CN110557753A - DNS redirection method based on relay access - Google Patents
DNS redirection method based on relay access Download PDFInfo
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- H—ELECTRICITY
- H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
- H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
- H04L61/00—Network arrangements, protocols or services for addressing or naming
- H04L61/09—Mapping addresses
- H04L61/25—Mapping addresses of the same type
- H04L61/2503—Translation of Internet protocol [IP] addresses
- H04L61/256—NAT traversal
- H04L61/2589—NAT traversal over a relay server, e.g. traversal using relay for network address translation [TURN]
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- H—ELECTRICITY
- H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
- H04W—WIRELESS COMMUNICATION NETWORKS
- H04W12/00—Security arrangements; Authentication; Protecting privacy or anonymity
- H04W12/06—Authentication
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- H—ELECTRICITY
- H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
- H04W—WIRELESS COMMUNICATION NETWORKS
- H04W12/00—Security arrangements; Authentication; Protecting privacy or anonymity
- H04W12/40—Security arrangements using identity modules
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- H—ELECTRICITY
- H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
- H04W—WIRELESS COMMUNICATION NETWORKS
- H04W16/00—Network planning, e.g. coverage or traffic planning tools; Network deployment, e.g. resource partitioning or cells structures
- H04W16/24—Cell structures
- H04W16/26—Cell enhancers or enhancement, e.g. for tunnels, building shadow
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- H—ELECTRICITY
- H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
- H04W—WIRELESS COMMUNICATION NETWORKS
- H04W40/00—Communication routing or communication path finding
- H04W40/02—Communication route or path selection, e.g. power-based or shortest path routing
- H04W40/22—Communication route or path selection, e.g. power-based or shortest path routing using selective relaying for reaching a BTS [Base Transceiver Station] or an access point
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- H—ELECTRICITY
- H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
- H04W—WIRELESS COMMUNICATION NETWORKS
- H04W48/00—Access restriction; Network selection; Access point selection
- H04W48/16—Discovering, processing access restriction or access information
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- H—ELECTRICITY
- H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
- H04W—WIRELESS COMMUNICATION NETWORKS
- H04W74/00—Wireless channel access
- H04W74/002—Transmission of channel access control information
- H04W74/008—Transmission of channel access control information with additional processing of random access related information at receiving side
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- H—ELECTRICITY
- H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
- H04W—WIRELESS COMMUNICATION NETWORKS
- H04W76/00—Connection management
- H04W76/10—Connection setup
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- H—ELECTRICITY
- H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
- H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
- H04L61/00—Network arrangements, protocols or services for addressing or naming
- H04L61/45—Network directories; Name-to-address mapping
- H04L61/4505—Network directories; Name-to-address mapping using standardised directories; using standardised directory access protocols
- H04L61/4511—Network directories; Name-to-address mapping using standardised directories; using standardised directory access protocols using domain name system [DNS]
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- H—ELECTRICITY
- H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
- H04W—WIRELESS COMMUNICATION NETWORKS
- H04W88/00—Devices specially adapted for wireless communication networks, e.g. terminals, base stations or access point devices
- H04W88/02—Terminal devices
- H04W88/04—Terminal devices adapted for relaying to or from another terminal or user
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- Y—GENERAL TAGGING OF NEW TECHNOLOGICAL DEVELOPMENTS; GENERAL TAGGING OF CROSS-SECTIONAL TECHNOLOGIES SPANNING OVER SEVERAL SECTIONS OF THE IPC; TECHNICAL SUBJECTS COVERED BY FORMER USPC CROSS-REFERENCE ART COLLECTIONS [XRACs] AND DIGESTS
- Y02—TECHNOLOGIES OR APPLICATIONS FOR MITIGATION OR ADAPTATION AGAINST CLIMATE CHANGE
- Y02D—CLIMATE CHANGE MITIGATION TECHNOLOGIES IN INFORMATION AND COMMUNICATION TECHNOLOGIES [ICT], I.E. INFORMATION AND COMMUNICATION TECHNOLOGIES AIMING AT THE REDUCTION OF THEIR OWN ENERGY USE
- Y02D30/00—Reducing energy consumption in communication networks
- Y02D30/70—Reducing energy consumption in communication networks in wireless communication networks
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Abstract
the invention relates to the technical field of communication, in particular to a DNS redirection method based on relay access, which comprises the following steps: and completing the establishment of the initial attachment connection between the public network UE and the private network UE, completing the authentication relay access by the private network UE, and performing DNS redirection on transmission data modification. The invention can effectively solve the problems that DNS redirection operation is complex, the DNS redirection operation is easy to detect and the success rate is low in the prior art.
