CN110213035A - A kind of intelligent terminal access authentication method based on similarity mode - Google Patents
A kind of intelligent terminal access authentication method based on similarity mode Download PDFInfo
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- CN110213035A CN110213035A CN201910462818.8A CN201910462818A CN110213035A CN 110213035 A CN110213035 A CN 110213035A CN 201910462818 A CN201910462818 A CN 201910462818A CN 110213035 A CN110213035 A CN 110213035A
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- H—ELECTRICITY
- H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
- H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
- H04L63/00—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security
- H04L63/08—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security for authentication of entities
- H04L63/0869—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security for authentication of entities for achieving mutual authentication
-
- H—ELECTRICITY
- H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
- H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
- H04L63/00—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security
- H04L63/08—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security for authentication of entities
- H04L63/0876—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security for authentication of entities based on the identity of the terminal or configuration, e.g. MAC address, hardware or software configuration or device fingerprint
-
- H—ELECTRICITY
- H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
- H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
- H04L9/00—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols
- H04L9/001—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols using chaotic signals
-
- H—ELECTRICITY
- H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
- H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
- H04L9/00—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols
- H04L9/06—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols the encryption apparatus using shift registers or memories for block-wise or stream coding, e.g. DES systems or RC4; Hash functions; Pseudorandom sequence generators
- H04L9/0643—Hash functions, e.g. MD5, SHA, HMAC or f9 MAC
-
- H—ELECTRICITY
- H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
- H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
- H04L9/00—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols
- H04L9/08—Key distribution or management, e.g. generation, sharing or updating, of cryptographic keys or passwords
- H04L9/0861—Generation of secret information including derivation or calculation of cryptographic keys or passwords
- H04L9/0866—Generation of secret information including derivation or calculation of cryptographic keys or passwords involving user or device identifiers, e.g. serial number, physical or biometrical information, DNA, hand-signature or measurable physical characteristics
-
- H—ELECTRICITY
- H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
- H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
- H04L9/00—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols
- H04L9/08—Key distribution or management, e.g. generation, sharing or updating, of cryptographic keys or passwords
- H04L9/0861—Generation of secret information including derivation or calculation of cryptographic keys or passwords
- H04L9/0869—Generation of secret information including derivation or calculation of cryptographic keys or passwords involving random numbers or seeds
-
- H—ELECTRICITY
- H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
- H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
- H04L9/00—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols
- H04L9/32—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols including means for verifying the identity or authority of a user of the system or for message authentication, e.g. authorization, entity authentication, data integrity or data verification, non-repudiation, key authentication or verification of credentials
- H04L9/3236—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols including means for verifying the identity or authority of a user of the system or for message authentication, e.g. authorization, entity authentication, data integrity or data verification, non-repudiation, key authentication or verification of credentials using cryptographic hash functions
-
- H—ELECTRICITY
- H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
- H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
- H04L9/00—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols
- H04L9/32—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols including means for verifying the identity or authority of a user of the system or for message authentication, e.g. authorization, entity authentication, data integrity or data verification, non-repudiation, key authentication or verification of credentials
- H04L9/3263—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols including means for verifying the identity or authority of a user of the system or for message authentication, e.g. authorization, entity authentication, data integrity or data verification, non-repudiation, key authentication or verification of credentials involving certificates, e.g. public key certificate [PKC] or attribute certificate [AC]; Public key infrastructure [PKI] arrangements
Abstract
The invention discloses a kind of intelligent terminal access authentication method based on similarity mode, first with lightweight operator, it realizes and is mutually authenticated between intelligent terminal P and different wearable device D, then facilitate intelligent terminal P further to excavate the data between different wearable device D based on Jaccard similarity factor again.In verification process, intelligent terminal P realizes the authentication to wearable device D using half character of Chebyshev's chaotic maps, wearable device D realizes authentication and data interaction to intelligent terminal P using selectivity leakage mechanism, the safety and flexibility for significantly improving verification process avoid the sensitive data of intelligent terminal being directly exposed to wearable device.During the similarity mode of latter half, wearable device D calculates its sensitive data minimum hash first with min-hash function, it calculates its data similarity, its is facilitated to carry out data mining, while avoiding user's sensitive data leakage of wearable device acquisition.
Description
Technical field
The present invention relates to wearable device security technology area more particularly to a kind of intelligent terminals based on similarity mode
Access authentication method.
