CN110944383B - A security localization method for wireless sensor network against cloning attack - Google Patents

A security localization method for wireless sensor network against cloning attack Download PDF

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CN110944383B
CN110944383B CN201911249588.3A CN201911249588A CN110944383B CN 110944383 B CN110944383 B CN 110944383B CN 201911249588 A CN201911249588 A CN 201911249588A CN 110944383 B CN110944383 B CN 110944383B
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朱青青
孙强
马秋环
曹爱霞
宋娟
胡凤菊
曾实现
刘娜
郝圣斌
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    • HELECTRICITY
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    • HELECTRICITY
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    • H04ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04WWIRELESS COMMUNICATION NETWORKS
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Abstract

The invention relates to a wireless sensor network safety positioning method aiming at clone attack, which considers the defects of large energy consumption, poor detection resistance and the like of clone nodes from the angle of an attacker, detects the clone nodes in a wireless sensor network by a mean square error consistency method based on the safety positioning process of RSSI ranging, eliminates the clone nodes in the wireless sensor network by adopting a minimum mean square error method, finally positions unknown nodes in a safe environment, performs positioning calculation again by the unknown nodes through the rest beacon nodes, and obtains a positioning result by a positioning method based on RSSI ranging. The method can well remove the clone node, reduce the influence of the clone node on the positioning of the unknown node, and improve the positioning precision of the unknown node.

Description

针对克隆攻击的无线传感器网络安全定位方法A security localization method for wireless sensor network against cloning attack

技术领域technical field

本发明属于物联网技术领域,涉及无线传感器网络技术,具体地说,涉及了一种针对克隆攻击的无线传感器网络安全定位方法。The invention belongs to the technical field of the Internet of Things, relates to wireless sensor network technology, and in particular relates to a wireless sensor network security positioning method for cloning attacks.

背景技术Background technique

基于信号接收强度指示(英文:Received Signal Strength Indicator,简称:RSSI)测距定位过程主要有两个阶段。第一阶段,计算未知节点到信标节点的距离。信标节点周期性向周围的节点发送ID和位置坐标等信息,未知节点通过无线信号接收到信息。在自由空间中,节点进行无线信号的传输,通常采用理论模型为衰减模型RSSI(d)=RSSI(d0)-10αlog(d/d0)+Pn,其中,RSSI表示未知节点接收信标节点的信号强度值,d表示未知节点与信标节点的距离,d0为参考距离,α表示路径损耗指数,Pn表示均值为0的高斯随机变量。衰减模型为测量未知节点到信标节点距离的经典计算方法。α和Pn需要根据具体环境设置,当已知未知节点到信标节点发送的信号强度值时,就可以计算出两者之间的距离。第二阶段,计算未知节点的位置。通过第一阶段计算出信标节点到未知节点的距离,再结合信标节点的位置坐标,未知节点使用极大似然估计法得到自身的位置信息。The process of ranging and positioning based on Received Signal Strength Indicator (English: Received Signal Strength Indicator, RSSI for short) mainly has two stages. In the first stage, the distance from the unknown node to the beacon node is calculated. Beacon nodes periodically send information such as ID and location coordinates to surrounding nodes, and unknown nodes receive information through wireless signals. In free space, the node transmits wireless signals, and the theoretical model is usually the attenuation model RSSI(d)=RSSI(d 0 )-10αlog(d/d 0 )+P n , where RSSI indicates that the unknown node receives the beacon The signal strength value of the node, d represents the distance between the unknown node and the beacon node, d 0 is the reference distance, α represents the path loss index, and P n represents a Gaussian random variable with a mean value of 0. The attenuation model is a classical calculation method to measure the distance from unknown nodes to beacon nodes. α and P n need to be set according to the specific environment. When the signal strength value sent by the unknown node to the beacon node is known, the distance between the two can be calculated. In the second stage, the location of the unknown node is calculated. In the first stage, the distance from the beacon node to the unknown node is calculated, and then combined with the position coordinates of the beacon node, the unknown node uses the maximum likelihood estimation method to obtain its own position information.

无线传感器网络中部署的信标节点,能够给未知节点提供定位服务。RSSI测距过程中受到噪声和障碍物等干扰,会影响未知节点到信标节点的距离计算,导致未知节点估计的定位位置与真实位置产生偏移。无线传感器网络通常部署在无人看守的敌对环境中,容易受到克隆攻击的破坏,克隆攻击捕获网络中的节点,提取节点的密钥、位置和身份标识等信息,通过这些信息制造克隆节点。当网络中存在克隆节点时,未知节点估计的位置与真实位置发生严重的偏差。由于克隆节点部署在网络中不同的位置,误导未知节点定位,严重影响定位精度。Beacon nodes deployed in wireless sensor networks can provide location services to unknown nodes. The interference of noise and obstacles during the RSSI ranging process will affect the calculation of the distance from the unknown node to the beacon node, resulting in a deviation between the estimated positioning position of the unknown node and the real position. Wireless sensor networks are usually deployed in unguarded hostile environments and are vulnerable to cloning attacks. Cloning attacks capture nodes in the network, extract information such as the key, location, and identity of the node, and create cloned nodes from this information. When there are cloned nodes in the network, the estimated position of the unknown node is seriously deviated from the real position. Since clone nodes are deployed in different locations in the network, the location of unknown nodes is misled and the location accuracy is seriously affected.

发明内容SUMMARY OF THE INVENTION

本发明针对现有技术存在的定位精度低等上述不足,提供一种针对克隆攻击的无线传感器网络安全定位方法,能够有效剔除克隆节点,提高未知节点的定位精度。Aiming at the above-mentioned shortcomings of the prior art such as low positioning accuracy, the present invention provides a wireless sensor network security positioning method for cloning attacks, which can effectively eliminate clone nodes and improve the positioning accuracy of unknown nodes.

为了达到上述目的,本发明提供了一种针对克隆攻击的无线传感器网络安全定位方法,含有以下步骤:In order to achieve the above object, the present invention provides a wireless sensor network security positioning method for cloning attacks, which includes the following steps:

(一)信标节点周期性向其周围的节点发送自身的ID和位置坐标,当已知未知节点接收到信标节点发送的信号强度值,利用信号强度值的衰减模型计算出信标节点到未知节点的距离;通过计算出的信标节点到未知节点的距离,结合信标节点的位置坐标,得到未知节点的估计位置。(1) The beacon node periodically sends its own ID and location coordinates to its surrounding nodes. When the known unknown node receives the signal strength value sent by the beacon node, the attenuation model of the signal strength value is used to calculate the distance between the beacon node and the unknown node. The distance of the node; through the calculated distance from the beacon node to the unknown node, combined with the position coordinates of the beacon node, the estimated position of the unknown node is obtained.