Description
Technical Field
the invention relates to the technical field of communication, in particular to a DNS redirection method based on relay access.
Background
the public security network communication field has special requirements for collecting user identity information, and has great value in analyzing and tracking users by utilizing mobile phone terminal information based on an LTE electronic fence. In the prior art, by setting an abnormal tac (tracking Area code), a terminal device is caused to perform a TAU (tracking Area update) process, a modification is performed in a complete TAU flow, an Identity ReqUEst NAS message is issued after RRC connection is completed, a Security header type and an Identity ReqUEst message Identity in the Identity ReqUEst are set, so that the terminal reports its IMSI code, and then the TAU flow is rejected, thereby avoiding bidirectional authentication and allowing the terminal to connect back to an original serving cell. The IMSI is used as the unique identity of the SIM card, and has important value for user information acquisition. In some special usage scenarios, it may be far from sufficient to obtain basic identification information, and besides obtaining IMSI, some other identification information may be needed, for example: data, telephone, short message, etc., so DNS redirection technology is currently used in many cases.
The existing DNS redirection technology modifies the local DNS setting by implanting software, so that the DNS requested by a user is redirected to a set target DNS server; or background codes are implanted into the webpage, and when a user clicks the webpage, the user can modify the local DNS setting, and the effect is the same as that of the method; or the firmware loophole of the router is utilized to cover the original DNS setting of the router, so that all users connected with the router are influenced and redirected to the target DNS.
in the actual use process, the following problems can occur in the technical scheme: when data transmission is carried out, particularly DNS redirection is carried out, the data transmission is triggered in a passive mode, the address of a DNS server of a user is modified through a webpage or software background implanted code, the user is required to actively click the webpage or install software, the mode is easily discovered and has low success rate, and the router connected with the user is difficult to locate and acquire by using a method for covering the original DNS setting of the router.
disclosure of Invention
In order to solve the technical problems, the invention provides a DNS redirection method based on relay access, which can effectively solve the problems that DNS redirection operation is complex, detection and discovery are easy and success rate is low in the prior art.
the invention is realized by adopting the following technical scheme:
A DNS redirection method based on relay access is characterized in that: establishing information communication connection between the public network UE and a private network eNB, between the private network eNB and the private network UE, and between the private network UE and the public network eNB respectively, so that the initial attachment connection of the public network UE and the private network UE is established, the private network UE completes authentication relay access, and DNS redirection is carried out on transmission data modification; the DNS redirection for the transmission data modification specifically includes:
a. The public network UE transmits an IP message to the private network eNB, the private network eNB positions a DNS data packet after receiving the message, and the message data is modified by bypassing encryption;
b. The private network eNB sends the modified IP message data to private network UE, the private network UE reports the request to the public network eNB, the private network UE accesses the Internet through a core network, locates to a modified DNS server, analyzes an IP address and returns the IP address to the private network eNB;
c. The private network eNB forwards the IP address to the public network UE, and the public network UE accesses the target HTTP server through the IP address so as to realize DNS redirection.
the specific steps of bypassing encryption and modifying message data are as follows: the same encryption algorithm used by both the sender and the receiver generates the key KeyStream, and both encryption and decryption are done by an exclusive-or operation.
