CN111049830B - Data information leakage prevention method for charging pile - Google Patents
Data information leakage prevention method for charging pile Download PDFInfo
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- CN111049830B CN111049830B CN201911284740.1A CN201911284740A CN111049830B CN 111049830 B CN111049830 B CN 111049830B CN 201911284740 A CN201911284740 A CN 201911284740A CN 111049830 B CN111049830 B CN 111049830B
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- H—ELECTRICITY
- H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
- H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
- H04L63/00—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security
- H04L63/04—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security for providing a confidential data exchange among entities communicating through data packet networks
- H04L63/0428—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security for providing a confidential data exchange among entities communicating through data packet networks wherein the data content is protected, e.g. by encrypting or encapsulating the payload
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- H—ELECTRICITY
- H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
- H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
- H04L43/00—Arrangements for monitoring or testing data switching networks
- H04L43/10—Active monitoring, e.g. heartbeat, ping or trace-route
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- H—ELECTRICITY
- H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
- H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
- H04L63/00—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security
- H04L63/14—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security for detecting or protecting against malicious traffic
- H04L63/1408—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security for detecting or protecting against malicious traffic by monitoring network traffic
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- H—ELECTRICITY
- H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
- H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
- H04L67/00—Network arrangements or protocols for supporting network services or applications
- H04L67/01—Protocols
- H04L67/12—Protocols specially adapted for proprietary or special-purpose networking environments, e.g. medical networks, sensor networks, networks in vehicles or remote metering networks
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- H—ELECTRICITY
- H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
- H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
- H04L9/00—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols
- H04L9/32—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols including means for verifying the identity or authority of a user of the system or for message authentication, e.g. authorization, entity authentication, data integrity or data verification, non-repudiation, key authentication or verification of credentials
- H04L9/3297—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols including means for verifying the identity or authority of a user of the system or for message authentication, e.g. authorization, entity authentication, data integrity or data verification, non-repudiation, key authentication or verification of credentials involving time stamps, e.g. generation of time stamps
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- Y—GENERAL TAGGING OF NEW TECHNOLOGICAL DEVELOPMENTS; GENERAL TAGGING OF CROSS-SECTIONAL TECHNOLOGIES SPANNING OVER SEVERAL SECTIONS OF THE IPC; TECHNICAL SUBJECTS COVERED BY FORMER USPC CROSS-REFERENCE ART COLLECTIONS [XRACs] AND DIGESTS
- Y02—TECHNOLOGIES OR APPLICATIONS FOR MITIGATION OR ADAPTATION AGAINST CLIMATE CHANGE
- Y02T—CLIMATE CHANGE MITIGATION TECHNOLOGIES RELATED TO TRANSPORTATION
- Y02T90/00—Enabling technologies or technologies with a potential or indirect contribution to GHG emissions mitigation
- Y02T90/10—Technologies relating to charging of electric vehicles
- Y02T90/16—Information or communication technologies improving the operation of electric vehicles
- Y02T90/167—Systems integrating technologies related to power network operation and communication or information technologies for supporting the interoperability of electric or hybrid vehicles, i.e. smartgrids as interface for battery charging of electric vehicles [EV] or hybrid vehicles [HEV]
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- Y—GENERAL TAGGING OF NEW TECHNOLOGICAL DEVELOPMENTS; GENERAL TAGGING OF CROSS-SECTIONAL TECHNOLOGIES SPANNING OVER SEVERAL SECTIONS OF THE IPC; TECHNICAL SUBJECTS COVERED BY FORMER USPC CROSS-REFERENCE ART COLLECTIONS [XRACs] AND DIGESTS
- Y04—INFORMATION OR COMMUNICATION TECHNOLOGIES HAVING AN IMPACT ON OTHER TECHNOLOGY AREAS
- Y04S—SYSTEMS INTEGRATING TECHNOLOGIES RELATED TO POWER NETWORK OPERATION, COMMUNICATION OR INFORMATION TECHNOLOGIES FOR IMPROVING THE ELECTRICAL POWER GENERATION, TRANSMISSION, DISTRIBUTION, MANAGEMENT OR USAGE, i.e. SMART GRIDS
- Y04S30/00—Systems supporting specific end-user applications in the sector of transportation
- Y04S30/10—Systems supporting the interoperability of electric or hybrid vehicles
- Y04S30/12—Remote or cooperative charging
Abstract
The invention discloses a method for preventing data information leakage of a charging pile, which comprises the following steps: detecting whether the charging pile is implanted with viruses or invaded or not in an idle state before charging; carrying out heartbeat interaction with a cloud server in real time when the charging pile is in a charging state, and detecting whether data communication between modules or chips in the charging pile is invaded or not; when the charging pile transmits the charging data of the user to the cloud server, the byte stream of the data is coded and sequenced to realize data encryption transmission. The system can not only carry out encryption transmission on data when the charging pile and the cloud server carry out data transmission, but also detect whether the charging pile is invaded in real time, and can also detect whether the charging pile is invaded in an idle state; when user information safety has been protected, also played fine guard action to charging pile self data safety.
