CN110855683B - Method for carrying out attack detection and reconstruction on electric power information physical system - Google Patents

Method for carrying out attack detection and reconstruction on electric power information physical system Download PDF

Info

Publication number
CN110855683B
CN110855683B CN201911126969.2A CN201911126969A CN110855683B CN 110855683 B CN110855683 B CN 110855683B CN 201911126969 A CN201911126969 A CN 201911126969A CN 110855683 B CN110855683 B CN 110855683B
Authority
CN
China
Prior art keywords
physical system
power information
attack
information physical
signal
Prior art date
Legal status (The legal status is an assumption and is not a legal conclusion. Google has not performed a legal analysis and makes no representation as to the accuracy of the status listed.)
Active
Application number
CN201911126969.2A
Other languages
Chinese (zh)
Other versions
CN110855683A (en
Inventor
李健
靳长岭
苏庆宇
赵晓琪
李波
Current Assignee (The listed assignees may be inaccurate. Google has not performed a legal analysis and makes no representation or warranty as to the accuracy of the list.)
Northeast Electric Power University
Original Assignee
Northeast Dianli University
Priority date (The priority date is an assumption and is not a legal conclusion. Google has not performed a legal analysis and makes no representation as to the accuracy of the date listed.)
Filing date
Publication date
Application filed by Northeast Dianli University filed Critical Northeast Dianli University
Priority to CN201911126969.2A priority Critical patent/CN110855683B/en
Publication of CN110855683A publication Critical patent/CN110855683A/en
Application granted granted Critical
Publication of CN110855683B publication Critical patent/CN110855683B/en
Active legal-status Critical Current
Anticipated expiration legal-status Critical

Links

Images

Classifications

    • HELECTRICITY
    • H04ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04LTRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
    • H04L63/00Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security
    • H04L63/14Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security for detecting or protecting against malicious traffic
    • H04L63/1408Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security for detecting or protecting against malicious traffic by monitoring network traffic
    • H04L63/1416Event detection, e.g. attack signature detection
    • HELECTRICITY
    • H04ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04LTRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
    • H04L41/00Arrangements for maintenance, administration or management of data switching networks, e.g. of packet switching networks
    • H04L41/14Network analysis or design
    • H04L41/145Network analysis or design involving simulating, designing, planning or modelling of a network

Abstract

The invention relates to a method for carrying out attack detection and reconstruction on a power information physical system. The invention designs a method for carrying out attack detection on a power information physical system by combining a sliding-mode observer and a self-adaptive method, which widens the attack condition from the existing function boundary to part of the known upper boundary functions and estimates the unknown upper boundary value by the self-adaptive method; for some attacks which can not realize attack detection by comparing the residual signal with the threshold value, in order to ensure the accuracy of the attack detection, the method utilizes the residual signal to converge to zero to reconstruct the attack signal, and carries out attack judgment on the reconstructed attack signal according to attack detection logic; the method is also popularized to the condition that the power information physical system is attacked by the sensor, and the detection and reconstruction of the power information physical system attacked by the sensor are realized; the invention takes the example that the physical system of the power information containing three motors and six buses is attacked to carry out attack detection and reconstruction.