the establishment of the initial attach connection of the public network UE specifically includes:
Firstly, after a public network UE is started, a physical downlink channel is synchronized to start searching a cell, whether the signal quality of the cell meets the requirement or not is judged, a proper cell is selected, and then the cell is resided and an attachment process is carried out;
secondly, the public network UE initiates random access request information, and the private network eNB sends a random access response message to the public network UE after detecting the information;
After receiving the random access response message, the public network UE adjusts the uplink sending time according to the tracking area in the message and sends a wireless resource control connection request message to the private network eNB;
Fourthly, the private network eNB sends the radio resource bearing establishment information and the radio resource configuration information to the public network UE;
and fifthly, the public network UE completes radio resource bearing and radio resource configuration and sends a radio resource control connection completion message to the private network eNB.
The private network UE completes radio resource bearing and radio resource configuration with the public network eNB in the same flow as the initial attachment connection of the public network UE.
the rrc connection complete message includes attach request information of the non-access stratum layer.
The specific steps of the private network UE completing the authentication relay access include:
the method comprises the steps that i, a private network eNB sends attachment request information sent by a public network UE to a public network eNB to MME through the private network UE to start an authentication process, wherein the attachment request information comprises IMSI and authentication request information;
II, the MME reports the authentication request information to HSS, and the HSS verifies the validity of the IMSI by inquiring a database thereof and generates an authentication vector group AV to be issued to the MME;
iii, the MME extracts data such as RAND, AUTN, KASME and the like from the AV, distributes a key identification KSIASME for the KASME, and issues a user authentication request with the data such as RAND, AUTN, KASME and the like to the private network UE;
and iv, the private network UE forwards the data of the user authentication request to the public network UE through the private network eNB, the public network UE calculates XMAC by extracting and calculating information such as MAC in AUTN, compares whether XMAC and MAC are equal, simultaneously checks whether the sequence number SQN is within a normal range, is used for authenticating the accessed network, and uploads the calculated RES to MME through the private network eNB, the private network UE and the public network eNB as an authentication response to complete an authentication process.
Before DNS redirection of transmission data modification, the method further comprises:
i, an MME requests to establish a default bearer by sending an initial context setting request message to a public network eNB;
II, after receiving the initial context setting request message, the public network eNB detects that if the initial context setting request message does not contain the public network UE capability information, the public network eNB issues messages to the private network UE to inquire the public network UE capability, and after the private network UE inquires the capability message of the public network UE through the private network eNB, the private network UE sends the messages to the public network eNB to report the public network UE capability information;
III, the public network eNB sends a safety mode starting message to the private network UE according to safety information supported by the public network UE to carry out safety activation; the private network UE sends a safety mode completion message to the public network eNB;
IV, the public network eNB sends wireless resource connection reconfiguration information to the private network UE to perform UE resource reconfiguration;
and V, after the private network UE sends the configuration success message to the public network eNB, the access flow is completed.
Compared with the prior art, the invention has the beneficial effects that:
1. the invention sets a relay node in the public network UE and the public network eNB, and the relay node forwards the message for one time or more times, thereby realizing relay access to obtain more terminal identity information and solving the problem of bidirectional authentication process which can not be carried out because the secret key can not be obtained. Meanwhile, the relay node is divided into two parts, namely the private network UE and the private network eNB, and the functions are decoupled, so that the functions are not interfered with each other, and the subsequent modules are easier to expand. When the private network UE is used, the private network eNB can be fixed in position, the private network UE is small in size and can be carried about to move, information receiving and parameter changing are facilitated, functions of the private network UE can be added and deleted conveniently, and the like are more convenient.
When the DNS for the transmission data is redirected, the private network UE and the private network eNB are utilized, so that the IP data packet of the public network UE can be directly modified when the public network UE is distributed in a network, active triggering is realized, no operation is required to be performed by a user, the detection and the discovery are difficult, and the success rate is higher. The DNS redirection is carried out through the relay access, so that the user can be induced to a recently deployed HTTP server to carry out user information acquisition.
