CN110782173A - Deduction method for emergency power event of ubiquitous power Internet of things - Google Patents
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Abstract
The invention provides a deduction method of an emergency power event of a ubiquitous power Internet of things, which comprises the following steps of: s1, taking the emergency power event as a top event, performing accident tree analysis, and determining a basic event for triggering the top event and a bottom event for triggering the basic event; s2, determining a minimum cut set of basic events in the accident tree, and calculating the structural importance of each bottom event in the accident tree according to the minimum cut set; s3, performing BowTie risk assessment based on the accident tree, determining a danger source, a risk event, a risk threat and a potential result, and setting a barrier for preventing the occurrence of the emergency power event to perform BowTie risk management and control. The accident tree analysis method is adopted to carry out layer-by-layer deep analysis on the emergency power event, and determine the safety measures corresponding to each bottom event in the accident tree, so that an emergency decision maker can rapidly make scientific judgment, and the occurrence probability of the emergency power event or the severity of potential consequences can be reduced.
Description
Technical Field
The invention relates to the field of sudden power event fault analysis and deduction, in particular to a method for sudden power event generation under ubiquitous power Internet of things
Background
The ubiquitous power internet of things is a ubiquitous network established on the internet, and the important foundation and core of the technology of the ubiquitous power internet of things is still the internet. With the development of the ubiquitous power internet of things and the application thereof, the complexity of the network layer system environment is increased. Because the ubiquitous power internet of things technology is closely related to the application of the ubiquitous power internet of things technology, in order to meet the application requirements of a distributed heterogeneous environment and realize interoperation and interoperability among applications, it is very important to provide a unified architecture and standard system for the internet of things.
Meanwhile, with the comprehensive construction of the ubiquitous power internet of things, the form of a power grid is gradually complicated, the evolution mechanism of power flow and power grid faults is continuously changed from foreseeable to unpredictable, different evolution modes of transformation, spreading, derivation, coupling, diffusion and the like of power safety emergent power events of the ubiquitous power internet of things are mutually interwoven to form a plurality of emergent power event chains which are crossed together, and an emergent power event evolution network can be finally formed, so that higher requirements are provided for the safe and stable operation of the power grid.
However, the investigation of the power accident usually takes the experience of the investigator as the leading factor, and usually concerns some single links, and the analysis of the accident is only limited to the investigation of the accident reason, so that corresponding measures are taken to prevent the accident from happening again. The investigation mode usually focuses on finding out the obvious reasons of the accident, so that the development process of the accident is difficult to reflect, and the investigation result is not enough to provide a comprehensive scientific basis for the formulation of safety measures. Therefore, the accident needs to be analyzed systematically and comprehensively to determine the basic cause event causing the accident.
Therefore, the multi-integration of the smart power grid has an information security mechanism bottleneck to be overcome urgently, and becomes a research hotspot and difficulty of modern power grid informatization. However, most of research on the deduction method of the emergent power event of the ubiquitous power internet of things for the heterogeneous converged network is still in a qualitative description stage at present.
Disclosure of Invention
The invention provides a deduction method of a ubiquitous power Internet of things emergency power event, which is characterized in that an accident tree analysis method is adopted to carry out deep analysis on the emergency power event layer by layer, determine a direct reason for causing the emergency power event and a potential result after the emergency power event occurs, draw a corresponding protection barrier on the basis of an accident tree analysis graph, determine a safety measure corresponding to the protection barrier, and visually display each level event and the protection barrier in the whole accident.
In order to achieve the purpose, the invention provides a deduction method of an emergency power event of a ubiquitous power internet of things, which comprises the following steps of:
s1, taking the emergency power event as a top event, performing accident tree analysis, and determining a basic event for triggering the top event and a bottom event for triggering the basic event;
s2, determining a minimum cut set of basic events in the accident tree, and calculating the structural importance of each bottom event in the accident tree according to the minimum cut set;
s3, performing BowTie risk assessment based on the accident tree, determining a danger source, a risk event, a risk threat and a potential result, and setting a barrier for preventing the occurrence of the emergency power event to perform BowTie risk management and control.
The calculation formula of the structural importance degree is as follows:
in the formula (I), the compound is shown in the specification,
a structural importance coefficient for the ith elementary event; k is the total number of the minimum cut sets; k is a radical of
jIs the jth minimal cut set; n is
jK is the ith basic event
jThe number of basic events of the cutset.
