CN110661831B - Big data test field security initialization method based on trusted third party - Google Patents

Big data test field security initialization method based on trusted third party Download PDF

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CN110661831B
CN110661831B CN201810693676.1A CN201810693676A CN110661831B CN 110661831 B CN110661831 B CN 110661831B CN 201810693676 A CN201810693676 A CN 201810693676A CN 110661831 B CN110661831 B CN 110661831B
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trusted
party
cluster
mirror image
openstack
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CN110661831A (en
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王国平
肖惠娟
吴承荣
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Fudan University
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    • HELECTRICITY
    • H04ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04LTRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
    • H04L67/00Network arrangements or protocols for supporting network services or applications
    • H04L67/50Network services
    • H04L67/51Discovery or management thereof, e.g. service location protocol [SLP] or web services
    • GPHYSICS
    • G06COMPUTING; CALCULATING OR COUNTING
    • G06FELECTRIC DIGITAL DATA PROCESSING
    • G06F21/00Security arrangements for protecting computers, components thereof, programs or data against unauthorised activity
    • G06F21/50Monitoring users, programs or devices to maintain the integrity of platforms, e.g. of processors, firmware or operating systems
    • G06F21/52Monitoring users, programs or devices to maintain the integrity of platforms, e.g. of processors, firmware or operating systems during program execution, e.g. stack integrity ; Preventing unwanted data erasure; Buffer overflow
    • G06F21/53Monitoring users, programs or devices to maintain the integrity of platforms, e.g. of processors, firmware or operating systems during program execution, e.g. stack integrity ; Preventing unwanted data erasure; Buffer overflow by executing in a restricted environment, e.g. sandbox or secure virtual machine
    • HELECTRICITY
    • H04ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04LTRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
    • H04L63/00Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security
    • H04L63/12Applying verification of the received information
    • H04L63/123Applying verification of the received information received data contents, e.g. message integrity
    • HELECTRICITY
    • H04ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04LTRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
    • H04L67/00Network arrangements or protocols for supporting network services or applications
    • H04L67/01Protocols
    • H04L67/10Protocols in which an application is distributed across nodes in the network
    • HELECTRICITY
    • H04ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04LTRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
    • H04L67/00Network arrangements or protocols for supporting network services or applications
    • H04L67/01Protocols
    • H04L67/10Protocols in which an application is distributed across nodes in the network
    • H04L67/1095Replication or mirroring of data, e.g. scheduling or transport for data synchronisation between network nodes

Abstract

The invention belongs to the field of cloud computing resource management, and relates to a sandbox management system based on OpenStack. The cloud service renting method and the cloud service renting system have the advantages that in the traditional cloud service providing process, a trusted third party platform independent of a cloud service provider is added, and the safety and the fairness of the whole cloud service renting process are improved. The mirror image file is ensured not to be tampered and other functions are added by separating the mirror image making, the deployment and the management cluster and comparing the mirror image ID of the trusted third party record with the mirror image ID to be registered by the cloud service provider; by adding the initialization module and the integrity check module, the safe initialization, the safe delivery and the corresponding account management and the authority management in the later period of the sandbox are ensured, and the cloud service behavior guarantee scheme supporting privacy protection is provided.

Description

Big data test field security initialization method based on trusted third party
Technical Field
The invention belongs to the field of cloud computing resource management, relates to a cloud platform security initialization method, and particularly relates to an OpenStack-based sandbox management system.
Background
The concept of cloud computing was first proposed in 2006 from google, and through cloud computing, computing resources and information were allocated to users as needed. Information and resources are highly shared in cloud computing, which is considered to be the inevitable direction for next generation computing. In recent years, cloud computing has been rapidly developed, and more media, companies and technicians have started to pursue cloud computing.