Description

Method for carrying out attack detection and reconstruction on electric power information physical system
Technical Field
The invention relates to the field of information security of power information physical systems, in particular to a method for carrying out attack detection and reconstruction on a power information physical system.
Background
With the increase of the node scale of the power information physical system, the diversification of the communication mode and the improvement of the automation control level, the technical means for attacking the power terminal equipment are continuously increased, the attack of the power information physical system can be timely detected, the important effect on improving the performance of the power information physical system is played, the damage of the system can be reduced, and the brought negative effects can be reduced to the maximum extent. On the basis of deeply analyzing the relatively undetectable attack and the absolutely undetectable attack, the conditions that the absolutely undetectable attack is zero and the relatively undetectable attack is a stable signal are obtained, and then the conditions of attack signal reconstruction and detection are established according to a vector decomposition method, namely, the state attack and the sensor attack exist respectively.
The existing attack detection method only injects malicious data attack aiming at single synchronous phase angle measurement, for example, the Chinese patent application No. 201510062192.3, because the attack of hackers on the power information system is arbitrary, it is not known which channel is attacked, nor is it known which channels are attacked at the same time, therefore, when the problem of attack detection is researched, it is not appropriate to select a single channel. In the prior art, no literature report and practical application related to a method for detecting and reconstructing the attack of the power information physical system, which has good stability, high accuracy and high response speed, are available so far.
Disclosure of Invention
The invention aims to overcome the defects of the prior art and provides a method for carrying out attack detection and reconstruction on a power information physical system, which has the advantages of good stability, high accuracy and high response speed.
The technical scheme adopted for realizing the aim of the invention is as follows: 1. a method for carrying out attack detection and reconstruction on a power information physical system is characterized by comprising the following contents:
1) establishing a mathematical model when a power information physical system comprising three motors and six buses is attacked by a state:
Figure GDA0003136089050000011
y(t)=Cx(t)+Duu(t) (1)
wherein x (t) is a state signal when the power information physical system is under state attack, y (t) is an output signal when the power information physical system is under state attack, u (t) is a controlled input signal of the power information physical system,
Figure GDA0003136089050000012
is the differentiation of the state signal when the power information physical system is attacked by the state, Bηηx(t) is a status attack signal of the Power information physical System, A, Bu、C、DuIs a system parameter with proper dimensionality in the power information physical system;
2) establishing a mathematical model when a power information physical system comprising three motors and six buses is attacked by a sensor:
Figure GDA0003136089050000021
y′(t)=Cx′(t)+Duu(t)+Dηηs(t) (2)
wherein x '(t) is a state signal when the electrical information physical system is attacked by the sensor, y' (t) is an output signal when the electrical information physical system is attacked by the sensor, u (t) is a controlled input signal of the electrical information physical system,
Figure GDA0003136089050000022
is the differentiation of the state signal when the electrical power information physical system is attacked by a sensor, Dηηs(t) is the sensor attack signal of the Power cyber-physical System, A, Bu、C、DuIs a system parameter with proper dimensionality in the power information physical system;
3) the method comprises the following steps of establishing a mathematical model of the adaptive sliding mode observer when a power information physical system containing three motors and six buses is attacked by states:
Figure GDA0003136089050000023
Figure GDA0003136089050000024
wherein
Figure GDA0003136089050000025
Is the state signal of the adaptive sliding mode observer when a state attack is encountered,
Figure GDA0003136089050000026
is the output signal of the adaptive sliding mode observer under a state attack, vx(t) is the reconstructed signal of the state attack in the adaptive sliding mode observer,
Figure GDA0003136089050000027
is the differential of the state signal of the adaptive sliding mode observer when the state attack is received, u (t) is the controlled input signal of the electric power information physical system, y (t) is the output signal of the electric power information physical system when the state attack is received, B (t)ηIs a selection matrix of a state attack signal of the power information physical system, L is a gain matrix of an adaptive sliding mode observer when the state attack is received, A, Bu、C、DuIs a system parameter with proper dimensionality in the power information physical system;
4) when a mathematical model of the adaptive sliding mode observer is established when an electric power information physical system containing three motors and six buses is attacked by a sensor, according to an attack detection scheme of the electric power information physical system:
introducing a low-pass filter into an output signal y' (t) when the electric power information physical system is attacked by a sensor:
Figure GDA0003136089050000028
wherein
Figure GDA0003136089050000029
Is the output signal of the low-pass filter, x'f(t) is the integration of the output signal of the low-pass filter, the integration constant is 0, y' (t) is the output signal when the power information physical system is attacked by the sensor, As,BsIs a designed Huvitz matrix, having:
Figure GDA00031360890500000210
in the formula Dηηs(t) is the sensor attack signal of the Power cyber-physical System, C, DuIs a system parameter with proper dimension in the electric power information physical system, u (t) is a controlled input signal of the electric power information physical system;
defining: v (t) ═ x' (t)T,x′f(t)T]T,y″(t)=x′f(t), a mathematical model of the electric power information physical system comprising three motors and six buses under the attack of a sensor after the electric power information physical system is introduced into a low-pass filter is described as follows:
Figure GDA0003136089050000031
y″(t)=C′v(t) (6)
wherein v (t) is a state signal of the electric power information physical system under the sensor attack after the low-pass filter is introduced, y' (t) is an output signal of the electric power information physical system under the sensor attack after the low-pass filter is introduced, u (t) is a controlled input signal of the electric power information physical system,
Figure GDA0003136089050000038
is the differential, D ', of the state signal when the electric power information physical system is attacked by the sensor after the low-pass filter is introduced'ηηs(t) is a sensor attack signal of the physical system of the electric power information after the introduction of the low-pass filter, A ', B'uC' is a system parameter with proper dimensionality in the electric power information physical system after the low-pass filter is introduced;
the method comprises the following steps of establishing a mathematical model of the self-adaptive sliding mode observer when an electric power information physical system containing three motors and six buses is attacked by a sensor after being introduced into a low-pass filter:
Figure GDA0003136089050000032
Figure GDA0003136089050000033
wherein
Figure GDA0003136089050000034
Is a state signal of the adaptive sliding mode observer when the electric power information physical system is attacked by a sensor after the low-pass filter is introduced,
Figure GDA0003136089050000035
