CN110930603B - Bidirectional encryption verification system and cash recycling machine with same - Google Patents
Bidirectional encryption verification system and cash recycling machine with same Download PDFInfo
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- CN110930603B CN110930603B CN201911227261.6A CN201911227261A CN110930603B CN 110930603 B CN110930603 B CN 110930603B CN 201911227261 A CN201911227261 A CN 201911227261A CN 110930603 B CN110930603 B CN 110930603B
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- G—PHYSICS
- G07—CHECKING-DEVICES
- G07F—COIN-FREED OR LIKE APPARATUS
- G07F19/00—Complete banking systems; Coded card-freed arrangements adapted for dispensing or receiving monies or the like and posting such transactions to existing accounts, e.g. automatic teller machines
- G07F19/20—Automatic teller machines [ATMs]
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- G—PHYSICS
- G07—CHECKING-DEVICES
- G07F—COIN-FREED OR LIKE APPARATUS
- G07F19/00—Complete banking systems; Coded card-freed arrangements adapted for dispensing or receiving monies or the like and posting such transactions to existing accounts, e.g. automatic teller machines
- G07F19/20—Automatic teller machines [ATMs]
- G07F19/211—Software architecture within ATMs or in relation to the ATM network
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- H—ELECTRICITY
- H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
- H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
- H04L63/00—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security
- H04L63/04—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security for providing a confidential data exchange among entities communicating through data packet networks
- H04L63/0428—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security for providing a confidential data exchange among entities communicating through data packet networks wherein the data content is protected, e.g. by encrypting or encapsulating the payload
Abstract
The invention discloses a bidirectional encryption verification system, which comprises: the PC industrial control host is used for running a cash processing module control program; the cash processing module has a bidirectional encryption verification function, can perform data communication with the PC industrial control host, is internally provided with a cash outlet authentication module, and comprises a first cash outlet authentication module and a second cash outlet authentication module, wherein the first cash outlet authentication module is connected to the PC industrial control host, and the second cash outlet authentication module is connected to the cash processing module; and the password keyboard is in communication connection with the PC industrial control host, and keys used by the password keyboard comprise a working key and an MAC key, wherein the working key is used for protecting a PIN (personal identification number) code input by a user, and the MAC key is used for MAC (media access control) calculation of transaction information. The bidirectional encryption verification system has the bidirectional encryption verification function, realizes hard encryption between the cash processing module and the PC industrial control host, and obviously improves the security of the property and information of customers.
Description
Technical Field
The invention relates to the technical field of financial information security, in particular to a bidirectional encryption verification system and a cash recycling system with the bidirectional encryption system.
Background
The automatic teller machine (ATM for short) is one of ATM used by banks, and the English name can be: the Cash Recycling System, abbreviated as CRS. With the development of cash self-service business, more and more CRS devices are installed in 24-hour self-service banks, shopping malls, hotels, hospitals, schools, residential areas, convenience stores, and even directly on the roadside in order to meet the needs of people.
The severe installation environment can bring dead angles of safety monitoring, communication lines of some equipment are easily exposed outside, the lines can be damaged only by means of simple tools to cause communication interruption, or illegal communication equipment is embedded into the lines, so that the possibility of information leakage is generated. Moreover, more and more CRS devices adopt wireless transmission methods, and more reports about interference or eavesdropping received by wireless communication equipment are recently provided, so that the CRS devices cannot be unique. When a transaction occurs with the CRS machine, the data packet it communicates with the host computer may contain the following information: card information of the cardholder, account password of the cardholder, transaction amount, transaction type and account number for transferring money. This information is related to the security and privacy of the individual's property. If a lawbreaker obtains the card number and the password, the lawbreaker can imitate a magnetic card and steal cash in an account of another person; such information may also be sold to fraudulent groups, causing further losses. If lawbreakers have a certain technical means, the purpose of tampering account balance or stealing cash can be achieved by increasing or decreasing transaction amount by replacing key data in the message. Once such an event occurs, it will cause serious impact and loss to the bank's personal financial system.
When products of other manufacturers at home and abroad deal with the encryption problem of communication between the cash processing module and the industrial control host, a software data encryption mode is mostly adopted, but the mode is easy to crack, so that the risk of information leakage exists. Some manufacturers realize hard encryption between the cash processing module and the industrial control host, but the data processing mode is not optimized, so that the transmission rate is greatly reduced compared with that before encryption.
