CN111093190A - Method, device and system for writing key data, electronic equipment and storage medium - Google Patents
Method, device and system for writing key data, electronic equipment and storage medium Download PDFInfo
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- CN111093190A CN111093190A CN201911255909.0A CN201911255909A CN111093190A CN 111093190 A CN111093190 A CN 111093190A CN 201911255909 A CN201911255909 A CN 201911255909A CN 111093190 A CN111093190 A CN 111093190A
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- 238000000034 method Methods 0.000 title claims abstract description 54
- 238000003860 storage Methods 0.000 title claims abstract description 33
- 230000002457 bidirectional effect Effects 0.000 claims abstract description 17
- 238000004891 communication Methods 0.000 claims abstract description 10
- 238000012795 verification Methods 0.000 claims description 15
- 238000004364 calculation method Methods 0.000 claims description 3
- 238000004519 manufacturing process Methods 0.000 description 13
- 238000010367 cloning Methods 0.000 description 9
- 238000013478 data encryption standard Methods 0.000 description 6
- 238000010586 diagram Methods 0.000 description 5
- 238000004422 calculation algorithm Methods 0.000 description 4
- 238000005516 engineering process Methods 0.000 description 4
- 230000006870 function Effects 0.000 description 3
- 238000010295 mobile communication Methods 0.000 description 3
- 238000009826 distribution Methods 0.000 description 2
- 238000012545 processing Methods 0.000 description 2
- 230000009286 beneficial effect Effects 0.000 description 1
- 230000001413 cellular effect Effects 0.000 description 1
- 238000004590 computer program Methods 0.000 description 1
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- H—ELECTRICITY
- H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
- H04W—WIRELESS COMMUNICATION NETWORKS
- H04W12/00—Security arrangements; Authentication; Protecting privacy or anonymity
- H04W12/30—Security of mobile devices; Security of mobile applications
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- G—PHYSICS
- G06—COMPUTING; CALCULATING OR COUNTING
- G06F—ELECTRIC DIGITAL DATA PROCESSING
- G06F21/00—Security arrangements for protecting computers, components thereof, programs or data against unauthorised activity
- G06F21/30—Authentication, i.e. establishing the identity or authorisation of security principals
- G06F21/44—Program or device authentication
- G06F21/445—Program or device authentication by mutual authentication, e.g. between devices or programs
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- H—ELECTRICITY
- H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
- H04W—WIRELESS COMMUNICATION NETWORKS
- H04W12/00—Security arrangements; Authentication; Protecting privacy or anonymity
- H04W12/02—Protecting privacy or anonymity, e.g. protecting personally identifiable information [PII]
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- H—ELECTRICITY
- H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
- H04W—WIRELESS COMMUNICATION NETWORKS
- H04W12/00—Security arrangements; Authentication; Protecting privacy or anonymity
- H04W12/03—Protecting confidentiality, e.g. by encryption
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- H—ELECTRICITY
- H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
- H04W—WIRELESS COMMUNICATION NETWORKS
- H04W12/00—Security arrangements; Authentication; Protecting privacy or anonymity
- H04W12/40—Security arrangements using identity modules
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Abstract
The embodiment of the invention discloses a method, a device, a system, electronic equipment and a storage medium for writing key data, relates to the field of communication, and can improve the safety of writing key data into a mobile terminal by safety equipment. The method for writing key data into the virtual subscriber identity module SIM comprises the following steps: performing bidirectional authentication between the mobile terminal and the safety device; and when the mutual authentication between the mobile terminal and the safety device is passed, allowing the safety device to write IMEI and SIM key data into the mobile terminal.
Description
Technical Field
The present invention relates to the field of communications, and in particular, to a method, an apparatus, a system, an electronic device, and a storage medium for writing key data into a virtual subscriber identity module SIM.
