CN110536294A - A kind of method that inverse attack obtains GMR-2 encryption satellite communication key - Google Patents
A kind of method that inverse attack obtains GMR-2 encryption satellite communication key Download PDFInfo
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- H—ELECTRICITY
- H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
- H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
- H04L9/00—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols
- H04L9/08—Key distribution or management, e.g. generation, sharing or updating, of cryptographic keys or passwords
- H04L9/0894—Escrow, recovery or storing of secret information, e.g. secret key escrow or cryptographic key storage
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- H—ELECTRICITY
- H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
- H04W—WIRELESS COMMUNICATION NETWORKS
- H04W12/00—Security arrangements; Authentication; Protecting privacy or anonymity
- H04W12/04—Key management, e.g. using generic bootstrapping architecture [GBA]
- H04W12/041—Key generation or derivation
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- H—ELECTRICITY
- H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
- H04W—WIRELESS COMMUNICATION NETWORKS
- H04W84/00—Network topologies
- H04W84/02—Hierarchically pre-organised networks, e.g. paging networks, cellular networks, WLAN [Wireless Local Area Network] or WLL [Wireless Local Loop]
- H04W84/04—Large scale networks; Deep hierarchical networks
- H04W84/06—Airborne or Satellite Networks
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- H—ELECTRICITY
- H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
- H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
- H04L9/00—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols
- H04L9/50—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols using hash chains, e.g. blockchains or hash trees
Abstract
A kind of method that inverse attack obtains GMR-2 encryption satellite communication key, belongs to satellite communication decryption technology field.The present invention can use a frame key stream and establish inquiry table, and candidate key is obtained and then tabling look-up to obtain effective key chain, be correct encryption key finally by unique public keys in the corresponding candidate cipher key sets of multiframe key stream is found.What be can be convenient during specific implementation carries out dynamic additions and deletions and backtracking to effective key chain, so that concrete operations are easier to realize；The method for looking for public keys by using multiple candidate key sets in verifying simultaneously, can obtain encryption key in the case where not knowing key device initialization mode.
Description
Technical field
The present invention relates to a kind of methods that inverse attack obtains GMR-2 encryption satellite communication key, belong to satellite communication solution
Close technical field.
Background technique
With the rapid development of mobile communication, people all over the world can conveniently be communicated.But it is mobile
The normal work of communication system depend on base station and antenna, it is some remote districts or the length and breadth of land oceans on base station construction and
There are engineering or technical difficulties for maintenance.Therefore, in the region that these traditional mobile communication system signals can not cover
Satellite phone is widely used.
Enjoy satellite communication to we life bring it is many convenient while, the safety of satellite communication is also more next
More is concerned by people.European Telecommunication Standardization Association (ETSI) proposes the Encryption Algorithm of two kinds of satellite phones:
GMR-1 and GMR-2.The specification of GMR-1 algorithm is the extension of GSM standard, and Thuraya (shura is sub-) satellite phone has used this
Encryption Algorithm；GMR-2 is a kind of stream cipher of ETSI brand-new design, is mainly used for International Maritime Satellite Organization (INMARSAT)
In satellite phone.
In recent years, researcher has done very in terms of the safety using the satellite communication system of GMR-2 Encryption Algorithm
More researchs." Don't Trust Satellite Phones:A Security is write by Benedikt Driessen et al.
Analysis of Two Satphone Standards " (not believe satellite phone: the safety of two kinds of satellite phone standards
Analysis) pass through reversed work in [IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy, 2012, pp.128-142] text
Journey is proposed the structure and ciphering process of GMR-2 encryption equipment, to crack GMR-2 algorithm.Jiao HU et al. is write
“A real-time inversion attack on the GMR-2cipher used in the satellite
Phones " (the real-time inverse attack to the GMR-2 encryption equipment being used in satellite phone) [Science China
Information Sciences, 2018,61 (3): 032113] text is proposed by the reverse characteristic of research GMR-2 encryption equipment
A kind of real-time inverse attack method using single frames key stream, including establish inquiry table, On-line Timing Plan Selection, screening, combine and test
Card and etc..This method needs the initialization mode of well-known key device in verifying, therefore has some limitations.
