CN110572370A - Agent re-encryption system and method for resisting quantum attack - Google Patents
Agent re-encryption system and method for resisting quantum attack Download PDFInfo
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- CN110572370A CN110572370A CN201910759333.5A CN201910759333A CN110572370A CN 110572370 A CN110572370 A CN 110572370A CN 201910759333 A CN201910759333 A CN 201910759333A CN 110572370 A CN110572370 A CN 110572370A
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- H—ELECTRICITY
- H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
- H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
- H04L63/00—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security
- H04L63/04—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security for providing a confidential data exchange among entities communicating through data packet networks
- H04L63/0428—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security for providing a confidential data exchange among entities communicating through data packet networks wherein the data content is protected, e.g. by encrypting or encapsulating the payload
- H04L63/0442—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security for providing a confidential data exchange among entities communicating through data packet networks wherein the data content is protected, e.g. by encrypting or encapsulating the payload wherein the sending and receiving network entities apply asymmetric encryption, i.e. different keys for encryption and decryption
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- H—ELECTRICITY
- H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
- H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
- H04L9/00—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols
- H04L9/002—Countermeasures against attacks on cryptographic mechanisms
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- H—ELECTRICITY
- H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
- H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
- H04L9/00—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols
- H04L9/08—Key distribution or management, e.g. generation, sharing or updating, of cryptographic keys or passwords
- H04L9/0861—Generation of secret information including derivation or calculation of cryptographic keys or passwords
Abstract
The invention discloses an agent re-encryption system and method capable of resisting quantum attack; first, a system parameter generating module generates a system public parameter. The key generation module generates a public and private key pair for an employee authorized to process data needing encryption in a company, and the employee i encrypts the processed data and uploads the encrypted data to the cloud server. When the employee j needs to check the data, after the data is authorized, the cloud server, the employee i and the employee j can generate a re-encryption key according to the re-encryption key protocol, the cloud server uses the re-encryption key to perform re-encryption processing on the data to obtain a re-encryption ciphertext, then the cloud server sends the re-encryption ciphertext to the employee j, and the employee j can decrypt the re-encryption ciphertext by using a private key of the employee j to obtain the data. The method adopts an NTRU encryption system based on the problem of lattice difficulty, can effectively resist quantum attack, designs a unique re-encryption protocol, can resist collusion attack, and can only perform one-way re-encryption.
Description
Technical Field
the invention belongs to the technical field of information security, relates to an agent re-encryption system and method capable of resisting quantum attack, and particularly relates to an agent re-encryption system and method capable of resisting quantum attack and applied to the field of office security
Background
In recent years, cloud computing has evolved from a small concept as part of the rapid growth in the IT industry due to the characteristics of cloud servers due to their high performance computing throughput and high density, low cost, and low power consumption. It enables many people to share information without geographical restrictions. Therefore, protecting sensitive files stored in the cloud from tampering by malicious attackers is critical to the success of the cloud. Currently, data security has become a critical issue in a variety of applications. The user may prefer to store the file in an encrypted manner and effectively authorize the decryption rights.
To protect files stored in the cloud, a user may encrypt the files using a key before uploading the files to the cloud. Nevertheless, the user still needs to share her encrypted file online, because she needs to send her key to her friend, which may cause the key to be compromised. It is also inefficient because it incurs a heavy overhead to the user. Or the user may encrypt the private data using the public key of the person who needs the private data and send the encrypted private data to the person who needs the private data, but the efficiency is also reduced.
This problem can be solved if proxy cloud computing is employed. For example, a company assigns a pair of public and private keys to each employee who processes confidential data, and each employee encrypts the data by using the public key of the employee and uploads the data to the cloud server for storage. If the data is needed by the staff authorized to use the data, a re-encryption key can be generated by the cloud server, the authorizer and the authorized person through a protocol, and then the cloud server uses the re-encryption key to convert the ciphertext of the authorizer into the ciphertext which can be decrypted by the authorized person. This has not only improved the security, has still promoted work efficiency. However, it should be noted that when acting as a proxy in proxy re-encryption, the cloud server cannot acquire private information (for example, private keys of both parties) of both parties from the re-encryption key generation protocol, and therefore the cloud server needs to perform data processing in a state where no private information is obtained.
The proxy re-encryption is an asymmetric encryption system, and a semi-trusted agent uses a re-encryption key to convert a ciphertext encrypted by a public key of an authorizer into a ciphertext which can be decrypted by a private key of an authorizer. The traditional proxy re-encryption scheme is based on the difficult problem of factorization of large prime numbers in number theory, discrete logarithm or bilinear pairings as a security basis, but with the rapid development of quantum computers, the security assumption is seriously threatened.
disclosure of Invention
in order to solve the technical problems, the invention provides a new agent re-encryption system and method which are applied to the office security field and can resist quantum attacks.
