CN110311782A - Zero-knowledge proof method, system and the storage medium of personal information - Google Patents

Zero-knowledge proof method, system and the storage medium of personal information Download PDF

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Publication number
CN110311782A
CN110311782A CN201910365739.5A CN201910365739A CN110311782A CN 110311782 A CN110311782 A CN 110311782A CN 201910365739 A CN201910365739 A CN 201910365739A CN 110311782 A CN110311782 A CN 110311782A
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China
Prior art keywords
merkel
verified
root
authoritative institution
personal information
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CN201910365739.5A
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CN110311782B (en
Inventor
张晓�
许强
周伟明
范辉
刘培强
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YANTAI DASHAN DATA TECHNOLOGY Co.,Ltd.
Shandong Technology and Business University
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Shandong Ice Chain Network Information Technology Co Ltd
Shandong Technology and Business University
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Priority to CN201910365739.5A priority Critical patent/CN110311782B/en
Priority to PCT/CN2019/088063 priority patent/WO2020220413A1/en
Publication of CN110311782A publication Critical patent/CN110311782A/en
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    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
    • H04L9/00—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols
    • H04L9/32—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols including means for verifying the identity or authority of a user of the system or for message authentication, e.g. authorization, entity authentication, data integrity or data verification, non-repudiation, key authentication or verification of credentials
    • H04L9/3218—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols including means for verifying the identity or authority of a user of the system or for message authentication, e.g. authorization, entity authentication, data integrity or data verification, non-repudiation, key authentication or verification of credentials using proof of knowledge, e.g. Fiat-Shamir, GQ, Schnorr, ornon-interactive zero-knowledge proofs
    • H04L9/3221—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols including means for verifying the identity or authority of a user of the system or for message authentication, e.g. authorization, entity authentication, data integrity or data verification, non-repudiation, key authentication or verification of credentials using proof of knowledge, e.g. Fiat-Shamir, GQ, Schnorr, ornon-interactive zero-knowledge proofs interactive zero-knowledge proofs

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  • Engineering & Computer Science (AREA)
  • Computer Security & Cryptography (AREA)
  • Computer Networks & Wireless Communication (AREA)
  • Signal Processing (AREA)
  • Storage Device Security (AREA)
  • Telephonic Communication Services (AREA)

Abstract

The invention discloses zero-knowledge proof method, system and the storage mediums of a kind of personal information, method includes: that personal information to be verified, authoritative institution ID, Merkel's verification information and the corresponding hash algorithm of authoritative institution ID that third-party authentication server is sent according to user terminal and orderly Merkel tree building rule calculate, Merkel's root to be verified is obtained, and Merkel's root and authoritative institution ID to be verified are sent to block platform chain；Block platform chain obtains according to Merkel's root to be verified and sends the corresponding Merkel's root of authoritative institution ID, corresponding digital signature and storage time to third-party authentication server；Third-party authentication server according to authoritative institution ID, each Merkel's root, corresponding digital signature and the storage time that receive, verify by the personal information to be verified sent to user terminal.The present invention solves the technical issues of personal information verifying causes non-essential privacy information to be exposed.

Description

Zero-knowledge proof method, system and the storage medium of personal information
Technical field
The present invention relates to the zero-knowledge proof method of block platform chain technical field more particularly to personal information, system and Computer readable storage medium.
Background technique
In recent years, With the fast development of internet and the fast development of memory technology, big data era, a people The work intelligence epoch are fade-in the every aspect of our lives.It is also our society while internet allows life to become more convenient Many hidden danger are will increase.In many scenes such as ordering train ticket, air ticket, logging in social account, move in hotel, can all it be related to It needs to carry out personal information verifying.But in carrying out personal information verification process, it is desirable to provide individual privacy information is tested Card so as to cause individual privacy information exposure and there is a problem of being stolen possible.
Above content is only used to facilitate the understanding of the technical scheme, and is not represented and is recognized that above content is existing skill Art.
Summary of the invention
The main purpose of the present invention is to provide a kind of zero-knowledge proof methods of personal information, system and computer-readable Storage medium, it is intended to solve the technical issues of existing personal information verifying causes privacy information to be exposed.
To achieve the above object, the application provides a kind of zero-knowledge proof method of personal information, comprising steps of
The personal information to be verified of at least one of third-party authentication server reception user terminal transmission, information to be verified are recognized The authoritative institution ID and Merkel's verification information of card, wherein Merkel's verification information includes removing the personal information to be verified The cryptographic Hash of at least one other node outside corresponding Merkel's node is corresponding including removing the personal information to be verified The cryptographic Hash of at least one other node outside Merkel's node and corresponding affiliated layer；
The third-party authentication server obtains information to be verified according to the authoritative institution ID of the authentification of message to be verified The corresponding hash algorithm of authoritative institution ID of certification and orderly Merkel tree building rule；
The third-party authentication server according to the hash algorithm, orderly Merkel tree building rule, it is described extremely A few personal information to be verified, Merkel's verification information calculate, and obtain Merkel's root to be verified, and will be to Merkel's root of verifying and the authoritative institution ID of authentification of message to be verified are sent to block platform chain；
The block platform chain is according to the power of the Merkel's root and authentification of message to be verified to be verified that receive Prestige mechanism ID, obtain authentification of message to be verified authoritative institution ID it is corresponding at least one with Merkel's root to be verified Identical Merkel's root, and each Merkel's root, corresponding digital signature and corresponding storage time of acquisition are sent out It send to the third-party authentication server；
The third-party authentication server receives each Merkel's root, the corresponding number that the block platform chain is sent Word signature and corresponding storage time, and according to the authoritative institution ID of authentification of message to be verified, each Merkel received Root, corresponding digital signature and corresponding storage time, each personal information to be verified sent to user terminal are verified.
Optionally, Merkel's verification information further includes at least one non-personal information to be verified；
The third-party authentication server is according to the hash algorithm, the orderly Merkel tree building rule, institute It states at least one personal information to be verified and Merkel's verification information calculates, obtain Merkel's root to be verified Step includes:
The third-party authentication server according to the hash algorithm, orderly Merkel tree building rule, it is described extremely Few personal information, at least one non-personal information to be verified and Merkel's verification information to be verified are counted It calculates, obtains Merkel's root to be verified, wherein Merkel's verification information includes at least one non-personal letter to be verified It ceases with the cryptographic Hash of at least one other node in addition to the corresponding Merkel's node of the personal information to be verified or including extremely It is a few non-personal information to be verified, at least one other in addition to the corresponding Merkel's node of the personal information to be verified The cryptographic Hash of node and corresponding affiliated layer.
Optionally, the third-party authentication server according to the authoritative institution ID of authentification of message to be verified, receive Each Merkel's root, corresponding digital signature and corresponding storage time, user terminal is sent each to be verified The step of people's information is verified include:
The third-party authentication server is according to the corresponding storage time of each Merkel's root, from each Merkel The Merkel's root for selecting storage time nearest in root；
The third-party authentication server obtains the letter to be verified according to the authoritative institution ID in the information to be verified First public key of the corresponding authoritative institution of Xi Zhong authoritative institution ID, and it is nearest to the storage time of selection using first public key The corresponding digital signature of Merkel's root verify；
If being verified, each personal information to be verified that the third-party authentication server determines that user terminal is sent is true It is real；
If verifying does not pass through, the third-party authentication server determines each personal information to be verified of user terminal transmission not Really.