is the output signal of the adaptive sliding mode observer when the electric power information physical system is attacked by the sensor after the low-pass filter is introduced, vs(t) is a reconstructed signal of the sensor attack of the electrical information physical system after a low-pass filter is introduced into the adaptive sliding mode observer,
Figure GDA0003136089050000036
is the derivative of the state signal of the adaptive sliding mode observer when the electric power information physical system is attacked by the sensor after the low-pass filter is introduced, u (t) is the controlled input signal of the electric power information physical system, y '(t) is the output signal when the electric power information physical system is attacked by the sensor after the low-pass filter is introduced, D'ηIs a selection matrix of a sensor attack signal of a power information physical system after introducing a low-pass filter, G is a gain matrix of an adaptive sliding mode observer when the sensor is attacked, A 'and B'uC' is a system parameter with proper dimensionality in the electric power information physical system after the low-pass filter is introduced;
5) the output signal y (t) of the power information physical system under the condition attack and the output signal of the adaptive sliding mode observer under the condition attack are utilized
Figure GDA0003136089050000037
Residual signal generated in the process of reconstructing the state attack signal and converging to zeroThe output signal y' (t) of the electric power information physical system under the sensor attack after the low-pass filter is introduced and the output signal of the adaptive sliding mode observer when the electric power information physical system under the sensor attack after the low-pass filter is introduced are utilized
Figure GDA0003136089050000041
Residual signals generated in the process of reconstructing the sensor attack signals are converged to zero:
when the electric power information physical system is attacked by the state:
Bηηx(t)-Bηvx(t)=0 (8)
in the formula Bηηx(t) is a status attack signal of the Power information physical System, BηIs a selection matrix of state attack signals of the power information physical system, vx(t) is the reconstructed signal of the state attack in the adaptive sliding mode observer;
defining:
Figure GDA0003136089050000042
the constant K is greater than 0, and the reconstruction v can be achieved byx(t):
Figure GDA0003136089050000043
ρxIs that
Figure GDA0003136089050000044
With an integration constant of 0, vx(t) is a reconstructed signal of a state attack of the adaptive sliding mode observer, wherein
Figure GDA0003136089050000045
Fx=Bη TPCT(CCT)-1,BηIs a selection matrix of state attack signals in the power information physical system, P is a matrix which is larger than 0 and meets the system requirements, C is a matrix with proper dimensionality in the power information physical systemThe system parameters of (1);
to reduce jitter, the signal vx(t) is modified to:
Figure GDA0003136089050000046
where δ is guaranteed to be sufficiently small;
when the electric power information physical system is attacked by the sensor:
D′ηηs(t)-D′ηvs(t)=0 (11)
d 'in the formula'ηηs(t) is a sensor attack signal of the physical system of the power information after introduction of the low-pass filter, D'ηIs a selection matrix of sensor attack signals of a power information physical system after introducing a low-pass filter, vs(t) a reconstructed signal of the electric power information physical system sensor attack after a low-pass filter is introduced into the adaptive sliding mode observer;
defining:
Figure GDA0003136089050000047
the constant M is greater than 0, and the reconstruction v can be achieved bys(t):
Figure GDA0003136089050000048
ρsIs that
Figure GDA0003136089050000049
With an integration constant of 0, vs(t) is a reconstructed signal of the sensor attack of the electrical information physical system after introducing a low-pass filter in the adaptive sliding mode observer, wherein
Figure GDA0003136089050000051
Fs=D′η TQC′T(C′C′T)-1,D′ηIs the electric power introduced after the low-pass filterThe method comprises the following steps that a selection matrix of sensor attack signals of the cyber-physical system is provided, Q is a matrix which is larger than 0 and meets system requirements, and C' is a system parameter with proper dimensionality in the cyber-physical system after a low-pass filter is introduced;
to reduce jitter, the signal vs(t) is modified to:
Figure GDA0003136089050000052
where δ is guaranteed to be sufficiently small;
6) setting an attack detection logic of the power information physical system:
firstly, reconstructing state attack signal v of power information physical system by using residual signalxiDesigning a state attack detection logic:
Figure GDA0003136089050000053
power information physical system state attack non-warning
Figure GDA0003136089050000054
Power information physical system state attack warning
Wherein v isxiIs a reconstructed state attack signal, Th, of a power information physical systemxiIs an attack threshold value given by the reconstruction state attack of the power information physical system, | vxi| represents an absolute value of a reconfiguration state attack signal of the power information physical system, FlagiAn alarm signal indicating a state attack of the electrical information physical system;
secondly, reconstructing sensor attack signal v of electric power information physical system by using residual signalsiDesigning a sensor attack detection logic:
Figure GDA0003136089050000055
power information physical system sensor attack non-warning
Figure GDA0003136089050000056
Power information physical system sensor attack warning
Wherein v issiIs a reconstructed sensor attack signal, Th, of a power information physical systemsiIs an attack threshold value given by the attack of a reconstruction sensor of a power information physical system, | vsiI represents the absolute value of the reconstructed sensor attack signal of the power information physical system, FlagiAn alarm signal indicative of a sensor attack of the electrical cyber-physical system.
The invention discloses a method for carrying out attack detection and reconstruction on an electric power information physical system, which designs a method for carrying out attack detection on the electric power information physical system by combining a sliding-mode observer and a self-adaptive method, widens the attack condition from the existing function boundary into part of upper boundary functions, and estimates an unknown upper boundary value by the self-adaptive method; for some attacks which can not realize attack detection by comparing a residual signal with a threshold value, in order to ensure the accuracy of the attack detection, the method utilizes the residual signal to converge to zero for attack signal reconstruction, not only can accurately obtain a reconstructed signal of the power information physical system attack, but also can detect the attack signal exceeding a certain threshold value, and carries out attack judgment on the reconstructed attack signal according to attack detection logic; the method is also popularized to the condition that the power information physical system is attacked by the sensor, and a corresponding self-adaptive sliding mode observer and an attack signal reconstruction method are designed, so that attack detection and reconstruction of the power information physical system sensor attack are realized; the method takes the case that a physical system of the electric power information containing three motors and six buses is attacked to carry out attack detection and reconstruction, and has the advantages of being scientific and reasonable, good in stability, high in accuracy, high in response speed and the like.
Drawings
FIG. 1 is a diagram of a three-motor six-bus power information physical system attack detection architecture of the present invention;
FIG. 2 is a flowchart of the power cyber-physical system attack detection of the present invention;
FIG. 3 is a diagram of the detection response of the Power Messaging physical System of the present invention to a state attack;
FIG. 4 is a diagram of the detection response of the power cyber-physical system of the present invention to three state attacks;
FIG. 5 is a graph of the detection response of the Power Messaging physical System of the present invention to a sensor attack;
