CN110517040A - Anti- quantum calculation block chain secure transactions method, system and equipment based on group's unsymmetrical key pond - Google Patents
Anti- quantum calculation block chain secure transactions method, system and equipment based on group's unsymmetrical key pond Download PDFInfo
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- G06Q—INFORMATION AND COMMUNICATION TECHNOLOGY [ICT] SPECIALLY ADAPTED FOR ADMINISTRATIVE, COMMERCIAL, FINANCIAL, MANAGERIAL OR SUPERVISORY PURPOSES; SYSTEMS OR METHODS SPECIALLY ADAPTED FOR ADMINISTRATIVE, COMMERCIAL, FINANCIAL, MANAGERIAL OR SUPERVISORY PURPOSES, NOT OTHERWISE PROVIDED FOR
- G06Q20/00—Payment architectures, schemes or protocols
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- G06Q20/382—Payment protocols; Details thereof insuring higher security of transaction
- G06Q20/3829—Payment protocols; Details thereof insuring higher security of transaction involving key management
Abstract
The invention discloses a kind of anti-quantum calculation block chain secure transactions method, system and equipment based on group's unsymmetrical key pond, the transaction initiator of participation and transaction verification side are the user in block chain, each user configuration has identical key card, and group's asymmetric public key pond, group's asymmetric privacy keys pond, user's asymmetric public key pond, client public key pointer random number and private key for user are stored in the key card.The present invention sign close using label decryption method to trade input data and output data of block chain, replaces the existing mode encrypted afterwards of first sign, can largely shorten existing signature in ciphering process the signature time and signature length.
Description
Technical field
The application belongs to block chain field, and in particular to a kind of anti-quantum calculation block based on group's unsymmetrical key pond
Chain secure transactions method, system and equipment.
Background technique
Block chain is a kind of completely new distributed basis framework and calculation paradigm, is stored using orderly linked data structure
Data ensure data safety using cryptological technique using common recognition algorithm more new data.In the transaction based on block chain, really
The privacy of the data safety and client of protecting transaction is the necessary condition that block chain can further develop.For this purpose, cryptological technique
Especially public-key cryptographic keys are widely used in block chain.
As most people is understood, quantum computer has great potential in password cracking.Mainstream is non-now
Symmetrically (public key) Encryption Algorithm, such as RSA cryptographic algorithms, it is most of to be all based in factorization or the finite field of big integer
The two difficult math questions of the calculating of discrete logarithm.Their difficulty that cracks also is dependent on the efficiency solved these problems.Tradition
On computer, it is desirable that solve the two difficult math questions, the cost time is the exponential time (to crack the time with the growth of public key length
Increased with exponential), this is unacceptable in practical applications.It and is that your elegant algorithm for making to measure of quantum computer can be with
In polynomial time (time is cracked as the growth of public key length is increased with the speed of k power, wherein k is long with public key
Spend unrelated constant) carry out integer factorization or discrete logarithm and calculate, thus for RSA, discrete logarithm Encryption Algorithm it is broken
Solution is for possible.Therefore classical block chain technology is difficult to resist cracking and attacking for quantum computer.
To resist quantum calculation in current block chain technology, block chain member can be issued with the close of shared key pond
Key card, and sign with related data of the pool of keys to transaction and then encrypt, then transaction is broadcasted again, has ensured friendship
The safety of easy data.The block chain client of other transaction nodes just can be with only after completing decryption and verifying signature
Subsequent processing is carried out to the transaction data.
Problem of the existing technology:
(1) in the prior art, corresponding private key, existing area are obtained quickly through public key due to quantum calculation function
Block chain method of commerce is easy to be cracked by quantum computer.
(2) in the prior art, key card with shared key pond can be issued block chain member, and with pool of keys pair
The related data of transaction sign and then encrypts, but the signature time that should be needed in the process and corresponding signature length needs
It optimizes, to reduce the memory capacity of the calculating time and block chain of block chain member.
Summary of the invention
Based on this, it is necessary in view of the above technical problems, provide a kind of based on the anti-quantum in group's unsymmetrical key pond
Calculate block chain secure transactions method, system and equipment.
This application discloses the anti-quantum calculation block chain secure transactions methods based on group's unsymmetrical key pond, implement
Trade initiator, the anti-quantum calculation block chain secure transactions method, comprising:
Initiate the transaction unsigned, the combination of at least partly output data of transaction sign it is close, sign it is close during
To first key, sign it is close after the completion of obtain in label confidential information deposit transaction according to signing close result；
With the first key in transaction wallet address and amount of the fund encrypted and cover deposit transaction in, will
Encrypted transaction is broadcasted to the transaction verification side of block chain network；The transaction is for obtaining label secret letter for transaction verification side
Breath, the label confidential information for transaction verification side is close to label for carrying out verifying and being verified to trade after being verified to carry out extensively
It broadcasts, the verifying transaction is traded and is added in block for formation digging mine after being obtained for miner user by block chain network and carries out
Broadcast, the block are used to verify for the other users in block chain and are followed by being incorporated as new block being proved to be successful.
This application discloses the anti-quantum calculation block chain secure transactions methods based on group's unsymmetrical key pond, implement
Transaction verification side, the anti-quantum calculation block chain secure transactions method, comprising:
Obtain the transaction in block chain network；The transaction is initiated by transaction initiator, includes label secret letter in the transaction
Breath, by first key encryption wallet address and amount of the fund, the label confidential information by trade initiator according to transaction extremely
The combination of small part output data sign it is close after the obtained close result of label generate, the first key is being signed by the initiator that trades
It is obtained during close；
It trades based on the received and obtains label confidential information, and be verified transaction after being verified to label confidential information and carry out extensively
It broadcasts, the verifying transaction is traded and is added in block for formation digging mine after being obtained for miner user by block chain network and carries out
Broadcast, the block are used to verify for the other users in block chain and are followed by being incorporated as new block being proved to be successful.
It is described anti-this application discloses the anti-quantum calculation block chain secure transactions method based on group's unsymmetrical key pond
Quantum calculation block chain secure transactions method, comprising:
Transaction initiator initiates the transaction unsigned, and sign to the combination of at least partly output data of transaction close, label
Obtain first key during close, sign it is close after the completion of obtain in label confidential information deposit transaction according to signing close result, with described first
Wallet address and amount of the fund in key pair transaction are encrypted and are covered in deposit transaction, extremely by encrypted transaction broadcast
The transaction verification side of block chain network；
The transaction verification side obtains the transaction in block chain network, trades obtain label confidential information based on the received, and
It is verified transaction after being verified label confidential information to broadcast, the verifying transaction is for passing through block chain for miner user
Network is formed after obtaining to be dug mine and trade and be added in block and is broadcasted, the block for for the other users in block chain into
Row is verified and is followed by being incorporated as new block being proved to be successful.