In recent years, more and more companies have begun to launch cloud computing services. More representative enterprises include amazon, Tencent, Alibaca and the like, and the large cloud service providers reduce IT investment cost and maintenance cost for the enterprises by providing various cloud computing services, but security problems about the cloud platforms are controversial. Currently, the trust problem for cloud computing has two major issues from a large perspective. Firstly, on the user side, for the user, a large amount of sensitive data is stored on the cloud platform, and is under the control of the service provider, and the data may be acquired by the administrator of the service provider or the intruder of the system. A survey by fujitsu showed that 88% of cloud computing users were concerned about their personal data stored in the cloud being accessible to someone, especially those administrators who directly manage cloud computing hardware services, perhaps because of some need, directly or indirectly by using their rights to access the customer's data. The second problem arises from cloud providers who also have a fear of theft of a cloud user's password or intrusion of the user's access host, resulting in loss of user data, which is difficult for the cloud provider to detect because it is a result of normal user operation. And thus its security should be a focus of more attention.
According to research and development of the inventor of the application, certain potential safety hazards exist in cloud servers provided by some large-scale cloud service providers in China. When the user forgets or loses the password or the key of the cloud server, the management platform provided by the cloud platform can provide the user with a service of modifying the password, which actually means that the data of the user on the cloud platform is in the control of the service provider.
Aiming at the phenomenon, the inventor of the application intends to provide a cloud computing service security initialization mechanism with participation of a trusted third party, and the method is to be applied to a big data test field. In particular to a big data test field security initialization method based on a trusted third party.
Disclosure of Invention
The invention aims to provide a method for realizing an OpenStack-based sandbox management system in a big data test field, aiming at the current situation of the prior art, and the system ensures that the sandbox can realize safe initialization and safe delivery through the participation of a trusted third party. In particular to a big data test field security initialization method based on a trusted third party.
In the invention, according to the overall design of a big data test field, the 'test sandbox' becomes a virtual environment for providing relevant beneficiaries to carry out big data tests and transactions, so that a defense strategy facing the 'test sandbox' is adopted in the aspect of safety protection. A "test sandbox" is a dedicated space created for a particular big data application that is forcibly isolated from other big data applications. The virtual resources belonging to a plurality of collaborators related to the big data application are deployed in the test sandbox, and the test sandbox can be regarded as a self-complete big data safe controlled by a tenant and used for bearing data and applications. The virtual resources comprise data sources, processing/analyzing virtual hosts and software, virtual subnets and the like; the collaborators comprise a data owner, a data analysis and processing service provider, an application party and the like which establish a trust relationship, and the collaborators of the big data application can be considered to have deep sharing authority on data resources.
And the big data test sandbox system can provide a relatively strict isolation mechanism for the sandbox by adopting a virtual network and virtual machine boundary isolation technology through a virtualization technology, and on the basis, security audit and related security defense configuration management are enhanced to provide security enhancement for the test sandbox, so that the role of the big data test field sandbox system is the cloud service provider.
The main idea of the invention is to add the role of a trusted third party between a service provider and a tenant, realize the safety initialization and safety delivery of various test sandboxes related to transactions, safely transfer the initial control right of a virtual machine from a platform operator to the trusted third party, and simultaneously provide support for subsequent safety audit by implanting related mandatory safety audit agents and necessary safety mechanisms.
The invention comprises four devices, namely a mirror image management device, a sandbox initialization management device, a system integrity verification device, an OpenStack cluster deployment management device and the like (as shown in figure 3).