The technical scheme adopted by the system of the invention is as follows: an agent re-encryption system for resisting quantum attack, which is characterized in that: the system comprises a system parameter generation module, a key generation module, an encryption module, a re-encryption key generation module, a re-encryption module, a decryption module, an authorization module and a cloud server;
the system parameter generation module is used for generating system public parameters and sending the public parameters to the key generation module, the re-encryption key generation module, the cloud server, the encryption module, the decryption module and the re-encryption module;
The key generation module is used for generating a public and private key pair for the staff processing the confidential data;
The encryption module is used for encrypting a plaintext to be encrypted to obtain a ciphertext, the public key used for encryption is the public key of an authorizer, and the ciphertext is sent to the cloud server;
the re-encryption key generation module is used for generating a re-encryption key and sending the key to the cloud server;
The re-encryption module is used for performing re-encryption calculation on the ciphertext by the cloud server to obtain a re-encrypted ciphertext and sending the re-encrypted ciphertext to an authorized person;
The decryption module is used for decrypting the re-encrypted ciphertext by an authorized person by using a private key of the authorized person, and finally, the plaintext can be recovered;
The authorization module is used for authorizing the authorized person to apply for viewing the encrypted data of the authorized person.
the method adopts the technical scheme that: an agent re-encryption method for resisting quantum attack is characterized by comprising the following steps:
step 1: the system parameter generation module generates system parameters and sends the system parameters to the key generation module, the encryption module, the cloud server, the re-encryption module, the re-encryption key generation module and the decryption module;
Step 2: the key generation module generates a public and private key pair for the staff needing to process the confidential data and sends the public and private key pair to the corresponding staff through a secure channel;
and step 3: the employee i encrypts the confidential data by using a private key of the employee i and sends the confidential data to the cloud server for storage;
And 4, step 4: the employee j obtains authorization for obtaining the encrypted data of the employee i through an authorization module;
And 5: the employee i, the employee j and the cloud server obtain the re-encryption key through the re-encryption key generation module and send the re-encryption key to the cloud server;
step 6: the cloud server uses the re-encryption key to re-encrypt the ciphertext encrypted by the employee i and sends the re-encrypted ciphertext to the employee j;
And 7: and the employee j uses the private key of the employee j to decrypt and obtain the confidential data processed by the employee i.
Compared with the prior art, the invention has the beneficial effects that:
the invention provides a new re-encryption scheme, which is an efficient re-encryption scheme based on NTRU, thus resisting quantum attack.
advantage 2, this scheme is unidirectional because the re-encryption key generated according to the re-encryption key protocol in this scheme isthe re-encryption key only re-encrypts the ciphertext of employee i, but not the ciphertext of employee j.
The method has the advantages that the method and the system have the advantages of collusion attack resistance, due to the characteristic of the re-encryption key, the cloud server can obtain the private key of the employee j through collusion with the employee i by using the re-encryption key, and can not obtain the effective information of the employee i otherwise. )
drawings
FIG. 1 is a schematic block diagram of a system according to an embodiment of the present invention.
Detailed Description
in order to facilitate the understanding and implementation of the present invention for those of ordinary skill in the art, the present invention is further described in detail with reference to the accompanying drawings and examples, it is to be understood that the embodiments described herein are merely illustrative and explanatory of the present invention and are not restrictive thereof.
Referring to fig. 1, the agent re-encryption system for resisting quantum attack provided by the present invention includes a system parameter generation module, a key generation module, an encryption module, a re-encryption key generation module, a re-encryption module, a decryption module, an authorization module, and a cloud server;
the system parameter generating module is used for generating system public parameters and sending the public parameters to the key generating module, the re-encryption key generating module, the cloud server, the encryption module, the decryption module and the re-encryption module;
The key generation module is used for generating a public and private key pair for the staff processing the confidential data;
the encryption module is used for encrypting the plaintext to be encrypted to obtain a ciphertext, the public key used for encryption is the public key of the authorizer, and the ciphertext is sent to the cloud server;
the re-encryption key generation module is used for generating a re-encryption key and sending the key to the cloud server;
the re-encryption module is used for performing re-encryption calculation on the ciphertext by the cloud server to obtain a re-encrypted ciphertext and sending the re-encrypted ciphertext to an authorized person;
the decryption module is used for decrypting the re-encrypted ciphertext by an authorized person by using a private key of the authorized person, and finally, the plaintext can be recovered;
The authorization module is used for authorizing the authorized person to apply for viewing the encrypted data of the authorized person.
