
acquiring performance indexes corresponding to each device in a communication channel between the electric energy meter and the terminal, and establishing a communication channel model according to the performance indexes;
generating a key in a communication channel model, binding the key and data and encrypting to obtain encrypted data;
generating coding information containing beam forming and artificial noise according to the channel characteristics of the communication channel model, distributing transmitting power for the beam forming and the artificial noise in the coding information, and coding the encrypted data according to the distributed transmitting power by the coding information.
As a preferred embodiment, the expression of the communication channel model is as follows:
Figure BDA0002378356470000051
wherein k is1,k2P is a delay parameter, f is a signal transmission frequency, d is a cable length, and v is θr/c，θrIs the dielectric constant of the insulating material, c is the speed of light, g is the weighting factor, and e is the base of the natural logarithm.
As a preferred embodiment, the process of generating a key in the communication channel model includes: channel measurement, channel quantization, channel negotiation, and privacy enhancement.
As a preferred embodiment, the specific procedures of the channel measurement, the channel quantization, the channel negotiation and the security enhancement are as follows:
and (3) channel measurement: the electric energy meter and the terminal mutually send training signals to carry out channel estimation, and channel frequency domain response estimation sample values are obtained, wherein the channel is estimated by adopting a least square estimation algorithm as follows:
assuming that a pilot signal transmitted by the electric energy meter is X, a signal received by the terminal is Y, a channel impulse response matrix is H, and channel noise is N, then the estimated sample value of the channel frequency domain response is obtained as follows:
Figure BDA0002378356470000061
channel quantization: quantizing the channel frequency domain response estimation sample values into binary initial bit strings by using a threshold value; the threshold is determined by the mean and variance of the channel as follows:
thresh+＝mean(x)+ω·σ(x)
thresh_＝mean(x)-ω·σ(x)
where σ (x) represents the variance of the channel measurements, mean (x) represents the mean of the channel measurements, and ω is a weight constant. The channel measurement value here refers to the channel frequency domain response estimation sample value obtained from the above. The channel measurement x is quantized according to the following rule, defined as
Figure BDA0002378356470000062
Channel negotiation: the terminal and the electric energy meter exchange parity check information again to enable the sequences of the initial bit strings to be consistent, and the consistent initial bit string sequences are used as key sequences; parity is checked based on whether the number of "1" s in a transmitted set of binary digits is odd or even. If odd check is used, when the receiving end receives the group of codes, whether the number of 1 is odd or not is checked, and therefore the correctness of the transmitted codes is determined. Because the first two steps contain noise, the initial bit string sequences obtained by channel quantization may not be completely consistent, the terminal and the electric energy meter need to exchange parity check information again to make the sequences consistent, and an error correcting code Turbo code and an LDPC code are used in the process to make the sequences consistent.
And (3) secret enhancement: the key sequence is converted into a secure key. Since the information negotiation step may disclose information for a small number of keys, it is necessary to enhance security by slightly reducing the length of the keys so as to convert the key sequence into a secure key.
As a preferred embodiment, in the process of enhancing security, a one-way Hash function is used to convert the key sequence into the security key, wherein the Hash function constructs a mapping function as follows:
f:(0,1)n→(0,1)m,m＜n。
as a preferred embodiment, the transmission power is allocated for beamforming and artificial noise in the coding information, and the specific process of coding the encrypted data according to the allocated transmission power by the coding information is as follows:
determining the security capacity of the terminal and the communication capacity of an eavesdropper;
the data transmission process between the electric energy meter and the terminal is shown in fig. 4. Suppose that the electric energy meter needs to transmit data siTo the terminal, in order to improve the security performance of data transmission, the transmitting end of the electric energy meter needs to perform beam forming on data and transmit artificial noise to reduce data transmission interference between the electric energy meters and the eavesdropping capability of an eavesdropper. Beamforming may allow better data beam alignment for the terminal and artifacts may degrade the eavesdropper's communication channel. Recording the phase number of the power line connected with the electric energy meter as NMThe phase number of the power line connected to the terminal is NRThe phase number of the power line to which the eavesdropper is connected is NENamely: when the power line channel is a three-phase wire, N is 3; when the power line channel is a single-phase line, N is 1. Make the ith electric energy meter transmit beam forming vector
Figure BDA0002378356470000071
Artificial noise matrix
Figure BDA0002378356470000072
Note the book
Figure BDA0002378356470000073
For the ith power meter to transmit the beamforming matrix, the signal received by the jth terminal may be represented as:
Figure BDA0002378356470000074
wherein HTjMiFor the communication channel model from the ith power meter to the jth terminal,
Figure BDA0002378356470000075
for the artificial noise emitted by the ith electric energy meter,
Figure BDA0002378356470000076
is additive white gaussian noise.