The information disclosed in this background section is only for enhancement of understanding of the general background of the invention and should not be taken as an acknowledgement or any form of suggestion that this information forms the prior art already known to a person skilled in the art.
Disclosure of Invention
It is an object of the present invention to provide a two-way cryptographic authentication system that solves the above-mentioned problems of the prior art.
Another object of the present invention is to provide a cash recycling system having a two-way encryption system and a method of attaching a two-way encryption verification system to an ATM.
In order to achieve the above object, the present invention provides a bidirectional encryption verification system, including: the PC industrial control host is used for running a cash processing module control program; the cash processing module has a bidirectional encryption verification function, can perform data communication with the PC industrial control host, is internally provided with a cash outlet authentication module, and comprises a first cash outlet authentication module and a second cash outlet authentication module, wherein the first cash outlet authentication module is connected to the PC industrial control host, and the second cash outlet authentication module is connected to the cash processing module; and the password keyboard is in communication connection with the PC industrial control host, and keys used by the password keyboard comprise a working key and an MAC key, wherein the working key is used for protecting a PIN (personal identification number) code input by a user, and the MAC key is used for MAC (media access control) calculation of transaction information.
In one or more embodiments, the cash handling module in data communication with the PC industrial host includes the steps of: the PC industrial control host sends a command for generating a random number and a signature thereof to the cash processing module through the first USB port; the second cash-out authentication module generates a random number and a signature thereof, and returns the random number and the signature to the PC industrial control host; the first cash-out authentication module encrypts communication data by using a built-in working key and generates an MAC code for the encrypted data by using a built-in MAC key; the PC industrial control host sends the encrypted data and the check code obtained from the first cash-out authentication module to the cash processing module through the first USB port; the second cash-out authentication module uses a built-in MAC key to firstly verify the check code and then uses a built-in working key to decrypt the encrypted data to obtain plaintext command data, wherein the working key and the MAC key which are built in the first cash-out authentication module and the second cash-out authentication module are respectively a national secret SM4 working key and a national secret SM4MAC key; after the cash processing module finishes processing the command data, generating response data; the cash processing module adds a random number to the response data according to an agreed rule through the second cash-out authentication module, generates an MAC code by using a built-in MAC secret key, attaches the MAC code to the response data, and sends the MAC code to the PC industrial control host through the first USB; after receiving the data, the PC industrial control host sends the data to the first cash-out authentication module through the second USB port, and the first cash-out authentication module generates a check code for the received data according to a built-in MAC secret key and then returns the check code to the PC industrial control host.
In one or more embodiments, the cash handling module is in data communication with the PC industrial host computer and further comprises the steps of: the PC industrial control host compares the MAC code obtained from the cash processing module with the MAC code obtained from the first cash-out authentication module; if the two are consistent, the command is considered to be successfully executed, and subsequent processing is carried out; if the two are not consistent, the communication is considered to be in problem, and error reporting processing is carried out.
In one or more embodiments, the password keyboard and the bank background host are respectively in communication connection with the PC industrial control host, wherein a user inputs a PIN code through the password keyboard, the PC industrial control host sends account information and MAC data of the user to the password keyboard through an application program installed on the PC industrial control host, the password keyboard sends encrypted data and a check code of the MAC data to the application program, the application program can send a combined message to the bank background host for processing, and the bank background host can return a data processing result to the application program according to the received message.
In one or more embodiments, when a customer inputs a PIN code, the cryptographic keyboard uses a working key to calculate a ciphertext PINBLOCK, and when transaction communication is performed, the MAC key is used to calculate an MAC code of a communication message sent or received by the cryptographic keyboard, wherein the working key used by the cryptographic keyboard is used to protect the PIN code input by the user, when the user inputs the PIN code in the cryptographic keyboard, information of the user is sent to the cryptographic keyboard through an application interface of a PC industrial control host, the cryptographic keyboard combines the data according to a certain specification to form plaintext data, the plaintext data is encrypted by using a national secret SM4 algorithm, and the PINBLOCK ciphertext is returned.