According to an aspect of the present invention, there is provided a method for ensuring security of production and release of an image by an image management apparatus of a trusted third party, the image management apparatus running on a trusted third party management server, the method comprising the steps of:
a. continuously receiving requirements, including version requirements of a system version, hadoop and the like, for a big data operating environment in a sandbox, which are collected by a cloud service provider;
b. downloading and summarizing cloud mirror images of various operating systems including ubuntu, CentOS and the like, manufacturing and packaging the cloud mirror images by adopting an official project Diskimage-builder of OpenStack, and putting related scripts of third-party security initialization;
c. the packaged mirror images are manufactured for a trusted third party and uploaded to an OpenStack platform for release, any mirror image after being uploaded has a unique ID on the OpenStack platform, and the mirror images, the ID and other detailed information are recorded in a book;
d. when a cloud service provider deploys a cluster device by using Sahara on an OpenStack platform, contact is firstly established with a trusted third party, and when the trusted third party confirms that an image ID to be used is consistent with an image ID to be used, the cluster is allowed to be started and recorded.
According to one aspect of the invention, the sandbox safety initialization management device under the big data test field environment is provided, and the safety of the initialization process is ensured through various scripts for ensuring the system safety initialization;
which comprises the following steps:
a. compiling scripts connected with a trusted third-party platform when a virtual machine is networked for the first time, and Shell scripts such as system security reinforcement and security enhancement aiming at the characteristics of each operating system;
b. after the big data test field cluster submits for the tenant, the virtual machine is connected with credible third party platform when networking for the first time, and automatic script such as safety reinforcement, safety enhancement is downloaded from the platform, and wherein, the function that safety reinforcement and safety enhancement script realized includes:
(1) disabling or deleting unwanted accounts: useless accounts of the system are reduced, unnecessary accounts are locked, and the security risk of the system is reduced;
(2) checking the special account number: checking whether an account with a null password and root authority exists or not, and reinforcing the account with the null password;
(3) the password strategy is added, the complexity of the password is enhanced, and the possibility of guessing the solution is reduced;
(4) limiting users su, namely limiting users su capable of reaching root;
(5) and (3) forbidding root users to directly log in: a common authority account is created and a password is configured to prevent the remote login from being impossible;
(6) shutting down unnecessary services;
(7) SSH service security, namely, the SSH service is safely reinforced to prevent brute force from successfully cracking;
(8) setting umask value: a default umask value is set, so that a newly created file owner has read-write execution permission, the same group of users have read and execution permission, other users have no permission, and the system safety is enhanced;
(9) and setting login timeout, namely connecting the timeout time after the system is logged in, and enhancing the security.
According to an aspect of the present invention, there is provided a method for automatically checking the integrity of a system, including the integrity of a specified file and a specified directory, each time a sandbox is started, based on security considerations, using a system integrity checking apparatus, where the integrity checking apparatus is operated in a cloud server of a tenant, i.e., the sandbox, the method includes the following steps:
a. compiling an integrity checking tool, wherein the integrity checking tool comprises self-checking agent software, integrity self-detecting agent software and the like
Starting scripts and programs, wherein the methods employed by the integrity checking agent software can be used, but are not limited to use
The method comprises the following steps:
(1) the virtual trusted platform module (vTPM) provides a set of solution ideas of safe storage, trusted identity and integrity measurement, simulates the interface and function of the hardware TPM, enables each virtual machine to have an independent vTPM, protects sensitive information, provides remote certification and the like, and simultaneously provides support for an audit center of a trusted third party;
(2) trusted execution technology (TXT) uses hardware keys and subsystems to control resources inside a computer and decide who or what programs will be allowed or denied access to those resources;
taking the ubuntu system as an example, the sandbox of the tenant defaults to an ubuntu user, a hadoop user and a root user. The ubuntu user belongs to the basic user of the mirror image, is a user created by the mirror image, has authority belonging to the common user, the Hadoop user is a user required by the Hadoop cluster, is used for running the big data analysis task of the user, and has partial authority of the root user, and the root user is a super user of the system,
has the highest authority;
aiming at the three existing user identities, TXT can ensure that users with various authorities only have operation within the authority range of the users, particularly access to important files and important resources;
(3) intel is used for supporting and upgrading a trusted execution technology to support an open source project of TPM 2.0 edition and ensure that trusted computing is realized;
(4) analyzing the image file in the non-activated state;
b. after the security initialization module is connected with the trusted third-party platform, downloading the integrity verification tool to a specified directory in the sandbox;
c. aiming at each start of the tenant sandbox, the integrity checking tool automatically runs and checks the integrity of the system, including the safety of the specified file, the specified directory and the user account, and if the integrity problem occurs, the corresponding situation is informed to the tenant.
