CN110188137B - Integrity-based block chain consensus mechanism - Google Patents
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Abstract
The invention discloses a block chain consensus mechanism based on integrity. The invention comprises five modules, namely a credit value checking module, a dynamic deposit calculation module, a deposit payment checking module, a reward and sanction checking module and an exit set and deposit redemption checking module; when a node wants to join a consensus set, firstly, a dynamic deposit calculation module calculates a deposit to be paid by the node through the verification of an integrity value verification module, and a deposit payment verification module supervises the payment of the deposit; in the working process of the node, the behavior of the node is supervised and controlled by a reward and sanction checking module, and the module can reward or sanction the behavior of the node; when the node withdraws from the consensus set voluntarily, the withdrawal set and the guarantee fund redemption check module issues the remuneration and the guarantee fund of the node. The invention improves the defect of high power resource consumption of the original mechanism, maximizes the work done by people, avoids waste to the maximum extent and greatly improves the safety.
Description
Technical Field
The invention relates to the technical field of block chains, in particular to an honest-based block chain consensus mechanism.
Background
The block chain is a decentralized distributed account book system, and the account book is formed by linking blocks containing a plurality of transaction records through hash values. Accounts maintained by each node of the distributed system need to be guaranteed to be consistent, so that a rule is needed to realize state replication among the nodes in the system. The state copy is realized by executing the same command sequence on the basis of the same state, and the consistency of data is ensured. The command sequence in the block chain is the transaction sequence, and the face transaction sequence exists in the block, so that each node in the block chain realizes state copy, i.e. all nodes achieve consensus on the next block added in the chain, and the algorithm for achieving consensus on the blocks is called a block chain consensus mechanism.
The consensus mechanisms that are widely adopted at present include workload Proof (POW), equity Proof (POS), delegation equity proof (DPOS), proof of importance (POI), Practical Byzantine Fault Tolerance (PBFT), and authorized byzantine fault tolerance (DBFT), among others.
Wherein, 1, POW (proof of work) proves that the accounting right is competed by solving the problem of mathematics. The stronger the computing power of the node is, the more possible the mathematical problem is solved firstly, so as to obtain the accounting right; 2. P0S (ProofStake), right-of-interest proof, the node through rights-of-interest competition accounting rights held by the rights-of-interest person, right-of-interest is embodied as the share of the held token, the more tokens held, the more likely it is to obtain accounting rights; 3. DPOS (delayed Proof of stamp), trusting the rights and interests, the rights and interests use the way of voting to select a part of nodes as the candidate bookkeeper, the candidate bookkeeper nodes are booked in turn; 4. P0I (Proofof opportunity) Importance proves that the Importance of the node is calculated according to the rights and interests held by the node, the number of transactions and the amount of money, and the higher the Importance is, the more possible the accounting right is obtained; 5. PBFT (practical Byzantine Fault tolerance), adopting permission voting and few obedients to elect a leader for bookkeeping, and successfully bookkeeping when the number of nodes is less than (N-1)/3 in a reverse mode; 6. DBFT (deleted Byzantine Fault Tolerance), authorizing Byzantine Fault tolerance, voting for authorized users to select one node as candidate bookkeeping person, and realizing consensus among the candidate bookkeeping persons through a practical Byzantine Fault tolerance algorithm.
However, the above algorithms have the disadvantages that POW consumes a large amount of computing resources, which is a significant disadvantage; P0I considers the importance of the account while considering the rights, but the importance is only reflected by the use of the system rather than the contribution, PBFT is not suitable for the situation that nodes join and exit dynamically, so the applicability is limited, DPOS and DBFT based on delegation or authorization are established on the basis of the active participation of a voter, and the precondition is often not satisfied.
In the process of achieving consensus, the effort is not to have a node with great calculation power, because the node can be faked; nor are the winners who already own many properties; but are honest nodes that are active in the system, trying to contribute to the blockchain, because of their help, to achieve a good consensus. The existing consensus mechanism does not provide a good accounting mechanism, and can not carry out screening, excitation and punishment on nodes.
