CN110572254B - Lattice-based block chain changeable method - Google Patents

Lattice-based block chain changeable method Download PDF

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CN110572254B
CN110572254B CN201910862612.4A CN201910862612A CN110572254B CN 110572254 B CN110572254 B CN 110572254B CN 201910862612 A CN201910862612 A CN 201910862612A CN 110572254 B CN110572254 B CN 110572254B
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徐海霞
彭春英
李佩丽
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Institute of Information Engineering of CAS
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    • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
    • H04L63/00—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security
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    • H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
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    • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
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    • H04L9/00—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols
    • H04L9/002—Countermeasures against attacks on cryptographic mechanisms
    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
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    • H04L9/00—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols
    • H04L9/06—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols the encryption apparatus using shift registers or memories for block-wise or stream coding, e.g. DES systems or RC4; Hash functions; Pseudorandom sequence generators
    • H04L9/0643—Hash functions, e.g. MD5, SHA, HMAC or f9 MAC
    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
    • H04L9/00—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols
    • H04L9/32—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols including means for verifying the identity or authority of a user of the system or for message authentication, e.g. authorization, entity authentication, data integrity or data verification, non-repudiation, key authentication or verification of credentials
    • H04L9/3236—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols including means for verifying the identity or authority of a user of the system or for message authentication, e.g. authorization, entity authentication, data integrity or data verification, non-repudiation, key authentication or verification of credentials using cryptographic hash functions
    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
    • H04L9/00—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols
    • H04L9/32—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols including means for verifying the identity or authority of a user of the system or for message authentication, e.g. authorization, entity authentication, data integrity or data verification, non-repudiation, key authentication or verification of credentials
    • H04L9/3247—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols including means for verifying the identity or authority of a user of the system or for message authentication, e.g. authorization, entity authentication, data integrity or data verification, non-repudiation, key authentication or verification of credentials involving digital signatures
    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
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    • H04L9/00—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols
    • H04L9/32—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols including means for verifying the identity or authority of a user of the system or for message authentication, e.g. authorization, entity authentication, data integrity or data verification, non-repudiation, key authentication or verification of credentials
    • H04L9/3247—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols including means for verifying the identity or authority of a user of the system or for message authentication, e.g. authorization, entity authentication, data integrity or data verification, non-repudiation, key authentication or verification of credentials involving digital signatures
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Abstract

The invention provides a lattice-based method for changing a block chain, which comprises the following steps: when a user in the alliance chain puts forward a change request for the content of a certain historical block, other users in the alliance chain vote whether to allow the change, and if the number of votes which are allowed to be changed exceeds half of the total number of people, the vote is passed; after the vote passes, randomly selecting an editor from users participating in the vote to change the content of the history block; after the editor finishes changing the content, all information is broadcasted in the whole alliance chain, wherein the information comprises the changed content, the random number, the vote of the users participating in the vote, the selected certificate of the editor and the signature of the editor to the whole content; and other users in the alliance chain verify all the information broadcast by the editors, record the changed history blocks after the verification is passed, and mark all the information broadcast by the editors. The method can ensure that the block chain can be changed and resist quantum computing attack.

Description

Lattice-based block chain changeable method
Technical Field
The invention belongs to the technical field of information security, and relates to a design scheme of a post-quantum changeable block chain, in particular to a lattice-based changeable block chain method and a lattice-based changeable block chain system, which can improve the risk resistance of a block chain.
