CN110719168B - Hierarchical anonymous voting method based on block chain - Google Patents

Hierarchical anonymous voting method based on block chain Download PDF

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CN110719168B
CN110719168B CN201911006382.8A CN201911006382A CN110719168B CN 110719168 B CN110719168 B CN 110719168B CN 201911006382 A CN201911006382 A CN 201911006382A CN 110719168 B CN110719168 B CN 110719168B
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CN110719168A (en
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范家幸
王志伟
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Nanjing University of Posts and Telecommunications
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Nanjing University of Posts and Telecommunications
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    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
    • H04L9/00—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols
    • H04L9/08—Key distribution or management, e.g. generation, sharing or updating, of cryptographic keys or passwords
    • H04L9/0861—Generation of secret information including derivation or calculation of cryptographic keys or passwords
    • H04L9/0869—Generation of secret information including derivation or calculation of cryptographic keys or passwords involving random numbers or seeds
    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
    • H04L9/00—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols
    • H04L9/32—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols including means for verifying the identity or authority of a user of the system or for message authentication, e.g. authorization, entity authentication, data integrity or data verification, non-repudiation, key authentication or verification of credentials
    • H04L9/321—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols including means for verifying the identity or authority of a user of the system or for message authentication, e.g. authorization, entity authentication, data integrity or data verification, non-repudiation, key authentication or verification of credentials involving a third party or a trusted authority
    • H04L9/3213—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols including means for verifying the identity or authority of a user of the system or for message authentication, e.g. authorization, entity authentication, data integrity or data verification, non-repudiation, key authentication or verification of credentials involving a third party or a trusted authority using tickets or tokens, e.g. Kerberos
    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
    • H04L9/00—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols
    • H04L9/32—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols including means for verifying the identity or authority of a user of the system or for message authentication, e.g. authorization, entity authentication, data integrity or data verification, non-repudiation, key authentication or verification of credentials
    • H04L9/3247—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols including means for verifying the identity or authority of a user of the system or for message authentication, e.g. authorization, entity authentication, data integrity or data verification, non-repudiation, key authentication or verification of credentials involving digital signatures
    • H04L9/3255—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols including means for verifying the identity or authority of a user of the system or for message authentication, e.g. authorization, entity authentication, data integrity or data verification, non-repudiation, key authentication or verification of credentials involving digital signatures using group based signatures, e.g. ring or threshold signatures

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Abstract

The invention discloses a block chain-based hierarchical anonymous voting method which comprises a preparation stage, a registration stage, a voting stage, a ticket counting stage and a result issuing stage. The registration stage utilizes group verification to check the user identity, and the voting stage and the ticket counting stage use threshold ring signatures to ensure the anonymity of voting; the ticket counting process is simple and quick; in addition, updatability and unrepeatable voting of voting are achieved by generating time stamps and unique eligibility tokens, and finally a method of generating virtual identities is proposed so that hierarchical voting is achieved.

Description

Hierarchical anonymous voting method based on block chain
Technical Field
The invention relates to the technical field of block chains, in particular to a hierarchical anonymous voting method based on a block chain.
Background
The blockchain appears in the bitcoin open source project at the earliest time, and if the bitcoin is a social experiment with great influence, the blockchain technology extracted from the bitcoin core design makes people see the possibility of a future business network with higher shaping and safety. The characteristics and values of the blockchains are different according to different categories and application scenes. From a technical point of view, the blockchain has the following characteristics:
(1) distributed fault tolerance: the distributed network is extremely robust and can tolerate the abnormal state of part of nodes;
(2) non-tamper-proof property: the data which are submitted consistently exist all the time and cannot be destroyed or modified;
(3) privacy protection: cryptography ensures data privacy and cannot be resolved even if data is leaked.
