CN110971415A

CN110971415A - Space-ground integrated space information network anonymous access authentication method and system

Info

Publication number: CN110971415A
Application number: CN201911283127.8A
Authority: CN
Inventors: 徐川; 刘子琦; 赵国锋; 孙南彬; 韩珍珍
Original assignee: Chongqing University of Post and Telecommunications
Current assignee: Chongqing University of Post and Telecommunications
Priority date: 2019-12-13
Filing date: 2019-12-13
Publication date: 2020-04-07
Anticipated expiration: 2039-12-13
Also published as: CN110971415B

Abstract

The invention discloses a space-ground integrated space information network anonymous access authentication method and a system, wherein terminal equipment and a satellite register with a ground management center respectively, the terminal equipment sends a first access authentication request to the satellite, the satellite forwards the access authentication request and an identity authentication message of the terminal equipment, the ground management center replies a first response of the first access authentication of the satellite, the terminal equipment receives and verifies a second response of the first access authentication sent by the satellite, the first access authentication process is completed, the terminal equipment sends a second access authentication request to the satellite, receives the second access authentication response of the satellite, and the second access authentication process is completed.

Description

Space-ground integrated space information network anonymous access authentication method and system

Technical Field

The invention relates to the field of information network security, in particular to a space-ground integrated space information network anonymous access authentication method.

Background

With the rapid development of space-ground integrated spatial information network technology. Meanwhile, with the continuous enhancement of the requirements of national security, aerospace, disaster early warning and the like and the continuous development of various strategic information tasks in different dimensions such as land, sea, air, sky and the like, the original mutually independent networks are enabled to share information as required, cross-region and cross-airspace communication and the cooperative work of each node of the network are realized, so that the spatial information network is further developed, the access authentication is used as a first defense line of network security protection, the access authentication can be used for identity identification among each node in the network per se, and malicious and illegal terminal equipment is prevented from occupying network resources, so that the security access authentication scheme is very important for the space-ground integrated spatial information network.

Due to the characteristics of limited resources, large time delay, dynamic change of network topology, high exposure and vulnerability of a channel and more types of access terminal equipment in the space-ground integrated spatial information network, the terminal with different security level requirements faces the problem of frequent access authentication when accessing the satellite. However, the traditional space-ground integrated space information network anonymous access authentication method is based on a public key cryptosystem, has high calculation overhead and high key updating overhead, can only realize one-way authentication of a satellite on terminal equipment, cannot prevent replay attack, and cannot select a proper access authentication mode for the terminal equipment with different security requirements. Therefore, it becomes more difficult to provide services for the terminal device in the space-ground integrated spatial information network with limited resources, and the service experience of the terminal device is greatly influenced.

Therefore, the invention provides a space-ground integrated space information network anonymous access authentication method and system, which can reduce the number of access authentication interaction, reduce the access authentication delay and the calculation overhead and ensure the security of the access authentication process of the terminal equipment.

Disclosure of Invention

The invention aims to solve the problems in the prior art and provides a method and a system for anonymous access authentication of a space-ground integrated space information network, which can reduce the interaction times of access authentication, reduce the access authentication delay and the calculation overhead and ensure the security of the access authentication process of terminal equipment.

According to one aspect of the invention, a method for anonymous access authentication of a space-ground integrated space information network is provided, and the method comprises the following steps:

step 1, the terminal equipment and the satellite respectively send information carrying inherent identity to a ground management center for registration, and the ground management center sends information containing real identity ID of the terminal equipment to the terminal equipment_uA registration response of the first secret key K and the first random number r, and the ground management center sends a registration response containing the true identity ID of the satellite equipment to the satellite_sA second secret key K ', a second random number r' and a public key P of a ground management center_NCCThe registration response of (1);

step 2, the terminal equipment sends a first access authentication request message to the satellite, wherein the first access authentication request message comprises: a third random number calculated using an exclusive-or operation and a hash function

Terminal equipment pseudo identity obtained by utilizing third random number H to calculate

First message authentication code MAC_u＝h(ID_u||R_u| T) and a fourth random number

Wherein R is_uA fifth random number generated when the terminal transmits the authentication request, T being a first time stamp,

the operation symbol represents exclusive-or operation, | the operation symbol represents splicing operation, and the h () function is a hash function;

step 3, the satellite receives the first access authentication request message, judges whether the current terminal equipment is accessed for the first time through a legal access user verification table maintained on the satellite, and forwards the access authentication of the terminal equipment if the current terminal equipment is accessed for the first timeThe identity authentication method comprises the following steps of sending an identity authentication message of a satellite and a certificate request message to a ground management center, wherein the identity authentication message of the satellite comprises: the satellite calculates a sixth random number by using an exclusive-or operation and a hash function

Satellite pseudo-identity calculated by using sixth random number H

Second message authentication code MAC_s＝h(ID_s||R_s| T') and a seventh random number

Where T' is a second time stamp, R_sAn eighth random number generated when the identity authentication message is sent for the satellite;

step 4, the ground management center receives and verifies the first access authentication request message of the terminal equipment and the identity authentication message of the satellite, and if the authentication fails, the ground management center replies an authentication failure message; if the verification is successful, replying a first response message of the satellite first access authentication, wherein the first response message of the satellite first access authentication comprises: message S, negotiation key generation algorithm, ID of true identity of terminal equipment by using first session key sk negotiated between satellite and ground_uA message obtained by encrypting with the first key K, a third message verification code MAC obtained by signing the message S by using the first message verification code key MAC _ key and a third timestamp T_NCCInformation;

step 5, the satellite receives a first response message of the first access authentication, and a public key P of the ground management center is used_NCCIf the verification is successful, the verification message S calculates a first session key sk ═ h (h (K | | R' | | R) for key update according to a key generation algorithm negotiated with the ground management center_s) K '), and a first message authentication code key MAC _ key ═ h (K ' | | | h (K | | R ' | | | R)_s)||r_s) Verifying the third messageCode MAC, and whether the timestamp information is in the allowed time range is judged, and the true identity ID of the successfully authenticated terminal equipment is obtained_uAnd a corresponding first key K, establishing a corresponding relation table, and calculating an element H of a second session key SK for generating data secure transmission between the satellite and the terminal_sat＝h(K’||r’||r||T_s'), satellite message authentication code key MAC_SAT_key＝h(ID_u||K||r_u) And an identification message session _ ID ═ h (ID) uniquely specifying the terminal device_u||T_s') wherein T is_s' is a fourth timestamp;