According to one aspect of the invention, an OpenStack cluster deployment management device is provided, a packaged mirror image is manufactured based on a trusted third party, a component Sahara of an OpenStack platform is used for deploying a cluster and managing the cluster, and the cluster deployment management device runs on a cloud service provider management server; wherein the method comprises the steps of:
a. and accessing, controlling calculation, storage and network resources in a web UI mode by adopting an application portal Horizon of OpenStack, and acquiring the image list information uploaded by a trusted third party. Selecting a mirror image and confirming a mirror image ID with a trusted third party according to the requirements of tenants;
b. and adopting a Sahara project on an OpenStack controller node to quickly build a Hadoop and Spark cluster. This image is registered using Sahara and the plug-in used is added with a matching tag, e.g. Vanilla;
c. a node group and cluster template are selected. With Sahara managing clusters, the following three entity objects are mainly operated: node Group Templates, Cluster Templates and Cluster;
d. managing the cluster according to the user requirement, such as adding or deleting nodes;
e. when the tenant does not need the tenant, the cluster can be deleted, and all resources are released.
The invention relates to a sandbox management system based on OpenStack, which has the following advantages compared with the current mainstream cloud platform operators:
1. the cloud service renting system is based on big data test field projects, a trusted third-party platform independent of a cloud service provider is added, and the safety and the fairness of the whole cloud service renting process are improved; the mirror image file is ensured not to be tampered and other functions are added by separating the mirror image making, the deployment and the management cluster and comparing the mirror image ID of the trusted third party record with the mirror image ID to be registered by the cloud service provider; by adding the initialization module and the integrity check module, the safe initialization, the safe delivery and the corresponding account management and the authority management in the later period of the sandbox are ensured, and the cloud service behavior guarantee scheme supporting privacy protection is provided.
2. Compared with the traditional cloud service providing and managing mode, the cloud service has the characteristics of higher credibility, tenant privacy protection and data protection. The user does not worry that personal data stored in the cloud can be stolen and used by some people, particularly managers directly managing cloud computing hardware service, so that the safety of using the cloud service by tenants is guaranteed; the method and the system support the characteristics of multi-tenant and multi-service concurrency of the cloud platform, and ensure the privacy and the safety of cloud tenant information.
3. For cloud service providers, the privacy information of tenants in a big data test field and important data in sandboxes are not mastered under the authority, the credibility of the cloud platform is improved due to the addition of a credible third party, meanwhile, security threats such as invasion of the sandboxes of users are reduced by the integrity verification module, and the loss of the cloud providers is reduced.
4. The tenant accesses the sandbox by accessing an application server of a cloud service provider after logging in through an external network portal, and dragging a data processing task to select the sandbox to run the task. And the application server requests access to the sandbox by sending an intranet URL. It is ensured that the sandbox has no external access.
Drawings
FIG. 1 depicts a big data farm security initialization system framework diagram.
FIG. 2 depicts a process diagram for a tenant using a sandbox in a big data farm.
Fig. 3 illustrates that the present invention is composed of an image management device, an OpenStack cluster deployment device, a security initialization management device, and a system integrity verification device, and the relationship between the four devices.
FIG. 4 depicts a relationship diagram for Sahara and OpenStack items.
Detailed Description
The invention described in fig. 3 is composed of an image management device, an OpenStack cluster deployment management device, a security initialization management device, and a system integrity verification device, and in specific implementation, the image management device is installed on a server of a trusted third party, the OpenStack cluster deployment management device is installed on a cloud platform management server of a cloud service provider, and the security initialization management device and the system integrity verification device are installed on a virtual machine in each cloud environment.