The resulting services may include the following characteristics:
(1) credibility: the block chain technology can provide a natural and credible distributed account book platform without the participation of an additional third-party intermediary mechanism;
(2) the cost is reduced: compared to conventional techniques, blockchain techniques may require less time, labor, and maintenance costs;
(3) enhancing safety: the blockchain technology is beneficial to safe and reliable audit management and account clearing, and crime risks are reduced.
The ring signature is a simplified group signature, only ring members in the ring signature have no manager, and cooperation among the ring members is not needed. The ring signature scheme allows members of a group to sign on behalf of this group and does not need to expose their own identities. That is, assuming that each user has been associated with the public key of some standard signature scheme, a user may form a group by simply collecting all group members that do not necessarily know that they are joined in the group, including their public keys. The ring signature scheme can be used for anonymous reporting, anonymous voting, etc. many applications that do not require a complex group formation process but require anonymity of the signers. The ring signature added with the threshold at least needs n members to cooperate to generate one signature, and can be well applied to a voting scene with minimum number of people requiring voting for the votes.
The traditional paper voting consumes a large amount of manpower and material resources along with the increase of the number of votes, and has regional limitation; compared with the traditional electronic voting, the electronic voting has greater advantages, the electronic voting is not limited by areas, and people in remote areas can also participate in the voting. Compared with the traditional paper voting, the electronic voting system consumes far less manpower and material resources than the paper voting, and the more votes, the more resources are saved. However, since the voting information is electronic information, the data is easily tampered by a person to gain a profit; in addition, when the electronic voting system fails, the electronic voting system can miss and miss the notes, and the voter can not know the notes.
Disclosure of Invention
The invention aims to: aiming at the characteristics of the prior art and the problems that electronic voting is easy to occur, the invention provides a hierarchical anonymous voting method based on a block chain by combining the prior threshold ring signature technology, which comprises a preparation stage, a registration stage, a voting stage, a vote counting stage and a verification and result issuing stage.
The technical scheme is as follows: in order to achieve the purpose, the invention adopts the technical scheme that:
a grading anonymous voting method based on a block chain comprises the following stages:
(1) preparation phase
Step S1.1, initializing a system, wherein a notarization party generates an initial block, and sets contents to be voted, voting specifications, time nodes of each stage and signature verification keys of the notarization party on the initial block;
step S1.2, the bilinear group generator Ag generates the system parameters
Figure BDA0002242899290000021
The generator Ag gives the Ag at the same time1,B0,u,u1,…,uk∈G,h1∈GqAnd alpha epsilon ZN(ii) a Order to
Figure BDA0002242899290000022
Let H be NXG*×{0,1}*→{0,1}k，H0：{0,1}*→ G is collision-resistant hash; wherein N, GT,ɡ1,g2,B0,h1,h2,u,u1,…,ukH is a common parameter;
(2) registration phase
Step S2.1, selecting random number S by useri∈R ZNThe public key of the user is
Figure BDA0002242899290000023
The private key is
Figure BDA0002242899290000024
The public key uniquely identifies the user identity;
s2.2, the user who wants to participate in voting signs the identity information of the user before the registration deadline and sends the signature to the notarization party, and the notarization party verifies the identity of the user;
s2.3, after the notarization party receives the signatures with n legal identities, starting group verification to verify whether the ID is matched with the signer;
s2.4, after passing the verification, the notarization party verifies according to the user ViThe identity of (a) divides it into several levels, each level setting a corresponding eligibility Token, as follows:
{Token1}＝{Tokeni|i＝1,…i},
{Token2}＝{Tokenj,a,|j＝i+1,…,j&a*pkj≠pki≠pkz≠pkz*b},
{Token3}＝{Tokenz,a,b|z＝j+1,…,z&a*pkz≠b*pkz≠pki≠pkj}，…