step 6, the satellite sends a first access authentication second response message to the terminal device, wherein the first access authentication second response message comprises: element H of second session key SK using first key K_satAnd a message obtained by encrypting a first identification message session _ id uniquely specifying the terminal device, using a satellite message authentication code key MAC_SATA signature message of the key to the second response message and a fourth timestamp Ts';

step 7, the terminal equipment receives and verifies the first access authentication second response message, and calculates the satellite message verification code key MAC_SAT_key＝h(ID_u||K||r_u) Verifying the signature message, and if the verification is successful, decrypting by using the first secret key K of the signature message to obtain an element H of the second session secret key SK_satAnd a first identification message session _ id, storing the first identification message session _ id, and calculating a second session key SK ═ h (h (K '| | r' | r) | | K) and a terminal message authentication code key MAC_US_key＝h(ID_u||H_sat) Completing the first access authentication process of the terminal equipment;

step 8, when the terminal device needs to perform access authentication again, calculating a second message verification code key MAC _ key ═ h (K | | | ID)_u||R_u'), sending a re-access authentication request message to the satellite, the re-access authentication request message comprising: first identification information session _ ID stored in the process of first access authentication, and real identity ID of terminal equipment by using first secret key K_uA second session key SK and a second message authentication codeMessage encrypted by Key MAC _ Key, ninth random number R_u' and fifth time stamp T_u', using a second message verification code key MAC _ key to sign the message of the re-access authentication request message;

step 9, the satellite receives and verifies the re-access authentication request message, if the verification is successful, negotiates with the terminal device for a third session key SK 'and a third message verification code key MAC _ key', calculates a second identification message session _ id, deletes the session key information stored before, and replies a re-access authentication response message to the terminal device, wherein the re-access authentication response message includes: second identification message session _ id, signature message signed by using first key K of terminal, tenth random number R_s' and sixth time stamp T_s”；

And step 10, the terminal equipment receives the re-access authentication response message, calculates a third session key SK 'and a third message verification code key MAC _ key' for data security transmission, and completes the re-access authentication process.

According to another aspect of the present invention, a system for anonymous access authentication of a space-ground integrated spatial information network is provided, where the system includes at least 1 satellite, a plurality of terminal devices, and 1 trusted ground management center, and the system specifically includes:

a terminal device for:

sending information carrying inherent identity to a ground management center for registration, and receiving ID containing real identity of terminal equipment sent by the ground management center_uA registration response of the first key K and the first random number r;

sending a first access authentication request message to a satellite, wherein the first access authentication request message comprises: a third random number calculated using an exclusive-or operation and a hash function

Terminal pseudo identity calculated by using third random number H

First disappearInformation verification code MAC_u＝h(ID_u||R_u| T) and a fourth random number

receiving and verifying a first access authentication second response message sent by a satellite, and calculating a satellite message verification code key MAC_SAT_key＝h(ID_u||K||r_u) Verifying the signature message, and if the verification is successful, decrypting by using the first secret key K of the signature message to obtain an element H of the second session secret key SK_satAnd a first identification message session _ id, storing the first identification message session _ id, and calculating a second session key SK ═ h (h (K '| | r' | r) | | K) and a terminal message authentication code key MAC_US_key＝h(ID_u||H_sat) Completing the first access authentication process of the terminal equipment;

when access authentication needs to be performed again, a second message verification code key MAC _ key h (K | | | ID) is calculated_u||R_u'), sending a re-access authentication request message to the satellite, the re-access authentication request message comprising: first identification information session _ ID stored in the process of first access authentication, and real identity ID of terminal equipment by using first secret key K_uA message encrypted by the second session Key SK and the second message authentication code Key MAC _ Key, and a ninth random number R_u' and fifth time stamp T_u', using a second message verification code key MAC _ key to sign the message of the re-access authentication request message;

receiving a re-access authentication response message sent by the satellite, and calculating a third session key SK 'and a third message verification code key MAC _ key' for data security transmission to complete a re-access authentication process;

a satellite for:

sending information carrying inherent identity to a ground management center for registration, and receiving ID containing true identity of satellite equipment sent by the ground management center_sA second secret key K ', a second random number r' and a public key P of a ground management center_NCCThe registration response of (1);

receiving a first access authentication request message sent by a terminal, judging whether the current terminal equipment is accessed for the first time through a legal access user verification table maintained on a satellite, if the current terminal equipment is accessed for the first time, forwarding the access authentication request message of the terminal equipment and an identity authentication message of the satellite to a ground management center, wherein the identity authentication message of the satellite comprises: the satellite calculates a sixth random number by using an exclusive-or operation and a hash function

Satellite pseudo-identity calculated by using sixth random number H

receiving first response message of first access authentication sent by ground control center, using public key P of ground management center_NCCIf the verification is successful, the verification message S calculates a first session key sk ═ h (h (K | | R' | | R) for key update according to a key generation algorithm negotiated with the ground management center_s) K '), and a first message authentication code key MAC _ key ═ h (K ' | | | h (K | | R ' | | | R)_s)||r_s) Verifying the third message verification code MAC and judging whether the time stamp information is in the allowed time range,solving the true identity ID of the successfully authenticated terminal equipment_uAnd a corresponding first key K, establishing a corresponding relation table, and calculating an element H of a second session key SK for generating data secure transmission between the satellite and the terminal_sat＝h(K’||r’||r||T_s'), satellite message authentication code key MAC_SAT_key＝h(ID_u||K||r_u) And a first identification message session _ ID ═ h (ID) uniquely specifying the terminal device_u||T_s') wherein T is_s' is a fourth timestamp;

sending a first access authentication second response message to the terminal equipment, wherein the first access authentication second response message comprises: element H of second session key SK using first key K_satAnd a message obtained by encrypting a first identification message session _ id uniquely specifying the terminal device, using a satellite message authentication code key MAC_SATA signature message of the key to the second response message and a fourth timestamp Ts';

receiving and verifying a re-access authentication request message sent by the terminal equipment, negotiating a third session key SK 'and a third message verification code key MAC _ key' with the terminal equipment if the verification is successful, calculating a second identification message session _ id, deleting the session key information stored before, and replying a re-access authentication response message of the terminal equipment, wherein the re-access authentication response message comprises: a second identification message session _ id, a signature message signed using a first key K of the terminal, a tenth random number R_s' and sixth time stamp T_s”；

