CN110572267B - Anonymous electronic voting method based on block chain of alliances - Google Patents

Anonymous electronic voting method based on block chain of alliances Download PDF

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CN110572267B
CN110572267B CN201910857681.6A CN201910857681A CN110572267B CN 110572267 B CN110572267 B CN 110572267B CN 201910857681 A CN201910857681 A CN 201910857681A CN 110572267 B CN110572267 B CN 110572267B
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rsign
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CN110572267A (en
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阮诚
王勇
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Beijing University of Technology
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    • G—PHYSICS
    • G07—CHECKING-DEVICES
    • G07C—TIME OR ATTENDANCE REGISTERS; REGISTERING OR INDICATING THE WORKING OF MACHINES; GENERATING RANDOM NUMBERS; VOTING OR LOTTERY APPARATUS; ARRANGEMENTS, SYSTEMS OR APPARATUS FOR CHECKING NOT PROVIDED FOR ELSEWHERE
    • G07C13/00—Voting apparatus
    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
    • H04L63/00—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security
    • H04L63/04—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security for providing a confidential data exchange among entities communicating through data packet networks
    • H04L63/0407—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security for providing a confidential data exchange among entities communicating through data packet networks wherein the identity of one or more communicating identities is hidden
    • H04L63/0421—Anonymous communication, i.e. the party's identifiers are hidden from the other party or parties, e.g. using an anonymizer
    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
    • H04L63/00—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security
    • H04L63/04—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security for providing a confidential data exchange among entities communicating through data packet networks
    • H04L63/0428—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security for providing a confidential data exchange among entities communicating through data packet networks wherein the data content is protected, e.g. by encrypting or encapsulating the payload
    • H04L63/0442—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security for providing a confidential data exchange among entities communicating through data packet networks wherein the data content is protected, e.g. by encrypting or encapsulating the payload wherein the sending and receiving network entities apply asymmetric encryption, i.e. different keys for encryption and decryption
    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
    • H04L63/00—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security
    • H04L63/08—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security for authentication of entities
    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
    • H04L63/00—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security
    • H04L63/08—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security for authentication of entities
    • H04L63/0823—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security for authentication of entities using certificates
    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
    • H04L9/00—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols
    • H04L9/32—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols including means for verifying the identity or authority of a user of the system or for message authentication, e.g. authorization, entity authentication, data integrity or data verification, non-repudiation, key authentication or verification of credentials
    • H04L9/3247—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols including means for verifying the identity or authority of a user of the system or for message authentication, e.g. authorization, entity authentication, data integrity or data verification, non-repudiation, key authentication or verification of credentials involving digital signatures
    • H04L9/3255—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols including means for verifying the identity or authority of a user of the system or for message authentication, e.g. authorization, entity authentication, data integrity or data verification, non-repudiation, key authentication or verification of credentials involving digital signatures using group based signatures, e.g. ring or threshold signatures
    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
    • H04L9/00—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols
    • H04L9/32—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols including means for verifying the identity or authority of a user of the system or for message authentication, e.g. authorization, entity authentication, data integrity or data verification, non-repudiation, key authentication or verification of credentials
    • H04L9/3263—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols including means for verifying the identity or authority of a user of the system or for message authentication, e.g. authorization, entity authentication, data integrity or data verification, non-repudiation, key authentication or verification of credentials involving certificates, e.g. public key certificate [PKC] or attribute certificate [AC]; Public key infrastructure [PKI] arrangements
    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
    • H04L2209/00—Additional information or applications relating to cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communication H04L9/00
    • H04L2209/42—Anonymization, e.g. involving pseudonyms
    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
    • H04L2209/00—Additional information or applications relating to cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communication H04L9/00
    • H04L2209/46—Secure multiparty computation, e.g. millionaire problem
    • H04L2209/463—Electronic voting
    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
    • H04L9/00—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols
    • H04L9/50—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols using hash chains, e.g. blockchains or hash trees

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Abstract

The invention discloses an anonymous electronic voting method based on a block chain technology of a alliance. A new anonymous voting method is designed by combining the alliance blockchain technology and the existing ring signature algorithm. The system is based on the alliance block chain, the system is provided with an admission mechanism, only voters authenticated by a CA mechanism and acquiring certificates have voting qualification, and the legality of the voters is ensured; the invention adopts the ring signature algorithm to ensure the anonymity of the ballot, collects the ballot after ring signature through an intelligent contract, and then sends the ballot to the vote counting contract, thereby isolating the information of the voter and the relevance of the ballot. The method provided by the invention not only ensures the anonymity of voting, but also thoroughly isolates voters from voting information through a vote collection contract, the whole voting process and voting results are recorded in the block chain, the voting information is open and transparent and can be verified, and the anonymous voting function of the block chain of the alliance is realized.