2. The same encryption algorithm used by both the sender and the receiver generates a key KeyStream, encryption and decryption are completed through XOR operation, the original ciphertext can be modified into the required ciphertext through a specific mask, operation and operation are simple, and the efficiency of modifying message data is improved.
Because PDCD (packet data convergence protocol) layer only opens the encryption mode without integrity protection, the IP data message is modified by bypassing the encryption algorithm to realize DNS redirection
3. public network UE establishes connection with a private network eNB, the public network eNB establishes connection with the private network UE, the private network UE and the private network eNB serve as relay nodes to act as agents for accessing the public network UE to a public network core, encryption keys do not need to be acquired, the UE can be acted to access the core network by breaking encryption algorithms, and therefore data is intercepted in subsequent data transmission to acquire relevant information.
Drawings
the invention will be described in further detail with reference to the following description taken in conjunction with the accompanying drawings and detailed description, in which:
FIG. 1 is a schematic diagram of the general structure of the present invention;
Fig. 2 is a schematic diagram of a relay access process according to the present invention.
Detailed Description
example 1
as a basic implementation manner of the present invention, referring to fig. 1 of the specification, the present invention includes a DNS redirection method based on relay access, which establishes information communication connections between a public network UE and a private network eNB, between the private network eNB and the private network UE, and between the private network UE and the public network eNB, respectively, so that the initial attachment connection establishment of the public network UE and the private network UE is completed, the private network UE completes authentication relay access, and performs DNS redirection for transmission data modification.
the DNS redirection for the transmission data modification specifically includes:
a. Public network UE transmits an IP message to a private network eNB, the private network eNB receives the message and then positions a DNS data packet, encryption is bypassed to modify message data, a sender and a receiver both use the same encryption algorithm to generate a secret key KeyStream, and encryption and decryption are completed through XOR operation;
b. the private network eNB sends the modified IP message data to private network UE, the private network UE reports the request to the public network eNB, the private network UE accesses the Internet through a core network, locates to a modified DNS server, analyzes an IP address and returns the IP address to the private network eNB;
c. the private network eNB forwards the IP address to the public network UE, and the public network UE accesses the target HTTP server through the IP address so as to realize DNS redirection.
The public network UE is a user terminal needing to acquire relevant identity information; the public network eNB is a base station of a conventional operator; the private network eNB is a base station enabling the public network UE to be in relay access; the private network UE is a terminal for simulating the public network UE to access the base station of the operator.
example 2
as a preferred embodiment of the present invention, the present invention includes a relay access based DNS redirection method, which establishes information communication connections between a public network UE and a private network eNB, between a private network eNB and a private network UE, and between a private network UE and a public network eNB, respectively, so that the initial attachment establishment of the public network UE and the private network UE is completed, the private network UE completes authentication relay access, and performs DNS redirection for transmission data modification.
The establishment of the initial attach connection of the public network UE specifically includes:
Firstly, after a public network UE is started, PLMN (public land mobile network) selection is carried out, then physical downlink channel synchronization is carried out, and cells are searched, wherein the searching order is a same-frequency cell, a different-frequency cell and a different-system cell under the same system; the public network UE still needs to judge whether the signal quality of the cell meets the requirements, determine whether the cell can be resided in, select a proper cell according to the rule of cell selection, and then perform an attachment process;
secondly, the public network UE carries out an attachment process, and firstly initiates random access request information, namely MSG1 information; after detecting the MSG1 message, the private network eNB sends a random access response message, namely an MSG2 message, to the public network UE;
After receiving the random access response, the public network UE adjusts the uplink transmission opportunity according to the tracking area in the MSG2, and transmits an RRCConnectionReqUEst message to the private network eNB.
Fourthly, the private network eNB sends a radio resource control connection request message to the public network UE, wherein the radio resource control connection request message comprises the bearing information for establishing SRB1 (radio resource bearing) and the radio resource configuration information;
fifthly, the public network UE completes SRB1 bearing and radio resource configuration, and sends RRCConnectionSetupComplex (radio resource control connection complete) message to the private network eNB, wherein the message comprises Attach reqUEst information of the non-access layer.