Summary of the invention
In order to make up deficiency existing for existing research, GMR-2 is obtained the present invention provides a kind of inverse attack and encrypts satellite
The method of communication key realizes the method for looking for public keys by using multiple candidate key sets in verifying, has filled up
The blank of encryption key can be obtained in the case where not knowing key device initialization mode.
Technical scheme is as follows:
A kind of method that inverse attack obtains GMR-2 encryption satellite communication key, is realized, including life by three steps
At inquiry table, table look-up candidate key and verifying obtain correct key, the specific steps of which are as follows:
1) inquiry table is generated according to key stream
In GMR-2 standard, encryption key totally 8 bytes are expressed as (K0,K1,…,K7)；One frame key stream has 15 words
Section, is expressed as (Z0,Z1..., Z14), for key stream known to one group, analyze the c+8 clock, available 7 group key stream
Combination (the Z of bytec+8,Zc+7,Zc), wherein 0≤c≤6, ZcIndicate c-th of key stream byte；In c-th of key byte KcIt is known
In the case where, according to (Zc+8,Zc+7,Zc) it can uniquely determine t-th of key byte Kt, therefore every group of (Zc+8,Zc+7,Zc) value
All correspond to 256 groups of possible (Kc,Kt,t)；Define 8 structural body list [0] ..., list [7], for 0≤c≤6, (Kc,
Kt, t) and according to Kc0~255 sequence is taken to be stored in structural body list [c], referred to as table list [c], thus, it is possible to obtain 7
Table；When the serial number of table takes 7, corresponding KtIt can not be obtained according to key stream with t, therefore when establishing [7] table list, wherein K7Take 0
~255, corresponding KtIt is set as 0 entirely with t；8 table list [0] have thus been obtained ..., list [7]；
2) by tabling look-up to obtain candidate key
A. the effective key chain found before a vector R is used to store is defined；Vector Delta is used to store currently
The key chain of lookup；Array Tao1, Tao2 length is 8, and array element value is 0 or 1, and the key word of corresponding position is indicated when taking 1
Section has obtained；Vector KeyCandidate is used to store the candidate key found；The value of initialize array Tao1, Tao2 is 0,
C=0, Kc=0；
B. according to (c, Kc) look-up table list [c] KcRow obtains and KcCorresponding (t, Kt), judge array Tao1 or
Whether t of Tao2 are 1, if not 1, then go to step c；If 1, then (t, K are judgedt) with the presence or absence of in vector Delta
Or in R, if so, going to step g；If it is not, executing function backtrack；Then go to step i；
C. judge whether t is equal to c, if so, going to step d；If it is not, going to step e；
D. judge KtWhether K is equal toc, if so, going to step g；If it is not, executing function backtrack；Then go to step
i；
E. judge whether t is equal to 7, if so, going to step f；If it is not, going to step h；
F. it is set as 1 c and the 7th of array Tao2, while (c, Kc) and (7, K7) be stored in vector Delta, it holds
Line function Combine；Then go to step i；
G. it is set as 1 c of array Tao2, while (c, Kc) be stored in vector Delta, execute function Combine；
Then go to step i；
H. it is set as 1 c of array Tao2, while (c, Kc) be stored in vector Delta, (t, Kt) value be assigned to
(c,Kc)；
I. judge c=0 and KcWhether > 255 set up simultaneously, if it is not, going to step b；If so, vector KeyCandidate
In content be whole candidate keys；
Two subfunctions described in above-mentioned steps, are defined respectively as:
Function Combine:
C1. the value of vector Delta is stored in vector R, the value of array Tao1 and array Tao2 is subjected to exclusive or result and is deposited
Into array Tao1, the number for the element that statistics array Tao1 intermediate value is 1 then goes to step C2 if 8；Otherwise step is gone to
C3；
C2. vector R is stored in vector KeyCandidate, the last one element in vector R is deleted, by array