In one or more embodiments, the MAC key used by the password keyboard is used for MAC calculation of transaction information, when a transaction is carried out, the transaction information is provided by an application program, and the transaction information is sent to the password keyboard through an application interface of the PC industrial control host so as to be processed through the password keyboard.
In one or more embodiments, processing transaction information via a cryptographic keypad includes the steps of: taking a hexadecimal number 00 of 16 bytes as an initial variable; dividing MAC data into data blocks with 16 bytes as units, wherein the last data block is 1-16 bytes; if the length of the last data block is 16 bytes, going to the next step, if the length of the last data block is less than 16 bytes, adding hexadecimal byte 00 after the last data block until the length reaches 16 bytes; and carrying out XOR processing on the initial variable and the first data block, then encrypting, carrying out XOR processing on the encryption result and the next data block, encrypting the result of the XOR processing, and repeating the steps until the whole MAC data is processed, wherein the final encryption result is the MAC check code.
The invention also provides a depositing and withdrawing circulation all-in-one machine which is provided with the bidirectional encryption verification system.
The invention also provides a method for additionally installing the bidirectional encryption verification system on the ATM, which comprises the following steps: generating two pairs of SM2 keys in a first cash-out authentication module by using a key downloader in a safety workshop, signing an SM2 public key by using a manufacturer private key, and then filling the first cash-out authentication module; generating two pairs of SM2 keys in a second cash-out authentication module by using a key downloader, signing an SM2 public key by using a manufacturer private key, and filling the second cash-out authentication module with the signed SM2 public key; installing a first cash-out authentication module and a second cash-out authentication module which finish root key encryption on an ATM on a production line; encrypted communications are established for the ATM.
In one or more embodiments, establishing encrypted communications for an ATM includes the steps of: powering up the ATM; the first USB port communication between the PC industrial control host and the cash processing module is ensured to be smooth; the communication of a second USB port of the communication between the PC industrial control host and the first cash outlet module is ensured to be smooth; exchanging two SM2 public keys of the first and second cash-out modules, wherein a first of the two SM2 public keys is used to verify a parameter signature for generating a first SM4 session key and a second of the two SM2 public keys is used to verify a parameter signature for generating a second SM4 session key; the first and second cash-out modules share two SM4 session keys, wherein one of the two SM4 session keys is used to encrypt/decrypt command words and the other is used to generate MAC of command words/corresponding data; and starting the encrypted communication of the PC industrial control host, the first cash dispensing module and the second cash dispensing module.
Compared with the prior art, the bidirectional encryption verification system has the following beneficial effects:
the two-way encryption verification system has the two-way encryption verification function due to the fact that the cash processing module and the password keyboard which are internally provided with the two cash outlet modules are arranged, hard encryption between the cash processing module and the PC industrial control host is achieved, the data processing mode is integrally optimized, and therefore delay of data transmission is controlled to be almost imperceptible to an operator. The personal financial system of the bank adopts the cryptograph transmission and the key management, thereby ensuring the property and the information security of the client and improving the security and the credit degree of the bank in the client.
Drawings
FIG. 1 is a block diagram of a bi-directional cryptographic authentication system according to an embodiment of the invention;
FIG. 2 is a simplified data encryption communication schematic of a cash handling module according to one embodiment of the present invention;
FIG. 3 is a flow chart of cryptographic keyboard key usage according to one embodiment of the present invention;
figure 4 is a flow diagram of a method for attaching a two-way encryption verification system to an ATM in accordance with one embodiment of the present invention.
Detailed Description
The following detailed description of the present invention is provided in conjunction with the accompanying drawings, but it should be understood that the scope of the present invention is not limited to the specific embodiments.
Throughout the specification and claims, unless explicitly stated otherwise, the word "comprise", or variations such as "comprises" or "comprising", will be understood to imply the inclusion of a stated element or component but not the exclusion of any other element or component.
As shown in fig. 1, a bidirectional encryption verification system 100 according to an embodiment of the present invention includes: a PC industrial control host 101, a cash processing module 102 and a password keyboard 103. The PC industrial control host 101 runs a cash processing module control program. The cash processing module 102 has a bidirectional encryption verification function, the cash processing module 102 can perform data communication with the PC industrial control host 101, and the cash processing module 102 is internally provided with a cash-out authentication module 104. The banknote-out authentication module 104 uses the SRM1501 approved by the national bureau of cryptology. The cash-out authentication module 104 includes a first cash-out authentication module (ECC-H for short) connected to the PC industrial control host 101 and a second cash-out authentication module (ECC-C for short) connected to the cash processing module 102. The password keyboard 103 is in communication connection with the PC industrial control host 101, and keys used by the password keyboard 103 comprise a working key and an MAC key, wherein the working key is used for protecting a PIN code input by a user, and the MAC key is used for MAC calculation of transaction information.