The mirror image management device is used as software running on a trusted third-party server, can run in a background service mode, continuously receives the requirements on a big data running environment in a sandbox collected by a cloud service provider, uses an official project Diskimage-builder of OpenStack to make and pack cloud mirror images according to the requirements, and puts a security initialization related script into the process; for example, using this tool to make a mirror image of Ubuntu, where elements contain the following factors: environment.d: defining an environment variable; preinstall.d: preparation before installation, such as defining a mirror version number; install.d: executing the script in the installation process; finish.d and root.d: executing the script after the installation is finished; element-deps: other elements that are dependent; element-developers: a support element related to the system; completing mirror image production, uploading the mirror image to a graphical service platform Horizon of OpenStack, obtaining and storing a unique ID of the mirror image, and confirming that the mirror image is safe and credible; when a cloud service provider deploys a cluster device by using Sahara on an OpenStack platform, the cloud service provider must send a registered mirror image ID to a trusted third party, and after the trusted third party confirms that the mirror image is a mirror image with authenticated security, the cloud service provider is allowed to start deploying the cluster; the software can be realized by adopting Shell scripting language, and the connection with the OpenStack cluster deployment management device can be realized by logging in an OpenStack platform by adopting a super administrator account and a common account to deliver a mirror image;
the safety initialization management device is used as software running on all virtual machines and can run in a background service mode; the sandbox safety initialization and safety delivery are realized through various scripts for ensuring the system safety, firstly, the script connected with a trusted third party is added during the production of a packaging mirror image, when a virtual machine is connected with a network for the first time, the connection with the trusted third party is realized, the safety initialization script is automatically downloaded, and in the aspect of safety initialization, account authorization and authentication authorization are mainly ensured. The method is realized by checking and modifying files related to an account number, a user group, a password and the like, locking an unrelated account, forbidding a remote login of a super administrator account, modifying a user group and a password strategy, setting file directory authority, checking whether a user with UID (user identifier) of 0 except a root exists and the like;
the system integrity checking device is used as software running on all virtual machines, can run in a background service mode, combines a trusted computing technology and a key storage and management idea of a TPM (trusted platform Module) which is a core module thereof, and performs integrity check on key files and account information by means of a virtual trusted platform module, a trusted execution technology and the like; the specific content comprises the following steps: key storage protection mechanism: the key is submitted to vTPM management and accessed from the vTPM, and the key safety storage and management functions are provided for the system due to the safety of the vTPM in design;
file write security control mechanism: the system forbids the write, delete and rename operations of the system key file in the strategy by maintaining a binary access strategy of (file object, authorization code)', all authorization code verification processes in the system including the dynamic update of the strategy file and the delete and replacement of the controlled file are completed by a driving layer, and the access of all application programs is forbidden;
the OpenStack cluster deployment management device is used as software running on a cloud platform management server of a cloud service provider, an additional component Sahara of OpenStack is used as a central point, a Hadoop and Spark distribution architecture is constructed, and big data analysis is carried out; architecturally, Sahara runs on an OpenStack controller node, and a Hadoop cluster runs on an OpenStack computing node, fig. 4 describes the relationship between Sahara and other items of OpenStack, and a cloud service provider enters an OpenStack management platform through an OpenStack application portal, selects an image according to user requirements, for example, the currently selected image is an image of Ubuntu: first, the image is registered using Sahara and the plug-in to be used adds a matching label, e.g., Vanilla. When adding Sahara to Horizon, a dashboard may be used. The VM template and the node group template have the same characteristics of RAM and CPU, for example, m1.medium, and finally, the node group template is combined with the cluster template to complete the steps, an example is created in Horizon, a master-slave Hadoop node is set, then, the cluster is started, and a Hadoop job can be created, wherein the task can be Spark, Pig, Java, MapReduce and the like; then, starting cluster work; finally, the result is output to a shader or other storage; meanwhile, when a user proposes to add or delete a node, the cloud service provider can utilize Sahara to perform cluster management; once the user rents the sandbox, the cluster can be deleted, and resources are released; the software can be implemented by using Python language, and the connection between the software and the sandbox initialization management device and the system integrity check device can be implemented by using the method shown in fig. 2.