Figure BDA0002378356470000077
Is additive white gaussian noise for the jth terminal. Similarly, the signal received by the eavesdropper can be expressed as:
Figure BDA0002378356470000078
wherein HEMiFor the communication channel model from the ith power meter to the eavesdropper,
Figure BDA0002378356470000079
for additive white gaussian noise, the security capacity of the terminal and the communication capacity of the eavesdropper can be expressed as:
Figure BDA00023783564700000710
Figure BDA00023783564700000711
wherein the content of the first and second substances,
Figure BDA00023783564700000712
Figure BDA00023783564700000713
Figure BDA0002378356470000081
Figure BDA0002378356470000082
obtaining the data transmission safety rate between a single electric energy meter and the terminal according to the safety capacity of the terminal and the communication capacity of an eavesdropper;
the method comprises the following steps of establishing a data transmission optimization model by taking the sum of data transmission safety rates between all electric energy meters and a terminal as a target and under the condition that the transmitting power of the electric energy meters is kept unchanged:
under the condition that the transmitting power of the electric energy meter is limited, the two strategies of transmitting noise and transmitting beam forming have complementary advantages: and when the quality of the eavesdropper channel is better than that of the terminal and the electric energy meter channel, the transmission rate is high when no transmission beam forming is carried out. The beamforming can improve the receiving signal-to-noise ratio of the terminal, but when the channel quality of an eavesdropper is good, the security cannot be ensured. The artificial noise and the beam forming are jointly optimized, so that the eavesdropping of an eavesdropper when the channel quality of the eavesdropper is good can be overcome, and the safety rate can be improved. In the embodiment, the sum of the data transmission safety rates of all the electric energy meters is maximized as a target, and under the condition that the transmission power of the electric energy meters is certain, the following optimization models are established by taking the optimization of artificial noise and a beam forming matrix as means:
Figure BDA0002378356470000083
wherein the content of the first and second substances,
Figure BDA0002378356470000084
transmit a beamforming matrix, Ω, for the ith meteriTransmitting an artificial noise matrix, H, for the ith electric energy meterTiMjFor the communication channel model from jth electric energy meter to ith terminal, Δ HTiMjFor communication channel HTiMjWithin an error range of
Figure BDA0002378356470000085
Within. HEMiModel of the communication channel from the ith meter to the eavesdropper, Δ HEMiFor communication channel HEMiWithin an error range of
Figure BDA0002378356470000086
Within.
Figure BDA0002378356470000091
In order to newly introduce the auxiliary variable,
Figure BDA0002378356470000092
the unit matrix of (a) is,
Figure BDA0002378356470000093
the identity matrix of (2).
Solving a data transmission optimization model to obtain the power distributed to beam forming by the transmitting power of the electric energy meter and the power of artificial noise;
aiming at a data transmission optimization model, the model is transformed into an optimization problem which can be optimized by using a block gradient descent iteration method through linear matrix inequality transformation and an S-program.
The objective function is transformed according to the following theorem:
Figure BDA0002378356470000094
wherein the content of the first and second substances,
Figure BDA0002378356470000095
using the above theorem, X is optimized by optimizing W. For the original optimization function, the following changes can be obtained using this theorem:
Figure BDA0002378356470000096
Figure BDA0002378356470000097
Figure BDA0002378356470000098
Figure BDA0002378356470000099
in order to improve the robustness of the algorithm, the following constraint conditions are added:
constraint 1:
Figure BDA00023783564700000910
constraint 2:
Figure BDA00023783564700000911
constraint 3:
Figure BDA00023783564700000912
wherein, αiIndicating a signal leaked to an eavesdropper, βijRepresents the data interference value between the electric energy meters,
Figure BDA00023783564700000913
representing the artificial noise matrix received by an eavesdropper.
Figure BDA00023783564700000914
Is composed of
Figure BDA00023783564700000915
The Hermite matrix of (a) is,
Figure BDA00023783564700000916
is HTiMjThe Hermite matrix of (a) is,
Figure BDA00023783564700000917
for eavesdropping on the channel
Figure BDA00023783564700000918
The error space of the estimation of (2),
Figure BDA00023783564700000919
for eavesdropping on channel HTiMjIs estimated from the error space.