In one or more embodiments, referring to fig. 2, the cash processing module control program 201 is used for controlling data communication between the PC industrial control host 101 and the cash processing module 102, and includes the following steps:
(1) firstly, the PC industrial control host 101 sends a command for generating a random number and a signature thereof to the cash processing module 102 through the first USB port 202; the second cash-out authentication module 204 generates a random number and a signature thereof, and returns the random number and the signature to the PC industrial control host 101.
(2) The first banknote dispensing authentication module 205 encrypts the communication data by using a built-in working key, and generates an MAC code for the encrypted data by using a built-in MAC key.
(3) The PC industrial control host 101 sends the encrypted data and the check code obtained from the first cash-out authentication module 205 to the cash processing module 102 through the first USB port 202; the second cash-out authentication module 204 uses a built-in MAC key to verify the check code, and then uses a built-in working key to decrypt the encrypted data to obtain plaintext command data, wherein the working key and the MAC key built in the first cash-out authentication module 205 and the second cash-out authentication module 204 are a national secret SM4 working key and a national secret SM4MAC key, respectively.
(4) After the cash processing module 102 finishes processing the command data, response data is generated.
(5) The cash processing module 102 adds a random number according to an agreed rule to the response data through the second cash-out authentication module 204, generates a MAC code using a built-in MAC key, appends the MAC code to the response data, and transmits the response data to the PC industrial control host 101 through the first USB port 202.
(6) After receiving the data, the PC industrial control host 101 sends the data to the first cash-out authentication module 205 through the second USB port 203, and the first cash-out authentication module 205 generates a check code for the received data according to the built-in MAC key, and then returns the check code to the PC industrial control host 101.
(7) The PC industrial control host 101 compares the MAC code obtained from the cash processing module 102 with the MAC code obtained from the first cash-out authentication module 205; if the two are consistent, the command is considered to be successfully executed, and subsequent processing is carried out; if the two are not consistent, the communication is considered to be in problem, and error reporting processing is carried out.
The key for the cash processing module 102 to communicate with the PC industrial control host 101 is regenerated every time it is started: when the machine is started, key exchange is carried out between the cash processing module 102 and the PC industrial control host 101 once, and a working key is regenerated, so that even if the working key is cracked and decoded by people, the key is decoded, and a hardware or software means is used to try to steal sensitive data of the next transaction, the key cannot be used due to the change of the key caused by restarting, and the data security is greatly improved.
In one or more embodiments, referring to fig. 3, the password keyboard 103 and the bank backend host 301 are respectively in communication connection with the PC industrial control host 101, wherein a user inputs a PIN code through the password keyboard 103, the PC industrial control host 101 sends account information and MAC data of the user to the password keyboard through an application installed thereon, the password keyboard 103 sends encrypted data and a check code of the MAC data to the application, the application can send a combined message to the bank backend host 301 for processing, and the bank backend host 301 returns a data processing result to the application according to the received message.
In one or more embodiments, when a customer inputs a PIN code, the cryptographic keyboard uses a working key to calculate a ciphertext PINBLOCK, and when transaction communication is performed, the MAC key is used to calculate an MAC code of a communication message sent or received by the cryptographic keyboard, wherein the working key used by the cryptographic keyboard is used to protect the PIN code input by the user, when the user inputs the PIN code in the cryptographic keyboard, information of the user is sent to the cryptographic keyboard through an application interface of a PC industrial control host, the cryptographic keyboard combines the data according to a certain specification to form plaintext data, the plaintext data is encrypted by using a national secret SM4 algorithm, and the PINBLOCK ciphertext is returned.