Background
The SIM card (Subscriber Identity Module) is also called Subscriber Identity Module. The user must access the mobile cellular network of the operator by means of the SIM card. With the development of technology, the form of an SIM (International Mobile Equipment Identity number) card is also gradually changed, and an eSIM designed together with a terminal circuit appears, that is, an original card and a card slot are replaced by one chip. Then, the SOFTSIM card, also called virtual SIM card, appears, i.e. the functions of the SIM card are completely realized by program simulation, without requiring neither a chip nor a card and a card slot, thereby achieving the purposes of simplifying the terminal hardware design and saving the cost.
The SIM card plays a major role: and the authentication and the certification of the mobile terminal equipment when accessing the network are realized. Data used in the authentication and certification process is preset in a secure storage area of the SIM card during production of the SIM card, and any data leakage is not allowed. Due to the security nature of such data, it is often referred to as sensitive or critical data.
It is also desirable for the SOFTSIM to securely store these critical data. Except that the storage space is changed from the SIM card to the mobile device, i.e.: the security of critical data is guaranteed by the mobile device.
In the prior art, as shown in fig. 1, a security device storing SIM key data in advance communicates with a mobile terminal, and the encrypted key data is transmitted to the mobile terminal. After receiving the ciphertext data, the mobile terminal decrypts the data to obtain the original key data and stores the original key data in the read-only space of the mobile terminal. The prior art has the following problems:
(1) the security device sending the key data does not authenticate the legality of the mobile terminal, and the security is insufficient;
(2) the mobile terminal does not authenticate the validity of the security device, and the security is also insufficient.
Disclosure of Invention
In view of this, embodiments of the present invention provide a method, an apparatus, a system, an electronic device, and a storage medium for writing key data into a virtual subscriber identity module SIM, which can improve the security of the whole process of writing the key data into a soft SIM.
A method for writing key data into a virtual Subscriber Identity Module (SIM) card comprises the following steps:
performing bidirectional authentication between the mobile terminal and the safety device;
and when the mutual authentication between the mobile terminal and the safety device is passed, allowing the safety device to write IMEI and SIM key data into the mobile terminal.
The step of performing mutual authentication between the mobile terminal and the security device comprises:
the mobile terminal receives a first security factor R1 sent by the security device; the mobile terminal carries out encryption operation on the first security factor R1 to obtain first authentication data D1 through calculation; simultaneously generating a second security factor R2, sending the first authentication data D1 and the second security factor R2 to a security device, enabling the security device to perform decryption operation on the first authentication data D1 to obtain a third security factor R1 ', and comparing the first security factor R1 with the third security factor R1' to perform first verification; if the first check fails, communication is stopped; if the first verification is passed, the security device performs encryption operation on the received second security factor R2 to obtain second authentication data D2, and sends the second authentication data D2 to the mobile terminal;
after receiving the second authentication data D2, the mobile terminal performs decryption operation on the second authentication data D2 to obtain a fourth security factor R2'; and comparing the second safety factor R2 with the fourth safety factor R2', if both are identical, the second check is passed.
Before the step of allowing the secure device to write IMEI and SIM critical data to the mobile terminal, the method further comprises:
judging whether IMEI and SIM key data are stored in the mobile terminal;
if the IMEI and the SIM key data are not stored, allowing the safety device to write the IMEI and the SIM key data into the mobile terminal;
if the IMEI is stored, judging whether the IMEI stored in the soft SIM in the mobile terminal is consistent with the IMEI to be written in this time;
and if the IMEI and the SIM are inconsistent, deleting the IMEI and the SIM key data stored in the mobile terminal.
The method further comprises the following steps:
storing the IMEI received from the security device in a first predetermined memory space in the mobile terminal; and storing the IMEI received from the secure device in a second predetermined memory space for holding the SOFTSIM.
The method further comprises the following steps:
after the mobile terminal is restarted, judging whether the IMEI stored in the first preset storage space is consistent with the IMEI stored in the second preset storage space or not;
if the mobile terminal is consistent with the virtual SIM, starting the virtual SIM of the mobile terminal, and performing the mobile terminal network access and authentication processes;
and if not, not allowing the virtual SIM of the mobile terminal to be started.
