CN110661771A - Secure smart power grid access control method and system for resisting differential attack - Google Patents

Secure smart power grid access control method and system for resisting differential attack Download PDF

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CN110661771A
CN110661771A CN201910542517.6A CN201910542517A CN110661771A CN 110661771 A CN110661771 A CN 110661771A CN 201910542517 A CN201910542517 A CN 201910542517A CN 110661771 A CN110661771 A CN 110661771A
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CN110661771B (en
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鲍海勇
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Zhejiang Gongshang University
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    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
    • H04L63/00—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security
    • H04L63/04—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security for providing a confidential data exchange among entities communicating through data packet networks
    • H04L63/0428—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security for providing a confidential data exchange among entities communicating through data packet networks wherein the data content is protected, e.g. by encrypting or encapsulating the payload
    • H04L63/0478—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security for providing a confidential data exchange among entities communicating through data packet networks wherein the data content is protected, e.g. by encrypting or encapsulating the payload applying multiple layers of encryption, e.g. nested tunnels or encrypting the content with a first key and then with at least a second key
    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
    • H04L63/00—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security
    • H04L63/06—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security for supporting key management in a packet data network
    • H04L63/062—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security for supporting key management in a packet data network for key distribution, e.g. centrally by trusted party
    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
    • H04L67/00—Network arrangements or protocols for supporting network services or applications
    • H04L67/01—Protocols
    • H04L67/12—Protocols specially adapted for proprietary or special-purpose networking environments, e.g. medical networks, sensor networks, networks in vehicles or remote metering networks
    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
    • H04L9/00—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols
    • H04L9/08—Key distribution or management, e.g. generation, sharing or updating, of cryptographic keys or passwords
    • H04L9/0816—Key establishment, i.e. cryptographic processes or cryptographic protocols whereby a shared secret becomes available to two or more parties, for subsequent use
    • H04L9/0819—Key transport or distribution, i.e. key establishment techniques where one party creates or otherwise obtains a secret value, and securely transfers it to the other(s)
    • H04L9/083—Key transport or distribution, i.e. key establishment techniques where one party creates or otherwise obtains a secret value, and securely transfers it to the other(s) involving central third party, e.g. key distribution center [KDC] or trusted third party [TTP]
    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
    • H04L9/00—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols
    • H04L9/08—Key distribution or management, e.g. generation, sharing or updating, of cryptographic keys or passwords
    • H04L9/0861—Generation of secret information including derivation or calculation of cryptographic keys or passwords
    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
    • H04L9/00—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols
    • H04L9/30—Public key, i.e. encryption algorithm being computationally infeasible to invert or user's encryption keys not requiring secrecy
    • H04L9/3006—Public key, i.e. encryption algorithm being computationally infeasible to invert or user's encryption keys not requiring secrecy underlying computational problems or public-key parameters
    • H04L9/3033—Public key, i.e. encryption algorithm being computationally infeasible to invert or user's encryption keys not requiring secrecy underlying computational problems or public-key parameters details relating to pseudo-prime or prime number generation, e.g. primality test

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Abstract

The invention relates to a safe smart grid access control method and system for resisting differential attack, wherein a trusted authority is responsible for managing and distributing secret information of the system; the control center is responsible for integrating, processing and analyzing the electricity consumption data; the transmission center is responsible for managing the transmission network; the power distribution center is responsible for managing a power distribution network; the electric power supplier is responsible for providing a competitive electric power retail market; the gateway is responsible for connecting the control center and the electric energy consumption side and aggregating the electricity consumption; the sensing network is responsible for collecting power consumption data in real time and reporting the data to the control center, and the specific steps comprise a system initialization stage; a data encryption stage; a data aggregation stage; data re-encryption and access control stage; and a data decryption and data recovery stage. The invention researches and designs a fine-grained security data access control mechanism suitable for the application requirements of multiple receivers of the smart grid, and can effectively eliminate and resist potential network hidden dangers, collusion attacks and differential attacks from the inside and the outside of the smart grid.

Description

Secure smart power grid access control method and system for resisting differential attack
Technical Field
The invention relates to a secure smart grid access control method and system for resisting differential attack.
Background
Relevant scholars propose various solutions based on data aggregation aiming at privacy protection of a smart grid communication system. Mohammed et al use blind factors to mask individual power consumption data of users, and when data aggregation is performed, the blind factors cancel each other and obtain aggregated data of all users. The alssharif et al designs a homomorphic encryption privacy protection system based on a Paillier cipher mechanism, and each user encrypts the power consumption of the user and performs related operations in a ciphertext domain to decrypt the aggregated power consumption of the user. The existing data aggregation scheme can only support a single-receiver smart grid communication architecture. In order to meet the application requirements of multiple receivers, each user needs to encrypt for 2 times by using public keys of a power distribution center and a power supplier, and a control center groups and aggregates ciphertexts of the same power supplier or the power distribution center. However, this simple and straightforward theoretical assumption requires high communication overhead and is not highly practical. Because encryption operations multiply and the aggregate ciphertext linearly increases with the number of recipients in the network; furthermore, the aggregator must know the customer distribution status of each power provider to implement multi-recipient based data packet encryption operations. Therefore, the data aggregation demand of different user sets on the electricity consumption side cannot be satisfied, and a competitive electricity retail market cannot be provided. Very few existing schemes can support the data aggregation application needs with multiple recipients. In the multi-receiver data aggregation scheme designed by Mustafa et al, the gateway must correspondingly group received ciphertexts according to the identity information of each power provider, aggregate each group of ciphertexts together, then send each group of aggregated ciphertexts to each power distribution center, finally decrypt each group of received aggregated ciphertexts by each power distribution center, and redistribute the aggregated information to the power providers. Ruj et al attempt to implement a data aggregation system with multiple recipients based on attribute-based encryption and the Paillier cryptosystem. Each user encrypts the power consumption of the user by using the public key of the trusted authority, sets an access strategy to determine which entities can access the data of the user, performs data aggregation on ciphertexts with the same attribute in the access strategy, decrypts all received ciphertexts by the trusted authority, and re-encrypts each aggregated data according to the access strategy to ensure access control. The existing scheme has the following defects: (1) since the control center is allowed to classify the ciphertexts, the gateway controlled by the control center can know the customer distribution condition of each power provider in each area, thereby destroying the market environment of fair competition; (2) sending ciphertext information for multiple aggregated data (for each vendor or for each subset of attributes) can significantly increase communication overhead; (3) the potential network hidden danger that a system entity and a control center are communicated with each other to carry out collusion attack exists, and a power supplier pays false power distribution cost to a power distribution center; (4) potential differential attack of the smart grid communication system cannot be effectively resisted, and the effectiveness of differential privacy is low. Therefore, a fine-grained security data access control mechanism suitable for the application requirements of multiple receivers is lacked, each receiver can only access own exclusive data, and a safe and efficient smart power grid data aggregation solution and an application system capable of effectively eliminating and resisting potential network hidden dangers, collusion attacks and differential attacks from the inside and the outside can be effectively achieved.
Disclosure of Invention
Aiming at the problems in the prior art, the invention aims to provide a method and a system for controlling access to a secure smart grid, which resist differential attacks.
The new generation smart grid communication system collects information of fine-grained power consumption data of users by introducing an advanced metering infrastructure network so as to perform real-time monitoring and energy management. However, frequent collection of user power usage presents a security risk of revealing user privacy. Many theoretical research and engineering application personnel have designed numerous security data collection schemes aiming at various privacy protection problems in the smart grid communication system, and allow a power grid control center to perform data analysis based on the aggregated power consumption of users so as to protect the privacy information of the users. However, all of the schemes are based on a network architecture of a single receiver, and cannot be effectively applied to a smart grid application scenario of multiple receivers; the requirement that multiple entities freely access the aggregated information of different user groups according to needs cannot be met so as to analyze fine-grained security data; the data aggregation requirements of different user sets at the power consumption side cannot be met, and competitive safe power retail service cannot be provided; potential network hidden dangers and collusion attacks from the inside and the outside of the smart grid cannot be effectively eliminated and resisted.