Disclosure of Invention
The invention aims to provide a block chain consensus mechanism for node fair competition.
The invention comprises five modules, namely a credit value checking module, a dynamic deposit calculation module, a deposit payment checking module, a reward and sanction checking module and an exit set and deposit redemption checking module;
when the node wants to join the consensus set, firstly, the dynamic deposit calculation module calculates the deposit to be paid by the node through the verification of the integrity value verification module, and the deposit payment verification module supervises the payment of the deposit. During the operation of the node, the behavior of the node is supervised and controlled by a reward and sanction checking module, and the module can reward or sanction the behavior of the node. When the node withdraws from the consensus set voluntarily, the withdrawal set and the guarantee fund redemption check module issues the remuneration and the guarantee fund of the node.
A integrity value checking module;
if one node wants to join the consensus set and becomes one of the consensus nodes, the other nodes are required to carry out integrity value check, if the integrity value of the node is found to be lower than the requirement of the consensus threshold, the request of the node is ignored and discarded, and if the integrity value of the node is higher than the requirement of the consensus threshold, the node is added into the consensus set.
A dynamic deposit calculation module;
when the node joins the consensus set, the node also needs to submit the dynamic deposit to restrict illegal operation in the consensus set. Because one attack on the block chain, which is a rogue node, is often time-consuming and beneficial. If less benefit is obtained than the benefit of accepting the penalty loss, then no one can initiate an attack on the blockchain. The dynamic security fund is set, so that the malicious nodes with low cost can be prevented to a certain extent.
The dynamic guarantee fund is dynamic, the number of the dynamic guarantee fund is not separated from the number of the nodes participating in the consensus at present, and the size of the current dynamic guarantee fund is calculated by adopting a linear algorithm based on the number of the participating nodes, so that the size of the dynamic guarantee fund and the number of the nodes participating in the consensus at present meet a basic linear increasing relationship.
Dynamic assurance gold Deposit formula:
wherein, maxDeposit is the maximum guarantee, maxSize is the maximum number of participating nodes, and size represents the current number of participating nodes;
the relative in and out operation of any node to the consensus set is strictly supervised by other nodes.
The deposit payment verification module:
the receiver of the deposit is that the deposit in the platform receives the intelligent contract script, and other nodes not only need to carry out deposit payment verification on the request node, but also need to carry out verification on the intelligent contract script so as to ensure the high safety of the link. When the payment verification of the deposit and the verification of the intelligent contract script are qualified, the node normally works subsequently; otherwise, the node can not work normally until the node submits the intelligent contract script and the guarantee fund which meet the requirements;
the reward and sanction checking module: one node a reports to another node B and node a needs to provide cryptographic evidence or other verification consensus for the nodes, otherwise the reporting of node a will not be accepted by all nodes until node a again provides cryptographic evidence or other verification consensus for the nodes.
Firstly, discovering that honest nodes serving as the malignant nodes can be rewarded by the intelligent contract script; if the report is not established, the node A is judged to be the malignant node and is exercised with penalty sanction.
Description of the drawings: the cryptographic evidence is a digital signature of the node B and is used for confirming the identity of the rogue node and tracking and sanctioning the rogue node. Digital signature is a method for authenticating digital information by using the technology in the field of public key encryption, and can be used for verifying the identity of a signer, so that when A provides the digital signature of node B, it can be confirmed that node B is the reported person.
When each time round rolls out the block, the node checks other nodes, and when the node checking result is found to be inconsistent with the result displayed by the node, the node is submitted to report. When the node A reports the node B, the rest nodes can redo the work of the node B and compare with the submitted result, and the verification consensus is the result.
If the results are the same, the report of the node A fails, the node A is judged as a malicious node, and the node A is sanctioned; if the result is different, the node B is judged as a malignant node, and sanction is carried out on the node B. The nodes that work seriously and the nodes that submit the correct reports are honest nodes.