Preferably, the barriers for preventing the occurrence of the emergency power event include a defense barrier, a corrective barrier, and a countermeasure barrier against disturbance factors.
Preferably, the defensive measure barriers are established according to the danger source, the risk event and the risk threat of the top event, and the corresponding defensive measure barriers are sequentially established according to the structural importance ranking of the bottom event corresponding to the danger source, the risk event and the risk threat.
Preferably, the event corresponding to the hazard source and/or risk event and/or risk threat is a basic event, and then the first event establishes a defensive measure barrier corresponding to the basic event.
Preferably, the remedial action barrier is established in dependence upon the potential outcome of the overhead event.
Preferably, the countermeasure barrier against the disturbance factor is established in dependence on the disturbance factor that may cause the defense barrier and/or the corrective measure barrier to fail.
The invention has the following advantages:
the accident tree analysis method is adopted to carry out deep analysis on the emergency power event layer by layer, so that not only can the direct reason of the emergency power event be analyzed, but also the potential reason of the accident can be deeply revealed, the corresponding protective barrier is drawn on the basis of the accident tree analysis diagram, the safety measure corresponding to the protective barrier is determined, and the visual display is carried out on all the layer events and the protective barriers in the whole accident, so that a decision maker is clear at a glance, the rapid scientific judgment of the emergency decision maker is facilitated, and the accident can be timely stopped by adopting the correct measure.
Drawings
Fig. 1 is a flowchart of a method for deducing an emergency power event of a ubiquitous power internet of things according to the present invention;
FIG. 2 is a fault tree analysis diagram of a top event in accordance with an embodiment of the present invention;
FIG. 3 is a BowTie visualization analysis diagram according to an embodiment of the invention.
Detailed Description
The following describes in detail a method for deducing an emergency power event of the ubiquitous power internet of things according to the present invention with reference to the accompanying drawings and specific embodiments. Advantages and features of the present invention will become apparent from the following description and from the claims. It is to be noted that the drawings are in a very simplified form and are all used in a non-precise ratio for the purpose of facilitating and distinctly aiding in the description of the embodiments of the invention.
Fig. 1 shows a method for deducing an emergency power event according to the present invention, which includes the following steps:
s1, taking the emergency power event as a top event, performing accident tree analysis, and determining a basic event for triggering the top event and a bottom event for triggering the basic event;
as shown in fig. 2, the top event to be analyzed is denoted as T, the top event T is deeply analyzed layer by layer according to causal relationship, the top event of the layer is initiated by M1 layer events (M11, M12, M13 … … M1n), the M1 layer event is initiated by M2 layer events (M21, M22, M23 … … M2n), … …, the lower level events of the upper level event are analyzed layer by layer, the corresponding reason of each layer event is listed until the basic reason for initiating the top event, namely the bottom event (X1, X2, X3 … … Xn) is found, wherein the middle layer event is called as the basic event, and is finally displayed visually in the form of a tree diagram.
S2, determining a minimum cut set (a minimal set of basic events causing the occurrence of the top events) of the basic events in the accident tree, and calculating the structural importance of each bottom event in the accident tree according to the minimum cut set;
and analyzing the accident tree of the top event by adopting software to obtain a minimum cut set, calculating the structural importance of each bottom event in the accident tree, and sequencing the structural importance of each bottom event. The formula for calculating the structural importance is as follows:
in the formula (I), the compound is shown in the specification,
a structural importance coefficient for the ith elementary event; k is the total number of the minimum cut sets; k is a radical of
jIs the jth minimal cut set; n is
jK is the ith basic event
jThe number of basic events of the cutset.
The structural importance can be used for structurally analyzing the influence degree of each bottom event on the occurrence of the top event, and the larger the structural importance of the bottom event is, the larger the contribution of the bottom event to the occurrence of the top event is.
S3, performing BowTie risk assessment based on the accident tree, determining a danger source, a risk event, a risk threat and a potential result, and setting a barrier for preventing the occurrence of the emergency power event to perform BowTie risk management and control.