The invention is realized by the following technical scheme:
the secure smart grid access control method for resisting differential attack is characterized in that a trusted authority is responsible for managing and distributing secret information of all other entities in the system based on an application scene of a smart grid communication system; the control center is responsible for integrating, processing and analyzing the periodic time sequence electricity consumption data of all users in the electric energy consumption side network, and comprehensive and reliable intelligent service is provided; the transmission center manages a transmission network and is responsible for ensuring that electric energy is efficiently transmitted to each distribution station from each power station based on aggregated electricity consumption information of different user sets at an electric energy consumption side; from the electricity distribution center
Figure BDA0002103011110000031
The management power distribution network is responsible for aggregating power consumption information based on different user sets of the power consumption side and ensuring that the power is efficiently transmitted to each user of the consumption side from each power distribution station; by the electricity supplier:
Figure BDA0002103011110000032
Figure BDA0002103011110000033
the system is responsible for providing a competitive electric power retail market based on the aggregated electricity consumption information of different user sets at the electric energy consumption side; the gateway is connected with the control center and the electric energy consumption side and is responsible for aggregating the electricity consumption data submitted by each user and forwarding communication data between each user and the control center; by the awareness network:namely N on electric energy consumption side of smart griduEach user/node is responsible for collecting power consumption data in real time and reporting the data to the control center through the gateway, and the specific steps are as follows:
(1) system initialization phase
The trusted authority performs the following operations to perform system initialization:
1) entity public and private key generation
a) According to the input safety parameter rho, operating zeta (rho), outputting system parameters (G, G, p, q), wherein p and q are safety large prime numbers, q | (p-1), G is a cyclic group with the order of q, the discrete logarithm problem on the group G is difficult (the recalcitrance is met), and randomly selecting a generator G of the group G to belong to G;
b) random selection of NuAn
Figure BDA0002103011110000042
Wherein, i is 1,2, …, NuCalculating
Figure BDA0002103011110000043
Respectively combine s withiAnd SiAs Ui(the identity information thereof is ID)i) The private key and the public key of (c);
c) random selection
Figure BDA0002103011110000044
Computing
Figure BDA0002103011110000045
Respectively combine s withgAnd SgAs a control center (ID is the identity information of the control center)c) The private key and the public key of (c);
d) randomly selecting a secure hash function H:
e) randomly selecting a v-dimensional row vector S, where v is NdNsAnd randomly setting elements in S to 0 and 1, generating 2 system master keys, MK1＝{M1,M2,N1,N2,N3,N4And MK2＝{X1,X2,Y1,Y2,Y3,Y4}，MK1And MK2Each element in (a) is a randomly selected v × v invertible matrix;
2) user encryption key generation
Trusted authority utilization of MK1For each user UiGenerating an encryption keyKey:
calculating Ki＝{Ki1,Ki2,Ki3,Ki4}＝{aiN1,biN2,ciN3,diN4In which ai,bi,ci,diAre all randomly chosen v x v invertible matrices, and ai+bi＝M1，ci+di＝M2；
3) Re-encryption key generation
Trusted authority executes the following algorithm, utilizing MK1And MK2For each distribution center Dj(where j is 1,2, … Nd) And the power supplier Sk(wherein k is 1,2, … Ns) And generating a re-encryption key and sending the re-encryption key to the control center. Without loss of generality, the trusted authority generates S by performing the following operationskThe re-encryption key of (2):
a) generating an access control binary vector Qk: for all corresponding SkOf binary digits, i.e. for all Dj(where j is 1,2, … Nd) And SkSet up QkIs 1; set QkThe other binary bit of (a) is 0;
b) will QkSplitting into 2 vectors qk' and qk": random resolution of Q against a binary digit of 1 in s (z) (where z is 1,2, … v)k(z) satisfies qk′(z)+qk″(z)＝Qk(z); comparing the binary digit of 0 in s (z) (where z is 1,2, … v), q is setk′(z)＝qk″(z)＝Qk(z)；
c) Q is to bek' and qk"extended to 2 diagonal matrices respectivelyAnd
Figure BDA0002103011110000052
d)Skre-encryption and access control key RK ofkThe calculation is as follows:
Figure BDA0002103011110000061
RKkcomprising 8 parts RKk1,RKk2,RKk3,RKk4,RKk5,RKk6,RKk7,RKk8Each part is a v × v square matrix;
e) performing similar operations with the trusted authority generating each DjRe-encryption and access control key RK ofjRelative to generating RKkOnly the difference is that the access control binary vector QjThe generation method of (1): for all correspondences DjOf binary bits, i.e. for all Sk(wherein k is 1,2, … Ns) And DjSet up QjIs 1; set QjThe other binary bit of (a) is 0;
f) trusted authority will NdA distribution center and NsThe re-encryption key secret of each power supplier is sent to the control center;
4) decryption key generation
Trusted authority utilization of MK2For each distribution center Dj(where j is 1,2, … Nd) And the power supplier Sk(wherein k is 1,2, … Ns) A decryption key is generated. Without loss of generality, the trusted authority generates S by performing the following operationskThe decryption key of (2):
a) like QkGenerating a decrypted binary vector Rk；
b) R is to bekSplit into 2 vectors rk' and rk": randomly splitting R against a bin of 1 in s (z) (where z 1, 2.. v)k(z) satisfies rk′(z)+rk″(z)＝Rk(z); r is set against the binary digit of 0 in s (z) (where z is 1,2, … v)k′(z)＝rk″(z)＝Rk(z)；
c) Will r isk' and rk"extended to 2 diagonal matrices respectivelyAnd
Figure BDA00021030111100000712
d)Skdecryption key DK ofkThe calculation is as follows:
Figure BDA0002103011110000071
DKkcomprising 4 parts DKk1,DKk2,DKk3,DKk4Each part is a v × v square matrix; e.g. of the typek,fk,gk,hkAll are invertible matrices of v x v and satisfy ek+fk＝X1 -1And gk+hk＝X2 -1；
e) Performing similar operations with the trusted authority using the decrypted binary vector RjCalculate each DjDecryption key DK ofj；
f) The credible authority sends the secret of each decryption key to each Dj(where j is 1,2, … Nd) And Sk(wherein k is 1,2, … Ns)；
(2) Data encryption phase
At each data reporting time point tτEach user UiPerforming the following operation to use the electricity ri j,kReporting to a gateway:
1) computing session keys shared with a control center in a non-interactive manner
Figure BDA0002103011110000072
Figure BDA0002103011110000073
2) Constructing a v-dimensional plaintext data vector PiWhich corresponds to DjAnd SkIs set as the power consumption
Figure BDA0002103011110000074
The noisy ciphertext of (2):
Figure BDA0002103011110000075
Piis set to 0. Wherein: ki,cIs UiA session key shared with the control center;
Figure BDA0002103011110000076
and
Figure BDA0002103011110000077
for 2 obedient gamma distributions
Figure BDA0002103011110000078
The independent and uniformly distributed random variables of (1) are provided, x is more than or equal to 0, and gamma function is a function value of point 1/n; according to the Laplace distribution Lap (λ) (which has probability density)
Figure BDA0002103011110000079
Infinite decomposable property: for any n ≧ 1,
Figure BDA00021030111100000710
the total number of users of the system is NuWhen each user UiAt the real power consumption miIn (1) adding
Figure BDA0002103011110000081
Figure BDA0002103011110000082
Noise information of magnitude, total aggregate power consumption
Figure BDA0002103011110000083
Figure BDA0002103011110000084
Satisfying the ε _ DP differential privacy security attribute (for 2 datasets D differing by only 1 element)1And D2If Pr (A (D) is satisfied1)∈S)≤eε·Pr(A(D2)∈S)，
Figure BDA0002103011110000085
Then the random algorithm a satisfies the epsilon _ DP differential privacy security attribute);
3) will PiSplitting into 2 vectors pi' and pi": random splitting of P against a binary digit of 1 in s (z) (where z is 1,2, … v)i(z) satisfies pi′(z)+pi″(z)＝Pi(z); for a binary bit of 0 in s (z) (where z is 1,2, … v), p is seti′(z)＝pi″(z)＝Pi(z); 4) by pi′,pi"and encryption Key KiGenerating a ciphertext Ci＝[pi′aiN1,pi′biN2,pi″ciN3,pi″diN4]，CiIs a 4 v-dimensional row vector;
(3) data aggregation phase
After receiving the report data cryptographs of all users, the gateway executes the following operation to all CiCarrying out polymerization:
computing aggregate ciphertext for all users
Figure BDA0002103011110000086
Figure BDA0002103011110000087
CaggIs a 4 v-dimensional row vector;
(4) data re-encryption and access control phase
The control center performs the following operations of carrying out re-encryption operation on the aggregated information and realizing the access control function, namely each power distribution center Dj(where j is 1,2, … Nd) And the power supplier Sk(wherein k is 1,2, … Ns) Only the information to which each belongs can be accessed:
1) without loss of generality, the control center utilizes a re-encryption and access control key RKkTo CaggPerforming re-encryption to generate
Figure BDA0002103011110000091
Wherein
Figure BDA0002103011110000092
To send to SkAll of DjElectricity consumption for the aggregated ciphertext:
Figure BDA0002103011110000093
wherein
Figure BDA0002103011110000094
Is a 4 v-dimensional row vector;
Figure BDA0002103011110000095
the calculation process of (2) is as follows:
Figure BDA0002103011110000096
Figure BDA0002103011110000097
2) performing similar operation to obtain
Figure BDA0002103011110000098
The remainder of (a);
(5) data decryption and data recovery phases
Each distribution center Dj(where j is 1,2, … Nd) And the power supplier Sk(wherein k is 1, 2.. N.)s) And executing the following operation, decrypting the received ciphertexts respectively, and recovering the noise-caused aggregated electricity consumption of the ciphertexts respectively. Without loss of generality, SkUsing decryption key DKkPerforming the following operations on the received
Figure BDA0002103011110000099
Decrypting to obtain
Figure BDA00021030111100000910
1) Computing
Figure BDA00021030111100000911
Figure BDA00021030111100000912
Figure BDA0002103011110000101
Calculated v-dimensional row vectorWith NdThe value of each position is not 0, NdEach position corresponds to a two-dimensional position serial number<Sk,Dj>(where k is fixed, j is 1, 2.., N)d) (ii) a This NdEach value not equal to 0 represents a corresponding two-dimensional position number<Sk,Dj>(where k is fixed, j is 1,2, …, Nd) Of all users of (1) a group of noisy ciphertext
Figure BDA0002103011110000103
Figure BDA0002103011110000104
Figure BDA0002103011110000105
Wherein Lap (λ) is Laplace noise with parameter λ;
2) calculating and calculating U of each user in a non-interactive modeiShared session key
Figure BDA0002103011110000106
Figure BDA0002103011110000107
Wherein i is 1,2, …, NuAnd calculate
Figure BDA0002103011110000108
3)SkBy calculation ofObtaining NdNoise-reduced electricity consumption
Figure BDA00021030111100001010
(where k is fixed, j is 1,2, … N)d)；
4)SkBy calculation of
Figure BDA00021030111100001011
Can obtain the corresponding SkAll of Dj(where k is fixed, j is 1,2, … N)d) The total noise of (1) and (2) is aggregated into electricity consumption;
5)Djperform similar operations, N can be calculatedsNoise-reduced electricity consumption
Figure BDA00021030111100001012
Figure BDA00021030111100001013
(where j is fixed, k is 1,2, …, Ns)；
6) In the same way, DjBy calculation of
Figure BDA00021030111100001014
Can obtain a correspondence DjAll of Sk(where j is fixed, k is 1,2, … N)s) The total noise of (1) and (2) is aggregated into electricity consumption;
7) finally, the transmission center passes through the calculationObtaining all Dj(where j is 1,2, … Nd) And the power supplier Sk(wherein k is 1,2, … Ns) Total noise-reduced electricity consumption
Figure BDA0002103011110000111
The secure smart grid access control system for resisting differential attack is characterized by comprising:
a trusted authority: the system is responsible for managing and distributing secret information of all other entities in the system, and has high credibility and super computing capability;
the control center: the system is responsible for integrating, processing and analyzing the periodic time series power consumption data of all users in the electric energy consumption side network and providing comprehensive and reliable intelligent service;
a power transmission center: the system is used for managing a transmission network and is responsible for ensuring that electric energy is efficiently transmitted to each distribution station from each power station based on aggregated electricity consumption information of different user sets at an electric energy consumption side;
the power distribution center:
Figure BDA0002103011110000112
the system is used for managing a power distribution network and is responsible for ensuring that electric energy is efficiently transmitted to each user on a consumption side from each power distribution station based on aggregated electricity consumption information of different user sets on the electric energy consumption side;
the power supplier:
Figure BDA0002103011110000113
the system is responsible for providing a competitive electric power retail market based on the aggregated electricity consumption information of different user sets at the electric energy consumption side;
a gateway: the system is used for connecting the control center and the electric energy consumption side, and is responsible for aggregating the electricity consumption data submitted by each user and forwarding communication data between each user and the control center;
the perception network:
Figure BDA0002103011110000114
the electric energy consumption side of the smart grid is aware of the network and has NuAnd each user/node is responsible for collecting power consumption data in real time and reporting the data to the control center through the gateway.