Background
The block chain is used as a core technology of a decentralized accounting platform, has the characteristics of tamper resistance, unchangeability and transaction traceability, and is an important technical innovation in the field of financial science and technology. The method can establish point-to-point credible value transfer among strange nodes without depending on a third-party credible institution, is beneficial to reducing transaction cost and improving interaction efficiency, is considered to have very wide application prospects in a plurality of fields such as asset management, finance, credit investigation, Internet of things, economic trade settlement and the like, and is widely concerned by various circles. While the irretrievable block chain guarantees the reliability and integrity of the data, it is not without its drawbacks. Harmful and illegal files, images and links exist in a bitcoin blockchain disclosed by the international criminal police organization, a vulnerability exists in a blockchain platform, error correction is needed, and under special conditions, contracts and records on the blockchain or transactions need to be cancelled, a changeable mechanism needs to be provided by the blockchain to ensure the healthy development of blockchain application.
In 2000, Krawczyk and Rabin first proposed the concept of chameleon hash function, which has its own special property, namely trapdoor collision, in addition to satisfying the collision resistance property of the hash function. When the information of the trap door is known, the collision meeting the conditions can be effectively calculated; and when no trap door exists, the method is equivalent to the collision resistance of a common hash function. In 2017, Atenise G, Magri B and Venturi D et al put forward the concept of modifiable blockchains in the written article "recoverable Block or writing History in Bitcoin and Friends", which replaced the ordinary hash function SHA256 in the Blockchain with a chameleon hash function, where given a privacy trap, collisions can be efficiently computed to modify the blocks while keeping the chain state unchanged. However, there is a problem in that if the trapdoor is held by an entity, he can modify the history block arbitrarily. If secret sharing is adopted and then the trap door is restored through the MPC protocol, the method is not suitable for the unlicensed scene of multiple users such as the bitcoin network due to the efficiency problem. Later, Puddu I, Dmitrienko A and Capkun S put forward a new modifiable block chain called μ chain in the paper "μ chain: How to Forget Without Hard Forks", introducing the concept of variable transactions for replacing data records. All data modification in the chain is achieved through access control policies and can be authenticated like normal transactions, subject to authorization and consensus. However, the adversary can set his transactions as unchangeable or just himself, and the MPC can also impact the efficiency and scalability of the chain.
In 2018, Li P L et al designed a new chameleon hash function for the federation chain in the written article "Research on fault-correcting block chain technology", and each member of the federation chain had an opportunity to modify the history record when the modification triggering condition was satisfied. The method is similar to the research content of the invention, but the trap door private key is exposed in the scheme, and if the trap door private key is not changed, the trap door private key can be calculated by calculating the hash value twice for different messages.
In addition to cryptographic techniques, non-cryptographic techniques are also used to modify blockchains, such as hard and soft forking. In the hard forking, no matter what transaction needs to be modified on the block, a new blockchain is directly connected from the block needing to be modified, but the influence is large, a plurality of blocks which are already confirmed are wasted, and all users need to download the new chain again. Old nodes in soft forking may not know that the consensus rule has changed, easily causing confusion.
Recently, Deuber D et al in the paper "reusable block chain in the licensing Setting" designed a consensus voting based block chain change scheme for unlicensed settings, and if the proposed modification operation votes enough, the corresponding block can be replaced with a new version (the old block remains on the chain). Derler D, Samelin K and Slamanig D, et al propose Attribute-Based Chameleon-Hashing in the written article "Fine-Grained and Controlled writing in Block chains-Chaeleon-Hashing Gone Attribute-Based", add a policy as input on the basis of the original Chameleon-Hashing, and only users who satisfy the policy can find the collision, which is more elaborate. However, the existing research work aiming at the modifiable mechanism of the block chain cannot resist the quantum computing attack.
Disclosure of Invention
Aiming at the problem that the block chain based on the existing public key cryptography is no longer safe under quantum computation, the invention aims to provide a lattice-based block chain changeable method based on a special algorithm of a lattice-based hash function, and provides a post-quantum block chain changeable scheme, so that the block chain is enabled to be changeable, and meanwhile, quantum computation attack can be resisted.