Further, the transaction initiator and transaction verification side are the user in block chain, and each user configuration has phase
With key card, be stored with group's asymmetric public key pond, group's asymmetric privacy keys pond, user's asymmetric public key in the key card
Pond, client public key pointer random number and private key for user.
Optionally, the transaction initiator sign to the combination of at least partly output data of transaction close, signs close process
In obtain first key, sign it is close after the completion of obtain in label confidential information deposit transaction according to signing close result, comprising:
Group asymmetric public key PKGtx is taken out from key card according to the first random number that one's own side generates and group is asymmetric
Private key SKGtx takes in key card an only client public key pointer random number as public key pointer random number R PKtx, according to
Public key pointer random number R PKtx obtains client public key PKtx and private key for user SKtx from key card；
It sums respectively to the wallet address and amount of the fund of output data in transaction, and the two after summation is combined to obtain
Close original text is signed, generates the second random number, and first key and ginseng are obtained according to the second random number and group asymmetric public key PKGtx
Number k2 ' signs close original text using first key encryption and obtains signing ciphertext；
The close original text of label is acted on using hash function and parameter k2 ' obtains parameter Rtx, according to the second random number, parameter Rtx
Parameter Stx is obtained with private key for user SKtx, obtains signing close as a result, the close result of the label is label ciphertext, parameter Rtx and parameter Stx
Combination；
Key KRStx is obtained using client public key PKtx, group asymmetric privacy keys SKGtx and the first random number, by parameter
It is encrypted after Rtx and parameter Stx combination using key KRStx, and after being combined with public key pointer random number R PKtx, the first random number
It obtains in label confidential information deposit transaction.
Optionally, the transaction initiator sign to the combination of at least partly output data of transaction close, signs close process
In obtain first key, sign it is close after the completion of obtain in label confidential information deposit transaction according to signing close result, comprising:
It first signs to the transaction unsigned, to the combination of at least partly inputoutput data of transaction after the completion of signature
Sign it is close, sign it is close during obtains first key, sign it is close after the completion of obtain in label confidential information deposit transaction according to signing close result；
The described pair of transaction unsigned is signed, comprising:
If including the more input amount of money in the input data of the transaction, sign to every input amount of money, wherein right
The signature process of the m input amount of money is as follows:
It is stored in the m input amount of money corresponding Dest value in transaction where its source into the transaction unsigned, obtains
First transaction；
Group asymmetric public key PKGm is taken out from key card according to the 4th random number that one's own side generates, and it is random to generate third
Number, parameter k2 is obtained according to third random number and group asymmetric public key PKGm, using hash function act on the first transaction and
Parameter k2 obtains parameter Rm, obtains parameter Sm according to third random number and parameter Rm, so that signature result is obtained, the signature result
Including the first transaction, parameter Rm and parameter Sm；
Obtained accordingly inputting the corresponding trading signature Txsm of the amount of money according to parameter Rm and parameter Sm, by trading signature Txsm and
After its corresponding client public key pointer random number R PKm combination in deposit transaction；
According to the signature process that m are inputted with the amount of money, the corresponding trading signature of every input amount of money is calculated, and will transaction
It signs and is stored in the corresponding position of transaction after client public key pointer random number corresponding with each trading signature combines.
Further, sign to the combination of at least partly inputoutput data of transaction close, label after the completion of the signature
Obtain first key during close, sign it is close after the completion of obtain in label confidential information deposit transaction according to signing close result, comprising:
Group asymmetric public key PKGtx is taken out from key card according to the first random number that one's own side generates and group is asymmetric
Private key SKGtx randomly selects one from several client public key pointer random numbers of key card and is used as public key pointer random number
RPKtx obtains client public key PKtx and private key for user SKtx according to public key pointer random number R PKtx from key card；
To client public key pointer random number, trading signature, wallet address and the amount of the fund of inputoutput data in transaction
It sums respectively, and four after summation is combined to obtain and sign close original text, generate the second random number, and according to the second random number and group
Group asymmetric public key PKGtx obtains first key and parameter k2 ', signs close original text using first key encryption and obtains signing ciphertext；
The close original text of label is acted on using hash function and parameter k2 ' obtains parameter Rtx, according to the second random number, parameter Rtx
Parameter Stx is obtained with private key for user SKtx, will be used as the close result of label after ciphertext, parameter Rtx and parameter Stx combination will be signed；
Key KRStx is obtained using client public key PKtx, group asymmetric privacy keys SKGtx and the first random number, by parameter
It is encrypted after Rtx and parameter Stx combination using key KRStx, and after being combined with public key pointer random number R PKtx, the first random number
It obtains in label confidential information deposit transaction.
Further, the transaction initiator further include: after the completion of signing close, to the trading signature and its correspondence in transaction
The combination of client public key pointer random number encrypted using first key, and encrypted value is covered in deposit transaction；
The transaction verification side further include: to sign it is close be verified after, to the corresponding trading signature of every input amount of money into
Row verifying, is verified transaction after being verified to trading signature and broadcasts.
Disclosed herein as well is a kind of computer equipment, including memory and processor, the memory is stored with calculating
Machine program, when the processor executes the computer program described in realization based on the anti-quantum in group's unsymmetrical key pond
The step of calculating block chain secure transactions method.
The anti-quantum calculation block chain secure transactions system based on group's unsymmetrical key pond that disclosed herein as well is a kind of,
The anti-quantum calculation block chain secure transactions system includes transaction initiator and transaction verification side, the transaction initiator and friendship
Easy authentication is the user in block chain, and each user configuration has identical key card, and it is non-to be stored with group in the key card
Symmetrical public key pond, group's asymmetric privacy keys pond, user's asymmetric public key pond, client public key pointer random number and private key for user；
The transaction initiator and transaction verification side pass through described in the realization of block chain network based on group's unsymmetrical key
The step of anti-quantum calculation block chain secure transactions method in pond.
Anti- quantum calculation block chain secure transactions method provided by the present application based on group's unsymmetrical key pond, system and
Equipment sign close, existing first sign is replaced to add afterwards using label decryption method to trade input data and output data of block chain
Close mode can largely shorten existing signature and signature time and signature length in ciphering process.
Detailed description of the invention
Fig. 1 is communication system architecture figure provided in an embodiment of the present invention；
Fig. 2 is the structural schematic diagram of key card in the present invention；
Fig. 3 is that public key pointer random number obtains the process schematic of public key；
Fig. 4 be group's asymmetric public key private key access schematic diagram；
Fig. 5 is the structural schematic diagram of transaction of unsigning；
Fig. 6 is structure of deal schematic diagram in the m times signature process；
Fig. 7 is the structural schematic diagram of the transaction of having signed of unencryption；
Fig. 8 is the relation schematic diagram of block and transaction；
Fig. 9 is the structure of deal schematic diagram for being stored into block；
Figure 10 is original digging mine transaction schematic diagram；
Figure 11 is digging mine transaction schematic diagram after encryption.