A ground management center for:

receiving registration information which is respectively sent by terminal equipment and a satellite and carries inherent identity, and sending ID containing real identity of the terminal equipment to the terminal equipment_uA registration response containing the first secret key K and the first random number r sends a real identity ID containing the satellite equipment to the satellite_sA second secret key K ', a second random number r' and a public key P of a ground management center_NCCThe registration response of (1);

receiving and verifying first access authentication request message of terminal equipment and identity authentication of satelliteThe authentication information, if the verification fails, the authentication failure information is replied; if the verification is successful, replying a first response message of the satellite first access authentication, wherein the first response message of the satellite first access authentication comprises: message S, negotiation key generation algorithm, ID of true identity of terminal equipment by using first session key sk negotiated between satellite and ground_uA message encrypted by the key K, a third message verification code MAC obtained by signing the message S by using the first message verification code key MAC _ key and a third timestamp T_NCCAnd (4) information.

The invention has the beneficial effects that the invention provides the space-ground integrated space information network anonymous access authentication method and system, which can effectively judge the legality of the terminal equipment and avoid the illegal access of illegal malicious users to network resources. When the terminal equipment sends an access authentication request to the satellite for the first time, the satellite forwards the authentication request and identity information carrying the satellite to a ground management center for verification, if the verification is successful, the ground management center sends an access authentication response message and the encrypted real identity information of the terminal equipment to the satellite, and meanwhile the satellite stores the real identity information of the terminal equipment passing the current authentication, so that the access authentication request of the terminal equipment can be directly verified when the terminal equipment is accessed to the authentication again, meanwhile, the anonymous authentication of the terminal equipment is realized by using the identity of the pseudo terminal equipment, the privacy of the terminal equipment is protected, and the real identity of a malicious user can be tracked through the pseudo identity and the responsibility can be traced to the malicious user. When the terminal equipment requests to access authentication again, the invention transfers the authentication function to the satellite, and authenticates the terminal equipment by using a symmetric encryption mode, thereby greatly reducing the complexity of access authentication, reducing the access authentication delay and the calculation cost, providing various access authentication security level options for users with different security requirements, and simultaneously effectively ensuring the security of the system.

Drawings

FIG. 1 is a flowchart of the overall operation of a space-ground integrated space information network anonymous access authentication method provided by the present invention;

FIG. 2 is a schematic flow chart of another method for authenticating space-ground integrated space information network anonymous access provided by the present invention;

fig. 3 is a flowchart of authentication for a terminal device to access a satellite for the first time according to the present invention;

fig. 4 is a flowchart of the authentication process for re-accessing the terminal device to the satellite according to the present invention;

fig. 5 is an overall architecture diagram of a space-ground integrated space information network anonymous access authentication system provided by the invention.

Detailed Description

The following description will be made for the purpose of further explaining the starting point and the corresponding technical solutions of the present invention.

Fig. 1 shows a flow chart of an anonymous access authentication method for a space-ground integrated space information network, which mainly includes the following three stages: system initialization phase, registration phase and authentication phase. These three phases are described in detail below.

Firstly, a system initialization stage: establishing system parameters, wherein the established system parameters mainly comprise: two prime numbers p and q, and an Euler formula phi (n) modular operation; public and private key pairs of the ground management center NCC; a public and private key pair of a satellite; a one-way hash function h.

II, a registration stage: the terminal device registers and registers with the ground management center to obtain the relevant terminal device information, and meanwhile, when the terminal device is completely registered, the satellite registers and registers with the ground management center to obtain the relevant satellite information and the public key information of the ground management center.

Thirdly, authentication stage: the terminal equipment generates authentication related parameter information by utilizing the terminal equipment information and sends the authentication related parameter information to an access satellite, the satellite firstly judges whether the terminal equipment is firstly accessed for authentication, if not, the terminal equipment access authentication request information and the identity authentication information of the satellite are forwarded to a ground management center for verification, meanwhile, the ground management center sends the real identity information of the terminal equipment passing the verification and the corresponding key information to the satellite, the satellite replies an authentication response message to the terminal equipment, and meanwhile, the two parties negotiate out a session key and a message verification code for later key updating, and the first access authentication is completed. If the terminal equipment initiates the authentication request again, the access satellite judges the authentication request message, if the authentication is passed, the session key of the terminal equipment which is accessed to the authentication negotiation for the first time is used for generating new session key information and a message authentication code, and the re-access authentication is completed.

Fig. 2 is a schematic flow chart of another method for anonymous access authentication of space-ground integrated spatial information network provided by the present invention, the method includes the following steps:

step 201, the terminal device carries inherent identity information to register with a ground management center, the satellite terminal carries satellite inherent device information to register with the ground management center, and the ground management center sends registration response to the terminal device and the satellite and stores the registration information of the terminal device and the satellite. Completing the registration of the terminal equipment and the satellite, specifically: the inherent identity information comprises 18-bit identity card numbers or equipment production numbers, if the inherent identity information is less than 18 bits, the information is filled by random numbers, and the ground management center calculates the real identity ID of the terminal equipment after acquiring the inherent identity information of the terminal equipment_uGenerating a secret key K corresponding to 256 bits in a symmetric encryption mode (SHA 1 (identity card number or equipment production number | | | 18-byte random number), simultaneously generating a random number r of the 256 bits and sending the random number r to a registered terminal equipment, and sending the ID to the terminal equipment_uK and r are stored; the function SHA1() is a hash function of the secure hash algorithm 1, SHA1 (random number of 18 bytes of identity card number or equipment production number) operation represents, and the identity card number or the equipment production number is spliced with the random number of 18 bytes and then one-way hash calculation is performed.