Optionally, the block platform chain is recognized according to the Merkel's root to be verified received and information to be verified The authoritative institution ID of card, obtain authentification of message to be verified authoritative institution ID it is corresponding at least one with the Merck to be verified The identical Merkel's root of your root, and by each Merkel's root, corresponding digital signature and the corresponding storage of acquisition Time was sent to before the step of third-party authentication server
Authoritative institution's server receives at least two personal information that user terminal is sent, and according to receiving user terminal Send at least two personal information, create a file number and the file number it is corresponding include user terminal send at least The news file of two personal information；
Authoritative institution's server is regular and described using preset hash algorithm, preset orderly Merkel tree building Each personal information in news file, constructs the corresponding first Merkel tree of the file number, and by authoritative institution ID, the shelves Reference Number and the news file are sent to the user terminal；
Authoritative institution's server is signed according to Merkel's root of first private key to the first Merkel tree, is generated Corresponding first digital signature of Merkel's root of the first Merkel tree；
Authoritative institution's server will include Merkel's root of the first Merkel tree, the first Merkel tree Corresponding first digital signature of Merkel's root and the information of authoritative institution ID store to the block platform chain.
Optionally, authoritative institution server by include the first Merkel tree Merkel's root, described Corresponding first digital signature of Merkel's root of first Merkel tree and the information of authoritative institution ID are stored to the block chain The step of platform includes:
Intelligent contract on block platform chain described in authoritative institution's server calls, creation one includes described first Merkel's root of Merkel tree, corresponding first digital signature of Merkel's root of the first Merkel tree and authoritative institution The first transaction record of ID；
Authoritative institution's server stores first transaction record to the block platform chain.
Optionally, authoritative institution server by include the first Merkel tree Merkel's root, described Corresponding first digital signature of Merkel's root of first Merkel tree and the information of authoritative institution ID are stored to the block chain After platform further include:
Authoritative institution's server receives the update request that user terminal is sent, wherein update request includes archives Number and at least one personal information；
Authoritative institution's server is according to the corresponding news file of file number updated in request and updates in request At least one personal information generates the corresponding new information archives of file number updated in request；
Authoritative institution's server is regular and described using preset hash algorithm, preset orderly Merkel tree building Each personal information in new information archives, building update the corresponding second Merkel tree of file number in request, and by authoritative machine Structure ID, the file number in update request and the new information archives are sent to the user terminal；
Authoritative institution's server is signed using Merkel's root of first private key to the second Merkel tree, generates second Digital signature；
The authoritative institution will include Merkel's root of the second Merkel tree, the second digital signature and authoritative institution ID Information is stored to the block platform chain.
Optionally, authoritative institution server is using the first private key to Merkel's root label of the second Merkel tree Before the step of name, the second digital signature of generation further include:
Authoritative institution's server is using the second private key to the corresponding first Merkel tree of file number in update request Merkel's root is signed, and third digital signature, and Merkel's root, the third number that will include the first Merkel tree are generated The information of signature and authoritative institution ID are stored to the block platform chain.
Optionally, the authoritative institution will include Merkel's root of the second Merkel tree, the second digital signature and The information of authoritative institution ID was stored to the step of block platform chain
Intelligent contract on block platform chain described in authoritative institution's server calls, creation one includes described second Second transaction record of Merkel's root of Merkel tree, second digital signature and authoritative institution ID；
Authoritative institution's server sends second transaction record and stores to the block platform chain.
In addition, to achieve the above object, the present invention also provides a kind of zero-knowledge proof system of personal information, the systems Include:
Third-party authentication server, for receiving at least one personal information to be verified, to be verified of user terminal transmission The authoritative institution ID and Merkel's verification information of authentification of message, wherein Merkel's verification information includes except described to be verified The cryptographic Hash of at least one other node outside the corresponding Merkel's node of people's information or including remove the personal information to be verified The cryptographic Hash of at least one other node outside corresponding Merkel's node and corresponding affiliated layer；
The third-party authentication server, is also used to the authoritative institution ID according to the authentification of message to be verified, obtain to The corresponding hash algorithm of authoritative institution ID and orderly Merkel tree building rule of verification information certification, and calculated according to the Hash Method, orderly Merkel tree building rule, at least one personal information to be verified and Merkel's verification information into Row calculates, and obtains Merkel's root to be verified, and by the authoritative machine of Merkel's root and authentification of message to be verified to be verified Structure ID is sent to block platform chain；
Block platform chain, for the power according to the Merkel's root and authentification of message to be verified to be verified received Prestige mechanism ID, obtain authentification of message to be verified authoritative institution ID it is corresponding at least one with Merkel's root to be verified Identical Merkel's root, and each Merkel's root, corresponding digital signature and corresponding storage time of acquisition are sent out It send to the third-party authentication server；
The third-party authentication server, be also used to receive each Merkel's root that the block platform chain sends, Corresponding digital signature and corresponding storage time, and according to the authoritative institution ID of authentification of message to be verified, receive described in Each Merkel's root, corresponding digital signature and corresponding storage time, each personal information to be verified that user terminal is sent It is verified.
In addition, to achieve the above object, it is described computer-readable the present invention also provides a kind of computer readable storage medium Computer program is stored on storage medium, the computer program realizes personal information as described above when being executed by processor Zero-knowledge proof method the step of.
Zero-knowledge proof method, system and the computer-readable storage medium for a kind of personal information that the embodiment of the present invention proposes Matter receives at least one personal information to be verified, information to be verified that user terminal is sent by third-party authentication server and recognizes The authoritative institution ID and Merkel's verification information of card, wherein Merkel's verification information includes removing the personal information to be verified The cryptographic Hash of at least one other node outside corresponding Merkel's node is corresponding including removing the personal information to be verified The cryptographic Hash of at least one other node outside Merkel's node and corresponding affiliated layer；The third-party authentication server according to The authoritative institution ID of the authentification of message to be verified, obtain authentification of message to be verified the corresponding hash algorithm of authoritative institution ID and Orderly Merkel tree building rule；The third-party authentication server is according to the hash algorithm, the orderly Merkel tree structure It builds rule, at least one personal information to be verified, Merkel's verification information to calculate, obtains Merck to be verified That root, and the authoritative institution ID of Merkel's root and authentification of message to be verified to be verified is sent to block platform chain；Institute Block platform chain is stated according to the authoritative institution ID of the Merkel's root and authentification of message to be verified to be verified that receive, is obtained Take at least one corresponding Merck identical with Merkel's root to be verified of the authoritative institution ID of authentification of message to be verified Your root, and each Merkel's root, corresponding digital signature and the corresponding storage time of acquisition are sent to described the Tripartite's authentication server；The third-party authentication server receive each Merkel's root that the block platform chain sends, Corresponding digital signature and corresponding storage time, and according to the authoritative institution ID of authentification of message to be verified, receive described in Each Merkel's root, corresponding digital signature and corresponding storage time, each personal information to be verified that user terminal is sent It is verified.Other institutes including privacy information are provided to during needing to verify certain personal information, not need user There is personal information, it is only necessary to which selection provides personal information to be verified and carries out to the third-party institution.
Detailed description of the invention
Fig. 1 is the structural schematic diagram for the hardware running environment that the embodiment of the present invention is related to；
Fig. 2 is the flow diagram of the zero-knowledge proof method first embodiment of personal information of the present invention；
The refinement process signal that Fig. 3 is step S50 in the zero-knowledge proof method second embodiment of personal information of the present invention Figure；
The refinement process signal that Fig. 4 is step S90 in the zero-knowledge proof method fourth embodiment of personal information of the present invention Figure；
Fig. 5 is the system architecture schematic diagram of the zero-knowledge proof method first embodiment of personal information of the present invention；
Fig. 6 is the Merkel's tree schematic diagram constructed；
Fig. 7 is the transaction record schematic diagram for being stored with Merkel's root.