And (4) repeating the processes from the first step to the fifth step by the private network UE, and completing radio resource bearing and radio resource allocation with the public network eNB.
The DNS redirection for the transmission data modification specifically includes:
a. public network UE transmits an IP message to a private network eNB, the private network eNB receives the message and then positions a DNS data packet, encryption is bypassed to modify message data, a sender and a receiver both use the same encryption algorithm to generate a secret key KeyStream, and encryption and decryption are completed through XOR operation;
b. The private network eNB sends the modified IP message data to private network UE, the private network UE reports the request to the public network eNB, the private network UE accesses the Internet through a core network, locates to a modified DNS server, analyzes an IP address and returns the IP address to the private network eNB;
c. The private network eNB forwards the IP address to the public network UE, and the public network UE accesses the target HTTP server through the IP address so as to realize DNS redirection.
example 3
as a best implementation mode of the present invention, referring to fig. 2 of the specification, the present invention includes a DNS redirection method based on relay access, which establishes information communication connections between a public network UE and a private network eNB, between the private network eNB and the private network UE, and between the private network UE and the public network eNB, respectively, so that the initial attachment connection establishment of the public network UE and the private network UE is completed, the private network UE completes authentication relay access, and performs DNS redirection for transmission data modification.
the establishment of the initial attachment connection of the public network UE specifically includes:
firstly, after a public network UE is started, PLMN (public land mobile network) selection is carried out, then physical downlink channel synchronization is carried out, and cells are searched, wherein the searching order is a same-frequency cell, a different-frequency cell and a different-system cell under the same system; the public network UE still needs to judge whether the signal quality of the cell meets the requirements, determine whether the cell can be resided in, select a proper cell according to the rule of cell selection, and then perform an attachment process;
Secondly, the public network UE carries out an attachment process, and firstly initiates random access request information, namely MSG1 information; after detecting the MSG1 message, the private network eNB sends a random access response message, namely an MSG2 message, to the public network UE;
After receiving the random access response, the public network UE adjusts the uplink transmission opportunity according to the tracking area in the MSG2, and transmits an RRCConnectionReqUEst message to the private network eNB.
Fourthly, the private network eNB sends a radio resource control connection request message to the public network UE, wherein the radio resource control connection request message comprises the bearing information for establishing SRB1 (radio resource bearing) and the radio resource configuration information;
fifthly, the public network UE completes SRB1 bearing and radio resource configuration, and sends RRCConnectionSetupComplex (radio resource control connection complete) message to the private network eNB, wherein the message comprises Attach reqUEst information of the non-access layer.
the establishment of the initial attach connection of the private network UE specifically includes: and (4) repeating the processes from the first step to the fifth step by the private network UE, and completing radio resource bearing and radio resource allocation with the public network eNB.