Constraint 1 indicates that the signal leaked to the eavesdropper should not be greater than a certain value; constraint 2 indicates that data interference between electric energy meters should be less than or equal to a certain value; constraint 3 indicates that the artificial noise matrix received by the eavesdropper should be greater than or equal to a certain matrix.
For constraint 1 and constraint 2, they are transformed using an S-program, giving the condition that one particular quadratic inequality is the result of another quadratic inequality. The S-program changes were specifically as follows: let F1、F2Is a symmetric matrix, g1、g2Is a vector of h1、h2Are real numbers. If vector z is present such that the inequality is
Figure BDA0002378356470000101
If true, derive
Figure BDA0002378356470000102
Then if and only if there is some non-zero λ such that:
Figure BDA0002378356470000103
then constraint 1 and constraint 2 may be converted to:
Figure BDA0002378356470000104
Figure BDA0002378356470000105
and aiming at the constraint condition 3, converting by using a linear matrix inequality.
Constraint 3 can be converted to:
Figure BDA0002378356470000106
the optimization problem after the transformation is as follows:
Figure BDA0002378356470000111
Figure BDA0002378356470000112
Figure BDA0002378356470000113
trace(Qi+Ωi)≤Ptot
wherein, PtotThe total power required to transmit data and transmit artifacts for each power meter.
And finally, carrying out iterative solution on the optimization problem by using a block coordinate descent iterative algorithm so as to obtain the numerical value of the transmitting power required to be distributed for beam forming and artificial noise. The following conditions need to be satisfied using this algorithm: and (X) for each variable X epsilon X meeting the constraint condition, the objective function has at least one optimal solution under the constraint condition when other variables are fixed and unchanged. The iterative optimization process comprises the following steps: given a current iteration variable
Figure BDA0002378356470000114
According to
Figure BDA0002378356470000115
Form the next iteration quantity
Figure BDA0002378356470000116
Aiming at the optimization problem provided by the patent, the optimization steps are as follows:
the first step is as follows: setting l to 1 and initializing arbitrarily in feasible domain
Figure BDA0002378356470000117
And WE(l)。
The second step is that: fixing
Figure BDA0002378356470000121
WE＝WE(l) Optimization of f ({ αi,βij,Qi,ΩiI 1., K, j ≠ i }) obtained from α in the round of iterationsi,βij,Qi，ΩiCorresponding global optimum solution
Figure BDA0002378356470000122
And order
Figure BDA0002378356470000123
Figure BDA0002378356470000124
Third step, fixing αi＝αi(l)、βij＝βij(l)、Qi＝Qi(l)、Ωi＝Ωi(l) (ii) a Optimization
Figure BDA0002378356470000125
Get the round of iteration
Figure BDA0002378356470000126
WEGlobal optimum for K, i 1
Figure BDA0002378356470000127
And order
Figure BDA0002378356470000128
The fourth step: set iteration accuracy σ (the maximum distance allowed between the results of the last two iterations when the iteration is stopped) and determine if it is true? If not, l is l +1 and the second step is skipped,
Figure BDA0002378356470000129
the fifth step: output { Qi,ΩiI 1.., K }, the transmit power allocated to beamforming and artificial noise is obtained.
The encoding information encodes the encrypted data according to power allocated to beamforming and power allocated to artificial noise.
As a preferred embodiment, the security capacity of the terminal and the communication capacity of the eavesdropper are determined according to shannon's theory.
As a preferred embodiment, the method for solving the data transmission security rate between the single electric energy meter and the terminal is as follows:
Figure BDA00023783564700001210
wherein R isiFor a safe rate of data transmission between a single power meter and a terminal,
Figure BDA00023783564700001211
in order to be a safe capacity of the terminal,
Figure BDA00023783564700001212
is the communication capacity of an eavesdropper.
As shown in fig. 2, a system for securely transmitting data between a terminal and an electric energy meter includes a communication channel model building module 201, an encrypted data generating module 202, and an encrypted data encoding module 203;
the communication channel model building module 201 is configured to obtain performance indexes in a communication channel between the electric energy meter and the terminal, and build a communication channel model according to the performance indexes;
the encrypted data generation module 202 is configured to generate a key in the communication channel model, and bind the key and data for encryption to obtain encrypted data;
the encrypted data encoding module 203 is configured to generate encoding information including beamforming and artificial noise according to a channel characteristic of a communication channel model, allocate transmission power to beamforming and artificial noise in the encoding information, and encode the encrypted data according to the allocated transmission power by the encoding information.