Figure 12 is the structure of deal schematic diagram that another kind is stored into block.
Specific embodiment
Below in conjunction with the attached drawing in the embodiment of the present application, technical solutions in the embodiments of the present application carries out clear, complete
Site preparation description, it is clear that the described embodiments are only a part but not all of the embodiments of the present application.Based on this
Embodiment in application, every other reality obtained by those of ordinary skill in the art without making creative efforts
Example is applied, shall fall in the protection scope of this application.
Unless otherwise defined, all technical and scientific terms used herein and the technical field for belonging to the application
The normally understood meaning of technical staff is identical.The term used in the description of the present application is intended merely to description tool herein
The purpose of the embodiment of body is not to be to limit the application.
Wherein in an embodiment, the anti-quantum calculation block chain secure transactions method based on group's unsymmetrical key pond, institute
State anti-quantum calculation block chain secure transactions method, comprising:
Transaction initiator initiates the transaction unsigned, and sign to the combination of at least partly output data of transaction close, label
Obtain first key during close, sign it is close after the completion of obtain in label confidential information deposit transaction according to signing close result, with described first
Wallet address and amount of the fund in key pair transaction are encrypted and are covered in deposit transaction, extremely by encrypted transaction broadcast
The transaction verification side of block chain network；
The transaction verification side obtains the transaction in block chain network, trades obtain label confidential information based on the received, and
It is verified transaction after being verified label confidential information to broadcast, the verifying transaction is for passing through block chain for miner user
Network is formed after obtaining to be dug mine and trade and be added in block and is broadcasted, the block for for the other users in block chain into
Row is verified and is followed by being incorporated as new block being proved to be successful.
The present embodiment sign to block chain transaction output data close using label decryption method, and substitution is first signed the side encrypted afterwards
Formula can largely shorten signature time and signature length in signature and ciphering process.
Wherein in an embodiment, the anti-quantum calculation block chain secure transactions method based on group's unsymmetrical key pond is real
It applies in transaction initiator, the anti-quantum calculation block chain secure transactions method, comprising:
Initiate the transaction unsigned, the combination of at least partly output data of transaction sign it is close, sign it is close during
To first key, sign it is close after the completion of obtain in label confidential information deposit transaction according to signing close result；
With the first key in transaction wallet address and amount of the fund encrypted and cover deposit transaction in, will
Encrypted transaction is broadcasted to the transaction verification side of block chain network；The transaction is for obtaining label secret letter for transaction verification side
Breath, the label confidential information for transaction verification side is close to label for carrying out verifying and being verified to trade after being verified to carry out extensively
It broadcasts, the verifying transaction is traded and is added in block for formation digging mine after being obtained for miner user by block chain network and carries out
Broadcast, the block are used to verify for the other users in block chain and are followed by being incorporated as new block being proved to be successful.
The present embodiment sign to block chain transaction output data close using label decryption method, and substitution is first signed the side encrypted afterwards
Formula can largely shorten signature time and signature length in signature and ciphering process.
Wherein in an embodiment, the anti-quantum calculation block chain secure transactions method based on group's unsymmetrical key pond is real
It applies in transaction verification side, the anti-quantum calculation block chain secure transactions method, comprising:
Obtain the transaction in block chain network；The transaction is initiated by transaction initiator, includes label secret letter in the transaction
Breath, by first key encryption wallet address and amount of the fund, the label confidential information by trade initiator according to transaction extremely
The combination of small part output data sign it is close after the obtained close result of label generate, the first key is being signed by the initiator that trades
It is obtained during close；
It trades based on the received and obtains label confidential information, and be verified transaction after being verified to label confidential information and carry out extensively
It broadcasts, the verifying transaction is traded and is added in block for formation digging mine after being obtained for miner user by block chain network and carries out
Broadcast, the block are used to verify for the other users in block chain and are followed by being incorporated as new block being proved to be successful.
The present embodiment sign to block chain transaction output data close using label decryption method, and substitution is first signed the side encrypted afterwards
Formula can largely shorten signature time and signature length in signature and ciphering process.
In one embodiment, the transaction initiator and transaction verification side are the user in block chain, each user configuration
There is identical key card, it is asymmetric that group's asymmetric public key pond, group's asymmetric privacy keys pond, user are stored in the key card
Public key pond, client public key pointer random number and private key for user.
In the present embodiment, client public key is stored in key card, and all keys can not take out, and needs when correspondence with foreign country to make
Public key pointer position is identified with public key pointer random number, so the not other users of key card or other in transmission process
People can not obtain public key or private key, even therefore quantum computer be also difficult to crack block linkwork described herein
System.
In one embodiment, transaction initiator sign to the combination of at least partly output data of transaction close, signs close mistake
Obtain first key in journey, sign it is close after the completion of obtain in label confidential information deposit transaction according to signing close result, comprising:
Group asymmetric public key PKGtx is taken out from key card according to the first random number that one's own side generates and group is asymmetric
Private key SKGtx takes in key card an only client public key pointer random number as public key pointer random number R PKtx, according to
Public key pointer random number R PKtx obtains client public key PKtx and private key for user SKtx from key card；
It sums respectively to the wallet address and amount of the fund of output data in transaction, and the two after summation is combined to obtain
Close original text is signed, generates the second random number, and first key and ginseng are obtained according to the second random number and group asymmetric public key PKGtx
Number k2 ' signs close original text using first key encryption and obtains signing ciphertext；
The close original text of label is acted on using hash function and parameter k2 ' obtains parameter Rtx, according to the second random number, parameter Rtx
Parameter Stx is obtained with private key for user SKtx, obtains signing close as a result, the close result of the label is label ciphertext, parameter Rtx and parameter Stx
Combination；
Key KRStx is obtained using client public key PKtx, group asymmetric privacy keys SKGtx and the first random number, by parameter
It is encrypted after Rtx and parameter Stx combination using key KRStx, and after being combined with public key pointer random number R PKtx, the first random number
It obtains in label confidential information deposit transaction.
The asymmetric public private key pair of group and user's public private key pair are obtained according to random number in the present embodiment, and utilize public and private key
Close process is entirely signed to completion, and combines random number into label confidential information, signs close safety to improve.