The specific steps of the private network UE completing the authentication relay access include:
The method comprises the steps that i, a private network eNB sends Attach reqUEst information (Attach reqUEst information) sent by a public network UE to a public network eNB through the private network UE to start an authentication process from the public network eNB to a public network MME, wherein the Attach reqUEst information comprises IMSI and authentication reqUEst information;
II, the public network MME reports the authentication request information to the public network HSS, and the public network HSS verifies the validity of the IMSI by inquiring a database thereof and generates an authentication vector group AV and sends the authentication vector group AV to the public network MME;
iii, the public network MME extracts data such as RAND, AUTN, KASME and the like from the AV, distributes a key identifier KSIASME for the KASME, and issues a user authentication request with the data such as RAND, AUTN, KASME and the like to the private network UE;
iv, private network UE forwards the data of the user authentication request to public network UE through a private network eNB, the public network UE calculates XMAC by extracting and calculating information such as MAC in AUTN, compares whether XMAC and MAC are equal, simultaneously checks whether a sequence number SQN is in a normal range, is used for authenticating the accessed network, and uploads the calculated RES as an authentication response to MME to complete an authentication process through the private network eNB, the private network UE and the public network eNB in sequence;
v, the public network MME REQUESTs to establish a default bearer by sending an INITIAL CONTEXT SETUP REQUEST message to the public network eNB, wherein the default bearer comprises an Attach Accept message and an active default EPS bearer contract REQUEST message of a non-access stratum (NAS);
After receiving the initial context setting request message, the public network eNB detects that if the public network eNB does not contain the public network UE capability information, the public network eNB sends messages to the private network UE to inquire the public network UE capability, and after the private network UE inquires the capability message of the public network UE through the private network eNB, the private network UE sends the messages to the public network eNB to report the public network UE capability information;
vii the public network eNB sends a securityModeCommand message to the private network UE according to the security information supported by the public network UE, performs security activation, and after the security activation is completed, the private network UE returns a securityModeComplete message to the public network eNB;
Viii the public network eNB sends an RRCConnectionReconfiguration message to the private network UE to perform UE resource reconfiguration, including reconfiguring SRB1 (radio resource bearer) and radio resource configuration, and establishing SRB2, DRB (including default bearer), and the like. After the completion, the private network UE returns a configuration success message to the public network eNB to complete the access flow.
The DNS redirection for the transmission data modification specifically includes:
a. The public network UE transmits an IP message to the private network eNB, the private network eNB receives the message and then positions a DNS data packet, encryption and modification of message data are bypassed, a same encryption algorithm used by a sender and a receiver generates a secret key KeyStream, and encryption and decryption are completed through exclusive OR operation.
Assuming that the transmitted plaintext is m and the encrypted ciphertext is c, the encryption is: KeyStream XOR m = c, decrypted as: KeyStream XOR c = m. When modifying the message data, it is assumed that a specific mask is used to perform XOR with the ciphertext c to obtain a ciphertext c ', and the ciphertext c ' is decrypted to obtain a plaintext m '.
The formula is described as: mask XOR c = c '; KeyStream XOR c ' = m '; simple derivation:
KeyStream XOR c’ XOR m = m’ XOR m；
KeyStream XOR c’ XOR (KeyStream XOR c)=m’ XOR m；
KeyStream XOR (mask XOR c) XOR (KeyStream XOR c)=m’ XOR m；
mask=m’ XOR m;
i.e. the required mask is the xor of the original plaintext and the modified message data. For a mobile data network, the DNS of the same operator and the same area is generally fixed and easily available, so that the plaintext of the DNS data packet can be guessed approximately. The DNS redirection is achieved by only modifying the IP address in the DNS request, which is fixed at the offset in the packet, so that the modified location can be easily found.
The transmitted data message needs to be positioned with a DNS request data packet, the length of the DNS data packet is found to have very obvious distinction degree with the length of other frames through statistics, so that the data packet of the suspected DNS request is modified, whether a request response exists subsequently or not is observed, and if the response is received, the modified position is correct.
b. the private network eNB sends the modified IP message data to private network UE, the private network UE reports the request to the public network eNB, the private network UE accesses the Internet through a core network, locates to a modified DNS server, analyzes an IP address and returns the IP address to the private network eNB;
c. the private network eNB forwards the IP address to the public network UE, and the public network UE accesses the target HTTP server through the IP address so as to realize DNS redirection.
In summary, after reading the present disclosure, those skilled in the art should make various other modifications without creative efforts according to the technical solutions and concepts of the present disclosure, which are within the protection scope of the present disclosure.