The inherent equipment information of the satellite comprises 18-bit satellite production numbers, if the number is less than 18, the number is filled with random numbers, and the ground management center calculates the true identity ID of the satellite after acquiring the inherent identity information of the satellite equipment_sGenerating a secret key K 'corresponding to 256 bits in a symmetric encryption mode, generating a random number r' of 256 bits at the same time, generating a public and private key pair by a ground management center in an asymmetric encryption algorithm mode, sending the public and private key pair to a registered satellite, and sending the ID to the registered satellite by the satellite, wherein the SHA1 (random number of 18 bytes in the satellite production number | |)_sPublic keys P of K ', r' and NCC_NCCStoring the data;

step 202, the terminal device sends an access authentication request message to the satellite, including a random number calculated using an exclusive-or operation and a hash function

Further calculating the pseudo-identity

H, message authentication code MAC_u＝h(ID_u||R_uT) and random numbers

Where T is a time stamp, R_uRandom numbers generated by the terminal when the terminal sends an authentication request are all used for ensuring the freshness of the message; r is_uIs a random number R generated by the terminal_uThe random number r is obtained by common calculation with the random number r obtained by previous registration;

the operation sign represents an exclusive or operation,

represents K and R_uAnd performing Hash calculation after splicing, and then performing XOR operation with r to obtain H.

Preferably, the terminal device sends the access authentication request message to the satellite, and the access authentication method of the security level selected by the terminal device is also included, the access authentication method of the security level is forwarded to the ground management center through the satellite, and the ground management center selects the corresponding calculation method for authentication. The terminal equipment can select access authentication modes with different security levels to comprise a hash Algorithm option, a random number length option and a symmetric Encryption Algorithm option, wherein the hash Algorithm option comprises a secure hash Algorithm SHA1, a secure hash Algorithm SHA128 and a secure hash Algorithm SHA256, the random number length option comprises 32bit, 64bit and 128bit, and the symmetric Encryption Algorithm option comprises AES (advanced Encryption Standard), DES (Data Encryption Standard) and 3DES (Triple Data Encryption Standard).

Step 203, the satellite receives the access authentication request message of the terminal device, and judges whether the current terminal device is accessed for the first time through a legal access user verification table maintained on the satellite, for example, whether the terminal device carries session _ id information or whether the carried session _ id information is in the legal access user verification table to judge whether the terminal device is accessed for the first time. If the terminal equipment is the first access authentication, the access authentication request message of the terminal equipment and the identity authentication message of the satellite are forwarded to the ground management center, so that the legality of the terminal equipment is inquired from the ground.

The identity authentication message of the satellite specifically includes: satellite obtains random number by using XOR operation and Hash function calculation

Further calculating to obtain a pseudo identity

Message authentication code MAC_s＝h(ID_s||R_s| T') and random numbers

Where T' is a time stamp, R_sA random number generated by the satellite itself when sending the authentication request.

204, the ground management center receives and verifies the access authentication request message of the terminal equipment and the identity authentication message of the satellite, and solves the true identity IDs of the terminal equipment and the satellite by using the XOR operation_uAnd ID_sThe ground management center finds out the secret keys K and K ' of the terminal equipment and the satellite by looking up the registry, further calculates random numbers R and R ' by using inverse exclusive-or operation, calculates h (K ' | R ') by using the random numbers R and R ' through a hash function, and further calculates the random number R for generating the message authentication code MAC by using the inverse exclusive-or operation_uAnd R_sCalculate MAC_uAnd MAC_sMAC transmitted with terminal equipment and satellite_uAnd MAC_sComparing, judging whether the time stamp is in the allowed time range, if the verification fails, replying an authentication failure message, and if the verification succeeds, calculating a master key h (K | | R' | R) for updating the key_s) Signing the message S by using a private key of the NCC, simultaneously replying a satellite access authentication response message, wherein the message S comprises a negotiation key generation algorithm and an ID pair by using a session key sk_uK, signing the message S by using the message verification code key MAC _ key to obtain the message verification code MAC and the time stamp T_NCCInformation;

step 205, the satellite receives the access authentication response message, verifies the message S using the public key of the NCC, and if the verification is successful, calculates a session key sk ═ h (h (K | | R' | R |) for key update according to a key generation algorithm negotiated with the ground management center_s) K '), sk is a session key negotiated between the satellite and the ground, and MAC _ key ═ h (K ' | | h (K | | | R ' | | | R)_s)||r_s) Verifying the message verification code MAC, judging whether the timestamp information is in the allowed time range, and resolving the true identity ID of the successfully authenticated terminal equipment_uAnd a corresponding secret key K, establishing a corresponding relation table, storing the corresponding relation table on the satellite, and calculating an element H of the secret key SK for generating data secure transmission_sat＝h(K’||r’||r||T_s'), message authentication code MAC_SAT_key＝h(ID_u||K||r_u) And an identification message session _ ID ═ h (ID) uniquely specifying the terminal device_u||T_s') wherein T is_s' is a time stamp.

In step 206, the satellite sends an access authentication response message to the terminal device, including using the terminal device registration key K to H_satAnd session _ id encrypted messages, using MAC_SATSigning the message by the key to obtain a message verification code and a time stamp T_s’；

Step 207, after receiving the access authentication response message, the terminal device verifies the message, specifically: terminal device computing MAC_SAT_key＝h(ID_u||K||r_u) Verifying the signature if the verification is successfulDecrypting with its own key K to obtain H_satAnd a session _ id, storing the session _ id, and further calculating a key SK h (h (K' | r) | K) for data secure transmission, wherein the SK is a session key generated by negotiation between the terminal and the satellite, and a message authentication code MAC_US_key＝h(ID_u||H_sat) And finishing the first access authentication process of the terminal equipment.