The value of Tao1 and array Tao2 carries out exclusive or result and is stored in array Tao1, executes function backtrack；Then go to step
C4；
C3. if preceding 7 place value is 1 in array Tao1, last place value is 0, then enabling first 7 of array Tao2 is 0, finally
One is 1；Vector Delta is emptied, K is worked as7When successively taking 0~255, following operation is executed respectively: (7, K7) deposit vector
In Delta, function Combine is executed；If above-mentioned condition is unsatisfactory for, enable c be equal to array Tao1 in first be 0 member
The corresponding subscript of element, Kc=0；Go to step C4；
C4. the element in array Tao2 is initialized as 0, empties vector Delta, return to (c, Kc) value；
Function backtrack:
B1. the value of first structural body in amount of orientation Delta is assigned to (c, Kc), then KcValue add 1；Judge Kc>
Whether 255 is true, if so, going to step B2；If it is not, then going to step B4；
B2. judge whether c=0 is true, if so, returning to (c, Kc) value；If it is not, then going to step B3；
B3. the last one value in vector R is assigned to vector Delta, the digit of array Tao2 is indicated with s, successively to
First value of each structural body is assigned to s in amount Delta, and the s values of array Tao2 are set as 1；It deletes in vector R most
The value of array Tao1 and array Tao2 is carried out exclusive or result and is stored in array Tao1, executes function by the latter element
backtrack；
B4. the value of array Tao2 is initialized as 0, the value of vector Delta empties, and returns to (c, Kc) value；
3) verifying obtains correct key
In the case where not knowing key device initialization mode, encryption key is obtained in the following manner:
I. the public keys that a vector I is used to store two group key streams is defined, indicates kth frame key stream with k, k's is first
Initial value is 1；
Ii. for the 0th frame key stream, one group of candidate's key can be obtained by step 1) and step 2), be stored in vector
In KeyCandidate [0]；For kth frame key stream, one group of candidate's key can be obtained by step 1) and step 2), be stored in
In vector KeyCandidate [k]；A candidate key and vector are successively taken from vector KeyCandidate [0]
Each of KeyCandidate [k] candidate's key is compared, if it is possible to the time from vector KeyCandidate [k]
Select found in key one it is identical as this candidate key in vector KeyCandidate [0], then be stored in vector I；
Iii. judge the element number in vector I, if the candidate key of only one in vector I, this candidate key
The encryption key looked for is sought to, obtaining encryption key process terminates；If there is multiple candidate keys, then k=k+1 is enabled, step is gone to
Rapid iv；
Iv. for kth frame key stream, one group of candidate's key can be obtained by step 1) and step 2), be stored in vector
In KeyCandidate [k]；Candidate each of a key and vector KeyCandidate [k] are successively taken from vector I
Candidate key is compared, if it is possible to from found in the candidate key in vector KeyCandidate [k] one with vector I in
This candidate key it is identical, then retain this candidate key in vector I, if this candidate key in vector I with to
All candidate keys measured in KeyCandidate [k] are all different, then delete this candidate's key from vector I；Go to step
Rapid iii.
The present invention provides a kind of methods that inverse attack obtains GMR-2 encryption satellite communication key, it may be convenient to right
Effective key chain is dynamically deleted and is recalled, and has the characteristics that be easily achieved；Simultaneously in verifying by using multiple times
The method for selecting key set to look for public keys has been filled up and has obtained encryption key in the case where not knowing key device initialization mode
Blank.
Specific embodiment
Below with reference to embodiment, the invention will be further described, but not limited to this.