Before the step of determining whether the IMEI stored in the first predetermined storage space and the IMEI stored in the second predetermined storage space are consistent, the method further includes:
judging whether the byte content stored in the second preset storage space meets the following conditions: not all F or not all 0;
and when the above conditions are met, executing a step of judging whether the IMEI stored in the first preset storage space is consistent with the IMEI stored in the second preset storage space.
An apparatus for writing critical data to a virtual subscriber identity card (SIM), comprising:
the bidirectional authentication module is used for performing bidirectional authentication between the mobile terminal and the safety device;
and the writing unit is used for allowing the safety device to write IMEI and SIM key data into the mobile terminal when the mutual authentication between the mobile terminal and the safety device is passed.
A system for writing critical data to a virtual subscriber identity card, SIM, comprising: a mobile terminal and a security device;
the mobile terminal is used for performing bidirectional authentication with the safety device; and when the mutual authentication between the mobile terminal and the safety device is passed, allowing the safety device to write IMEI and SIM key data into the mobile terminal.
An electronic device, the electronic device comprising: the device comprises a shell, a processor, a memory, a circuit board and a power circuit, wherein the circuit board is arranged in a space enclosed by the shell, and the processor and the memory are arranged on the circuit board; a power supply circuit for supplying power to each circuit or device of the electronic apparatus; the memory is used for storing executable program codes; the processor executes a program corresponding to the executable program code by reading the executable program code stored in the memory for performing the method of any of the preceding claims.
A computer readable storage medium storing one or more programs, the one or more programs being executable by one or more processors to implement the method of any preceding claim.
In the scheme, in the whole process of writing the key data into the soft SIM, the bidirectional authentication is performed between the mobile terminal and the safety device in advance; when the mutual authentication between the mobile terminal and the safety device is passed, the safety device is allowed to write IMEI and SIM key data into the mobile terminal, so that the safety of the whole process of writing the key data into the soft SIM can be improved.
Drawings
In order to more clearly illustrate the embodiments of the present invention or the technical solutions in the prior art, the drawings used in the description of the embodiments or the prior art will be briefly described below, it is obvious that the drawings in the following description are only some embodiments of the present invention, and for those skilled in the art, other drawings can be obtained according to the drawings without creative efforts.
Fig. 1 is a schematic diagram illustrating a process of writing critical data into a soft SIM of a mobile terminal by a security device in the prior art.
Fig. 2 is a schematic flow chart of a method for writing key data into a virtual subscriber identity module SIM according to the present invention.
Fig. 3 is a schematic flow chart illustrating bidirectional authentication between a security device and a mobile terminal in an application scenario of the present invention;
FIG. 4 is a diagram illustrating a writing process of IMEI and critical data in an application scenario of the present invention;
FIG. 5 is a schematic flow chart of an anti-cloning mechanism in an application scenario of the present invention;
fig. 6 is a schematic connection diagram of the apparatus for writing key data to the SIM card according to the present invention.
Fig. 7 is a schematic connection diagram of a system for writing key data into a virtual subscriber identity module SIM according to the present invention.
Fig. 8 is a schematic structural diagram of an embodiment of an electronic device according to the present invention.
Detailed Description
Embodiments of the present invention will be described in detail below with reference to the accompanying drawings.