Description
Technical Field
The invention relates to the technical field of data processing, in particular to a method for preventing data information leakage of a charging pile.
Background
With the consumption aggravation and pollution problem of the traditional energy sources, the popularization and application of new energy sources are advocated in the world; electric vehicles have become popular in more and more countries and regions as a new energy application form; and a large amount of electric automobile faces this problem of charging, all solves electric automobile's electric power continuation of journey's problem through filling electric pile at present.
And need can acquire some data information of electric automobile and need with data transmission to the high in the clouds in real time in the charging process, in order to avoid filling electric pile in the in-process of acquireing electric automobile data, reveal user's personal information or other privacy simultaneously, just must encrypt the data information who acquires, at present there is not the method to the data leakage of prevention filling electric pile.
Disclosure of Invention
The invention aims to overcome the defects of the prior art, provides a method for preventing leakage of data information of a charging pile, and solves the problem that personal information or other privacy of a user is leaked by the existing charging pile.
The purpose of the invention is realized by the following technical scheme: a data information leakage prevention method for a charging pile comprises the following steps:
carrying out heartbeat interaction with a cloud server in real time when the charging pile is in a charging state, and detecting whether data communication between modules or chips in the charging pile is invaded or not;
when the charging pile transmits the charging data of the user to the cloud server, the byte stream of the data is coded and sequenced to realize data encryption transmission.
The method comprises the steps of monitoring whether data communication between modules in the charging pile is invaded or not in real time when the charging pile is in a charging state, and detecting whether the charging pile is implanted with viruses or invaded or not when the charging pile is in an idle state.
When the charging pile transmits the charging data of the user to the cloud server, the following contents are included in the process of coding and sequencing the byte stream of the data to realize data encryption transmission:
judging whether the length of the data area in the byte stream meets a preset length value or not, and if not, completing by 0;
storing each byte in the data byte stream in a cross way, dividing the data length of the byte stream into a plurality of byte stream data areas with equal length by taking a threshold length as a reference, checking the byte stream, and recording the time stamp of division of each byte stream data area;
and randomly scrambling all the byte stream data areas, sending the scrambled byte stream data areas to a cloud server through a public key, and sending timestamps divided by all the byte stream data areas to the cloud server in a private key mode.
The byte stream check processing includes the following contents:
the data length of the byte stream can be divided by the threshold length, and the exclusive or check is carried out on the bytes of each threshold length in sequence until the tail of the byte stream;
the length of the byte stream data cannot be divided by the threshold length, the rest bytes are discarded from the end of the data, and the bytes are subjected to exclusive-or check in sequence every threshold length.
The relation between the threshold length and the preset length value for dividing the byte stream data area length is that the preset length value is an integral multiple of the threshold length.
When filling electric pile and being in charged state in real time with high in the clouds server carry out the heartbeat interaction to whether data communication between the detection charging pile inner module or the chip suffers the content that the invasion step included as follows:
the charging pile actively sends a heartbeat request to a cloud server within a specified heartbeat period, and reports the state;
if the cloud server receives the heartbeat request in a heartbeat cycle, sending an empty packet signal to the charging pile to respond and establish communication connection;
and detecting whether data communication between the modules or chips in the charging pile is invaded or not.
And if the cloud server does not receive the heartbeat request reported by the charging pile in N continuous heartbeat cycles, determining that the charging pile is in failure and lost.
The step of detecting whether data communication between modules or chips in the charging pile is invaded comprises the following contents:
carrying out protocol analysis, comparison and analysis processing on two paths of non-homogeneous communication modes between modules or chips in the charging pile;
judging whether the two-path communication data quantity between each module or each chip is the same as the communication data content or not;
if the communication data volume is the same as the communication data content, the intrusion is not considered, and if the communication data volume is different from the communication data content, the intrusion is considered.