(二)利用均方误差一致性根据未知节点的估计位置的均方误差检测无线传感器网络中是否存在克隆攻击,若不存在克隆攻击,步骤(一)中得到的未知节点的估计位置即为未知节点的安全定位位置;若存在克隆攻击,剔除克隆节点,直至未知节点的最小均方误差小于设定均方误差阈值γ,重复步骤(一)的步骤,得到的未知节点的估计位置即为未知节点的安全定位位置。(2) Use the mean square error consistency to detect whether there is a clone attack in the wireless sensor network according to the mean square error of the estimated position of the unknown node. If there is no clone attack, the estimated position of the unknown node obtained in step (1) is unknown. The safe positioning position of the node; if there is a cloning attack, remove the cloned node until the minimum mean square error of the unknown node is less than the set mean square error threshold γ, repeat the steps of step (1), and the estimated position of the unknown node obtained is unknown. The safe location of the node.

优选的,所述无线传感器网络包含m,m≥3个信标节点、多个未知节点和n,0≤n<m个克隆节点,每个信标节点具有唯一的ID,且每个信标节点已知自身的位置坐标,信标节点、未知节点和克隆节点的通讯半径均为R,节点之间无通信数据丢失。Preferably, the wireless sensor network includes m, m≥3 beacon nodes, multiple unknown nodes and n,0≤n<m clone nodes, each beacon node has a unique ID, and each beacon node has a unique ID. The node knows its own position coordinates, the communication radius of the beacon node, the unknown node and the clone node is R, and there is no communication data loss between the nodes.

优选的,信号强度值的衰减模型表示为:RSSI(d)=RSSI(d0)-10αlog(d/d0)+Pn,其中,RSSI表示未知节点接收信标节点的信号强度值,d表示未知节点与信标节点的距离,d0为参考距离,α表示路径损耗指数,Pn表示均值为0的高斯随机变量;所述无线传感器网络中,m个信标节点的位置坐标分别为(x1,y1),(x2,y2),...,(xm,ym),未知节点到信标节点的距离分别为d1,d2,...,dm,假设未知节点的位置坐标为(x,y),则计算未知节点的位置坐标的公式表示为:Preferably, the attenuation model of the signal strength value is expressed as: RSSI(d)=RSSI(d 0 )-10αlog(d/d 0 )+P n , where RSSI represents the signal strength value of the unknown node receiving the beacon node, d represents the distance between the unknown node and the beacon node, d 0 is the reference distance, α represents the path loss index, and P n represents a Gaussian random variable with a mean value of 0; in the wireless sensor network, the position coordinates of m beacon nodes are respectively ( x 1 ,y 1 ),(x 2 ,y 2 ),...,(x m ,y m ), the distances from the unknown node to the beacon node are respectively d 1 ,d 2 ,...,d m , Assuming that the position coordinates of the unknown node are (x, y), the formula for calculating the position coordinates of the unknown node is expressed as:

Figure BDA0002308647410000031
Figure BDA0002308647410000031

公式(1)的第一个方程到第m-1个方程依次减第m个方程得到线性方程,其中:From the first equation of formula (1) to the m-1th equation, subtract the mth equation in turn to obtain a linear equation, where:

Figure BDA0002308647410000032
Figure BDA0002308647410000032

Figure BDA0002308647410000033
Figure BDA0002308647410000033

Figure BDA0002308647410000034
Figure BDA0002308647410000034

式中,A、b表示系数矩阵,X表示未知节点的实际位置坐标;In the formula, A and b represent the coefficient matrix, and X represents the actual position coordinates of the unknown node;

利用极大似然估计法,计算出未知节点的估计位置坐标为:

Figure BDA0002308647410000035
其中,
Figure BDA0002308647410000036
表示未知节点的估计位置坐标。Using the maximum likelihood estimation method, the estimated position coordinates of the unknown nodes are calculated as:
Figure BDA0002308647410000035
in,
Figure BDA0002308647410000036
Represents the estimated location coordinates of the unknown node.

优选的,步骤(二)中,利用均方误差一致性根据未知节点的估计位置的均方误差检测无线传感器网络中是否存在克隆攻击的具体方法:Preferably, in step (2), a specific method for detecting whether there is a clone attack in the wireless sensor network according to the mean square error of the estimated position of the unknown node by using the mean square error consistency:

未知节点得到的估计位置的位置坐标映射在二维平面上相对集中,表现为在未知节点真实位置为中心的一块密集区域内,得到未知节点的均方误差均一致,若无线传感器网络中存在克隆节点,计算的未知节点的均方误差值不一致,且大于安全状态下未知节点的均方误差值;未知节点的均方误差通过公式(5)计算获得,公式(5)表示为:The position coordinates of the estimated position obtained by the unknown node are relatively concentrated on the two-dimensional plane, which is represented as a dense area centered on the real position of the unknown node, and the mean square error of the unknown node is consistent. If there are clones in the wireless sensor network node, the calculated mean square error value of the unknown node is inconsistent, and is greater than the mean square error value of the unknown node in the safe state; the mean square error of the unknown node is calculated by formula (5), and formula (5) is expressed as:

Figure BDA0002308647410000041
Figure BDA0002308647410000041

式中,

Figure BDA0002308647410000042
表示未知节点的均方误差,xj表示第j个信标节点的位置坐标的横坐标,yj表示第j个信标节点的位置坐标的纵坐标,
Figure BDA0002308647410000043
表示未知节点的位置坐标的横坐标,
Figure BDA0002308647410000044
表示未知节点的位置坐标的纵坐标。In the formula,
Figure BDA0002308647410000042
represents the mean square error of the unknown node, x j represents the abscissa of the position coordinate of the jth beacon node, y j represents the ordinate of the position coordinate of the jth beacon node,
Figure BDA0002308647410000043
the abscissa representing the location coordinates of the unknown node,
Figure BDA0002308647410000044
The ordinate representing the location coordinates of the unknown node.