Description

Anonymous electronic voting method based on block chain of alliances
Technical Field
The invention belongs to the field of computer communication safety, and particularly relates to an anonymous electronic voting method based on a block chain of a union.
Background
The electronic voting system is based on the principle of cryptography, and adopts the computer, internet and other technologies to replace the traditional manual method to realize the voting function. The electronic voting agreement was first proposed by Chaum in 1981, and needs to solve security problems of legality, anonymity, vote counting integrity, non-repeatability, non-forgeability, non-tamper-resistance and the like of voting in the internet environment. However, the current voting protocol based on the trusted third party has the risks of too large authority of the central server, falsification of the voting result and leakage of voting information of voters, and the voting result cannot be verified. And a good solution is provided for solving the problems through the combination of the existing ring signature technology and the block chain technology.
On the premise of not introducing a third-party intermediary mechanism, the block chain can provide characteristics of decentralization, non-falsification, safety, reliability and the like, and can be used as an anonymity guarantee of the voting system. While a federation chain is a block chain with an admission mechanism, a user must have a legitimate identity to join the federation chain. A federation chain with an identity admission mechanism can meet the requirements of voting scenarios in a particular range (e.g., a fixed population) and identity audit requirements.
Disclosure of Invention
In order to solve the above problems in the prior art, the present invention aims to provide an anonymous electronic voting method based on a federation blockchain.
The technical scheme adopted by the invention is as follows:
an anonymous electronic voting method based on a block chain of a union, wherein the specific process of the anonymous electronic voting comprises the following steps:
s1, preparation phase. The CA contract generates an encrypted key pair (epk, esk), and the private key esk is sent to the invoicing contract.
And S2, registering the user. Voting user UiRegistering the certificate into a block chain system of the alliance through CA authentication to obtain a certificate ECertiAnd a public key epk.
And S3, generating a public key ring. Voting user UiGenerating a public and private key pair (pk)i,ski) And the public key pkiSending the public key ring management contract to a public key ring management contract, and calling an algorithm GenRing (RList) to generate a public key ring R, wherein RList ═ { pk1,pk2,...,pknIs the collected public key set.
And S4, generating the encrypted ballot. Voting user UiThe generated original vote voting information is ticketiFurther, the original ballot is encrypted by using the encrypted public key epk to generate an encrypted ballot mi＝ENC(ticketi,epk)。
And S5, generating the ring signature vote. Voting user UiObtaining a public key ring R from a management contract, calling a ring signature algorithm RingSign, and utilizing a private key skiAnd a public key ring R pair encrypted ballot miGenerate ring signature Signi＝RingSign(mi,skiR), constructing ring signature ballot RSigni＝{mi,Signi}。
And S6, sending the ring signature vote. Voting user UiRing signature ballot RSigniTo a ballot box contract.
And S7, verifying the validity of the ring signature vote. The ballot box contract passes the authentication algorithm CertVerify (ECert)i,RSigni) Entering credential information ECertiAnd ring signature ballot RSigniAnd outputting a verification result of 0 or 1.
And S8, collecting the ring signature vote. If the CertVerify result is 1, the ballot box contract accepts ring signature ballot RSigniAnd apply RSigniPutting the vote into a vote set TList; if the verification result is 0, discarding the ring signature ballot RSigni。
And S9, sending the vote set. After the vote box closes TLimit between the expiration of the reached votes, the vote set TList is set to { RSign }p,...,RSignk,.. } sending to the invoicing contract.
And S10, verifying the validity of the ballot and constructing a ballot set. The vote counting contract receives a vote set TList sent by a vote casting box contract, calls a ring signature verification algorithm Verify, and verifies elements RSign in the TList one by onep＝{mp,SignpGet RSign if verification passespInto the vote set FList ═ RSign1...,RSignn,...}。
And S11, counting votes. The element RSign in the ballot set FList is extracted one by the ticket counting contractx＝{mx，SignxH, the encrypted ballot m is subjected to the secret key eskxDecrypting to obtain the original voting information ticketx＝DEC(mxEsk), then the ticket counting contract calls the statistical method Count (ticket)1,ticket2,...,ticketn) And counting the votes.
And S12, publishing the voting result. The ticket counting contract publishes the final result VoteResult of the statistical method Count.
Further, the algorithm genring (rlist) in step S3 is as follows:
wherein the algorithm GenRing randomly generates n public keys { PK1,PK2,..,PKnR is the set formed by R and RList
{PK1,PK2,..,PKnRList }, and outputs a set R, where1<＝n<＝20。
Further, the certificating algorithm CertVerify (ECert) in step S7i,RSigni) The method comprises the following specific steps:
if the certificate ECertiValid and verified for the first time, a 1 is output, otherwise a 0 is output.
Compared with the prior art, the invention has the following advantages:
the invention introduces a alliance block chain technology in the traditional electronic voting method:
the invention ensures the safety, reliability and verifiability of voting by means of decentralized design of the block chain of the alliance without depending on a central server.
The invention ensures the isolation of the voting user information and the signature vote information, cuts off the correlation between the voting user identity and the signature vote information and avoids the leakage of the voting user identity.