The secure smart grid access control system for resisting differential attack is characterized by further comprising:
(1) system initialization module
1) User U is calculated and distributed based on discrete logarithm difficulty problem by credible authorityiAnd public and private keys of the control center, selecting and initializingv＝NdNsMaintain the row vector S, generate the system master key MK1＝{M1,M2,N1,N2,N3,N4And MK2＝{X1,X2,Y1,Y2,Y3,Y4The technology of (1) is used for a method for safely generating and distributing system network nodes and interactive entity secret information;
2) trusted authority utilizes system master key MK1For each user UiGenerating an encryption key Ki＝{Ki1,Ki2,Ki3,Ki4}＝{aiN1,biN2,ciN3,diN4The technology of (1), a method for encrypting user data and ensuring confidentiality of communication data;
3) trusted authority for each power supplier
Figure BDA0002103011110000121
And a power distribution center
Figure BDA0002103011110000122
Generating an access control binary vector QkAnd QjSplitting vector qk′、qk"and qj′、qj", diagonal matrixAnd
Figure BDA0002103011110000124
a method for generating a re-encryption and access control key;
4) trusted authority utilizes system master key MK1And MK2For each power supplier
Figure BDA0002103011110000125
And a power distribution centerGenerating a re-encryption and access control key RKk＝{RKk1,RKk2,RKk3,RKk4,RKk5,RKk6,RKk7,RKk8} and RKj＝{RKj1,RKj2,RKj3,RKj4,RKj5,RKj6,RKj7,RKj8The technology of (1) is used for carrying out proxy re-encryption on user aggregated data to realize a method for controlling secure data access with multiple recipients;
5) trusted authority for each power supplier
Figure BDA0002103011110000128
And a power distribution centerGenerating a decrypted binary vector RkAnd RjSplit vector rk′、rk"and rj′、rj", diagonal matrix
Figure BDA00021030111100001210
Anda method for generating a decryption key;
6) trusted authority utilizes system master key MK2For each power supplier
Figure BDA00021030111100001214
And a power distribution center
Figure BDA00021030111100001213
Generating a decryption key DKk＝{DKk1,DKk2,DKk3,DKk4} and DKj＝{DKj1,DKj2,DKj3,DKj4The technology of { is used for carrying on the declassification to the users 'aggregate heavy enciphered data, realize the method with many recipients' access control of safe data;
(2) data encryption module
1) Each user UiThe technology of fusing the information of the identity, public and private keys, reporting time point, etc. of both communication parties is used for calculating the session key shared with the control center in a non-interactive way
Figure BDA0002103011110000131
Figure BDA0002103011110000132
The method of (1);
2) by fusing a secure data access control technology based on multi-user permission, a non-interactive session key generation and sharing mechanism and an infinite decomposition characteristic of Laplace distribution, a high-efficiency and light-weight modulo addition technology is designed
Figure BDA0002103011110000133
A method for implementing secure data aggregation and distributed differential privacy security;
3) construction of a plaintext data vector PiFor each user UiFor reporting power consumptionCarry out noise encryption
Figure BDA0002103011110000135
To satisfy the power supplier
Figure BDA0002103011110000136
And a power distribution center
Figure BDA0002103011110000137
A method of secure access control;
4) by having a probability density
Figure BDA0002103011110000138
The infinite resolvable property of the laplace distribution Lap (λ):
Figure BDA0002103011110000139
G1(n, lambda) and G2(n, λ) is 2 obedient gamma distributions
Figure BDA00021030111100001310
Is the function value of gamma function at point 1/n, and each user UiIn a distributed mode, the real electricity consumption miIn (1) adding
Figure BDA00021030111100001311
Information of large and small noises, and total electricity consumption The technology meeting the epsilon _ DP differential privacy security attribute is a method for resisting differential attack and protecting the privacy of a user;
5) generating a split vector p from a v-dimensional row vector s (z) (where z ═ 1,2, … v)i′、pi"for user UiThe method for encrypting the electricity consumption;
6) by pi′,pi"and encryption Key Ki＝{Ki1,Ki2,Ki3,Ki4}＝{aiN1,biN2,ciN3,diN4The technology for generating 4 v-dimensional row vectors for users UiThe electricity consumption is encrypted Ci＝[pi′aiN1,pi′biN2,pi″ciN3,pi″diN4]The method of (1);
(3) data aggregation module
Gateway pairAll users
Figure BDA0002103011110000141
Report cipher text Ci＝[pi′aiN1,pi′biN2,pi″ciN3,pi″diN4]Techniques for performing security processing to generate 4 v-dimensional row vectors for
Secure aggregation of reporting data for all users
Figure BDA0002103011110000143
The method of (1);
(4) data re-encryption and access control module
Control center using re-encryption and access control key RKkAnd RKjTo CaggPerforming re-encryption for each power supplier
Figure BDA0002103011110000145
And a power distribution center
Figure BDA0002103011110000146
Figure BDA0002103011110000147
Generating a re-encrypted ciphertextAnd
Figure BDA0002103011110000149
the technique of (1) is used for carrying out proxy re-encryption on user aggregated data, and is realized bySecure data access control of multiple recipients, a method to ensure that each recipient can only access own proprietary data;
(5) data decryption and data recovery module
1) Each power supplier
Figure BDA00021030111100001411
And a power distribution center
Figure BDA00021030111100001412
Figure BDA0002103011110000151
Using decryption key DKkAnd DKjTo be received
Figure BDA0002103011110000152
And
Figure BDA0002103011110000153
decrypting to recover the noise-aggregated electricity consumption of each
Figure BDA0002103011110000154
Figure BDA0002103011110000155
And
Figure BDA0002103011110000156
Figure BDA0002103011110000157
the method of (1);
2) each power supplier
Figure BDA0002103011110000158
And a power distribution center
Figure BDA0002103011110000159
A technique for analyzing information of noise-caused aggregated power consumption to which each of the two-dimensional position numbers belongs<Sk,Dj>Aggregate noisy ciphertext for all users
Figure BDA00021030111100001511
Figure BDA00021030111100001512
The method of (1);
3) the control center integrates the information of the identity, public and private keys, reporting time point and the like of the two communication parties, and calculates the information with each user U in a non-interactive modeiShared session key
Figure BDA00021030111100001513
Figure BDA00021030111100001514
For obtaining a noised aggregated electric power consumption
Figure BDA00021030111100001515
Figure BDA00021030111100001516
The method of (1);
4) each power supplierAnd a power distribution center
Figure BDA00021030111100001518
Figure BDA00021030111100001519
ComputingAnd
Figure BDA00021030111100001521
obtain a correspondence SkAll of DjTotal noise ofElectric power consumption for chemical polymerization, and corresponding DjAll of Sk(where j is fixed, k is 1,2, … N)s) The total noise-based electricity consumption aggregation technology is used for ensuring that each receiver can only access own exclusive data, and realizing a method for safely sharing and controlling access of mixed information of a physical layer and an information layer of the smart grid;
5) calculation of transmission centerOrObtaining all power suppliers
Figure BDA00021030111100001524
And a power distribution center
Figure BDA00021030111100001525
Total noise-reduced electricity consumption
Figure BDA00021030111100001526
The technology of the intelligent power grid is used for ensuring that each receiver can only access own exclusive data, and the method for realizing the safe sharing and access control of the mixed information of the physical layer and the information layer of the intelligent power grid is realized.