The embodiments will be further described with reference to the accompanying drawings for the realization, the function and the advantages of the object of the present invention.
Specific embodiment
It should be appreciated that the specific embodiments described herein are merely illustrative of the present invention, it is not intended to limit the present invention.
Fig. 1 is please referred to, Fig. 1 is third-party authentication server, user terminal, power provided in each embodiment of the present invention The hardware structural diagram of prestige authority server or block platform chain, the third-party authentication server, user terminal, Quan Weiji Structure server or block platform chain include the components such as communication module 10, memory 20 and processor 30.Those skilled in the art can To understand, third-party authentication server, user terminal, authoritative institution's server or block platform chain shown in Fig. 1 may be used also To include perhaps combining certain components or different component layouts than illustrating more or fewer components.Wherein, the place Reason device 30 is connect with the memory 20 and the communication module 10 respectively, is stored with computer program on the memory 20, The computer program is executed by processor 30 simultaneously.
Communication module 10 can be connect by network with external equipment.Communication module 10 can receive external equipment sending Data, also transmittable data, instruction and information to the external equipment.The external equipment can be user terminal, third party Authentication server, user terminal, authoritative institution's server or block platform chain.
Memory 20 can be used for storing software program and various data.Memory 20 can mainly include storing program area The storage data area and, wherein storing program area can application program needed for storage program area, at least one function (based on using Family information architecture Merkel tree) etc.；Storage data area can be stored according to third-party authentication server, user terminal, authoritative institution Server or block platform chain use created data or information etc..In addition, memory 20 may include that high speed is deposited at random Access to memory, can also include nonvolatile memory, a for example, at least disk memory, flush memory device or other easily The property lost solid-state memory.
Processor 30 is the control of third-party authentication server, user terminal, authoritative institution's server or block platform chain Center utilizes various interfaces and the entire third-party authentication server of connection, user terminal, authoritative institution's server or block The various pieces of platform chain by running or execute the software program and/or module that are stored in memory 20, and are called and are deposited The data in memory 20 are stored up, third-party authentication server, user terminal, authoritative institution's server or block platform chain are executed Various functions and processing data, thus flat to third-party authentication server, user terminal, authoritative institution's server or block chain Platform carries out integral monitoring.Processor 30 may include one or more processing units；Preferably, processor 30 can be integrated using processing Device and modem processor, wherein the main processing operation system of application processor, user interface and application program etc., modulation Demodulation processor mainly handles wireless communication.It is understood that above-mentioned modem processor can not also be integrated into processing In device 30.
Although Fig. 1 is not shown, above-mentioned third-party authentication server, user terminal, authoritative institution's server or block chain Platform can also include circuit control module, for being electrically connected with city, realize power supply control, guarantee the normal work of other component Make.
It will be understood by those skilled in the art that third-party authentication server, user terminal, authoritative institution shown in Fig. 1 Server or block platform chain structure are not constituted to third-party authentication server, user terminal, authoritative institution's server or area The restriction of block platform chain may include perhaps combining certain components or different components than illustrating more or fewer components Arrangement.
According to above-mentioned hardware configuration, each embodiment of the method for the present invention is proposed.
Referring to Fig. 2, in the first embodiment of the zero-knowledge proof method of personal information of the present invention, the personal information Zero-knowledge proof method comprising steps of
Step S10, third-party authentication server receive at least one personal information to be verified that user terminal sends, to be tested The authoritative institution ID and Merkel's verification information of authentification of message are demonstrate,proved, wherein Merkel's verification information includes except described to be verified The cryptographic Hash of at least one other node outside the corresponding Merkel's node of personal information is believed including removing the individual to be verified Cease at least one other node outside corresponding Merkel's node cryptographic Hash and corresponding affiliated layer；
In the present solution, zero-knowledge proof refers to that a side (certifier) can prove a statement to another party (verifier) Be correctly, without reveal the statement be correctly except other useful informations.In in the present invention, " statement " is referred to Personal information to be verified.Merkel tree (Merkle Tree) is exactly a kind of binary tree data structure for storing cryptographic Hash, Merck The leaf of your tree is the cryptographic Hash of data block (for example, set that data block can be information, file or file), nonleaf node It is its cryptographic Hash for corresponding to child node series strings.Orderly Merkel tree building rule refers to constructing effective Merkel tree When, to the rule that position of all nodes in respective layer is ranked up in each layer, which can foundation In every layer in the size of 16 binary values of the cryptographic Hash of each node or every layer the cryptographic Hash of each node character ASCII character number Sequentially, each node is successively arranged into each node location from left to right from small to large or from big to small.
When user needs to be verified personal information, user can by user terminal by least one information to be verified, The authoritative institution ID and Merkel's verification information of authentification of message to be verified are sent to business audit end by wirelessly or non-wirelessly network End, can also be directly by least one information to be verified, the authoritative institution ID and Merkel's verification information of authentification of message to be verified It is input in the terminal of third-party authentication mechanism, retransmits to third-party authentication server, wherein Merkel's verification information The cryptographic Hash of other nodes including at least one in addition to the corresponding Merkel's node of the personal information to be verified or including removing The cryptographic Hash of at least one other node outside the corresponding Merkel's node of the personal information to be verified and corresponding affiliated layer.
When at least one personal information of the third-party authentication server to user is verified, user terminal is in addition to sending Outside the personal information to be verified of above-mentioned at least one, the authoritative institution ID of authentification of message to be verified and Merkel's verification information, also Hash algorithm and orderly Merkel tree building rule can be sent.
It should be noted that prevent at least one personal information, Merkel's verification information and the authority to be verified sent These information of mechanism ID are intercepted and captured by other people, can be using the public key of third-party authentication server at least one to be verified These information of people's information, Merkel's verification information and authoritative institution ID encrypt, then encrypted information is sent to Tripartite's authentication server, third-party authentication server can use the private key of third-party authentication server oneself to the letter of the encryption Breath is decrypted, to obtain the hash algorithm of user terminal transmission, at least one personal information to be verified and Merkel's verifying Information.
The cryptographic Hash of each node in Merkel's verification information be generated by Hash mapping function unidirectional as a result, itself simultaneously It cannot be used for extrapolating any useful information.These nodes in Merkel's verification information are corresponding from personal information to be verified Except the corresponding Merkel's section of personal information to be verified necessary on Merkel's node to the Hash calculation path of Merkel's root The cryptographic Hash of all nodes outside point, or all node cryptographic Hash in addition to the corresponding Merkel's node of personal information to be verified and Layer belonging to corresponding, according to most fast Hash calculation path, can only include one group in Merkel's verification information for providing has The node cryptographic Hash array of sequence arrangement, it is the sequencing using nodal value that this, which puts in order to calculate Merkel's root process,. It further include each section in the Merkel's verification information provided other than node cryptographic Hash according to non-most fast Hash calculation path Layer belonging to point cryptographic Hash is corresponding.Such as information to be verified is the P1 name in Fig. 6, from the corresponding node location of name to Fig. 6 The Hash calculation path of Merkel's root of middle Merkel tree can be B+CD+EF, or B+C+D+EF can also be B+C+ D+E+F, wherein the Hash calculation path of B+CD+EF is most fast Hash calculation path for A, and the Hash of B+C+D+E+F Path is calculated for A, is most slow Hash calculation path, according to most fast Hash calculation path, then Merkel verifies Information is the node cryptographic Hash array { hash (P2), hash (C+D), hash (E+F) } of one group of ordered arrangement.If the calculating path For B+C+D+EF, then Merkel's verification information be include node B cryptographic Hash and node B belonging to layer be first layer, node C Layer belonging to cryptographic Hash and node C is first layer, the cryptographic Hash that layer belonging to the cryptographic Hash of node D and node D is first layer, node EF It is third layer with layer belonging to node EF.In another example information to be verified is P1 name and the birthplace P3 in Fig. 6, from name and birth The Hash calculation path of the corresponding node location in ground Merkel's root of Merkel tree into Fig. 6 can be B+D+EF (most fast Hash Calculate path) or B+D+E+F.Other sections in Merkel's verification information in addition to the corresponding Merkel's node of personal information to be verified The quantity of point is determined by the complexity of Merkel tree, and Merkel tree is simpler, and level is fewer, then needs other nodes provided Quantity is fewer, such as only there are two the simplest Merkel trees that leaf node and Merkel's root node form, then user terminal The nodal value of a leaf node in addition to the corresponding Merkel's node of the personal information to be verified need to be only provided.