As shown in fig. 2, a method for writing key data into a virtual subscriber identity module SIM according to the present invention includes:
step 11, performing bidirectional authentication between the mobile terminal and the safety device;
wherein, step 11 specifically comprises:
the mobile terminal receives a first security factor R1 sent by the security device; the mobile terminal carries out encryption operation on the first security factor R1 to obtain first authentication data D1 through calculation; simultaneously generating a second security factor R2, sending the first authentication data D1 and the second security factor R2 to a security device, enabling the security device to perform decryption operation on the first authentication data D1 to obtain a third security factor R1 ', and comparing the first security factor R1 with the third security factor R1' to perform first verification; if the first check fails, communication is stopped; if the first verification is passed, the security device performs encryption operation on the received second security factor R2 to obtain second authentication data D2, and sends the second authentication data D2 to the mobile terminal;
after receiving the second authentication data D2, the mobile terminal performs decryption operation on the second authentication data D2 to obtain a fourth security factor R2'; and comparing the second safety factor R2 with the fourth safety factor R2', if both are identical, the second check is passed.
The invention confirms that the keys stored by the safety device and the mobile terminal are consistent through a series of encryption and decryption operations and comparison, namely, the safety device and the mobile terminal are legal to each other.
If the second verification fails, communication is stopped;
and if the second verification is passed, finishing the authentication.
And 12, when the mutual authentication between the mobile terminal and the safety device is passed, allowing the safety device to write IMEI and SIM key data into the mobile terminal.
In the scheme, in the whole process of writing the key data into the soft SIM, the bidirectional authentication is performed between the mobile terminal and the safety device in advance; when the mutual authentication between the mobile terminal and the safety device is passed, the safety device is allowed to write IMEI and SIM key data into the mobile terminal, so that the safety of the whole process of writing the key data into the soft SIM can be improved.
As shown in fig. 2, before the step of allowing the secure device to write IMEI and SIM critical data to the mobile terminal, the method further comprises:
step 12A, judging whether IMEI and SIM key data are stored in the mobile terminal;
if the IMEI and the SIM key data are not stored, step 12 is executed: allowing the secure device to write IMEI and SIM critical data to the mobile terminal.
If the IMEI and the SIM key data are stored, executing step 12B, and judging whether the IMEI stored in the soft SIM in the mobile terminal is consistent with the IMEI to be written in this time;
if not, executing step 12C, deleting the IMEI and SIM key data stored in the mobile terminal, and then executing step 12.
If the two are consistent, the production of the equipment is completed, and the next processing can not be carried out. This embodiment can be used in a practical mass production phase.
In an embodiment, the method further comprises:
step 13, storing the IMEI received from the safety device in a first predetermined storage space in the mobile terminal; and storing the IMEI received from the secure device in a second predetermined memory space for holding a virtual SIM. In this step, the first predetermined storage space is read only. The IMEI is stored in different places of the mobile terminal, and subsequently, the IMEI can be compared to determine whether the IMEI is modified.
The method further comprises the following steps:
step 14, after the mobile terminal is restarted, judging whether the byte content stored in the second predetermined storage space meets the following conditions: not all F or not all 0; when the above condition is not satisfied, it indicates that the key data has not been written in the device, and the processing flow is directly ended.
When the above conditions are satisfied, step 15 is executed to determine whether the IMEI stored in the first predetermined storage space and the IMEI stored in the second predetermined storage space are consistent.
If yes, executing step 16, starting the virtual SIM of the mobile terminal, and performing the mobile terminal network access and authentication process;
if not, step 17 is executed, and the virtual SIM of the mobile terminal is not allowed to be started.
The following describes an application scenario of the present invention.
In the prior art, the following problems exist:
1. in the prior art, during the process of manufacturing the SIM cards, each SIM card writes a unique IMEI. After the SIM card leaves the factory, each IMEI corresponds to a unique group of key data. Likewise, for a mobile device using the SOFTSIM technology, its production process also guarantees that critical data corresponds to IMEIs one-to-one;
2. in the production process of the mobile terminal, if the IMEI needs to be rewritten, the prior art cannot ensure the one-to-one correspondence between the IMEI and the key data;
3. the read-only space of the mobile terminal does not have the anti-cloning function, the program mirror image of the mobile device is easy to clone, and the key data is easy to clone into other devices for illegal use.