As shown in fig. 3, a data secure transmission system device 30 between a terminal and an electric energy meter includes a processor 300 and a memory 301;
the memory 301 is used for storing a program code 302 and transmitting the program code 302 to the processor;
the processor 300 is configured to execute the steps of the above-mentioned method for a system for secure data transmission between a terminal and an electric energy meter according to the instructions in the program code 302.
Illustratively, the computer program 302 may be partitioned into one or more modules/units that are stored in the memory 301 and executed by the processor 300 to accomplish the present application. The one or more modules/units may be a series of computer program instruction segments capable of performing specific functions, which are used to describe the execution process of the computer program 302 in the terminal device 30.
The terminal device 30 may be a desktop computer, a notebook, a palm computer, a cloud server, or other computing devices. The terminal device may include, but is not limited to, a processor 300, a memory 301. Those skilled in the art will appreciate that fig. 3 is merely an example of a terminal device 30 and does not constitute a limitation of terminal device 30 and may include more or fewer components than shown, or some components may be combined, or different components, e.g., the terminal device may also include input-output devices, network access devices, buses, etc.
The Processor 300 may be a Central Processing Unit (CPU), other general purpose Processor, a Digital Signal Processor (DSP), an Application Specific Integrated Circuit (ASIC), an off-the-shelf Programmable Gate Array (FPGA) or other Programmable logic device, discrete Gate or transistor logic, discrete hardware components, etc. A general purpose processor may be a microprocessor or the processor may be any conventional processor or the like.
The storage 301 may be an internal storage unit of the terminal device 30, such as a hard disk or a memory of the terminal device 30. The memory 301 may also be an external storage device of the terminal device 30, such as a plug-in hard disk, a Smart Media Card (SMC), a Secure Digital (SD) Card, a Flash memory Card (Flash Card), and the like, which are provided on the terminal device 30. Further, the memory 301 may also include both an internal storage unit and an external storage device of the terminal device 30. The memory 301 is used for storing the computer program and other programs and data required by the terminal device. The memory 301 may also be used to temporarily store data that has been output or is to be output.
It is clear to those skilled in the art that, for convenience and brevity of description, the specific working processes of the above-described systems, apparatuses and units may refer to the corresponding processes in the foregoing method embodiments, and are not described herein again.
In the several embodiments provided in the present application, it should be understood that the disclosed system, apparatus and method may be implemented in other manners. For example, the above-described apparatus embodiments are merely illustrative, and for example, the division of the units is only one logical division, and other divisions may be realized in practice, for example, a plurality of units or components may be combined or integrated into another system, or some features may be omitted, or not executed. In addition, the shown or discussed mutual coupling or direct coupling or communication connection may be an indirect coupling or communication connection through some interfaces, devices or units, and may be in an electrical, mechanical or other form.
The units described as separate parts may or may not be physically separate, and parts displayed as units may or may not be physical units, may be located in one place, or may be distributed on a plurality of network units. Some or all of the units can be selected according to actual needs to achieve the purpose of the solution of the embodiment.
In addition, functional units in the embodiments of the present invention may be integrated into one processing unit, or each unit may exist alone physically, or two or more units are integrated into one unit. The integrated unit can be realized in a form of hardware, and can also be realized in a form of a software functional unit.
The integrated unit, if implemented in the form of a software functional unit and sold or used as a stand-alone product, may be stored in a computer readable storage medium. Based on such understanding, the technical solution of the present invention may be embodied in the form of a software product, which is stored in a storage medium and includes instructions for causing a computer device (which may be a personal computer, a server, or a network device) to execute all or part of the steps of the method according to the embodiments of the present invention. And the aforementioned storage medium includes: a U-disk, a removable hard disk, a Read-only Memory (ROM), a Random Access Memory (RAM), a magnetic disk or an optical disk, and other various media capable of storing program codes.
The above-mentioned embodiments are only used for illustrating the technical solutions of the present invention, and not for limiting the same; although the present invention has been described in detail with reference to the foregoing embodiments, it will be understood by those of ordinary skill in the art that: the technical solutions described in the foregoing embodiments may still be modified, or some technical features may be equivalently replaced; and such modifications or substitutions do not depart from the spirit and scope of the corresponding technical solutions of the embodiments of the present invention.