It should be noted that Merkel's verification information that user terminal is sent, in addition at least one is except described to be verified The cryptographic Hash of other nodes outside the corresponding Merkel's node of people's information can also include at least one non-personal letter to be verified Breath.Such as authenticatee provides the cleartext information in " birthplace: Shandong Yantai " in hum pattern 6 to be verified, it should for verifying Cleartext information, Merkel's verification information that authenticatee provides may include node cryptographic Hash AB and third layer in the second layer The cleartext information of " address: Guangzhou " in interior joint cryptographic Hash EF and Fig. 6.
Step S20, the third-party authentication server according to the authoritative institution ID of the authentification of message to be verified, obtain to The corresponding hash algorithm of authoritative institution ID and orderly Merkel tree building rule of verification information certification；
Third-party authentication server, can be ID pairs to the authoritative institution according to the authoritative institution ID of authentification of message to be verified The authoritative institution's server answered sends the request for obtaining hash algorithm and orderly Merkel tree building rule, the authoritative institution ID After corresponding authoritative institution's server receives the request of third-party authentication server transmission, authoritative institution is constructed into Merck The hash algorithm and orderly Merkel tree building rule that your tree uses are sent to third-party authentication server.
When having stored hash algorithm and orderly Merkel including each authoritative institution ID in third-party authentication server The authoritative institution ID of tree building rule and hash algorithm, orderly Merkel tree construct regular mapping table, third-party authentication clothes Being engaged in device can be according to the authoritative institution ID of authentification of message to be verified, and inquiry obtains the corresponding Kazakhstan the authoritative institution ID from the mark Uncommon algorithm and orderly Merkel tree building rule.
Hash algorithm can be MD4 algorithm, MD5 algorithm, SHA-1, SHA-256, SHA-512, national secret algorithm or other Kazakhstan Uncommon algorithm.
Step S30, the third-party authentication server is according to the hash algorithm, the orderly Merkel tree building rule Then, described at least one personal information to be verified and Merkel's verification information calculate, and obtain Merkel to be verified Root, and the authoritative institution ID of Merkel's root and authentification of message to be verified to be verified is sent to block platform chain；
Third-party authentication server can according to receive at least one personal information to be verified and it is described at least one except institute State other nodes outside the corresponding Merkel's node of personal information to be verified cryptographic Hash and affiliated layer, use the Hash got Algorithm and orderly Merkel tree building rule successively calculate cryptographic Hash, finally obtain Merkel's root to be verified.Such as it is tested Card person provides the cleartext information and Merkel's verification information that information to be verified is " birthplace: Shandong Yantai " in Fig. 6, wherein Merkel's verification information is the cryptographic Hash hash (A+B) of the cryptographic Hash hash (P4) of the node D of Merkel tree, node AB in Fig. 6 With the cryptographic Hash hash (E+F) of node EF, the orderly Merkel tree building rule that third-party authentication server is got is from small To each node of same layer is successively arranged each node location from left to right greatly.Third-party authentication server can use hash algorithm It treats verification information and carries out the cryptographic Hash hash (P3) that node C is calculated, and hash (P3) is less than hash (P4) size；Then The cryptographic Hash hash (C+D) of the second node layer CD is calculated according to the cryptographic Hash of the cryptographic Hash of node C and node D, further Compare hash (A+B) and hash (C+D) size to obtain after hash (A+B) be less than hash (C+D), according to hash (A+B) and hash (C+D) cryptographic Hash that third node layer ABCD is calculated is hash (AB+CD), finally compares hash (AB+CD) and hash (E+ F) size knows that hash (AB+CD) is less than hash (E+F), is calculated according to hash (AB+CD) and hash (E+F) to be verified Merkel's root hash (ABCD+EF).
After Merkel's root to be verified is calculated, third-party authentication server can be by Merkel's root to be verified Block platform chain is sent to by wired or wireless network with the authoritative institution ID of authentification of message to be verified.Such as third-party authentication Server passes through the api interface of block platform chain, by the authoritative institution of Merkel's root and authentification of message to be verified to be verified ID is sent to block platform.
Step S40, the block platform chain is according to the Merkel's root and information to be verified to be verified received The authoritative institution ID of certification, obtain authentification of message to be verified authoritative institution ID it is corresponding at least one with it is described to be verified silent The identical Merkel's root of Ke Er root, and by each Merkel's root of acquisition, corresponding digital signature and corresponding deposit The storage time is sent to the third-party authentication server；
Since multiple Merkel's roots identical with Merkel's root to be verified may be stored on block platform chain, this Some in a little Merkel's roots are sent by the corresponding authoritative institution's server of authoritative institution ID of authentification of message to be verified, are had It is to be sent by other authoritative institution's servers a bit, also some are sent by inauthoritativeness authority server.
When block platform chain can be according to the authoritative institution ID of Merkel's root and authentification of message to be verified to be verified, from depositing The database for storing up Merkel's root or storage obtain authentification of message to be verified including inquiring in the transaction record of Merkel's root At least one Merkel's root identical with Merkel's root to be verified that the corresponding authoritative institution of authoritative institution ID sends over Value, and the Merkel's root and corresponding digital signature and storage time that inquiry obtains are sent to third-party authentication service Device.
It should be noted that when block platform chain does not inquire the corresponding authority of authoritative institution ID of authentification of message to be verified When Merkel's root identical with Merkel's root to be verified that mechanism sends over, block platform chain can feed back there is no to For the information of Merkel's root of verifying to third-party authentication server, third-party authentication server can be according to this information, directly Each personal information to be verified for determining that user terminal is sent is incorrect.
Step S50, the third-party authentication server receive each Merkel's root that the block platform chain sends, Corresponding digital signature and corresponding storage time, and according to the authoritative institution ID of authentification of message to be verified, receive described in Each Merkel's root, corresponding digital signature and corresponding storage time, each personal information to be verified that user terminal is sent It is verified.
Third-party authentication server selects from these Merkel's roots storage time nearest first according to storage time Merkel's root, and according to the authoritative institution ID of authentification of message to be verified, obtain the authoritative institution ID's of authentification of message to be verified First public key is verified using the first public key corresponding digital signature of Merkel's root nearest to storage time, if verifying Pass through, it is determined that each personal information to be verified that user terminal is sent is true, and it is whole to user to send the information being verified End；If verifying does not pass through, it is determined that each personal information to be verified that user terminal is sent is untrue, and it is unacceptable to send verifying Information is to user terminal.Each Merkel's root that third authentication server can also directly be fed back according to block platform chain Quantity, when if odd number, it is determined that each personal information to be verified that user terminal is sent is true；When if even number, it is determined that Each personal information to be verified that user terminal is sent is untrue.