In one embodiment, transaction initiator sign to the combination of at least partly output data of transaction close, signs close mistake
Obtain first key in journey, sign it is close after the completion of obtain in label confidential information deposit transaction according to signing close result, comprising:
It first signs to the transaction unsigned, to the combination of at least partly inputoutput data of transaction after the completion of signature
Sign it is close, sign it is close during obtains first key, sign it is close after the completion of obtain in label confidential information deposit transaction according to signing close result；
The described pair of transaction unsigned is signed, comprising:
If including the more input amount of money in the input data of the transaction, sign to every input amount of money, wherein right
The signature process of the m input amount of money is as follows:
It is stored in the m input amount of money corresponding Dest value in transaction where its source into the transaction unsigned, obtains
First transaction；
Group asymmetric public key PKGm is taken out from key card according to the 4th random number that one's own side generates, and it is random to generate third
Number, parameter k2 is obtained according to third random number and group asymmetric public key PKGm, using hash function act on the first transaction and
Parameter k2 obtains parameter Rm, obtains parameter Sm according to third random number and parameter Rm, so that signature result is obtained, the signature result
Including the first transaction, parameter Rm and parameter Sm；
Obtained accordingly inputting the corresponding trading signature Txsm of the amount of money according to parameter Rm and parameter Sm, by trading signature Txsm and
After its corresponding client public key pointer random number R PKm combination in deposit transaction；
According to the signature process that m are inputted with the amount of money, the corresponding trading signature of every input amount of money is calculated, and will transaction
It signs and is stored in the corresponding position of transaction after client public key pointer random number corresponding with each trading signature combines.
Client public key pointer random number in the present embodiment have it is multiple, to transaction label it is close before, first to transaction generate hand over
Easily signature, and the corresponding client public key pointer random number combination of trading signature is stored in transaction, when there is the more input amount of money,
The each corresponding trading signature of the input amount of money is calculated, then in order to which authentication further verifies trading signature.
In one embodiment, sign to the combination of at least partly inputoutput data of transaction close, label after the completion of signature
Obtain first key during close, sign it is close after the completion of obtain in label confidential information deposit transaction according to signing close result, comprising:
Group asymmetric public key PKGtx is taken out from key card according to the first random number that one's own side generates and group is asymmetric
Private key SKGtx randomly selects one from several client public key pointer random numbers of key card and is used as public key pointer random number
RPKtx obtains client public key PKtx and private key for user SKtx according to public key pointer random number R PKtx from key card；
To client public key pointer random number, trading signature, wallet address and the amount of the fund of inputoutput data in transaction
It sums respectively, and four after summation is combined to obtain and sign close original text, generate the second random number, and according to the second random number and group
Group asymmetric public key PKGtx obtains first key and parameter k2 ', signs close original text using first key encryption and obtains signing ciphertext；
The close original text of label is acted on using hash function and parameter k2 ' obtains parameter Rtx, according to the second random number, parameter Rtx
Parameter Stx is obtained with private key for user SKtx, will be used as the close result of label after ciphertext, parameter Rtx and parameter Stx combination will be signed；
Key KRStx is obtained using client public key PKtx, group asymmetric privacy keys SKGtx and the first random number, by parameter
It is encrypted after Rtx and parameter Stx combination using key KRStx, and after being combined with public key pointer random number R PKtx, the first random number
It obtains in label confidential information deposit transaction.
In one embodiment, trade initiator further include: after the completion of signing close, to the trading signature and its correspondence in transaction
The combination of client public key pointer random number encrypted using first key, and encrypted value is covered in deposit transaction；
Transaction verification side further include: after signing close be verified, the corresponding trading signature of every input amount of money is tested
Card, is verified transaction after being verified to trading signature and broadcasts.
The present embodiment is using key encrypting input data and output data obtained in close process is signed, to improve transaction transmission
Safety.It should be noted that transaction initiator and transaction verification side not as the limitation to user in block chain, only for just
In the different identity for distinguishing the user in primary transaction.
In the present embodiment, each of block chain node has matched key card, the user side key in key card
It is all downloaded from the same network service station down, and the pool of keys stored in each key card is completely the same.
This system structure has corresponding block chain to answer as shown in Figure 1, a node of each user as block chain
With, and it is furnished with key card.Key card structure is as shown in Fig. 2, wherein there is different (may be multiple) public key pointer random numbers
RPK, (may multiple) private key for user SK, identical user's unsymmetrical key pond (public key), group's unsymmetrical key pond (public key),
Group's unsymmetrical key pond (private key).Key card is called by the application of block chain, and key does not go out key card.
The storage mode of public key is as shown in Figure 3, the specific steps are as follows: takes public key pointer random number at random to some user
RPK obtains public key pointer PPK in conjunction with specified public key pointer function FPPK and is stored in from the corresponding position in corresponding public key pond
The public key PK of the user.
Group's asymmetric public key/private key storage mode is as shown in Figure 4, the specific steps are as follows: takes at random to some user
The public and private key pointer random number R G of group, RG combine specific group's public key pointer function FRG to obtain group public key pointer PRG, PRG
The corresponding position being directed toward in group's unsymmetrical key pond (public key) is stored in group's public key PKG, and PRG is directed toward group's unsymmetrical key pond
Corresponding position deposit group's private key SKG, PKG and SKG in (private key) are pairs of public private key pairs.Read key mode and storage
Key mode is identical.
Trading, specific step is as follows (when referred in no specified otherwise, in the application using private key, understands
For one's own side's private key of active user.Each title in the application is subject to letter and number and is combined, such as the RTx that trades that unsigns,
RTx hereinafter indicates same meaning, that is, unsign the RTx that trades；Remaining title is similarly.And random number x1, trading signature Txs etc.
X1, Txs in statement are intended merely to facilitate differentiation and narration, do not have additional qualification, such as needle random number to parameter itself
RPK, PKGm in RPK, group asymmetric public key PKGm；Other are similarly).
Embodiment one
Step 1.1 generates the RTx that trades that unsigns
Before initiating transaction, trade initiator (transaction initiator), which initiates user terminal A, need to generate a transaction of unsigning
RTx, structure are as shown in Figure 5.In Fig. 5, InN indicates serial number of certain the input fund in this transaction Tx；TxID indicate certain it is defeated
Enter fund in the ID of the Tx where its source.Generally desirable TxID=Hash (Tx)；N indicates certain input fund in its source institute
Tx in serial number as finance of export；OutN indicates serial number of certain finance of export in this Tx；Dest indicate certain it is defeated
That provides funds is transferred to address, the usually form of wallet；Value indicates the number of certain finance of export.
Step 1.2 generates trading signature Txs
Step 1.2.1, it signs to the input data of RTx
By taking the m times signature as an example, change as shown in Figure 6 is made to RTx and obtains RTxm (the first transaction).When the m times signature, obtain
Take the m input amount of money corresponding Dest values in the Tx where its source.Acquisition modes are as follows: looked for from block chain historical trading
It is corresponding out to trade and solve that label are close, see that carrying out solution to some transaction in step 1.4 signs close step.