In one or more embodiments, the MAC key used by the password keyboard is used for MAC calculation of transaction information, when a transaction is carried out, the transaction information is provided by an application program, and the transaction information is sent to the password keyboard through an application interface of the PC industrial control host so as to be processed through the password keyboard. The processing of the transaction information through the password keyboard comprises the following steps: the first step is as follows: taking a hexadecimal digit '00' of 16 bytes as an initial variable; the second step is that: dividing MAC data into data blocks with 16 bytes as units, wherein the last data block is 1-16 bytes; the third step: if the length of the last data block is 16 bytes, going to the next step, if the length of the last data block is less than 16 bytes, adding hexadecimal bytes '00' after the last data block until the length reaches 16 bytes; the fourth step: and carrying out XOR processing on the initial variable and the first data block, then encrypting, carrying out XOR processing on the encryption result and the next data block, encrypting the result of the XOR processing, and repeating the steps until the whole MAC data is processed, wherein the final encryption result is the MAC check code.
The invention also provides a depositing and withdrawing circulation all-in-one machine which is provided with the bidirectional encryption verification system and the receipt printer. Due to the above, all technical effects of the above bidirectional encryption verification system are achieved, and are not described herein again.
As shown in fig. 4, the present invention further provides a method for installing the above bidirectional encryption authentication system on an ATM, which includes the following steps: generating two pairs of SM2 keys in a first cash-out authentication module (ECC-H for short) by using a key downloader in a safety workshop, and signing an SM2 public key by using a manufacturer private key and then filling the first cash-out authentication module; generating two pairs of SM2 keys in a second cash-out authentication module (ECC-C for short) by using a key downloader, signing an SM2 public key by using a manufacturer private key, and then filling the second cash-out authentication module; installing a first cash-out authentication module and a second cash-out authentication module which finish root key encryption on an ATM on a production line; encrypted communications are established for the ATM. Establishing encrypted communications for an ATM includes the steps of: powering up the ATM; the first USB port communication between the PC industrial control host and the cash processing module is ensured to be smooth; the communication of a second USB port of the communication between the PC industrial control host and the first cash outlet module is ensured to be smooth; exchanging two SM2 public keys of the first and second cash-out modules, wherein a first of the two SM2 public keys is used to verify a parameter signature for generating a first SM4 session key and a second of the two SM2 public keys is used to verify a parameter signature for generating a second SM4 session key; the first and second cash-out modules share two SM4 session keys, wherein one of the two SM4 session keys is used to encrypt/decrypt command words and the other is used to generate MAC of command words/corresponding data; and starting the encrypted communication of the PC industrial control host, the first cash dispensing module and the second cash dispensing module.
As will be appreciated by one skilled in the art, embodiments of the present application may be provided as a method, system, or computer program product. Accordingly, the present application may take the form of an entirely hardware embodiment, an entirely software embodiment or an embodiment combining software and hardware aspects. Furthermore, the present application may take the form of a computer program product embodied on one or more computer-usable storage media (including, but not limited to, disk storage, CD-ROM, optical storage, and the like) having computer-usable program code embodied therein.
The present application is described with reference to flowchart illustrations and/or block diagrams of methods, apparatus (systems), and computer program products according to embodiments of the application. It will be understood that each flow and/or block of the flow diagrams and/or block diagrams, and combinations of flows and/or blocks in the flow diagrams and/or block diagrams, can be implemented by computer program instructions. These computer program instructions may be provided to a processor of a general purpose computer, special purpose computer, embedded processor, or other programmable data processing apparatus to produce a machine, such that the instructions, which execute via the processor of the computer or other programmable data processing apparatus, create means for implementing the functions specified in the flowchart flow or flows and/or block diagram block or blocks.
These computer program instructions may also be stored in a computer-readable memory that can direct a computer or other programmable data processing apparatus to function in a particular manner, such that the instructions stored in the computer-readable memory produce an article of manufacture including instruction means which implement the function specified in the flowchart flow or flows and/or block diagram block or blocks.
These computer program instructions may also be loaded onto a computer or other programmable data processing apparatus to cause a series of operational steps to be performed on the computer or other programmable apparatus to produce a computer implemented process such that the instructions which execute on the computer or other programmable apparatus provide steps for implementing the functions specified in the flowchart flow or flows and/or block diagram block or blocks.