3, the invention uses the ring signature to authenticate the validity of the vote information. The signer of the vote is hidden in a group of public key rings, so that the anonymity of the identity of the voting user is realized.
Drawings
Fig. 1 is a timing diagram of the voting flow of the anonymous electronic voting method based on the federation blockchain of the present invention.
Detailed Description
The invention provides an anonymous electronic voting method for allied block chains, a specific time sequence chart of the method is shown in figure 1, and the method aims to solve the problems that the voting publicity is difficult to ensure and the information of voters is leaked in the traditional electronic voting method.
The anonymous electronic voting method for the federation block chain disclosed in this embodiment is described in detail below with reference to fig. 1.
An anonymous electronic voting method based on a federation blockchain (the system structure is shown in figure 1) mainly comprises 3 major parts, namely voting users, SDK access and a core federation blockchain intelligent contract module. The method mainly comprises the steps of preparation, user registration, generation of ring signature votes, collection of ring signature votes, transmission of a vote set, statistics of votes and voting result publication.
The first step is the preparation stage.
The preparation stage comprises the following specific steps:
the CA contract generates an encrypted public key pair (epk, esk) by an ECC (elliptic curve cryptography) algorithm and sends the decrypted private key esk to the invoicing contract.
The second step is that: and (4) registering the user.
The voting users are accessed into the block chain system through the SDK provided by the alliance chain, and corresponding certificates ECert are obtained through inputting user information and CA intelligent contract authenticationiAnd an encrypted public key epk.
The third step: a ring signature ballot is generated.
The generation of the ring signature ballot is divided into three stages of generating a public key ring, encrypting the original ballot and encrypting the ring signature of the ballot. The method comprises the following specific steps:
and (3) generating a public key ring: voting user UiGenerating a public and private key pair (pk) by elliptic curve encryption algorithmi,ski) And the public key pkiSending the public key ring management contract to a public key ring management contract, and calling an algorithm GenRing (RList) to generate a public key ring R, wherein RList ═ { pk1,pk2,...,pknIs a collected set of public keys, where the algorithm GenRing randomly generates n public keys { PK1,PK2,..,PKnR & ltSUB & gt & lt/SUB & gt { PK ] and RList1,PK2,..,PKnRList }, and outputs a set R, where 1<＝n<＝20。
Encryption of an original vote: voting user UiThe obtained original vote voting information is ticketiCarrying out encryption signature on the original ballot by utilizing an elliptic curve signature algorithm ENC to generate an encrypted ballot mi＝ENC(ticketi,epk)。
Ring signature of encrypted ballot, voter UiObtaining a public key ring R from a management contract, calling a ring signature algorithm RingSign, and utilizing a private key ski and the public key ring R to encrypt a vote miGenerate ring signature SigniRing signature ballot is finally constructedRSigni＝{mi,Signi}。
The fourth step: collecting ring signature votes.
The specific steps for collecting the ring signature ballot are as follows:
voting user UiRing signature ballot RSigniSending the contract to a ballot box; the ballot box contract passes the authentication algorithm CertVerify (ECert)i,RSigni) Verifying ring signature ballot RSigniIf the verification result is 1, RSign is determinediPutting the vote into a vote set TList; if the verification result is 0, discarding the ring signature ballot RSigni. Wherein the authentication algorithm CertVerify (ECert)i,RSigni) If the certificate ECertiValid and verified for the first time, a 1 is output, otherwise a 0 is output. The rule ensures that one certificate only corresponds to one vote, and ensures the uniqueness and the legality of the vote.
The fifth step: and sending the vote set.
After the vote box closes TLimit between the expiration of the reached votes, the vote set TList is set to { RSign }p,...,RSignk,.. } sending to the invoicing contract. In the voting box contract, the vote set TList is sent to the vote counting contract at a fixed deadline time, so that a voter and the vote counting contract are isolated, the ring signature is separated from the voter, and the anonymity of the information of the voter is realized.
And a sixth step: and (5) counting votes.
The method comprises the following steps of counting votes, namely, verifying the validity of the votes and counting votes passing verification, wherein the method comprises the following steps:
verifying the validity of the ballot, receiving a ballot set TList sent by a ballot box contract by a vote counting contract, calling a ring signature verification algorithm Verify, and verifying elements RSign in the TList one by onep＝{mp,SignpGet RSign if verification passespInto the vote set FList ═ RSign1...,RSignn,., wherein the votes in the vote set FList are validated votes.
Counting the votes passing the verification, the tallying contract is one by oneElement RSign in each extracted vote set FListx＝{mx,SignxH, the encrypted ballot m is subjected to the secret key eskxDecrypting to obtain the original voting information ticketx＝DEC(mxEsk), then the ticket counting contract calls the statistical method Count (ticket)1,ticket2,...,ticketn) And counting the votes. Where DEC is the elliptic curve decryption algorithm.
The seventh step: and (6) publishing a voting result.
The ticket counting contract publishes the final result VoteResult of the statistical method Count.
The above embodiments are preferred embodiments of the present invention, but the present invention is not limited to the above embodiments, and any other changes, modifications, substitutions, combinations, and simplifications which do not depart from the spirit and principle of the present invention should be construed as equivalents thereof, and all such changes, modifications, substitutions, combinations, and simplifications are intended to be included in the scope of the present invention.