fig. 6 is a detection response diagram of the power cyber-physical system of the present invention under attack of three sensors.
Detailed Description
The invention is further illustrated with reference to the following figures and examples.
Referring to fig. 1, the method for attack detection and reconstruction of an electric power information physical system of the present invention combines a sliding mode observer and a self-adaptive method to perform attack detection on the electric power information physical system, widens the attack condition from the existing function boundary known to a part of upper boundary functions known, and estimates an unknown upper boundary value by the self-adaptive method, thereby designing a self-adaptive sliding mode observer to realize simultaneous estimation of the state of the electric power information physical system and an attack signal; for general attack signals, the detection of the attack signals can be realized by comparing residual signals generated between output signals of a power information physical system and an adaptive sliding mode observer with a set threshold, however, for special attack signals, the detection of the attack cannot be realized by comparing the residual signals with the set threshold, in order to ensure the accuracy of the attack detection, a method for reconstructing the attack signals is adopted for the attack detection, and a novel detection logic for reconstructing the attack signals is also provided.
Aiming at the situation that the electric power information physical system is attacked by the state, a sliding mode observer is combined with a self-adaptive method, a self-adaptive sliding mode observer aiming at the state attack is designed, and a system state signal and a state attack signal of the electric power information physical system are observed at the same time; the state attack is detected by using a self-adaptive sliding mode observer and a method for reconstructing an attack signal, so that not only can the state attack signal of the electric power information physical system be accurately obtained, but also the state attack signal exceeding a certain threshold value can be detected; in addition, the method is popularized to the situation that the power information physical system is attacked by the sensor, a low-pass filter is introduced into an output signal of the power information physical system attacked by the sensor to obtain a correspondingly expanded power information physical system, and a corresponding self-adaptive sliding mode observer and attack reconstruction method are designed to realize detection of the sensor attack of the power information physical system. Finally, the method provided by the invention is applied to an electric power information physical system containing three motors and six buses, and the electric power information physical system is a power grid system, so that simulation calculation is carried out.
Referring to fig. 1-2, the method for attack detection and reconstruction of a power information physical system according to the present invention includes:
1) establishing a mathematical model when a power information physical system comprising three motors and six buses is attacked by a state:
Figure GDA0003136089050000071
y(t)=Cx(t)+Duu(t) (1)
wherein x (t) is a state signal when the power information physical system is under state attack, y (t) is an output signal when the power information physical system is under state attack, u (t) is a controlled input signal of the power information physical system,
Figure GDA0003136089050000072
is the differentiation of the state signal when the power information physical system is attacked by the state, Bηηx(t) is a status attack signal of the Power information physical System, A, Bu、C、DuIs a system parameter with proper dimensionality in the power information physical system;
2) establishing a mathematical model when a power information physical system comprising three motors and six buses is attacked by a sensor:
Figure GDA0003136089050000073
Figure GDA0003136089050000074
wherein x '(t) is a state signal when the electrical information physical system is attacked by the sensor, y' (t) is an output signal when the electrical information physical system is attacked by the sensor, u (t) is a controlled input signal of the electrical information physical system,
Figure GDA0003136089050000075
is the differentiation of the state signal when the electrical power information physical system is attacked by a sensor, Dηηs(t) is the sensor attack signal of the Power cyber-physical System, A, Bu、C、DuIs a system parameter with proper dimensionality in the power information physical system;
3) the method comprises the following steps of establishing a mathematical model of the adaptive sliding mode observer when a power information physical system containing three motors and six buses is attacked by states:
Figure GDA0003136089050000076
Figure GDA0003136089050000077
wherein
Figure GDA0003136089050000078
Is the state signal of the adaptive sliding mode observer when a state attack is encountered,
Figure GDA0003136089050000079
is the output signal of the adaptive sliding mode observer under a state attack, vx(t) is the reconstructed signal of the state attack in the adaptive sliding mode observer,
Figure GDA00031360890500000710
is the differential of the state signal of the adaptive sliding mode observer when the state attack is received, u (t) is the controlled input signal of the electric power information physical system, y (t) is the output signal of the electric power information physical system when the state attack is received, B (t)ηIs a selection matrix of a state attack signal of the power information physical system, L is a gain matrix of an adaptive sliding mode observer when the state attack is received, A, Bu、C、DuIs a system parameter with proper dimensionality in the power information physical system;
4) when a mathematical model of the adaptive sliding mode observer is established when an electric power information physical system containing three motors and six buses is attacked by a sensor, according to an attack detection scheme of the electric power information physical system:
introducing a low-pass filter into an output signal y' (t) when the electric power information physical system is attacked by a sensor:
Figure GDA0003136089050000081
wherein
Figure GDA0003136089050000082
Is the output signal of the low-pass filter, x'f(t) is the integration of the output signal of the low-pass filter, the integration constant is 0, y' (t) is the output signal when the power information physical system is attacked by the sensor, As,BsIs a designed Huvitz matrix, having:
Figure GDA0003136089050000083
in the formula Dηηs(t) is the sensor attack signal of the Power cyber-physical System, C, DuIs a system parameter with proper dimension in the electric power information physical system, u (t) is a controlled input signal of the electric power information physical system;
defining:v(t)=[x′(t)T,x′f(t)T]T,y″(t)=x′f(t), a mathematical model of the electric power information physical system comprising three motors and six buses under the attack of a sensor after the electric power information physical system is introduced into a low-pass filter is described as follows:
Figure GDA0003136089050000084
y″(t)=C′v(t) (6)
wherein v (t) is a state signal of the electric power information physical system under the sensor attack after the low-pass filter is introduced, y' (t) is an output signal of the electric power information physical system under the sensor attack after the low-pass filter is introduced, u (t) is a controlled input signal of the electric power information physical system,
Figure GDA0003136089050000089
is the differential, D ', of the state signal when the electric power information physical system is attacked by the sensor after the low-pass filter is introduced'ηηs(t) is a sensor attack signal of the physical system of the electric power information after the introduction of the low-pass filter, A ', B'uC' is a system parameter with proper dimensionality in the electric power information physical system after the low-pass filter is introduced;