wherein, a and b are random numbers, a is not equal to b is not equal to 1, i, j and z are user subscripts of each level respectively, and the generated tokens are different from each other; after signing by a notarization party, randomly issuing the notarization party with the notarization party to voters of corresponding levels; after voters receive the Token corresponding to the voters, the voters obtain public keys representing identities through calculation;
s2.5, the notarization party publishes the public key of the legal voter and the public key of the virtual identity generated by the high-level voter on the block chain;
(3) voting stage
S3.1, the voter chooses to approve or reject the signature and stamps a timestamp on Token when voting, and then the Token and the signature are sent to a corresponding public party together, wherein MaOn behalf of consent, MdRepresents objection;
s3.2, before the voting deadline, the voter can resend the vote information by updating the time on Token when modifying the vote;
step S3.3, after receiving the same Token twice, the notarization party marks the Token as invalid and does not receive the Token any more;
(4) ticket counting stage
S4.1, after the voting is ended, counting votes by a fair party; verifying whether Token is valid or not, and discarding an invalid ticket; for votes with duplicate tokens, only the latest time results are retained;
s4.2, numbering the subscripts of the voters according to the statistical result, and calculating a parameter C in the digital signatureiAnd pii；
(5) Verification and issue results phase
S5.1, the notarization party is divided into Ca and Cd, wherein Ca receives vote approval and Cd receives vote objection; when more than half of the votes are received by one of the parties, a ring signature is calculated (S)1,S2) And verifying;
step S5.2. After passing the verification, Ca publishes the result of the resolution passing on the blockchain and attaches a signature
Figure BDA0002242899290000031
Further, in step S4.2 the parameter C is digitally signediAnd piiThe calculation method of (2) is as follows:
for Ca, define
Figure BDA0002242899290000032
For Cd, definition
Figure BDA0002242899290000033
Wherein d represents the number of praise persons; for i equal to 1, …, n, notary party selects random number xi∈R ZN，
Figure BDA0002242899290000041
Wherein f isiThe value is only 0 or 1; order to
Figure BDA0002242899290000042
Is provided with
Figure BDA0002242899290000043
Wherein
Figure BDA0002242899290000044
Further, the verification method in step S5.1 is as follows:
in the case of Ca, the amount of Ca,
step1 when
Figure BDA0002242899290000045
I.e. more than half of the votes received by Ca, are counted
Figure BDA0002242899290000046
Step 2: authentication
Figure BDA0002242899290000047
Step 3: if the equation in Step2 holds, verify
Figure BDA0002242899290000048
Step 4: if Step3 verifies, Ca issues the result of the resolution pass on the blockchain and attaches a signature
Figure BDA0002242899290000049
In the case of Cd,
step1: when in use
Figure BDA00022428992900000410
I.e. more than half of the votes received by Cd, calculating
Figure BDA00022428992900000411
Step 2: authentication
Figure BDA00022428992900000412
Step 3: if Step2 is satisfied, verify
Figure BDA00022428992900000413
Step 4: if Step3 verifies, Cd issues the result of voting is not on the block chain and attaches a signature
Figure BDA00022428992900000414
Drawings
FIG. 1 is a flow chart of a voting method provided by the present invention;
FIG. 2 is a diagram of a system model provided by the present invention;
FIG. 3 is a diagram of a voting block structure model provided in the present invention;
fig. 4 is a flow chart of a user registration phase provided by the present invention.
Detailed Description
The present invention will be further described with reference to the accompanying drawings.
As shown in fig. 1-2, the hierarchical anonymous voting system of the present invention includes three-party subjects: voters, notarization parties, and block chaining.
(1) Voter: the voter may be a corporate director, for voting by a certain agenda; the members of the cosmetology group under the British and American cosmetology system can vote the result of a certain case, and the like, and most of the voters need to hide the identity of the voters so as to prevent the voting result from being leaked.
(2) The notarization prescription: the two parties are respectively used for receiving agreement tickets and rejection tickets, counting the agreement tickets and the rejection tickets and issuing final voting results. One party receiving approval voting is recorded as Ca, and one party receiving denial is recorded as Cd.