Before the protocol analysis, comparison and analysis processing steps are carried out on the two paths of non-homogeneous communication modes between the modules or chips in the charging pile, communication connection of data communication is carried out on all the modules or chips which transmit user data information in the charging pile in a two-path non-homogeneous communication mode.
The method comprises the steps of detecting whether the charging pile is implanted with viruses or invaded when the charging pile is in an idle state, detecting the flash capacity state in the charging pile, calculating the result of whether the CRC checksum and the CRC checksum of the plug-in chip are different, and judging whether the charging pile is invaded or not according to the capacity change.
The invention has the beneficial effects that: a data information leakage prevention method for a charging pile can not only carry out encryption transmission on data when the charging pile and a cloud server carry out data transmission, but also detect whether the charging pile is invaded in real time, and can also detect whether the charging pile is invaded in an idle state; when user information safety has been protected, also played fine guard action to charging pile self data safety.
Drawings
FIG. 1 is a flow chart of the method of the present invention.
Detailed Description
In order to make the objects, technical solutions and advantages of the embodiments of the present invention clearer, the technical solutions in the embodiments of the present invention will be clearly and completely described below with reference to the drawings in the embodiments of the present invention, and it is obvious that the described embodiments are some, but not all, embodiments of the present invention. The components of embodiments of the present invention generally described and illustrated in the figures herein may be arranged and designed in a wide variety of different configurations.
Thus, the following detailed description of the embodiments of the present invention, presented in the figures, is not intended to limit the scope of the invention, as claimed, but is merely representative of selected embodiments of the invention. All other embodiments, which can be derived by a person skilled in the art from the embodiments given herein without making any creative effort, shall fall within the protection scope of the present invention.
It should be noted that: like reference numbers and letters refer to like items in the following figures, and thus, once an item is defined in one figure, it need not be further defined and explained in subsequent figures.
In the description of the present invention, it should be noted that the terms "upper", "inner", "outer", etc. indicate orientations or positional relationships based on those shown in the drawings or orientations or positional relationships that the products of the present invention conventionally use, which are merely for convenience of description and simplification of description, but do not indicate or imply that the devices or elements referred to must have a specific orientation, be constructed in a specific orientation, and be operated, and thus, should not be construed as limiting the present invention.
In the description of the present invention, it should also be noted that, unless otherwise explicitly specified or limited, the terms "disposed," "mounted," and "connected" are to be construed broadly, e.g., as meaning fixedly connected, detachably connected, or integrally connected; can be mechanically or electrically connected; they may be connected directly or indirectly through intervening media, or they may be interconnected between two elements. The specific meanings of the above terms in the present invention can be understood in specific cases to those skilled in the art.
The technical solutions of the present invention are further described in detail below with reference to the accompanying drawings, but the scope of the present invention is not limited to the following.
As shown in fig. 1, a method for preventing leakage of data information of a charging pile includes the following steps:
s1, detecting whether the charging pile is implanted with viruses or invaded or not in an idle state before charging;
s2, carrying out heartbeat interaction with a cloud server in real time when the charging pile is in a charging state, and detecting whether data communication between modules or chips in the charging pile is invaded or not;
and S3, when the charging pile transmits the charging data of the user to the cloud server, coding and sequencing the byte stream of the data to realize data encryption transmission.
Further, when the charging pile transmits the charging data of the user to the cloud server, the following contents are included in the process of coding and sequencing the byte stream of the data to realize data encryption transmission:
s21, judging whether the length of the data area in the byte stream meets a preset length value or not, and if not, completing by 0;
s22, storing each byte in the data byte stream in a crossed manner, dividing the data length of the byte stream into a plurality of byte stream data areas with equal length by taking a threshold length as a reference, checking the byte stream, and recording the time stamp of division of each byte stream data area;
and S23, randomly disordering all the byte stream data areas, sending the disordered byte stream data areas to the cloud server through the public key, and sending the time stamps divided by all the byte stream data areas to the cloud server through the private key.
The relation between the threshold length and the preset length value for dividing the byte stream data area length is that the preset length value is an integral multiple of the threshold length.
Further, the preset length value is 16 bytes, and the threshold length for dividing the length of the byte stream data area is 4 bytes; for a data region less than 16 bytes in the byte stream, 16 bytes must be filled with 0.
