CN111125706A - Trusted middleware of cloud platform - Google Patents
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- G06F21/57—Certifying or maintaining trusted computer platforms, e.g. secure boots or power-downs, version controls, system software checks, secure updates or assessing vulnerabilities
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Abstract
The invention provides a trusted middleware of a cloud platform, which comprises: the virtual trusted component comprises a virtual trusted root and a virtual trusted root management module, wherein the virtual trusted root is configured to extend a trust chain to a virtual machine and provide a trusted root service for the virtual machine; the trusted agent end comprises a host machine trusted agent end and a virtual machine trusted agent end, and is configured to measure relevant core programs and files during starting and detect the integrity of hardware and a system; and the trusted management end receives the measurement report and the detection result sent by the trusted agent end, and pushes the current trusted state to the virtualization software management end configured with the virtual trusted root management module when detecting that the trusted state of the host machine and/or the virtual machine is changed. The invention can extend the trust chain to the virtual machine, and provides the virtual machine with trusted computing service for the tenant.
Description
Technical Field
The present invention relates to the field of computers, and more particularly, to a trusted middleware of a cloud platform.
Background
With the continuous and deep application of cloud computing, the construction of cloud data centers becomes a consensus of the IT development of enterprises. The security challenge faced by cloud data centers is more severe than that of traditional data centers: the cloud data center is in dynamic change by using Advanced Persistent Threat (APT), virtualization, BYOD and other new application elements for the purpose of stealing confidential data and intelligence of enterprises, and the traditional security protection is difficult to defend malicious threats aiming at 'Guest OS image tampering', 'host tenant attack' and 'virtual machine tampering' of the cloud host.
Disclosure of Invention
In view of this, an object of the embodiments of the present invention is to provide a trusted middleware of a cloud platform, so as to extend a trust chain from a physical server hardware environment and a virtualization environment to a virtual machine.
Based on the above object, an aspect of the embodiments of the present invention provides a trusted middleware of a cloud platform, including:
the virtual trusted component comprises a virtual trusted root and a virtual trusted root management module, wherein the virtual trusted root is configured to extend a trust chain to a virtual machine and provide a trusted root service for the virtual machine;
the trusted agent end comprises a host machine trusted agent end and a virtual machine trusted agent end, and is configured to measure relevant core programs and files during starting and detect the integrity of hardware and a system;
and the trusted management end receives the measurement report and the detection result sent by the trusted agent end, and pushes the current trusted state to the virtualization software management end configured with the virtual trusted root management module when detecting that the trusted state of the host machine and/or the virtual machine is changed.
In some embodiments, the virtual root of trust is deployed in a virtual machine monitor of a compute node at virtual machine creation time to provide a virtual root of trust instance for the virtual machine.
In some embodiments, the virtual trusted component further comprises a virtual trusted metrics root core configured to measure a virtual machine BIOS and detect a trusted state of the virtual machine BIOS.
In some embodiments, the virtual trusted component further includes a virtual trusted root migration module, where the virtual trusted root migration module implements synchronous migration of virtual trusted root related data of the virtual machine to a destination during virtual machine migration.
In some embodiments, the virtual root of trust migration module is configured to implement the steps of:
receiving a trusted migration instruction issued by the virtualization software management end to the computing node A;
after the computing node A receives the migration instruction, migrating the virtual machine and the corresponding virtual trusted root to the computing node B under the condition that the service is not interrupted;
and after the migration is finished, destroying the residual data of the virtual trusted root in the computing node A.
In some embodiments, the virtual root of trust management module is configured in the virtualized software management end to cooperate with virtualized management software to complete management functions of the virtual root of trust, where the functions include synchronously starting the virtual root of trust when a virtual machine is started, detecting virtual trusted programs and Qemu integrity when the virtual root of trust is started, and notifying the virtual root of trust to synchronously migrate the virtual root of trust when a virtual machine is migrated.
In some embodiments, migrating, after the computing node a receives the migration instruction, the virtual machine and the corresponding virtual root of trust to the computing node B without service interruption includes:
constructing a secure migration channel between the computing node A and the computing node B;
under the condition of uninterrupted service, copying temporary data of the virtual trusted root and other virtual devices to the computing node B;
and under the condition of uninterrupted service, copying the virtual machine memory in the computing node A to the computing node B.
In some embodiments, the trusted agent includes a communication module, a service module, a business module, trusted basic software, and a trusted boot program.
In some embodiments, the trusted management side is implemented by using a Browser/Server (B/S) architecture, and includes a data communication layer, a service logic layer, an interface service layer, and a service presentation layer.
In some embodiments, the virtual root of trust supports Windows, Windows Server, CentOS, RedHat operating systems.
The invention has the following beneficial technical effects: according to the trusted middleware of the cloud platform provided by the embodiment of the invention, the related components of the trusted middleware are embedded in the virtual machine monitor on the virtualization software level, and the corresponding virtual trusted firmware and software are matched, so that the trust chain from the hardware environment of the physical server and the virtualization environment is expanded to the virtual machine, the hardware of the trusted server, the cloud operating system and the virtualization software are integrated in the virtualization cloud computing environment, a safe trusted cloud host computing environment is established for cloud service providers and virtual machine users, and a trusted computing environment is further provided for virtual machine tenants.
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In order to more clearly illustrate the embodiments of the present invention or the technical solutions in the prior art, the drawings used in the description of the embodiments or the prior art will be briefly described below, and it is obvious that the drawings in the following description are only some embodiments of the present invention, and it is obvious for those skilled in the art that other embodiments can be obtained by using the drawings without creative efforts.
FIG. 1 is a schematic diagram of a deployment architecture of trusted middleware of a cloud platform according to the present invention;
FIG. 2 is a schematic diagram of a trusted migration business process according to the present invention;
FIG. 3 is a logical diagram of trusted middleware of a cloud platform according to the present invention.
Detailed Description
Embodiments of the present invention are described below. However, it is to be understood that the disclosed embodiments are merely examples and that other embodiments may take various and alternative forms. The figures are not necessarily to scale; certain features may be exaggerated or minimized to show details of particular components. Therefore, specific structural and functional details disclosed herein are not to be interpreted as limiting, but merely as a representative basis for teaching one skilled in the art to variously employ the present invention. As one of ordinary skill in the art will appreciate, various features illustrated and described with reference to any one of the figures may be combined with features illustrated in one or more other figures to produce embodiments that are not explicitly illustrated or described. The combination of features shown provides a representative embodiment for a typical application. However, various combinations and modifications of the features consistent with the teachings of the present invention may be desired for certain specific applications or implementations.
In order to make the objects, technical solutions and advantages of the present invention more apparent, the following embodiments of the present invention are described in further detail with reference to the accompanying drawings.
Based on the above object, an aspect of the embodiments of the present invention provides a trusted middleware of a cloud platform, including: the virtual trusted component comprises a virtual trusted root and a virtual trusted root management module, wherein the virtual trusted root is configured to extend a trust chain to a virtual machine and provide a trusted root service for the virtual machine; the trusted agent end comprises a host machine trusted agent end and a virtual machine trusted agent end, and is configured to measure relevant core programs and files during starting and detect the integrity of hardware and a system; and the trusted management end receives the measurement report and the detection result sent by the trusted agent end, and pushes the current trusted state to the virtualization software management end configured with the virtual trusted root management module when detecting that the trusted state of the host machine and/or the virtual machine is changed. As shown in fig. 1, a schematic diagram of a deployment architecture of trusted middleware of a cloud platform according to the present invention is shown.
In some embodiments, the virtual root of trust is deployed in a virtual machine monitor of a computing node at virtual machine creation time, configured to extend a chain of trust to the virtual machine to ensure trustworthiness of the entire computing platform while providing root of trust services for the virtual machine. The virtual root of trust belongs to a trusted component provided for a virtual machine in a trusted computing node and conforming to a physical root of trust specification, and one virtual root of trust instance should correspond to a unique fixed virtual machine and can be migrated from one trusted computing node to another trusted computing node. According to different specifications, the virtual trusted root can be divided into vTCM (virtual trusted cryptography module) and vTPCM (virtual trusted platform control module), and in this document, the virtual trusted root refers to vTPM2.0. The design goal of the virtual trusted root is to provide trusted root service for the virtual machine in a safe mode, ensure the synchronization with the life cycle of the virtual machine and provide the trusted root service for the virtual machine in the full life cycle of the virtual machine. Meanwhile, the virtual machine can access the virtual trusted root in the same way as the physical trusted root without modification.
The virtual trusted root is a core component of the trusted middleware and is used for extending a trust chain to the virtual machine, ensuring the trust of the whole computing platform and providing a trusted root service for the virtual machine. In order to ensure that the virtual trusted root can provide service for the virtual machine in the full life cycle of the virtual machine and is synchronous with the life cycle of the virtual machine, management and function modules related to the virtual trusted root need to be embedded in each service module managed by the virtual machine, for example, vTPM management is embedded in a virtualization software management end and is used for configuring virtual trusted root equipment when the virtual machine is created, vtpm2.0 management is embedded in libvirt and is used for analyzing related fields of the vtpm2.0 equipment and issuing instructions and the like. In order to ensure that the trust chain is transferred from the virtualization software to the virtual machine, a virtual machine trust chain transfer module needs to be added on each layer of the virtual machine.
The virtual trusted root is used for providing a virtual trusted root instance for a specific virtual machine, and is required to be capable of accessing the virtual trusted root in a manner which is not different from that of a physical trusted root and supporting a full virtualization mode scene; meanwhile, the confidentiality of the nonvolatile data of the virtual trusted root needs to be ensured in design implementation. The virtual trusted root is deployed in a virtual machine monitor of the computing node, and the virtual trusted root is bound with the virtual machine from the beginning of virtual machine creation. When creating a virtual machine by virtualization management software, a disk file needs to be created for a virtual trusted root corresponding to the virtual machine; when the virtual machine is started, the virtual trusted root needs to be initialized or powered on "
In some embodiments, the virtual root of trust supports Windows10, Windows Server2016, CentOS7.0, RedHat7.0, etc. operating systems.
In some embodiments, the virtual trusted component further comprises a virtual trusted metrics root core that measures a virtual machine BIOS and detects a trusted state of the virtual machine BIOS. Namely, the virtual trusted measurement root core is a trusted starting point of the virtual machine, and is responsible for measuring the BIOS of the virtual machine and detecting the BIOS trusted state of the virtual machine.
In some embodiments, the virtual trusted component further includes a virtual trusted root migration module, where the virtual trusted root migration module implements synchronous migration of virtual trusted root related data of the virtual machine to a destination during virtual machine migration.
In some embodiments, the virtualization software management side is deployed in a separate operating system, and does not distinguish between a physical operating system and a virtual machine operating system. The virtual trusted root management module is deployed in the virtualized software management end, and the virtual trusted root device management function of the virtual machine needs to be realized, which is a component that needs to be designed and realized at the virtualized software management end in the project.
In some embodiments, the virtual root management module is configured in the virtualization software management end to cooperate with virtualization management software to complete management functions of the virtual root, where the functions include synchronously starting the virtual root at the time of virtual machine startup, detecting virtual programs and Qemu integrity at the time of virtual root startup, and notifying the virtual root migration module to synchronously migrate the virtual root at the time of virtual machine migration.
In some embodiments, in order to ensure the security and the credibility of the migration process of the virtual machine equipped with the virtual trusted root, according to the technical requirements of trusted computing, the design requires that the security of the target host and the security of the source host need to be determined before the migration of the virtual machine equipped with the vTPM, and the virtual machine migration can be performed on the premise of determining that both the target host and the source host are credible.
In some embodiments of the invention, the virtual root of trust migration module is configured to implement the steps of: receiving a trusted migration instruction issued by a virtualization software management end to a computing node A; after the computing node A receives the migration instruction, migrating the virtual machine and the corresponding virtual trusted root to the computing node B under the condition that the service is not interrupted; and after the migration is finished, destroying the residual data of the virtual trusted root in the computing node A.
In some further embodiments of the present invention, migrating, after receiving the migration instruction, the virtual machine and the corresponding virtual root of trust to the computing node B without service interruption by the computing node a includes: constructing a secure migration channel between a computing node A and a computing node B; under the condition that the service is not interrupted, the temporary data of the virtual credible root and other virtual equipment are copied to a computing node B; and under the condition of uninterrupted service, copying the virtual machine memory in the computing node A to the computing node B.
Taking the cloud environment with shared storage nodes as an example, when a virtual machine disk is stored in a shared storage, in order to prevent a link between a virtual trusted root and its persistent data from failing, it is necessary to store virtual trusted root persistent data (vTPM data) to the shared storage. The trusted migration business process is shown in fig. 2.
The specific migration process is as follows:
1) computing nodes a and B are two trusted computing nodes in a cloud environment using shared storage nodes; after judging that the computing node A, B is trusted, the virtualized software management end issues a trusted migration instruction to the computing node A;
2) after the computing node a receives the migration instruction, the virtual machine VM1 and the vTPM1 are migrated to the computing node B: a) building a secure migration channel between the virtual machines A, B; under the condition of uninterrupted service, temporary data of the vTPM1 and other virtual devices are copied to a computing node B, and a persistent data path of the vTPM1 is unchanged; b) under the condition that the service is not interrupted, copying the memory of the virtual machine to a computing node B, wherein the mirror path of the virtual machine is not changed;
3) after the migration is completed, the vTPM1 residual data in the computing node A is destroyed.
In some embodiments, the trusted management end is a core component of the trusted middleware, and is used for managing the computing nodes and the virtual machines with the trusted agent end, and mainly comprises the functions of policy management, log management, platform linkage and the like; when the trusted management terminal detects that the trusted state of the resource (host or virtual machine) is changed, the trusted management terminal pushes the current trusted state of the resource to the virtualization software management terminal in real time. The trusted management end realizes centralized management aiming at the relevant strategies of the trusted agent end and provides platform linkage service for the virtualization management software. The trusted management terminal is deployed in an independent operating system, and does not distinguish a physical operating system from a virtual machine operating system. As shown in fig. 3, a logical diagram of trusted middleware of a cloud platform according to the present invention is shown.
In some embodiments, the trusted management end is implemented by using a B/S architecture, and includes a data communication layer, a data storage layer, a service logic layer, an interface service layer, and a service presentation layer, where the data communication layer is responsible for performing message communication with the trusted agent end, for example, the data communication layer is implemented by using RabbitMQ technology; the data storage layer realizes management and storage of data, and comprises a database and traditional application, wherein the UI layer is mainly used for user access, for example, the data storage layer in the system can adopt MySQL database; the business logic layer comprises a credible monitoring mechanism, a log management mechanism, a platform linkage mechanism, a strategy management mechanism, a resource management mechanism, a system management mechanism and an exception handling mechanism, wherein the strategy management mechanism comprises a basic strategy, a measurement strategy, a white list strategy, a high-level strategy and a template management mechanism, and the system management mechanism comprises task management, account management, a log server, system setting and authorization management; and the interface service layer comprises a service function Restful interface and a linkage API, the service function Restful interface provides a system internal interface for the service presentation layer to call, and the linkage API is responsible for providing a platform linkage function for the virtualization software management terminal. The exception handling mechanism of the business logic layer is mainly used for handling exception information in the aspect of business logic and returning the exception information to the page.
In some embodiments, the business logic layer uses ORM technology to implement separation of the business logic layer and the data storage layer, and uses JPA to implement interaction with the database.
In some embodiments, the trusted agent is divided into two parts: one part is a trusted agent end in the host machine, and the other part is a trusted agent end in the virtual machine; the method is mainly used for realizing the trusted management of the host machine or the virtual machine by matching with a trusted management terminal, and comprises the functions of resource management, policy management, trusted report uploading and the like.
The host trusted agent end is an important component of the trusted middleware, is positioned above the host of the computing node, and is used for measuring core programs and files when the computing node is started, detecting the integrity of a platform (server hardware + host system), and reporting a platform measurement report to the trusted management end. Meanwhile, the trusted management end is matched to complete the management of the host and the trusted related strategy. The virtual machine trusted agent end is another important component of the trusted middleware, is located on a virtual machine running in the trusted computing node, and is used for measuring the kernel, the core program and the file of the virtual machine when the virtual machine is started, detecting the integrity of the virtual machine (virtual machine hardware + virtual machine operating system), and reporting a virtual machine measurement report to the trusted management end. Meanwhile, the management of the virtual machine and the credible related strategy is completed in cooperation with the credible association.
The host machine trusted agent end is deployed on the computing node host machine, platform identity certification and integrity certification are carried out through deployment of a trusted strategy, and a trusted host machine based on a TPM2.0 security chip is constructed. In some embodiments, the trusted agent design functionality includes functionality of a communication module, a service module, a business module, trusted base software, a trusted boot program, and so forth.
The trusted middleware vTPM2.0 is a software product constructed based on a trusted computing technology, and can help users to build a trusted cloud platform together with a wave server (TPM2.0), an InCloud Sphere enterprise edition and an OpenStack. The trust chain is extended to the virtual machine through a virtual trusted root (vTPM2.0), and is cooperated with OpenStack, the isolated host and the untrusted host are realized, and meanwhile, through the host/virtual machine safety visibility provided for the tenant through the OpenStack, the tenant sensitive virtual machine is ensured to be only allowed in the trusted host, and meanwhile, the virtual machine with trusted computing service is provided for the tenant.
In some embodiments, the main application mode of the present invention is to integrate trusted server hardware, a cloud operating system, and virtualization software in a virtualized cloud computing environment, to construct a secure trusted cloud host computing environment for a cloud service provider and a virtual machine user, and to further provide a trusted computing environment for a virtual machine tenant. The target environment of product deployment comprises a cloud data center computing node host, a cloud operating system/virtualization software, a virtual machine operating system and the like.
Where technically feasible, the technical features listed above for the different embodiments may be combined with each other or changed, added, omitted, etc. to form further embodiments within the scope of the invention.
It can be seen from the foregoing embodiments that, in the trusted middleware of the cloud platform provided in the embodiments of the present invention, by embedding the vtpm2.0 in the virtual machine monitor on the virtualization software layer and matching with the corresponding virtual trusted firmware and software, the trust chain from the physical server hardware environment and the virtualization environment is extended to the virtual machine, so as to integrate the trusted server hardware, the cloud operating system, and the virtualization software in the virtualization cloud computing environment, construct a secure trusted cloud host computing environment for the cloud service provider and the virtual machine user, and further provide a trusted computing environment for the virtual machine tenant.
Finally, it should be noted that, as will be understood by those skilled in the art, all or part of the processes for implementing the above embodiments may be implemented by instructing the relevant hardware through a computer program, where the computer program may be stored in a computer-readable storage medium, and when executed, the computer program may include the processes for implementing the above embodiments of the methods. The storage medium may be a magnetic disk, an optical disk, a read-only memory (ROM), a Random Access Memory (RAM), or the like.
In addition, the apparatuses, devices and the like disclosed in the embodiments of the present invention may be various electronic terminal devices, such as a mobile phone, a Personal Digital Assistant (PDA), a tablet computer (PAD), a smart television and the like, or may be a large terminal device, such as a server and the like, and therefore the scope of protection disclosed in the embodiments of the present invention should not be limited to a specific type of apparatus, device. The client disclosed in the embodiment of the present invention may be applied to any one of the above electronic terminal devices in the form of electronic hardware, computer software, or a combination of both.
Further, it should be appreciated that the computer-readable storage media (e.g., memory) referred to herein can be either volatile memory or nonvolatile memory, or can include both volatile and nonvolatile memory. By way of example, and not limitation, nonvolatile memory can include Read Only Memory (ROM), Programmable ROM (PROM), Electrically Programmable ROM (EPROM), Electrically Erasable Programmable ROM (EEPROM), or flash memory. Volatile memory can include Random Access Memory (RAM), which can act as external cache memory. By way of example and not limitation, RAM is available in a variety of forms such as synchronous RAM (DRAM), Dynamic RAM (DRAM), Synchronous DRAM (SDRAM), double data rate SDRAM (DDR SDRAM), Enhanced SDRAM (ESDRAM), Synchronous Link DRAM (SLDRAM), and Direct Rambus RAM (DRRAM). The storage devices of the disclosed aspects are intended to comprise, without being limited to, these and other suitable types of memory.
Those of skill would further appreciate that the various illustrative logical blocks, modules, circuits, and algorithm steps described in connection with the disclosure herein may be implemented as electronic hardware, computer software, or combinations of both. To clearly illustrate this interchangeability of hardware and software, various illustrative components, blocks, modules, circuits, and steps have been described above generally in terms of their functionality. Whether such functionality is implemented as software or hardware depends upon the particular application and design constraints imposed on the overall system. Skilled artisans may implement the described functionality in varying ways for each particular application, but such implementation decisions should not be interpreted as causing a departure from the scope of the disclosed embodiments of the present invention.
The various illustrative logical blocks, modules, and circuits described in connection with the disclosure herein may be implemented or performed with the following components designed to perform the functions described herein: a general purpose processor, a Digital Signal Processor (DSP), an Application Specific Integrated Circuit (ASIC), a Field Programmable Gate Array (FPGA) or other programmable logic device, discrete gate or transistor logic, discrete hardware components, or any combination of these components. A general purpose processor may be a microprocessor, but in the alternative, the processor may be any conventional processor, controller, microcontroller, or state machine. A processor may also be implemented as a combination of computing devices, e.g., a combination of a DSP and a microprocessor, a plurality of microprocessors, one or more microprocessors in conjunction with a DSP, and/or any other such configuration.
The steps of a method or algorithm described in connection with the disclosure herein may be embodied directly in hardware, in a software module executed by a processor, or in a combination of the two. A software module may reside in RAM memory, flash memory, ROM memory, EPROM memory, EEPROM memory, registers, hard disk, a removable disk, a CD-ROM, or any other form of storage medium known in the art. An exemplary storage medium is coupled to the processor such the processor can read information from, and write information to, the storage medium. In the alternative, the storage medium may be integral to the processor. The processor and the storage medium may reside in an ASIC. The ASIC may reside in a user terminal. In the alternative, the processor and the storage medium may reside as discrete components in a user terminal.
In one or more exemplary designs, the functions may be implemented in hardware, software, firmware, or any combination thereof. If implemented in software, the functions may be stored on or transmitted over as one or more instructions or code on a computer-readable medium. Computer-readable media includes both computer storage media and communication media including any medium that facilitates transfer of a computer program from one place to another. A storage media may be any available media that can be accessed by a general purpose or special purpose computer. By way of example, and not limitation, such computer-readable media can comprise RAM, ROM, EEPROM, CD-ROM or other optical disk storage, magnetic disk storage or other magnetic storage devices, or any other medium that can be used to carry or store desired program code in the form of instructions or data structures and that can be accessed by a general-purpose or special-purpose computer, or a general-purpose or special-purpose processor. Also, any connection is properly termed a computer-readable medium. For example, if the software is transmitted from a website, server, or other remote source using a coaxial cable, fiber optic cable, twisted pair, Digital Subscriber Line (DSL), or wireless technologies such as infrared, radio, and microwave, then the coaxial cable, fiber optic cable, twisted pair, DSL, or wireless technologies such as infrared, radio, and microwave are included in the definition of medium. Disk and disc, as used herein, includes Compact Disc (CD), laser disc, optical disc, Digital Versatile Disc (DVD), floppy disk, blu-ray disc where disks usually reproduce data magnetically, while discs reproduce data optically with lasers. Combinations of the above should also be included within the scope of computer-readable media.
It should be understood that, as used herein, the singular forms "a", "an" and "the" are intended to include the plural forms as well, unless the context clearly supports the exception. It should also be understood that "and/or" as used herein is meant to include any and all possible combinations of one or more of the associated listed items.
It will be understood by those skilled in the art that all or part of the steps for implementing the above embodiments may be implemented by hardware, or may be implemented by a program instructing relevant hardware, where the program may be stored in a computer-readable storage medium, and the above-mentioned storage medium may be a read-only memory, a magnetic disk, an optical disk, or the like.
The above-described embodiments are possible examples of implementations and are presented merely for a clear understanding of the principles of the invention. Those of ordinary skill in the art will understand that: the discussion of any embodiment above is meant to be exemplary only, and is not intended to intimate that the scope of the disclosure, including the claims, of embodiments of the invention is limited to these examples; within the idea of an embodiment of the invention, also technical features in the above embodiment or in different embodiments may be combined and there are many other variations of the different aspects of an embodiment of the invention as described above, which are not provided in detail for the sake of brevity. Therefore, any omissions, modifications, substitutions, improvements, and the like that may be made without departing from the spirit and principles of the embodiments of the present invention are intended to be included within the scope of the embodiments of the present invention.
Claims (10)
1. A trusted middleware of a cloud platform, comprising:
the virtual trusted component comprises a virtual trusted root and a virtual trusted root management module, wherein the virtual trusted root is configured to extend a trust chain to a virtual machine and provide a trusted root service for the virtual machine;
the trusted agent end comprises a host machine trusted agent end and a virtual machine trusted agent end, and is configured to measure relevant core programs and files during starting and detect the integrity of hardware and a system;
and the trusted management end receives the measurement report and the detection result sent by the trusted agent end, and pushes the current trusted state to the virtualization software management end configured with the virtual trusted root management module when detecting that the trusted state of the host machine and/or the virtual machine is changed.
2. The cloud platform's trusted middleware of claim 1, wherein the virtual root of trust is deployed in a virtual machine monitor of a compute node at virtual machine creation time, providing a virtual root of trust instance for the virtual machine.
3. The trusted middleware for a cloud platform as claimed in claim 1, wherein said virtual trusted component further comprises a virtual root of trust metric core configured to measure a virtual machine BIOS and detect a trusted state of the virtual machine BIOS.
4. The trusted middleware of the cloud platform according to claim 1, wherein the virtual trusted component further comprises a virtual root of trust migration module, and the virtual root of trust migration module is configured to synchronously migrate the virtual root of trust related data of the virtual machine to the destination end during migration of the virtual machine.
5. The trusted middleware of the cloud platform as claimed in claim 4, wherein said virtual root of trust migration module is configured to implement the steps of:
receiving a trusted migration instruction issued by the virtualization software management end to the computing node A;
after the computing node A receives the migration instruction, migrating the virtual machine and the corresponding virtual trusted root to the computing node B under the condition that the service is not interrupted;
and after the migration is finished, destroying the residual data of the virtual trusted root in the computing node A.
6. The trusted middleware of claim 1, wherein the virtual root of trust management module is configured in the virtualized software management end to cooperate with virtualized management software to perform management functions of the virtual root of trust, the functions include synchronously starting the virtual root of trust when a virtual machine is started, detecting the integrity of a virtual trusted program and Qemu when the virtual root of trust is started, and notifying the virtual root of trust migration module to synchronously migrate the virtual root of trust when a virtual machine is migrated.
7. The trusted middleware of the cloud platform according to claim 5, wherein migrating the virtual machine and the corresponding virtual root of trust to the computing node B without service interruption after the computing node A receives the migration instruction comprises:
constructing a secure migration channel between the computing node A and the computing node B;
under the condition of uninterrupted service, copying temporary data of the virtual trusted root and other virtual devices to the computing node B;
and under the condition of uninterrupted service, copying the virtual machine memory in the computing node A to the computing node B.
8. The trusted middleware of the cloud platform according to claim 1, wherein the trusted agent comprises a communication module, a service module, a business module, trusted basic software, and a trusted boot program.
9. The trusted middleware of the cloud platform according to claim 1, wherein the trusted management terminal is implemented by adopting a B/S architecture and comprises a data communication layer, a business logic layer, an interface service layer and a business presentation layer.
10. The cloud platform's trusted middleware of claim 2, wherein the virtual root of trust supports Windows, Windows Server, CentOS, RedHat operating systems.
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| CN201910993450.8A CN111125706A (en) | 2019-10-18 | 2019-10-18 | Trusted middleware of cloud platform |
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