CN110839036B - Attack detection method and system for SDN (software defined network) - Google Patents
Attack detection method and system for SDN (software defined network) Download PDFInfo
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- CN110839036B CN110839036B CN201911136044.6A CN201911136044A CN110839036B CN 110839036 B CN110839036 B CN 110839036B CN 201911136044 A CN201911136044 A CN 201911136044A CN 110839036 B CN110839036 B CN 110839036B
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- H—ELECTRICITY
- H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
- H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
- H04L63/00—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security
- H04L63/14—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security for detecting or protecting against malicious traffic
- H04L63/1408—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security for detecting or protecting against malicious traffic by monitoring network traffic
- H04L63/1416—Event detection, e.g. attack signature detection
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- H—ELECTRICITY
- H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
- H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
- H04L63/00—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security
- H04L63/04—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security for providing a confidential data exchange among entities communicating through data packet networks
- H04L63/0428—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security for providing a confidential data exchange among entities communicating through data packet networks wherein the data content is protected, e.g. by encrypting or encapsulating the payload
- H04L63/045—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security for providing a confidential data exchange among entities communicating through data packet networks wherein the data content is protected, e.g. by encrypting or encapsulating the payload wherein the sending and receiving network entities apply hybrid encryption, i.e. combination of symmetric and asymmetric encryption
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- H—ELECTRICITY
- H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
- H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
- H04L63/00—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security
- H04L63/06—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security for supporting key management in a packet data network
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- H—ELECTRICITY
- H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
- H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
- H04L63/00—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security
- H04L63/08—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security for authentication of entities
- H04L63/0823—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security for authentication of entities using certificates
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- H—ELECTRICITY
- H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
- H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
- H04L63/00—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security
- H04L63/08—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security for authentication of entities
- H04L63/0853—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security for authentication of entities using an additional device, e.g. smartcard, SIM or a different communication terminal
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- H—ELECTRICITY
- H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
- H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
- H04L63/00—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security
- H04L63/08—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security for authentication of entities
- H04L63/0869—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security for authentication of entities for achieving mutual authentication
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- H—ELECTRICITY
- H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
- H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
- H04L63/00—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security
- H04L63/14—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security for detecting or protecting against malicious traffic
- H04L63/1433—Vulnerability analysis
Abstract
The invention provides an attack detection method and system of an SDN (software defined network), which are characterized in that a secure encryption channel is established between a controller and a switch, a trusted authority CA (certificate authority) is added to authenticate and sign the controller and the switch, so that bidirectional authentication between the controller and the switch is realized, key negotiation is performed between the controller and the switch, and the purpose of improving SDN vulnerabilities in a targeted manner is realized; a plurality of key parameters are obtained by aggregating the feature vectors of the network flow data, so that the system is better helped to detect the attack.
Description
Technical Field
The present application relates to the field of network security technologies, and in particular, to an attack detection method and system for an SDN network.
Background
In the existing SDN, a TLS security channel is not forcibly established between a controller and a switch, and a default state is a non-open state, so that the network becomes vulnerable, clear text communication may occur between the controller and the switch, and any third party can intercept or modify communication contents of both parties and is easily attacked by a man-in-the-middle. Lack of authentication of the certificate between the controller and the switch makes it easy for an attacker to intercept the request sent by the controller to the switch, disguise that the controller is communicating with the switch, and thus obtain all the content of the communication between the switch and the controller.
Meanwhile, how to better detect network attacks in the SDN network system is also a focus of attention now.
Therefore, a security authentication method and system for improving SDN network vulnerabilities are urgently needed.
Disclosure of Invention
The invention aims to provide an attack detection method and system for an SDN network, wherein a secure encryption channel is established between a controller and a switch, a trusted authority CA (certificate authority) is added to authenticate and sign the controller and the switch, so that bidirectional authentication between the controller and the switch is realized, key negotiation is performed between the controller and the switch, and the purpose of improving the SDN network vulnerability in a targeted manner is realized; a plurality of key parameters are obtained by aggregating the feature vectors of the network flow data, so that the system is better helped to detect the attack.