The foregoing descriptions of specific exemplary embodiments of the present invention have been presented for purposes of illustration and description. It is not intended to limit the invention to the precise form disclosed, and obviously many modifications and variations are possible in light of the above teaching. The exemplary embodiments were chosen and described in order to explain certain principles of the invention and its practical application to enable one skilled in the art to make and use various exemplary embodiments of the invention and various alternatives and modifications as are suited to the particular use contemplated. It is intended that the scope of the invention be defined by the claims and their equivalents.
Claims (9)
1. A two-way cryptographic authentication system, the two-way cryptographic authentication system comprising:
the PC industrial control host is used for running a cash processing module control program;
the cash processing module has a bidirectional encryption verification function, can perform data communication with the PC industrial control host, is internally provided with a cash outlet authentication module, and comprises a first cash outlet authentication module and a second cash outlet authentication module, wherein the first cash outlet authentication module is connected to the PC industrial control host, and the second cash outlet authentication module is connected to the cash processing module; and
the password keyboard is in communication connection with the PC industrial control host, and keys used by the password keyboard comprise a working key and an MAC key, wherein the working key is used for protecting a PIN (personal identification number) code input by a user, and the MAC key is used for MAC (media access control) calculation of transaction information;
the data communication between the cash processing module and the PC industrial control host comprises the following steps:
the PC industrial control host sends a command for generating a random number and a signature thereof to the cash processing module through the first USB port;
the second cash-out authentication module generates a random number and a signature thereof, and returns the random number and the signature to the PC industrial control host;
the first cash-out authentication module encrypts communication data by using a built-in working key and generates an MAC code for the encrypted data by using a built-in MAC key;
the PC industrial control host sends the encrypted data and the check code obtained from the first cash-out authentication module to the cash processing module through the first USB port;
the second cash-out authentication module firstly verifies the check code by using a built-in MAC key, and then decrypts the encrypted data by using a built-in working key to obtain plaintext command data, wherein the working key and the MAC key which are built in the first cash-out authentication module and the second cash-out authentication module are respectively a national secret SM4 working key and a national secret SM4MAC key;
after the cash processing module finishes processing the command data, response data is generated;
the cash processing module adds a random number to the response data according to an agreed rule through the second cash-out authentication module, generates an MAC code by using a built-in MAC key, attaches the MAC code to the response data, and sends the MAC code to the PC industrial control host through the first USB;
and after receiving the data, the PC industrial control host sends the data to the first cash-out authentication module through the second USB port, and the first cash-out authentication module generates a check code for the received data according to a built-in MAC key and then returns the check code to the PC industrial control host.
2. The two-way cryptographic validation system of claim 1, wherein said cash handling module in data communication with said PC industrial host further comprises the steps of:
the PC industrial control host compares the MAC code obtained from the cash processing module with the MAC code obtained from the first cash-out authentication module;
if the two are consistent, the command is considered to be successfully executed, and subsequent processing is carried out;
if the two are not consistent, the communication is considered to be in problem, and error reporting processing is carried out.
3. The bidirectional encryption verification system of claim 1, wherein the password keyboard and the bank background host are respectively in communication connection with the PC industrial control host, wherein a user inputs a PIN code through the password keyboard, the PC industrial control host sends account information and MAC data of the user to the password keyboard through an application program installed on the PC industrial control host, the password keyboard sends encrypted data and a check code of the MAC data to the application program, the application program can send a combined message to the bank background host for processing, and the bank background host returns a data processing result to the application program according to the received message.
4. The bidirectional encryption verification system of claim 3, wherein when the customer inputs the PIN code, the cryptographic keyboard uses the working key to calculate the ciphertext PINBLOCK, and when the transaction communication is performed, the MAC key is used to calculate the MAC code of the communication message sent or received by the cryptographic keyboard, wherein the working key used by the cryptographic keyboard is used to protect the PIN code input by the user, when the user inputs the PIN code in the cryptographic keyboard, the user information is sent to the cryptographic keyboard through the application interface of the PC industrial control host, and the data is combined by the cryptographic keyboard according to a certain specification to form plaintext data, and then the plaintext data is encrypted by using the national secret SM4 algorithm, and the PINBLOCK ciphertext is returned.
5. The two-way encryption verification system of claim 4 wherein the MAC key used by the cryptographic keyboard is used for MAC calculation of transaction information, when a transaction is performed, the transaction information is provided by an application program, and the transaction information is sent to the cryptographic keyboard through an application interface of the PC industrial control host to process the transaction information through the cryptographic keyboard.
