CN110371081A - Vehicle tamper resistant method, device and vehicle - Google Patents
Vehicle tamper resistant method, device and vehicle Download PDFInfo
- Publication number
- CN110371081A CN110371081A CN201910729772.1A CN201910729772A CN110371081A CN 110371081 A CN110371081 A CN 110371081A CN 201910729772 A CN201910729772 A CN 201910729772A CN 110371081 A CN110371081 A CN 110371081A
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- China
- Prior art keywords
- vehicle
- cryptographic hash
- premise equipment
- server
- judging result
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Classifications
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- B—PERFORMING OPERATIONS; TRANSPORTING
- B60—VEHICLES IN GENERAL
- B60R—VEHICLES, VEHICLE FITTINGS, OR VEHICLE PARTS, NOT OTHERWISE PROVIDED FOR
- B60R25/00—Fittings or systems for preventing or indicating unauthorised use or theft of vehicles
- B60R25/20—Means to switch the anti-theft system on or off
- B60R25/2018—Central base unlocks or authorises unlocking
-
- H—ELECTRICITY
- H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
- H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
- H04L9/00—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols
- H04L9/32—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols including means for verifying the identity or authority of a user of the system or for message authentication, e.g. authorization, entity authentication, data integrity or data verification, non-repudiation, key authentication or verification of credentials
- H04L9/3236—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols including means for verifying the identity or authority of a user of the system or for message authentication, e.g. authorization, entity authentication, data integrity or data verification, non-repudiation, key authentication or verification of credentials using cryptographic hash functions
- H04L9/3239—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols including means for verifying the identity or authority of a user of the system or for message authentication, e.g. authorization, entity authentication, data integrity or data verification, non-repudiation, key authentication or verification of credentials using cryptographic hash functions involving non-keyed hash functions, e.g. modification detection codes [MDCs], MD5, SHA or RIPEMD
Abstract
The present invention provides vehicle tamper resistant method, comprising: the identity information of the premise equipment of the vehicle of collection is carried out Hash calculation and obtains the first cryptographic Hash；The second cryptographic Hash that server is sent is received, second cryptographic Hash carries out identical Hash calculation by the identity information of the legal premise equipment of the vehicle and obtains；Judge whether first cryptographic Hash and second cryptographic Hash being stored in advance on the server are identical, obtains the first judging result；Corresponding first control strategy is executed according to first judging result.The present invention also provides a kind of vehicle tamper resistant device and vehicles.The present invention can prevent vehicle key equipment to be tampered, and improve vehicle safety.
Description
Technical field
The present invention relates to technical field of vehicle more particularly to a kind of vehicle tamper resistant methods, device and vehicle.
Background technique
It should be noted that it is all the prior art that content documented by this part, which does not represent,.
Be generally fitted with vehicle arrangement on vehicle, for example, BCM controller, Engine ECU, electric vehicle VCU, BMS controller,
Domain controller, intelligent gateway etc., to realize that vehicle various aspects operate normally.Some vehicle arrangements are concerning in the normal row of vehicle
Sail, therefore security requirement is very high, for example, the safeties such as electric vehicle VCU and Engine ECU just may require that it is very high, if car owner
It voluntarily distorts, is then easy to cause safety accident, cause casualties.
Summary of the invention
In consideration of it, one of the technical issues of in order to solve in the related technology to a certain extent, it is necessary to provide a kind of vehicle
Tamper resistant method, device and vehicle, prevent vehicle key equipment to be tampered, and improve vehicle safety.
First aspect present invention provides a kind of vehicle tamper resistant method, the described method comprises the following steps:
The identity information of the premise equipment of the vehicle of collection is subjected to Hash calculation and obtains the first cryptographic Hash；
The second cryptographic Hash that server is sent is received, second cryptographic Hash passes through the legal premise equipment of the vehicle
Identity information carries out identical Hash calculation and obtains；
Judge whether first cryptographic Hash and the second cryptographic Hash being stored in advance on the server are identical, obtains the
One judging result；
Corresponding first control strategy is executed according to first judging result.