优选的,步骤(二)中,克隆节点的剔除方法为:Preferably, in step (2), the method for eliminating the clone node is:

(1)假设在未知节点的通信范围内有p,p=m+n个节点,从p个节点任选p-1个节点作为一组用于计算未知节点的位置,对每一组得到的未知节点的位置再计算该未知节点的位置的均方误差,总共有p个均方误差,记为

Figure BDA0002308647410000045
(1) Assuming that there are p, p=m+n nodes in the communication range of the unknown node, select p-1 nodes from the p nodes as a group for calculating the position of the unknown node, and for each group obtained The position of the unknown node is calculated and the mean square error of the position of the unknown node is calculated. There are p mean square errors in total, which are recorded as
Figure BDA0002308647410000045

(2)选出Y中最小的一组均方误差,记为

Figure BDA0002308647410000046
将M与γ做比较,若M<γ,则无线传感器网络中没有克隆节点;若M>γ,则无线传感器网络中有克隆节点,从均方误差最小的一组节点中随机剔除一个节点;(2) Select the smallest set of mean square errors in Y, denoted as
Figure BDA0002308647410000046
Compare M with γ, if M<γ, there is no clone node in the wireless sensor network; if M>γ, there is a clone node in the wireless sensor network, and a node is randomly selected from a group of nodes with the smallest mean square error;

(3)从p-1个节点中选出p-2个节点作为一组用于计算未知节点的位置,继续执行上述步骤(1)和步骤(2),直至最小的一组均方误差M小于γ,停止算法,完成克隆节点的剔除。(3) Select p-2 nodes from the p-1 nodes as a group for calculating the position of the unknown node, and continue to perform the above steps (1) and (2) until the minimum set of mean square errors M If it is less than γ, stop the algorithm and complete the elimination of clone nodes.

与现有技术相比,本发明的有益效果在于:Compared with the prior art, the beneficial effects of the present invention are:

本发明从攻击者的角度,考虑了未知节点、信标节点和克隆节点随机部署在无线传感器网络中的情况,基于RSSI测距的定位方法进行定位,实现简单,成本低,具有普遍性。在基于RSSI测距的安全定位过程中,通过均方误差一致性的方法检测无线传感器网络中存在的克隆节点,采用最小均方误差的方法剔除无线传感器网络中的克隆节点,最终使未知节点定位处于安全的环境中,未知节点通过剩余的信标节点重新进行定位计算,通过基于RSSI测距的定位方法得到定位结果。本发明能够很好的剔除克隆节点,降低克隆节点对未知节点定位的影响,提高未知节点的定位精度。From the attacker's point of view, the present invention considers the situation that unknown nodes, beacon nodes and clone nodes are randomly deployed in the wireless sensor network. In the process of secure localization based on RSSI ranging, the clone nodes in the wireless sensor network are detected by the method of mean square error consistency, and the clone nodes in the wireless sensor network are eliminated by the method of minimum mean square error, and finally the unknown nodes are located. In a safe environment, the unknown node re-calculates the positioning through the remaining beacon nodes, and obtains the positioning result through the positioning method based on RSSI ranging. The invention can eliminate clone nodes well, reduce the influence of clone nodes on the positioning of unknown nodes, and improve the positioning accuracy of unknown nodes.

附图说明Description of drawings

图1为现有无线传感器网络中克隆攻击对未知节点定位的影响示意图;Fig. 1 is a schematic diagram of the influence of cloning attack on the location of unknown nodes in the existing wireless sensor network;

图2为本发明实施例针对克隆攻击的无线传感器网络安全定位方法中克隆节点参与未知节点的定位示意图;2 is a schematic diagram of the location of a clone node participating in an unknown node in a wireless sensor network security location method for cloning attacks according to an embodiment of the present invention;

图3为本发明实施例针对克隆攻击的无线传感器网络安全定位方法中克隆节点个数对未知节点估计位置均方误差的影响比较示意图;3 is a schematic diagram illustrating the comparison of the influence of the number of cloned nodes on the mean square error of the estimated position of unknown nodes in the wireless sensor network security positioning method for cloning attacks according to an embodiment of the present invention;

图4为本发明实施例针对克隆攻击的无线传感器网络安全定位方法中克隆节点个数对未知节点定位的影响比较示意图;4 is a schematic diagram illustrating the comparison of the influence of the number of clone nodes on the location of unknown nodes in the wireless sensor network security location method for cloning attacks according to an embodiment of the present invention;

图5为本发明实施例针对克隆攻击的无线传感器网络安全定位方法中被克隆的信标节点到未知节点的距离对未知节点估计位置均方误差的影响比较示意图;5 is a schematic diagram illustrating the comparison of the influence of the distance from the cloned beacon node to the unknown node on the mean square error of the estimated position of the unknown node in the wireless sensor network security positioning method for cloning attacks according to an embodiment of the present invention;

图6为本发明实施例针对克隆攻击的无线传感器网络安全定位方法中被克隆的信标节点到未知节点的距离对未知节点定位的影响比较示意图;6 is a schematic diagram illustrating the comparison of the influence of the distance from the cloned beacon node to the unknown node on the positioning of the unknown node in the wireless sensor network security positioning method for cloning attacks according to an embodiment of the present invention;

图7为本发明所述针对克隆攻击的无线传感器网络安全定位方法与现有不同定位方法的性能对比图。FIG. 7 is a performance comparison diagram of the wireless sensor network security positioning method for cloning attack according to the present invention and different existing positioning methods.

具体实施方式Detailed ways

下面,通过示例性的实施方式对本发明进行具体描述。然而应当理解,在没有进一步叙述的情况下,一个实施方式中的元件、结构和特征也可以有益地结合到其他实施方式中。Hereinafter, the present invention will be specifically described through exemplary embodiments. It should be understood, however, that elements, structures and features of one embodiment may be beneficially combined in other embodiments without further recitation.

RSSI测距过程中受到噪声和障碍物等干扰,会影响未知节点到信标节点的距离计算,导致未知节点估计的定位位置与真实位置产生偏移。参见图1,当无线传感器网络中存在克隆节点时,未知节点估计位置与真实位置发生严重偏差,图1中,三角形表示信标节点,正方形表示克隆节点,圆形表示未知节点。The interference of noise and obstacles during the RSSI ranging process will affect the calculation of the distance from the unknown node to the beacon node, resulting in a deviation between the estimated positioning position of the unknown node and the real position. Referring to Figure 1, when there are clone nodes in the wireless sensor network, the estimated position of the unknown node is seriously deviated from the real position. In Figure 1, the triangle represents the beacon node, the square represents the clone node, and the circle represents the unknown node.

均方误差能够很好的反应估计量与被估计量之间的偏移程度,当无线传感器网络中只有信标节点,未知节点的均方误差在一定范围内波动。当无线传感器网络中存在克隆节点,未知节点估计位置的均方误差随着克隆节点的数量增加而增大。根据有无克隆节点导致未知节点的均方误差值不一致。本发明提供了一种针对克隆攻击的无线传感器网络安全定位方法,基于RSSI测距的安全定位过程,采用均方误差一致性的方法检测克隆节点,并剔除克隆节点,确保未知节点在安全环境中进行定位,定位精度高。The mean square error can well reflect the degree of deviation between the estimator and the estimated value. When there are only beacon nodes in the wireless sensor network, the mean square error of unknown nodes fluctuates within a certain range. When there are clone nodes in the wireless sensor network, the mean square error of the estimated position of the unknown node increases with the increase of the number of clone nodes. According to whether there are cloned nodes, the mean square error value of unknown nodes is inconsistent. The invention provides a wireless sensor network security positioning method for cloning attacks. Based on the security positioning process of RSSI ranging, the method of mean square error consistency is used to detect the clone nodes, and the clone nodes are eliminated to ensure that the unknown nodes are in a safe environment. Positioning with high positioning accuracy.