6. The two-way cryptographic authentication system of claim 4, wherein processing the transaction information via the cryptographic keypad comprises the steps of:
taking a hexadecimal number 00 of 16 bytes as an initial variable;
dividing MAC data into data blocks with 16 bytes as units, wherein the last data block is 1-16 bytes;
if the length of the last data block is 16 bytes, going to the next step, if the length of the last data block is less than 16 bytes, adding hexadecimal byte 00 after the last data block until the length reaches 16 bytes;
and carrying out XOR processing on the initial variable and the first data block, then encrypting, carrying out XOR processing on the encryption result and the next data block, encrypting the result of the XOR processing, and repeating the steps until the whole MAC data is processed, wherein the final encryption result is the MAC check code.
7. A depositing and dispensing cycle all-in-one machine is characterized in that the depositing and dispensing cycle all-in-one machine is provided with the bidirectional encryption verification system as set forth in any one of claims 1 to 6.
8. A method of attaching a two-way encryption verification system according to any one of claims 1 to 6 to an ATM machine, comprising the steps of:
generating two pairs of SM2 keys in a first cash-out authentication module by using a key downloader in a safety workshop, signing an SM2 public key by using a manufacturer private key, and then filling the first cash-out authentication module with the signed SM2 public key;
generating two pairs of SM2 keys in a second cash-out authentication module by using a key downloader, signing an SM2 public key by using a manufacturer private key, and filling the second cash-out authentication module with the signed SM2 public key;
installing the first cash-out authentication module and the second cash-out authentication module which finish root key encryption on an ATM on a production line;
and establishing encrypted communication for the ATM.
9. The method of claim 8 wherein said establishing encrypted communications for said ATM includes the steps of:
powering up the ATM;
the first USB port communication between the PC industrial control host and the cash processing module is ensured to be smooth;
the communication of a second USB port of the communication between the PC industrial control host and the first cash outlet module is ensured to be smooth;
exchanging two SM2 public keys of the first and second cash-out modules, wherein a first of the two SM2 public keys is used to verify a parameter signature for generating a first SM4 session key and a second of the two SM2 public keys is used to verify a parameter signature for generating a second SM4 session key;
the first cash-out module and the second cash-out module share two SM4 session keys, wherein one of the two SM4 session keys is used for encrypting/decrypting command words, and the other is used for generating MAC of the command words/corresponding data;
and starting the encrypted communication of the PC industrial control host, the first cash dispensing module and the second cash dispensing module.
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| CN113038463B (en) * | 2021-03-29 | 2022-05-13 | 北京正奇盾数据安全技术有限公司 | Communication encryption authentication experimental device |
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| JP2002358420A (en) * | 2001-06-01 | 2002-12-13 | Hitachi Ltd | Loan contract system |
| CN100461137C (en) * | 2006-12-21 | 2009-02-11 | 杭州东信金融技术服务有限公司 | Hard enciphered cipher keyboard device |
| CN201163428Y (en) * | 2007-12-29 | 2008-12-10 | 杭州东信金融技术服务有限公司 | Embedded type ATM |
| CN101656744B (en) * | 2009-09-04 | 2014-08-27 | 新达通科技股份有限公司 | Device and method for retransmitting communication protocol of cash-out machine |
| CN105374129A (en) * | 2014-06-10 | 2016-03-02 | 陆洪瑞 | System and method for bank transaction |
| CN104408834B (en) * | 2014-12-05 | 2017-04-19 | 湖南长城信息金融设备有限责任公司 | Method and system for controlling depositing and withdrawing safety based on safety core |
| CN209199271U (en) * | 2015-06-09 | 2019-08-02 | 陆洪瑞 | Bank's background system and bank's counting authentication device |
| CN105513222B (en) * | 2016-01-22 | 2018-04-20 | 广州御银科技股份有限公司 | A kind of note output system and method based on national secret algorithm |
| CN108198329A (en) * | 2018-02-09 | 2018-06-22 | 聚龙股份有限公司 | A kind of internet cash interactive service equipment based on national secret algorithm |
| CN109285299A (en) * | 2018-10-23 | 2019-01-29 | 恒银金融科技股份有限公司 | A kind of financial self-service equipment communication security control system and control method |
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