Claims (3)

1. An anonymous electronic voting method based on a federation block chain is characterized in that the anonymous electronic voting method comprises the following steps:
s1, in the preparation stage, the CA contract generates an encryption key pair (epk, esk), and the decryption key esk is sent to the ticket counting contract;
s2, user registration, user voting UiRegistering the certificate into a block chain system of the alliance through CA authentication to obtain a certificate ECertiAnd an encrypted public key epk;
s3, generating public key ring, voting users UiGenerating a public and private key pair (pk)i,ski) And the public key pkiSending the public key ring management contract to a public key ring management contract, and calling an algorithm GenRing (RList) to generate a public key ring R, wherein RList ═ { pk1,pk2,...,pknThe collected public key set is used as the key set;
s4, generating encrypted votes and voting users UiThe generated original vote voting information is ticketiFurther, the original ballot is encrypted by using the encrypted public key epk to generate an encrypted ballot mi＝ENC(ticketi,epk)；
S5, generating ring signature ballot and voting users UiObtaining a public key ring R from a management contract, calling a ring signature algorithm RingSign, and utilizing a private key skiAnd a public key ring R pair encrypted ballot miGenerate ring signature Signi＝RingSign(mi,skiR), constructing ring signature ballot RSigni＝{mi,Signi}；
S6, sending ring signature ballot and voting users UiRing signature ballot RSigniSending the contract to a ballot box;
s7, verifying the validity of ring signature ballot, and passing the ballot box contract through CertVerify (ECert) authentication algorithmi,RSigni) Entering credential information ECertiAnd ring signature ballot RSigniJudging the validity of the vote;
s8, collecting the ring signature ballot, if the certVerfy verification result is valid, the ballot box contract accepts the ring signature ballot RSigniAnd apply RSigniPutting the vote into a vote set TList; if the verification result is invalid, discarding the ring signature ballot RSigni；
S9, sending the vote set, after the vote box contract reaches the voting deadline TLimit, the vote set TList is set to { RSignp,...,RSignk,.. } sending the ticket counting contract;
s10, verifying the validity of the ballot and constructing a ballot set: the vote counting contract receives a vote set TList sent by a vote casting box contract, calls a ring signature verification algorithm Verify, and verifies elements RSign in the TList one by onep＝{mp,SignpGet RSign if verification passespInto the vote set FList ═ RSignx,...,RSignn,...}；
S11, counting votes: the element RSign in the ballot set FList is extracted one by the ticket counting contractx＝{mx，SignxH, the encrypted ballot m is subjected to the secret key eskxDecrypting to obtain the original voting information ticketx＝DEC(mxEsk), then the ticket counting contract calls a statistical method to carry out statistics on the votes;
s12, publishing the voting result: the ticket counting contract publishes the final result VoteResult of the statistical method Count.
2. The anonymous electronic voting method according to claim 1, wherein the algorithm genring (rlist) in step S3 is as follows:
algorithm GenRing randomly generates n public keys { PK1,PK2,..,PKnR & ltSUB & gt & lt/SUB & gt { PK ] and RList1,PK2,..,PKnRList }, and outputs a set R, wherein n is more than or equal to 1 and less than or equal to 20.
3. The anonymous electronic voting method according to claim 1, wherein the certificating algorithm CertVerify (ECert) in step S7i,RSigni) The rule for judging the validity of the vote is as follows:
if the certificate ECertiIf the vote is valid and the first time is verified to be passed, the vote is valid, otherwise the vote is invalid.
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