Step 208, when the terminal device needs to perform access authentication again (for example, when the terminal device needs to re-access the network after being disconnected), the message authentication code key MAC _ key is calculated as h (K | | ID)_u||R_u') sending a re-access authentication request message including session _ ID of first access authentication and real identity ID of terminal equipment using secret key K_uMessage encrypted by session Key SK and message authentication code Key MAC _ Key, and random number R_u' sum time stamp T_u', and sign the message using the MAC _ key;

step 209, the satellite receives the re-access authentication request message, and verifies the access authentication request message, specifically: finding out the key K of the terminal equipment uniquely appointed by the user according to the received session _ ID, and further decrypting the key K to obtain the ID_u', SK and MAC_USA key, and simultaneously searching the real identity ID of the terminal equipment corresponding to the key K through the corresponding relation table_uComparison of ID_uAnd ID_uIf the signature message is consistent with the signature message, the signature message is verified, and the verification is successful, otherwise, an authentication failure message is replied. After the verification is successful, negotiating a new session key SK 'and a message verification code MAC _ key' with the terminal equipment, calculating a new session _ id, deleting the previously stored session key information, and replying a re-access authentication response message;

step 210, the terminal device receives the re-access authentication response message, including the new session _ id, signature using the terminal key K, and the random number R_s' sum time stamp T_sCalculating a new session key SK and a message verification code MAC _ key for data secure transmission, and completing the re-access authentication process.

To explain the present invention in detail, the process of the terminal device performing access authentication for the first time is shown in fig. 3, and the specific steps are as follows:

step 301: terminal equipment generates random number R_uAnd a time stamp T, the terminal equipment sends an access authentication request message to the satellite, wherein the access authentication request message comprises a random number obtained by using exclusive-or operation and hash function calculation

Further calculating the pseudo-identity

Message authentication code MAC_u＝h(ID_u||R_uT) and random numbers

Step 302: the method comprises the following steps that a satellite receives an access authentication request message of terminal equipment, whether the current terminal equipment is accessed for the first time or not is judged through a legal access user verification table maintained on the satellite, if the current terminal equipment is accessed for the first time, the satellite forwards the access authentication request message of the terminal equipment and an identity authentication message of the satellite to a ground management center, and the method specifically comprises the following steps: satellite generated random number R_sAnd a timestamp T', the satellite calculates a random number by using an exclusive OR operation and a Hash function

Further calculating to obtain a pseudo identity

Message authentication code MAC_s＝h(ID_s||R_s| T') and random numbers

Step 303: the ground management center receives and verifies the access authentication request message of the terminal equipment and the identity authentication message of the satellite, and solves the real identity IDs of the terminal equipment and the satellite by using the XOR operation_uAnd ID_sGround managementThe center finds out the secret keys K and K ' of the terminal equipment and the satellite by looking up the registry, further calculates random numbers R and R ' by using an exclusive-or operation, calculates h (K ' | R ') by using the random numbers R and R ' through a hash function, and further calculates the random number R for generating the message authentication code MAC by using the exclusive-or operation_uAnd R_sCalculate MAC_uAnd MAC_sMAC transmitted with terminal equipment and satellite_uAnd MAC_sComparing and judging whether the time stamp is in the allowed time range, if the verification fails, disconnecting the connection, and if the verification succeeds, generating the time stamp T_NCCAnd calculates the master key h (K | | R' | | R) for updating the key_s) Signing the message S by using a private key of the NCC, simultaneously replying a satellite access authentication response message, wherein the message S comprises a negotiation key generation algorithm and an ID pair by using a session key sk_uAnd K encrypted message E_sk{ID_uK, signature MAC of message using MAC _ key, and timestamp T_NCCAnd (4) information.

Step 304: the satellite receives the access authentication response message, verifies the message S by using the public key of the NCC, and if the verification is successful, calculates a session key sk (h (K | | R' | R |) for updating the key according to a key generation algorithm negotiated with the ground management center_s) K ') and MAC _ key ═ h (K ' | | h (K | | | R ' | | R)_s)||r_s) Verifying the signature MAC, judging whether the timestamp information is in the allowed time range, and solving the true identity ID of the successfully authenticated terminal equipment_uAnd a corresponding secret key K, establishing a corresponding relation table, storing the corresponding relation table on the satellite, and calculating an element H of the secret key SK for generating data secure transmission_sat＝h(K’||r’||r||T_s'), message authentication code MAC_SAT_key＝h(ID_u||K||r_u) And an identification message session _ ID ═ h (ID) uniquely specifying the terminal device_u||T_s’)。

Step 305: after receiving the access authentication response message, the terminal device verifies the message, specifically: terminal device computing MAC_SAT_key＝h(ID_u||K||r_u) Verifying the signature, and if the verification is successful, decrypting by using the own secret key KTo H_satAnd a session _ id, storing the session _ id, and further calculating a key SK h (h (K' | r) | K) for data security transmission and a message authentication code MAC_US_key＝h(ID_u||H_sat) And finishing the first access authentication process of the terminal equipment.

When the terminal device is disconnected, the access authentication needs to be performed again, and the access authentication again is as shown in fig. 4, and the specific steps are as follows:

step 401: generating a random number R_u' sum time stamp T_u', calculate MAC _ key ═ h (K | | | ID)_u||R_u') sends a re-access authentication request message including a session _ ID for first access authentication, a pair of IDs using a secret key K_usessionKey (i.e., SK) and MAC _ Key encrypted message E_K{ IDu, sessionKey, MAC _ Key }, random number R_u' sum time stamp T_u', and signs the message using the MAC _ key.

Step 402: the satellite receives the re-access authentication request message, and verifies the access authentication request message, specifically: finding out the key K of the terminal equipment uniquely appointed by the user according to the received session _ ID, and further decrypting the key K to obtain the ID_u', SK and MAC_USA key, and simultaneously searching the real identity ID of the terminal equipment corresponding to the key K through the corresponding relation table_uComparison of ID_uAnd ID_uIf yes, the signature message is verified, and the verification is successful, otherwise, the connection is disconnected. After the verification is successful, a random number R is generated_s' sum time stamp T_s' negotiate a new session key SK ' and a message verification code MAC _ key ' with the terminal device, calculate a new session _ id, delete the previously saved session key information, and reply with a re-access authentication response message.

Step 403: the terminal equipment receives the re-access authentication response message which comprises a new session _ id, a signature by using a terminal key K and a random number R_s' sum time stamp T_sCalculating a new session key SK and a message verification code MAC _ key for data secure transmission, and completing the re-access authentication process.