The penalty sanctions include in detail: 1. the node does not produce blocks in the self block producing time period, deducts a certain integrity value and degrades from the consensus node to a common node; 2. the ordinary node broadcasts the block arbitrarily, deducts the integrity value and discards the broadcasted block; 3. packing the data in the non-data pool into a block, and degrading the data into a common node without receiving a guarantee fee; 4. broadcasting a plurality of blocks in the self block-out time period, and adding the block-out node into an integrity blacklist without receiving a guarantee fee; 5. packing the honeysuckle transaction into a block, adding the non-payment guarantee fee and the block-out node into an integrity blacklist; 6. and the node tries to branch the block chain, attacks the block chain, and adds the out-block node into the integrity blacklist without receiving the guarantee fund.
The double-flower transaction refers to the condition that a digital asset is reused, and as a non-third-party platform, the double-flower transaction needs to be ensured not to occur.
In a punishment mechanism, the first three nodes do not belong to serious violation, the nodes are violation nodes, and punishment is not too heavy; the last three are serious violations, and these nodes are considered as bad nodes and will be subjected to severe sanctions.
The content of sanctions comprises a common identification set and a deduction guarantee fund, and information is listed in a blacklist and cannot be added into the common identification set again.
Exit aggregate and margin redemption check module: to prevent the occurrence of a wanting situation, strict checks are required to check the node out of the consensus set and redeem the deposit. Strict checking refers to the checking by the system and other nodes of all the efforts submitted by the node. And when the node voluntarily exits the set, recording the integrity value of the node, calculating the reward and returning the guarantee fund.
The invention has the following beneficial effects:
PoH, a brand-new consensus mechanism is provided, the defect of high power resource consumption of the original mechanism is improved, the work done by people is improved to the maximum, the waste is avoided to the maximum extent, and the number of output blocks is greatly increased in the same time; the safety verification concept of the nodes is put forward for the first time, and the safety is greatly improved. The purpose of recording and storing information as a block is achieved, so that the function of the block chain is more definite and practical.
Drawings
FIG. 1 is a schematic view of the present invention.
Detailed Description
In view of the defects in the prior art, aiming at the situation that the existing consensus mechanism does not consider the differentiation, the reward and the punishment of the nodes, the invention provides a credit-based blockchain consensus mechanism (Proof of honocity, POH) which enables the nodes to compete for the accounting right through the credit value of the nodes and restricts and manages the behavior of the nodes in work.
As shown in the table 1 below, the following examples,
TABLE 1
Claims (1)
1. An integrity-based blockchain consensus system, comprising:
the system comprises five modules, namely an integrity value checking module, a dynamic deposit calculation module, a deposit payment checking module, a reward and sanction checking module and an exit set and deposit redemption checking module; when a node wants to join a consensus set, firstly, a dynamic deposit calculation module calculates a deposit to be paid by the node through the verification of an integrity value verification module, and a deposit payment verification module supervises the payment of the deposit; in the working process of the node, the behavior of the node is supervised and controlled by a reward and sanction checking module, and the module can reward or sanction the behavior of the node; when the node withdraws from the consensus set voluntarily, the withdrawal set and the guarantee fund redemption check module issues the remuneration and the guarantee fund of the node;
the integrity value checking module is specifically as follows:
if one node wants to join the consensus set and becomes one of the consensus nodes, the integrity value of other nodes is required to be checked, if the integrity value is found to be lower than the requirement of the consensus threshold, the request of the node is ignored and discarded, and if the integrity value is higher than the requirement of the consensus threshold, the node is added into the consensus set;
the dynamic deposit calculation module specifically comprises the following components:
when the node is added into the consensus set, the node also needs to submit dynamic guarantee funds to restrict illegal operation of the node in the consensus set; the dynamic security fund is set to prevent the malicious nodes with low cost; the dynamic security fund is dynamic, the number of the dynamic security fund is not different from the number of the nodes participating in consensus at present, and the size of the dynamic security fund is calculated by adopting a linear algorithm based on the number of the participating nodes, so that the size of the dynamic security fund and the number of the nodes participating in consensus at present meet a relationship of basic linear increase;