On the basis of the existing research results of the in-depth research and analysis of the data aggregation technology in the field of smart grid application, the invention realizes a safe and efficient smart grid safe data communication and access control solution and application system. The invention researches and designs a fine-grained security data access control mechanism suitable for the application requirements of multiple receivers of the smart grid, and ensures that each receiver can only access own exclusive data; meanwhile, the method can effectively eliminate and resist potential network hidden dangers, collusion attacks and differential attacks from the inside and the outside of the smart power grid. The main innovation points comprise: (1) by carrying out concept modeling and bionic design on the smart grid communication system in a physical-information fusion environment and extracting the smart grid communication system into network nodes and interaction entities such as a power transmission center, a power distribution center, a power supplier, a gateway, a sensing network, a control center and the like, communication information flow, energy flow and control flow are effectively simulated, and the safety sharing and access control of mixed information of a physical layer and an information layer of the smart grid are realized; (2) by utilizing technologies such as differential privacy, data aggregation, access control, proxy re-encryption and the like, a secure data access control method with multiple receivers is designed, so that the individual power consumption of each user is hidden, the individual privacy of the user is protected, and an access control mechanism with secure data authorization is designed, so that the client distribution privacy information of each power provider is effectively hidden and protected; (3) by fusing the infinite resolvable characteristics of Laplace distribution, a non-interactive session key generation and sharing mechanism and a secure data access control technology based on multi-user permission, a secure data aggregation and distributed differential security model based on a lightweight high-efficiency 'modulo addition' technology is innovated and designed, and differential attack is effectively resisted; (4) an agent re-encryption mechanism is innovated and designed, data aggregation is allowed to be carried out before the power consumption of a re-encryption user, the re-encrypted aggregated data can be completely or partially accessed in a controllable manner according to actual needs, fine-grained safety data access control with multiple receivers is realized, and each receiver can only access own exclusive data; (5) by designing a lightweight security algorithm and a system model in the stages of key distribution and management, data encryption, information aggregation, data re-encryption and access control, data decryption, data recovery and the like, potential network hidden dangers and collusion attacks from the inside and the outside of the smart grid are effectively eliminated and resisted, and indexes such as communication cost, calculation expense and the like are better than those of the existing independent subsystems and solutions.
Drawings
FIG. 1 is a system architecture diagram of the present invention;
FIG. 2 is an algorithm block diagram and a dataflow diagram.
Detailed Description
The invention is further described in detail and specific embodiments are given below with reference to the accompanying drawings.
A secure smart grid access control method for resisting differential attack is based on a typical smart grid communication system application fieldThe overall system architecture is shown in fig. 1, and includes the following 7 participants: a trusted authority: the system is responsible for managing and distributing secret information of all other entities in the system, and has high credibility and super computing capability; the control center: the system is responsible for integrating, processing and analyzing the periodic time series power consumption data of all users in the electric energy consumption side network and providing comprehensive and reliable intelligent service; a power transmission center: the system is used for managing a transmission network and is responsible for ensuring that electric energy is efficiently transmitted to each distribution station from each power station based on aggregated electricity consumption information of different user sets at an electric energy consumption side; the power distribution center:
Figure BDA0002103011110000171
the system is used for managing a power distribution network and is responsible for ensuring that electric energy is efficiently transmitted to each user on a consumption side from each power distribution station based on aggregated electricity consumption information of different user sets on the electric energy consumption side; the power supplier:
Figure BDA0002103011110000181
the system is responsible for providing a competitive electric power retail market based on the aggregated electricity consumption information of different user sets at the electric energy consumption side; a gateway: the system is used for connecting the control center and the electric energy consumption side, and is responsible for aggregating the electricity consumption data submitted by each user and forwarding communication data between each user and the control center; the perception network:
Figure BDA0002103011110000182
the electric energy consumption side of the smart grid is aware of the network and has NuAnd each user/node is responsible for collecting power consumption data in real time and reporting the data to the control center through the gateway.
The method specifically comprises the following steps:
(1) system initialization phase
The trusted authority performs the following operations to perform system initialization:
1) entity public and private key generation
a) According to the input safety parameter rho, operating zeta (rho), outputting system parameters (G, G, p, q), wherein p and q are safety large prime numbers, q | (p-1), G is a cyclic group with the order of q, the discrete logarithm problem on the group G is difficult (the recalcitrance is met), and randomly selecting a generator G of the group G to belong to G;
b) random selection of NuAn
Figure BDA0002103011110000183
Wherein, i is 1,2, …, NuCalculating
Figure BDA0002103011110000184
Respectively combine s withiAnd SiAs Ui(the identity information thereof is ID)i) The private key and the public key of (c);
c) random selection
Figure BDA0002103011110000185
Computing
Figure BDA0002103011110000186
Respectively combine s withgAnd SgAs a control center (ID is the identity information of the control center)c) The private key and the public key of (c);
d) randomly selecting a secure hash function H:
Figure BDA0002103011110000187
e) randomly selecting a v-dimensional row vector S, where v is NdNsAnd randomly setting elements in S to 0 and 1, generating 2 system master keys, MK1＝{M1,M2,N1,N2,N3,N4And MK2＝{X1,X2,Y1,Y2,Y3,Y4}，MK1And MK2Each element in (a) is a randomly selected v × v invertible matrix;
2) user encryption key generation
Trusted authority utilization of MK1For each user UiGenerating an encryption key:
calculating Ki＝{Ki1,Ki2,Ki3,Ki4}＝{aiN1,biN2,ciN3,diN4In which ai,bi,ci,diAre all randomly chosen v x v invertible matrices, and ai+bi＝M1，ci+di＝M2；
3) Re-encryption key generation
Trusted authority executes the following algorithm, utilizing MK1And MK2For each distribution center Dj(where j is 1,2, … Nd) And the power supplier Sk(wherein k is 1, 2.. N.)s) And generating a re-encryption key and sending the re-encryption key to the control center. Without loss of generality, the trusted authority generates S by performing the following operationskThe re-encryption key of (2):
a) generating an access control binary vector Qk: for all corresponding SkOf binary digits, i.e. for all Dj(wherein j ═ 1, 2.. Nd) And SkSet up QkIs 1; set QkThe other binary bit of (a) is 0;
b) will QkSplitting into 2 vectors qk' and qk": random resolution of Q against a binary digit of 1 in s (z) (where z is 1,2, … v)k(z) satisfies qk′(z)+qk″(z)＝Qk(z); comparing the binary digit of 0 in s (z) (where z is 1,2, … v), q is setk′(z)＝qk″(z)＝Qk(z)；
c) Q is to bek' and qk"extended to 2 diagonal matrices respectively
Figure BDA0002103011110000191
And
Figure BDA0002103011110000192
d)Skre-encryption and access control key RK ofkThe calculation is as follows:
Figure BDA0002103011110000201
RKkcomprising 8 parts RKk1,RKk2,RKk3,RKk4,RKk5,RKk6,RKk7,RKk8Each part is a v × v square matrix;
e) performing similar operations with the trusted authority generating each DjRe-encryption and access control key RK ofjRelative to generating RKkOnly the difference is that the access control binary vector QjThe generation method of (1): for all correspondences DjOf binary bits, i.e. for all Sk(wherein k is 1,2, … Ns) And DjSet up QjIs 1; set QjThe other binary bit of (a) is 0;
f) trusted authority will NdA distribution center and NsThe re-encryption key secret of each power supplier is sent to the control center;
4) decryption key generation
Trusted authority utilization of MK2For each distribution center Dj(where j is 1,2, … Nd) And the power supplier Sk(wherein k is 1,2, … Ns) A decryption key is generated. Without loss of generality, the trusted authority generates S by performing the following operationskThe decryption key of (2):
a) like QkGenerating a decrypted binary vector Rk；