It should be noted that the corresponding power of authoritative institution ID of authentification of message to be verified can be got with block chain query After at least one Merkel's root identical with Merkel's root to be verified that prestige mechanism sends over, from these Merkel's roots The Merkel's root for selecting storage time nearest in value, and using the corresponding authoritative machine of the authoritative institution ID of authentification of message to be verified First public key of the structure Merkel root nearest to storage time is verified, if being verified, there are to be verified for feedback The information of Merkel's root to third-party authentication server, third-party authentication server so that it is determined that user terminal send respectively to Testing personal information is true；If verifying does not pass through, there is no the information of Merkel's root to be verified and test to third party in feedback Server is demonstrate,proved, so that each personal information to be verified that third-party authentication server determines that user terminal is sent is incorrect.
For example, when whether need to check certain customer is to order to arrest runaway convict, it is only necessary to which the customer, which shows, to be based on including whether Certain nodal informations (nodal value or nodal value and affiliated layer) in the Merkel tree for a plurality of personal information building escaped, according to The Hash that above- mentioned information, the not fugitive information to be verified of the customer and the building Merkel tree that the customer provides use is calculated Method, Merkel's tree node ordering rule calculate Merkel's root to be verified.Then to be verified according to this by block chain Merkel's root inquire, and at least one the Merkel's root inquired is fed back into authentication server, the service for checking credentials Device carries out judging whether the not fugitive information to be verified of the customer is really, if really according to each Merkel's root received Then determining the customer not is to order to arrest runaway convict, on the contrary, it is determined that the customer is fugitive wanted criminal.If it is determined that the name that user provides is No true calculating only needs user to show whether previous conviction.
The present embodiment received by third-party authentication server at least one personal information to be verified that user terminal sends, The authoritative institution ID and Merkel's verification information of authentification of message to be verified, wherein Merkel's verification information include except it is described to The cryptographic Hash of at least one other node outside the corresponding Merkel's node of testing personal information is described to be verified a including removing The cryptographic Hash of at least one other node outside the corresponding Merkel's node of people's information and corresponding affiliated layer；The third party tests Server is demonstrate,proved according to the authoritative institution ID of the authentification of message to be verified, the authoritative institution ID for obtaining authentification of message to be verified is corresponding Hash algorithm and orderly Merkel tree building rule；The third-party authentication server according to the hash algorithm, described have Sequence Merkel tree building rule, at least one personal information to be verified, Merkel's verification information calculate, and obtain Merkel's root to be verified, and the authoritative institution ID of Merkel's root and authentification of message to be verified to be verified is sent to area Block platform chain；The block platform chain is according to the power of the Merkel's root and authentification of message to be verified to be verified that receive Prestige mechanism ID, obtain authentification of message to be verified authoritative institution ID it is corresponding at least one with Merkel's root to be verified Identical Merkel's root, and each Merkel's root, corresponding digital signature and corresponding storage time of acquisition are sent out It send to the third-party authentication server；The third-party authentication server receives the described each silent of the block platform chain transmission Ke Er root, corresponding digital signature and corresponding storage time, and according to the authoritative institution ID of authentification of message to be verified, reception Each Merkel's root, corresponding digital signature and the corresponding storage time arrived sends user terminal each to be verified Personal information is verified.To during needing to verify certain personal information, not need user to provide to include privacy information Other all personal information, it is only necessary to selection provides personal information to be verified and carries out to the third-party institution.
Further, it referring to Fig. 3, is mentioned according to the first embodiment of the zero-knowledge proof method of the application personal information The second embodiment of the zero-knowledge proof method of the application personal information out, in the present embodiment, the step S50 includes:
Step S51, the third-party authentication server is according to the corresponding storage time of each Merkel's root, from described The Merkel's root for selecting storage time nearest in each Merkel's root；
Step S52, the third-party authentication server is according to the authoritative institution ID in the information to be verified, described in acquisition First public key of the corresponding authoritative institution of authoritative institution ID in information to be verified, and the storage using first public key to selection The time nearest corresponding digital signature of Merkel's root is verified；
Step S53, if being verified, the third-party authentication server determines each individual to be verified that user terminal is sent Information is true；
Step S54, if verifying does not pass through, the third-party authentication server determines each to be verified that user terminal is sent People's information is untrue.
In the present solution, certain information due to individual subscriber may have variation, such as user residence, marriage shape Condition etc..When so authoritative institution's server gets userspersonal information's variation, it can be created again according to updated personal information A Merkel root b is built, but due to Merkel's root a of the Merkel tree based on userspersonal information's building before update Stored Merkel's root a cannot be deleted and be modified to it on block platform chain, be not prevented from user using more New and old personal information go to be verified this happen, authoritative institution's server can be using the second private key to the Merkel Root a sign again generate the second digital signature, then will include Merkel's root a, corresponding second digital signature and The information of authoritative institution ID is stored to block platform chain.This results in that two can be stored on block platform chain to include Merkel's root The information of a.
The authoritative institution ID that third-party authentication server receives the authentification of message to be verified of block platform chain transmission is corresponding At least one Merkel's root identical with Merkel's root to be verified after, can first according to storage time, from this The nearest Merkel's root of selection storage time in a little Merkel's roots, and according to the authoritative institution ID of authentification of message to be verified, The first public key for obtaining the authoritative institution ID of authentification of message to be verified, using the first public key Merkel root nearest to storage time It is worth corresponding digital signature to be verified, if being verified, it is determined that each personal information to be verified that user terminal is sent is true It is real, and the information that is verified is sent to user terminal；If verifying does not pass through, it is determined that user terminal is sent each to be verified a People's information is untrue, and sends the unacceptable information of verifying to user terminal.
It should be noted that authoritative institution's server may only exist a private key.Since userspersonal information's variation is led When the effective or failure state of Merkel's root being caused to change, authoritative institution's server can be again with the same private key to Merck You sign at root, and again store Merkel's root and corresponding digital signature to block platform chain.This just leads Causing block platform chain, there are multiple identical Merkel's roots, and these corresponding digital signature of Merkel's root are also identical 's.The quantity for each Merkel's root that the third service for checking credentials can also directly be fed back according to block platform chain, if odd number When, it is determined that each personal information to be verified that user terminal is sent is true；When if even number, it is determined that user terminal was sent Each personal information to be verified is untrue.
It present embodiments provides a kind of block platform chain and carries out verifying by using the first public key and determine effective Merkel's root The strategy of value, to prevent after personal information updates, user still passes through verifying using the real information before updating.
Further, the application individual is proposed according to the first embodiment of the zero-knowledge proof method of the application personal information The 3rd embodiment of the zero-knowledge proof method of information, in the present embodiment, before the step S40 further include:
Step S60, authoritative institution's server receive at least two personal information that user terminal is sent, and according to receiving At least two personal information that user terminal is sent, create a file number and the file number is corresponding including user terminal hair The news file at least two personal information sent；
Step S70, authoritative institution's server is using preset hash algorithm, preset orderly Merkel tree building rule Then with each personal information in the news file, the corresponding first Merkel tree of the file number is constructed, and by authoritative institution ID, the file number and the news file are sent to the user terminal；
Step S80, authoritative institution's server is according to the first private key to Merkel's root of the first Merkel tree Signature generates corresponding first digital signature of Merkel's root of the first Merkel tree；
Step S90, authoritative institution's server by include the first Merkel tree Merkel's root, described first Corresponding first digital signature of Merkel's root of Merkel tree and the information of authoritative institution ID are stored to the block platform chain.
In the present solution, at least two personal information that authoritative institution's server reception user terminal is sent, will create one A unique file number and the file number corresponding news file include each item that user terminal is sent in the news file People's information.