In a first aspect, the present application provides an attack detection method for an SDN network, where the method includes:
acquiring network flow data, and identifying the type of a network according to network characteristics;
collecting flow statistic information by using an OpenFlow protocol, analyzing and extracting a feature vector in network flow data, and aggregating one or more of flow entry transmission rate, data packet transmission rate, data packet mean value, duration standard deviation, data packet standard deviation and one-way flow table ratio by using the feature vector;
inputting the feature vector and one or more information of the aggregated flow entry transmission rate, data packet transmission rate, data packet mean value, duration standard deviation, data packet standard deviation and one-way flow table ratio into a convolutional neural network model for attack detection analysis;
when the network is identified to be the SDN network, a control instruction is issued to a controller and a switch, and the control instruction carries an identifier and an address of a trusted authority CA in the middle of the network;
the controller and the switch receive the control instruction and respectively send identity authentication requests to a trusted authority CA in the middle of the network, wherein the identity authentication requests carry respective public keys, user identity information and equipment identification of the controller and the switch;
the trusted authority CA receives the identity authentication request, queries a database according to the equipment identifier, judges whether the controller and the switch are legal, and returns a plaintext message and a digital signature certificate of the plaintext message by using a CA private key to the controller and the switch if the judgment result is legal; if the judgment result is illegal, the trusted authority CA returns a notice of authentication failure;
the controller and the switch receive the digital signature certificate sent by the trusted authority CA, the public key of the trusted authority CA is used for verifying the digital signature certificate, and if the verification is successful, the controller and the switch replace the digital signature certificate with respective identity information; if the verification is unsuccessful, the controller and the switch send a notice of authentication error to the trusted authority CA;
after the controller and the switch are successfully verified, the switch sends an encryption security connection request to the controller, wherein the encryption security connection request carries version information, a supported encryption algorithm and a first random number;
after receiving the encryption security connection request, the controller returns a response message to the switch, wherein the response message comprises a confirmed encryption algorithm, a randomly generated second random number and a digital signature certificate of the controller;
after the switch receives the response message, the switch verifies the digital signature certificate of the controller by using the public key of the trusted authority CA, if the verification is successful, a third random number is generated, the public key of the controller is used for encrypting the third random number, and the third random number and the digital signature certificate of the switch are sent to the controller;
after the controller receives the message sent by the switch, the public key of the trusted authority CA is used for verifying the digital signature certificate of the switch, if the verification is successful, the private key of the controller is used for decrypting the third random number ciphertext in the message, and the key agreement between the controller and the switch is completed;
the controller and the switch carry out encryption communication on the established encryption security connection by using the negotiated encryption algorithm and key;
the attack detection analysis result shows whether the host is attacked or not and the specific positions of other hosts communicating with the attacked host.
With reference to the first aspect, in a first possible implementation manner of the first aspect, the digital signature certificate employs a hash operation.
With reference to the first aspect, in a second possible implementation manner of the first aspect, the encryption algorithm includes any one of DES, MD5, and AES.
With reference to the first aspect, in a third possible implementation manner of the first aspect, the network intermediary trusted authority CA may be any one of a certificate server, a key server, and a digital certificate server.
In a second aspect, the present application provides an attack detection system for an SDN network, the system including: the system comprises a gateway server, an analysis server, a trusted authority CA in the middle of a network, at least one SDN controller and at least one SDN switch;
the gateway server acquires network flow data and identifies the type of a network according to network characteristics;
the analysis server collects flow statistic information by using an OpenFlow protocol, analyzes and extracts feature vectors in network flow data, and aggregates one or more of flow entry transmission rate, data packet transmission rate, data packet mean value, duration standard deviation, data packet standard deviation and one-way flow table ratio by using the feature vectors;
inputting the feature vector and one or more information of the aggregated flow entry transmission rate, data packet transmission rate, data packet mean value, duration standard deviation, data packet standard deviation and one-way flow table ratio into a convolutional neural network model for attack detection analysis;