The byte stream check processing includes the following contents:
the length of byte stream data can be divided by 4, and exclusive or check is carried out on every 4 bytes in sequence until the tail of the byte stream;
the length of the byte stream data cannot be divided by 4, the bytes which are left by dividing 4 bytes are discarded from the end of the data, and exclusive-or check is carried out on every 4 bytes.
Furthermore, the encryption rule of the data is basically invariable, the cloud server knows the encryption rule of the data, and the cloud server does not know the time stamps of the division of all byte stream data areas which change in real time; therefore, the cloud server decrypts the data by combining the encryption rule interface after receiving the timestamp; the time stamp is sent by a private key and is not easy to intercept, so that the confidentiality is high, the time stamp has unique certainty when being generated and cannot be counterfeited or changed, and even if someone intercepts the data and knows the encryption rule, the data cannot be decrypted without knowing the time stamp divided by all byte stream data areas corresponding to the data, the confidentiality of the data is further improved, and the leakage of user information is effectively prevented.
When filling electric pile and being in charged state in real time with high in the clouds server carry out the heartbeat interaction to whether data communication between the detection charging pile inner module or the chip suffers the content that the invasion step included as follows:
the charging pile actively sends a heartbeat request to a cloud server within a specified heartbeat period of 60 seconds, and reports the state;
if the cloud server receives the heartbeat request within 60 seconds, an empty packet signal is sent to the charging pile to respond and establish communication connection;
and detecting whether data communication between the modules or chips in the charging pile is invaded or not.
Further, if the cloud server does not receive the heartbeat request reported by the charging pile in 3 continuous heartbeat cycles, the charging pile is considered to be failed and lost.
Further, the step of detecting whether data communication between modules or chips in the charging pile is invaded includes the following contents:
carrying out protocol analysis, comparison and analysis processing on two paths of non-homogeneous communication modes between modules or chips in the charging pile;
judging whether the two-path communication data quantity between each module or each chip is the same as the communication data content or not;
if the communication data volume is the same as the communication data content, the intrusion is not considered, and if the communication data volume is different from the communication data content, the intrusion is considered.
Before the protocol analysis, comparison and analysis processing steps are carried out on the two paths of non-homogeneous communication modes between the modules or chips in the charging pile, communication connection of data communication is carried out on all the modules or chips which transmit user data information in the charging pile in a two-path non-homogeneous communication mode.
Further, except encrypting data on the software level, need erase the silk screen printing to each module, chip on the hardware level, seal module, chip through coloured hot melt adhesive after the paster, carry out dual guarantee.
The method comprises the steps of detecting whether the charging pile is implanted with viruses or invaded when the charging pile is in an idle state, detecting the flash capacity state in the charging pile, calculating the result of CRC (cyclic redundancy check) and whether the result of CRC checksum of a plug-in chip and capacity change judge whether the charging pile is invaded.
Further, the flash mainly comprises three areas: the method comprises the following steps that 1, an area bootstrap program and a self-checking program are adopted, 2, an area operation program and 3, a backup program are adopted; the running program jumps to a self-checking program at a specific moment → CRC is carried out from the area 2 one by one → a result is obtained → the CRC and the memory capacity information stored in the plug-in flash chip are obtained → the residual capacity of the area 2 is analyzed → whether intrusion is caused is judged.
If the CRC results are consistent and the capacity is unchanged, the CRC result is normal;
if the CRC result is consistent and the capacity is reduced, replacing the memory capacity information in the plug-in flash;
if the CRC result is inconsistent and the capacity is unchanged, replacing the CRC in the plug-in flash;
if the CRC results are inconsistent and the capacity is reduced, the abnormal condition is indicated, and the possibility of intrusion exists.
The above description is only an embodiment of the present invention, and not intended to limit the scope of the present invention, and all modifications of equivalent structures and equivalent processes performed by the present specification and drawings, or directly or indirectly applied to other related technical fields, are included in the scope of the present invention.