BowTie risk assessment is carried out based on analysis of an accident tree analysis diagram, and analysis is carried out by using past accident experience and related professional knowledge for reference, so that which events are a danger source, a risk event and a risk threat and which events are potential results in basic events and bottom events in the tree diagram are judged; respectively providing corresponding advanced troubleshooting methods and defense measure barriers for the danger source, the risk event and the risk threat, sequentially establishing corresponding defense measure barriers according to the structural importance of the bottom event corresponding to the danger source, the risk event and the risk threat, and preferentially establishing the defense measure barriers corresponding to the basic event if the danger source and/or the risk event and/or the event corresponding to the risk threat is the basic event; providing a preventive method for the potential result and a barrier of corrective measures to be taken after the potential result occurs; analyzing interference factors which may cause the failure of defense measure barriers and/or corrective measure barriers, providing measure barriers of the interference factors with anti-interference factors, and finally drawing the methods and the measure barriers on the basis of the tree diagram to make a BowTie visual analysis diagram.
The eight major elements of the BowTie visual analysis graph include hazard sources, risk events, risk threats, potential outcomes, defensive action barriers, corrective action barriers, interference factors, and action barriers to interference factors.
The source of danger is a condition, object or activity that could potentially cause casualties, equipment structural damage, material dysfunction. Any source of possible injury or loss is a source of risk, but the source of risk is not meant to be a consequence, and the description of the source of risk should not include a consequence.
The risk events occur along with the secondary risk sources, each risk event has a corresponding risk source, each risk source can be accompanied by a plurality of risk events, and the event consequences are not included in the risk events.
The risk threat is the cause or possibility of a source of danger arising from the occurrence of a risk event. Each risk threat must have one outcome, but multiple risk threats may have one outcome. Each risk threat exists independently, and the two risk threats do not interfere with each other or influence each other.
The potential results are the possible consequences after the risk event occurs, and each potential result must correspond to at least one risk threat.
Said barriers to defensive and/or corrective actions can be generally subdivided into 4 types, depending on the stage and extent of the action to be performed: the risk threat can be directly avoided by adopting a clearance measure; preventive measures, which can avoid the occurrence of risk events after the occurrence of risk threats; a reducing measure that reduces the likelihood of a potential outcome after a risk event has occurred; and the loss stopping measure reduces the loss caused by the potential result after the potential result appears.
The interference factors are often the reasons for the failure of a certain measure barrier, and according to the requirements of actual conditions, the interference factors are analyzed by combining with relevant professional knowledge on each prevention/measure barrier, or the interference factors are analyzed for a certain measure barrier or certain measure barriers with lower effectiveness, so that a special measure barrier is made for the interference factors, and finally closed-loop control is achieved.
The principle of the measure barrier against interference factors is the same as that of a preventive/corrective measure barrier, and the measure barrier against interference factors can be divided into: clearance measures, preventive measures, reduction measures, and damage-stopping measures.
Examples
The invention provides a deduction method of emergent power events of a ubiquitous power internet of things, and large-scale power failure faults of Argentina and yerba mate interconnected power grids are analyzed by the method, and the method comprises the following steps of:
s1, taking the emergency power event as a top event, performing accident tree analysis, and determining a basic event for triggering the top event and a bottom event for triggering the basic event;
determining that 'large-scale power failure fault occurs in Argentina and Uyery interconnected power grids' is a top event, and investigating or analyzing a direct reason causing the top event. After data review and analysis, the direct causes of large-scale faults of the Argentina and Uyery interconnected power grids are mainly the Argentina power grid fault (M11) and the Uyery large-area power failure (M12).
Through analysis, the reason for causing the event M12 is mainly two: the failure of the inter-network fusion (X1) and the failure of the full-time power grid personnel to make correct treatment measures (X2). After Argentina electric wire netting trouble takes place, the relevant department of electric power of Utraguay fails to defend in advance in the bud, fail to in time correctly handle to foreign cross-network connection trouble, take correct method to remedy, cause the electric wire netting of this country to receive adjacent national grid to influence and produce the power failure incident, so the two makes up the reason of the large tracts of land accident Utraguay power failure jointly, if one of them is not standing, then the large tracts of land power failure incident of this case just can not take place, its relation is: m12 ═ X1 × X2.
Through analysis, the reason for causing the event M11 is mainly two: the cross-network authentication process of the Argentina power grid is subjected to network attack (M21) and misoperation (X3) caused by the fact that full-time personnel of the power grid fail to correctly authenticate the authorization of the child node, and the simultaneous occurrence of the two events M21 and X3 causes an event M11 to occur, wherein the relationship is as follows: m11 ═ M21 × X3.