the method comprises the following steps of establishing a mathematical model of the self-adaptive sliding mode observer when an electric power information physical system containing three motors and six buses is attacked by a sensor after being introduced into a low-pass filter:
Figure GDA0003136089050000085
Figure GDA0003136089050000086
wherein
Figure GDA0003136089050000087
Is to introduce low-pass filteringThe state signal of the adaptive sliding mode observer when the post-wave power information physical system is attacked by the sensor,
Figure GDA0003136089050000088
is the output signal of the adaptive sliding mode observer when the electric power information physical system is attacked by the sensor after the low-pass filter is introduced, vs(t) is a reconstructed signal of the sensor attack of the electrical information physical system after a low-pass filter is introduced into the adaptive sliding mode observer,
Figure GDA0003136089050000091
is the derivative of the state signal of the adaptive sliding mode observer when the electric power information physical system is attacked by the sensor after the low-pass filter is introduced, u (t) is the controlled input signal of the electric power information physical system, y '(t) is the output signal when the electric power information physical system is attacked by the sensor after the low-pass filter is introduced, D'ηIs a selection matrix of a sensor attack signal of a power information physical system after introducing a low-pass filter, G is a gain matrix of an adaptive sliding mode observer when the sensor is attacked, A 'and B'uC' is a system parameter with proper dimensionality in the electric power information physical system after the low-pass filter is introduced;
5) the output signal y (t) of the power information physical system under the condition attack and the output signal of the adaptive sliding mode observer under the condition attack are utilized
Figure GDA0003136089050000098
Residual signals generated between the two are converged to zero to reconstruct state attack signals, and output signals y' (t) of the electric power information physical system under the sensor attack after the low-pass filter is introduced and output signals of the adaptive sliding mode observer under the sensor attack after the low-pass filter is introduced are utilized
Figure GDA0003136089050000092
Residual signals generated in the process of reconstructing the sensor attack signals are converged to zero:
when the electric power information physical system is attacked by the state:
Bηηx(t)-Bηvx(t)=0 (8)
in the formula Bηηx(t) is a status attack signal of the Power information physical System, BηIs a selection matrix of state attack signals of the power information physical system, vx(t) is the reconstructed signal of the state attack in the adaptive sliding mode observer;
defining:
Figure GDA0003136089050000093
the constant K is greater than 0, and the reconstruction v can be achieved byx(t):
Figure GDA0003136089050000094
ρxIs that
Figure GDA0003136089050000095
With an integration constant of 0, vx(t) is a reconstructed signal of a state attack of the adaptive sliding mode observer, wherein
Figure GDA0003136089050000096
Fx=Bη TPCT(CCT)-1,BηThe method is characterized in that the method is a selection matrix of state attack signals in the power information physical system, P is a matrix which is larger than 0 and meets system requirements, and C is a system parameter with proper dimensionality in the power information physical system;
to reduce jitter, the signal vx(t) is modified to:
Figure GDA0003136089050000097
where δ is guaranteed to be sufficiently small;
when the electric power information physical system is attacked by the sensor:
D′ηηs(t)-D′ηvs(t)=0 (11)
d 'in the formula'ηηs(t) is a sensor attack signal of the physical system of the power information after introduction of the low-pass filter, D'ηIs a selection matrix of sensor attack signals of a power information physical system after introducing a low-pass filter, vs(t) a reconstructed signal of the electric power information physical system sensor attack after a low-pass filter is introduced into the adaptive sliding mode observer;
defining:
Figure GDA0003136089050000101
the constant M is greater than 0, and the reconstruction v can be achieved bys(t):
Figure GDA0003136089050000102
ρsIs that
Figure GDA0003136089050000103
With an integration constant of 0, vs(t) is a reconstructed signal of the sensor attack of the electrical information physical system after introducing a low-pass filter in the adaptive sliding mode observer, wherein
Figure GDA0003136089050000104
Fs=D′η TQC′T(C′C′T)-1,D′ηThe method is characterized in that a selection matrix of a sensor attack signal of the electric power information physical system after a low-pass filter is introduced is used, Q is a matrix which is larger than 0 and meets the system requirement, and C' is a system parameter with proper dimensionality in the electric power information physical system after the low-pass filter is introduced;
to reduce jitter, the signal vs(t) is modified to:
Figure GDA0003136089050000105
where δ is guaranteed to be sufficiently small;
6) setting an attack detection logic of the power information physical system:
firstly, reconstructing state attack signal v of power information physical system by using residual signalxiDesigning a state attack detection logic:
Figure GDA0003136089050000106
power information physical system state attack non-warning
Figure GDA0003136089050000107
Power information physical system state attack warning
Wherein v isxiIs a reconstructed state attack signal, Th, of a power information physical systemxiIs an attack threshold value given by the reconstruction state attack of the power information physical system, | vxi| represents an absolute value of a reconfiguration state attack signal of the power information physical system, FlagiAn alarm signal indicating a state attack of the electrical information physical system;
secondly, reconstructing sensor attack signal v of electric power information physical system by using residual signalsiDesigning a sensor attack detection logic:
Figure GDA0003136089050000108
power information physical system sensor attack non-warning
Figure GDA0003136089050000111
Power information physical system sensor attack warning
Wherein v issiIs a reconstructed sensor attack signal, Th, of a power information physical systemsiIs an attack threshold value given by the attack of a reconstruction sensor of a power information physical system, | vsiI represents the absolute value of the reconstructed sensor attack signal of the power information physical systemFor value, FlagiAn alarm signal indicative of a sensor attack of the electrical cyber-physical system.
Embodiment and results:
referring to fig. 3-6, the designed electric information physical system model and its corresponding adaptive sliding mode observer initially make it work in a stable operation state, and the implementation is as follows:
the first step is as follows: injecting a state attack to the power information physical system and giving a simulation result;
the second step is that: three state attacks are injected into the power information physical system, and a simulation result is given;
the third step: injecting a sensor attack to the electric power information physical system, and giving a simulation result;
the fourth step: three sensors are injected into the power information physical system to attack, and a simulation result is given.
Analysis shows that by using the method for carrying out attack detection and reconstruction on the power information physical system, the value of the state signal of the power information physical system and the value of attack reconstruction can be obtained more accurately, and the attack signal exceeding a certain threshold value can be detected; simulation results show that the method for attack detection and reconstruction of the power information physical system can accurately observe the system state signal of the power information physical system, reconstruct the attack signal in the power information physical system and realize attack detection by using the reconstructed attack signal.
The embodiments of the present invention are not exhaustive, and those skilled in the art will still fall within the scope of the present invention as claimed without simple duplication and modification by the inventive efforts.