The invention designs a new chameleon-based chameleon hash function by taking advantage of the chameleon-based chameleon hash functions proposed by Cash and Hofheinz, and realizes the construction of a coalition chain alterable scheme of post-quantum security:
1. chameleon hash function based on lattice
The lattice-based hash function was first proposed by Cash and Hofheinz et al in "Bonsai trees, or how to delay a lattice basis", the definition of the function being as follows:
integer n is greater than or equal to 1, integer q is greater than or equal to 2, integer k is greater than or equal to 1, integer p is greater than or equal to 1, k is message length, message space
Figure BDA0002200265640000025
Gaussian parameter s, random number space
Figure BDA0002200265640000021
Value range
Figure BDA0002200265640000022
For matrix
Figure BDA0002200265640000023
And A ═ A0||A1Hash function
Figure BDA0002200265640000024
The expression of (a) is:
hA(m；r)＝A·(m||r)＝A0m+A1r
where m is the message to be encrypted and r is a random number.
2. Improved lattice-based hash function
In the method, a new hash function is proposed by referring to the concept and definition of the lattice-based hash function.
For matrix
Figure BDA0002200265640000031
(i∈[n]),A＝A0||A1||...||AnRandom number r ═ r (r)1,r2,...,rn) Hash function
Figure BDA0002200265640000032
Expressed as:
HashA(m；r)＝A·(m||r)＝A0m+A1r1+A2r2+...+Anrn
where m represents encrypted content, r represents a random number, and other parameters are consistent with those in the hash function proposed by Cash and Hofheinz et al.
The invention discloses a lattice-based method for changing a block chain, which comprises the following steps:
1. the user who needs to change the historical block information makes a change request, other users (which can be other partial users) in the alliance chain vote, and if the number of votes which are allowed to change exceeds half of the total number of the alliance chain, the next step is carried out.
2. The change request randomly selects an editor from the members participating in the voting in the alliance chain to change the content of the history block after the voting is passed.
3. After the editor finishes the content modification, the modified content and the random number are broadcasted in the whole chain, the votes of the participating users, the selected certificates of the editor and the signature of the editor on the whole content are carried out, and other users in the alliance chain are verified and recorded.
In the present invention, assuming that the number of all members of the federation chain is n, each member has a fixed ID, and the information to be modified is m, the specific steps of the lattice-based method for modifying a block chain include:
1. voting stage
When an emergency occurs, the information of a certain history block needs to be changed. If user P in the alliance chains(s∈[n]) If a change request is voluntarily initiated to change the content m of a certain historical block to m', the steps of starting voting by the user are as follows:
1) for change request RsSignature, broadcast (R)s,σs)；
2) After other users in the alliance chain receive the change request, if the other users agree to the change, the P pairsRequest R ofsSigning and broadcasting;
3) when P is presentsAfter more than half of the users' signatures are collected (assuming users are present)Number of is
Figure BDA0002200265640000033
) The t signatures are broadcast.
2. Election stage
When the edit request is passed, an editor is randomly selected from the users who participated in the voting, and the method uses (P)1,P2,...Pt) To represent the t users participating in the vote.
4) Each user participating in voting selects a random character string Si(i∈[t]) And signing the string and then broadcasting (S)i,σsi)；
5) After other users in the alliance chain receive the character strings, the character strings are sequenced according to the user IDs of the users participating in voting, and then the sequencing result is used as the input of a common hash function (predetermined) to obtain H (S)1,S2,...,St) Jmodt. According to the list of all the user IDs in the alliance chain, the users who participate in the voting and ranked at the j position can obtain the opportunity of changing the history block, and the P is usedcTo represent.