Fig. 5 is an overall architecture diagram of an anonymous access authentication system for a space-ground integrated space information network provided by the present invention, where the system includes a plurality of terminal devices 501, at least 1 satellite 502, and 1 trusted ground management center 503, and the system specifically includes:

a terminal device 501, configured to:

sending information carrying inherent identity to the ground management center 503 for registration, and receiving the information containing the real identity ID of the terminal device sent by the ground management center 503_uA registration response of the key K and the random number r;

sending a first access authentication request message to the satellite 502, the first access authentication request message comprising: random number computed using an exclusive-or operation and a hash function

Pseudo-identity calculated using a random number H

Message authentication code MAC_u＝h(ID_u||R_uT) and random numbers

Wherein R is_uA random number generated when the terminal transmits an authentication request, T is a time stamp,

receiving and verifying the first access authentication second response message sent by the satellite 502, and calculating a satellite message verification code key MAC_SAT_key＝h(ID_u||K||r_u) Verifying the signature message, and if the verification is successful, decrypting by using the own secret key K to obtain an element H of a second session secret key SK_satAnd a first identification message session _ id for identifying the first labelThe session id is stored and calculated for the second session key SK ═ h (h (K' | r) | K), and the terminal message authentication code key MAC_US_key＝h(ID_u||H_sat) The first access authentication process of the terminal device 501 is completed;

when access authentication needs to be performed again, a second message verification code key MAC _ key h (K | | | ID) is calculated_u||R_u'), transmit a re-access authentication request message to the satellite 502, the re-access authentication request message comprising: first identification information session _ ID stored in the process of first access authentication and real identity ID of terminal equipment by using secret key K_uA message encrypted by the second session Key SK and the second message authentication code Key MAC _ Key, and a random number R_u' sum time stamp T_u', using a second message verification code key MAC _ key to sign the message of the re-access authentication request message;

receiving a re-access authentication response message sent by the satellite 502, and calculating a third session key SK 'and a third message verification code key MAC _ key' for data security transmission to complete a re-access authentication process;

a satellite 502 for:

sending information carrying inherent identity to the ground management center 503 for registration, and receiving the information containing the satellite equipment true identity ID sent by the ground management center 503_sSecret key K', random number r and public key P of ground management center_NCCThe registration response of (1);

receiving a first access authentication request message sent by the terminal device 501, determining whether the current terminal device 501 is first accessed for authentication through a legal access user verification table maintained on the satellite 502, and if the current terminal device 501 is first accessed for authentication, forwarding the access authentication request message of the terminal device 501 and an identity authentication message of the satellite 502 to the ground management center 503, wherein the identity authentication message of the satellite 502 includes: satellite 502 computes a random number using an XOR operation and a hash function

Calculated pseudo-random number HIdentity

Message authentication code MAC_s＝h(ID_s||R_s| T') and random numbers

Where T' is a time stamp, R_sA random number generated when the satellite 502 sends the identity authentication message;

receiving a first response message of first access authentication sent by the ground control center 503, using the public key P of the ground management center 503_NCCIf the verification is successful, the verification message S calculates a first session key sk-h (h (K | | R' | R) for key update according to a key generation algorithm negotiated with the ground management center 503_s) K '), and a first message authentication code key MAC _ key ═ h (K ' | | | h (K | | R ' | | | R)_s)||r_s) Verifying the message verification code MAC, judging whether the timestamp information is in the allowed time range, and resolving the true identity ID of the successfully authenticated terminal equipment_uAnd the corresponding key K, establishing a corresponding relation table, and calculating an element H of a second session key SK for generating data secure transmission between the satellite 502 and the terminal 501_sat＝h(K’||r’||r||T_s'), satellite message authentication code key MAC_SAT_key＝h(ID_u||K||r_u) And an identification message session _ ID ═ h (ID) uniquely specifying the terminal device_u||T_s') wherein T is_s' is a timestamp;

sending a first access authentication second response message to the terminal device 501, where the first access authentication second response message includes: element H of the registration key K for the second session key SK using the terminal device 501_satAnd a message obtained by encrypting a first identification message session _ id uniquely specifying the terminal device, using a satellite message authentication code key MAC_SATA signature message of the key to the second response message and a timestamp Ts';

receiving and verifying the re-access authentication request message sent by the terminal device 501, if the verification is successful, negotiating a third session key SK 'and a third message verification code key MAC _ key' with the terminal device, calculating a second identification message session _ id, deleting the session key information stored before, and replying a re-access authentication response message for the terminal device, where the re-access authentication response message includes: second identification message session _ id, signed message signed by using terminal key K, and random number R_s' sum time stamp T_s”；

A ground management center 503 for:

receiving registration information with inherent identity respectively sent by a terminal device 501 and a satellite 502, and sending a registration message containing a terminal device real identity ID to the terminal device 501_uThe registration response, key K and random number r, sends a registration response containing the satellite device true identity ID to the satellite 502_sSecret key K ', random number r' and public key P of ground management center_NCCThe registration response of (1);

receiving and verifying a first access authentication request message of the terminal device 501 and an identity authentication message of the satellite 502, and if the authentication fails, replying an authentication failure message; if the verification is successful, replying to the satellite 502 to access the first authentication response message for the first time, wherein the first authentication response message for the first time comprises: message S, negotiated key generation algorithm, true ID of terminal device using first session key sk negotiated by satellite 502 and ground management center 503_uA message encrypted with the key K, a message authentication code MAC obtained by signing the message S with the first message authentication code key MAC _ key, and a third timestamp T_NCCAnd (4) information.

Preferably, the first access authentication request message sent by the terminal device 501 to the satellite 502 further includes: the access authentication mode of the security level selected by the terminal device 501;

the access authentication mode of the security level is forwarded to a ground management center 503 through a satellite 502, and the ground management center 503 selects a corresponding authentication mode for authentication according to the access authentication mode of the security level;

the access authentication mode of the security level comprises a Hash algorithm option, a random number length option and a symmetric encryption algorithm option, wherein the Hash algorithm option at least comprises a secure Hash algorithm SHA1, a secure Hash algorithm SHA128 and a secure Hash algorithm SHA256, the random number length option at least comprises 32 bits, 64 bits and 128 bits, and the symmetric encryption algorithm option at least comprises an Advanced Encryption Standard (AES), a Data Encryption Standard (DES) and a triple data encryption standard (3 DES).