Through analysis, five reasons are found to cause the event M21: the power grid control center node verifies that the child node fails to pass the intranet verification (X4); after the intranet authentication is passed, the access center does not interpret the activation state information DS-RK (X5) in the request; the authentication center performs DEA inverse operation on the DS-RK, and a temporary indication result is not obtained (X6); the authorization center sends a temporary transmission certificate which cannot be sent to the request node, and a transmission interface is opened (X7); after the requesting node authorizes, the destination port is not connected, and the transmission is completed (X8). The reason why the five events together form the event M21 is that if one of the events is not true, the large area outage event of the present case will not occur, and the relationship is: m21 ═ M4 × M5 × M6 × M7 × M8.
According to the large-scale power failure fault evolution path of the interconnected power grids of Argentina and Uyery, in order to facilitate accident tree analysis, key elements capable of reflecting event evolution are selected, and all event elements are numbered, and are shown in Table 1.
Table 1 event notation
| Symbol | Event(s) |
| T | Multinational large area power outage |
| M11 | Argentine grid fault |
| M12 | Large area power failure of Uguay |
| M21 | Argentina power grid cross-network authentication process suffering network attack |
| X1 | Failure of heterogeneous network convergence |
| X2 | The full-time personnel of the power grid fail to make correct treatment measures |
| X3 | Misoperation of power grid full-time personnel due to failure of correct authentication of child node authorization |
| X4 | Intranet authentication failure |
| X5 | Access center unexplained activation state information |
| X6 | The authentication center does not obtain a temporary indication result |
| X7 | Failure of the transient transmission certificate to be sent to the requesting node |
| X8 | The target port is not successfully connected to complete the transmission |
S2, determining a minimum cut set of basic events in the accident tree, and calculating the structural importance of each bottom event in the accident tree according to the minimum cut set;
the accident tree of argentina and yerba-guay internet failures was analyzed using FreeFta software to obtain its minimal cut set, see table 2.
TABLE 2 Argentina and Urugright Internet Fault minimal Get Table
| Classification | Combining events |
| Minimal cut set | K1＝{X1，X2，X3，X4，X5，X6，X7，X8} |
And (3) selecting a structural importance algorithm for approximate calculation:
in the formula (I), the compound is shown in the specification,
a structural importance coefficient for the ith elementary event; k is the total number of the minimum cut sets; k is a radical of
jIs the jth minimal cut set; n is
jK is the ith basic event
jThe number of basic events of the cutset.
The structural importance of the accident tree bottom events is calculated and sorted by combining the formula (1) and the minimal cut set in table 2, which is shown in table 3.
TABLE 3 structural importance calculation of incident Tree bottom events
| Basic events | Importance of structure | Basic events | Importance of structure |
| X1 | 0.0078125 | X5 | 0.0078125 |
| X2 | 0.0078125 | X6 | 0.0078125 |
| X3 | 0.0078125 | X7 | 0.0078125 |
| X4 | 0.0078125 | X8 | 0.0078125 |
The structural importance of the accident tree bottom events is equal, and the sequence is as follows:
I(X8)＝I(X7)＝I(X6)＝I(X5)＝I(X4)＝I(X3)＝I(X2)＝I(X1)
based on the analysis conditions of the faults of the Argentina and the Uyery interconnected network, when the fault tree analysis is carried out on the occurred fault, the basic event is often selected based on the early-stage investigation result and the possible event is eliminated, so that the fault tree mainly comprises an AND gate or has fewer gates. As shown in fig. 2, the accident tree analysis diagram is mainly used for verifying the correctness of the analysis of the accident tree at this time, because the cross-network authentication flow under multi-network convergence is subjected to network attack and the daily operation and maintenance of the different-network convergence is improper, and is consistent with the actual survey report.
S3, performing BowTie risk assessment based on the accident tree, determining a danger source, a risk event, a risk threat and a potential result, and setting a barrier for preventing the occurrence of the emergency power event to perform BowTie risk management and control.