Background technique
Existing wearable device is mostly based on the short-distance wireless communication technologies such as bluetooth, WiFi, near-field communication and realizes user
Data acquisition, calculates and shares storage.Tradition is existed intrinsic based on the safety data transmission mechanism of end-to-end encrypted communication agreement
Security risk, malicious attacker realizes identity personation and data possibly also with the actively and passively attack pattern such as resetting, listening to
It forges, it would be highly desirable to which the effective authentication protocol of design safety realizes the legitimate verification of object identity.Currently, based on traditional cryptography
The safety authentication protocol of algorithm is not suitable for directly applying to resource-constrained wearable device mostly.It is set as a result, in authentication protocol
Meter aspect, it is necessary to which the algorithm for designing lightweight guarantees the authentic and valid of interactive object identity, and realizing can under complex network environment
The safety of wearable device and mobile terminal.
During interactive authentication, intelligent terminal may use the data being locally stored for wearable device and intelligent terminal
Collection shares it with wearable device as certification operator, it is necessary to take into account fine-grained sensitive data reveals mechanism.Together
When intelligent terminal may face the similarity for calculating the data of multiple wearable devices transmission, carry out further data mining
Demand, it is necessary to take into account protection is used for not being leaked for the data of the wearable device of similarity calculation.
Summary of the invention
In view of the above technical problems, the present invention provides a kind of intelligent terminal access authentication side based on similarity mode
Method.The invention is characterized in that following technical scheme is achieved:
Wearable device D0With other wearable devices { DiPossess false identity identifier respectivelyWithIntelligence
Energy terminal P possesses the false identity identifier of wearable deviceWithLocal data setsCertificate CAP, public and private key is to { Q, α }；
Intelligent terminal P generates one group of pseudo random number first with pseudo-random function generatorIt utilizesTo local data setsIt (is denoted as) random process is carried out, temporary data set is calculated
……
Wherein, " # " is as a kind of additional character, for dividing and definingWithData field；
One group of numerical value is calculated using One-way Hash function in intelligent terminal P
……
Intelligent terminal P willIt (is denoted as)、It (is denoted as) it is sent to credible third
Side's (such as certification authority), trusted third party's detectionValue, it is ensured that correspond；It is used in combinationReplacementObtain updated certificate CAP；Hereafter, intelligent terminal P is by the certificate CA containing sensitive dataPIt is sent to wearable device
D0With other wearable devices { Di}。
The step of described safety certifying method for wearable device, is as follows:
Step 1: intelligent terminal P generates pseudo random number using pseudo-random function generatorWithGeneration one is just whole
Public key is calculated using the Chebyshev polynomials of extension as private key in number αWith Wherein p is big prime number；Intelligent terminal P is by concatenated message r0||Q0And ri||QiIt is sent respectively to wearable set
Standby D0With other wearable devices { DiAs access request and one new session period of unlatching；
Wherein, the Chebyshev polynomials Γ of extensionl(x) (x ∈ (- ∞, ∞), l ∈ N*) it is defined as follows:
Γ0(x)=1,
Γ1(x)=x,
Γl(x)=2x Γl-1(x)-Γl-2(x), x >=2；
Step 2: as wearable device D0Receive concatenated message r0||Q0Afterwards, it is generated using its pseudo-random function generator pseudo-
Random numberGenerate positive integer β0, extract the false identity identifier being locally storedWearable device D is calculated0With
In the factor authenticated with intelligent terminal P；The factor includes:S01、S02, wherein
By cascade messageIntelligent terminal P is returned to as response, other wearable devices { Di}
It carries out and wearable device D0Identical operation；
Step 3: when intelligent terminal P is receivedAfterwards, intelligent terminal P utilizes the Chebyshev using extension
Multinomial ΓαIt is calculated
According toTheoreticallyIt should be equal toSpecific calculating process is as follows:
Intelligent terminal P is utilizedIt is calculatedS ' is obtained by carrying out Hash to it01Compare the S for receiving and obtaining01's
Consistency is realized to wearable device D0The verifying of identity reality；If two values are equal, intelligent terminal P thinks to wear
Wear equipment D0It is a legitimate device, agreement continues, and intelligent terminal P passes through calculatingS02It obtainsOtherwise agreement terminates；
Intelligent terminal P, which chooses, intends shared part temporary data setIt is calculatedIt is calculatedAnd it willIt is sent to wearable device D0。
The concatenated message that other wearable devices are sended overIntelligent terminal P executes it identical
Operation, complete to { DiAuthentication.