dynamic assurance gold Deposit formula:
wherein, maxDeposit is the maximum guarantee, maxSize is the maximum number of participating nodes, and size represents the current number of participating nodes;
the related access operation of any node to the consensus set is strictly supervised by other nodes;
the module for payment and verification of the deposit is as follows:
the receiver of the deposit is that the deposit in the platform receives the intelligent contract script, and other nodes not only need to carry out deposit payment verification on the request node, but also need to carry out verification on the intelligent contract script so as to ensure the high safety of the link; when the payment verification of the deposit and the verification of the intelligent contract script are qualified, the node normally works subsequently; otherwise, the node can not work normally until the node submits the intelligent contract script and the guarantee fund which meet the requirements;
the reward and sanction checking module is as follows:
one node A reports to another node B, the node A needs to provide cryptology evidence or other node verification consensus, otherwise, the report of the node A cannot be accepted by all the nodes until the node A provides the cryptology evidence or other node verification consensus again;
firstly, discovering that honest nodes serving as the malignant nodes can be rewarded by the intelligent contract script; if the report is not established, the node A is judged as the malignant node and is executed with penalty sanction;
the withdrawing set and the guarantee fund redemption checking module comprises the following specific steps:
in order to prevent the occurrence of the wanting situation, strict verification is required when the node exits the consensus set and redeems the deposit; strict verification refers to the verification of all achievements submitted by the node by the system and other nodes; when the node voluntarily exits the set, recording the integrity value of the node, calculating a reward and returning a guarantee fund;
the cryptographic evidence is a digital signature of the node B and is used for confirming the identity of the rogue node and tracking and sanctioning the rogue node; the digital signature is a method for identifying digital information by the technology in the field of public key encryption, and can be used for verifying the identity of a signatory, so that after A provides the digital signature of node B, the node B can be confirmed to be a reported person;
when each time wheel rolls out a block, the node checks other nodes, and when the node checking result is found to be inconsistent with the result displayed by the node, the node is submitted to report; when the node A reports the node B, the rest nodes can redo the work of the node B and compare with the submitted result, namely the verification consensus;
if the results are the same, the report of the node A fails, the node A is judged as a malicious node, and the node A is sanctioned; if the results are different, the node B is judged to be a malignant node, and the node B is sanctioned; the nodes which work seriously and the nodes which submit the correct report are honest nodes;
the penalty sanctions include in detail: 1. the node does not produce blocks in the self block producing time period, deducts a certain integrity value and degrades from the consensus node to a common node; 2. the ordinary node broadcasts the block arbitrarily, deducts the integrity value and discards the broadcasted block; 3. packing the data in the non-data pool into a block, and degrading the data into a common node without receiving a guarantee fee; 4. broadcasting a plurality of blocks in the self block-out time period, and adding the block-out node into an integrity blacklist without receiving a guarantee fee; 5. packing the honeysuckle transaction into a block, adding the non-payment guarantee fee and the block-out node into an integrity blacklist; 6. and the node tries to branch the block chain, attacks the block chain, and adds the out-block node into the integrity blacklist without receiving the guarantee fund.
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| CN110610421B (en) * | 2019-09-03 | 2022-03-25 | 北京航空航天大学 | Guarantee fund management method and device under fragment framework |
| CN110752925B (en) * | 2019-10-31 | 2021-12-03 | 电子科技大学 | Improved PBFT consensus method suitable for Internet of things equipment management |
| CN111062730B (en) * | 2019-12-17 | 2023-08-18 | 浙江大学 | Pork information management method and system based on Internet of things and blockchain |
| CN111899094B (en) * | 2020-05-12 | 2024-06-11 | 成都梦马行远科技有限公司 | Block chain consensus method and system based on node credit scoring and pre-crossing loyalty |
| CN111654492B (en) * | 2020-06-01 | 2022-04-26 | 中国联合网络通信集团有限公司 | Method and device for preventing block chain attack |
| CN112101939A (en) * | 2020-09-14 | 2020-12-18 | 邢文超 | Node management method and system based on block chain |
| CN113222593B (en) * | 2021-03-24 | 2024-03-15 | 贵州大学 | Authorized big data transaction scheme based on intelligent contract and digital watermark |
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