Preferably, the verifying, by the ground management center 503, the access authentication request message of the terminal device 501 and the identity authentication message of the satellite 502 includes:

the ground management center 503 uses the xor operation to solve the true identity IDs of the terminal device 501 and the satellite 502_uAnd ID_sKeys K and K' of the terminal device 501 and the satellite 502 are found by looking up the registry; further calculating random numbers r and r 'by using an inverse exclusive-or operation, and calculating h (K' | | r ') by using the random numbers r and r' through a hash function; further using an exclusive-OR operation to calculate a random number R for generating a message authentication code MAC_uAnd R_sCalculating message authentication code MAC_uAnd MAC_sMessage authentication code MAC transmitted with terminal device 501 and satellite 502_uAnd MAC_sComparing; if the time stamps are consistent and the time stamps are within the allowed time range, the verification is successful, and a master key h (K | | R' | | R) for updating the key is calculated_s) Signing the message by using a private key of a ground management 503 center to obtain a message S; otherwise, the verification fails, and an authentication failure message is replied.

Preferably, the satellite 502 receives and verifies the re-access authentication request message, including:

the satellite 502 finds the key K of the uniquely specified terminal device 501 according to the received first identification message session _ id; further using the secret key K for decryption to obtain the true identity ID of the terminal equipment for verification_u', second session key SK and terminal message authentication code key MAC_USA key, and simultaneously searching the real identity ID of the terminal equipment corresponding to the key K through the corresponding relation table_uComparison of ID_uAnd ID_u'; if the signature message is consistent with the signature message, the signature message is verified successfully; otherwise, the verification fails, and an authentication failure message is replied.

The above examples are to be construed as merely illustrative and not limitative of the remainder of the disclosure. After reading the description of the invention, the skilled person can make various changes or modifications to the invention, and these equivalent changes and modifications also fall into the scope of the invention defined by the claims.

Claims

1. A method for anonymous access authentication of a space-ground integrated space information network is characterized by comprising the following steps:

step 2, the terminal equipment sends a first access authentication request message to the satellite, wherein the first access authentication request message comprises a third random number H-R ⊕ H (K-R) calculated by using exclusive-or operation and a hash function_u) And the terminal equipment pseudo-identity PID obtained by utilizing the third random number H for calculation_u＝ID_u⊕ H, first message authentication code MAC_u＝h(ID_u||R_u| T) and a fourth random number r_u＝R_u⊕ h (K | | R), wherein R_uGenerating a fifth random number when the authentication request is sent to the terminal, wherein T is a first timestamp, ⊕ operation symbols represent exclusive-or operation, | | the operation symbols represent splicing operation, and h () function is a hash function;

step 3, the satellite receives the first access authentication request message, judges whether the current terminal equipment is accessed for the first time through a legal access user verification table maintained on the satellite, and forwards the access authentication request message of the terminal equipment if the current terminal equipment is accessed for the first timeAnd sending the satellite identity authentication message to a ground management center, wherein the satellite identity authentication message comprises a sixth random number H ' ═ R ' ⊕ H (K ' | | R) calculated by the satellite by using exclusive-or operation and a hash function_s) Satellite pseudo-identity PID calculated by utilizing sixth random number H_sIDs ⊕ H', second message authentication code MAC_s＝h(ID_s||R_s| T') and a seventh random number r_s＝R_s⊕ h (K ' | R '), where T ' is the second timestamp, R_sAn eighth random number generated when the identity authentication message is sent for the satellite;

step 5, the satellite receives a first response message of the first access authentication, and a public key P of the ground management center is used_NCCIf the verification is successful, the verification message S calculates a first session key sk ═ h (h (K | | R' | | R) for key update according to a key generation algorithm negotiated with the ground management center_s) K '), and a first message authentication code key MAC _ key ═ h (K ' | | | h (K | | R ' | | | R)_s)||r_s) Verifying the third message verification code MAC, judging whether the timestamp information is in the allowed time range, and resolving the successful authentication terminal equipment real identity ID_uAnd a corresponding first key K, establishing a corresponding relation table, and calculating an element H of a second session key SK for generating data secure transmission between the satellite and the terminal_sat＝h(K’||r’||r||T_s'), satellite message authentication code key MAC_SAT_key＝h(ID_u||K||r_u) And a unique fingerIdentification message session _ ID ═ h (ID) for a given terminal device_u||T_s') wherein T is_s' is a fourth timestamp;

step 8, when the terminal device needs to perform access authentication again, calculating a second message verification code key MAC _ key ═ h (K | | | ID)_u||R_u'), sending a re-access authentication request message to the satellite, the re-access authentication request message comprising: first identification information session _ ID stored in the process of first access authentication, and real identity ID of terminal equipment by using first secret key K_uA message encrypted by the second session Key SK and the second message authentication code Key MAC _ Key, and a ninth random number R_u' and fifth time stamp T_u', using a second message verification code key MAC _ key to sign the message of the re-access authentication request message;

step 9, the satellite receives and verifies the re-access authentication request message, if the verification is successful, the satellite negotiates a third session key SK 'and a third message verification code key MAC _ key' with the terminal equipment, and calculates a second identification message sesAnd (2) deleting the session key information stored before, and replying a re-access authentication response message of the terminal equipment, wherein the re-access authentication response message comprises: second identification message session _ id, signature message signed by using first key K of terminal, tenth random number R_s' and sixth time stamp T_s”；

2. The method of claim 1, wherein the step 2 of the terminal device sending the first access authentication request message to the satellite further comprises: the access authentication mode of the security level selected by the terminal equipment;

the access authentication mode of the security level is forwarded by the satellite to reach a ground management center, and the ground management center selects a corresponding authentication mode for authentication according to the access authentication mode of the security level;

3. The method according to claim 1, wherein the step 4 of verifying the access authentication request message of the terminal device and the identity authentication message of the satellite by the ground management center comprises:

the ground management center uses the inverse XOR operation to solve the real identity ID of the terminal equipment_uAnd true identity ID of the satellite_sFinding a first key K and a second key K' of the terminal equipment and the satellite by looking up a registry; further calculated using an inverse exclusive OR operationA first random number r and a second random number r ', and calculating h (K' | | r ') by a hash function using the first random number r and the second random number r'; further using an inverse exclusive-or operation, a fifth random number R for generating a third message authentication code MAC is calculated_uAnd an eighth random number R_sCalculating a first message authentication code MAC_uAnd a second message authentication code MAC_sMAC, first message authentication code transmitted with terminal equipment and satellite_uAnd a second message authentication code MAC_sComparing; if the time stamps are consistent and the time stamps are within the allowed time range, the verification is successful, and a master key h (K | | R' | | R) for updating the key is calculated_s) Signing the message by using a private key of a ground management center to obtain a message S; otherwise, the verification fails, and an authentication failure message is replied.