In the invention, the mobile communication terminal adopting the SOFTSIM technology needs to write the key data used in the network access authentication into the terminal equipment safely and completely in the production, distribution and use processes, ensures that the written key data is in one-to-one correspondence with the written IMEI and only exists in one unique mobile terminal, and cannot be cloned into other equipment for illegal use, namely, ensures the security of the key data, in one-to-one correspondence with the IMEI and prevents cloning in the production, distribution and use processes of the mobile equipment. Described separately below.
Firstly, the invention ensures the security of the key data. A mechanism for mutual authentication is introduced at the very beginning of the communication between the secure device and the mobile terminal. As shown in fig. 3, the specific steps of the bidirectional authentication process include:
1) the security device sends a security factor R1 to the mobile terminal;
2) the mobile terminal calculates corresponding authentication data D1 by using the received security factor R1, generates a security factor R2 at the same time, and then sends D1 and R2 to the security device;
3) the security device checks the received D1, and if the check fails, the security device stops communication as the currently connected mobile terminal is illegal. If the verification is passed, the received R2 is used for calculating authentication data D2, and D2 is sent to the mobile terminal;
4) and the mobile terminal verifies the received D2, and if the verification fails, the mobile terminal stops communication when the currently connected security device is illegal. And if the verification is passed, finishing the authentication. The security device starts writing IMEI and SIM critical data to the mobile terminal.
The checking specifically comprises the following steps:
the mobile terminal receives a first security factor R1 sent by the security device; the mobile terminal uses R1 as original data according to the received first security factor R1, uses an international common Data Encryption Standard (DES) algorithm to perform encryption operation on R1, and calculates to obtain first authentication data D1; obtaining first authentication data D1 and generating a second security factor R2, and then sending the first authentication data D1 and the second security factor R2 to a security device, so that the security device performs first verification on the received first authentication data D1; the method specifically comprises the following steps: after receiving the first authentication data D1, the security device performs decryption operation on the first authentication data D1 by using the international common Data Encryption Standard (DES) algorithm to obtain a third security factor R1 ', compares the first security factor R1 with the third security factor R1 ', and if the first security factor R1 and the third security factor R1 ' are consistent, passes the first verification.
If the first check fails, stopping communication; if the first check is passed, then the security device uses the received second security factor R2 as original data, and performs encryption operation on the second security factor R2 by using the DES algorithm, and the obtained result is the second authentication data D2, and sends the second authentication data D2 to the mobile terminal.
The mobile terminal receives the authentication second authentication data D2 and performs a second verification; after receiving the second authentication data D2, the mobile terminal performs decryption operation on the D2 by using a DES algorithm to obtain a fourth security factor R2 ', compares the second security factor R2 with the fourth security factor R2 ', and if the second security factor R2 and the fourth security factor R2 ' are consistent, the verification is passed.
Secondly, the invention ensures that the written key data corresponds to the IMEI one by one. In the actual mass production process, the IMEI of the mobile terminal is often changed because the mobile terminal rewrites the IMEI. As shown in fig. 4, the writing process of IMEI and critical data is described. In order to ensure that the IMEI is in one-to-one correspondence with the key data and exists in the only terminal equipment, in the production process, after the IMEI is written in each time, whether SIM key data exist in the current terminal or not is judged first. If not, directly writing the key data; if yes, judging whether the IMEI stored in the SOFTSSIM is consistent with the IMEI written in the current time. If the two are consistent, the production of the equipment is finished; if the IMEI and the key data are inconsistent, the fact that the key data are written into the current equipment once is indicated, at this time, the IMEI and the key data which are stored before need to be deleted, and the IMEI and the key data need to be rewritten.
Finally, the invention ensures an anti-cloning function. In order to prevent the internal code of the mobile device from being cloned on other devices in a whole for illegal use, an anti-cloning mechanism is specially designed. As shown in fig. 5, at the device production stage, the IMEI is stored in the secure storage space of the device, denoted IMEIa, and the file space of the SOFTSIM, denoted IMEIb, respectively. Each boot of the device compares IMEIa with IMEIb. If the two are consistent, the key data is not illegally used, and the SOFSIM can be normally started and completes the processes of network access, authentication and the like; if the two are not consistent, the key data is illegally cloned into the terminal equipment, the current terminal equipment is illegal equipment, and the SOFSIM cannot be started.