when the network is identified to be the SDN network, issuing a control instruction to at least one controller and at least one switch, wherein the control instruction carries an identifier and an address of a trusted authority CA in the middle of the network;
the at least one controller and the at least one switch receive the control instruction and respectively send identity authentication requests to a trusted authority CA in the middle of the network, wherein the identity authentication requests carry respective public keys, user identity information and equipment identifications of the controller and the switch;
the trusted authority CA receives the identity authentication request, queries a database according to the equipment identification, judges whether the at least one controller and the at least one switch are legal or not, and returns a plaintext message and a digital signature certificate of the plaintext message by using a CA private key to the at least one controller and the at least one switch if the judgment result is legal; if the judgment result is illegal, the trusted authority CA returns a notice of authentication failure;
the at least one controller and the at least one switch receive the digital signature certificate sent by the trusted authority CA, the public key of the trusted authority CA is used for verifying the digital signature certificate, and if the verification is successful, the at least one controller and the at least one switch replace the digital signature certificate with respective identity information; if the verification is unsuccessful, the at least one controller and the at least one switch send a notification of authentication error to the trusted authority CA;
after the at least one controller and the at least one switch are successfully verified, the switch sends an encryption security connection request to the corresponding controller, wherein the encryption security connection request carries version information, a supported encryption algorithm and a first random number;
after receiving the encryption security connection request, the controller returns a response message to the switch, wherein the response message comprises a confirmed encryption algorithm, a randomly generated second random number and a digital signature certificate of the controller;
after the switch receives the response message, the switch verifies the digital signature certificate of the controller by using the public key of the trusted authority CA, if the verification is successful, a third random number is generated, the public key of the controller is used for encrypting the third random number, and the third random number and the digital signature certificate of the switch are sent to the controller;
after the controller receives the message sent by the switch, the public key of the trusted authority CA is used for verifying the digital signature certificate of the switch, if the verification is successful, the private key of the controller is used for decrypting the third random number ciphertext in the message, and the key agreement between the controller and the switch is completed;
the controller and the switch carry out encryption communication on the established encryption security connection by using the negotiated encryption algorithm and key;
the attack detection analysis result shows whether the host is attacked or not and the specific positions of other hosts communicating with the attacked host.
With reference to the second aspect, in a first possible implementation manner of the second aspect, the digital signature certificate employs a hash operation.
With reference to the second aspect, in a second possible implementation manner of the second aspect, the encryption algorithm includes any one of DES, MD5, and AES.
With reference to the second aspect, in a third possible implementation manner of the second aspect, the network intermediary trusted authority CA may be any one of a certificate server, a key server, and a digital certificate server.
The invention provides an attack detection method and system of an SDN (software defined network), which are characterized in that a secure encryption channel is established between a controller and a switch, a trusted authority CA (certificate authority) is added to authenticate and sign the controller and the switch, so that bidirectional authentication between the controller and the switch is realized, key negotiation is performed between the controller and the switch, and the purpose of improving SDN vulnerabilities in a targeted manner is realized; a plurality of key parameters are obtained by aggregating the feature vectors of the network flow data, so that the system is better helped to detect the attack.
Drawings
In order to more clearly illustrate the technical solutions in the embodiments of the present invention, the drawings needed to be used in the embodiments will be briefly described below, and it is obvious for those skilled in the art that other drawings can be obtained according to these drawings without creative efforts.
Fig. 1 is a flowchart of an attack detection method for an SDN network according to the present invention;
fig. 2 is an architecture diagram of an attack detection system of an SDN network according to the present invention.
Detailed Description
The preferred embodiments of the present invention will be described in detail below with reference to the accompanying drawings so that the advantages and features of the present invention can be more easily understood by those skilled in the art, and the scope of the present invention will be more clearly and clearly defined.