It should be noted that after authoritative institution's server receives at least two personal information that user terminal is sent, meeting The authenticity for each personal information that first audit user terminal is sent, such as the ID card No. that user terminal is sent, by sentencing The disconnected length for whether meeting ID card No. defined or judge ID card No. and user terminal transmission name whether be Corresponding relationship.When a plurality of personal information for determining that user terminal is sent is all true, a unique file number is just created News file corresponding with the file number includes each personal information that user terminal is sent in the news file.
Authoritative institution's server is regular and described using preset hash algorithm, preset orderly Merkel tree building Each personal information in news file constructs the corresponding first Merkel tree of the file number.Such as the Merkel tree in Fig. 6 The detailed process of building is as follows: the first step, obtains the corresponding cryptographic Hash hash of each personal information using preset hash algorithm (P1), hash (P2), hash (P3), hash (P4), hash (P5) and hash (P6), more each cryptographic Hash, know hash (P1) < hash (P2) < hash (P3) < hash (P4) < hash (P5) < hash (P6) is constructed according to preset orderly Merkel tree Rule (successively sorts) from left to right from as low as big, and successively sort first layer leaf node；Second step is according to each leaf to have sorted The cryptographic Hash of node obtains the cryptographic Hash hash (A+B) of the second node layer AB, the cryptographic Hash of node CD using hash algorithm Hash (C+D) and node EF cryptographic Hash hash (E+F), and hash (A+B) < hash (C+D) < hash (E+F) are advised according to sequence Then, the node AB with hash (A+B) is first position of the second layer, and the node CD with hash (C+D) is the second layer second A position, and the node EF of hash (E+F) rises to third node layer automatically；Third step is according to hash (A+B) and hash (C+ D), the cryptographic Hash of third node layer ABCD is calculated as hash (AB+CD), and hash (AB+CD) < hash (E+F), according to Node ABCD is placed on first position of third layer by ordering rule, and node EF is placed on second position of third layer；4th step, root It is hash (ABCD+EF) according to the cryptographic Hash that hash (AB+CD) and hash (E+F) calculates Merkel's root node.
It should be noted that during above-mentioned cleartext information and Merkel's verification information are transmitted and third party tests During card server verifies information, even if using secrecy transmission mechanism, it is also possible to cause part for Merck The cryptographic Hash leakage of your verifying.Such as ask for diversified personal letter repeatedly by the certifying organization of network monitoring or malice Breath, the data that all may result in all or part of Merkel tree are obtained by illegal person.Because identity is many with privacy information Belong to the Discrete Finite set an of fixed size, such as gender { male, female }, marital status { unmarried, married, divorced, funeral It is even } etc..Attacker can repeatedly construct leaf node by the method for exhaustion, and combine the information of known ordered numbers abstract layer, calculate Final Merkel's root out.If be consistent with personal true Merkel's root, attacker just obtains a certain personal letter The clear content of breath.It can be every when constructing leaf node to prevent the mode of malicious attacker exhaustion from inferring personal information Personal information distributes a special value, carries out calculating acquisition to personal information and corresponding special value using hash algorithm The corresponding cryptographic Hash of this personal information.The special value can be the numerical value that authoritative institution is randomly generated, or user The cryptographic Hash of the personal identification number of upload, and individual periodically can also replace personal identification number by certified authority.In this way, i.e. Allow the cleartext information in the exhaustive finite discrete set of attacker, also middle special value impossible to exhaust, also with regard to calculation impossible to exhaust The corresponding cryptographic Hash of the cleartext information out also can not just extrapolate Merkel's root.
It, can be by authoritative institution ID, the file number, the information shelves after authoritative institution's server construction the first Merkel tree Case is sent to the user terminal, user terminal according to authoritative institution ID, obtain the corresponding hash algorithm of authoritative institution ID and orderly Then Merkel tree building rule constructs rule according to the news file, the hash algorithm and the orderly Merkel tree, Oneself the first Merkel tree of building, to obtain the data in the first Merkel tree.
After authoritative institution's server construction the first Merkel tree, in addition to by authoritative institution ID, the file number, the information Archives are sent to the user terminal, and the corresponding first Merkel tree of the file number can also be also sent to user terminal.
It should be noted that authoritative institution's server can by generate one include authoritative institution ID, the file number, The corresponding digital certificate of the news file, the digital certificate can also include the corresponding first Merkel tree of the file number Digital certificate, the digital certificate is sent to the user terminal.
Authoritative institution's server can sign to Merkel's root of the first Merkel tree of building using the first private key, Corresponding first digital signature of Merkel's root for generating the first Merkel tree (carries out signature using the first private key and represents this Merkel's root is effective).Later, authoritative institution's server can by include the first Merkel tree Merkel's root, First digital signature and the information of authoritative institution ID are sent to block platform chain, and block platform chain can store the institute received State Merkel's root, the information of first digital signature and authoritative institution ID including the first Merkel tree.
It should be noted that for some reason, such as userspersonal information updates, when authoritative authority server thinks Merkel's root through creating fails, and authoritative institution's server will use the second private key and sign to Merkel's root Generate digital signature (signed using the second private key, represent Merkel's root failure), and will include Merkel's root, The information storage value block platform chain of digital signature and authoritative institution ID.
The present embodiment is based on user terminal by using preset hash algorithm and the building rule building of orderly Merkel tree The Merkel tree of the personal information of offer, and Merkel's root of the Merkel tree is stored in block platform chain.Due to breathing out Uncommon digest algorithm is unidirectional mapping algorithm, can not reversely extrapolate cleartext information by cryptographic Hash, and the root of Merkel tree and The content of any leaf node and position are all directly related, and the change of the interior perhaps position of any leaf node can all cause changing for root The data stored in change and block platform chain cannot be modified and be deleted, to ensure that the identity content letter of user The safety of breath, and ensure that Merkel's root of the Merkel tree based on user information creation is not easily modified.
Further, referring to Fig. 4, this is proposed according to the first embodiment of the zero-knowledge proof method of the application personal information Apply for the fourth embodiment of the zero-knowledge proof method of personal information, in the present embodiment, the step S90 includes:
Step S91, the intelligent contract on block platform chain described in authoritative institution's server calls, creation one include Merkel's root of the first Merkel tree, corresponding first digital signature of Merkel's root of the first Merkel tree and The first transaction record of authoritative institution ID；
Step S92, authoritative institution's server store first transaction record to the block platform chain.
In the present solution, authoritative institution's server can generate a transaction by the intelligent contract on calling block platform chain, Authoritative institution's server can be by Merkel's root, first digital signature and authoritative institution including the first Merkel tree Information write-in transaction record in.Then the intelligent contract called the transaction record being stored on block platform chain In.Fig. 7 is a kind of transaction record for storing Merkel's root, is ended up in the Input Data of the transaction record with aecb88 That string character string be just the information for including Merkel's root and corresponding digital signature, the information in From is then authoritative institution ID。
The present embodiment is by being written transaction record for Merkel's root and being stored on block platform chain, so that it is guaranteed that Merck Your root is not easily modified.
Further, the application individual is proposed according to the first embodiment of the zero-knowledge proof method of the application personal information 5th embodiment of the zero-knowledge proof method of information, in the present embodiment, after the step S90 further include:
Step S100, authoritative institution's server receives the update request that user terminal is sent, wherein the update is asked It asks including file number and at least one personal information；
Step S110, authoritative institution's server is according to the corresponding news file of file number and update updated in request At least one personal information in request generates the corresponding new information archives of file number updated in request；
Step S120, authoritative institution's server is using preset hash algorithm, preset orderly Merkel tree building Each personal information in the regular and described new information archives, building update the corresponding second Merkel tree of file number in request, And by authoritative institution ID, update request in file number and the new information archives be sent to the user terminal；
Step S130, authoritative institution's server is using the first private key to Merkel's root label of the second Merkel tree Name generates the second digital signature；
Step S140, the authoritative institution is by Merkel's root, the second digital signature and power including the second Merkel tree The information of prestige mechanism ID is stored to the block platform chain.