(3) Block chains: the whole voting process comprises personnel registration, auditing, individual voting, ticket counting, verification and result issuing which are all carried out on the block chain.
The following gives examples of the specific steps of the present invention:
a grading anonymous voting method based on a block chain comprises the following stages:
(1) a preparation stage:
s1.1, initializing the system, generating an initial block by the notarization party, and setting the content to be voted, the voting specification, the time nodes of each stage and the signature verification key of the notarization party on the initial block. Each ticket has a separate block recording its content and the corresponding entitlement Token and signature, as shown in fig. 3.
Step S1.2, generating system parameters by bilinear group generator
Figure BDA0002242899290000051
The generator Ag gives the Ag at the same time1,B0,u,u1,…,uk∈G,h1∈GqAnd alpha epsilon ZN(ii) a Order to
Figure BDA0002242899290000052
Let H be NXG*×{0,1}*→{0,1}k，H0：{0,1}*→ G is collision-resistant hash; wherein N, GT,ɡ1,g2,B0,h1,h2,u,u1,…,ukAnd H is a common parameter.
(2) A registration stage:
step S2.1, selecting random number S by useri∈R ZNThe public key of the user is
Figure BDA0002242899290000053
The private key is
Figure BDA0002242899290000054
The public key uniquely identifies the user identity.
And S2.2, the user who wants to participate in voting signs the identity information of the user before the registration deadline and sends the signature to the notarization party, and the notarization party verifies the identity of the user.
And S2.3, after the notarization party receives the signatures with the n legal identities, starting group verification and verifying whether the ID is matched with the signer.
Step S2.4, after passing the verification, the notarization party according to the user ViThe identity of (c) divides it into several levels. In the embodiment, three-level grading is adopted, wherein a first-level user has a voting right of one ticket, a second-level user has a voting right of two tickets, and a third-level user has a voting right of three tickets. The notary party sets the corresponding qualification Token at each level as follows:
{Token1}＝{Tokeni|i＝1,…i},
{Token2}＝{Tokenj,a,|j＝i+1,…,j&a*pkj≠pki≠pkz≠pkz*b},
{Token3}＝{Tokenz,a,b|z＝j+1,…,z&a*pkz≠b*pkz≠pki≠pkj}，…
wherein a and b are random numbers, a is not equal to b is not equal to 1, i, j and z are user subscripts of each level, and the generated tokens are different from each other. The notarization party then signs them and issues them randomly to the voters at the corresponding level. The voter can determine the authenticity of Token by verifying the signature of the notary. Token can be considered a vote received by the voter. After voters receive their corresponding Token, the secondary voter calculates skjA obtains the public key as pkjPrivate key of virtual identity of a. Similarly, a third tier voter may obtain the public key pkzA and pkzB, private key corresponding to the virtual identity.
Then the public certificate party publishes the public key of the legal voter and the public key of the virtual identity generated by the high-level voter on the block chain to form a public key ring, wherein the public key ring is y ═ pk ═1,…pkn}。
(3) Voting stage
S3.1, the voter chooses to approve or reject the signature and stamps a timestamp on Token when voting, and then the Token and the signature are sent to a corresponding public party together, wherein MaOn behalf of consent, MdRepresenting an objection. The specific method comprises the following steps:
voter calculation of opt-in (m)1,…mk)＝H(d,y,Ma). And randomly select ri∈ZN，
i) Voter V of one leveliCalculating out
Figure BDA0002242899290000061
And adds a timestamp T to Token, will (S)1,i,S2,iToken1| | T) to Ca.
ii) two-level voter ViComputing
Figure BDA0002242899290000062
Time stamp Token, will (S)1,i·S1,i+1,S2,i·S2,i+1Token2| | T) to Ca.
iii) three-level voter ViCalculating out
Figure BDA0002242899290000071
Figure BDA0002242899290000072
Time stamp Token, will (S)1,i·S1,i+1·S1,i+2,S2,i·S2,i+1·S2,i+2Token2| | T) to Ca.