Claims (9)
1. A method for preventing data information leakage of a charging pile is characterized by comprising the following steps: the data information encryption method comprises the following steps:
carrying out heartbeat interaction with a cloud server in real time when the charging pile is in a charging state, and detecting whether data communication between modules or chips in the charging pile is invaded or not;
when the charging pile transmits user charging data to the cloud server, encoding and sequencing byte streams of the data to realize data encryption transmission;
when the charging pile transmits the charging data of the user to the cloud server, the following contents are included in the process of coding and sequencing the byte stream of the data to realize data encryption transmission:
judging whether the length of the data area in the byte stream meets a preset length value or not, and if not, completing by 0;
storing each byte in the data byte stream in a cross way, dividing the data length of the byte stream into a plurality of byte stream data areas with equal length by taking a threshold length as a reference, checking the byte stream, and recording the time stamp of division of each byte stream data area;
and randomly scrambling all the byte stream data areas, sending the scrambled byte stream data areas to a cloud server in a public key mode, and sending timestamps divided by all the byte stream data areas to the cloud server in a private key mode.
2. The method for preventing data information leakage of the charging pile according to claim 1, wherein the method comprises the following steps: the method comprises the steps of monitoring whether data communication between modules in the charging pile is invaded or not in real time when the charging pile is in a charging state, and detecting whether the charging pile is implanted with viruses or invaded or not when the charging pile is in an idle state.
3. The method for preventing data information leakage of the charging pile according to claim 1, wherein the method comprises the following steps: the byte stream check processing includes the following contents:
the data length of the byte stream can be divided by the threshold length, and the exclusive or check is carried out on the bytes of each threshold length in sequence until the tail of the byte stream;
the length of the byte stream data cannot be divided by the threshold length, the rest bytes are discarded from the end of the data, and the bytes are subjected to exclusive-or check in sequence every threshold length.
4. The method for preventing data information leakage of the charging pile according to claim 1, wherein the method comprises the following steps: the relation between the threshold length and the preset length value for dividing the byte stream data area length is that the preset length value is an integral multiple of the threshold length.
5. The method for preventing data information leakage of the charging pile according to claim 1, wherein the method comprises the following steps: when filling electric pile and being in charged state in real time with high in the clouds server carry out the heartbeat interaction to whether data communication between the detection charging pile inner module or the chip suffers the content that the invasion step included as follows:
the charging pile actively sends a heartbeat request to a cloud server within a specified heartbeat period, and reports the state;
if the cloud server receives the heartbeat request in a heartbeat cycle, sending an empty packet signal to the charging pile to respond and establish communication connection;
and detecting whether data communication between the modules or chips in the charging pile is invaded or not.
6. The method for preventing data information leakage of the charging pile according to claim 5, wherein: and if the cloud server does not receive the heartbeat request reported by the charging pile in N continuous heartbeat cycles, determining that the charging pile is in failure and lost.
7. The method for preventing data information leakage of the charging pile according to claim 5, wherein: the step of detecting whether data communication between modules or chips in the charging pile is invaded comprises the following contents:
carrying out protocol analysis, comparison and analysis processing on two paths of non-homogeneous communication modes between modules or chips in the charging pile;
judging whether the two-path communication data quantity between each module or each chip is the same as the communication data content or not;
if the communication data volume is the same as the communication data content, the intrusion is not considered, and if the communication data volume is different from the communication data content, the intrusion is considered.
8. The method for preventing data information leakage of the charging pile according to claim 7, wherein: before the protocol analysis, comparison and analysis processing steps are carried out on the two paths of non-homogeneous communication modes between the modules or chips in the charging pile, communication connection of data communication is carried out on all the modules or chips which transmit user data information in the charging pile in a two-path non-homogeneous communication mode.
9. The method for preventing data information leakage of the charging pile according to claim 2, wherein: the method comprises the steps of detecting whether the charging pile is implanted with viruses or invaded when the charging pile is in an idle state, detecting the flash capacity state in the charging pile, calculating the result of whether the CRC checksum and the CRC checksum of the plug-in chip are different, and judging whether the charging pile is invaded or not according to the capacity change.
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| CN113688407A (en) * | 2021-07-30 | 2021-11-23 | 山东云海国创云计算装备产业创新中心有限公司 | Data management method and related device |
| CN115022373A (en) * | 2022-06-21 | 2022-09-06 | 浙江浩瀚能源科技有限公司 | Data security detection method, system, equipment and storage medium for charging pile |
| CN115859387B (en) * | 2022-12-01 | 2024-04-09 | 深圳市赛特新能科技有限公司 | Electric automobile charging safety detection method |
| CN116155634B (en) * | 2023-04-23 | 2023-08-04 | 驿羚江苏大数据有限公司 | Charging process safety protection method and system based on SaaS mode |
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