In the present solution, it includes file number and at least one personal information that authoritative institution's server, which receives user terminal, which to be sent, Update request after, can according to update request in file number, the corresponding news file of the file number is recalled, then according to update The a plurality of personal information at least one personal information and the corresponding news file of file number in request, updates the file number Corresponding news file, and by authoritative institution ID, update request in file number and the new information archives be sent to user end End, or the file number in file number, the new information archives and the update request in authoritative institution ID, update request is corresponding The second Merkel tree be sent to the user terminal.
It should be noted that the personal information updated in request may be certain information content in original information archives Update, for example, in original archives there are certain personal information be " residence is Guangdong ", update request in personal information be " occupy Residence is Shenzhen ", this personal information of original " residence is Guangdong " can be deleted in this case, by " residence is The personal information storage in Shenzhen " generates new news file in original information archives.The personal information updated in request may It is the information being not present in original information archives, the personal information updated in request can be added to original information in this case In archives, the new information archives of generation.
After news file updates, authoritative institution's server can be generated according to preset hash algorithm and new news file The corresponding second Merkel tree of the new news file.It is carried out using Merkel root of first private key to the second Merkel tree Signature generates the second digital signature, and by Merkel's root, the second digital signature and authoritative institution including the second Merkel tree The information of ID is stored to block platform chain
It should be noted that the authoritative institution is by Merkel's root, the second digital signature including the second Merkel tree It stores with the information of authoritative institution ID to before the block platform chain step further include:
Authoritative institution's server is using the second private key to the corresponding first Merkel tree of file number in update request Merkel's root is signed, and third digital signature, and Merkel's root, the third number that will include the first Merkel tree are generated The information of signature and authoritative institution ID are stored to the block platform chain.
When certain information of individual subscriber change, due to the corresponding Merkel's root of userspersonal information before updating Value has stored on block platform chain, which cannot delete and modify to it, is not prevented from user's benefit It is happened with this that old personal information goes to be verified.There are the first private keys and the second private key two for authoritative institution's server Private key (the first private key, which carries out signature, indicates that Merkel's root is effective, and the second private key, which carries out signature, indicates the failure of Merkel's root), letter After ceasing archives update, authoritative institution's server can be using the second private key to the corresponding Merck of news file before stored update You sign at root, generate third digital signature；It will include the corresponding Merkel's root of news file and third before updating The information of digital signature is stored to block platform chain.
The present embodiment is requested by being updated according to the personal information of user terminal, is updated to news file and is updated News file creates new Merkel tree and new Merkel's tree root value is stored in block platform chain, thus a few in user After people's information update, it is ensured that updated real information can pass through verifying.
The invention also provides a kind of zero-knowledge proof method systems of personal information.
Referring to Fig. 5, in one embodiment, the system comprises: third-party authentication server 100,200 and of block platform chain User terminal 300.
Third-party authentication server 100, for receive the transmission of user terminal 300 at least one personal information to be verified, The authoritative institution ID and Merkel's verification information of authentification of message to be verified, wherein Merkel's verification information include except it is described to The cryptographic Hash of at least one other node outside the corresponding Merkel's node of testing personal information is described to be verified a including removing The cryptographic Hash of at least one other node outside the corresponding Merkel's node of people's information and corresponding affiliated layer；
The third-party authentication server 100 is also used to the authoritative institution ID according to the authentification of message to be verified, obtains The corresponding hash algorithm of authoritative institution ID of authentification of message to be verified and orderly Merkel tree building rule, and according to the Hash Algorithm, the orderly Merkel tree building rule, at least one personal information to be verified and Merkel's verification information It is calculated, obtains Merkel's root to be verified, and by the authority of Merkel's root and authentification of message to be verified to be verified Mechanism ID is sent to block platform chain 200；
Block platform chain 200, for according to the Merkel's root to be verified and authentification of message to be verified received Authoritative institution ID, obtain authentification of message to be verified authoritative institution ID it is corresponding at least one with the Merkel to be verified The identical Merkel's root of root, and when by each Merkel's root, corresponding digital signature and corresponding storage of acquisition Between be sent to the third-party authentication server 100；
The third-party authentication server 100 is also used to receive each Merkel that the block platform chain 200 is sent Root, corresponding digital signature and corresponding storage time, and according to the authoritative institution ID of authentification of message to be verified, receive Each Merkel's root, corresponding digital signature and corresponding storage time, each to be verified that user terminal 300 is sent People's information is verified.
It should be noted that above system has whole skills of the first embodiment of the zero-knowledge proof method of personal information Art feature, the whole embodiments that specific interactive process is referred to preceding method execute, accordingly also with the reality of preceding method Apply whole technical effects of example.
The present invention also proposes a kind of computer readable storage medium, is stored thereon with computer program.The computer can Reading storage medium can be the memory 20 in the server of Fig. 1, be also possible to as ROM (Read-Only Memory, it is read-only to deposit Reservoir)/RAM (Random Access Memory, random access memory), magnetic disk, at least one of CD, the calculating Machine readable storage medium storing program for executing include several information use so that third-party authentication server, user terminal, authoritative institution's server and/ Or block platform chain executes method described in each embodiment of the present invention.
It should be noted that, in this document, the terms "include", "comprise" or its any other variant are intended to non-row His property includes, so that the process, method, article or the system that include a series of elements not only include those elements, and And further include other elements that are not explicitly listed, or further include for this process, method, article or system institute it is intrinsic Element.In the absence of more restrictions, the element limited by sentence "including a ...", it is not excluded that including being somebody's turn to do There is also other identical elements in the process, method of element, article or system.
The serial number of the above embodiments of the invention is only for description, does not represent the advantages or disadvantages of the embodiments.
Through the above description of the embodiments, those skilled in the art can be understood that above-described embodiment side Method can be realized by means of software and necessary general hardware platform, naturally it is also possible to by hardware, but in many cases The former is more preferably embodiment.
The above is only a preferred embodiment of the present invention, is not intended to limit the scope of the invention, all to utilize this hair Equivalent structure or equivalent flow shift made by bright specification and accompanying drawing content is applied directly or indirectly in other relevant skills Art field, is included within the scope of the present invention.

Claims (10)

1. a kind of zero-knowledge proof method of personal information, which is characterized in that comprising steps of
Third-party authentication server receives at least one personal information to be verified that user terminal sends, authentification of message to be verified Authoritative institution ID and Merkel's verification information, wherein Merkel's verification information includes except the personal information to be verified is corresponding Merkel's node outside at least one other node cryptographic Hash or including except the corresponding Merck of the personal information to be verified The cryptographic Hash of at least one other node outside your node and corresponding affiliated layer；
The third-party authentication server obtains authentification of message to be verified according to the authoritative institution ID of the authentification of message to be verified The corresponding hash algorithm of authoritative institution ID and orderly Merkel tree building rule；
The third-party authentication server is according to the hash algorithm, the orderly Merkel tree building rule, described at least one Item personal information to be verified and Merkel's verification information calculate, and obtain Merkel's root to be verified, and will be to be tested Merkel's root of card and the authoritative institution ID of authentification of message to be verified are sent to block platform chain；
The block platform chain is according to the authoritative machine of the Merkel's root and authentification of message to be verified to be verified that receive Structure ID, obtaining the authoritative institution ID of authentification of message to be verified, corresponding at least one is identical as Merkel's root to be verified Merkel's root, and each Merkel's root, corresponding digital signature and the corresponding storage time of acquisition are sent to The third-party authentication server；
The third-party authentication server receives each Merkel's root, the corresponding number label that the block platform chain is sent Name and corresponding storage time, and according to the authoritative institution ID of authentification of message to be verified, each Merkel's root received, Corresponding digital signature and corresponding storage time, each personal information to be verified sent to user terminal are verified.