b) R is to bekSplit into 2 vectors rk' and rk": random splitting R against a binary digit of 1 in s (z) (where z is 1,2, … v)k(z) satisfies rk′(z)+rk″(z)＝Rk(z); r is set against the binary digit of 0 in s (z) (where z is 1,2, … v)k′(z)＝rk″(z)＝Rk(z)；
c) Will r isk' and rk"extended to 2 diagonal matrices respectively
Figure BDA0002103011110000202
And
Figure BDA0002103011110000203
d)Skdecryption key DK ofkThe calculation is as follows:
Figure BDA0002103011110000211
DKkcomprising 4 parts DKk1,DKk2,DKk3,DKk4Each part is a v × v square matrix; e.g. of the typek,fk,gk,hkAll are invertible matrices of v x v and satisfy ek+fk＝X1 -1And gk+hk＝X2 -1；
e) Performing similar operations with the trusted authority using the decrypted binary vector RjCalculate each DjDecryption key DK ofj；
f) The credible authority sends the secret of each decryption key to each Dj(where j is 1,2, … Nd) And Sk(wherein k is 1,2, … Ns)；
(2) Data encryption phase
At each data reporting time point tτEach user UiPerforming the following operation to use the electricity ri j,kReporting to a gateway:
1) computing session keys shared with a control center in a non-interactive manner
Figure BDA0002103011110000212
Figure BDA0002103011110000213
2) Constructing a v-dimensional plaintext data vector PiWhich corresponds to DjAnd SkIs set as the power consumptionThe noisy ciphertext of (2):Piis set to 0. Wherein: ki,cIs UiA session key shared with the control center;
Figure BDA0002103011110000216
and
Figure BDA0002103011110000217
for 2 obedient gamma distributionsThe independent and uniformly distributed random variables of (1) are provided, x is more than or equal to 0, and gamma function is a function value of point 1/n; according to the Laplace distribution Lap (λ) (which has probability density)
Figure BDA0002103011110000219
Infinite decomposable property: for any n ≧ 1,the total number of users of the system is NuWhen each user UiAt the real power consumption miIn (1) adding
Figure BDA00021030111100002111
Figure BDA0002103011110000221
Noise information of magnitude, total aggregate power consumption
Figure BDA0002103011110000222
Figure BDA0002103011110000223
Satisfying the ε _ DP differential privacy security attribute (for 2 datasets D differing by only 1 element)1And D2If Pr (A (D) is satisfied1)∈S)≤eε·Pr(A(D2)∈S)，
Figure BDA0002103011110000224
Then the random algorithm a satisfies the epsilon _ DP differential privacy security attribute);
3) will PiSplitting into 2 vectors pi' and pi": randomly splitting P against a bin of 1 in s (z) (where z 1, 2.. v)i(z) satisfies pi′(z)+pi″(z)＝Pi(z); for a binary bit of 0 in s (z) (where z is 1,2, … v), p is seti′(z)＝pi″(z)＝Pi(z)；
4) By pi′,pi"and encryption Key KiGenerating a ciphertext Ci＝[pi′aiN1,pi′biN2,pi″ciN3,pi″diN4]，CiIs a 4 v-dimensional row vector;
(3) data aggregation phase
After receiving the report data cryptographs of all users, the gateway executes the following operation to all CiCarrying out polymerization:
computing aggregate ciphertext for all users
Figure BDA0002103011110000226
CaggIs a 4 v-dimensional row vector;
(4) data re-encryption and access control phase
The control center performs the following operations of carrying out re-encryption operation on the aggregated information and realizing the access control function, namely each power distribution center Dj(where j is 1,2, … Nd) And the power supplier Sk(wherein k is 1, 2.. N.)s) Only the information to which each belongs can be accessed:
1) without loss of generality, the control center utilizes a re-encryption and access control key RKkTo CaggPerforming re-encryption to generate
Figure BDA0002103011110000227
Wherein
Figure BDA0002103011110000228
To send to SkAll of DjElectricity consumption for the aggregated ciphertext:
Figure BDA0002103011110000231
wherein
Figure BDA0002103011110000232
Is a 4 v-dimensional row vector;
Figure BDA0002103011110000233
the calculation process of (2) is as follows:
Figure BDA0002103011110000234
Figure BDA0002103011110000235
2) performing similar operation to obtain
Figure BDA0002103011110000236
The remainder of (a);
(5) data decryption and data recovery phases
Each distribution center Dj(where j is 1,2, … Nd) And the power supplier Sk(wherein k is 1,2, … Ns) And executing the following operation, decrypting the received ciphertexts respectively, and recovering the noise-caused aggregated electricity consumption of the ciphertexts respectively. Without loss of generality, SkUsing decryption key DKkPerforming the following operations on the received
Figure BDA0002103011110000237
Decrypting to obtain
Figure BDA0002103011110000238
1) Computing
Figure BDA0002103011110000239
Calculated v-dimensional row vector
Figure BDA00021030111100002311
With NdThe value of each position is not 0, NdEach position corresponds to a two-dimensional position serial number<Sk,Dj>(where k is fixed, j is 1,2, …, Nd) (ii) a This NdEach value not equal to 0 represents a corresponding two-dimensional position number<Sk,Dj>(where k is fixed, j is 1, 2.., N)d) Of all users of (1) a group of noisy ciphertext
Figure BDA0002103011110000241
Figure BDA0002103011110000242
Figure BDA0002103011110000243
Wherein Lap (λ) is Laplace noise with parameter λ;
2) calculating and calculating U of each user in a non-interactive modeiShared session key
Figure BDA0002103011110000244
Figure BDA0002103011110000245
Wherein i is 1,2, …, NuAnd calculate
Figure BDA0002103011110000246
3)SkBy calculation of
Figure BDA0002103011110000247
Obtaining NdNoise-reduced electricity consumption
Figure BDA0002103011110000248
(where k is fixed, j is 1,2, … N)d)；
4)SkBy calculation of
Figure BDA0002103011110000249
Can obtain the corresponding SkAll of Dj(where k is fixed, j is 1,2, … N)d) The total noise of (1) and (2) is aggregated into electricity consumption;
5)Djperform similar operations, N can be calculatedsNoise-reduced electricity consumption
Figure BDA00021030111100002410
Figure BDA00021030111100002411
(where j is fixed, k is 1,2, …, Ns)；
6) In the same way, DjBy calculation of
Figure BDA00021030111100002412
Can obtain a correspondence DjAll of Sk(where j is fixed, k is 1,2, … N)s) The total noise of (1) and (2) is aggregated into electricity consumption;
7) finally, the transmission center passes through the calculationObtaining all Dj(where j is 1,2, … Nd) And the power supplier Sk(wherein k is 1,2, … Ns) Total noise-reduced electricity consumption
Figure BDA00021030111100002414
A secure smart grid access control system that resists differential attacks, comprising: a trusted authority: the system is responsible for managing and distributing secret information of all other entities in the system, and has high credibility and super computing capability; the control center: the system is responsible for integrating, processing and analyzing the periodic time series power consumption data of all users in the electric energy consumption side network and providing comprehensive and reliable intelligent service; a power transmission center:the system is used for managing a transmission network and is responsible for ensuring that electric energy is efficiently transmitted to each distribution station from each power station based on aggregated electricity consumption information of different user sets at an electric energy consumption side; the power distribution center:
Figure BDA0002103011110000251
the system is used for managing a power distribution network and is responsible for ensuring that electric energy is efficiently transmitted to each user on a consumption side from each power distribution station based on aggregated electricity consumption information of different user sets on the electric energy consumption side; the power supplier:
Figure BDA0002103011110000252
the system is responsible for providing a competitive electric power retail market based on the aggregated electricity consumption information of different user sets at the electric energy consumption side; a gateway: the system is used for connecting the control center and the electric energy consumption side, and is responsible for aggregating the electricity consumption data submitted by each user and forwarding communication data between each user and the control center; the perception network:
Figure BDA0002103011110000253
the electric energy consumption side of the smart grid is aware of the network and has NuAnd each user/node is responsible for collecting power consumption data in real time and reporting the data to the control center through the gateway. The system also comprises the following 5 modules, and an algorithm block diagram and a data flow diagram are shown in FIG. 2:
(1) system initialization module
1) User U is calculated and distributed based on discrete logarithm difficulty problem by credible authorityiAnd a public and private key of the control center, and selecting and initializing v as NdNsMaintain the row vector S, generate the system master key MK1＝{M1,M2,N1,N2,N3,N4And MK2＝{X1,X2,Y1,Y2,Y3,Y4The technology of (1) is used for a method for safely generating and distributing system network nodes and interactive entity secret information;
2) trusted authority utilizes system master key MK1For each user UiGenerating an encryption key Ki＝{Ki1,Ki2,Ki3,Ki4}＝{aiN1,biN2,ciN3,diN4The technology of (1), a method for encrypting user data and ensuring confidentiality of communication data;
3) trusted authority for each power supplier
Figure BDA0002103011110000261
And a power distribution center
Figure BDA0002103011110000262
Generating an access control binary vector QkAnd QjSplitting vector qk′、qk"and qj′、qj", diagonal matrix
Figure BDA0002103011110000263
And