Embodiment:
A kind of method that inverse attack obtains GMR-2 encryption satellite communication key, is realized, including life by three steps
At inquiry table, table look-up candidate key and verifying obtain correct key, the specific steps of which are as follows:
1) inquiry table is generated according to key stream
In GMR-2 standard, encryption key totally 8 bytes are expressed as (K0,K1,…,K7)；One frame key stream has 15 words
Section, is expressed as (Z0,Z1..., Z14), for key stream known to one group, analyze the c+8 clock, available 7 group key stream
Combination (the Z of bytec+8,Zc+7,Zc), wherein 0≤c≤6, ZcIndicate c-th of key stream byte；In c-th of key byte KcIt is known
In the case where, according to (Zc+8,Zc+7,Zc) it can uniquely determine t-th of key byte Kt, therefore every group of (Zc+8,Zc+7,Zc) value
All correspond to 256 groups of possible (Kc,Kt,t)；Define 8 structural body list [0] ..., list [7], for 0≤c≤6, (Kc,
Kt, t) and according to Kc0~255 sequence is taken to be stored in structural body list [c], referred to as table list [c], thus, it is possible to obtain 7
Table；When the serial number of table takes 7, corresponding KtIt can not be obtained according to key stream with t, therefore when establishing [7] table list, wherein K7Take 0
~255, corresponding KtIt is set as 0 entirely with t；8 table list [0] have thus been obtained ..., list [7]；
2) by tabling look-up to obtain candidate key
A. the effective key chain found before a vector R is used to store is defined；Vector Delta is used to store currently
The key chain of lookup；Array Tao1, Tao2 length is 8, and array element value is 0 or 1, and the key word of corresponding position is indicated when taking 1
Section has obtained；Vector KeyCandidate is used to store the candidate key found；The value of initialize array Tao1, Tao2 is 0,
C=0, Kc=0；
B. according to (c, Kc) look-up table list [c] KcRow obtains and KcCorresponding (t, Kt), judge array Tao1 or
Whether t of Tao2 are 1, if not 1, then go to step c；If 1, then (t, K are judgedt) with the presence or absence of in vector Delta
Or in R, if so, going to step g；If it is not, executing function backtrack；Then go to step i；
C. judge whether t is equal to c, if so, going to step d；If it is not, going to step e；
D. judge KtWhether K is equal toc, if so, going to step g；If it is not, executing function backtrack；Then go to step
i；
E. judge whether t is equal to 7, if so, going to step f；If it is not, going to step h；
F. it is set as 1 c and the 7th of array Tao2, while (c, Kc) and (7, K7) be stored in vector Delta, it holds
Line function Combine；Then go to step i；
G. it is set as 1 c of array Tao2, while (c, Kc) be stored in vector Delta, execute function Combine；
Then go to step i；
H. it is set as 1 c of array Tao2, while (c, Kc) be stored in vector Delta, (t, Kt) value be assigned to
(c,Kc)；
I. judge c=0 and KcWhether > 255 set up simultaneously, if it is not, going to step b；If so, vector KeyCandidate
In content be whole candidate keys；
Two subfunctions described in above-mentioned steps, are defined respectively as:
Function Combine:
C1. the value of vector Delta is stored in vector R, the value of array Tao1 and array Tao2 is subjected to exclusive or result and is deposited
Into array Tao1, the number for the element that statistics array Tao1 intermediate value is 1 then goes to step C2 if 8；Otherwise step is gone to
C3；
C2. vector R is stored in vector KeyCandidate, the last one element in vector R is deleted, by array
The value of Tao1 and array Tao2 carries out exclusive or result and is stored in array Tao1, executes function backtrack；Then go to step
C4；
C3. if preceding 7 place value is 1 in array Tao1, last place value is 0, then enabling first 7 of array Tao2 is 0, finally
One is 1；Vector Delta is emptied, K is worked as7When successively taking 0~255, following operation is executed respectively: (7, K7) deposit vector
In Delta, function Combine is executed；If above-mentioned condition is unsatisfactory for, enable c be equal to array Tao1 in first be 0 member
The corresponding subscript of element, Kc=0；Go to step C4；
C4. the element in array Tao2 is initialized as 0, empties vector Delta, return to (c, Kc) value；
Function backtrack:
B1. the value of first structural body in amount of orientation Delta is assigned to (c, Kc), then KcValue add 1；Judge Kc>
Whether 255 is true, if so, going to step B2；If it is not, then going to step B4；
B2. judge whether c=0 is true, if so, returning to (c, Kc) value；If it is not, then going to step B3；
B3. the last one value in vector R is assigned to vector Delta, the digit of array Tao2 is indicated with s, successively to