Further, including at least two premise equipments, the identity of the premise equipment of the vehicle by collection are believed
Breath carries out Hash calculation and obtains the first cryptographic Hash, comprising:
Hash calculation is carried out after combining the identity information of at least two premise equipment according to predetermined way obtains the
One cryptographic Hash.
Further, the identity information includes: the device id of the premise equipment and the chip of the premise equipment
ID；
The mode of the predetermined way combination includes: to make a reservation for set using the device id and chip id combination as described
Standby total ID, and the input value by total ID combination of each premise equipment as Hash calculation in order.
It is further, described that corresponding first control strategy is executed according to first judging result, comprising:
When first cryptographic Hash and second cryptographic Hash are unequal, the determining premise equipment being tampered is simultaneously right
The premise equipment being tampered executes corresponding control strategy.
Further, described that corresponding first control strategy is executed according to first judging result, comprising: when described the
One judging result is when being, to allow logon operation；
After corresponding first control strategy according to first judging result execution, the method also includes:
Corresponding MD5 value is generated according to the software version information of the premise equipment；
It receives the corresponding with legal software version of server transmission and prestores MD5 value；
Judge the MD5 value and whether prestore MD5 value identical, and obtains the second judging result；
Corresponding second control strategy is executed according to second judging result.
Second aspect of the present invention provides a kind of vehicle tamper resistant method, the described method comprises the following steps:
The identity information of the premise equipment of the vehicle of collection is subjected to Hash calculation and obtains the first cryptographic Hash；
First cryptographic Hash is sent to server, with by the server judge first cryptographic Hash and in advance
Whether the second cryptographic Hash being stored on the server is identical, and second cryptographic Hash makes a reservation for set by the legal of the vehicle
Standby identity information carries out identical Hash calculation and obtains；
Corresponding first control strategy is executed according to the first judging result of the server feedback.
It is further, described that corresponding first control strategy is executed according to the first judging result of the server feedback,
It include: to allow logon operation when the first judging result of the server feedback, which is, is；
After corresponding first control strategy according to first judging result execution, the method also includes:
Corresponding MD5 value is generated according to the software version information of the premise equipment；
The MD5 value is sent to the server, to judge the MD5 value by the server and be stored in advance in
On the server whether prestore MD5 value identical；
Corresponding second control strategy is executed according to the second judging result of the server feedback.
Third aspect present invention provides a kind of vehicle tamper resistant device, and described device includes:
Computing module obtains first for the identity information of the premise equipment for the vehicle collected to be carried out Hash calculation
Cryptographic Hash；
Receiving module, for receiving the second cryptographic Hash of server transmission, second cryptographic Hash passes through the vehicle
The identity information of legal premise equipment carries out identical Hash calculation and obtains；
Judgment module, for judging that first cryptographic Hash is with the second cryptographic Hash being stored in advance on the server
It is no identical, obtain the first judging result；
Execution module, for executing corresponding first control strategy according to first judging result.
Fourth aspect present invention provides a kind of vehicle tamper resistant device, and described device includes:
Computing module obtains first for the identity information of the premise equipment for the vehicle collected to be carried out Hash calculation
Cryptographic Hash；
Sending module, for first cryptographic Hash to be sent to server, to judge described the by the server
Whether one cryptographic Hash and the second cryptographic Hash being stored in advance on the server are identical, and second cryptographic Hash passes through the vehicle
The identity information of legal premise equipment carry out identical Hash calculation and obtain；
Execution module, for executing corresponding first control strategy according to the first judging result of the server feedback.
Fifth aspect present invention provides a kind of vehicle, and the vehicle includes:
Processor；And
Storage device, the storage device include processor-executable instruction, and the executable instruction is held by processor
For executing the vehicle tamper resistant method when row.
By above scheme it is found that the identity information of premise equipment is carried out Hash calculation by the present invention, as long as legal is pre-
Locking equipment is not distorted, then its identity information is constant, then the cryptographic Hash after Hash calculation is and storage on the server legal pre-
The cryptographic Hash of locking equipment be it is identical, when legal premise equipment is replaced, then its identity information changes, then Hash calculation
Cryptographic Hash afterwards be change, it is therefore, not identical as the cryptographic Hash for the legal premise equipment for being stored in advance in server, by with
Upper judging result, vehicle executes corresponding control strategy, so as to improve the safety of automobile.