具体地,无线传感器网络包括m,m≥3个信标节点、多个未知节点和n,0≤n<m个克隆节点,每个信标节点具有唯一的ID,且每个信标节点已知自身的位置坐标,信标节点、未知节点和克隆节点的通讯半径均为R,节点之间无通信数据丢失。克隆节点通过获取信标节点的ID和未知坐标信息,参与到未知节点的定位过程中,能够影响未知节点的定位精度。节点的性能和功能都一样,具有数据融合功能。Specifically, the wireless sensor network includes m, m≥3 beacon nodes, multiple unknown nodes and n,0≤n<m clone nodes, each beacon node has a unique ID, and each beacon node has Knowing its own position coordinates, the communication radius of beacon nodes, unknown nodes and clone nodes are all R, and no communication data is lost between nodes. The clone node participates in the positioning process of the unknown node by obtaining the ID and unknown coordinate information of the beacon node, which can affect the positioning accuracy of the unknown node. The performance and functions of the nodes are the same, and they have the function of data fusion.

本发明提供的上述针对克隆攻击的无线传感器网络安全定位方法,其具体含有以下步骤:The above-mentioned wireless sensor network security positioning method for cloning attack provided by the present invention specifically includes the following steps:

(一)信标节点周期性向其周围的节点发送自身的ID和位置坐标,当已知未知节点接收到信标节点发送的信号强度值,利用信号强度值的衰减模型计算出信标节点到未知节点的距离;通过计算出的信标节点到未知节点的距离,结合信标节点的位置坐标,得到未知节点的估计位置。(1) The beacon node periodically sends its own ID and location coordinates to its surrounding nodes. When the known unknown node receives the signal strength value sent by the beacon node, the attenuation model of the signal strength value is used to calculate the distance between the beacon node and the unknown node. The distance of the node; through the calculated distance from the beacon node to the unknown node, combined with the position coordinates of the beacon node, the estimated position of the unknown node is obtained.

具体地,信号强度值的衰减模型表示为:RSSI(d)=RSSI(d0)-10αlog(d/d0)+Pn,其中,RSSI表示未知节点接收信标节点的信号强度值,d表示未知节点与信标节点的距离,d0为参考距离,α表示路径损耗指数,Pn表示均值为0的高斯随机变量。其中,α和Pn需要根据具体环境假设置。在自由空间中,节点进行无线信号的传输,当已知未知节点接收到信标节点发送的信号强度值时,就可以利用计算出两者之间的距离。Specifically, the attenuation model of the signal strength value is expressed as: RSSI(d)=RSSI(d 0 )-10αlog(d/d 0 )+P n , where RSSI represents the signal strength value of the unknown node receiving the beacon node, d represents the distance between the unknown node and the beacon node, d 0 is the reference distance, α represents the path loss index, and P n represents a Gaussian random variable with a mean value of 0. Among them, α and P n need to be set according to specific environmental assumptions. In free space, the nodes transmit wireless signals. When the known unknown node receives the signal strength value sent by the beacon node, it can be used to calculate the distance between the two.

具体地,所述无线传感器网络中,m个信标节点的位置坐标分别为(x1,y1),(x2,y2),...,(xm,ym),未知节点到信标节点的距离分别为d1,d2,...,dm,假设未知节点的位置坐标为(x,y),则计算未知节点的位置坐标的公式表示为:Specifically, in the wireless sensor network, the position coordinates of m beacon nodes are respectively (x 1 , y 1 ), (x 2 , y 2 ),..., (x m , y m ), and the unknown nodes are The distances to the beacon nodes are respectively d 1 , d 2 ,...,d m . Assuming that the position coordinates of the unknown nodes are (x, y), the formula for calculating the position coordinates of the unknown nodes is expressed as:

Figure BDA0002308647410000071
Figure BDA0002308647410000071

公式(1)的第一个方程到第m-1个方程依次减第m个方程得到线性方程,其中:From the first equation of formula (1) to the m-1th equation, subtract the mth equation in turn to obtain a linear equation, where:

Figure BDA0002308647410000072
Figure BDA0002308647410000072

Figure BDA0002308647410000081
Figure BDA0002308647410000081

Figure BDA0002308647410000082
Figure BDA0002308647410000082

式中,A、b表示系数矩阵,X表示未知节点的实际位置坐标;In the formula, A and b represent the coefficient matrix, and X represents the actual position coordinates of the unknown node;

利用极大似然估计法,计算出未知节点的估计位置坐标为:

Figure BDA0002308647410000083
其中,
Figure BDA0002308647410000084
表示未知节点的估计位置坐标。此处,计算未知节点的估计位置坐标时,还可以采用最小二乘法。Using the maximum likelihood estimation method, the estimated position coordinates of the unknown nodes are calculated as:
Figure BDA0002308647410000083
in,
Figure BDA0002308647410000084
Represents the estimated location coordinates of the unknown node. Here, when calculating the estimated position coordinates of the unknown node, the least squares method can also be used.

(二)利用均方误差一致性根据未知节点的估计位置的均方误差检测无线传感器网络中是否存在克隆攻击,若不存在克隆攻击,则未知节点定位处于安全环境中,步骤(一)中得到的未知节点的估计位置即为未知节点的安全定位位置;若存在克隆攻击,剔除克隆节点,直至未知节点的最小均方误差小于设定均方误差阈值γ,则确定未知节点定位处于安全环境中,重复步骤(一)的步骤,得到的未知节点的估计位置即为未知节点的安全定位位置。需要说明的是,均方误差阈值γ是在安全状态下,通过实验统计的误差上限。(2) Use the mean square error consistency to detect whether there is a clone attack in the wireless sensor network according to the mean square error of the estimated position of the unknown node. If there is no clone attack, the unknown node is located in a safe environment. Step (1) obtains The estimated position of the unknown node is the safe positioning position of the unknown node; if there is a cloning attack, the cloned node is eliminated until the minimum mean square error of the unknown node is less than the set mean square error threshold γ, then it is determined that the unknown node is located in a safe environment. , repeating the steps of step (1), the obtained estimated position of the unknown node is the safe positioning position of the unknown node. It should be noted that the mean square error threshold γ is the upper limit of error calculated through experiments in a safe state.