RTx is added as PreDestm in the Dest value and obtains RTxm.Trade initiator signs to RTxm, specific mistake
Journey is following (actual use is label decryption method, but does not execute the encrypting step in label decryption method).If signature algorithm is SIGNC
(M, PKB, SKA)=SC=(M, r, s), wherein SIGNC is signature algorithm, and M is message to be signed, and PKB is recipient's public key,
SKA is signature sender's private key, and SC is signature result, can also be expressed as the form of (M, r, s), and r is signature authentication code, and s is
Signature.
Signature algorithm can be bibliography " Digital Signcryption or How to Achieve Cost
(Signature&Encryption) < < Cost (Signature)+Cost (Encryption) " described in method.It takes random
Number RGm (the 4th random number), obtains group asymmetric public key PKGm and group asymmetric privacy keys SKGm from key card.It calculates
SIGNC (RTxm, PKGm, SKm)=SCm, wherein SKm is the private key of the wallet owner of m inputs, corresponding public key
PKm can be obtained from key card by public key pointer random number R PKm.
Detailed process is as follows for signature algorithm.Random number x1 (third random number) is taken, according to formula k=(PKGm)x1mod p
(p is signature parameter) obtains the value of k, is then made with function f1 (such as splitting off a number according to the length of 1:1 is two sections)
Two number k1 and k2 are obtained for k.Take that hash function KH acts on RTxm and k2 obtains Rm.
X1, Rm and SKm are then acted on using function fs1 using SDSS1 signature scheme if it is selection, specific formula is
Sm=x1/ (Rm+SKm) is to calculate Sm；If it is selection then acted on using function fs2 using SDSS2 signature scheme x1,
Rm and SKm, for Sm=x1/ (1+SKm*Rm), to calculate Sm, (wherein signature scheme SDSS1 and SDSS2 are derived from specific formula
Reference " Digital Signcryption or How to Achieve Cost (Signature&Encryption) < <
Cost(Signature)+Cost(Encryption)》)。
To combine RTxm | | Rm | | Sm } it is used as signature result, also referred to as SCm.By RGm and Rm | | Sm in combination as
Final m-th of signature RGm | | Rm | | Sm }, i.e. Txsm.All corresponding friendships of the input amount of money are calculated with identical method
Easily signature Txs.And itself and corresponding public key pointer random number R PK are inserted into table together, as shown in Figure 7.
Step 1.2.2, the inputoutput data of RTx is encrypted
Before broadcasting Tx, first by the random RPK of public key pointer, trading signature Txs, the wallet address D est, fund in Tx
Number Value combine to obtain ∑ RPKi | | ∑ Txsi | | ∑ Desti | | ∑ Valuei, and be named as the close original text Mtx of label.
According to label decryption method above start that Mtx sign close.
Random number R Gtx (the first random number) is taken, group asymmetric public key PKGtx is obtained from key card and group is non-right
Claim private key SKGtx, then randomly chooses one in the range of client public key pointer random number R PK1 to RPKm and refer to as public key
Needle random number R PKtx, corresponding public key private key be respectively PKtx SKtx.Calculating SIGNC (Mtx, PKGtx, SKtx)=
SCtx={ Ctx, Rtx, Stx }, wherein Ctx is the ciphertext of Mtx.
Sign close algorithm detailed process is as follows (this generate have label ciphertext Ctx, and do not generate ciphertext above and have area
Not).Random number x2 (the second random number) is taken, according to formula k '=(PKGtx)x2Mod p obtains the value of k ', then uses function f1
(such as splitting off a number according to the length of 1:1 is two sections) acts on k ' and obtains two number k1 ' and k2 ', and wherein k1 ' is also known as
For Ktx (first key).Ciphertext { Mtx } Ktx, also known as Ctx is obtained with Ktx encryption Mtx.Hash function KH is taken to act on Mtx
And k2 ' obtains Rtx.
X2, Rtx and SKtx, specific formula are then acted on using function fs1 using SDSS1 stopover sites if it is selection
It is Stx=x2/ (Rtx+SKtx) to calculate Stx；Then made using function fs2 if it is selection using SDSS2 stopover sites
For x2, Rtx and SKtx, specific formula is Stx=x2/ (1+SKtx*Rtx) to calculate Stx.
To combine Ctx | | Rtx | | Stx } it is close as a result, also referred to as SCtx as signing.PKtx and SKGtx are done into XOR operation
PKtx ⊕ SKGtx is obtained, it is combined to obtain RGtx with RGtx | | (PKtx ⊕ SKGtx), and hash fortune is carried out to result
Calculation obtains KRStx.{ Rtx | | Stx } KRStx is obtained with KRStx encryption Rtx and Stx, and is combined with RGtx and RPKtx
To RPKtx | | RGtx | | { Rtx | | Stx } KRStx, and using RPKtx | | RGtx | | { Rtx | | Stx } KRStx is close as the label in Tx
The content of message part.
All Dest and Value are encrypted with Ktx obtained in close process is signed, and is inserted in table；Likewise, using Ktx
{ RPK, Txs } combination that encryption table Central Plains has obtains { RPK, Txs } Ktx, and replaces original table with { RPK, Txs } Ktx
In { RPK, Txs }；Confidential information RPKtx will finally be signed | | RGtx | | { Rtx | | Stx } KRStx also inserts table, as shown in Figure 8.
Step 1.3 sends Tx；
The transaction Tx of encrypted signature is broadcasted to all nodes of block chain network.
Step 1.4, verifying Tx: each node (transaction verification side) in block chain network verifies the transaction.
During transaction verification, each node in block chain network can be used as verifying node.
Step 1.4.1, first with solution corresponding with close algorithm is signed sign close algorithm to Tx carry out solution sign it is close, really pair
The label of Mtx are close, and to carry out solution label close.Authentication obtains the i.e. RPKtx of label confidential information therein first | | RGtx | | Rtx | | Stx }
Then KRStx takes out public key PKtx according to RPKtx in key card, it is asymmetric then to obtain group from key card with RGtx
Private key SKGtx.PKtx and SKGtx are done into XOR operation and obtain PKtx ⊕ SKGtx, it is combined to obtain RGtx with RGtx | |
(PKtx ⊕ SKGtx), and hash operation is carried out to result and obtains KRStx.It is obtained with KRStx decryption { Rtx | | Stx } KRStx
In Rtx and Stx.
It is acted on according to the stopover sites SDSS1 or SDSS2 for signing close selection using corresponding function fu1 or fu2
In SKGtx, Rtx, Stx and PKtx, specific formula is k '=(SKGtx*gRtx)Stx*PKtxMod p (SDSS1 situation) or k '=
(g*(SKGtx)Rtx)Stx*PKtxMod p (SDSS2 situation) available k '.K ' is acted on function f1 identical with close person is signed
Obtain k1 ' (also referred to as Ktx ') and k2 ', use Ktx ' decrypt the Dest of all encryptions, the Value of encryption, encryption RPK,
Txs } combination, the random RPK of public key pointer in Tx, trading signature Txs, wallet address D est, amount of the fund Value group are closed
Come obtain ∑ RPKi | | ∑ Txsi | | ∑ Desti | | ∑ Valuei, and be named as Mtx ',.