Fig. 1 is a flowchart of an attack detection method for an SDN network provided in the present application, where the method includes:
acquiring network flow data, and identifying the type of a network according to network characteristics;
collecting flow statistic information by using an OpenFlow protocol, analyzing and extracting a feature vector in network flow data, and aggregating one or more of flow entry transmission rate, data packet transmission rate, data packet mean value, duration standard deviation, data packet standard deviation and one-way flow table ratio by using the feature vector;
inputting the feature vector and one or more information of the aggregated flow entry transmission rate, data packet transmission rate, data packet mean value, duration standard deviation, data packet standard deviation and one-way flow table ratio into a convolutional neural network model for attack detection analysis;
when the network is identified to be the SDN network, a control instruction is issued to a controller and a switch, and the control instruction carries an identifier and an address of a trusted authority CA in the middle of the network;
the controller and the switch receive the control instruction and respectively send identity authentication requests to a trusted authority CA in the middle of the network, wherein the identity authentication requests carry respective public keys, user identity information and equipment identification of the controller and the switch;
the trusted authority CA receives the identity authentication request, queries a database according to the equipment identifier, judges whether the controller and the switch are legal, and returns a plaintext message and a digital signature certificate of the plaintext message by using a CA private key to the controller and the switch if the judgment result is legal; if the judgment result is illegal, the trusted authority CA returns a notice of authentication failure;
the controller and the switch receive the digital signature certificate sent by the trusted authority CA, the public key of the trusted authority CA is used for verifying the digital signature certificate, and if the verification is successful, the controller and the switch replace the digital signature certificate with respective identity information; if the verification is unsuccessful, the controller and the switch send a notice of authentication error to the trusted authority CA;
after the controller and the switch are successfully verified, the switch sends an encryption security connection request to the controller, wherein the encryption security connection request carries version information, a supported encryption algorithm and a first random number;
after receiving the encryption security connection request, the controller returns a response message to the switch, wherein the response message comprises a confirmed encryption algorithm, a randomly generated second random number and a digital signature certificate of the controller;
after the switch receives the response message, the switch verifies the digital signature certificate of the controller by using the public key of the trusted authority CA, if the verification is successful, a third random number is generated, the public key of the controller is used for encrypting the third random number, and the third random number and the digital signature certificate of the switch are sent to the controller;
after the controller receives the message sent by the switch, the public key of the trusted authority CA is used for verifying the digital signature certificate of the switch, if the verification is successful, the private key of the controller is used for decrypting the third random number ciphertext in the message, and the key agreement between the controller and the switch is completed;
the controller and the switch carry out encryption communication on the established encryption security connection by using the negotiated encryption algorithm and key;
the attack detection analysis result shows whether the host is attacked or not and the specific positions of other hosts communicating with the attacked host.
In some preferred embodiments, the digitally signed certificate employs a hash operation.
In some preferred embodiments, the encryption algorithm comprises any one of DES, MD5, AES.
In some preferred embodiments, the network intermediary trusted authority CA may be any one of a certificate server, a key server, and a digital certificate server.
Fig. 2 is an architecture diagram of an attack detection system of an SDN network provided in the present application, where the system includes: the system comprises a gateway server, an analysis server, a trusted authority CA in the middle of a network, at least one SDN controller and at least one SDN switch;
the gateway server acquires network flow data and identifies the type of a network according to network characteristics;
the analysis server collects flow statistic information by using an OpenFlow protocol, analyzes and extracts feature vectors in network flow data, and aggregates one or more of flow entry transmission rate, data packet transmission rate, data packet mean value, duration standard deviation, data packet standard deviation and one-way flow table ratio by using the feature vectors;
inputting the feature vector and one or more information of the aggregated flow entry transmission rate, data packet transmission rate, data packet mean value, duration standard deviation, data packet standard deviation and one-way flow table ratio into a convolutional neural network model for attack detection analysis;
when the network is identified to be the SDN network, issuing a control instruction to at least one controller and at least one switch, wherein the control instruction carries an identifier and an address of a trusted authority CA in the middle of the network;
the at least one controller and the at least one switch receive the control instruction and respectively send identity authentication requests to a trusted authority CA in the middle of the network, wherein the identity authentication requests carry respective public keys, user identity information and equipment identifications of the controller and the switch;
the trusted authority CA receives the identity authentication request, queries a database according to the equipment identification, judges whether the at least one controller and the at least one switch are legal or not, and returns a plaintext message and a digital signature certificate of the plaintext message by using a CA private key to the at least one controller and the at least one switch if the judgment result is legal; if the judgment result is illegal, the trusted authority CA returns a notice of authentication failure;
the at least one controller and the at least one switch receive the digital signature certificate sent by the trusted authority CA, the public key of the trusted authority CA is used for verifying the digital signature certificate, and if the verification is successful, the at least one controller and the at least one switch replace the digital signature certificate with respective identity information; if the verification is unsuccessful, the at least one controller and the at least one switch send a notification of authentication error to the trusted authority CA;
after the at least one controller and the at least one switch are successfully verified, the switch sends an encryption security connection request to the corresponding controller, wherein the encryption security connection request carries version information, a supported encryption algorithm and a first random number;
after receiving the encryption security connection request, the controller returns a response message to the switch, wherein the response message comprises a confirmed encryption algorithm, a randomly generated second random number and a digital signature certificate of the controller;
after the switch receives the response message, the switch verifies the digital signature certificate of the controller by using the public key of the trusted authority CA, if the verification is successful, a third random number is generated, the public key of the controller is used for encrypting the third random number, and the third random number and the digital signature certificate of the switch are sent to the controller;
after the controller receives the message sent by the switch, the public key of the trusted authority CA is used for verifying the digital signature certificate of the switch, if the verification is successful, the private key of the controller is used for decrypting the third random number ciphertext in the message, and the key agreement between the controller and the switch is completed;
the controller and the switch carry out encryption communication on the established encryption security connection by using the negotiated encryption algorithm and key;
the attack detection analysis result shows whether the host is attacked or not and the specific positions of other hosts communicating with the attacked host.