First value of each structural body is assigned to s in amount Delta, and the s values of array Tao2 are set as 1；It deletes in vector R most
The value of array Tao1 and array Tao2 is carried out exclusive or result and is stored in array Tao1, executes function by the latter element
backtrack；
B4. the value of array Tao2 is initialized as 0, the value of vector Delta empties, and returns to (c, Kc) value；
3) verifying obtains correct key
In the case where not knowing key device initialization mode, encryption key is obtained in the following manner:
I. the public keys that a vector I is used to store two group key streams is defined, indicates kth frame key stream with k, k's is first
Initial value is 1；
Ii. for the 0th frame key stream, one group of candidate's key can be obtained by step 1) and step 2), be stored in vector
In KeyCandidate [0]；For kth frame key stream, one group of candidate's key can be obtained by step 1) and step 2), be stored in
In vector KeyCandidate [k]；A candidate key and vector are successively taken from vector KeyCandidate [0]
Each of KeyCandidate [k] candidate's key is compared, if it is possible to the time from vector KeyCandidate [k]
Select found in key one it is identical as this candidate key in vector KeyCandidate [0], then be stored in vector I；
Iii. judge the element number in vector I, if the candidate key of only one in vector I, this candidate key
The encryption key looked for is sought to, obtaining encryption key process terminates；If there is multiple candidate keys, then k=k+1 is enabled, step is gone to
Rapid iv；
Iv. for kth frame key stream, one group of candidate's key can be obtained by step 1) and step 2), be stored in vector
In KeyCandidate [k]；Candidate each of a key and vector KeyCandidate [k] are successively taken from vector I
Candidate key is compared, if it is possible to from found in the candidate key in vector KeyCandidate [k] one with vector I in
This candidate key it is identical, then retain this candidate key in vector I, if this candidate key in vector I with to
All candidate keys measured in KeyCandidate [k] are all different, then delete this candidate's key from vector I；Go to step
Rapid iii.
Claims (1)
1. a kind of method that inverse attack obtains GMR-2 encryption satellite communication key, is realized by three steps, including is generated
Inquiry table, table look-up candidate key and verifying obtain correct key, the specific steps of which are as follows:
1) inquiry table is generated according to key stream
In GMR-2 standard, encryption key totally 8 bytes are expressed as (K0,K1,…,K7)；One frame key stream has 15 bytes,
It is expressed as (Z0,Z1..., Z14), for key stream known to one group, analyze the c+8 clock, available 7 group key stream word
Combination (the Z of sectionc+8,Zc+7,Zc), wherein 0≤c≤6, ZcIndicate c-th of key stream byte；In c-th of key byte KcIt is known
In the case of, according to (Zc+8,Zc+7,Zc) it can uniquely determine t-th of key byte Kt, therefore every group of (Zc+8,Zc+7,Zc) value is all
Corresponding 256 groups of possible (Kc,Kt,t)；Define 8 structural body list [0] ..., list [7], for 0≤c≤6, (Kc,Kt,
T) according to Kc0~255 sequence is taken to be stored in structural body list [c], referred to as table list [c], thus, it is possible to obtain 7 tables；
When the serial number of table takes 7, corresponding KtIt can not be obtained according to key stream with t, therefore when establishing [7] table list, wherein K7Take 0~
255, corresponding KtIt is set as 0 entirely with t；8 table list [0] have thus been obtained ..., list [7]；
2) by tabling look-up to obtain candidate key
A. the effective key chain found before a vector R is used to store is defined；Vector Delta, which is used to store, currently to be searched
Key chain；Array Tao1, Tao2 length is 8, and array element value is 0 or 1, and the key byte of corresponding position has been indicated when taking 1
It obtains；Vector KeyCandidate is used to store the candidate key found；The value of initialize array Tao1, Tao2 is 0, c=
0, Kc=0；
B. according to (c, Kc) look-up table list [c] KcRow obtains and KcCorresponding (t, Kt), judge array Tao1 or Tao2
Whether t be 1, if not 1, then go to step c；If 1, then (t, K are judgedt) whether there is in vector Delta or R,
If so, going to step g；If it is not, executing function backtrack；Then go to step i；
C. judge whether t is equal to c, if so, going to step d；If it is not, going to step e；
D. judge KtWhether K is equal toc, if so, going to step g；If it is not, executing function backtrack；Then go to step i；
E. judge whether t is equal to 7, if so, going to step f；If it is not, going to step h；