Figure BDA0002103011110000264
a method for generating a re-encryption and access control key;
4) trusted authority utilizes system master key MK1And MK2For each power supplier
Figure BDA0002103011110000265
Figure BDA0002103011110000266
And a power distribution center
Figure BDA0002103011110000267
Generating a re-encryption and access control key RKk＝{RKk1,RKk2,RKk3,RKk4,RKk5,RKk6,RKk7,RKk8} and RKj＝{RKj1,RKj2,RKj3,RKj4,RKj5,RKj6,RKj7,RKj8The technology of the method is used for carrying out proxy re-encryption on the user aggregated data to realize the multi-receiverThe method of secure data access control of (1);
5) trusted authority for each power supplier
Figure BDA0002103011110000268
And a power distribution center
Figure BDA0002103011110000269
Generating a decrypted binary vector RkAnd RjSplit vector rk′、rk"and rj′、rj", diagonal matrix
Figure BDA00021030111100002610
And
Figure BDA00021030111100002611
a method for generating a decryption key;
6) trusted authority utilizes system master key MK2For each power supplier
Figure BDA00021030111100002612
Figure BDA00021030111100002613
And a power distribution center
Figure BDA00021030111100002614
Generating a decryption key DKk＝{DKk1,DKk2,DKk3,DKk4} and DKj＝{DKj1,DKj2,DKj3,DKj4The technology of { is used for carrying on the declassification to the users 'aggregate heavy enciphered data, realize the method with many recipients' access control of safe data;
(2) data encryption module
1) Each user UiTechnology for fusing identity, public and private keys, reporting time point and other information of two communication parties and calculating session key shared with control center in non-interactive mode
Figure BDA00021030111100002615
Figure BDA0002103011110000271
The method of (1);
2) by fusing a secure data access control technology based on multi-user permission, a non-interactive session key generation and sharing mechanism and an infinite decomposition characteristic of Laplace distribution, a high-efficiency and light-weight modulo addition technology is designed
Figure BDA0002103011110000272
A method for implementing secure data aggregation and distributed differential privacy security;
3) construction of a plaintext data vector PiFor each user UiFor reporting power consumptionCarry out noise encryption
Figure BDA0002103011110000274
Satisfy the power supplier
Figure BDA0002103011110000275
And a power distribution centerA method of secure access control;
4) by having a probability densityThe infinite resolvable property of the laplace distribution Lap (λ):
Figure BDA0002103011110000278
g1(n, λ) and G2(n, λ) is 2 obedient gamma distributions
Figure BDA0002103011110000279
Is an independent and identically distributed random variable of (1/n), wherein gamma function is a function of point 1/nNumerical value, each user UiIn a distributed mode, the real electricity consumption miIn (1) adding
Figure BDA00021030111100002710
Information of large and small noises, and total electricity consumption
Figure BDA00021030111100002711
Figure BDA00021030111100002712
The technology meeting the epsilon _ DP differential privacy security attribute is a method for resisting differential attack and protecting the privacy of a user;
5) generating a split vector p from a v-dimensional row vector s (z) (where z ═ 1,2, … v)i′、pi"for user UiThe method for encrypting the electricity consumption;
6) by pi′,pi"and encryption Key Ki＝{Ki1,Ki2,Ki3,Ki4}＝{aiN1,biN2,ciN3,diN4The technology for generating 4 v-dimensional row vectors for users UiThe electricity consumption is encrypted Ci＝[pi′aiN1,pi′biN2,pi″ciN3,pi″diN4]The method of (1);
(3) data aggregation module
Gateway for all users
Figure BDA0002103011110000281
Report cipher text Ci＝[pi′aiN1,pi′biN2,pi″ciN3,pi″diN4]Techniques for performing security processing to generate 4 v-dimensional row vectors for
Secure aggregation of reporting data for all users
Figure BDA0002103011110000282
Figure BDA0002103011110000283
Figure BDA0002103011110000284
The method of (1);
(4) data re-encryption and access control module
Control center using re-encryption and access control key RKkAnd RKjTo CaggPerforming re-encryption for each power supplierAnd a power distribution center
Figure BDA0002103011110000287
Generating a re-encrypted ciphertext
Figure BDA0002103011110000288
And
Figure BDA0002103011110000289
the technology of (1) is used for carrying out proxy re-encryption on user aggregated data, realizing secure data access control with multiple receivers and ensuring that each receiver can only access own exclusive data;
(5) data decryption and data recovery module
1) Each power supplier
Figure BDA00021030111100002811
And a power distribution center
Figure BDA00021030111100002812
Using decryption key DKkAnd DKjTo be received
Figure BDA00021030111100002814
And
Figure BDA00021030111100002815
decryption technique for recovering respective noise-reduced aggregated power consumption
Figure BDA00021030111100002816
Figure BDA00021030111100002817
And
Figure BDA00021030111100002818
Figure BDA00021030111100002819
the method of (1);
2) each power supplier
Figure BDA00021030111100002820
And a power distribution center
Figure BDA00021030111100002821
Figure BDA00021030111100002822
A technique for analyzing information of noise-caused aggregated power consumption to which each of the two-dimensional position numbers belongs<Sk,Dj>Aggregate noisy ciphertext for all users
Figure BDA0002103011110000291
Figure BDA0002103011110000292
The method of (1);
3) in control ofThe identity, public and private keys, reporting time point and other information of the two communication parties are integrated, and the information is calculated and transmitted to each user U in a non-interactive modeiShared session key
Figure BDA0002103011110000293
Figure BDA0002103011110000294
For obtaining a noised aggregated electric power consumption
Figure BDA0002103011110000295
The method of (1);
4) each power supplier
Figure BDA0002103011110000297
And a power distribution center
Figure BDA0002103011110000298
Figure BDA0002103011110000299
Computing
Figure BDA00021030111100002910
And
Figure BDA00021030111100002911
obtain a correspondence SkAll of DjTotal noise-reduced aggregate power consumption, and corresponding DjAll of Sk(where j is fixed, k is 1,2, … N)s) The total noise-based electricity consumption aggregation technology is used for ensuring that each receiver can only access own exclusive data, and realizing a method for safely sharing and controlling access of mixed information of a physical layer and an information layer of the smart grid;
5) calculation of transmission center
Figure BDA00021030111100002912
Or
Figure BDA00021030111100002913
Obtaining all power suppliers
Figure BDA00021030111100002914
And a power distribution centerTotal noise-reduced electricity consumption
Figure BDA00021030111100002916
The technology of the intelligent power grid is used for ensuring that each receiver can only access own exclusive data, and the method for realizing the safe sharing and access control of the mixed information of the physical layer and the information layer of the intelligent power grid is realized.
The system of the invention has the following technical characteristics:
(1) by carrying out concept modeling and bionic design on the smart grid communication system in a physical-information fusion environment, the smart grid communication system is extracted into network nodes and interaction entities such as a power transmission center, a power distribution center, a power supplier, a gateway, a sensing network, a control center and the like, the information flow, the energy flow and the control flow of the smart grid communication system are effectively simulated, and the safe sharing and the access control of mixed information of a physical layer and an information layer of the smart grid are realized;
(2) compared with the existing similar scheme, the method not only hides the personal power consumption of each user so as to strictly protect the personal privacy of the user, but also effectively hides and protects the client distribution privacy information of each power supplier by designing an access control mechanism with secure data authorization;
(3) by fusing the infinite resolvable characteristics of Laplace distribution, a non-interactive session key generation and sharing mechanism and a secure data access control technology based on multi-user permission, a secure data aggregation and distributed differential security model based on an efficient and lightweight modular addition technology is innovated, and differential attack is effectively resisted;
(4) an agent re-encryption mechanism is innovated and designed, data aggregation operation is allowed to be carried out before re-encryption is carried out on the power consumption of a user, and the re-encrypted aggregated data can be completely or partially accessed according to actual needs, so that fine-grained safety data access control of multiple receivers in intelligent power grid communication is realized, and each receiver can only access own exclusive data;
(5) by designing a lightweight security algorithm and a system model in the stages of key distribution and management, data encryption, information aggregation, data re-encryption and access control, data decryption, data recovery and the like, potential network hidden dangers and collusion attacks from the inside and the outside of the smart grid are effectively eliminated and resisted, and indexes such as communication cost, calculation expense and the like are better than those of the existing independent subsystems and solutions.