In some preferred embodiments, the digitally signed certificate employs a hash operation.
In some preferred embodiments, the encryption algorithm comprises any one of DES, MD5, AES.
In some preferred embodiments, the network intermediary trusted authority CA may be any one of a certificate server, a key server, and a digital certificate server.
In specific implementation, the present invention further provides a computer storage medium, where the computer storage medium may store a program, and the program may include some or all of the steps in the embodiments of the present invention when executed. The storage medium may be a magnetic disk, an optical disk, a read-only memory (ROM) or a Random Access Memory (RAM).
Those skilled in the art will readily appreciate that the techniques of the embodiments of the present invention may be implemented as software plus a required general purpose hardware platform. Based on such understanding, the technical solutions in the embodiments of the present invention may be embodied in the form of a software product, which may be stored in a storage medium, such as a ROM/RAM, a magnetic disk, an optical disk, etc., and includes several instructions for enabling a computer device (which may be a personal computer, a server, or a network device, etc.) to execute the method according to the embodiments or some parts of the embodiments.
The same and similar parts in the various embodiments of the present specification may be referred to each other. In particular, for the embodiments, since they are substantially similar to the method embodiments, the description is simple, and the relevant points can be referred to the description in the method embodiments.
The above-described embodiments of the present invention should not be construed as limiting the scope of the present invention.
Claims (8)
1. An attack detection method for an SDN network, the method comprising:
acquiring network flow data, and identifying the type of a network according to network characteristics;
collecting flow statistic information by using an OpenFlow protocol, analyzing and extracting a feature vector in network flow data, and aggregating one or more of flow entry transmission rate, data packet transmission rate, data packet mean value, duration standard deviation, data packet standard deviation and one-way flow table ratio by using the feature vector;
inputting the feature vector and one or more information of the aggregated flow entry transmission rate, data packet transmission rate, data packet mean value, duration standard deviation, data packet standard deviation and one-way flow table ratio into a convolutional neural network model for attack detection analysis;
when the network is identified to be the SDN network, a control instruction is issued to a controller and a switch, and the control instruction carries an identifier and an address of a trusted authority CA in the middle of the network;
the controller and the switch receive the control instruction and respectively send identity authentication requests to a trusted authority CA in the middle of the network, wherein the identity authentication requests carry respective public keys, user identity information and equipment identification of the controller and the switch;
the trusted authority CA receives the identity authentication request, queries a database according to the equipment identifier, judges whether the controller and the switch are legal, and returns a plaintext message and a digital signature certificate of the plaintext message by using a CA private key to the controller and the switch if the judgment result is legal; if the judgment result is illegal, the trusted authority CA returns a notice of authentication failure;
the controller and the switch receive the digital signature certificate sent by the trusted authority CA, the public key of the trusted authority CA is used for verifying the digital signature certificate, and if the verification is successful, the controller and the switch replace the digital signature certificate with respective identity information; if the verification is unsuccessful, the controller and the switch send a notice of authentication error to the trusted authority CA;
after the controller and the switch are successfully verified, the switch sends an encryption security connection request to the controller, wherein the encryption security connection request carries version information, a supported encryption algorithm and a first random number;
after receiving the encryption security connection request, the controller returns a response message to the switch, wherein the response message comprises a confirmed encryption algorithm, a randomly generated second random number and a digital signature certificate of the controller;
after the switch receives the response message, the switch verifies the digital signature certificate of the controller by using the public key of the trusted authority CA, if the verification is successful, a third random number is generated, the public key of the controller is used for encrypting the third random number, and the third random number and the digital signature certificate of the switch are sent to the controller;
after the controller receives the message sent by the switch, the public key of the trusted authority CA is used for verifying the digital signature certificate of the switch, if the verification is successful, the private key of the controller is used for decrypting a third random number ciphertext in the message, and the key agreement between the controller and the switch is completed;
the controller and the switch carry out encryption communication on the established encryption security connection by using the negotiated encryption algorithm and key;
the results of the attack detection analysis show whether a host is attacked and the specific locations of other hosts communicating with the attacked host.