Function KH is taken to act on Mtx ' and k2 again ', by obtained result and the Rtx comparison in close combination is signed, if identical
Can then verify sign close person identity it is correct and be transmitted to the Mtx of transaction node (i.e. authentication) and do not repaired in transmit process
Change.The verifying of each signature in the importation Tx can be carried out after verifying label are close.It is worth noting that including multiple groups Dest in Mtx
With the content of Value.The Dest of this step decryption can be used for constructing subsequent new Tx, and read in block chain in history Tx
Also the solution label decryption method of this step is used when Dest and Value.
Step 1.4.2, next the signature of input data is verified, it is specific as follows.
Authentication forms the RTx of an one's own side with mode same as above, for its m times signature, obtains m
The pen input amount of money corresponding Dest value in the Tx where source, is then added RTx as PreDestm for the Dest value and obtains
RTxm'.Authentication authentication obtain table in m-th signature RGm | | Rm | | Sm } (i.e. Txsm) and RPKm, obtain therein
RGm, Rm and Sm.Public key PKm is taken out in key card according to RPKm, then obtains the asymmetric private of group from key card with RGm
Key SKGm.
It is acted on according to the signature scheme SDSS1 or SDSS2 for selection of signing using corresponding function fu1 or fu2
SKGm, Rm, Sm and PKm, specific formula are k=(SKGm*gRm)Sm*PKmMod p (SDSS1 situation) or k=(g* (SKGm)Rm)Sm*PKm
Mod p (SDSS2 situation) available k.K is acted on function f1 identical with signer and obtains k1 and k2, then takes function KH
RTxm ' and k2 are acted on, the Rm in obtained result and signature combination is compared, can if the same verify transaction input
Signature it is effective, complete verifying.If in importation of trading, producing amount information and including more and different produce the amount of money
Source is then produced the corresponding signature of the amount of money to more using same procedure and is verified.
After verifying to each signature, verifying node is according to the TxID of each input amount of money in the historical record of block chain
The transaction where producing the amount of money is found, close method is signed using solution described previously and takes out the corresponding amount of money and its sequence from the transaction
Number and in this Tx the amount of money and its serial number compare, thus prove this trade it is each input the amount of money existence.Verifying
Node obtains input amount of money total value after taking out the input amount of money, compares, checks whether equal with this output amount of money total value；Such as
Fruit is equal, is verified, and is verified transaction；The authentication failed if unequal.
Block is added in the transaction by step 1.5: block and the relationship of transaction are as shown in Figure 9.
Step 1.5.1 miner forms digging mine and trades and encrypt
After miner is verified transaction by block chain network, a digging mine transaction as shown in Figure 10, input unit are formed
Point fill some affiliated mine ponds of miner or other necessary informations, output par, c is identical with general transaction, export amount of money total amount and
The amount of money award for generating block is identical.It generates after digging mine transaction, it is the same according to the label decryption method in step 1.2.2, use miner
The private key of itself sign it is close, if the public key pointer random number of miner be RPKtx, the group key pond random number that miner selects for
RGtx, then described in similar step 1.2.2, the label confidential information of generation is represented by RPKtx | | RGtx | | Rtx | | and Stx } KRStx,
And with the close encryption importation encryption key Ktx calculated in the process and all Dest and Value is signed, it is then filled with table
In lattice, encrypted digging mine transaction as shown in figure 11 is obtained.
Step 1.5.2, miner, which calculates, digs mine random number
Miner calculates the random number for meeting rule, that is, obtains this book keeping operation power, the digging that oneself is generated and is encrypted
Mine transaction is added in block.
Step 1.5.3, miner broadcasts successfully digging mining area block
After miner obtains successfully digging mining area block, which is broadcasted, remaining node verifies block.Mainly verify
Dig whether mine random number meets rule, the correctness of each transaction and the correctness of Merkle root.It is such as proved to be successful, then connects
It is new block by the block.
The present embodiment is can be considered for each step for aforementioned corresponding embodiment, also visual for all steps
For the combination of aforementioned corresponding embodiment.
Embodiment two
The difference between this embodiment and the first embodiment lies in:
One and only one client public key pointer random number R PK when carrying out signing close to the Dest and Value of transaction output
It is available come obtain corresponding client public key private key, it is same to trade so also there is no need to go to select from several RPK
The N and TxID of input are also close there is no need to sign, that is, do not need the step 1.2.1 for executing embodiment one, it is only necessary to hand over
Easy output par, c, which is done, once signs close be sufficient.
Also resided in one difference of embodiment, it is only necessary to by wallet address D est, the amount of the fund Value in Tx respectively into
Row sums and combines to obtain { ∑ Desti | | ∑ Valuei }, and is named as Mtx, carries out according still further in embodiment one to Mtx
Sign close method Mtx sign it is close.Sign it is close during encrypt all Dest and Value using Ktx, and insert in table；
Confidential information RPKtx will finally be signed | | RGtx | | { Rtx | | Stx } KRStx also inserts table, as shown in figure 12.Tx ' at this time is made
Block is added for the final form of transaction, and obtains the TxID=Hash (Tx ') of this transaction.
It is close according to the method validation label in step 1.4 in embodiment one when verifying.Elsewhere with embodiment
One is identical.The present embodiment is can be considered for each step for aforementioned corresponding embodiment, also visual for all steps
For the combination of aforementioned corresponding embodiment.
In one embodiment, a kind of computer equipment, i.e., a kind of anti-quantum based on group's unsymmetrical key pond are provided
Calculation block chain secure transactions system, the computer equipment can be terminal, and internal structure may include passing through system bus
Processor, memory, network interface, display screen and the input unit of connection.Wherein, the processor of the computer equipment is for mentioning
For calculating and control ability.The memory of the computer equipment includes non-volatile memory medium, built-in storage.This is non-volatile
Storage medium is stored with operating system and computer program.The built-in storage be non-volatile memory medium in operating system and
The operation of computer program provides environment.The network interface of the computer equipment is used for logical by network connection with external terminal
Letter.To realize the above-mentioned anti-quantum calculation block chain based on group's unsymmetrical key pond when the computer program is executed by processor
Secure transactions method.The display screen of the computer equipment can be liquid crystal display or electric ink display screen, the computer
The input unit of equipment can be the touch layer covered on display screen, be also possible to the key being arranged on computer equipment shell,
Trace ball or Trackpad can also be external keyboard, Trackpad or mouse etc..