2. the zero-knowledge proof method of personal information as described in claim 1, which is characterized in that Merkel's verification information It further include at least one non-personal information to be verified；
The third-party authentication server according to the hash algorithm, orderly Merkel tree building rule, it is described extremely A step of few personal information to be verified and Merkel's verification information calculate, obtain Merkel's root to be verified Include:
The third-party authentication server is according to the hash algorithm, the orderly Merkel tree building rule, described at least one Item personal information to be verified and Merkel's verification information calculate, and obtain Merkel's root to be verified, wherein described Merkel's verification information includes at least one non-personal information to be verified Merck corresponding with the personal information to be verified is removed The cryptographic Hash of at least one other node outside your node or including at least one non-personal information to be verified, except described to be tested The cryptographic Hash of at least one other node outside the corresponding Merkel's node of card personal information and corresponding affiliated layer.
3. the zero-knowledge proof method of personal information as claimed in claim 2, which is characterized in that the third-party authentication Server is according to the authoritative institution ID of authentification of message to be verified, each Merkel's root, the corresponding digital signature that receive With corresponding storage time, to user terminal send each personal information to be verified verify the step of include:
The third-party authentication server is according to the corresponding storage time of each Merkel's root, from each Merkel's root The nearest Merkel's root of middle selection storage time；
The third-party authentication server obtains in the information to be verified according to the authoritative institution ID in the information to be verified First public key of the corresponding authoritative institution of authoritative institution ID, and write from memory using storage time of first public key to selection is nearest The corresponding digital signature of Ke Er root is verified；
If being verified, each personal information to be verified that the third-party authentication server determines that user terminal is sent is true；
If verifying does not pass through, each personal information to be verified that the third-party authentication server determines that user terminal is sent is not true It is real.
4. the zero-knowledge proof method of personal information as claimed in claim 3, which is characterized in that the block platform chain According to the authoritative institution ID of the Merkel's root and authentification of message to be verified to be verified that receive, information to be verified is obtained At least one corresponding Merkel's root identical with Merkel's root to be verified of the authoritative institution ID of certification, and will obtain Each Merkel's root, corresponding digital signature and the corresponding storage time obtained is sent to the third-party authentication server The step of before include:
Authoritative institution's server receives at least two personal information that user terminal is sent, and sends according to user terminal is received At least two personal information, create a file number and the file number it is corresponding including user terminal send at least two The news file of personal information；
Authoritative institution's server is using preset hash algorithm, preset orderly Merkel tree building rule and the information Each personal information in archives, constructs the corresponding first Merkel tree of the file number, and by authoritative institution ID, the file number It is sent to the user terminal with the news file；
Authoritative institution's server is signed according to Merkel's root of first private key to the first Merkel tree, described in generation Corresponding first digital signature of Merkel's root of first Merkel tree；
Authoritative institution's server will include that Merkel's root of the first Merkel tree, the first Merkel tree are write from memory Corresponding first digital signature of Ke Er root and the information of authoritative institution ID are stored to the block platform chain.
5. the zero-knowledge proof method of personal information as claimed in claim 4, which is characterized in that authoritative institution's clothes Device be engaged in for Merkel's root, Merkel's root corresponding first of the first Merkel tree including the first Merkel tree Digital signature and the information of authoritative institution ID were stored to the step of block platform chain
Intelligent contract on block platform chain described in authoritative institution's server calls, creation one includes first Merck Merkel's root, corresponding first digital signature of Merkel's root of the first Merkel tree and the authoritative institution ID's that you set First transaction record；
Authoritative institution's server stores first transaction record to the block platform chain.
6. the zero-knowledge proof method of personal information as claimed in claim 5, which is characterized in that authoritative institution's clothes Device be engaged in for Merkel's root, Merkel's root corresponding first of the first Merkel tree including the first Merkel tree Digital signature and the information of authoritative institution ID are stored to the block platform chain further include:
Authoritative institution's server receives the update request that user terminal is sent, wherein updates request include file number with At least one personal information；
Authoritative institution's server is according to the corresponding news file of file number updated in request and updates in request at least One personal information generates the corresponding new information archives of file number updated in request；
Authoritative institution's server is using preset hash algorithm, preset orderly Merkel tree building rule and the new letter Cease archives in each personal information, building update request in the corresponding second Merkel tree of file number, and by authoritative institution ID, The file number and the new information archives updated in request is sent to the user terminal；
Authoritative institution's server is signed using Merkel's root of first private key to the second Merkel tree, generates the second number Signature；
The authoritative institution is by Merkel's root, the information of the second digital signature and authoritative institution ID including the second Merkel tree It stores to the block platform chain.
7. the zero-knowledge proof method of personal information as described in claim 6, which is characterized in that the authoritative institution Before the step of server is signed using Merkel's root of first private key to the second Merkel tree, is generated the second digital signature also Include:
Authoritative institution's server is using the second private key to the Merck for updating the corresponding first Merkel tree of file number in request Your root is signed, and generates third digital signature, and by Merkel's root, third digital signature including the first Merkel tree It stores with the information of authoritative institution ID to the block platform chain.
8. the zero-knowledge proof method of personal information as claimed in claim 7, which is characterized in that the authoritative institution will The information of Merkel's root, the second digital signature and authoritative institution ID including the second Merkel tree stores flat to the block chain The step of platform includes:
Intelligent contract on block platform chain described in authoritative institution's server calls, creation one includes second Merck Second transaction record of Merkel's root, second digital signature and authoritative institution ID that you set；
Authoritative institution's server sends second transaction record and stores to the block platform chain.
9. a kind of zero-knowledge proof method system of personal information, which is characterized in that the system comprises:
Third-party authentication server, for receiving at least one personal information to be verified, the information to be verified of user terminal transmission The authoritative institution ID and Merkel's verification information of certification, wherein Merkel's verification information includes except the personal letter to be verified Cease the cryptographic Hash of at least one other node outside corresponding Merkel's node or including except the personal information to be verified is corresponding Merkel's node outside at least one other node cryptographic Hash and corresponding affiliated layer；
The third-party authentication server is also used to the authoritative institution ID according to the authentification of message to be verified, obtains to be verified The corresponding hash algorithm of authoritative institution ID of authentification of message and orderly Merkel tree building rule, and according to the hash algorithm, The orderly Merkel tree building rule, at least one personal information to be verified and Merkel's verification information are counted It calculates, obtains Merkel's root to be verified, and by the authoritative institution ID of Merkel's root and authentification of message to be verified to be verified It is sent to block platform chain；
Block platform chain, for the authoritative machine according to the Merkel's root and authentification of message to be verified to be verified received Structure ID, obtaining the authoritative institution ID of authentification of message to be verified, corresponding at least one is identical as Merkel's root to be verified Merkel's root, and each Merkel's root, corresponding digital signature and the corresponding storage time of acquisition are sent to The third-party authentication server；
The third-party authentication server is also used to receive each Merkel's root, correspondence that the block platform chain is sent Digital signature and corresponding storage time, and according to the authoritative institution ID of authentification of message to be verified, receive it is described each silent Ke Er root, corresponding digital signature and corresponding storage time carry out each personal information to be verified that user terminal is sent Verifying.
10. a kind of computer readable storage medium, which is characterized in that be stored with computer on the computer readable storage medium Program realizes zero such as personal information described in any item of the claim 1 to 8 when the computer program is executed by processor The step of knowledge proof method.
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