Claims (7)
1. A DNS redirection method based on relay access is characterized in that: establishing information communication connection between the public network UE and a private network eNB, between the private network eNB and the private network UE, and between the private network UE and the public network eNB respectively, so that the initial attachment connection of the public network UE and the private network UE is established, the private network UE completes authentication relay access, and DNS redirection is carried out on transmission data modification; the DNS redirection for the transmission data modification specifically includes:
a. the public network UE transmits an IP message to the private network eNB, the private network eNB positions a DNS data packet after receiving the message, and the message data is modified by bypassing encryption;
b. the private network eNB sends the modified IP message data to private network UE, the private network UE reports the request to the public network eNB, the private network UE accesses the Internet through a core network, locates to a modified DNS server, analyzes an IP address and returns the IP address to the private network eNB;
c. The private network eNB forwards the IP address to the public network UE, and the public network UE accesses the target HTTP server through the IP address so as to realize DNS redirection.
2. the DNS redirecting method according to claim 1, wherein: the specific step of bypassing encryption and modifying message data in the step a is as follows: the same encryption algorithm used by both the sender and the receiver generates the key KeyStream, and both encryption and decryption are done by an exclusive-or operation.
3. the DNS redirecting method according to claim 2, wherein: the establishment of the initial attach connection of the public network UE specifically includes:
Firstly, after a public network UE is started, a physical downlink channel is synchronized to start searching a cell, whether the signal quality of the cell meets the requirement or not is judged, a proper cell is selected, and then the cell is resided and an attachment process is carried out;
secondly, the public network UE initiates random access request information, and the private network eNB sends a random access response message to the public network UE after detecting the information;
after receiving the random access response message, the public network UE adjusts the uplink sending time according to the tracking area in the message and sends a wireless resource control connection request message to the private network eNB;
fourthly, the private network eNB sends the radio resource bearing establishment information and the radio resource configuration information to the public network UE;
And fifthly, the public network UE completes radio resource bearing and radio resource configuration and sends a radio resource control connection completion message to the private network eNB.
4. The DNS redirection method based on relay access according to claim 3, wherein: the private network UE completes radio resource bearing and radio resource configuration with the public network eNB in the same flow as the initial attachment connection of the public network UE.
5. The DNS redirection method based on relay access according to claim 4, wherein: the rrc connection complete message includes attach request information of the non-access stratum layer.
6. the DNS redirection method based on relay access according to claim 5, wherein: the specific steps of the private network UE completing the authentication relay access include:
The method comprises the steps that i, a private network eNB sends attachment request information sent by a public network UE to a public network eNB to MME through the private network UE to start an authentication process, wherein the attachment request information comprises IMSI and authentication request information;
II, the MME reports the authentication request information to HSS, and the HSS verifies the validity of the IMSI by inquiring a database thereof and generates an authentication vector group AV to be issued to the MME;
Iii, the MME extracts data such as RAND, AUTN, KASME and the like from the AV, distributes a key identification KSIASME for the KASME, and issues a user authentication request with the data such as RAND, AUTN, KASME and the like to the private network UE;
and iv, the private network UE forwards the data of the user authentication request to the public network UE through the private network eNB, the public network UE calculates XMAC by extracting and calculating information such as MAC in AUTN, compares whether XMAC and MAC are equal, simultaneously checks whether the sequence number SQN is within a normal range, is used for authenticating the accessed network, and uploads the calculated RES to MME through the private network eNB, the private network UE and the public network eNB as an authentication response to complete an authentication process.
7. the DNS redirection method based on relay access according to claim 6, wherein: before DNS redirection of transmission data modification, the method further comprises:
I, an MME requests to establish a default bearer by sending an initial context setting request message to a public network eNB;
II, after receiving the initial context setting request message, the public network eNB detects that if the initial context setting request message does not contain the public network UE capability information, the public network eNB issues messages to the private network UE to inquire the public network UE capability, and after the private network UE inquires the capability message of the public network UE through the private network eNB, the private network UE sends the messages to the public network eNB to report the public network UE capability information;
III, the public network eNB sends a safety mode starting message to the private network UE according to safety information supported by the public network UE to carry out safety activation; the private network UE sends a safety mode completion message to the public network eNB;
IV, the public network eNB sends wireless resource connection reconfiguration information to the private network UE to perform UE resource reconfiguration;
and V, after the private network UE sends the configuration success message to the public network eNB, the access flow is completed.
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