Wherein in an embodiment, a kind of anti-quantum calculation block chain secure transactions based on group's unsymmetrical key pond are provided
System, the anti-quantum calculation block chain secure transactions system include transaction initiator and transaction verification side, and the transaction is initiated
Side and transaction verification side are the user in block chain, and each user configuration has identical key card, is stored in the key card
Group's asymmetric public key pond, group's asymmetric privacy keys pond, user's asymmetric public key pond, client public key pointer random number and user are private
Key；
The transaction initiator and transaction verification side pass through described in the realization of block chain network based on group's unsymmetrical key
The step of anti-quantum calculation block chain secure transactions method in pond.
Specific restriction about the anti-quantum calculation block chain secure transactions system based on group's unsymmetrical key pond can be with
For the restriction of the anti-quantum calculation block chain secure transactions method based on group's unsymmetrical key pond in seeing above, herein not
It repeats again.
Sign close to trade input data and output data of block chain using label decryption method in the present invention, replaces existing
First sign the mode encrypted afterwards, sign it is close during signature time and signature length all reduce very much, concrete analysis is as follows.
According to the endorsement method of current block chain technology, protected for anti-quantum calculation and to block chain information, generally
Using classical signature+encryption method, such as Schnorr signature+ElGamal encryption.Assuming that individually the signature time is TS, label
Name length is LS.According to reference " Digital Signcryption or How to Achieve Cost
(Signature&Encryption) < < Cost (Signature)+Cost (Encryption) " it is described, label decryption method will be to label
There is 50% shortening in the name time, there is 76.8%~96% shortening to signature length.To embodiment 1, it is assumed that there are 5 inputs, it is right
Answer 5 wallets.Original method, sign time=5TS, signature length=5LS；This patent method, sign close time=(5+1) ×
(1-50%) × TS=3TS signs close length=(5+1) × (1-76.8%~96%)=(0.24~1.392) LS.So for
For this transaction, signature time=5TS-3TS=2TS of saving shortens 40%, the signature for similarly also shortening 40% is tested
Demonstrate,prove the time；The signature length of saving be 5LS- (0.24~1.392) LS=(3.608~4.76) LS, that is, shorten 72.16%~
95.2%.
To embodiment 2, it is assumed that have 5 inputs, come from the same wallet.Original method, sign time=5TS, signature length
Degree=5LS；This patent method signs close time=(1-50%) × TS=0.5TS, sign close length=(1-76.8%~96%)=
(0.04~0.232) LS.So for this transaction, signature time=5TS-0.5TS=4.5TS of saving shortens
90%, similarly also shorten for 90% signature verification time；The signature length of saving is 5LS- (0.04~0.232) LS=
(4.768~4.96) LS shortens 95.36%~99.2%.
Found out by estimation result, close encrypt to block chain data of label used herein can largely shorten
Existing signature and signature time and signature length in ciphering process.
Each technical characteristic of embodiment described above can be combined arbitrarily, for simplicity of description, not to above-mentioned reality
It applies all possible combination of each technical characteristic in example to be all described, as long as however, the combination of these technical characteristics is not present
Contradiction all should be considered as described in this specification.
The several embodiments of the application above described embodiment only expresses, the description thereof is more specific and detailed, but simultaneously
It cannot therefore be construed as limiting the scope of the patent.It should be pointed out that coming for those of ordinary skill in the art
It says, without departing from the concept of this application, various modifications and improvements can be made, these belong to the protection of the application
Range.Therefore, the scope of protection shall be subject to the appended claims for the application patent.
Claims (10)
1. the anti-quantum calculation block chain secure transactions method based on group's unsymmetrical key pond is implemented in transaction initiator,
It is characterized in that, the anti-quantum calculation block chain secure transactions method, comprising:
Initiate the transaction unsigned, the combination of at least partly output data of transaction sign it is close, sign it is close during obtain the
One key, sign it is close after the completion of obtain in label confidential information deposit transaction according to signing close result；
With the first key in transaction wallet address and amount of the fund encrypted and cover deposit transaction in, will encrypt
Transaction afterwards is broadcasted to the transaction verification side of block chain network；The transaction is for obtaining label confidential information, institute for transaction verification side
It states label confidential information to be used to verify and be verified transaction after being verified broadcasting for transaction verification side is close to label, institute
It states to verify to trade to trade and be added in block for formation digging mine after obtaining for miner user by block chain network and broadcast,
The block is used to verify for the other users in block chain and is followed by being incorporated as new block being proved to be successful.
2. the anti-quantum calculation block chain secure transactions method based on group's unsymmetrical key pond is implemented in transaction verification side,
It is characterized in that, the anti-quantum calculation block chain secure transactions method, comprising:
Obtain the transaction in block chain network；The transaction is initiated by transaction initiator, include in the transaction label confidential information, by
First key encryption wallet address and amount of the fund, the label confidential information by trade initiator according to transaction at least partly
The combination of output data sign it is close after the obtained close result of label generate, the first key is signing close process by transaction initiator
In obtain；
Transaction obtains label confidential information based on the received, and is verified transaction after being verified to label confidential information and broadcasts,
The verifying is traded wide for being traded for miner user by formation digging mine after the acquisition of block chain network and progress in block being added
It broadcasts, the block is used to verify for the other users in block chain and is followed by being incorporated as new block being proved to be successful.
3. the anti-quantum calculation block chain secure transactions method based on group's unsymmetrical key pond, which is characterized in that the anti-amount
Sub- calculation block chain secure transactions method, comprising:
Transaction initiator initiates the transaction unsigned, sign to the combination of at least partly output data of transaction close, signs close mistake
Obtain first key in journey, sign it is close after the completion of obtain in label confidential information deposit transaction according to signing close result, with the first key
To in transaction wallet address and amount of the fund encrypted and covered in deposit transaction, encrypted transaction is broadcasted to block
The transaction verification side of chain network；
The transaction verification side obtains the transaction in block chain network, and transaction obtains label confidential information based on the received, and to label
Confidential information is verified transaction after being verified and is broadcasted, and the verifying transaction is for passing through block chain network for miner user
Formation digging mine, which is traded and is added in block, after acquisition is broadcasted, and the block for the other users in block chain for being tested
It demonstrate,proves and is followed by being incorporated as new block being proved to be successful.
It is handed over 4. the anti-quantum calculation block chain as described in any one of claims 1 to 3 based on group's unsymmetrical key pond maintains secrecy
Easy method, which is characterized in that the transaction initiator and transaction verification side are user in block chain, and each user configuration has phase
With key card, be stored with group's asymmetric public key pond, group's asymmetric privacy keys pond, user's asymmetric public key in the key card
Pond, client public key pointer random number and private key for user.