Claims (3)

1. A safe smart grid access control method for resisting differential attack is characterized in that a trusted authority is responsible for managing and distributing secret information of all other entities in a system based on an application scene of a smart grid communication system; the control center is responsible for integrating, processing and analyzing the periodic time sequence electricity consumption data of all users in the electric energy consumption side network, and comprehensive and reliable intelligent service is provided; the transmission center manages a transmission network and is responsible for ensuring that electric energy is efficiently transmitted to each distribution station from each power station based on aggregated electricity consumption information of different user sets at an electric energy consumption side; from the electricity distribution center
Figure FDA0002103011100000011
The management power distribution network is responsible for aggregating power consumption information based on different user sets of the power consumption side and ensuring that the power is efficiently transmitted to each user of the consumption side from each power distribution station; by the electricity supplier:
Figure FDA0002103011100000012
the system is responsible for providing a competitive electric power retail market based on the aggregated electricity consumption information of different user sets at the electric energy consumption side; connecting control center and electricity by gatewayThe energy consumption side is responsible for aggregating the power consumption data submitted by each user and forwarding communication data between each user and the control center; by the awareness network:
Figure FDA0002103011100000013
namely N on electric energy consumption side of smart griduEach user/node is responsible for collecting power consumption data in real time and reporting the data to the control center through the gateway, and the specific steps are as follows:
(1) system initialization phase
The trusted authority performs the following operations to perform system initialization:
1) entity public and private key generation
a) According to the input safety parameter rho, operating zeta (rho), outputting system parameters (G, G, p, q), wherein p and q are safety large prime numbers, q | (p-1), G is a cyclic group with the order of q, the discrete logarithm problem on the group G is difficult (the recalcitrance is met), and randomly selecting a generator G of the group G to belong to G;
b) random selection of NuAn
Figure FDA0002103011100000021
Wherein, i is 1,2uCalculating
Figure FDA0002103011100000022
Respectively combine s withiAnd SiAs Ui(the identity information thereof is ID)i) The private key and the public key of (c);
c) random selection
Figure FDA0002103011100000023
Computing
Figure FDA0002103011100000024
Respectively combine s withgAnd SgAs a control center (ID is the identity information of the control center)c) The private key and the public key of (c);
d) randomly selecting a secure hash function H:
e) randomly selecting a v-dimensional row vector S, where v is NdNsAnd randomly setting elements in S to 0 and 1, generating 2 system master keys, MK1＝{M1,M2,N1,N2,N3,N4And MK2＝{X1,X2,Y1,Y2,Y3,Y4}，MK1And MK2Each element in (a) is a randomly selected v × v invertible matrix;
2) user encryption key generation
Trusted authority utilization of MK1For each user UiGenerating an encryption key: calculating Ki＝{Ki1,Ki2,Ki3,Ki4}＝{aiN1,biN2,ciN3,diN4In which ai,bi,ci,diAre all randomly chosen v x v invertible matrices, and ai+bi＝M1，ci+di＝M2；
3) Re-encryption key generation
Trusted authority executes the following algorithm, utilizing MK1And MK2For each distribution center Dj(where j is 1,2, … Nd) And the power supplier Sk(wherein k is 1,2, … Ns) And generating a re-encryption key and sending the re-encryption key to the control center. Without loss of generality, the trusted authority generates S by performing the following operationskThe re-encryption key of (2):
a) generating an access control binary vector Qk: for all corresponding SkOf binary digits, i.e. for all Dj(where j is 1,2, … Nd) And SkSet up QkIs 1; set QkThe other binary bit of (a) is 0;
b) will QkSplitting into 2 vectors qk' and qk": random resolution of Q against a binary digit of 1 in s (z) (where z is 1,2, … v)k(z) satisfies qk′(z)+qk″(z)＝Qk(z); comparing the binary digit of 0 in s (z) (where z is 1,2, … v), q is setk′(z)＝qk″(z)＝Qk(z)；
c) Q is to bek' and qk"extended to 2 diagonal matrices respectively
Figure FDA0002103011100000031
And
Figure FDA0002103011100000032
d)Skre-encryption and access control key RK ofkThe calculation is as follows:
Figure FDA0002103011100000033
RKkcomprising 8 parts RKk1,RKk2,RKk3,RKk4,RKk5,RKk6,RKk7,RKk8Each part is a v × v square matrix;
e) performing similar operations with the trusted authority generating each DjRe-encryption and access control key RK ofjRelative to generating RKkOnly the difference is that the access control binary vector QjThe generation method of (1): for all correspondences DjOf binary bits, i.e. for all Sk(wherein k is 1, 2.. N.)s) And DjSet up QjIs 1; set QjThe other binary bit of (a) is 0;
f) trusted authority will NdA distribution center and NsThe re-encryption key secret of each power supplier is sent to the control center;
4) decryption key generation
Trusted authority utilization of MK2For each distribution center Dj(wherein j ═ 1, 2.. Nd) And the power supplier Sk(wherein k is 1,2, … Ns) A decryption key is generated. Without loss of generality, the trusted authority generates S by performing the following operationskThe decryption key of (2):
a) like QkGenerating a decrypted binary vector Rk；
b) R is to bekSplit into 2 vectors rk' and rk": randomly splitting R against a bin of 1 in s (z) (where z 1, 2.. v)k(z) satisfies rk′(z)+rk″(z)＝Rk(z); r is set against the binary digit of 0 in s (z) (where z is 1,2, … v)k′(z)＝rk″(z)＝Rk(z)；
c) Will r isk' and rk"extended to 2 diagonal matrices respectivelyAnd
Figure FDA0002103011100000042
d)Skdecryption key DK ofkThe calculation is as follows:
Figure FDA0002103011100000043
DKkcomprising 4 parts DKk1,DKk2,DKk3,DKk4Each part is a v × v square matrix; e.g. of the typek,fk,gk,hkAll are invertible matrices of v x v and satisfy ek+fk＝X1 -1And gk+hk＝X2 -1；
e) Performing similar operations with the trusted authority using the decrypted binary vector RjCalculate each DjDecryption key DK ofj；
f) The credible authority sends the secret of each decryption key to each Dj(where j is 1,2, … Nd) And Sk(wherein k is 1,2, … Ns)；
(2) Data encryption phase
At each data reporting time point tτEach user UiPerforming the following operation to use the electricity ri j,kReporting to a gateway:
1) by non-crossingMutually calculating session key shared with control center
Figure FDA0002103011100000044
Figure FDA0002103011100000045
2) Constructing a v-dimensional plaintext data vector PiWhich corresponds to DjAnd SkIs set as the power consumption
Figure FDA0002103011100000051
The noisy ciphertext of (2):
Figure FDA0002103011100000052
Piis set to 0. Wherein: ki,cIs UiA session key shared with the control center;
Figure FDA0002103011100000053
and
Figure FDA0002103011100000054
for 2 obedient gamma distributions
Figure FDA0002103011100000055
The independent and uniformly distributed random variables of (1) are provided, x is more than or equal to 0, and gamma function is a function value of point 1/n; according to the Laplace distribution Lap (λ) (which has probability density)
Figure FDA0002103011100000056
Infinite decomposable property: for any n ≧ 1,
Figure FDA0002103011100000057
the total number of users of the system is NuWhen each user UiAt the real power consumption miIn (1) adding
Figure FDA0002103011100000058
Figure FDA0002103011100000059
Noise information of magnitude, total aggregate power consumption
Figure FDA00021030111000000511
Satisfying the ε _ DP differential privacy security attribute (for 2 datasets D differing by only 1 element)1And D2If Pr (A (D) is satisfied1)∈S)≤eε·Pr(A(D2)∈S)，Then the random algorithm a satisfies the epsilon _ DP differential privacy security attribute);
3) will PiSplitting into 2 vectors pi' and pi": random splitting of P against a binary digit of 1 in s (z) (where z is 1,2, … v)i(z) satisfies pi′(z)+pi″(z)＝Pi(z); for a binary bit of 0 in s (z) (where z is 1,2, … v), p is seti′(z)＝pi″(z)＝Pi(z)；
4) By pi′,pi"and encryption Key KiGenerating a ciphertext Ci＝[pi′aiN1,pi′biN2,pi″ciN3,pi″diN4]，CiIs a 4 v-dimensional row vector;
(3) data aggregation phase
After receiving the report data cryptographs of all users, the gateway executes the following operation to all CiCarrying out polymerization:
computing aggregate ciphertext for all users
Figure FDA00021030111000000513
CaggIs a 4 v-dimensional row vector;
(4) data re-encryption and access control phase
The control center performs the following operations of carrying out re-encryption operation on the aggregated information and realizing the access control function, namely each power distribution center Dj(wherein j ═ 1, 2.. Nd) And the power supplier Sk(wherein k is 1,2, … Ns) Only the information to which each belongs can be accessed:
1) without loss of generality, the control center utilizes a re-encryption and access control key RKkTo CaggPerforming re-encryption to generate
Figure FDA0002103011100000062
Wherein
Figure FDA0002103011100000063
To send to SkAll of DjElectricity consumption for the aggregated ciphertext:
Figure FDA0002103011100000064
wherein
Figure FDA0002103011100000065
Is a 4 v-dimensional row vector;
Figure FDA0002103011100000066
the calculation process of (2) is as follows:
Figure FDA0002103011100000067
Figure FDA0002103011100000068
2) performing similar operation to obtain
Figure FDA0002103011100000069
The remainder of (a);
(5) data decryption and data recovery phases
Each distribution center Dj(where j is 1,2, … Nd) And the power supplier Sk(wherein k is 1,2, … Ns) And executing the following operation, decrypting the received ciphertexts respectively, and recovering the noise-caused aggregated electricity consumption of the ciphertexts respectively. Without loss of generality, SkUsing decryption key DKkPerforming the following operations on the received
Figure FDA0002103011100000071
Decrypting to obtain
Figure FDA0002103011100000072
1) Computing
Figure FDA0002103011100000073
Figure FDA0002103011100000074
Calculated v-dimensional row vector
Figure FDA0002103011100000075
With NdThe value of each position is not 0, NdEach position corresponds to a two-dimensional position serial number<Sk,Dj>(where k is fixed, j is 1,2, …, Nd) (ii) a This NdEach value not equal to 0 represents a corresponding two-dimensional position number<Sk,Dj>(where k is fixed, j is 1,2, …, Nd) Of all users of (1) a group of noisy ciphertext
Figure FDA0002103011100000076
Figure FDA0002103011100000077
Figure FDA0002103011100000078
Wherein Lap (λ) is Laplace noise with parameter λ;
2) calculating and calculating U of each user in a non-interactive modeiShared session key
Figure FDA00021030111000000710
Wherein i is 1,2, …, NuAnd calculate
Figure FDA00021030111000000711
3)SkBy calculation of
Figure FDA00021030111000000712
Obtaining NdNoise-reduced electricity consumption
Figure FDA00021030111000000713
(where k is fixed, j is 1,2, … N)d)；
4)SkBy calculation ofCan obtain the corresponding SkAll of Dj(where k is fixed, j is 1,2, … N)d) The total noise of (1) and (2) is aggregated into electricity consumption;
5)Djperform similar operations, N can be calculatedsNoise-reduced electricity consumption
Figure FDA0002103011100000081
Figure FDA0002103011100000082
(where j is fixed, k is 1,2, …, Ns)；
6) In the same way, DjBy calculation of
Figure FDA0002103011100000083
Can obtain a correspondence DjAll of Sk(where j is fixed, k is 1,2, … N)s) The total noise of (1) and (2) is aggregated into electricity consumption;
7) finally, the transmission center passes through the calculation
Figure FDA0002103011100000084
Obtaining all Dj(where j is 1,2, … Nd) And the power supplier Sk(wherein k is 1, 2.. N.)s) Total noise-reduced electricity consumption
Figure FDA0002103011100000085
2. A secure smart grid access control system that resists differential attacks, comprising:
a trusted authority: the system is responsible for managing and distributing secret information of all other entities in the system, and has high credibility and super computing capability;
the control center: the system is responsible for integrating, processing and analyzing the periodic time series power consumption data of all users in the electric energy consumption side network and providing comprehensive and reliable intelligent service;
a power transmission center: the system is used for managing a transmission network and is responsible for ensuring that electric energy is efficiently transmitted to each distribution station from each power station based on aggregated electricity consumption information of different user sets at an electric energy consumption side;
the power distribution center:
Figure FDA0002103011100000086
the system is used for managing a power distribution network and is responsible for ensuring that electric energy is efficiently transmitted to each user on a consumption side from each power distribution station based on aggregated electricity consumption information of different user sets on the electric energy consumption side;
the power supplier:the system is responsible for providing a competitive electric power retail market based on the aggregated electricity consumption information of different user sets at the electric energy consumption side;
a gateway: the system is used for connecting the control center and the electric energy consumption side, and is responsible for aggregating the electricity consumption data submitted by each user and forwarding communication data between each user and the control center;
the perception network:
Figure FDA0002103011100000091
the electric energy consumption side of the smart grid is aware of the network and has NuAnd each user/node is responsible for collecting power consumption data in real time and reporting the data to the control center through the gateway.