Claims (1)

1. A method for carrying out attack detection and reconstruction on a power information physical system is characterized by comprising the following contents:
1) establishing a mathematical model when a power information physical system comprising three motors and six buses is attacked by a state:
Figure FDA0003136089040000011
y(t)=Cx(t)+Duu(t) (1)
wherein x (t) is a state signal when the power information physical system is under state attack, y (t) is an output signal when the power information physical system is under state attack, u (t) is a controlled input signal of the power information physical system,
Figure FDA0003136089040000012
is the differentiation of the state signal when the power information physical system is attacked by the state, Bηηx(t) is a status attack signal of the Power information physical System, A, Bu、C、DuIs a system parameter with proper dimensionality in the power information physical system;
2) establishing a mathematical model when a power information physical system comprising three motors and six buses is attacked by a sensor:
Figure FDA0003136089040000013
y′(t)=Cx′(t)+Duu(t)+Dηηs(t) (2)
wherein x '(t) is a state signal when the electrical information physical system is attacked by the sensor, y' (t) is an output signal when the electrical information physical system is attacked by the sensor, u (t) is a controlled input signal of the electrical information physical system,
Figure FDA0003136089040000014
is the differentiation of the state signal when the electrical power information physical system is attacked by a sensor, Dηηs(t) is the sensor attack signal of the Power cyber-physical System, A, Bu、C、DuIs a system parameter with proper dimensionality in the power information physical system;
3) the method comprises the following steps of establishing a mathematical model of the adaptive sliding mode observer when a power information physical system containing three motors and six buses is attacked by states:
Figure FDA0003136089040000015
Figure FDA0003136089040000016
wherein
Figure FDA0003136089040000017
Is the state signal of the adaptive sliding mode observer when a state attack is encountered,
Figure FDA0003136089040000018
is the output signal of the adaptive sliding mode observer under a state attack, vx(t) is the reconstructed signal of the state attack in the adaptive sliding mode observer,
Figure FDA0003136089040000019
is the differential of the state signal of the adaptive sliding mode observer when the state attack is received, u (t) is the controlled input signal of the electric power information physical system, y (t) is the output signal of the electric power information physical system when the state attack is received, B (t)ηIs a selection matrix of a state attack signal of the power information physical system, L is a gain matrix of an adaptive sliding mode observer when the state attack is received, A, Bu、C、DuIs a system parameter with proper dimensionality in the power information physical system;
4) when a mathematical model of the adaptive sliding mode observer is established when an electric power information physical system containing three motors and six buses is attacked by a sensor, according to an attack detection scheme of the electric power information physical system:
introducing a low-pass filter into an output signal y' (t) when the electric power information physical system is attacked by a sensor:
Figure FDA0003136089040000021
wherein
Figure FDA0003136089040000022
Is the output signal of the low-pass filter, x'f(t) is the integration of the output signal of the low-pass filter, the integration constant is 0, y' (t) is the output signal when the power information physical system is attacked by the sensor, As,BsIs a designed Huvitz matrix, having:
Figure FDA0003136089040000023
in the formula Dηηs(t) is the sensor attack signal of the Power cyber-physical System, C, DuIs a system parameter with proper dimension in the electric power information physical system, u (t) is a controlled input signal of the electric power information physical system;
defining: v (t) ═ x' (t)T,x′f(t)T]T,y″(t)=x′f(t), a mathematical model of the electric power information physical system comprising three motors and six buses under the attack of a sensor after the electric power information physical system is introduced into a low-pass filter is described as follows:
Figure FDA0003136089040000024
y″(t)=C′v(t) (6)
wherein v (t) is a state signal of the electric power information physical system under the sensor attack after the low-pass filter is introduced, y' (t) is an output signal of the electric power information physical system under the sensor attack after the low-pass filter is introduced, u (t) is a controlled input signal of the electric power information physical system,
Figure FDA0003136089040000025
is the differential, D ', of the state signal when the electric power information physical system is attacked by the sensor after the low-pass filter is introduced'ηηs(t) is a sensor attack signal of the physical system of the electric power information after the introduction of the low-pass filter, A ', B'uC' is a system parameter with proper dimensionality in the electric power information physical system after the low-pass filter is introduced;
the method comprises the following steps of establishing a mathematical model of the self-adaptive sliding mode observer when an electric power information physical system containing three motors and six buses is attacked by a sensor after being introduced into a low-pass filter:
Figure FDA0003136089040000026
Figure FDA0003136089040000027
wherein
Figure FDA0003136089040000028
Is a state signal of the adaptive sliding mode observer when the electric power information physical system is attacked by a sensor after the low-pass filter is introduced,
Figure FDA0003136089040000029
is the output signal of the adaptive sliding mode observer when the electric power information physical system is attacked by the sensor after the low-pass filter is introduced, vs(t) is a reconstructed signal of the sensor attack of the electrical information physical system after a low-pass filter is introduced into the adaptive sliding mode observer,