3. Change validation phase
6) To ensure that the hash values are identical, editor PcHash meeting the condition needs to be foundΑ(m；r)＝HashA(m '; r'), i.e. A0m+...+Acrc+...+Anrn＝A0m′+...+Acrc′+...+Anrn. By simplification, equation A can be obtainedcrc′＝A0m-A0m′+AcrcThen by using the private key (base S)c) Can be distributed from
Figure BDA0002200265640000041
Sampling random number rc', wherein
Figure BDA0002200265640000042
7) For better expression, a block is denoted as B ═ BS, x, ctr, r, where s is the state of the previous block, x is the block data, ctr is the maximum number of hash queries in each round, and r is a random number. Editor PcAfter changing block B to s, x, ctr, r > to B ═ s, x ', ctr, r' > then broadcast (m ', (r')1,...,rc',...,rn) T votes by other users (voting stage other users request for change R)sSignature of (d), random string S in election phasei(i∈[t]) And PcSignature on the above.
8) All user authentications H (S) in the federation chain, except for the editor1,S2,...St) Whether it is equal to j mod t, PcAnd the votes of the participants. If the verification is passed, the Hash is verified againA(m; r) is equal to HashA(m '; r'). After passing the verification, recording the changed history blocks and marking the history blocks, wherein the marked contents comprise the editors P in the last stepcAll information broadcast.
Compared with the prior art, the method provided by the invention has the advantages that the lattice-based hash function is adopted to replace the original hash function, and the quantum computing attack can be resisted. The new consensus mechanism provides guarantee for multi-party decision by introducing random character strings, ensures that selected editors are fair and random, and each member in the alliance chain has an opportunity to obtain the right of editing. When the history blocks are changed, the members of the whole chain do not need to cooperate together, the interaction times are few, and the efficiency is high. The invention thus provides an overall efficient and secure method for changing the block chain.
Drawings
FIG. 1 is a block chain structure capable of being modified according to the present invention.
Detailed Description
In order to make the aforementioned and other objects, features and advantages of the present invention comprehensible, embodiments accompanied with figures are described in detail below.
Suppose in a federation chain, the total number of users is denoted as n, each user has a fixed ID, and the information that the user needs to change is denoted as m. The specific implementation mode of the scheme of the invention is as follows:
1. initiating a vote
1) The user A wants to change the information m of the history block to m', and requests R for the changeASign, and broadcast (R)A,σA)；
2) After other users in the alliance chain receive the change request, if the other users agree to the modification request of the user A, the request R of the user AASigning and broadcasting;
3) after user A collects more than half of the signatures of the federation chain members (assuming the number is
Figure BDA0002200265640000051
) The t signatures are broadcast.
2. Election editor
4) After more than half of the members of the federation chain have granted the request to change, it is necessary to randomly select an editor from the voting participants (P)1,P2,...Pt) To represent the t users participating in the vote. Each user participating in voting selects a random character string Si(i∈[t]) And signing the string and then broadcasting (S)i,σsi)；
5) After other users in the alliance chain receive the character strings, the character strings are sequenced according to the user IDs of the users participating in voting, and then the sequencing result is used as the input of a common hash function (predetermined) to obtain H (S)1,S2,...,St) Jmodt. According to the list of all the user IDs in the alliance chain, the users who participate in the voting and ranked at the j position can obtain the opportunity of changing the history block, and the P is usedBTo represent.
3. Altering block content
6) To ensure that the hash values of the blocks before and after the change are the same, editor PBHash meeting the condition needs to be foundΑ(m；r)＝HashA(m '; r') is equivalent to solving the following equation when substituting the expression for the hash function: a. the0m+...+ABrB+...+Anrn＝A0m'+...+ABrB'+...+Anrn. By simplifyingEquation A can be obtainedBrB'＝A0m-A0m'+ABrBThen by using its own private key (base S)B) Can be distributed from
Figure BDA0002200265640000052
Sampling random number rB', wherein
Figure BDA0002200265640000053
4. Confirmation
After the editor changes the block, it needs to broadcast the information of the whole change process to the whole chain, and then the other members of the alliance chain perform verification and recording.