2. The method of claim 1, wherein the digitally signed certificate employs a hash operation.
3. The method according to any of claims 1-2, wherein the encryption algorithm comprises any of DES, MD5, AES.
4. The method according to any one of claims 1 to 3, wherein the network intermediary trusted authority (CA) can be any one of a certificate server, a key server and a digital certificate server.
5. An attack detection system for an SDN network, the system comprising: the system comprises a gateway server, an analysis server, a trusted authority CA in the middle of a network, at least one SDN controller and at least one SDN switch;
the gateway server acquires network flow data and identifies the type of a network according to network characteristics;
the analysis server collects flow statistic information by using an OpenFlow protocol, analyzes and extracts feature vectors in network flow data, and aggregates one or more of flow entry transmission rate, data packet transmission rate, data packet mean value, duration standard deviation, data packet standard deviation and one-way flow table ratio by using the feature vectors;
inputting the feature vector and one or more information of the aggregated flow entry transmission rate, data packet transmission rate, data packet mean value, duration standard deviation, data packet standard deviation and one-way flow table ratio into a convolutional neural network model for attack detection analysis;
when the network is identified to be the SDN network, issuing a control instruction to at least one controller and at least one switch, wherein the control instruction carries an identifier and an address of a trusted authority CA in the middle of the network;
the at least one controller and the at least one switch receive the control instruction and respectively send identity authentication requests to a trusted authority CA in the middle of the network, wherein the identity authentication requests carry respective public keys, user identity information and equipment identifications of the controller and the switch;
the trusted authority CA receives the identity authentication request, queries a database according to the equipment identification, judges whether the at least one controller and the at least one switch are legal or not, and returns a plaintext message and a digital signature certificate of the plaintext message by using a CA private key to the at least one controller and the at least one switch if the judgment result is legal; if the judgment result is illegal, the trusted authority CA returns a notice of authentication failure;
the at least one controller and the at least one switch receive the digital signature certificate sent by the trusted authority CA, the public key of the trusted authority CA is used for verifying the digital signature certificate, and if the verification is successful, the at least one controller and the at least one switch replace the digital signature certificate with respective identity information; if the verification is unsuccessful, the at least one controller and the at least one switch send a notification of authentication error to the trusted authority CA;
after the at least one controller and the at least one switch are successfully verified, the switch sends an encryption security connection request to the corresponding controller, wherein the encryption security connection request carries version information, a supported encryption algorithm and a first random number;
after receiving the encryption security connection request, the controller returns a response message to the switch, wherein the response message comprises a confirmed encryption algorithm, a randomly generated second random number and a digital signature certificate of the controller;
after the switch receives the response message, the switch verifies the digital signature certificate of the controller by using the public key of the trusted authority CA, if the verification is successful, a third random number is generated, the public key of the controller is used for encrypting the third random number, and the third random number and the digital signature certificate of the switch are sent to the controller;
after the controller receives the message sent by the switch, the public key of the trusted authority CA is used for verifying the digital signature certificate of the switch, if the verification is successful, the private key of the controller is used for decrypting a third random number ciphertext in the message, and the key agreement between the controller and the switch is completed;
the controller and the switch carry out encryption communication on the established encryption security connection by using the negotiated encryption algorithm and key;
the results of the attack detection analysis show whether a host is attacked and the specific locations of other hosts communicating with the attacked host.
6. The system of claim 5, wherein the digitally signed certificate employs a hash operation.
7. The system according to any of claims 5-6, wherein the encryption algorithm comprises any of DES, MD5, AES.
8. The system according to any one of claims 5-7, wherein the network intermediary trusted authority CA can be any one of a certificate server, a key server, a digital certificate server.
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