Figure FDA0003136089040000031
is the differentiation of the state signal of the adaptive sliding mode observer when the electric power information physical system is attacked by the sensor after the low-pass filter is introduced, u (t) is the controlled input signal of the electric power information physical system, y' (t) is the electric power information object after the low-pass filter is introducedOutput signal of physical system under attack of sensor, D'ηIs a selection matrix of a sensor attack signal of a power information physical system after introducing a low-pass filter, G is a gain matrix of an adaptive sliding mode observer when the sensor is attacked, A 'and B'uC' is a system parameter with proper dimensionality in the electric power information physical system after the low-pass filter is introduced;
5) the output signal y (t) of the power information physical system under the condition attack and the output signal of the adaptive sliding mode observer under the condition attack are utilized
Figure FDA0003136089040000032
Residual signals generated between the two are converged to zero to reconstruct state attack signals, and output signals y' (t) of the electric power information physical system under the sensor attack after the low-pass filter is introduced and output signals of the adaptive sliding mode observer under the sensor attack after the low-pass filter is introduced are utilized
Figure FDA0003136089040000033
Residual signals generated in the process of reconstructing the sensor attack signals are converged to zero:
when the electric power information physical system is attacked by the state:
Bηηx(t)-Bηvx(t)=0 (8)
in the formula Bηηx(t) is a status attack signal of the Power information physical System, BηIs a selection matrix of state attack signals of the power information physical system, vx(t) is the reconstructed signal of the state attack in the adaptive sliding mode observer;
defining:
Figure FDA0003136089040000034
the constant K is greater than 0, and the reconstruction v can be achieved byx(t):
Figure FDA0003136089040000035
ρxIs that
Figure FDA0003136089040000036
With an integration constant of 0, vx(t) is a reconstructed signal of a state attack of the adaptive sliding mode observer, wherein
Figure FDA0003136089040000037
Fx=Bη TPCT(CCT)-1,BηThe method is characterized in that the method is a selection matrix of state attack signals in the power information physical system, P is a matrix which is larger than 0 and meets system requirements, and C is a system parameter with proper dimensionality in the power information physical system;
to reduce jitter, the signal vx(t) is modified to:
Figure FDA0003136089040000038
where δ is guaranteed to be sufficiently small;
when the electric power information physical system is attacked by the sensor:
D′ηηs(t)-D′ηvs(t)=0 (11)
d 'in the formula'ηηs(t) is a sensor attack signal of the physical system of the power information after introduction of the low-pass filter, D'ηIs a selection matrix of sensor attack signals of a power information physical system after introducing a low-pass filter, vs(t) a reconstructed signal of the electric power information physical system sensor attack after a low-pass filter is introduced into the adaptive sliding mode observer;
defining:
Figure FDA0003136089040000041
the constant M is greater than 0, and the reconstruction v can be achieved bys(t):
Figure FDA0003136089040000042
ρsIs that
Figure FDA0003136089040000043
With an integration constant of 0, vs(t) is a reconstructed signal of the sensor attack of the electrical information physical system after introducing a low-pass filter in the adaptive sliding mode observer, wherein
Figure FDA0003136089040000044
D′ηThe method is characterized in that a selection matrix of a sensor attack signal of the electric power information physical system after a low-pass filter is introduced is used, Q is a matrix which is larger than 0 and meets the system requirement, and C' is a system parameter with proper dimensionality in the electric power information physical system after the low-pass filter is introduced;
to reduce jitter, the signal vs(t) is modified to:
Figure FDA0003136089040000045
where δ is guaranteed to be sufficiently small;
6) setting an attack detection logic of the power information physical system:
firstly, reconstructing state attack signal v of power information physical system by using residual signalxiDesigning a state attack detection logic:
Figure FDA0003136089040000046
power information physical system state attack non-warning
Figure FDA0003136089040000047
Power information physical system state attack warning
Wherein v isxiIs a reconstructed state attack signal, Th, of a power information physical systemxiIs an attack threshold value given by the reconstruction state attack of the power information physical system, | vxi| represents an absolute value of a reconfiguration state attack signal of the power information physical system, FlagiAn alarm signal indicating a state attack of the electrical information physical system;
secondly, reconstructing sensor attack signal v of electric power information physical system by using residual signalsiDesigning a sensor attack detection logic:
Figure FDA0003136089040000048
power information physical system sensor attack non-warning
Figure FDA0003136089040000051
Power information physical system sensor attack warning
Wherein v issiIs a reconstructed sensor attack signal, Th, of a power information physical systemsiIs an attack threshold value given by the attack of a reconstruction sensor of a power information physical system, | vsiI represents the absolute value of the reconstructed sensor attack signal of the power information physical system, FlagiAn alarm signal indicative of a sensor attack of the electrical cyber-physical system.
CN201911126969.2A 2019-11-18 2019-11-18 Method for carrying out attack detection and reconstruction on electric power information physical system Active CN110855683B (en)