具体地,利用均方误差一致性根据未知节点的估计位置的均方误差检测无线传感器网络中是否存在克隆攻击的具体方法为:Specifically, using the mean square error consistency to detect whether there is a clone attack in the wireless sensor network according to the mean square error of the estimated position of the unknown node is as follows:

未知节点得到的估计位置的位置坐标映射在二维平面上相对集中,表现为在未知节点真实位置为中心的一块密集区域内,得到未知节点的均方误差均一致,若无线传感器网络中存在克隆节点,计算的未知节点的均方误差值不一致,且大于安全状态下未知节点的均方误差值;未知节点的均方误差通过公式(5)计算获得,公式(5)表示为:The position coordinates of the estimated position obtained by the unknown node are relatively concentrated on the two-dimensional plane, which is represented as a dense area centered on the real position of the unknown node, and the mean square error of the unknown node is consistent. If there are clones in the wireless sensor network node, the calculated mean square error value of the unknown node is inconsistent, and is greater than the mean square error value of the unknown node in the safe state; the mean square error of the unknown node is calculated by formula (5), and formula (5) is expressed as:

Figure BDA0002308647410000091
Figure BDA0002308647410000091

式中,

Figure BDA0002308647410000092
表示未知节点的均方误差,xj表示第j个信标节点的位置坐标的横坐标,yj表示第j个信标节点的位置坐标的纵坐标,
Figure BDA0002308647410000093
表示未知节点的位置坐标的横坐标,
Figure BDA0002308647410000094
表示未知节点的位置坐标的纵坐标。In the formula,
Figure BDA0002308647410000092
represents the mean square error of the unknown node, x j represents the abscissa of the position coordinate of the jth beacon node, y j represents the ordinate of the position coordinate of the jth beacon node,
Figure BDA0002308647410000093
the abscissa representing the location coordinates of the unknown node,
Figure BDA0002308647410000094
The ordinate representing the location coordinates of the unknown node.

具体地,克隆节点的剔除方法为:Specifically, the method for removing cloned nodes is as follows:

(1)假设在未知节点的通信范围内有p,p=m+n个节点,从p个节点任选p-1个节点作为一组用于计算未知节点的位置,对每一组得到的未知节点的位置再计算该未知节点的位置的均方误差,总共有p个均方误差,记为

Figure BDA0002308647410000095
(1) Assuming that there are p, p=m+n nodes in the communication range of the unknown node, select p-1 nodes from the p nodes as a group for calculating the position of the unknown node, and for each group obtained The position of the unknown node is calculated and the mean square error of the position of the unknown node is calculated. There are p mean square errors in total, which are recorded as
Figure BDA0002308647410000095

(2)通过冒泡算法选出Y中最小的一组均方误差,记为

Figure BDA0002308647410000096
将M与γ做比较,若M<γ,则无线传感器网络中没有克隆节点,停止算法;若M>γ,则无线传感器网络中有克隆节点,从均方误差最小的一组节点中随机剔除一个节点;(2) Select the smallest set of mean square errors in Y through the bubble algorithm, denoted as
Figure BDA0002308647410000096
Compare M with γ. If M<γ, there is no clone node in the wireless sensor network, and the algorithm stops; if M>γ, there is a clone node in the wireless sensor network, and it is randomly selected from the group of nodes with the smallest mean square error. a node;

(3)从p-1个节点中选出p-2个节点作为一组用于计算未知节点的位置,继续执行上述步骤(1)和步骤(2),直至最小的一组均方误差M小于γ,停止算法,完成克隆节点的剔除。(3) Select p-2 nodes from the p-1 nodes as a group for calculating the position of the unknown node, and continue to perform the above steps (1) and (2) until the minimum set of mean square errors M If it is less than γ, stop the algorithm and complete the elimination of clone nodes.

例如:在节点信息集合L中随机剔除一个节点,产生新的集合一共有q组,其中一种新的集合为:For example: randomly remove a node from the node information set L, and generate a new set with a total of q groups, one of which is:

Figure BDA0002308647410000097
Figure BDA0002308647410000097

将q组集合的数据,带入未知节点的均方误差计算中,得到一组均方误差为

Figure BDA0002308647410000098
选出选出均方误差最小的一组与γ进行比较。如果均方误差小于γ,则停止剔除节点。如果均方误差大于γ,则从均方误差最小的集合中,再次随机减少一个节点。继续之前的操作,直至均方误差小于γ。The data of the q group set is brought into the calculation of the mean square error of the unknown node, and a set of mean square error is obtained as
Figure BDA0002308647410000098
The group with the smallest mean square error is selected and compared with γ. Stop culling nodes if the mean squared error is less than γ. If the mean squared error is greater than γ, from the set with the smallest mean squared error, one node is randomly reduced again. Continue the previous operation until the mean squared error is less than γ.

采用最小均方误差的方法剔除克隆节点,从一组节点信息集合中随机剔除一个节点,再计算未知节点的均方误差。当剔除的节点为克隆节点时,得到未知节点的均方误差将会减小。然后从均方误差最小的一组节点中,随机剔除一个节点,再计算未知节点的均方误差,直至最小的均方误差小于γ,确保未知节点定位处于安全环境中,在安全环境中对未知节点进行定位,有效提高了未知节点的定位精度。The method of minimum mean square error is used to eliminate clone nodes, a node is randomly selected from a set of node information, and the mean square error of unknown nodes is calculated. When the removed node is a clone node, the mean square error of the unknown node will be reduced. Then, from a group of nodes with the smallest mean square error, a node is randomly removed, and then the mean square error of the unknown node is calculated until the minimum mean square error is less than γ, so as to ensure that the unknown node is positioned in a safe environment, and the unknown nodes are located in a safe environment. Node positioning can effectively improve the positioning accuracy of unknown nodes.

为了进一步说明本发明上述方法的优点及有效性,下面结合附图和实施例对本发明做出进一步说明。In order to further illustrate the advantages and effectiveness of the above method of the present invention, the present invention will be further described below with reference to the accompanying drawings and embodiments.