The invention also provides a proxy re-encryption method for resisting quantum attack, wherein the employee i uploads the secret-related data to the cloud after encrypting by using the own public key, the cloud server performs re-encryption calculation by using the re-encryption key, and sends the re-encrypted ciphertext to the employee j, and the employee j can recover the secret-related data by using the own private key. The method specifically comprises the following steps:
step 1: the system parameter generation module generates system parameters and sends the system parameters to the key generation module, the encryption module, the cloud server, the re-encryption module, the re-encryption key generation module and the decryption module;
The system parameters in the embodiment comprise a convolution polynomial ring R, a dimensionality n of the polynomial ring, and parameters p and q; wherein R ═ Z [ x ]]/(xn-1), R represents a set of all integer coefficient polynomials of maximum degree not exceeding n-1, Z [ x ]]representing an integer coefficient polynomial ring; n is generally prime number, p and q represent modulus, and the larger the value of the parameter q is, the safer the system is;
The element generated by the convolution polynomial ring R is represented asdefine the addition on the ring as f + g ═ f0+g0)+(f1+g1)x+…+xn-1defining the multiplication on the ring as f x g h, wherein,
Step 2: the key generation module generates a public and private key pair for the staff needing to process the confidential data and sends the public and private key pair to the corresponding staff through a secure channel;
in this embodiment, the key generation module generates a public and private key pair (pk) for an employee who needs to process confidential datai,ski) Wherein i is more than 1 and less than or equal to k, and k represents the number of employees used for encrypting and decrypting the authority;
private keyWhereinrepresenting a random choice, the private key f being a small random polynomial with coefficients 0, -1 and 1, and the private key skiWhile satisfying fi*fi -11(mod q) and fi(mod p) ═ 1(mod p); the private key of employee i is fi。
When generating the public key, firstly randomly selecting a polynomial g from Rito find out the public key pki＝p*gi*fi -1(modq) and then sends the key pairs to the corresponding employees, respectively, over a secure channel.
In the same way, the public and private keys of other employees are (pk)x＝p*gx*fx -1(mod q),skx＝fx)。
and step 3: the employee i encrypts the confidential data by using a private key of the employee i and sends the confidential data to the cloud server for storage;
In this embodiment, the specific implementation in step 3 includes the following substeps:
Step 3.1: randomly selecting a polynomial R from a polynomial ring R2；
Step 3.2: using public key pk of employee iiCarrying out encryption operation on plaintext M to be encrypted to obtain ciphertext C1＝pki*r2+ M (mod q); and then the ciphertext is sent to the cloud server for storage.
And 4, step 4: the employee j obtains authorization for obtaining the encrypted data of the employee i through an authorization module;
Employee j is authorized by the authorization module via a secure channel (either telephonic or physical).
And 5: the employee i, the employee j and the cloud server obtain the re-encryption key through the re-encryption key generation module and send the re-encryption key to the cloud server;
In this embodiment, the specific implementation in step 5 includes the following sub-steps:
step 5.1: employee i randomly selects a small polynomial R from R1and e1；
step 5.2; employee i calculates a ═ r1*(fi+p*e1) (modq), send a to employee j, r1Sending the data to a cloud server;
Step 5.3: employee j calculationThen b is sent to a cloud server;
Step 5.4: cloud server computing re-encryption key
step 6: the cloud server uses the re-encryption key to re-encrypt the ciphertext encrypted by the employee i and sends the re-encrypted ciphertext to the employee j;
in this embodiment, the process of re-encrypting the cloud service is as follows:
encrypt the ciphertext C again2To employee j.
and 7: the employee j uses the private key of the employee j to decrypt and obtain the confidential data processed by the employee i;
in this embodiment, the decryption calculation process of employee j is as follows,
C2*fj(mod p)＝(p*gi*r2+fi*M+p*e1*p*gi*fi -1*r2+p*e1*M)(mod q)(mod p)
＝M
because f isi(mod p) 1 so employee j can recover the secret-related data.
If other employees also need the data, the property that the proxy re-encryption can be used for re-encryption for multiple times can be utilized to obtain a re-encrypted ciphertext which can be decrypted by the other employees.
The method adopts an NTRU encryption system based on the problem of lattice difficulty, and can effectively resist quantum attack.
It should be understood that parts of the specification not set forth in detail are well within the prior art.
It should be understood that the above description of the preferred embodiments is given for clarity and not for any purpose of limitation, and that various changes, substitutions and alterations can be made herein without departing from the spirit and scope of the invention as defined by the appended claims.