Claims (5)

1. A big data test field security initialization method based on a trusted third party is characterized in that security initialization and security delivery of various test sandboxes of a big data test field are achieved through the addition of the trusted third party, so that the initial control right of the sandboxes is safely transferred to the trusted third party from a platform operator, and integrity verification of the sandboxes is achieved; which comprises the following steps: mirror image management device, safe initialization management device, system integrity check device and OpenStack cluster deployment management device, wherein:
a. the mirror image management device is operated on a trusted third-party server, continuously receives the requirements on the large data operation environment in the sandbox, collected by a cloud service provider, uses the official project Diskimage-builder of OpenStack to make and pack the cloud mirror image according to the requirements, and puts a security initialization related script in the process; completing mirror image production, uploading the mirror image to a graphical service platform Horizon of OpenStack, obtaining and storing a unique ID of the mirror image, and confirming that the mirror image is safe and credible; when a cloud service provider deploys a cluster device by using Sahara on an OpenStack platform, the cloud service provider must send a registered mirror image ID to a trusted third party, and after the trusted third party confirms that the mirror image is a mirror image with authenticated security, the cloud service provider is allowed to start deploying the cluster;
b. the safe initialization management device runs on each virtual machine in the cluster, realizes safe initialization and safe delivery of the sandbox through various scripts for ensuring system safety, firstly adds a script connected with a trusted third party when a packaging mirror image is manufactured, and when the virtual machines are connected with a network for the first time, the safe initialization management device is connected with the trusted third party through the network, automatically downloads a safe initialization script, and the safe initialization comprises: the method mainly ensures account authorization and authentication authorization, locks irrelevant accounts by checking and modifying files related to an account, a user group and a password, forbids remote login of a super administrator account, modifies the user group and a password strategy, sets file directory authority and checks whether users with UID (user identification) of 0 except root exist;
c. the system integrity checking device runs on each virtual machine in the cluster, combines the trusted computing technology and the key storage and management of the TPM of the core module thereof, and performs integrity check on the key files and the account information by means of the virtual trusted platform module and the trusted execution technology; the file writing safety control mechanism comprises: by adopting an object-oriented file protection measure, a system inhibits the write, delete and rename operations of system key files in a strategy from occurring by maintaining a binary access strategy of a (file object, authorization code)';
the OpenStack cluster deployment management device runs on a cloud platform management server of a cloud service provider, and adopts an additional component Sahara of OpenStack as a central point to construct a Hadoop and Spark distribution architecture; a cloud service provider enters an OpenStack management platform through an OpenStack application entrance, and selects a mirror image according to user requirements; after registering the mirror image and selecting a cluster template, starting a cluster; when a user proposes to add or delete a node, the cloud service provider performs cluster management by using Sahara, and the user finishes renting the sandbox, deletes the cluster and releases resources.
2. The method of claim 1, wherein the image management device comprises the steps of:
a. continuously receiving requirements, including system versions and hadoop version requirements, for a big data operating environment in a sandbox, which are collected by a cloud service provider;
b. downloading and summarizing cloud mirror images comprising ubuntu and a CentOS operating system, manufacturing and packaging the cloud mirror images by adopting an official project Diskimage-builder of OpenStack, and putting related scripts of third-party security initialization into the cloud mirror images;
c. the packaged mirror images are manufactured for a trusted third party and uploaded to an OpenStack platform for release, any mirror image after being uploaded has a unique ID on the OpenStack platform, and the mirror images, the ID and other detailed information are recorded in a book;
d. when a cloud service provider deploys a cluster device by using Sahara on an OpenStack platform, contact is firstly established with a trusted third party, and when the trusted third party confirms that an image ID to be used is consistent with an image ID to be used, the cluster is allowed to be started and recorded.