7) For better expression, a block is denoted as B ═ s, x, ctr, r >, where s is the state of the previous block, x is the block data, ctr is the maximum number of hash queries in each round, and r is a random number. Editor PBAfter changing block B to s, x, ctr, r > to B ═ s, x ', ctr, r' > then broadcast (m ', (r')1,...,rB',...,rn) T votes by other users (voting stage other users request for change R)sSignature of (d), random string S in election phasei(i∈[t]) And PBSignature on the above.
8) All other user authentications H (S) in the federation chain except the editor1,S2,...St) Whether it is equal to j mod t, PBAnd the votes of the participants. If the verification is passed, the Hash is verified againA(m; r) is equal to HashA(m '; r'). After passing the verification, recording the changed history blocks and marking the history blocks, wherein the marked contents comprise the last step of the user PBAll information of the editor.
The above embodiments are only intended to illustrate the technical solution of the present invention and not to limit the same, and a person skilled in the art can modify the technical solution of the present invention or substitute the same without departing from the spirit and scope of the present invention, and the scope of the present invention should be determined by the claims.

Claims (7)

1. A lattice-based method for changing a blockchain, comprising the steps of:
when a user in a alliance chain puts forward a change request for the content of a certain historical block, voting is carried out on whether the change is allowed by other users in the alliance chain, and if the number of votes which are allowed to be changed exceeds half of the total number of the users in the alliance chain, the votes are passed;
after the vote passes, randomly selecting an editor from users participating in the vote to change the content of the history block;
the method for selecting the editor comprises the following steps:
each user participating in voting selects a random character string, signs the character string and broadcasts the character string;
after other users in the alliance chain receive the character strings, sequencing the character strings according to the user IDs participating in voting;
performing modular operation on the hash function output value of the sorting result and the number of users participating in voting to obtain a parameter j;
according to the ID lists of all users in the alliance chain, the users who participate in voting and are ranked at the j-th position are used as editors;
when an editor changes the content, the editor finds out the random number meeting the condition according to the improved hash function based on the lattice to ensure that the hash values of the blocks before and after the change are the same, and the steps are as follows:
the expression of the improved lattice-based hash function is as follows:
HashA(m；r)＝A0m+...+ABrB+...+Anrn；
wherein the matrix
Figure FDA0002687552340000011
r is a random number, r is selected from a random number space
Figure FDA0002687552340000012
m is the encrypted content, s is a gaussian parameter,k is the message length, n, k and p are integers which are more than or equal to 1, and q is an integer which is more than or equal to 2;
hash satisfying conditionsA(m；r)＝HashA(m’；r’)；
HashA(m’；r’)＝A0m’+...+ABrB’+...+Anrn；
Solving for ABrB′＝A0m-A0m′+ABrBFrom distribution by private keys
Figure FDA0002687552340000013
Sampling random number rB', wherein
Figure FDA0002687552340000014
After the editor finishes changing the content, all information is broadcasted in the whole alliance chain, wherein the information comprises the changed content, the random number, the vote of the users participating in the vote, the selected certificate of the editor and the signature of the editor to the whole content;
all the other users except the editor in the alliance chain verify all the information broadcasted by the editor, record the changed history blocks after the verification is passed, and mark all the information broadcasted by the editor.
2. The method of claim 1, wherein the change request is signed and broadcast when the user makes the change request.
3. The method of claim 2, wherein other users in the federation chain, after receiving the change request, sign and broadcast the change request if they agree to the change; when more than half of the users' signatures are received by the users, the signatures are broadcast.
4. The method of claim 3, wherein the vote of the voting user is a signature of the change request by the voting user.
5. The method of claim 1 wherein the selected credentials of the editor are random strings selected by each user participating in the vote.
6. The method of claim 1, wherein for a block B ═ s, x, ctr, r >, where s is the state of the previous block, x is block data, ctr is the maximum number of hash queries in each round, r is a random number, and the editor modified block is B ═ s, x ', ctr, r' >.
7. The method of claim 1, wherein the modified content and random number are (m', (r)1,...,rB',...,rn))。
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