Claims (8)
1. An agent re-encryption system for resisting quantum attack, which is characterized in that: the system comprises a system parameter generation module, a key generation module, an encryption module, a re-encryption key generation module, a re-encryption module, a decryption module, an authorization module and a cloud server;
The system parameter generation module is used for generating system public parameters and sending the public parameters to the key generation module, the re-encryption key generation module, the cloud server, the encryption module, the decryption module and the re-encryption module;
the key generation module is used for generating a public and private key pair for the staff processing the confidential data;
The encryption module is used for encrypting a plaintext to be encrypted to obtain a ciphertext, the public key used for encryption is the public key of an authorizer, and the ciphertext is sent to the cloud server;
The re-encryption key generation module is used for generating a re-encryption key and sending the key to the cloud server;
the re-encryption module is used for performing re-encryption calculation on the ciphertext by the cloud server to obtain a re-encrypted ciphertext and sending the re-encrypted ciphertext to an authorized person;
The decryption module is used for decrypting the re-encrypted ciphertext by an authorized person by using a private key of the authorized person, and finally, the plaintext can be recovered;
The authorization module is used for authorizing the authorized person to apply for viewing the encrypted data of the authorized person.
2. An agent re-encryption method for resisting quantum attack is characterized by comprising the following steps:
Step 1: the system parameter generation module generates system parameters and sends the system parameters to the key generation module, the encryption module, the cloud server, the re-encryption module, the re-encryption key generation module and the decryption module;
step 2: the key generation module generates a public and private key pair for the staff needing to process the confidential data and sends the public and private key pair to the corresponding staff through a secure channel;
and step 3: the employee i encrypts the confidential data by using a private key of the employee i and sends the confidential data to the cloud server for storage;
and 4, step 4: the employee j obtains authorization for obtaining the encrypted data of the employee i through an authorization module;
And 5: the employee i, the employee j and the cloud server obtain the re-encryption key through the re-encryption key generation module and send the re-encryption key to the cloud server;
Step 6: the cloud server uses the re-encryption key to re-encrypt the ciphertext encrypted by the employee i and sends the re-encrypted ciphertext to the employee j;
and 7: and the employee j uses the private key of the employee j to decrypt and obtain the confidential data processed by the employee i.
3. the quantum attack resistant proxy re-encryption method of claim 2, wherein: the system parameters in the step 1 comprise a convolution polynomial ring R, a dimensionality n of the polynomial ring, and parameters p and q; wherein R ═ Z [ x ]]/(xn-1), R represents a set of all integer coefficient polynomials of maximum degree not exceeding n-1, Z [ x ]]Representing an integer coefficient polynomial ring; n is generally prime number, p and q represent modulus, and the larger the value of the parameter q is, the safer the system is;
The element generated by the convolution polynomial ring R is represented asdefine the addition on the ring as f + g ═ f0+g0)+(f1+g1)x+…+xn-1defining the multiplication on the ring as f x g h, wherein,
4. The quantum attack resistant proxy re-encryption method of claim 3, wherein: in step 2, the key generation module generates a public and private key pair (pk) for the staff needing to process the confidential datai,ski) Wherein i is more than 1 and less than or equal to k, and k represents the number of employees used for encrypting and decrypting the authority;
Private keywhereinRepresenting a random choice, the private key f being a small random polynomial with coefficients 0, -1 and 1, and the private key skiWhile satisfying fi*fi -11(mod q) and fi(mod p)＝1(mod p)；
when generating the public key, firstly randomly selecting a polynomial g from RiTo find out the public key pki＝p*gi*fi -1(mod q) and then sends the key pairs to the corresponding employees, respectively, through the secure channel.
5. The quantum attack resistant proxy re-encryption method of claim 4, wherein: the specific implementation in step 3 comprises the following substeps:
Step 3.1: randomly selecting a polynomial R from a polynomial ring R2；
step 3.2:using public key pk of employee iicarrying out encryption operation on plaintext M to be encrypted to obtain ciphertext C1＝pki*r2+ M (mod q); and then the ciphertext is sent to the cloud server for storage.
6. the method for agent re-encryption resisting quantum attacks as claimed in claim 5, wherein the step 5 is implemented by the following steps:
Step 5.1: employee i randomly selects a small polynomial R from R1And e1；
step 5.2; employee i calculates a ═ r1*(fi+p*e1) (mod q), send a to employee j, r1Sending the data to a cloud server;
Step 5.3: employee j calculationthen b is sent to a cloud server;
step 5.4: cloud server computing re-encryption key
7. The quantum attack resistant proxy re-encryption method of claim 6, wherein: the process of re-encrypting the cloud service in the step 6 is as follows:
encrypt the ciphertext C again2to employee j.
8. The quantum attack resistant proxy re-encryption method of claim 7, wherein: in step 7, the decryption calculation process of employee j is as follows,
C2*fj(mod p)＝(p*gi*r2+fi*M+p*e1*p*gi*fi -1*r2+p*e1*M)(mod q)(mod p)＝M。
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| CN110572370B (en) | 2021-09-14 |
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