Step 4: wearable device D0What extraction was locally storedIt is calculatedWhether deposit by comparing
What is be locally storedWithData it is equal, realize verifying to intelligent terminal P identity reality；If two
A numerical value is equal, wearable device D0Think that intelligent terminal P is a legal equipment, completes the authentication to P；It is wearable
Equipment D0Extract user dataIt is sent to intelligent terminal P, calculates its minimum hash
Other wearable devices { DiAnd wearable device D0Identical operation completion is carried out to recognize the identity of intelligent terminal P
Card and dataTransmission.
Step 5: intelligent terminal P calculates received wearable device D0The sensitive data collection sended over
WithJaccard similarity factor, and by similarity factor be higher than pre-set threshold one group of data be marked, use
In the data mining in later period.
A kind of intelligent terminal access authentication method based on similarity mode provided by the invention, cuts ratio first with extension
Avenge husband's multinomial, One-way Hash function, the lightweights operator such as XOR operation, realize intelligent terminal P and different wearable device D it
Between be mutually authenticated, then facilitate intelligent terminal P between different wearable device D based on Jaccard similarity factor again
Data are further excavated.In verification process, intelligent terminal P mainly utilizes half character of Chebyshev's chaotic maps real
Now to the authentication of wearable device D, wearable device D realizes the identity to intelligent terminal P using selectivity leakage mechanism
Certification and data interaction, significantly improve the safety and flexibility of verification process, effectively avoid the sensitive data of intelligent terminal
It is directly exposed to wearable device, suitable for the wearable device application scenarios with data sharing demand.In latter half
During similarity mode, wearable device D calculates its sensitive data minimum hash first with min-hash function, to calculate
Its data similarity facilitates it to carry out further data mining, while the user for also avoiding wearable device acquisition is sensitive
The leakage of data.
Detailed description of the invention
Fig. 1 is the flow chart provided by the invention based on the wearable device authentication method selectively revealed.
Fig. 2 is agreement flow diagram relevant to similarity calculation.
Specific embodiment
In conjunction with following specific embodiments and attached drawing, the invention will be described in further detail.Implement process of the invention, item
Part, experimental method etc. are among the general principles and common general knowledge in the art in addition to what is specifically mentioned below, the present invention
There are no special restrictions to content.
As shown in Figure 1, the invention proposes a kind of intelligent terminal cut-in method based on similarity mode, including following two
Big step:
One, system initialization
Wearable device D0With other wearable devices { DiPossess false identity identifier respectivelyWithIntelligence
Energy terminal P possesses the false identity identifier of wearable deviceWithLocal data setsCertificate CAP, public and private key is to { Q, α }；
Intelligent terminal P generates one group of pseudo random number first with pseudo-random function generatorIt utilizesTo local data setsIt (is denoted as) random process is carried out, temporary data set is calculated
……
Wherein, " # " is as a kind of additional character, for dividing and definingWithData field；
One group of numerical value is calculated using One-way Hash function in intelligent terminal P
……
Intelligent terminal P willIt (is denoted as)、It (is denoted as) it is sent to credible third
Side's (such as certification authority), trusted third party's detectionValue, it is ensured that correspond；It is used in combinationReplacementObtain updated certificate CAP；Hereafter, intelligent terminal P is by the certificate CA containing sensitive dataPIt is sent to wearable device
D0With other wearable devices { Di}。
Two, verification process
The step of described safety certifying method for wearable device, is as follows:
Step 1: intelligent terminal P generates pseudo random number using pseudo-random function generatorWithGeneration one is just whole
Public key is calculated using the Chebyshev polynomials of extension as private key in number αWith Wherein p is big prime number；Intelligent terminal P is by concatenated message r0||Q0And ri||QiIt is sent respectively to wearable
Equipment D0With other wearable devices { DiAs access request and one new session period of unlatching；
Wherein, the Chebyshev polynomials Γ of extensionl(x) (x ∈ (- ∞, ∞), l ∈ N*) it is defined as follows:
Γ0(x)=1,
Γ1(x)=x,
Γl(x)=2x Γl-1(x)-Γl-2(x), x >=2；
Step 2: as wearable device D0Receive concatenated message r0||Q0Afterwards, it is generated using its pseudo-random function generator pseudo-
Random numberGenerate positive integer β0, extract the false identity identifier being locally storedIt is calculated
S01、S02, and by cascade messageP is returned to as response, other wearable devices { DiCarry out with can
Wearable device D0Identical operation；
Step 3: when intelligent terminal P is receivedAfterwards, intelligent terminal P utilizes the Chebyshev using extension
Multinomial ΓαIt is calculated
According toTheoreticallyIt should be equal toSpecific calculating process is as follows:
Intelligent terminal P is utilizedIt is calculatedS ' is obtained by carrying out Hash to it01Compare the S for receiving and obtaining01
Consistency, realize to wearable device D0The verifying of identity reality；If two values are equal, intelligent terminal P thinks can
Wearable device D0It is a legitimate device, agreement continues, and intelligent terminal P passes through calculatingS02It obtainsOtherwise agreement terminates；
Intelligent terminal P, which chooses, intends shared part temporary data setIt is calculatedIt is calculatedAnd it willIt is sent to wearable device D0。
The data that other wearable devices are sended overIntelligent terminal P executes identical behaviour to it
Make, completes to other wearable devices { DiAuthentication.