BowTie risk assessment is carried out based on an accident tree analysis chart, and the large-scale power failure event is mainly caused by network attack on a cross-network authentication process under multi-network fusion and improper daily operation and maintenance of different-network fusion. The cross-network authentication process under multi-network fusion suffers from network attack and improper daily operation and maintenance of different-network fusion, and the root is caused by the loss of power grid operation management. The large-scale power failure event not only causes the equipment of Argentina Leita hydropower station to be damaged and a large amount of load to be lost, causes the power failure of important users such as public transportation, commercial activities and the like, but also causes the 'large-scale fault' of interconnected power grids of Argentina, Paraguay and Uraguay, and finally causes the complete power failure of three countries. Through the analysis, three risk threat events, namely network attack on the cross-network authentication process under multi-network fusion, improper daily operation and maintenance of different-network fusion and power grid operation management loss are determined; load loss, power failure of important users, equipment damage and loss are potential result events; combining with the practical management of the power grid, a defensive measure barrier is established from the perspective of equipment design and risk control of the power grid, and because the structural importance degrees of all bottom events of the accident tree are equal, namely the influence degrees of all bottom events on top events are the same, the defensive measure barrier is established against all risk threats without the difference of the sequence, which is shown in table 2; a corrective action barrier is established from an emergency disposal perspective, as shown in table 3. Through the analysis of the threat, the protection barrier, the consequence and the control measure, a BowTie visual analysis chart taking large-scale power failure as a top-level event is established, as shown in FIG. 3.
TABLE 2 defensive action barriers established in terms of risk threats
TABLE 3 corrective action Barrier based on potential results
The accident tree analysis method is adopted to carry out layer-by-layer deep analysis on the sudden power event, so that not only can the direct reason of the sudden power event be analyzed, but also the potential reason of the accident can be deeply revealed, the corresponding protective barrier is drawn on the basis of the accident tree analysis diagram, the safety measure corresponding to the protective barrier is determined, and the visual display is carried out on all the layer events and the protective barriers in the whole accident, so that a decision maker is clear at a glance, the rapid scientific judgment of the emergency decision maker is facilitated, and the accident can be timely stopped by adopting the correct measure.
While the present invention has been described in detail with reference to the preferred embodiments, it should be understood that the above description should not be taken as limiting the invention. Various modifications and alterations to this invention will become apparent to those skilled in the art upon reading the foregoing description. Accordingly, the scope of the invention should be determined from the following claims.
Claims (7)
1. A deduction method for sudden power events of a ubiquitous power Internet of things is characterized by comprising the following steps:
s1, taking the emergency power event as a top event, performing accident tree analysis, and determining a basic event for triggering the top event and a bottom event for triggering the basic event;
s2, determining a minimum cut set of basic events in the accident tree, and calculating the structural importance of each bottom event in the accident tree according to the minimum cut set;
s3, performing BowTie risk assessment based on the accident tree, determining a danger source, a risk event, a risk threat and a potential result, and setting a barrier for preventing the occurrence of the emergency power event to perform BowTie risk management and control.
2. The deduction method of the sudden power event of the ubiquitous power internet of things according to claim 1, wherein the structural importance degree is calculated by the following formula:
in the formula (I), the compound is shown in the specification,
a structural importance coefficient for the ith elementary event; k is the total number of the minimum cut sets; k is a radical of
jIs the jth minimal cut set; n is
jK is the ith basic event
jThe number of basic events of the cutset.
3. The method as claimed in claim 1, wherein the barriers for preventing the occurrence of the emergency power event include defense barriers, corrective barriers, and anti-interference barriers.
4. The deduction method of the sudden power event of the ubiquitous power internet of things as claimed in claim 3, wherein the defensive measure barriers are established according to the danger source, the risk event and the risk threat of the top event, and the corresponding defensive measure barriers are sequentially established according to the structural importance degree of the bottom event corresponding to the danger source, the risk event and the risk threat from large to small.
5. The deduction method of the sudden power event of the ubiquitous power internet of things as claimed in claim 1, wherein if the event corresponding to the hazard source and/or the risk event and/or the risk threat is a basic event, the first event establishes a defensive measure barrier corresponding to the basic event.
6. The method as claimed in claim 3, wherein the corrective action barrier is established according to the potential result of the top event.
7. The method as claimed in claim 3, wherein the countermeasure barrier against disturbance factors is established according to disturbance factors that may cause the defense barrier and/or the corrective barrier to fail.
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| Publication number | Priority date | Publication date | Assignee | Title |
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| CN113919186A (en) * | 2021-12-14 | 2022-01-11 | 中国民航大学 | Event tree-based method for calculating severity of synthetic consequence of primary overrun event |
| CN114648025A (en) * | 2022-05-18 | 2022-06-21 | 国网浙江省电力有限公司信息通信分公司 | Power grid data processing method and system based on multi-dimensional evolution diagram in power field |
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