F. it is set as 1 c and the 7th of array Tao2, while (c, Kc) and (7, K7) be stored in vector Delta, execute letter
Number Combine；Then go to step i；
G. it is set as 1 c of array Tao2, while (c, Kc) be stored in vector Delta, execute function Combine；Then
Go to step i；
H. it is set as 1 c of array Tao2, while (c, Kc) be stored in vector Delta, (t, Kt) value be assigned to (c,
Kc)；
I. judge c=0 and KcWhether > 255 set up simultaneously, if it is not, going to step b；If so, in vector KeyCandidate
Content is whole candidate keys；
Two subfunctions described in above-mentioned steps, are defined respectively as:
Function Combine:
C1. the value of vector Delta is stored in vector R, the value of array Tao1 and array Tao2 is subjected to exclusive or result and is stored to number
In group Tao1, the number for the element that statistics array Tao1 intermediate value is 1 then goes to step C2 if 8；Otherwise step C3 is gone to；
C2. vector R is stored in vector KeyCandidate, in vector R the last one element delete, by array Tao1 with
The value of array Tao2 carries out exclusive or result and is stored in array Tao1, executes function backtrack；Then go to step C4；
C3. if preceding 7 place value is 1 in array Tao1, last place value is 0, then enabling first 7 of array Tao2 is 0, last position
It is 1；Vector Delta is emptied, K is worked as7When successively taking 0~255, following operation is executed respectively: (7, K7) be stored in vector Delta,
Execute function Combine；If above-mentioned condition is unsatisfactory for, enable c corresponding for 0 element equal to first in array Tao1
Subscript, Kc=0；Go to step C4；
C4. the element in array Tao2 is initialized as 0, empties vector Delta, return to (c, Kc) value；
Function backtrack:
B1. the value of first structural body in amount of orientation Delta is assigned to (c, Kc), then KcValue add 1；Judge Kc> 255 are
No establishment, if so, going to step B2；If it is not, then going to step B4；
B2. judge whether c=0 is true, if so, returning to (c, Kc) value；If it is not, then going to step B3；
B3. the last one value in vector R is assigned to vector Delta, the digit of array Tao2 is indicated with s, successively vector
First value of each structural body is assigned to s in Delta, and the s values of array Tao2 are set as 1；It deletes last in vector R
The value of array Tao1 and array Tao2 is carried out exclusive or result and is stored in array Tao1, executes function by one element
backtrack；
B4. the value of array Tao2 is initialized as 0, the value of vector Delta empties, and returns to (c, Kc) value；
3) verifying obtains correct key
In the case where not knowing key device initialization mode, encryption key is obtained in the following manner:
I. the public keys that a vector I is used to store two group key streams is defined, indicates kth frame key stream, the initial value of k with k
It is 1；
Ii. for the 0th frame key stream, one group of candidate's key can be obtained by step 1) and step 2), be stored in vector
In KeyCandidate [0]；For kth frame key stream, one group of candidate's key can be obtained by step 1) and step 2), be stored in
In vector KeyCandidate [k]；A candidate key and vector are successively taken from vector KeyCandidate [0]
Each of KeyCandidate [k] candidate's key is compared, if it is possible to the time from vector KeyCandidate [k]
Select found in key one it is identical as this candidate key in vector KeyCandidate [0], then be stored in vector I；
Iii. judge the element number in vector I, if the candidate key of only one in vector I, this candidate key is exactly
The encryption key to be looked for, obtaining encryption key process terminates；If there is multiple candidate keys, then k=k+1 is enabled, step iv is gone to；
Iv. for kth frame key stream, one group of candidate's key can be obtained by step 1) and step 2), be stored in vector
In KeyCandidate [k]；Candidate each of a key and vector KeyCandidate [k] are successively taken from vector I
Candidate key is compared, if it is possible to from found in the candidate key in vector KeyCandidate [k] one with vector I in
This candidate key it is identical, then retain this candidate key in vector I, if this candidate key in vector I with to
All candidate keys measured in KeyCandidate [k] are all different, then delete this candidate's key from vector I；Go to step
Rapid iii.
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| CN114465804A (en) * | 2022-02-16 | 2022-05-10 | 贵州福润德文化产业发展有限公司 | Instruction encryption and decryption method capable of resisting replay attack |
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