Step 4: wearable device D0What extraction was locally storedIt is calculatedWhether deposit by comparing
What is be locally storedWithData it is equal, realize verifying to intelligent terminal P identity reality；If two
A numerical value is equal, wearable device D0Think that intelligent terminal P is a legal equipment, completes the authentication to P；It is wearable
Equipment D0Extract user dataIt is sent to intelligent terminal P, calculates its minimum hash
Other wearable devices { DiAnd wearable device D0Identical operation completion is carried out to recognize the identity of intelligent terminal P
Card and dataTransmission.
Step 5: intelligent terminal P calculates the data that received wearable device sends overWithJaccard similarity factor, and by similarity factor be higher than pre-set threshold one group of data be marked, be used for
The data mining in later period.
Content relevant to similarity calculation:
In intelligent terminal P and wearable device D0With other wearable devices { DiComplete two-way authentication after, for that can wear
Wear equipment D0And other wearable devices { DiThe data set sent, intelligent terminal P carried out based on Jaccard similarity factor
Similarity calculation.For sensitive data collectionWithJaccard similarity factorDefinition is such as
Under:
For multiple wearable device D0{ D1, D2..., Dn, Jaccard similarity factorIt is fixed
Justice is as follows:
Agreement process relevant to similarity calculation is as shown in Figure 2:
1, wearable device D0With other wearable devices { DiWith after intelligent terminal completion two-way authentication, it extracts respectively
The sensitive data collection of oneselfWithAnd it calculatesWithThen wearable device D0It can with other
Wearable device { DiRespectively willWithIt is sent to mobile terminal P, it is allowed to be based on Jaccard similarity factor
Calculate the similarity between respective data.
If 2,WithBetween similarity it is higher, thenJust closer to 1.Intelligent terminal P willOne group of wearable device more than its preset threshold value is marked, and further excavates between them later
Connection.
Protection content of the invention is not limited to above embodiments.Without departing from the spirit and scope of the invention, originally
Field technical staff it is conceivable that variation and advantage be all included in the present invention, and with appended claims be protect
Protect range.
Claims (9)
1. a kind of intelligent terminal cut-in method based on similarity mode characterized by comprising
It is mutually authenticated using lightweight operator between intelligent terminal P and different wearable device D；Wherein, the certification
In the process, the intelligent terminal P recognizes the identity of wearable device D using the half character realization of Chebyshev's chaotic maps
Card；The wearable device D realizes authentication and data interaction to intelligent terminal P using selectivity leakage mechanism；
Intelligent terminal P excavates the data between the different wearable device D based on Jaccard similarity factor；Wherein,
The wearable device D calculates its sensitive data minimum hash using min-hash function, to calculate its data similarity, together
When guarantee that oneself private data is not leaked.