3. A secure smart grid access control system against differential attacks as recited in claim 2, further comprising:
(1) system initialization module
1) User U is calculated and distributed based on discrete logarithm difficulty problem by credible authorityiAnd a public and private key of the control center, and selecting and initializing v as NdNsMaintain the row vector S, generate the system master key MK1＝{M1,M2,N1,N2,N3,N4And MK2＝{X1,X2,Y1,Y2,Y3,Y4The technology of (1) is used for a method for safely generating and distributing system network nodes and interactive entity secret information;
2) trusted authority utilizes system master key MK1For each user UiGenerating an encryption key Ki＝{Ki1,Ki2,Ki3,Ki4}＝{aiN1,biN2,ciN3,diN4The technology of (1), a method for encrypting user data and ensuring confidentiality of communication data;
3) trusted authority for each power supplier
Figure FDA0002103011100000092
And a power distribution center
Figure FDA0002103011100000093
Generating an access control binary vector QkAnd QjSplitting vector qk′、qk"and qj′、qj", diagonal matrix
Figure FDA0002103011100000094
And
Figure FDA0002103011100000095
a method for generating a re-encryption and access control key;
4) trusted authority utilizes system master key MK1And MK2For each power supplier
Figure FDA0002103011100000096
Figure FDA0002103011100000097
And a power distribution centerGenerating a re-encryption and access control key RKk＝{RKk1,RKk2,RKk3,RKk4,RKk5,RKk6,RKk7,RKk8} and RKj＝{RKj1,RKj2,RKj3,RKj4,RKj5,RKj6,RKj7,RKj8The technology of (1) is used for carrying out proxy re-encryption on user aggregated data to realize a method for controlling secure data access with multiple recipients;
5) trusted authority for each power supplierAnd a power distribution center
Figure FDA0002103011100000102
Generating a decrypted binary vector RkAnd RjSplit vector rk′、rk"and rj′、rj", diagonal matrixAnd
Figure FDA0002103011100000104
a method for generating a decryption key;
6) trusted authority utilizes system master key MK2For each power supplier
Figure FDA0002103011100000105
Figure FDA0002103011100000106
And a power distribution center
Figure FDA0002103011100000107
Generating a decryption key DKk＝{DKk1,DKk2,DKk3,DKk4} and DKj＝{DKj1,DKj2,DKj3,DKj4The technology of { is used for carrying on the declassification to the users 'aggregate heavy enciphered data, realize the method with many recipients' access control of safe data;
(2) data encryption module
1) Each user UiTechnology for fusing identity, public and private keys, reporting time point and other information of two communication parties and calculating session key shared with control center in non-interactive mode
Figure FDA0002103011100000108
Figure FDA0002103011100000109
The method of (1);
2) by fusing a secure data access control technology based on multi-user permission, a non-interactive session key generation and sharing mechanism and an infinite decomposition characteristic of Laplace distribution, a high-efficiency and light-weight modulo addition technology is designed
Figure FDA00021030111000001010
A method for implementing secure data aggregation and distributed differential privacy security;
3) construction of a plaintext data vector PiFor each user UiFor reporting power consumption
Figure FDA00021030111000001011
Carry out noise encryption
Figure FDA00021030111000001012
Satisfy the power supplier
Figure FDA00021030111000001013
And a power distribution center
Figure FDA00021030111000001014
A method of secure access control;
4) by having a probability density
Figure FDA0002103011100000111
The infinite resolvable property of the laplace distribution Lap (λ):
Figure FDA0002103011100000112
G1(n, lambda) and G2(n, λ) is 2 obedient gamma distributions
Figure FDA0002103011100000113
Is the function value of gamma function at point 1/n, and each user UiThrough a distributed modeReal electricity consumption miIn (1) adding
Figure FDA0002103011100000114
Information of large and small noises, and total electricity consumption
Figure FDA0002103011100000115
Figure FDA0002103011100000116
The technology meeting the epsilon _ DP differential privacy security attribute is a method for resisting differential attack and protecting the privacy of a user;
5) generating a split vector p from a v-dimensional row vector s (z) (where z ═ 1,2, … v)i′、pi"for user UiThe method for encrypting the electricity consumption;
6) by pi′,pi"and encryption Key Ki＝{Ki1,Ki2,Ki3,Ki4}＝{aiN1,biN2,ciN3,diN4The technology for generating 4 v-dimensional row vectors for users UiThe electricity consumption is encrypted Ci＝[pi′aiN1,pi′biN2,pi″ciN3,pi″diN4]The method of (1);
(3) data aggregation module
Gateway for all users
Figure FDA0002103011100000117
Report cipher text Ci＝[pi′aiN1,pi′biN2,pi″ciN3,pi″diN4]Technique for performing security processing to generate 4 v-dimensional row vector for performing security aggregation on report data of all users
Figure FDA0002103011100000119
Figure FDA00021030111000001110
The method of (1);
(4) data re-encryption and access control module
Control center using re-encryption and access control key RKkAnd RKjTo CaggPerforming re-encryption for each power supplier
Figure FDA0002103011100000121
And a power distribution center
Figure FDA0002103011100000122
Figure FDA0002103011100000123
Generating a re-encrypted ciphertext
Figure FDA0002103011100000124
And
Figure FDA0002103011100000125
Figure FDA0002103011100000126
the technology of (1) is used for carrying out proxy re-encryption on user aggregated data, realizing secure data access control with multiple receivers and ensuring that each receiver can only access own exclusive data;
(5) data decryption and data recovery module
1) Each power supplier
Figure FDA0002103011100000127
And a power distribution center
Figure FDA0002103011100000128
Figure FDA0002103011100000129
Using decryption key DKkAnd DKjTo be received
Figure FDA00021030111000001210
Anddecryption technique for recovering respective noise-reduced aggregated power consumption
Figure FDA00021030111000001212
Figure FDA00021030111000001213
And
Figure FDA00021030111000001214
Figure FDA00021030111000001215
the method of (1);
2) each power supplier
Figure FDA00021030111000001216
And a power distribution center
Figure FDA00021030111000001217
A technique for analyzing information of noise-caused aggregated power consumption to which each of the two-dimensional position numbers belongs<Sk,Dj>Aggregate noisy ciphertext for all users
Figure FDA00021030111000001219
Figure FDA00021030111000001220
The method of (1);
3) the control center integrates the identity, public and private keys, reporting time point and other information of both communication parties, and calculates and reports the information to each user U in a non-interactive modeiShared session key
Figure FDA00021030111000001221
Figure FDA00021030111000001222
For obtaining a noised aggregated electric power consumption
Figure FDA00021030111000001223
Figure FDA00021030111000001224
The method of (1);
4) each power supplier
Figure FDA00021030111000001225
And a power distribution center
Figure FDA00021030111000001226
Figure FDA0002103011100000131
Computing
Figure FDA0002103011100000132
And
Figure FDA0002103011100000133
obtain a correspondence SkAll of DjTotal noise-reduced aggregate power consumption, and corresponding DjAll of Sk(where j is fixed, k is 1,2, … N)s) For ensuring total noise and electricity consumptionEach receiver can only access own exclusive data, and a method for realizing safe sharing and access control of mixed information of a physical layer and an information layer of the smart grid is realized;
5) calculation of transmission centerOrObtaining all power suppliersAnd a power distribution center
Figure FDA0002103011100000137
Total noise-reduced electricity consumption
Figure FDA0002103011100000138
The technology of the intelligent power grid is used for ensuring that each receiver can only access own exclusive data, and the method for realizing the safe sharing and access control of the mixed information of the physical layer and the information layer of the intelligent power grid is realized.
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