Claims (10)

1. A method for safely transmitting data between a terminal and an electric energy meter is characterized by comprising the following steps:
acquiring performance indexes in a communication channel between the electric energy meter and the terminal, and establishing a communication channel model according to the performance indexes;
generating a key in a communication channel model, binding the key and data and encrypting to obtain encrypted data;
generating coding information containing beam forming and artificial noise according to the channel characteristics of the communication channel model, distributing transmitting power for the beam forming and the artificial noise in the coding information, and coding the encrypted data according to the distributed transmitting power by the coding information.
2. The method for safely transmitting the data between the terminal and the electric energy meter according to claim 1, wherein the expression formula of the communication channel model is as follows:
Figure FDA0002378356460000011
wherein k is1,k2P is a delay parameter, f is a signal transmission frequency, d is a cable length, and v is θr/c，θrIs the dielectric constant of the insulating material, c is the speed of light, g is the weighting factor, and e is the base of the natural logarithm.
3. The method for securely transmitting data between the terminal and the electric energy meter according to claim 2, wherein the process of generating the key in the communication channel model comprises: channel measurement, channel quantization, channel negotiation, and privacy enhancement.
4. The method for securely transmitting data between a terminal and an electric energy meter according to claim 3, wherein the specific processes of channel measurement, channel quantization, channel negotiation and privacy enhancement are as follows:
and (3) channel measurement: the electric energy meter and the terminal mutually send training signals to carry out channel estimation, and a channel frequency domain response estimation sample value is obtained;
channel quantization: quantizing the channel frequency domain response estimation sample values into binary initial bit strings by using a threshold value;
channel negotiation: the terminal and the electric energy meter exchange parity check information again to enable the sequences of the initial bit strings to be consistent, and the consistent initial bit string sequences are used as key sequences;
and (3) secret enhancement: the key sequence is converted into a secure key.
5. The method for the secure data transmission between the terminal and the electric energy meter according to claim 4, wherein in the process of security enhancement, a one-way Hash function is applied to convert the key sequence into the secure key.
6. The method for safely transmitting data between the terminal and the electric energy meter according to claim 5, wherein the transmitting power is allocated to the beam forming and the artificial noise in the coding information, and the specific process of coding the encrypted data by the coding information according to the allocated transmitting power is as follows:
determining the security capacity of the terminal and the communication capacity of an eavesdropper;
obtaining the data transmission safety rate between a single electric energy meter and the terminal according to the safety capacity of the terminal and the communication capacity of an eavesdropper;
the method comprises the following steps of establishing a data transmission optimization model by taking the sum of data transmission safety rates between all electric energy meters and a terminal as a target and under the condition that the transmitting power of the electric energy meters is kept unchanged:
solving a data transmission optimization model to obtain the power distributed to beam forming by the transmitting power of the electric energy meter and the power of artificial noise;
the encoding information encodes the encrypted data according to power allocated to beamforming and power allocated to artificial noise.
7. The method for the secure transmission of data between the terminal and the electric energy meter according to claim 6, wherein the secure capacity of the terminal and the communication capacity of the eavesdropper are determined according to Shannon's theory.
8. The method for safely transmitting data between the terminal and the electric energy meter according to claim 7, wherein the method for solving the safety rate of data transmission between a single electric energy meter and the terminal is as follows:
Figure FDA0002378356460000021
wherein R isiFor data transmission safety between single electric energy meter and terminalThe rate of the speed of the motor is,
Figure FDA0002378356460000022
in order to be a safe capacity of the terminal,
Figure FDA0002378356460000023
is the communication capacity of an eavesdropper.
9. A data security transmission system between a terminal and an electric energy meter is characterized by comprising a communication channel model building module, an encrypted data generating module and an encrypted data coding module;
the communication channel model building module is used for obtaining performance indexes in a communication channel between the electric energy meter and the terminal and building a communication channel model according to the performance indexes;
the encrypted data generation module is used for generating a key in the communication channel model, binding the key and data and encrypting to obtain encrypted data;
the encrypted data coding module is used for generating coding information containing beam forming and artificial noise according to the channel characteristics of the communication channel model, distributing transmitting power for the beam forming and the artificial noise in the coding information, and coding the encrypted data according to the distributed transmitting power by the coding information.
10. The equipment for safely transmitting the data between the terminal and the electric energy meter is characterized by comprising a processor and a memory;
the memory is used for storing program codes and transmitting the program codes to the processor;
the processor is used for executing the data security transmission method between the terminal and the electric energy meter according to any one of claims 1 to 8 according to the instructions in the program code.
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