Priority Applications (1)

Application Number Priority Date Filing Date Title
CN201911126969.2A CN110855683B (en) 2019-11-18 2019-11-18 Method for carrying out attack detection and reconstruction on electric power information physical system

Applications Claiming Priority (1)

Application Number Priority Date Filing Date Title
CN201911126969.2A CN110855683B (en) 2019-11-18 2019-11-18 Method for carrying out attack detection and reconstruction on electric power information physical system

Publications (2)

Publication Number Publication Date
CN110855683A CN110855683A (en) 2020-02-28
CN110855683B true CN110855683B (en) 2021-08-10

Family

ID=69602056

Family Applications (1)

Application Number Title Priority Date Filing Date
CN201911126969.2A Active CN110855683B (en) 2019-11-18 2019-11-18 Method for carrying out attack detection and reconstruction on electric power information physical system

Country Status (1)

Country Link
CN (1) CN110855683B (en)

Families Citing this family (7)

* Cited by examiner, † Cited by third party
Publication number Priority date Publication date Assignee Title
CN111258223A (en) * 2020-03-12 2020-06-09 电子科技大学 Sliding mode-based switching networked control system safety control method
CN112398840B (en) * 2020-11-06 2022-03-08 国网山东省电力公司 Electric power information physical system attack positioning method based on self-adaptive sliding mode observer
CN112666920A (en) * 2020-12-11 2021-04-16 国网辽宁省电力有限公司经济技术研究院 Attack monitoring and hazard assessment method for power information physical system
CN112788049B (en) * 2021-01-24 2022-03-22 国网山东省电力公司 Power information physical system attack detection method based on adaptive Kalman filter
CN113094712B (en) * 2021-05-17 2022-08-26 国网山东省电力公司电力科学研究院 Power information physical system attack defense method based on self-adaptive sliding mode controller
CN115051872B (en) * 2022-06-30 2023-03-17 苏州科技大学 Attack detection method considering attack signal and unknown disturbance based on interconnected CPS
CN115643111B (en) * 2022-12-22 2023-03-17 北京卓翼智能科技有限公司 State estimation method of multi-agent system under malicious attack

Citations (5)

* Cited by examiner, † Cited by third party
Publication number Priority date Publication date Assignee Title
CN106415580A (en) * 2014-06-24 2017-02-15 高通股份有限公司 Methods and systems for thwarting side channel attacks
CN106713354A (en) * 2017-01-23 2017-05-24 全球能源互联网研究院 Method for evaluating vulnerability node of electric cyber-physical system based on undetectable information attack pre-warning technology
CN108196448A (en) * 2017-12-25 2018-06-22 北京理工大学 False data injection attacks method based on inaccurate mathematical model
CN108628331A (en) * 2018-05-09 2018-10-09 北京航空航天大学 A kind of spacecraft attitude control method of Spatial Countermeasure environment lower sensor under fire
CN108718310A (en) * 2018-05-18 2018-10-30 安徽继远软件有限公司 Multi-level attack signatures generation based on deep learning and malicious act recognition methods

Patent Citations (5)

* Cited by examiner, † Cited by third party
Publication number Priority date Publication date Assignee Title
CN106415580A (en) * 2014-06-24 2017-02-15 高通股份有限公司 Methods and systems for thwarting side channel attacks
CN106713354A (en) * 2017-01-23 2017-05-24 全球能源互联网研究院 Method for evaluating vulnerability node of electric cyber-physical system based on undetectable information attack pre-warning technology
CN108196448A (en) * 2017-12-25 2018-06-22 北京理工大学 False data injection attacks method based on inaccurate mathematical model
CN108628331A (en) * 2018-05-09 2018-10-09 北京航空航天大学 A kind of spacecraft attitude control method of Spatial Countermeasure environment lower sensor under fire
CN108718310A (en) * 2018-05-18 2018-10-30 安徽继远软件有限公司 Multi-level attack signatures generation based on deep learning and malicious act recognition methods

Non-Patent Citations (3)

* Cited by examiner, † Cited by third party
Title
An improved robust adaptive parameter identifier for DC-DC converters using H-infinity design;Palak Jain等;《2018 IEEE Applied Power Electronics Conference and Exposition (APEC)》;20180419;全文 *
Sensor Fault Detection and Fault-Tolerant Control;JIAN LI等;《IEEE Access》;20190418;全文 *
基于变论域模糊控制的无刷直流电机转速问题;赵天宇;《控制与应用技术》;20171110;全文 *

Also Published As

Publication number Publication date
CN110855683A (en) 2020-02-28

Similar Documents

Publication Publication Date Title
CN110855683B (en) Method for carrying out attack detection and reconstruction on electric power information physical system
Greblicki et al. Identification of discrete Hammerstein systems using kernel regression estimates
Chen Stability analysis for 2-D systems with interval time-varying delays and saturation nonlinearities
Peng et al. Dynamics analysis of fractional-order permanent magnet synchronous motor and its DSP implementation
Li et al. Fault diagnosis for networked control systems with delayed measurements and inputs
CN105224428A (en) The arrow borne computer dynamic characteristic test method and system of control signal digital transmission
CN111208731B (en) Method for attack detection and reconstruction of electric power information physical system
CN204496021U (en) A kind of transient electromagnetic device of amplifying transient electromagnetic signal based on sectional type
CN115208680A (en) Dynamic network risk prediction method based on graph neural network
CN110543162B (en) Multiple fault identification method for motion control system under strong noise
KR20180032522A (en) Joint identification of merge signals in non-cooperative digital telecommunications
CN111521858A (en) Method for extracting double-frequency alternating current component in rotating coordinate system
Hong et al. A simplified form of the bias-eliminating least squares method for errors-in-variables identification
CN109582914B (en) Parallel fusion estimation method of noise-related deviation system
Young An instrumental variable approach to ARMA model identification and estimation
Ding Semi-global stabilisation of a class of non-minimum phase non-linear output-feedback systems
Gao et al. Adaptive synchronization of hyperchaotic Lü system with uncertainty
Tang et al. An augmented generalized likelihood ratio test detector for signal detection in clutter and noise
Zhang et al. On the failure of power system automatic generation control due to measurement noise
CN112398840B (en) Electric power information physical system attack positioning method based on self-adaptive sliding mode observer
CN110636053B (en) Network attack detection method based on local mean decomposition and support vector machine
Chen Mixed monotone iterative technique for impulsive periodic boundary value problems in Banach spaces
Djamai et al. Continuous-time model identification using reinitialized partial moments-application to power amplifier modeling
CN105678072A (en) Method for reducing error of electronic instrument transformer under influence of message jitter
CN105607138B (en) A kind of jamproof circuit of geomagnetic sensor and method

Legal Events

Date Code Title Description
PB01 Publication
PB01 Publication
SE01 Entry into force of request for substantive examination
SE01 Entry into force of request for substantive examination
GR01 Patent grant
GR01 Patent grant