Detailed description of the invention
Fig. 1 is the structural schematic diagram of the vehicle tamper resistant method of the first embodiment of the present invention.
Fig. 2 is the structural schematic diagram of the vehicle tamper resistant method of the second embodiment of the present invention.
Fig. 3 is the structural schematic diagram of the vehicle tamper resistant method of the third embodiment of the present invention.
Fig. 4 is the structural schematic diagram of the vehicle tamper resistant method of the fourth embodiment of the present invention.
Fig. 5 is the structural schematic diagram of the vehicle of one embodiment of the present invention.
Fig. 6 is the structural schematic diagram of the vehicle tamper resistant device of the first embodiment of the present invention.
Fig. 7 is the structural schematic diagram of the vehicle tamper resistant device of the second embodiment of the present invention.
The present invention that the following detailed description will be further explained with reference to the above drawings.
Specific embodiment
Following will be combined with the drawings in the embodiments of the present invention, and technical solution in the embodiment of the present invention carries out clear, complete
Site preparation description, it is clear that described embodiments are only a part of the embodiments of the present invention, instead of all the embodiments.It is based on
The embodiment of the present invention, those of ordinary skill in the art's obtained every other reality without making creative work
Example is applied, protection scope of the present invention is belonged to.It is understood that attached drawing be provided solely for reference and description use, not be used to pair
The present invention limits.
Fig. 1 is the vehicle tamper resistant method that first embodiment of the invention provides, and is applied to vehicle, the method may include
Following steps.
S100: the identity information of the premise equipment of the vehicle of collection is subjected to Hash calculation and obtains the first cryptographic Hash.
It should be understood that the vehicle can be electric vehicle, gasoline car or mixed electrical automobile herein with no restrictions can
To be that car is also possible to in-between car, herein also with no restrictions.
The premise equipment can be manufacturer and set, the high vehicle arrangement of security requirement according to the needs of safety
It can be set as premise equipment, can be using one or some very crucial vehicle arrangements are as premise equipment, premise equipment is
It is not intended to user or other people are distorted with private strength and selected vehicle arrangement, such as can be BCM controller, start
Machine ECU, electric vehicle VCU, BMS controller, domain controller, intelligent gateway etc. can also include that other are not desired to be tampered certainly
Other equipment etc..
It in the present embodiment, may include at least two premise equipments, it can all by two different vehicle arrangements
It is set as premise equipment.Therefore, this step can specifically include: by the identity information of at least two premise equipment according to pre-
Determine progress Hash calculation after mode combines and obtains the first cryptographic Hash.Can by premise equipment security level from high to low in the way of
Corresponding arrangement identity information, can also by premise equipment security level from low to high in the way of accordingly arrange identity information,
It can be combined according to other scheduled modes, the safety of such Hash calculation can be higher.
Manufacturer can be each regular premise equipment (including being installed on vehicle when factory and not being installed on vehicle
On but can be installed on vehicle) the individual identity information of distribution, the identity information may include the ID of premise equipment
And the chip id (such as main control chip ID) of premise equipment, etc..
It after vehicle release, is generally controlled by car owner, on startup, vehicle can pass through intelligent gateway/domain controller to vehicle
The identity information of the premise equipment of vehicle described in active collection.The identity information can obtain the first Hash by Hash calculation
Value, the first cryptographic Hash is a string of characters, such as is calculated the first cryptographic Hash by SHA256, the first cryptographic Hash we can claim
For the automobile finger-print that obtains in real time.
In the present embodiment, the mode of the predetermined way combination may include: with the device id and the chip
ID combines total ID (such as device id+chip id) as the premise equipment, and in order by each premise equipment
The input value of total ID combination (such as the total IDn of the total ID2..+ of total ID1+) as Hash calculation, through Hash calculation (such as SHA256
(the total IDn of total total ID2..+ of ID1+)) obtain the first cryptographic Hash.