3. The method of claim 1, wherein the step of securely initializing the management device comprises the steps of:
a. compiling scripts connected with a trusted third-party platform when a virtual machine is networked for the first time, and Shell scripts such as system security reinforcement and security enhancement aiming at the characteristics of each operating system;
b. after the big data test field cluster submits for the tenant, the virtual machine is connected with credible third party platform when networking for the first time, and automatic script such as safety reinforcement, safety enhancement is downloaded from the platform, and wherein, the function that safety reinforcement and safety enhancement script realized includes:
(1) disabling or deleting unwanted accounts: useless accounts of the system are reduced, unnecessary accounts are locked, and the security risk of the system is reduced;
(2) checking the special account number: checking whether an account with a null password and root authority exists or not, and reinforcing the account with the null password;
(3) the password strategy is added, the complexity of the password is enhanced, and the possibility of guessing the solution is reduced;
(4) limiting users su, namely limiting users su capable of reaching root;
(5) and (3) forbidding root users to directly log in: a common authority account is created and a password is configured to prevent the remote login from being impossible;
(6) shutting down unnecessary services;
(7) SSH service security, namely, the SSH service is safely reinforced to prevent brute force from successfully cracking;
(8) setting umask value: a default umask value is set, so that a newly created file owner has read-write execution permission, the same group of users have read and execution permission, other users have no permission, and the system safety is enhanced;
(9) and setting login timeout, namely connecting the timeout time after the system is logged in, and enhancing the security.
4. The method of claim 1, wherein the system integrity check device comprises the steps of:
a. compiling an integrity checking tool, wherein the integrity checking tool comprises audit agent software, an integrity self-detection agent software self-starting operation script and a program, and the integrity detection agent software adopts the following method:
(1) the virtual trusted platform module vTPM is used for providing a solution of safe storage, trusted identity and integrity measurement, simulating interfaces and functions of a hardware TPM, enabling each virtual machine to have an independent vTPM, protecting sensitive information, providing remote certification and simultaneously providing support for an audit center of a trusted third party;
(2) the trusted execution technology TXT uses hardware keys and subsystems to control the resources inside the computer and decide who or what programs will be allowed to access or denied access to these resources;
(3) intel is used for supporting and upgrading a trusted execution technology to support an open source project of TPM 2.0 edition, and the trusted computing is ensured to be realized;
(4) analyzing the image file in the non-activated state;
b. after the security initialization module is connected with the trusted third-party platform, downloading the integrity verification tool to a specified directory in the sandbox;
c. aiming at each start of the tenant sandbox, the integrity checking tool automatically runs and checks the integrity of the system, including the safety of the specified file, the specified directory and the user account, and if the integrity problem occurs, the corresponding situation is informed to the tenant.
5. The method according to claim 1, wherein the OpenStack cluster deployment management device comprises:
a. accessing, controlling calculation, storage and network resources in a web UI mode by adopting an application portal Horizon of OpenStack, acquiring mirror image list information uploaded by a trusted third party, selecting a mirror image according to the requirements of tenants and confirming a mirror image ID with the trusted third party;
b. quickly building a Hadoop and Spark cluster by adopting a Sahara project on an OpenStack controller node, registering the mirror image by using the Sahara, and adding a matched label, such as Vanilla, to a used plug-in;
c. selecting a node group and a cluster template, managing the cluster through Sahara, and mainly operating: three entity objects of Node Group Templates, Cluster Templates and Clusters;
d. managing the cluster according to the user requirement, such as adding or deleting nodes;
e. and when the tenant does not need the tenant, deleting the cluster and releasing all resources.
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