实施例:无线传感器网络中随机部署一批信标节点和未知节点,U为未知节点,B1、B2、B3、B4、B5为信标节点。信标节点提前获知自身的位置坐标信息,为未知节点提供定位服务。未知节点需要通过定位技术获取自身位置坐标。B2'和B4'分别为克隆攻击捕获B2和B4复制出的克隆节点,它们通过获取信标节点的ID和位置坐标信息,参与到未知节点的定位过程中,能够影响未知节点的定位精度。各个节点间能够进行信息的相互通信。每个信标节点都有唯一的ID,克隆节点与信标节点ID一样,同样能够参与到未知节点定位过程中。未知节点、信标节点和克隆节点的通讯半径均为R,d2'、d2、d4'、d4分别为U到B2'、B2、B4'、B4的距离。不考虑节点之间通信数据丢失问题。Embodiment: A batch of beacon nodes and unknown nodes are randomly deployed in the wireless sensor network, U is an unknown node, and B1, B2, B3, B4, and B5 are beacon nodes. The beacon node obtains its own location coordinate information in advance, and provides positioning services for unknown nodes. Unknown nodes need to obtain their own position coordinates through positioning technology. B2' and B4' are cloned nodes captured by clone attack B2 and B4 respectively. They participate in the positioning process of unknown nodes by obtaining the ID and location coordinate information of beacon nodes, which can affect the positioning accuracy of unknown nodes. Each node can communicate with each other of information. Each beacon node has a unique ID, and the clone node, like the beacon node ID, can also participate in the process of locating unknown nodes. The communication radius of unknown node, beacon node and clone node are all R, and d2', d2, d4', d4 are the distances from U to B2', B2, B4', B4, respectively. The problem of data loss in communication between nodes is not considered.

当未知节点U发送定位请求时,信标节点和克隆节点接收到广播,都会发送位置坐标信息。节点进行无线信号传输采用的理论模型为衰减模型RSSI(d)=RSSI(d0)-10αlog(d/d0)+Pn,其中,RSSI表示未知节点接收信标节点的信号强度值,d表示未知节点与信标节点的距离,d0为参考距离,α表示路径损耗指数,Pn表示均值为0的高斯随机变量。由此计算出信标节点到未知节点U的距离d1、d2'、d3、d4'、d5。通过计算出来的信标节点到未知节点的距离,再结合信标节点的位置坐标,未知节点使用极大似然估计法得到自身的估计位置信息。当无线传感器网络处于安全状态,未知节点使用极大似然估计法得到的位置坐标映射在二维平面上相对集中,表现为在未知节点真实位置为中心的一块密集区内,得到未知节点的均方误差值均一致。如果无线传感器网络中存在克隆节点时,计算得到未知节点的均方误差值不一致,而且大于安全状态下未知节点的均方误差值。参见图2,把B1、B2'、B3、B4'、B5的位置坐标和到未知节点的距离带入公式(1)中,计算出未知节点的位置坐标,然后把计算的结果带入公式(5)中,得到未知节点的均方误差,通过与γ进行比较,判断无线传感器网络中是否有克隆节点。在该实例中B2'和B4'发送的位置坐标信息是B2和B4的位置坐标信息,所以得到未知节点U的均方误差大于实验统计的误差上限,即均方误差阈值γ,从而判断该组信标节点集合中含有克隆节点,需要进一步使用最小均方误差的方法来剔除克隆节点。When the unknown node U sends a positioning request, both the beacon node and the clone node will send the position coordinate information after receiving the broadcast. The theoretical model used by the node for wireless signal transmission is the attenuation model RSSI(d)=RSSI(d 0 )-10αlog(d/d 0 )+P n , where RSSI represents the signal strength value of the unknown node receiving the beacon node, d represents the distance between the unknown node and the beacon node, d 0 is the reference distance, α represents the path loss index, and P n represents a Gaussian random variable with a mean value of 0. Thus, the distances d1, d2', d3, d4', and d5 from the beacon node to the unknown node U are calculated. By calculating the distance from the beacon node to the unknown node, combined with the position coordinates of the beacon node, the unknown node uses the maximum likelihood estimation method to obtain its own estimated position information. When the wireless sensor network is in a safe state, the position coordinates of the unknown nodes obtained by using the maximum likelihood estimation method are relatively concentrated on the two-dimensional plane, which is expressed as a dense area centered on the true position of the unknown node, and the average value of the unknown node is obtained. The square error values are the same. If there are clone nodes in the wireless sensor network, the calculated mean square error value of the unknown node is inconsistent, and it is greater than the mean square error value of the unknown node in the safe state. Referring to Figure 2, the position coordinates of B1, B2', B3, B4', B5 and the distance to the unknown node are brought into formula (1), the position coordinates of the unknown node are calculated, and then the calculated result is brought into the formula ( In 5), the mean square error of the unknown node is obtained, and by comparing with γ, it is judged whether there is a clone node in the wireless sensor network. In this example, the position coordinate information sent by B2' and B4' is the position coordinate information of B2 and B4, so the mean square error of the unknown node U is greater than the upper limit of the error of the experimental statistics, that is, the mean square error threshold γ, so as to judge the group The beacon node set contains clone nodes, and the method of minimum mean square error needs to be further used to eliminate clone nodes.

从一组节点信息集合中随机剔除一个节点,再计算未知节点的均方误差。当剔除的节点为克隆节点时,得到未知节点的均方误差将会减小。然后从均方误差最小的一组节点中,随机剔除一个节点,进行相同的运算,直至最小的均方误差小于γ。在该实例中,从信标节点集合L={B1,B2',B3,B4',B5}中随机剔除一个节点,产生新的集合一共有5组,分别为L1={B2',B3,B4',B5}L2={B1,B3,B4',B5},L3={B1,B2',B4',B5},L4={B1,B2',B3,B5},L5={B1,B2',B3,B4'},将5组集合的数据,带入未知节点的均方误差计算中,得到均方误差为

Figure BDA0002308647410000111
选出均方误差最小的一组与γ进行比较。如果均方误差小于γ,则停止剔除节点。如果均方误差大于γ,则从均方误差最小的集合中,再次随机减少一个节点,重复之前的操作步骤,直至均方误差小于γ。A node is randomly selected from a set of node information, and the mean square error of the unknown node is calculated. When the removed node is a clone node, the mean square error of the unknown node will be reduced. Then, from a group of nodes with the smallest mean square error, a node is randomly removed, and the same operation is performed until the smallest mean square error is less than γ. In this example, a node is randomly selected from the beacon node set L={B1, B2', B3, B4', B5}, and a total of 5 new sets are generated, which are L1={B2', B3, B4',B5}L2={B1,B3,B4',B5}, L3={B1,B2',B4',B5}, L4={B1,B2',B3,B5}, L5={B1, B2', B3, B4'}, bring the 5 sets of data into the mean square error calculation of the unknown node, and get the mean square error as
Figure BDA0002308647410000111
The group with the smallest mean square error is selected for comparison with γ. Stop culling nodes if the mean squared error is less than γ. If the mean square error is greater than γ, from the set with the smallest mean square error, one node is randomly reduced again, and the previous operation steps are repeated until the mean square error is less than γ.

通过均方误差一致性检测出克隆攻击,然后使用最小均方误差的方法剔除克隆节点后,确保未知节点定位处于安全环境中,最后基于RSSI测距的定位方法实现节点安全定位。The clone attack is detected by the consistency of the mean square error, and then the clone node is eliminated by the method of minimum mean square error to ensure that the location of the unknown node is in a safe environment.