It may be adapted after vehicle release, exterior trim, interior trim and premise equipment including vehicle etc., car owner's replacement is predetermined to be set
(car owner is likely to be the premise equipment with identity information bought from the regular channel in market, it is also possible to be from market after standby
Informal channel purchase the premise equipment without identity information), identity information will change, thus after Hash calculation
Obtained cryptographic Hash also changes correspondingly.
S110: receiving the second cryptographic Hash that server is sent, and second cryptographic Hash passes through the legal predetermined of the vehicle
The identity information of equipment carries out identical Hash calculation and obtains.
Before factory, the premise equipment being installed on vehicle has unique identity information for manufacturer, has installed before factory
It is referred to as legal premise equipment, i.e. equipment not tampered by user in the premise equipment on vehicle.Before factory, these are predetermined
The identity information of equipment can be recorded by manufacturer and collect and store, and the identity information of legal premise equipment passes through Hash calculation
The second cryptographic Hash is obtained, the second cryptographic Hash stores in the server, and Hash calculation mode is identical as aforesaid way, with the first Hash
It is worth identical, the second cryptographic Hash is also a string of characters, and character quantity is equal.Since the identity information of the premise equipment of each car is
Uniquely, therefore, corresponding second cryptographic Hash of each car is also unique.Second cryptographic Hash we can be referred to as legal automobile
Fingerprint.
After vehicle launch, vehicle can after server receives the request to the second cryptographic Hash of server request
To authenticate to the request, the second cryptographic Hash can be sent to the vehicle if if certification, which obtains second
Cryptographic Hash.
It is possible that when vehicle is sent, factory is repaired or depot is put in maintenance on record, if premise equipment is replaced, can be recognized
It is set to legal replacement, is not belonging to the case where replacing privately through private strength, at this point, the premise equipment after replacement belongs to legal make a reservation for
The identity information of premise equipment after replacement can be updated into server, be updated by Hash calculation by equipment, depot
The second cryptographic Hash and store as legal automobile finger-print.
S120: judging whether first cryptographic Hash and second cryptographic Hash are identical, obtains the first judging result.
S130: corresponding first control strategy is executed according to first judging result.
If the first judging result is that the first cryptographic Hash and the second cryptographic Hash be not identical, show legal premise equipment by privately
It distorts and does not put manufacturer on record, vehicle may include giving a warning, No starting, forbidding travelling, forbid any equipment operation of vehicle
Any of.
If the first judging result is that the first cryptographic Hash is identical as the second cryptographic Hash, show legal premise equipment not by privately
It distorts, then vehicle can operate normally.
It is executed and first judging result and institute specifically, this step may is that according to first judging result
State corresponding first control strategy of premise equipment.Specifically, if first judging result and the second judging result be not identical,
First control strategy is only to forbid the premise equipment to start or operation, rather than the vehicle arrangement of premise equipment is then still
It can run.Such as, if the first judging result is that the first cryptographic Hash and the second cryptographic Hash be not identical, and the premise equipment includes vehicle
Engine ECU but do not include interior air-conditioner controller, then can forbid engine start, but interior air-conditioning still can be beaten
It opens, if the first judging result is that the first cryptographic Hash and the second cryptographic Hash be not identical, and the premise equipment includes vehicle room lamp
Controller but do not include Engine ECU, then can forbid vehicle room lamp to open, but vehicle transmitter ECU still can be normal
Work.
Specifically, in this step specifically can also include: when first cryptographic Hash and second cryptographic Hash not phase
Whens equal, determine the premise equipment being tampered and corresponding control strategy is executed to the premise equipment being tampered.
When including multiple premise equipments, by the comparison of the first cryptographic Hash and the second cryptographic Hash, especially use body
Part information carries out the mode of predetermined way combination, can determine the premise equipment being tampered.Such as when premise equipment includes vehicle
Indoor lamp controller and Engine ECU, and what determination was tampered is Engine ECU, and vehicle room lamp controller is not usurped
Change, then only forbids Engine ECU to start or can sound an alarm instruction Engine ECU and be tampered, and vehicle room lamp controls
Device is still up.
Vehicle tamper resistant method provided by present embodiment can prevent the key equipment of vehicle to be tampered and influence vehicle
Safety, improve the safety of vehicle.
The vehicle tamper resistant method that second embodiment of the invention provides, as shown in Fig. 2, the method may include following steps
Suddenly.It should be understood that each concrete scheme suitable for first embodiment can correspondingly apply to the present embodiment, herein not
It is limited.
S200: the identity information of the premise equipment of the vehicle of collection is subjected to Hash calculation and obtains the first cryptographic Hash.
S210: being sent to server for first cryptographic Hash, to judge first cryptographic Hash by the server
Whether identical as the second cryptographic Hash for being stored in advance on the server, second cryptographic Hash is legal by the vehicle
The identity information of premise equipment carries out identical Hash calculation and obtains.
S220: corresponding first control strategy is executed according to the first judging result of the server feedback.
In the present embodiment, the first cryptographic Hash is sent to server, the first cryptographic Hash is compared by server
With the second cryptographic Hash, it is possible to reduce vehicle end program, and the safety of comparison can be improved.
The vehicle tamper resistant method that three embodiments of the invention provide, as shown in figure 3, the method may include following steps
Suddenly.It should be understood that this can be correspondingly applied to by being suitable for each concrete scheme of first embodiment and/or second embodiment
In embodiment, herein with no restrictions.
S300: the identity information of the premise equipment of the vehicle of collection is subjected to Hash calculation and obtains the first cryptographic Hash.
S310: receiving the second cryptographic Hash that server is sent, and second cryptographic Hash passes through the legal predetermined of the vehicle
The identity information of equipment carries out identical Hash calculation and obtains.
S320: judge whether first cryptographic Hash and second cryptographic Hash are identical, if not identical, then follow the steps
S330 thens follow the steps S340 if they are the same.
It should be understood that identical with second embodiment, judgment step can also be executed in server end.
S330: do not allow logon operation.
After this step, process terminates.
S340: allow logon operation.
S350: corresponding MD5 value is generated according to the software version information of the premise equipment.
After vehicle normally starts, software check process will be continued to complete, vehicle will be read in the software version in flash
Hold, the software can be system software, be also possible to be stored in the application software in flash.
Software version content can convert algorithm by the irreversible character string of MD5 algorithm, and it is unique to produce this
MD5 informative abstract, arbitrary software version content is after MD5 algorithm, and what is obtained is unique MD5 value, that is, if soft
Part version is changed (upgrading or replacement), then its corresponding MD5 value centainly changes correspondingly, if software version is identical, MD5 value
It is constant.
When with multiple premise equipments, it may include the software version information of multiple premise equipments, can be generated multiple
The software version of premise equipment MD5 verification and.
S360: it receives the corresponding with legal software version of server transmission and prestores MD5 value.
Prestoring MD5 value is that legal software version is calculated by MD5 algorithm, can be obtained and prestores before vehicle release
MD5 value, as legal MD5 value.
S370: judging the MD5 value and whether prestore MD5 value identical, and obtains the second judging result.
S380: corresponding second control strategy is executed according to second judging result.
(concrete scheme that is referred to the step S130 of first embodiment) similar with the step S130 of first embodiment,
It is specific it is possible that, when the second judging result, which is, is, show that software is not tampered with, then vehicle is mounted with the predetermined of the software
Equipment and/or the software can normally be started and run；When the second judging result is no, show that software is tampered, then vehicle
The premise equipment for being mounted with the software can not start or the software can not be installed and be run.
Present embodiment further includes software check step, when the premise equipment for determining vehicle is not passed this, it is thus necessary to determine that
Whether software is tampered, if software is also tampered, is equally also easy to cause safety accident, and therefore, the present embodiment passes through MD5
It is worth and prestores the comparison of MD5 value to determine whether software is tampered, is calculated software version content using MD5 algorithm, it will
Unique MD5 value is obtained, software is once be tampered, then MD5 value necessarily changes, and can safely monitoring software whether be usurped
Change, further increases the safety of vehicle.
The vehicle tamper resistant method that four embodiments of the invention provide, as shown in figure 4, the method may include following steps
Suddenly.It should be understood that each concrete scheme for being suitable for first embodiment and/or second embodiment and/or 3rd embodiment can
To correspondingly apply in the present embodiment, herein with no restrictions.
S400: the identity information of the premise equipment of the vehicle of collection is subjected to Hash calculation and obtains the first cryptographic Hash.
S410: receiving the second cryptographic Hash that server is sent, and second cryptographic Hash passes through the legal predetermined of the vehicle
The identity information of equipment carries out identical Hash calculation and obtains.
S420: judge whether first cryptographic Hash and second cryptographic Hash are identical, if not identical, then follow the steps
S430 thens follow the steps S440 if they are the same.
S430: do not allow logon operation.
S440: allow logon operation.
S450: corresponding MD5 value is generated according to the software version information of the premise equipment.
S460: being sent to the server for the MD5 value, with by the server judge the MD5 value and in advance
Be stored on the server whether corresponding with legal software version to prestore MD5 value identical.
S470: corresponding second control strategy is executed according to the second judging result of the server feedback.
The present embodiment is different from the third embodiment place and is, the MD5 value comparison of the present embodiment is carried out in server end
, it can so reduce the calculating of vehicle end.
Fig. 5 for the present invention provide vehicle 100 a kind of embodiment structure chart, the vehicle 100 may include processor 10,
Storage device 20 and vehicle tamper resistant device further include being stored in the storage device 20 and can be on the processor 10
Computer program of operation, such as application program installation procedure etc..Wherein, the processor 10 can be Vehicular intelligent gateway
And/or the control centre of domain controller, it is the core of Vehicular intelligent gateway and/or domain controller, the storage device 20
It similarly can be a part of Vehicular intelligent gateway and/or domain controller.
The processor 10 can be central processor equipment (CPU), can also be other general processors, at digital signal
It manages device (DSP), specific integrated circuit (ASIC), field programmable gate array (FPGA) or other programmable logic device, divide
Vertical door or transistor logic, discrete hardware components etc..General processor can be microprocessor or the processor
It can be any conventional processor etc..
The storage device 20 can be used for storing the computer program and/or module, and the processor 10 passes through operation
Or the computer program and/or module being stored in the storage device 20 are executed, and call and be stored in storage device 20
Data, realize the various functions of the vehicle.The storage device 20 can mainly include storing program area and storage data area,
Wherein, storing program area can application program needed for storage program area, at least one function etc.；Storage data area can store root
Created data etc. are used according to vehicle.It, can be in addition, storage device 20 may include high random access storage device
Including non-volatile memory device, such as hard disk, memory, plug-in type hard disk, intelligent memory card, safe digital card, flash card, extremely
A few disk storage device part, flush memory device or other non-volatile solid state memory parts.
Fig. 6 is the structural schematic diagram of the vehicle tamper resistant device 200 for the first embodiment that invention provides, and the vehicle is anti-to usurp
It may include the first computing module 21, the first receiving module 22, first judgment module 23 and the first execution module that repacking, which sets 200,
24。
The identity information of first computing module 21, the premise equipment for the vehicle that can be used for collect carries out Hash
The first cryptographic Hash is calculated.
First receiving module 22, can be used for receiving the second cryptographic Hash of server transmission, and second cryptographic Hash is logical
The identity information for crossing the legal premise equipment of the vehicle carries out identical Hash calculation and obtains.
The first judgment module 23 can be used for judging first cryptographic Hash and be stored in advance on the server
Whether the second cryptographic Hash is identical, obtains the first judging result.
First execution module 24 can be used for executing corresponding first control strategy according to first judging result.
Further, the vehicle includes at least two premise equipments, and first computing module 21 specifically can be used for:
Hash calculation is carried out after combining the identity information of at least two premise equipment according to predetermined way obtains the
One cryptographic Hash.
Further, the identity information includes: the device id of the premise equipment and the chip of the premise equipment
ID；
The mode of the predetermined way combination includes: to make a reservation for set using the device id and chip id combination as described
Standby total ID, and the input value by total ID combination of each premise equipment as Hash calculation in order.
Further, first execution module 24 is particularly used in, when first cryptographic Hash and second Hash
When being worth unequal, determines the premise equipment being tampered and corresponding control plan is executed to the premise equipment being tampered
Slightly.
Further, the vehicle tamper resistant device 200 can also include: the second computing module 25, the second receiving module
26, the second judgment module 27 and the second execution module 28.
First execution module 24 specifically can be also used for, and be executed accordingly described according to first judging result
After first control strategy, corresponding MD5 value is generated according to the software version information of the premise equipment.
Second computing module 25 can be used for receiving the prestoring corresponding with legal software version of the server transmission
MD5 value.
Second judgment module 27 can be used for judging the MD5 value and whether prestore MD5 value identical, and obtain second
Judging result.
Second execution module 28 can be used for executing corresponding second control strategy according to second judging result.
Fig. 7 is the structural schematic diagram of the vehicle tamper resistant device 300 for the second embodiment that invention provides, it should be understood that
It is that each concrete scheme of the vehicle tamper resistant device 200 suitable for first embodiment can also be suitable for the present embodiment accordingly
In.Corresponding with the vehicle tamper resistant method of above-described embodiment, in the present embodiment, the vehicle tamper resistant device 300 be can wrap
Include computing module 31, sending module 32 and execution module 33.
The identity information of the computing module 31, the premise equipment for the vehicle that can be used for collect carries out Hash calculation
Obtain the first cryptographic Hash；
The sending module 32 can be used for first cryptographic Hash being sent to server, to sentence by the server
Whether first cryptographic Hash of breaking and the second cryptographic Hash being stored in advance on the server are identical, and second cryptographic Hash is logical
The identity information for crossing the legal premise equipment of the vehicle carries out identical Hash calculation and obtains；
The execution module 33 can be used for executing corresponding first control according to the first judging result of the server feedback
System strategy.
The embodiment of the present invention also provides a kind of vehicle, and the vehicle includes processor and storage device, the storage device
It include processor-executable instruction, the executable instruction is used to execute when executed by the processor any of the above embodiment
The vehicle tamper resistant method.
The foregoing is merely illustrative of the preferred embodiments of the present invention, is not intended to limit the invention, all in essence of the invention
Made any modifications, equivalent replacements, and improvements etc. within mind and principle should all include within protection scope of the present invention.
Claims (10)
1. a kind of vehicle tamper resistant method, which is characterized in that the described method comprises the following steps:
The identity information of the premise equipment of the vehicle of collection is subjected to Hash calculation and obtains the first cryptographic Hash；
Receive the second cryptographic Hash that server is sent, the identity that second cryptographic Hash passes through the legal premise equipment of the vehicle
Information carries out identical Hash calculation and obtains；
Judge whether first cryptographic Hash and second cryptographic Hash being stored in advance on the server are identical, obtains the
One judging result；
Corresponding first control strategy is executed according to first judging result.
2. vehicle tamper resistant method according to claim 1, which is characterized in that described including at least two premise equipments
The identity information of the premise equipment of the vehicle of collection is subjected to Hash calculation and obtains the first cryptographic Hash, comprising:
Hash calculation is carried out after combining the identity information of at least two premise equipment according to predetermined way obtains the first Kazakhstan
Uncommon value.
3. vehicle tamper resistant method according to claim 2, it is characterised in that:
The identity information includes: the device id of the premise equipment and the chip id of the premise equipment；
The mode of the predetermined way combination includes: to be combined using the device id and the chip id as the premise equipment
Total ID, and the input value by total ID combination of each premise equipment as Hash calculation in order.
4. vehicle tamper resistant method according to claim 1, which is characterized in that described to be held according to first judging result
Corresponding first control strategy of row, comprising:
When first cryptographic Hash and second cryptographic Hash are unequal, the premise equipment that is tampered is determined and to being usurped
The premise equipment changed executes corresponding control strategy.
5. vehicle tamper resistant method according to claim 1, which is characterized in that described to be held according to first judging result
Corresponding first control strategy of row, comprising: when first judging result, which is, is, allow logon operation；
After corresponding first control strategy according to first judging result execution, the method also includes:
Corresponding MD5 value is generated according to the software version information of the premise equipment；
It receives the corresponding with legal software version of server transmission and prestores MD5 value；
Judge the MD5 value and whether prestore MD5 value identical, and obtains the second judging result；
Corresponding second control strategy is executed according to second judging result.
6. a kind of vehicle tamper resistant method, which is characterized in that the described method comprises the following steps:
The identity information of the premise equipment of the vehicle of collection is subjected to Hash calculation and obtains the first cryptographic Hash；
First cryptographic Hash is sent to server, to judge first cryptographic Hash by the server and be stored in advance
Whether the second cryptographic Hash on the server is identical, and second cryptographic Hash passes through the legal premise equipment of the vehicle
Identity information carries out identical Hash calculation and obtains；
Corresponding first control strategy is executed according to the first judging result of the server feedback.
7. vehicle tamper resistant method according to claim 6, which is characterized in that described according to the of the server feedback
One judging result executes corresponding first control strategy, comprising: when the first judging result of the server feedback, which is, is, permits
Perhaps logon operation；
After corresponding first control strategy according to first judging result execution, the method also includes:
Corresponding MD5 value is generated according to the software version information of the premise equipment；
The MD5 value is sent to the server, to judge the MD5 value by the server and be stored in advance in described
On server whether prestore MD5 value identical；
Corresponding second control strategy is executed according to the second judging result of the server feedback.
8. a kind of vehicle tamper resistant device, which is characterized in that described device includes:
Computing module obtains the first Hash for the identity information of the premise equipment for the vehicle collected to be carried out Hash calculation
Value；
Receiving module, for receiving the second cryptographic Hash of server transmission, second cryptographic Hash is legal by the vehicle
The identity information of premise equipment carries out identical Hash calculation and obtains；
Judgment module, for judge first cryptographic Hash and the second cryptographic Hash for being stored in advance on the server whether phase
Together, the first judging result is obtained；
Execution module, for executing corresponding first control strategy according to first judging result.
9. a kind of vehicle tamper resistant device, which is characterized in that described device includes:
Computing module obtains the first Hash for the identity information of the premise equipment for the vehicle collected to be carried out Hash calculation
Value；
Sending module, for first cryptographic Hash to be sent to server, to judge that described first breathes out by the server
Whether uncommon value and the second cryptographic Hash being stored in advance on the server are identical, and second cryptographic Hash passes through the vehicle
The identity information of legal premise equipment carries out identical Hash calculation and obtains；
Execution module, for executing corresponding first control strategy according to the first judging result of the server feedback.
10. a kind of vehicle, which is characterized in that the vehicle includes:
Processor；And
Storage device, the storage device include processor-executable instruction, and the executable instruction is when executed by the processor
The described in any item vehicle tamper resistant methods of 1-7 are required for perform claim.
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| CN112994898A (en) * | 2021-04-08 | 2021-06-18 | 北京邮电大学 | Vehicle intranet communication safety authentication method and device |
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| CN113709102A (en) * | 2021-07-19 | 2021-11-26 | 英博超算(南京)科技有限公司 | Gateway ECU security service system based on PKI asymmetric mechanism |
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| CN113708922A (en) * | 2021-07-19 | 2021-11-26 | 英博超算(南京)科技有限公司 | Safe updating method for automobile fingerprint VFP |
| CN114257450A (en) * | 2021-12-21 | 2022-03-29 | 山东爱德邦智能科技有限公司 | Method, device and medium for preventing parts from being tampered |
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| CN114257450A (en) * | 2021-12-21 | 2022-03-29 | 山东爱德邦智能科技有限公司 | Method, device and medium for preventing parts from being tampered |
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Application publication date: 20191025 |