2. the intelligent terminal cut-in method according to claim 1 based on similarity mode, which is characterized in that the method
Including system initialization step:
Wearable device D0With other wearable devices { DiPossess false identity identifier respectivelyWith
Intelligent terminal P possesses the false identity identifierWithLocal data setsCertificate CAPWith public and private key to { Q, α }；
Intelligent terminal P generates one group of pseudo random number using pseudo-random function generator, using the pseudo random number to local data
Collection carries out random process, and temporary data set is calculated；
One group of numerical value is calculated using one-way Hash function in intelligent terminal P；
The temporary data set, numerical value are sent to trusted third party by intelligent terminal P, and trusted third party's detection is described interim
Data set, numerical value, it is ensured that correspond；And the local data sets are replaced with the numerical value and obtain updated certificate CAP；This
Afterwards, intelligent terminal P is by updated certificate CAPIt is sent to wearable device D0With other wearable devices { Di}。
3. the intelligent terminal cut-in method according to claim 1 based on similarity mode, which is characterized in that the method
Safety certification step including wearable device:
Step 1: intelligent terminal P generates pseudo random number using pseudo-random function generatorWithA positive integer α is generated to make
For private key, public key Q0 and Qi is calculated using the Chebyshev polynomials of extension；Intelligent terminal P is by concatenated message r0||Q0With
ri||QiIt is sent respectively to wearable device D0With other wearable devices { DiAs the one new session of access request and unlatching
Period；
Step 2: as wearable device D0Receive concatenated message r0||Q0Afterwards, pseudorandom is generated using its pseudo-random function generator
NumberGenerate positive integer β0, extract the false identity identifier being locally storedWearable device D is calculated0For with
The factor that intelligent terminal P is authenticated；The factor includes:S01、S02；Wherein,
By concatenated messageIntelligent terminal P is returned to as response, other wearable devices { DiCarry out with
Wearable device D0Identical operation；
Step 3: when intelligent terminal P receives concatenated messageAfterwards, intelligent terminal P utilizes the Chebyshev extended
Multinomial ΓαIt is calculated
Intelligent terminal P is utilizedIt is calculatedS ' is obtained by carrying out Hash calculation to it01, compare the S for receiving and obtaining01
Consistency, realize to wearable device D0The verifying of identity reality；If two values are equal, intelligent terminal P thinks can
Wearable device D0It is a legitimate device, agreement continues, and intelligent terminal P passes through calculatingS02It obtainsOtherwise agreement terminates；
Wherein,
Intelligent terminal P, which chooses, intends shared part temporary data setIt is calculatedMeter
It obtainsAnd it willIt is sent to wearable device D0；
For other wearable devices { DiThe concatenated message that sends overIntelligent terminal P executes it identical
Operation, complete to other wearable devices { DiAuthentication；
Step 4: wearable device D0The numerical value being locally stored is extracted, is calculatedIt whether there is by comparing
The numerical value that is locally stored withNumerical value it is equal, realize verifying to intelligent terminal P identity reality；If two
A numerical value is equal, wearable device D0Think that intelligent terminal P is a legal equipment, completes the authentication to P；It is wearable
Equipment D0Extract user dataIt is sent to intelligent terminal P, calculates its minimum hash
Other wearable devices { DiAnd wearable device D0Carry out identical operation complete to the authentication of intelligent terminal P and
DataTransmission；
Step 5: intelligent terminal P calculates received wearable device D0The data sended overWithJaccard similarity factor, and by similarity factor be higher than pre-set threshold one group of data be marked, be used for
The data mining in later period.
4. the intelligent terminal cut-in method according to claim 3 based on similarity mode, which is characterized in that in step 1,
The temporary data set isWherein,
……
In formula, " # " is a kind of additional character, for dividing and definingWithData field.
5. the intelligent terminal cut-in method according to claim 3 based on similarity mode, which is characterized in that in step 2,
The public keyWithWherein p is big prime number；The Chebyshev of extension is more
Item formula Γl(x) (x ∈ (- ∞, ∞), l ∈ N*) it is defined as follows:
Γ0(x)=1,
Γ1(x)=x,
Γl(x)=2x Γl-1(x)-Γl-2(x), x >=2.
6. the intelligent terminal cut-in method according to claim 3 based on similarity mode, which is characterized in that in step 3,
Utilize the Chebyshev polynomials Γ of extensionαIt is calculated
According toTheoreticallyIt is equal toSpecific calculating process is as follows:
7. the intelligent terminal cut-in method according to claim 3 based on similarity mode, which is characterized in that in step 5,
For sensitive data collectionWithJaccard and like coefficientIt is defined as follows:
8. the intelligent terminal cut-in method according to claim 3 based on similarity mode, which is characterized in that in step 5,
For multiple wearable device D0{ D1, D2..., Dn, Jaccard similarity factorIt is defined as follows:
9. the intelligent terminal cut-in method according to claim 1 based on similarity mode, which is characterized in that intelligent terminal
P is according to the actual situation, selective by local partial data collection and one group of wearable device { DiShared, avoid data set
Whole leakages；For wearable device D0With other wearable devices { DiSensitive data, wearable device D0First calculate it
Minimum hash, then intelligent terminal P calculates its data similarity factor by its minimum hash, finds wherein similitude and difference
The opposite sex facilitates its further data mining, while also avoiding the leaking data of wearable device.
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