4. The method of claim 1, wherein the step 9 of the satellite receiving and verifying the re-access authentication request message comprises:

the satellite searches a first secret key K of the uniquely-assigned terminal equipment according to the received first identification message session _ id; further using the first secret key K to decrypt and obtain the true identity ID of the terminal equipment for verification_u', second session key SK and terminal message authentication code key MAC_USLooking up the real identity ID of the terminal equipment corresponding to the first key K through the corresponding relation table_uComparison of ID_uAnd ID_u'; if the signature message is consistent with the signature message, the signature message is verified successfully; otherwise, the verification fails, and an authentication failure message is replied.

5. A space-ground integrated space information network anonymous access authentication system comprises at least 1 satellite, a plurality of terminal devices and 1 credible ground management center, and is characterized by specifically comprising:

a terminal device for:

sending information carrying inherent identity to a ground management center for registration, and receiving ID containing real identity of terminal equipment sent by the ground management center_uFirst key K and second keyA registration response of a random number r;

sending a first access authentication request message to the satellite, wherein the first access authentication request message comprises a third random number H-R ⊕ H (K | | | R) calculated by using exclusive-or operation and a hash function_u) And the terminal equipment pseudo-identity PID obtained by utilizing the third random number H for calculation_u＝ID_u⊕ H, first message authentication code MAC_u＝h(ID_u||R_u| T) and a fourth random number r_u＝R_u⊕ h (K | | R), wherein R_uGenerating a fifth random number when the authentication request is sent to the terminal, wherein T is a first timestamp, ⊕ operation symbols represent exclusive-or operation, | | the operation symbols represent splicing operation, and h () function is a hash function;

when access authentication needs to be performed again, a second message verification code key MAC _ key h (K | | | ID) is calculated_u||R_u'), sending a re-access authentication request message to the satellite, the re-access authentication request message comprising: first identification information session _ ID stored in the process of first access authentication and real identity ID of terminal equipment by using secret key K_uA message encrypted by the second session Key SK and the second message authentication code Key MAC _ Key, and a ninth random number R_u' and fifth time stamp T_u', using a second message verification code key MAC _ key to sign the message of the re-access authentication request message;

a satellite for:

receiving a first access authentication request message sent by a terminal, judging whether the current terminal equipment is firstly accessed for authentication through a legal access user verification table maintained on a satellite, if so, forwarding the access authentication request message of the terminal equipment and an identity authentication message of the satellite to a ground management center, wherein the identity authentication message of the satellite comprises a sixth random number H ' ═ R ' ⊕ H (K ' | R) calculated by the satellite by using exclusive or operation and a hash function_s) Satellite pseudo-identity PID calculated by utilizing sixth random number H_s＝ID_s⊕ H', second message authentication code MAC_s＝h(ID_s||R_s| T') and a seventh random number r_s＝R_s⊕ h (K ' | R '), where T ' is the second timestamp, R_sAn eighth random number generated when the identity authentication message is sent for the satellite;

receiving first response message of first access authentication sent by ground control center, using public key P of ground management center_NCCIf the verification is successful, the verification message S calculates a first session key sk ═ h (h (K | | R' | | R) for key update according to a key generation algorithm negotiated with the ground management center_s) K '), and a first message authentication code key MAC _ key ═ h (K ' | | | h (K | | R ' | | | R)_s)||r_s) Verifying the third message verification code MAC, judging whether the timestamp information is in the allowed time range, and resolving the successful authentication terminal equipment real identity ID_uAnd a corresponding first key K, establishing a corresponding relation table, and calculating an element H of a second session key SK for generating data secure transmission between the satellite and the terminal_sat＝h(K’||r’||r||T_s'), satellite message authenticationCode key MAC_SAT_key＝h(ID_u||K||r_u) And a first identification message session _ ID ═ h (ID) uniquely specifying the terminal device_u||T_s') wherein T is_s' is a fourth timestamp;

A ground management center for:

receiving and verifying a first access authentication request message of the terminal equipment and an identity authentication message of the satellite, and if the authentication fails, replying an authentication failure message; if the verification is successful, replying a first response message of the satellite first access authentication, wherein the first response message of the satellite first access authentication comprises: message S, negotiation key generation algorithm, and setting of terminal using first session key sk negotiated between satellite and groundBackup real identity ID_uA message obtained by encrypting with the first key K, a third message verification code MAC obtained by signing the message S by using the first message verification code key MAC _ key and a third timestamp T_NCCAnd (4) information.

6. The system of claim 5, wherein the first access authentication request message sent by the terminal device to the satellite further comprises: the access authentication mode of the security level selected by the terminal equipment;

7. The system of claim 5, wherein the ground management center verifies the access authentication request message of the terminal device and the identity authentication message of the satellite, comprising:

the ground management center uses the inverse XOR operation to solve the true identity IDs of the terminal equipment and the satellite_uAnd ID_sFinding a first secret key K of the terminal equipment and a second secret key K' of the satellite by looking up a registry; further calculating a first random number r and a second random number r 'by using an inverse exclusive-or operation, and calculating h (K' | r ') by using the first random number r and the second random number r' through a hash function; further using an inverse exclusive-or operation, a fifth random number R for generating a third message authentication code MAC is calculated_uAnd an eighth random number R_sCalculating a first message authentication code MAC_uAnd a second message authentication code MAC_sMAC, first message authentication code transmitted with terminal equipment and satellite_uAnd a second message authentication code MAC_sComparing; if the time stamps are consistent and the time stamps are within the allowed time range, the verification is successful, and a master key h (K | | R' | | R) for updating the key is calculated_s) Signing the message by using a private key of a ground management center to obtain a message S; otherwise, the verification fails, and an authentication failure message is replied.

8. The system of claim 5, wherein the satellite receives and verifies the re-access authentication request message, comprising: