CN110336659A - A kind of multi-party quantum key machinery of consultation, terminal and storage device - Google Patents
A kind of multi-party quantum key machinery of consultation, terminal and storage device Download PDFInfo
- Publication number
- CN110336659A CN110336659A CN201910600518.1A CN201910600518A CN110336659A CN 110336659 A CN110336659 A CN 110336659A CN 201910600518 A CN201910600518 A CN 201910600518A CN 110336659 A CN110336659 A CN 110336659A
- Authority
- CN
- China
- Prior art keywords
- state
- information
- negotiation
- quantum
- interaction end
- Prior art date
- Legal status (The legal status is an assumption and is not a legal conclusion. Google has not performed a legal analysis and makes no representation as to the accuracy of the status listed.)
- Pending
Links
Classifications
-
- H—ELECTRICITY
- H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
- H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
- H04L63/00—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security
- H04L63/06—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security for supporting key management in a packet data network
-
- H—ELECTRICITY
- H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
- H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
- H04L63/00—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security
- H04L63/30—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security for supporting lawful interception, monitoring or retaining of communications or communication related information
-
- H—ELECTRICITY
- H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
- H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
- H04L9/00—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols
- H04L9/06—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols the encryption apparatus using shift registers or memories for block-wise or stream coding, e.g. DES systems or RC4; Hash functions; Pseudorandom sequence generators
- H04L9/0618—Block ciphers, i.e. encrypting groups of characters of a plain text message using fixed encryption transformation
- H04L9/0631—Substitution permutation network [SPN], i.e. cipher composed of a number of stages or rounds each involving linear and nonlinear transformations, e.g. AES algorithms
-
- H—ELECTRICITY
- H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
- H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
- H04L9/00—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols
- H04L9/08—Key distribution or management, e.g. generation, sharing or updating, of cryptographic keys or passwords
- H04L9/0816—Key establishment, i.e. cryptographic processes or cryptographic protocols whereby a shared secret becomes available to two or more parties, for subsequent use
- H04L9/0838—Key agreement, i.e. key establishment technique in which a shared key is derived by parties as a function of information contributed by, or associated with, each of these
-
- H—ELECTRICITY
- H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
- H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
- H04L9/00—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols
- H04L9/08—Key distribution or management, e.g. generation, sharing or updating, of cryptographic keys or passwords
- H04L9/0816—Key establishment, i.e. cryptographic processes or cryptographic protocols whereby a shared secret becomes available to two or more parties, for subsequent use
- H04L9/0852—Quantum cryptography
Landscapes
- Engineering & Computer Science (AREA)
- Computer Security & Cryptography (AREA)
- Computer Networks & Wireless Communication (AREA)
- Signal Processing (AREA)
- Computer Hardware Design (AREA)
- Computing Systems (AREA)
- General Engineering & Computer Science (AREA)
- Technology Law (AREA)
- Physics & Mathematics (AREA)
- Electromagnetism (AREA)
- Theoretical Computer Science (AREA)
- Optical Communication System (AREA)
Abstract
The present invention provides a kind of multi-party quantum key agreement method, terminal and storage devices, including N number of negotiation interaction end, are denoted as P respectivelyi, each PiRespectively one information coding state of preparationAnd eavesdropping detection state；Then the information coding state radom insertion is obtained into new quantum state sequence into eavesdropping detection stateEach PiIt will respectively obtainIt is sent to Pi+1；Pi+1With PiChannel safety detection is carried out, first round circulation is completed, next round circulation is carried out if judging channel safety until completing N wheel circulation, finally, all negotiation interaction ends announce respective randomly selected numerical value at random and the secret negotiation key of N number of interaction end are calculated based on the property of tenth of the twelve Earthly Branches operation.This agreement can be realized in Single quantum system; key generation efficiency is improved using ultra dense coding techniques; it can be provided based on quantum-mechanical theory and negotiate higher safety than classical code key, and the fairness of participant can be effectively protected, prevent the generation of malicious user control key.
Description
Technical field
The invention belongs to quantum cryptology technical field more particularly to a kind of multi-party quantum key agreement methods.
Background technique
Key agreement (key agreement, KA) is a most basic, most crucial proposition of contemporary cryptology, it is
Establish the key of cryptographic system mechanism.Key agreement is all the research hotspot of cryptography all the time.Its purpose is so that two
Side can safely negotiate a shared session key in many ways, the key by be used for cryptographic system secret communication or
Safety calculates.Therefore, the security intensity of cryptographic system is largely dependent upon the safety of key agreement.
Classical key agreement scheme needs a special server to store the password of participant, as a result attacker
The password of participant's preservation can be obtained by server.
Therefore, classic key negotiates the presence of very big security risk.
Summary of the invention
Technical problem to be solved by the present invention lies in provide a kind of multi-party quantum key agreement method, it is intended to solve warp
There is very big security risk in allusion quotation key agreement.
In order to solve the above technical problems, the invention is realized in this way, a kind of multi-party quantum key agreement method, including N
A negotiation interaction end, is denoted as P respectivelyi, 0≤i≤N-1, each secret information for negotiating interaction end is respectively x0,x1,...,xN-1
∈ { 0,1 ..., d-1 }, d are odd prime, PiIn cipher key agreement process, under be designated as modN operation, machinery of consultation includes such as
Under:
A kind of multi-party quantum key agreement method, which is characterized in that including N number of negotiation interaction end, be denoted as P respectivelyi, 0≤
I≤N-1, each secret information for negotiating interaction end is respectively x0,x1,...,xN-1∈ { 0,1 ..., d-1 }, d is odd prime,
PiIn cipher key agreement process, under be designated as modN operation, machinery of consultation includes the following:
Step S1, the first round recycles: each PiOne is respectively prepared for encoding the quantum state of secret informationClaim
For information coding state, and the quantum state sequence for detecting channel safety, referred to as eavesdropping detection state；By the information coding
State radom insertion obtains new quantum state sequence into eavesdropping detection stateEach negotiation interaction end PiIt will respectively obtain
'sIt is sent to next negotiation interaction end Pi+1；
Step S2, channel safety detects: next negotiation interaction end Pi+1With upper negotiation interaction end PiCarry out channel
Safety detection, if being judged as, safety thens follow the steps S3, otherwise return step S1；
Step S3, the second wheel circulation: Pi+1By what is receivedRemoval eavesdropping detection state, obtains information coding state
Pi+1A numerical value is taken at random, and combines secret information xi+1It is rightTenth of the twelve Earthly Branches operation is carried out, new information coding state is obtainedAnd radom insertion obtains new quantum state sequence into eavesdropping detection statePi+1It willIt is sent to next
Negotiate interaction end Pi+2；
Step S4, channel safety detects: next negotiation interaction end Pi+2With upper negotiation interaction end Pi+1Carry out channel
Safety inspection, the next round executed if passing through with step S3 recycle, and take turns circulation until completing N, otherwise return step S1；
Step S5, all negotiation interaction ends announce respective randomly selected numerical value at random, based on the property of tenth of the twelve Earthly Branches operation, meter
Calculation obtains N number of secret negotiation key.
Further, in the step S1,Wherein, ai,bi∈ { 0,1 ..., d-1 } is indicated
B in set MiThe a of group baseiA vector, M indicate that the set of d group base vector, the dimension of base are d, the quantum state difference in M
ForIndicate the coding of vector in each base, v
=0,1 ..., d-1 indicates the coding of every group of base.
Further, in the step S1, the eavesdropping detection state is the ordered sequence comprising q quantum state:
Further, the step S2 includes:
Step S21, PiTo Pi+1Each quantum state in the eavesdropping detection state is sent to existIn location information and corresponding
Base information dgIt is worth, wherein g ∈ { 1,2 ..., q }；
Step S22, Pi+1According to the positional information and the dgValue measures eavesdropping detection state, and at random will
Wherein the measurement result of half is sent to Pi, PiTo Pi+1The other half initial preparation state information of the eavesdropping detection state is disclosed；
PiWith Pi+1By comparing the initial preparation state information of measurement result and the eavesdropping detection state, to determine whether channel is safe.
Further, the measurement result is compared with eavesdropping detection state, if error rate is less than preset
Threshold value is then judged as safety, is otherwise judged as dangerous.
Further, in the step S3, the Pi+1A numerical value is taken at random, and combines secret information xi+1It is rightInto
The operation of the row tenth of the twelve Earthly Branches, comprising:
Pi+1A numerical value is taken at randomIt is rightImplement tenth of the twelve Earthly Branches operationObtain new amount
Sub- state isWherein xi+1∈ 0,1 ..., and d-1 } it is Pi+1The secret information of input,
Further, the step S5 includes:
Step S51, N number of negotiation interaction end announces its randomly selected numerical value according to random orderFor all Pi, calculateJ is calculated result；
Step S52, calculated result J, P are based oniIn baseUnder to the information coding received
State measures, and measurement result isIt willIt is encoded to classical information m, wherein
m∈{0,1,...,d-1}；
Step S53, it is operated based on the tenth of the twelve Earthly BranchesProperty, be calculatedThus it obtains
N number of secret negotiation key for negotiating interaction end are as follows:
A kind of terminal carries out multi-party quantum key negotiation, the terminal for N number of negotiation interaction end
It include: processor, the memory that is connect with processor communication, the memory is stored with computer program, the processor tune
With the multi-party quantum key agreement method as described above of realization when the computer program.
A kind of storage device carries out multi-party quantum key negotiation, the storage device storage for N number of negotiation interaction end
There is computer program, the computer program is performed realization multi-party quantum key agreement method as described above.
Compared with prior art, the present invention beneficial effect is: multi-party quantum key agreement method of the invention have with
Lower advantage: (1) this agreement can be realized in Single quantum system, it has big advantage in terms of scalability, and utilize super
Code technology improves key generation efficiency；(2) quantum key is negotiated to provide based on quantum-mechanical theory more secret than classical
Key negotiates higher safety；(3) fairness of user can be effectively protected in the key agreement scheme, prevent malicious user
The generation of control key.
Specific embodiment
In order to make the objectives, technical solutions, and advantages of the present invention clearer, with reference to embodiments, to this hair
It is bright to be further elaborated.It should be appreciated that the specific embodiments described herein are merely illustrative of the present invention, not
For limiting the present invention.
In the present invention in many ways in cipher key agreement process, it is assumed that classical channel has been certified with quantum channel, and is not had
There is the loss of noise and information.N participants pass through N number of negotiation interaction end P respectivelyi(0≤i≤N-1), carry out key association
Quotient.Assuming that each secret information for negotiating interaction end is respectively x0,x1,...,xN-1∈ { 0,1 ..., d-1 }, d is odd prime,
Participant PiIn cipher key agreement process, under be designated as modN operation, i.e. N participant is according to suitable in cipher key agreement process
Sequence Pi→Pi+1→…→PN-1→ PN-2→…→Pi-1→PiSuccessively hold consultation.
Multi-party quantum key agreement method of the invention includes the following steps S1-S5:
Step S1, the first round recycles: each PiOne is respectively prepared for encoding the quantum state of secret informationClaim
For information coding state, and the quantum state sequence for detecting channel safety, referred to as eavesdropping detection state；By the information coding
State radom insertion obtains new quantum state sequence into eavesdropping detection stateEach negotiation interaction end PiIt will respectively obtain
'sIt is sent to next negotiation interaction end Pi+1。
Specifically, to all i=0,1 ..., N-1, PiRandom one quantum state of preparationMark it
ForIndicate b in set MiThe a of group baseiA vector, P in protocol proceduresiNo
Reveal aiAnd biValue give anyone.Wherein, M indicates that the set of d group base vector, the dimension of base are d, the quantum state difference in M
For Indicate vector in each base
Coding, v=0,1 ..., d-1 indicate the coding of every group of base.Such asIndicate u-th of vector of v group base.Whole
For encoding the secret information of participant, referred to as information coding state in a protocol procedures.In order to detect the safety of channel,
Need additional quantum state, referred to as eavesdropping detection state.Eavesdropping detection state is by PiIt is random to generate, wherein including q orderly amounts
Sub- state, such asThe value of q depends on the security level of system, and q is bigger, safety
Rank is higher.Then PiIt encodes information onto the random orderly eavesdropping that is inserted into of state to detect in state sequence, forms new quantum state
SequenceLast PiIt willIt is sent to Pi+1。
Step S2, channel safety detects: next negotiation interaction end Pi+1With upper negotiation interaction end PiCarry out channel
Safety detection, if being judged as, safety thens follow the steps S3, otherwise return step S1.
One specific embodiment of channel safety detection, includes the following steps S21, step S22.
Step S21, PiTo Pi+1Each quantum state in the eavesdropping detection state is sent to existIn location information and corresponding
Base information dgIt is worth, wherein g ∈ { 1,2 ..., q }.
Step S22, Pi+1According to the positional information and the dgValue measures eavesdropping detection state, and random
The measurement result of wherein half is sent to Pi, PiTo Pi+1The other half the initial preparation state letter of the eavesdropping detection state is disclosed
Breath；PiWith Pi+1Each by the initial preparation state information for comparing measurement result and the eavesdropping detection state, to determine that channel is
No safety.
Specifically, when determining all Pi+1It receivesAfterwards, PiTo Pi+1Inform that q detection state existsIn position letter
Breath and corresponding q dgIt is worth, wherein g ∈ { 1,2 ..., q }.Pi+1According to PiInformation dg, eavesdropping is examined under corresponding base
It surveys state to measure, and records measurement result.Pi+1Tell the measurement result of half to P at randomi, then PiThe other half is disclosed
The information of initial preparation state.PiWith Pi+1By measurement result and it is initial when prepare eavesdropping detection state information, it is right respectively
Channel carries out safety detection, calculates error rate.An error rate threshold can be previously set, if error rate is more than the threshold value,
PiWith Pi+1Acknowledgement channel has eavesdropping, dangerous, and terminates and this time communicate, and return step S1 restarts this agreement.Otherwise,
It is judged as safety.
Step S3, the second wheel circulation: Pi+1By what is receivedRemoval eavesdropping detection state, obtains information coding state
Pi+1A numerical value is taken at random, and combines secret information xi+1It is rightTenth of the twelve Earthly Branches operation is carried out, new information coding state is obtainedAnd radom insertion obtains new quantum state sequence into eavesdropping detection statePi+1It willIt is sent to next
Negotiate interaction end Pi+2。
Specifically, after judging channel safety, Pi+1By what is receivedRemoval eavesdropping detection state, obtains information coding statePi+1Random takes a numerical valueAnd to information coding stateImplement tenth of the twelve Earthly Branches operationForming new quantum state (coding state) isWherein xi+1∈ 0,1 ..., and d-1 } it is Pi+1Input it is secret
Confidential information,Then Pi+1Random preparation contains q quantum state
Eavesdropping detect state, be inserted into the information coding state after coding is random in orderly eavesdropping detection state sequence, formed new
Quantum state sequenceLast Pi+1It willIt is sent to Pi+2。Pi+1To the q eavesdropping detection state secrecy prepared at random, do not reveal
To any participant.
Step S4, channel safety detects: next negotiation interaction end Pi+2With upper negotiation interaction end Pi+1Carry out channel
Safety inspection, the next round executed if passing through with step 3 recycle, and take turns circulation until completing N, otherwise return step S1.
Specifically, as all Pi+2It receivesAfterwards, Pi+1The open q detection state prepared at random existsIn position
Information and q corresponding dgValue.Pi+2According to Pi+1Information dg, eavesdropping detection state is surveyed under corresponding base
Amount, and record measurement result.Pi+2Tell the measurement result of half to P at randomi+1, then Pi+1The other half initial preparation is disclosed
The information of state.Pi+1With Pi+2By measurement result and it is initial when prepare eavesdropping detection state information, to channel carry out safety
Detection, calculates error rate.If error rate is more than preset threshold value, Pi+1With Pi+2Acknowledgement channel has eavesdropping, and terminates
It this time communicates, returns to step S1, restart this agreement.Otherwise, Pi+2After removal eavesdropping detection state, information volume has just been obtained
Code state
Step S5, all negotiation interaction ends announce respectively randomly selected numerical value according to random order, are operated based on the tenth of the twelve Earthly Branches
Property, N number of secret negotiation key is calculated.
The present invention provides the methods of the following N number of secret negotiation key of calculating, including step S51-S53.
Step S51, PiRandom selection Pn, n ∈ { 0,1 ..., N-1 }, all participants announce its randomly selected number
ValueI.e. N number of negotiation interaction end does not need to be announced according to cycle calculations sequence above-mentioned, can adopt
It is announced with random order, PiIt calculatesJ is calculated result.
Step S52, according to calculated result J, PiIn baseUnder to the information coding received
State measures, and measurement result isThen willIt is encoded to classical information m,
Wherein m ∈ { 0,1 ..., d-1 }.
Step S53, it is operated based on the tenth of the twelve Earthly BranchesProperty, be calculatedThus it obtains
N number of secret negotiation key for negotiating interaction end are as follows:
The all or part of technical solution of the present invention the part that contributes to existing technology or the technical solution can
To be expressed in the form of software products, which is stored in a storage medium, including some instructions
With so that terminal (can be personal computer, server or the network equipment an etc.) execution present invention is each
The all or part of the steps of embodiment the method.And storage device above-mentioned includes: USB flash disk, mobile hard disk, read-only memory
(ROM, Read-Only Memory), random access memory (RAM, Random Access Memory), magnetic or disk
Etc. the various media that can store program code.
The Correctness Analysis of agreement
If all participant's honesty execute agreement, Pi, i ∈ 0,1 ..., and N-1 } it can correctly calculate final association
Quotient's key.In agreement above, PiThe information coding state of preparation isWhat every participant possessed
Secret information is respectively x0,x1,...,xN-1∈{0,1,...,d-1}.N number of participant is respectively to information coding stateImplement
After tenth of the twelve Earthly Branches operation, information coding state becomes
By can be obtained above:
ai+x0+...+xN-1=mmodd (2)
That is, if PiIn baseLower measurement, final message coding state areMeasurement result is encoded to ai+x0+...+xN-1=mmodd, final PiIt can be easily
Calculating final arranging key is K=x0+...+xN-1=(m-a) modd.
The safety analysis of agreement
The attack of Main Analysis two ways, one is external attacks: external attacker attempts to obtain the final association of user
Quotient's key；One is internal attack: participant attempts to control final key generation.Arranging key participant is one special
Internal attacker, he possesses attacking ability more stronger than external attacker.Attack analysis process is as follows:
(1) external attack
In this agreement, in order to detect external attack, between any two subscriber channel, examined using q eavesdropping detection state
Attack is surveyed, which is known as inveigling state technology.Inveigling state technology is one of main detection Eavesdropping of quantum cryptography, the party
Method is most suggested early in BB84 agreement, and the Security Proof of this method has been proved to.It is any that quantum channel is stolen
Behavior is listened, will be all detected.Using the eavesdropping detection technique, present existing various attack means are such as intercepted to reset and be attacked
Hit, measure Replay Attack, tangle measurement attack etc., it will be all invalid.For example, it is assumed that attack is attacked using reproducing process is intercepted
The agreement.Assuming that external attacker Eve attempts to obtain the secret information of participant, she needs to obtain for secret encryption information
Initial quantum state information and final encrypted quantum information, thus to be inferred to the tenth of the twelve Earthly Branches operation that ciphering process is implemented.
Obviously, which is doomed failure.Firstly, Eve can not obtain the information of initial quantum state, the information is in entire agreement mistake
It maintains secrecy always in journey.Eve may attempt to intercept initial data state, and the quantum state for sending oneself some preparation is sent to and connects
Debit.However this mode is in eavesdropping that detection-phase is very easy is just detected.It is passed in the quantum state and channel of Eve preparation
The completely the same probability of defeated quantum state is 1/d, then the probability that Eve is detected is 1- (1/d) in detection processq.Work as q
When sufficiently large, which is intended to 1.Therefore, which can effectively resist external attacker attack.
(2) it internals attack: participant's collusion of any N-1 malice.
Internal participant possesses more resources than external attacker, can be obtained by lying in protocol procedures
Economic interests.Therefore, all QKA agreements must can resist the attack of internal attacker.Internal attacker's attack can divide
For two processes: key steals the stage and key overturns the stage.Stolen the stage in key, internal conspirator it is available other
The key exclusive or information of legitimate user.Then they can control final shared key in the key overturning stage, make
Shared code key finally is obtained no longer by the common fair generation of all participants.Why conspirator can obtain legitimate user
The exclusive or information of key is that conspirator generates initial quantum state, and conspirator shares all letters of the initial quantum state
Breath.There is the information of initial state, the user in two specific positions, which can smoothly measure, obtains the close of intermediate legitimate user
Key exclusive or information.
Consider under worst case, only one honest user Pt, t ∈ { 0 ..., N-1 }, remaining N-1 user's collusion.
In the case, if collusion attack success, N-1 user needs to obtain P before agreement terminatestKey Kt, specifically retouch
It states as conspirator sends message coding sequence and gives user Pt, PtBy the secret information of oneself and randomly select y ∈ 0,
1 ..., d-1 } it is encoded to message coding sequence, then the message coding sequence after coding is sent by eavesdropping detection technique
To next user, then other N-2 user successively carries out eavesdropping detection operation and operates without any information coding.
Due to PtDo not disclose oneself randomly selects information y, therefore N-1 user can not select correctly to measure base to information volume
Code state measures, and the correct probability for choosing measurement base is 1/d, therefore is also unable to get any about PtSecret information.?
With regard to saying, PtCryptographic operation carried out to message coding state using y, key is stolen in attack is no longer feasible, and agreement can resist safely
Portion attacker.
The foregoing is merely illustrative of the preferred embodiments of the present invention, is not intended to limit the invention, all in essence of the invention
Made any modifications, equivalent replacements, and improvements etc., should all be included in the protection scope of the present invention within mind and principle.
Protocol efficiency analysis
In agreement of the invention, it is assumed that d can be expressed as N-bit binary number, in order to generate the key of LN length,
Each user generates L single quantum state (information coding state) and L eavesdropping detects state.Since information coding state transmits n times,
So every wheel agreement needs LN eavesdropping detection state in total.Because of N number of user, N is needed to take turns agreement, so needing N (L+ in total
LN) a quantum state.In order to decode final arranging key, user needs to announce the classical bit of LN (N-1).Therefore protocol bits
Rate can be calculated,And existing quantum key negotiation maximum bit rate isTherefore, bit rate of the invention has obtained larger promotion.
Claims (9)
1. a kind of multi-party quantum key agreement method, which is characterized in that including N number of negotiation interaction end, be denoted as P respectivelyi, 0≤i≤
N-1, each secret information for negotiating interaction end is respectively x0,x1,...,xN-1∈ { 0,1 ..., d-1 }, d are odd prime, Pi?
In cipher key agreement process, under be designated as modN operation, machinery of consultation includes the following:
Step S1, the first round recycles: each PiOne is respectively prepared for encoding the quantum state of secret informationReferred to as information
State, and the quantum state sequence for detecting channel safety are encoded, referred to as eavesdropping detection state；By the information coding state with the machine transplanting of rice
Enter into eavesdropping detection state, obtains new quantum state sequenceEach negotiation interaction end PiIt will respectively obtainIt sends
To next negotiation interaction end Pi+1；
Step S2, channel safety detects: next negotiation interaction end Pi+1With upper negotiation interaction end PiCarry out channel safety inspection
It surveys, if being judged as, safety thens follow the steps S3, otherwise return step S1；
Step S3, the second wheel circulation: Pi+1By what is receivedRemoval eavesdropping detection state, obtains information coding statePi+1At random
A numerical value is taken, and combines secret information xi+1It is rightTenth of the twelve Earthly Branches operation is carried out, new information coding state is obtainedAnd it is random
It is inserted into eavesdropping detection state, obtains new quantum state sequencePi+1It willIt is sent to next negotiation interaction end Pi+2；
Step S4, channel safety detects: next negotiation interaction end Pi+2With upper negotiation interaction end Pi+1Carry out channel safety
It checks, recycles, recycled until completing N wheel, otherwise return step S1 if executing the next round with step S3 if；
Step S5, all negotiation interaction ends are announced respective randomly selected numerical value at random and are calculated based on the property of tenth of the twelve Earthly Branches operation
N number of secret negotiation key.
2. multi-party quantum key agreement method as described in claim 1, which is characterized in that in the step S1,Wherein, ai,bi∈ { 0,1 ..., d-1 } indicates b in set MiThe a of group baseiA vector, M table
Show that the set of d group base vector, the dimension of base are d, the quantum state in M is respectivelyIndicate the volume of vector in each base
Code, v=0,1 ..., d-1 indicate the coding of every group of base.
3. multi-party quantum key agreement method as claimed in claim 2, which is characterized in that in the step S1, the eavesdropping
Detection state is the ordered sequence comprising q quantum state:
4. multi-party quantum key agreement method as claimed in claim 3, which is characterized in that the step S2 includes:
Step S21, PiTo Pi+1Each quantum state in the eavesdropping detection state is sent to existIn location information and corresponding base letter
Cease dgIt is worth, wherein g ∈ { 1,2 ..., q }；
Step S22, Pi+1According to the positional information and the dgValue measures eavesdropping detection state, and at random will wherein one
Half measurement result is sent to Pi, PiTo Pi+1The other half initial preparation state information of the eavesdropping detection state is disclosed；PiWith Pi+1
By comparing the initial preparation state information of measurement result and the eavesdropping detection state, to determine whether channel is safe.
5. multi-party quantum key agreement method as claimed in claim 4, which is characterized in that steal the measurement result with described
It listens detection state to compare, if error rate is less than preset threshold value, is judged as safety, is otherwise judged as dangerous.
6. multi-party quantum key agreement method as claimed in claim 4, which is characterized in that in the step S3, the Pi+1With
Machine takes a numerical value, and combines secret information xi+1It is rightCarry out tenth of the twelve Earthly Branches operation, comprising:
Pi+1A numerical value is taken at randomIt is rightImplement tenth of the twelve Earthly Branches operationObtain new quantum state
ForWherein xi+1∈ 0,1 ..., and d-1 } it is Pi+1The secret information of input,
7. multi-party quantum key agreement method as claimed in claim 6, which is characterized in that the step S5 includes:
Step S51, N number of negotiation interaction end announces its randomly selected numerical value according to random orderIt is right
In all Pi, calculateJ is calculated result；
Step S52, calculated result J, P are based oniIn baseUnder the information coding state that receives is carried out
Measurement, measurement result areIt willBe encoded to classical information m, wherein m ∈ 0,
1,...,d-1}；
Step S53, it is operated based on the tenth of the twelve Earthly BranchesProperty, be calculatedThus N number of association is obtained
The secret negotiation key of quotient's interaction end are as follows:
8. a kind of terminal, which is characterized in that carry out multi-party quantum key negotiation, the meter for N number of negotiation interaction end
The memory that calculation machine terminal includes: processor, is connect with processor communication, the memory is stored with computer program, described
Processor realizes such as the described in any item multi-party quantum key agreement methods of claim 1-7 when calling the computer program.
9. a kind of storage device, which is characterized in that carry out multi-party quantum key negotiation, the storage for N number of negotiation interaction end
Device is stored with computer program, and it is described in any item multi-party that the computer program is performed realization such as claim 1-7
Quantum key agreement method.
Priority Applications (1)
| Application Number | Priority Date | Filing Date | Title |
|---|---|---|---|
| CN201910600518.1A CN110336659A (en) | 2019-07-04 | 2019-07-04 | A kind of multi-party quantum key machinery of consultation, terminal and storage device |
Applications Claiming Priority (1)
| Application Number | Priority Date | Filing Date | Title |
|---|---|---|---|
| CN201910600518.1A CN110336659A (en) | 2019-07-04 | 2019-07-04 | A kind of multi-party quantum key machinery of consultation, terminal and storage device |
Publications (1)
| Publication Number | Publication Date |
|---|---|
| CN110336659A true CN110336659A (en) | 2019-10-15 |
Family
ID=68143134
Family Applications (1)
| Application Number | Title | Priority Date | Filing Date |
|---|---|---|---|
| CN201910600518.1A Pending CN110336659A (en) | 2019-07-04 | 2019-07-04 | A kind of multi-party quantum key machinery of consultation, terminal and storage device |
Country Status (1)
| Country | Link |
|---|---|
| CN (1) | CN110336659A (en) |
Cited By (1)
| Publication number | Priority date | Publication date | Assignee | Title |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| CN111970111A (en) * | 2020-10-22 | 2020-11-20 | 深圳职业技术学院 | Quantum zero knowledge proof-based block chain consensus mechanism establishing method and system |
Citations (4)
| Publication number | Priority date | Publication date | Assignee | Title |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| CN105846999A (en) * | 2016-06-14 | 2016-08-10 | 泰山学院 | Multi-side quantum secret key negotiation method based on unidirectional transmission loop |
| CN106712936A (en) * | 2016-12-20 | 2017-05-24 | 中国电子科技集团公司第三十研究所 | Ring structure based multi-party quantum key agreement protocol |
| US20170346627A1 (en) * | 2015-01-09 | 2017-11-30 | Institut Mines-Telecom | Communication with everlasting security from short-term-secure encrypted quantum communication |
| CN108632261A (en) * | 2018-04-24 | 2018-10-09 | 深圳职业技术学院 | Multi-party quantum summation method and system |
-
2019