参见图3、图4,无线传感器网络中含有的克隆节点越多,对未知节点的定位影响越大,且定位精度越低。具体地,继续参见图3,克隆节点个数越多,对未知节点估计位置的均方误差影响越大,在具有相同信标节点个数的情况下,克隆节点个数越多,未知节点估计位置的均方误差越大。继续参见图4,克隆节点个数越多,对未知节点的定位误差影响越大,在具有相同信标节点个数的情况下,克隆节点个数越多,未知节点的定位误差越大,定位精度就越低。Referring to Figure 3 and Figure 4, the more clone nodes contained in the wireless sensor network, the greater the impact on the location of unknown nodes, and the lower the location accuracy. Specifically, continue to refer to Fig. 3, the more the number of clone nodes, the greater the influence on the mean square error of the estimated position of the unknown node. In the case of the same number of beacon nodes, the more the number of clone nodes, the greater the estimated value of the unknown node. The larger the mean squared error of the location. Continuing to refer to Figure 4, the more the number of clone nodes, the greater the impact on the positioning error of the unknown node. In the case of the same number of beacon nodes, the more the number of clone nodes, the greater the positioning error of the unknown node, and the greater the positioning error of the unknown node. the lower the accuracy.

参见图5、图6,随着无线传感器网络中克隆节点到未知节点的距离增加,未知节点估计位置的均方误差越大,且未知节点的定位误差越大。Referring to Figure 5 and Figure 6, as the distance from the clone node to the unknown node in the wireless sensor network increases, the mean square error of the estimated position of the unknown node is larger, and the positioning error of the unknown node is larger.

参见图7,采用本发明上述安全定位方法、有克隆攻击的定位方法及无克隆攻击的定位方法对无线传感器网络的未知节点进行定位,随着信标节点个数的增加,采用有克隆攻击的定位方法及无克隆攻击的定位方法,未知节点的定位误差基本保持不变,且无克隆攻击时未知节点的定位误差明显小于有克隆攻击时未知节点的定位误差。而采用本发明上述安全定位方法,随着信标节点个数的增加,未知节点的定位误差明显减小,且与有克隆攻击的定位方法及无克隆攻击的定位方法相比,未知节点的定位误差明显小于上述两种方法。需要说明的是,虽然信标节点的小于20个时,采用本发明上述安全定位方法的未知节点的定位误差大于无克隆攻击的定位方法的未知节点的定位误差,但差别不明显,然而,当信标节点的大于20个时,随着信标节点的增多,采用本发明上述安全定位方法的未知节点的定位误差明显小于无克隆攻击的定位方法的未知节点的定位误差。Referring to FIG. 7 , the above-mentioned security positioning method, the positioning method with cloning attack and the positioning method without cloning attack of the present invention are used to locate the unknown node of the wireless sensor network. With the increase of the number of beacon nodes, the positioning with cloning attack is adopted. The method and the positioning method without cloning attack, the positioning error of the unknown node remains basically unchanged, and the positioning error of the unknown node without the clone attack is significantly smaller than the positioning error of the unknown node with the clone attack. With the above-mentioned security positioning method of the present invention, with the increase of the number of beacon nodes, the positioning error of the unknown node is significantly reduced, and compared with the positioning method with clone attack and the positioning method without clone attack, the positioning error of the unknown node is significantly reduced. Significantly smaller than the above two methods. It should be noted that, although the number of beacon nodes is less than 20, the positioning error of the unknown node using the above-mentioned security positioning method of the present invention is greater than the positioning error of the unknown node of the positioning method without cloning attack, but the difference is not obvious. However, when When there are more than 20 beacon nodes, with the increase of beacon nodes, the positioning error of the unknown node using the above-mentioned secure positioning method of the present invention is obviously smaller than that of the unknown node of the positioning method without cloning attack.

由上可知,本发明提供的针对克隆攻击的无线传感器网络安全定位方法,能够有效检测克隆节点,并对克隆节点进行剔除,确保未知节点在安全环境下进行定位,能够很大程度降低克隆节点对未知节点定位的影响,提高定位精度,且与现有方法相比,更具有效性。As can be seen from the above, the wireless sensor network security positioning method for cloning attacks provided by the present invention can effectively detect clone nodes, and eliminate clone nodes, ensure that unknown nodes are located in a safe environment, and can greatly reduce the number of clone nodes. The influence of unknown node positioning improves positioning accuracy and is more effective than existing methods.

以上所举实施例仅用为方便举例说明本发明,并非对本发明保护范围的限制,在本发明所述技术方案范畴,所属技术领域的技术人员所作各种简单变形与修饰,均应包含在以上申请专利范围中。The above-mentioned embodiments are only used to illustrate the present invention for convenience, and are not intended to limit the scope of protection of the present invention. Within the scope of the technical solutions described in the present invention, various simple deformations and modifications made by those skilled in the art shall be included in the above descriptions. patent application.

Claims (2)