Likewise, voter's calculation of a selective rejection (m)1,…mk)＝H(d,y,Md) And randomly select ri∈ZNOther calculations and transmissions are consistent with the voting process selected to pass, except that here they are not sent to Ca, but to the common square Cd.
And S3.2, before the voting deadline, the voter can resend the vote information by updating the time on Token when modifying the vote. Before the voting deadline, the time on Token can be updated to resend the result, and the justice only keeps the latest voting result of each voter.
And S3.3, after the notarization party receives the same Token twice, the Token is marked as invalid and is not received any more, so that the resources statistically consumed by the notarization party can be effectively reduced.
(4) Ticket counting stage
And S4.1, counting votes by the fair party after the voting is ended. Two aspects of verification are mainly performed. Firstly, verifying whether Token is valid, namely verifying whether Token contains a valid signature of CA, and discarding invalid tickets; second, for votes with duplicate Token, only the latest time results are retained. Since the voting result of each person is visible on the block chain, all people can check whether the voting result of each person is recorded or not, and can count the votes to verify the result of a common person.
S4.2, numbering the subscripts of the voters according to the statistical result, and calculating C according to a specific formulaiAnd pii. The specific method comprises the following steps:
{1,2, …, d } is the vote of the voter, { d +1, …, n } is the vote of the vetor,
for Ca, define
Figure BDA0002242899290000073
For Cd, definition
Figure BDA0002242899290000074
Where d is the number of praise for i 1, …, n, the notary chooses the random number xi∈R ZNAre combined with
Figure BDA0002242899290000075
Wherein f isiThe value is only 0 or 1; order to
Figure BDA0002242899290000081
Is provided with
Figure BDA0002242899290000082
Wherein
Figure BDA0002242899290000083
(5) Verification and issue results phase
S5.1, the notarization party is divided into Ca and Cd, wherein Ca receives vote approval and Cd receives vote objection; when more than half of the votes are received by one of the parties, a ring signature is calculated (S)1,S2) And performing verification.
Step S5.2, if the verification is passed, the Ca issues a result of passing the statement on the block chainFruits with attached signatures
Figure BDA0002242899290000084
The specific method comprises the following steps:
in the case of Ca, the amount of Ca,
step1 when
Figure BDA0002242899290000085
I.e. more than half of the votes received by Ca, are counted
Figure BDA0002242899290000086
Step 2: authentication
Figure BDA0002242899290000087
Step 3: if the equation in Step2 holds, verify
Figure BDA0002242899290000088
Step 4: if Step3 verifies, Ca issues the result of the resolution pass on the blockchain and attaches a signature
Figure BDA0002242899290000089
In the case of Cd,
step1: when in use
Figure BDA00022428992900000810
I.e. Cd receives more than half of votes, calculates
Figure BDA00022428992900000811
Step 2: authentication
Figure BDA00022428992900000812
Step 3: if Step2 is satisfied, verify
Figure BDA00022428992900000813
Step 4: if Step3 verifies, Cd issues the result of voting is not on the block chain and attaches a signature
Figure BDA0002242899290000091
The above description is only of the preferred embodiments of the present invention, and it should be noted that: it will be apparent to those skilled in the art that various modifications and adaptations can be made without departing from the principles of the invention and these are intended to be within the scope of the invention.