- 2019-07-04 CN CN201910600518.1A patent/CN110336659A/en active Pending
Patent Citations (4)
| Publication number | Priority date | Publication date | Assignee | Title |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| US20170346627A1 (en) * | 2015-01-09 | 2017-11-30 | Institut Mines-Telecom | Communication with everlasting security from short-term-secure encrypted quantum communication |
| CN105846999A (en) * | 2016-06-14 | 2016-08-10 | 泰山学院 | Multi-side quantum secret key negotiation method based on unidirectional transmission loop |
| CN106712936A (en) * | 2016-12-20 | 2017-05-24 | 中国电子科技集团公司第三十研究所 | Ring structure based multi-party quantum key agreement protocol |
| CN108632261A (en) * | 2018-04-24 | 2018-10-09 | 深圳职业技术学院 | Multi-party quantum summation method and system |
Cited By (2)
| Publication number | Priority date | Publication date | Assignee | Title |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| CN111970111A (en) * | 2020-10-22 | 2020-11-20 | 深圳职业技术学院 | Quantum zero knowledge proof-based block chain consensus mechanism establishing method and system |
| CN111970111B (en) * | 2020-10-22 | 2021-01-05 | 深圳职业技术学院 | Quantum zero knowledge proof-based block chain consensus mechanism establishing method and system |
Similar Documents
| Publication | Publication Date | Title |
|---|---|---|
| Wazid et al. | LAM-CIoT: Lightweight authentication mechanism in cloud-based IoT environment | |
| Zhou et al. | Provable secure authentication protocol with anonymity for roaming service in global mobility networks | |
| US8484469B2 (en) | Method, system and equipment for key distribution | |
| WO2021000329A1 (en) | Multi-party quantum key agreement method, computer terminal and storage device | |
| Maitra et al. | A robust ElGamal‐based password‐authentication protocol using smart card for client‐server communication | |
| CN105991285A (en) | Identity authentication methods, devices and system applied to quantum key distribution process | |
| Giri et al. | Efficient biometric and password based mutual authentication for consumer USB mass storage devices | |
| Rührmair et al. | Practical security analysis of PUF-based two-player protocols | |
| CN109379176B (en) | Password leakage resistant authentication and key agreement method | |
| CN110213060A (en) | A kind of quantum Proxy Signature method and system that the nothing based on quantum walking is tangled | |
| CN110855667B (en) | Block chain encryption method, device and system | |
| CN113114456B (en) | Multi-user quantum privacy query method with authentication | |
| Bhattacharya et al. | ASPA-MOSN: An efficient user authentication scheme for phishing attack detection in mobile online social networks | |
| Chikouche et al. | Improved RFID authentication protocol based on randomized McEliece cryptosystem | |
| CN110336659A (en) | A kind of multi-party quantum key machinery of consultation, terminal and storage device | |
| CN110365477A (en) | Can collusion resistant quantum key agreement method, terminal and storage device | |
| Li et al. | An improved two-factor user authentication protocol for wireless sensor networks using elliptic curve cryptography | |
| Roe et al. | Secure sessions from weak secrets | |
| Li et al. | A simple and robust anonymous two‐factor authenticated key exchange protocol | |
| Nikooghadam et al. | HAKECC: Highly efficient authentication and key agreement scheme based on ECDH for RFID in IOT environment | |
| US11159317B2 (en) | SpaceFlip plus: ordinal cryptography | |
| Jiang et al. | PRUB: a privacy protection friend recommendation system based on user behavior | |
| ÖZCANHAN et al. | Mersenne twister-based RFID authentication protocol | |
| Lee et al. | Forward anonymity-preserving secure remote authentication scheme | |
| Sahi et al. | Three-party password-based authenticated key exchange protocol based on the computational Diffie-Hellman assumption |
Legal Events
| Date | Code | Title | Description |
|---|---|---|---|
| PB01 | Publication | ||
| PB01 | Publication | ||
| SE01 | Entry into force of request for substantive examination | ||
| SE01 | Entry into force of request for substantive examination | ||
| RJ01 | Rejection of invention patent application after publication |
Application publication date: 20191015 |
|
| RJ01 | Rejection of invention patent application after publication |