5. the anti-quantum calculation block chain secure transactions method based on group's unsymmetrical key pond as claimed in claim 4,
Be characterized in that, the transaction initiator combination of at least partly output data of transaction sign it is close, sign it is close during obtains
First key, sign it is close after the completion of obtain in label confidential information deposit transaction according to signing close result, comprising:
Group asymmetric public key PKGtx and group's asymmetric privacy keys are taken out from key card according to the first random number that one's own side generates
SKGtx, takes in key card that an only client public key pointer random number is as public key pointer random number R PKtx, according to public key
Pointer random number R PKtx obtains client public key PKtx and private key for user SKtx from key card；
Sum respectively to the wallet address and amount of the fund of output data in transaction, and the two after summation combined to obtain sign it is close
Original text generates the second random number, and obtains first key and parameter according to the second random number and group asymmetric public key PKGtx
K2 ' signs close original text using first key encryption and obtains signing ciphertext；
The close original text of label is acted on using hash function and parameter k2 ' obtains parameter Rtx, according to the second random number, parameter Rtx and use
Family private key SKtx obtains parameter Stx, obtains signing close as a result, the close result of the label is label ciphertext, the group of parameter Rtx and parameter Stx
It closes；
Obtain key KRStx using client public key PKtx, group asymmetric privacy keys SKGtx and the first random number, by parameter Rtx and
It is encrypted after parameter Stx combination using key KRStx, and is signed after being combined with public key pointer random number R PKtx, the first random number
In confidential information deposit transaction.
6. the anti-quantum calculation block chain secure transactions method based on group's unsymmetrical key pond as claimed in claim 4,
Be characterized in that, the transaction initiator combination of at least partly output data of transaction sign it is close, sign it is close during obtains
First key, sign it is close after the completion of obtain in label confidential information deposit transaction according to signing close result, comprising:
It first signs to the transaction unsigned, the combination of at least partly inputoutput data of transaction is carried out after the completion of signature
Sign it is close, sign it is close during obtains first key, sign it is close after the completion of obtain in label confidential information deposit transaction according to signing close result；
The described pair of transaction unsigned is signed, comprising:
If including the more input amount of money in the input data of the transaction, sign to every input amount of money, wherein to m
The signature process for inputting the amount of money is as follows:
It is stored in the m input amount of money corresponding Dest value in transaction where its source into the transaction unsigned, obtains first
Transaction；
Group asymmetric public key PKGm is taken out from key card according to the 4th random number that one's own side generates, and generates third random number,
Parameter k2 is obtained according to third random number and group asymmetric public key PKGm, acts on the first transaction and parameter using hash function
K2 obtains parameter Rm, obtains parameter Sm according to third random number and parameter Rm, to obtain signature result, which includes
First transaction, parameter Rm and parameter Sm；
It is obtained accordingly inputting the corresponding trading signature Txsm of the amount of money according to parameter Rm and parameter Sm, trading signature Txsm is right with its
After the client public key pointer random number R PKm combination answered in deposit transaction；
According to the signature process that m are inputted with the amount of money, the corresponding trading signature of every input amount of money is calculated, and by trading signature
Client public key pointer random number corresponding with each trading signature is stored in the corresponding position of transaction after combining.
7. the anti-quantum calculation block chain secure transactions method based on group's unsymmetrical key pond as claimed in claim 6,
Be characterized in that, the combination of at least partly inputoutput data of transaction sign after the completion of the signature it is close, sign it is close during
Obtain first key, sign it is close after the completion of obtain in label confidential information deposit transaction according to signing close result, comprising:
Group asymmetric public key PKGtx and group's asymmetric privacy keys are taken out from key card according to the first random number that one's own side generates
SKGtx randomly selects one from several client public key pointer random numbers of key card and is used as public key pointer random number
RPKtx obtains client public key PKtx and private key for user SKtx according to public key pointer random number R PKtx from key card；
To the client public key pointer random number of inputoutput data, trading signature, wallet address and amount of the fund difference in transaction
Summation, and four after summation are combined to obtain and sign close original text, the second random number is generated, and non-according to the second random number and group
Symmetrical public key PKGtx obtains first key and parameter k2 ', signs close original text using first key encryption and obtains signing ciphertext；
The close original text of label is acted on using hash function and parameter k2 ' obtains parameter Rtx, according to the second random number, parameter Rtx and use
Family private key SKtx obtains parameter Stx, is used as the close result of label after signing ciphertext, parameter Rtx and parameter Stx combination；
Obtain key KRStx using client public key PKtx, group asymmetric privacy keys SKGtx and the first random number, by parameter Rtx and
It is encrypted after parameter Stx combination using key KRStx, and is signed after being combined with public key pointer random number R PKtx, the first random number
In confidential information deposit transaction.
8. the anti-quantum calculation block chain secure transactions method based on group's unsymmetrical key pond as claimed in claim 7,
It is characterized in that, the transaction initiator further include: public to trading signature user corresponding with its in transaction after the completion of signing close
The combination of key pointer random number is encrypted using first key, and encrypted value is covered in deposit transaction；
The transaction verification side further include: after signing close be verified, the corresponding trading signature of every input amount of money is tested
Card, is verified transaction after being verified to trading signature and broadcasts.
9. a kind of computer equipment, including memory and processor, the memory are stored with computer program, feature exists
In the processor is realized asymmetric based on group described in any one of claims 1 to 2 when executing the computer program
The step of anti-quantum calculation block chain secure transactions method of pool of keys.
10. the anti-quantum calculation block chain secure transactions system based on group's unsymmetrical key pond, which is characterized in that the anti-amount
Sub- calculation block chain secure transactions system includes transaction initiator and transaction verification side, the transaction initiator and transaction verification side
It is the user in block chain, each user configuration has identical key card, group's asymmetric public key is stored in the key card
Pond, group's asymmetric privacy keys pond, user's asymmetric public key pond, client public key pointer random number and private key for user；
The transaction initiator and transaction verification side are realized as claimed in claim 3 asymmetric based on group by block chain network
The step of anti-quantum calculation block chain secure transactions method of pool of keys.
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| Publication number | Priority date | Publication date | Assignee | Title |
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| CN110868295A (en) * | 2019-12-12 | 2020-03-06 | 南京如般量子科技有限公司 | Anti-quantum computing alliance chain system based on secret sharing and communication method |
| CN115001723A (en) * | 2021-02-20 | 2022-09-02 | 南京如般量子科技有限公司 | Group communication method and system based on tree structure and asymmetric key pool |
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| CN110868295B (en) * | 2019-12-12 | 2023-03-14 | 南京如般量子科技有限公司 | Anti-quantum computing union chain system based on secret sharing and communication method |
| CN115001723A (en) * | 2021-02-20 | 2022-09-02 | 南京如般量子科技有限公司 | Group communication method and system based on tree structure and asymmetric key pool |
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