1.一种针对克隆攻击的无线传感器网络安全定位方法,其特征在于,所述无线传感器网络包含m,m≥3个信标节点、多个未知节点和n,0≤n<m个克隆节点,每个信标节点具有唯一的ID,且每个信标节点已知自身的位置坐标,信标节点、未知节点和克隆节点的通讯半径均为R,节点之间无通信数据丢失,m个信标节点的位置坐标分别为(x1,y1),(x2,y2),...,(xm,ym),未知节点到信标节点的距离分别为d1,d2,...,dm;所述方法含有以下步骤:1. A wireless sensor network security positioning method for cloning attack, wherein the wireless sensor network comprises m, m≥3 beacon nodes, multiple unknown nodes and n,0≤n<m clone nodes , each beacon node has a unique ID, and each beacon node knows its own position coordinates, the communication radius of the beacon node, unknown node and clone node is R, no communication data is lost between nodes, m The position coordinates of the beacon nodes are (x 1 , y 1 ), (x 2 , y 2 ),..., (x m , y m ), and the distances from the unknown nodes to the beacon nodes are d 1 , d 2 ,...,d m ; the method comprises the following steps: (一)信标节点周期性向其周围的节点发送自身的ID和位置坐标,当已知未知节点接收到信标节点发送的信号强度值,利用信号强度值的衰减模型计算出信标节点到未知节点的距离;通过计算出的信标节点到未知节点的距离,结合信标节点的位置坐标,得到未知节点的估计位置;(1) The beacon node periodically sends its own ID and location coordinates to its surrounding nodes. When the known unknown node receives the signal strength value sent by the beacon node, the attenuation model of the signal strength value is used to calculate the distance between the beacon node and the unknown node. The distance of the node; through the calculated distance from the beacon node to the unknown node, combined with the position coordinates of the beacon node, the estimated position of the unknown node is obtained; (二)利用均方误差一致性根据未知节点的估计位置的均方误差检测无线传感器网络中是否存在克隆攻击,若不存在克隆攻击,步骤(一)中得到的未知节点的估计位置即为未知节点的安全定位位置;若存在克隆攻击,剔除克隆节点,直至未知节点的最小均方误差小于设定均方误差阈值γ,重复步骤(一)的步骤,得到的未知节点的估计位置即为未知节点的安全定位位置;利用均方误差一致性根据未知节点的估计位置的均方误差检测无线传感器网络中是否存在克隆攻击的具体方法为:(2) Use the mean square error consistency to detect whether there is a clone attack in the wireless sensor network according to the mean square error of the estimated position of the unknown node. If there is no clone attack, the estimated position of the unknown node obtained in step (1) is unknown. The safe positioning position of the node; if there is a cloning attack, remove the cloned node until the minimum mean square error of the unknown node is less than the set mean square error threshold γ, repeat the steps of step (1), and the estimated position of the unknown node obtained is unknown. The safe positioning position of the node; the specific method to detect whether there is a clone attack in the wireless sensor network according to the mean square error of the estimated position of the unknown node by using the mean square error consistency is: 未知节点得到的估计位置的位置坐标映射在二维平面上相对集中,表现为在未知节点真实位置为中心的一块密集区域内,得到未知节点的均方误差均一致,若无线传感器网络中存在克隆节点,计算的未知节点的均方误差值不一致,且大于安全状态下未知节点的均方误差值;未知节点的均方误差通过公式(5)计算获得,公式(5)表示为:The position coordinates of the estimated position obtained by the unknown node are relatively concentrated on the two-dimensional plane, which is represented as a dense area centered on the real position of the unknown node, and the mean square error of the unknown node is consistent. If there are clones in the wireless sensor network node, the calculated mean square error value of the unknown node is inconsistent, and is greater than the mean square error value of the unknown node in the safe state; the mean square error of the unknown node is calculated by formula (5), and formula (5) is expressed as:
Figure FDA0003172655120000021
Figure FDA0003172655120000021
式中,
Figure FDA0003172655120000022
表示未知节点的均方误差,xj表示第j个信标节点的位置坐标的横坐标,yj表示第j个信标节点的位置坐标的纵坐标,
Figure FDA0003172655120000023
表示未知节点的位置坐标的横坐标,
Figure FDA0003172655120000024
表示未知节点的位置坐标的纵坐标;
In the formula,
Figure FDA0003172655120000022
represents the mean square error of the unknown node, x j represents the abscissa of the position coordinate of the jth beacon node, y j represents the ordinate of the position coordinate of the jth beacon node,
Figure FDA0003172655120000023
the abscissa representing the location coordinates of the unknown node,
Figure FDA0003172655120000024
The ordinate representing the location coordinates of the unknown node;
克隆节点的剔除方法为:The culling method of cloned nodes is: (1)假设在未知节点的通信范围内有p,p=m+n个节点,从p个节点任选p-1个节点作为一组用于计算未知节点的位置,对每一组得到的未知节点的位置再计算该未知节点的位置的均方误差,总共有p个均方误差,记为
Figure FDA0003172655120000025
(1) Assuming that there are p, p=m+n nodes in the communication range of the unknown node, select p-1 nodes from the p nodes as a group for calculating the position of the unknown node, and for each group obtained The position of the unknown node is calculated and the mean square error of the position of the unknown node is calculated. There are p mean square errors in total, which are recorded as
Figure FDA0003172655120000025
(2)选出Y中最小的一组均方误差,记为
Figure FDA0003172655120000026
将M与γ做比较,若M<γ,则无线传感器网络中没有克隆节点;若M>γ,则无线传感器网络中有克隆节点,从均方误差最小的一组节点中随机剔除一个节点;
(2) Select the smallest set of mean square errors in Y, denoted as
Figure FDA0003172655120000026
Compare M with γ, if M<γ, there is no clone node in the wireless sensor network; if M>γ, there is a clone node in the wireless sensor network, and a node is randomly selected from a group of nodes with the smallest mean square error;
(3)从p-1个节点中选出p-2个节点作为一组用于计算未知节点的位置,继续执行上述步骤(1)和步骤(2),直至最小的一组均方误差M小于γ,停止算法,完成克隆节点的剔除。(3) Select p-2 nodes from the p-1 nodes as a group for calculating the position of the unknown node, and continue to perform the above steps (1) and (2) until the minimum set of mean square errors M If it is less than γ, stop the algorithm and complete the elimination of clone nodes.
2.如权利要求1所述的针对克隆攻击的无线传感器网络安全定位方法,其特征在于,信号强度值的衰减模型表示为:RSSI(d)=RSSI(d0)-10αlog(d/d0)+Pn,其中,RSSI表示未知节点接收信标节点的信号强度值,d表示未知节点与信标节点的距离,d0为参考距离,α表示路径损耗指数,Pn表示均值为0的高斯随机变量;假设未知节点的位置坐标为(x,y),则计算未知节点的位置坐标的公式表示为:2 . The wireless sensor network security positioning method for cloning attack according to claim 1 , wherein the attenuation model of the signal strength value is expressed as: RSSI(d)=RSSI(d 0 )-10αlog(d/d 0 . 3 . )+P n , where RSSI represents the signal strength value of the unknown node receiving the beacon node, d represents the distance between the unknown node and the beacon node, d 0 is the reference distance, α represents the path loss index, and P n represents the Gaussian with mean 0 Random variable; Assuming that the position coordinates of the unknown node are (x, y), the formula for calculating the position coordinates of the unknown node is expressed as:
Figure FDA0003172655120000031
Figure FDA0003172655120000031
公式(1)的第一个方程到第m-1个方程依次减第m个方程得到线性方程,其中:From the first equation of formula (1) to the m-1th equation, subtract the mth equation in turn to obtain a linear equation, where:
Figure FDA0003172655120000032
Figure FDA0003172655120000032
Figure FDA0003172655120000033
Figure FDA0003172655120000033
Figure FDA0003172655120000034
Figure FDA0003172655120000034
式中,A、b表示系数矩阵,X表示未知节点的实际位置坐标;In the formula, A and b represent the coefficient matrix, and X represents the actual position coordinates of the unknown node; 利用极大似然估计法,计算出未知节点的估计位置坐标为:
Figure FDA0003172655120000035
其中,
Figure FDA0003172655120000036
表示未知节点的估计位置坐标。
Using the maximum likelihood estimation method, the estimated position coordinates of the unknown nodes are calculated as:
Figure FDA0003172655120000035
in,
Figure FDA0003172655120000036
Represents the estimated location coordinates of the unknown node.
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