In addition, in order to avoid influencing the production flow of the equipment, when the IMEIb is empty, namely the content is all F or all 0, the anti-cloning judgment is not made. Because IMEIb is empty at this point, meaning that critical data has not been written in the device, there is no risk of cloning. The anti-cloning mechanism is only effective after the critical data is written in the terminal device.
The invention has the following beneficial effects:
1. the method and the device can ensure the safety and reliability of the whole process of writing the SOFSIM key data and the IMEI, and avoid the situation of repeated data writing.
2. The invention can ensure that the written IMEI and the key data are in one-to-one correspondence and only exist in one unique mobile communication terminal, namely an anti-cloning mechanism.
In summary, when the mobile communication terminal based on the SOFTSIM technology is produced, issued and used, the IMEI and the key data can be safely written into the mobile device, and the IMEI and the key data can be in one-to-one correspondence, and meanwhile, the key data is ensured not to be cloned.
As shown in fig. 6, the apparatus for writing key data into a virtual subscriber identity module SIM according to the present invention includes:
the bidirectional authentication module 31 is used for performing bidirectional authentication between the mobile terminal and the security device;
a writing unit 32, configured to allow the security device to write IMEI and SIM key data into the mobile terminal when the mutual authentication between the mobile terminal and the security device is passed.
As shown in fig. 7, a system for writing critical data into a virtual subscriber identity module SIM includes: a mobile terminal 3 and a security device 4;
the mobile terminal 3 is used for performing bidirectional authentication with the safety device; and when the mutual authentication between the mobile terminal and the safety device is passed, allowing the safety device to write IMEI and SIM key data into the mobile terminal.
As shown in fig. 8, the present invention also provides an electronic device, including: the device comprises a shell, a processor, a memory, a circuit board and a power circuit, wherein the circuit board is arranged in a space enclosed by the shell, and the processor and the memory are arranged on the circuit board; a power supply circuit for supplying power to each circuit or device of the electronic apparatus; the memory is used for storing executable program codes; the processor executes a program corresponding to the executable program code by reading the executable program code stored in the memory for performing the method of any of the preceding claims.
The invention also provides a computer readable storage medium storing one or more programs which are executable by one or more processors to implement the method of any preceding claim.
It should be understood that the described embodiments are only some embodiments of the invention, and not all embodiments. All other embodiments, which can be derived by a person skilled in the art from the embodiments given herein without making any creative effort, shall fall within the protection scope of the present invention.
For convenience of description, the above devices are described separately in terms of functional division into various units/modules. Of course, the functionality of the units/modules may be implemented in one or more software and/or hardware implementations of the invention.
It will be understood by those skilled in the art that all or part of the processes of the methods of the embodiments described above can be implemented by a computer program, which can be stored in a computer-readable storage medium, and when executed, can include the processes of the embodiments of the methods described above. The storage medium may be a magnetic disk, an optical disk, a Read-Only Memory (ROM), a Random Access Memory (RAM), or the like.
The above description is only for the specific embodiment of the present invention, but the scope of the present invention is not limited thereto, and any changes or substitutions that can be easily conceived by those skilled in the art within the technical scope of the present invention are included in the scope of the present invention. Therefore, the protection scope of the present invention shall be subject to the protection scope of the claims.
Claims (10)
1. A method for writing key data into a virtual Subscriber Identity Module (SIM) card is characterized by comprising the following steps:
performing bidirectional authentication between the mobile terminal and the safety device;
and when the mutual authentication between the mobile terminal and the safety device is passed, allowing the safety device to write IMEI and SIM key data into the mobile terminal.