Claims (1)

1. A grading anonymous voting method based on a block chain is characterized in that: comprises the following stages:
(1) preparation phase
S1.1, initializing a system, wherein a notarization party generates an initial block, and sets contents to be voted, voting specifications, time nodes of each stage and signature verification keys of the notarization party on the initial block;
step S1.2, the bilinear group generator Ag generates the system parameters
Figure FDA0003562606250000011
The generator Ag gives the Ag at the same time1,B0,u,u1,…,uk∈G,h1∈GqAnd alpha epsilon ZN(ii) a Order to
Figure FDA0003562606250000012
Let H be NXG × {0,1}*→{0,1}k，H0：{0,1}*→ G is collision-resistant hash; wherein N, GT,ɡ1,g2,B0,h1,h2,u,u1,…,ukH is a common parameter;
(2) registration phase
Step S2.1, selecting random number S by useri∈RZNThe public key of the user is
Figure FDA0003562606250000013
The private key is
Figure FDA0003562606250000014
The public key uniquely identifies the user identity;
s2.2, the user who wants to participate in voting signs the identity information of the user before the registration deadline and sends the signature to the notarization party, and the notarization party verifies the identity of the user;
s2.3, after the notarization party receives the signatures of n legal identities, starting group verification to verify whether the ID is matched with the signer;
s2.4, after passing the verification, the notarization party verifies according to the user ViThe identity of the user is divided into 3 grades, the user is divided into three grades, one grade of personnel has one ticket, two grade of personnel have two tickets, and three grade of personnel have three tickets; token1 is a primary user and the Token is Tokenv(ii) a Token2 is a secondary user, and the Token is Tokenj(ii) a Token3 is a third level user and the Token is Tokenz；
S2.5, the notarization party publishes the public key of the legal voter and the public key of the virtual identity generated by the high-level voter on the block chain;
(3) voting stage
S3.1, the voter selects to approve or reject the signature and stamps a time stamp on Token when voting, and then the Token and the signature are sent to the corresponding notarization party together, wherein MaOn behalf of consent, MdRepresents objection;
s3.2, before the voting deadline, the voter can resend the vote information by updating the time on Token when modifying the vote;
step S3.3, after receiving the same Token twice, the notarization party marks the Token as invalid and does not receive the Token any more;
(4) ticket counting stage
S4.1, after the voting is ended, counting votes by a notarization party; verifying whether Token is valid or not, and discarding invalid votes; for votes with duplicate tokens, only the latest time results are retained;
s4.2, numbering the subscripts of the voters according to the statistical result, and calculating a parameter C in the digital signatureiAnd pii(ii) a In particular, the amount of the solvent to be used,
for Ca, define
Figure FDA0003562606250000021
For Cd, definition
Figure FDA0003562606250000022
Wherein d represents the number of praise persons; for i 1, …, n, notary party chooses random number xi∈RZN，
Figure FDA0003562606250000023
Order to
Figure FDA0003562606250000024
Is provided with
Figure FDA0003562606250000025
Wherein
Figure FDA0003562606250000026
(5) Verification and issue results phase
Step S5, dividing the notarization party into Ca and Cd, wherein Ca receives vote approval and Cd receives vote objection; when more than half of the votes are received by one of the parties, a ring signature is calculated (S)1,S2) And verifying; the specific verification method comprises the following steps:
in the case of Ca, the amount of Ca,
step1 when
Figure FDA0003562606250000027
I.e. more than half of the votes received by Ca, are counted
Figure FDA0003562606250000028
Step 2: authentication
Figure FDA0003562606250000029
Step 3: when the equation in Step2 is satisfied, verification is made
Figure FDA00035626062500000210
Step 4: after Step3 verifies that the results passed, Ca publishes the results of the vote pass on the blockchain and attaches a signature
Figure FDA0003562606250000031
In the case of Cd, the Cd is,
step1: when in use
Figure FDA0003562606250000032
I.e. more than half of the votes received by Cd, calculating
Figure FDA0003562606250000033
Step 2: authentication
Figure FDA0003562606250000034
Step 3: when the equation in Step2 is satisfied, verification is performed
Figure FDA0003562606250000035
Step 4: after Step3 passes the verification, Cd issues the result of voting is not on the block chain and attaches a signature
Figure FDA0003562606250000036
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