2. The method of claim 1, wherein the step of performing mutual authentication between the mobile terminal and the secure device comprises:
the mobile terminal receives a first security factor R1 sent by the security device; the mobile terminal carries out encryption operation on the first security factor R1 to obtain first authentication data D1 through calculation; simultaneously generating a second security factor R2, sending the first authentication data D1 and the second security factor R2 to a security device, enabling the security device to perform decryption operation on the first authentication data D1 to obtain a third security factor R1 ', and comparing the first security factor R1 with the third security factor R1' to perform first verification; if the first check fails, communication is stopped; if the first verification is passed, the security device performs encryption operation on the received second security factor R2 to obtain second authentication data D2, and sends the second authentication data D2 to the mobile terminal;
after receiving the second authentication data D2, the mobile terminal performs decryption operation on the second authentication data D2 to obtain a fourth security factor R2'; and comparing the second safety factor R2 with the fourth safety factor R2', if both are identical, the second check is passed.
3. The method of claim 1, wherein prior to the step of allowing the secure device to write IMEI and SIM critical data to the mobile terminal, the method further comprises:
judging whether IMEI and SIM key data are stored in the mobile terminal;
if the IMEI and the SIM key data are not stored, allowing the safety device to write the IMEI and the SIM key data into the mobile terminal;
if the IMEI is stored, judging whether the IMEI stored in the soft SIM in the mobile terminal is consistent with the IMEI to be written in this time;
and if the IMEI and the SIM are inconsistent, deleting the IMEI and the SIM key data stored in the mobile terminal.
4. The method of claim 1, further comprising:
storing the IMEI received from the security device in a first predetermined memory space in the mobile terminal; and storing the IMEI received from the secure device in a second predetermined memory space for holding a virtual SIM.
5. The method of claim 4, further comprising:
after the mobile terminal is restarted, judging whether the IMEI stored in the first preset storage space is consistent with the IMEI stored in the second preset storage space or not;
if the mobile terminal is consistent with the virtual SIM, starting the virtual SIM of the mobile terminal, and performing the mobile terminal network access and authentication processes;
and if not, not allowing the virtual SIM of the mobile terminal to be started.
6. The method according to claim 5, wherein before the step of determining whether the IMEI stored in the first predetermined storage space and the IMEI stored in the second predetermined storage space are consistent, the method further comprises:
judging whether the byte content stored in the second preset storage space meets the following conditions: not all F or not all 0;
and when the above conditions are met, executing a step of judging whether the IMEI stored in the first preset storage space is consistent with the IMEI stored in the second preset storage space.
7. An apparatus for writing critical data to a virtual Subscriber Identity Module (SIM), comprising:
the bidirectional authentication module is used for performing bidirectional authentication between the mobile terminal and the safety device;
and the writing unit is used for allowing the safety device to write IMEI and SIM key data into the mobile terminal when the mutual authentication between the mobile terminal and the safety device is passed.
8. A system for writing critical data to a virtual subscriber identity card, SIM, comprising: a mobile terminal and a security device;
the mobile terminal is used for performing bidirectional authentication with the safety device; and when the mutual authentication between the mobile terminal and the safety device is passed, allowing the safety device to write IMEI and SIM key data into the mobile terminal.
9. An electronic device, characterized in that the electronic device comprises: the device comprises a shell, a processor, a memory, a circuit board and a power circuit, wherein the circuit board is arranged in a space enclosed by the shell, and the processor and the memory are arranged on the circuit board; a power supply circuit for supplying power to each circuit or device of the electronic apparatus; the memory is used for storing executable program codes; the processor executes a program corresponding to the executable program code by reading the executable program code stored in the memory for performing the method of any of the preceding claims.
10. A computer readable storage medium, characterized in that the computer readable storage medium stores one or more programs which are executable by one or more processors to implement the method of any preceding claim.
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| Publication number | Priority date | Publication date | Assignee | Title |
|---|---|---|---|---|
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