CN110119624A - A kind of security measure method - Google Patents
A kind of security measure method Download PDFInfo
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- CN110119624A CN110119624A CN201811090648.7A CN201811090648A CN110119624A CN 110119624 A CN110119624 A CN 110119624A CN 201811090648 A CN201811090648 A CN 201811090648A CN 110119624 A CN110119624 A CN 110119624A
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- JBWKIWSBJXDJDT-UHFFFAOYSA-N triphenylmethyl chloride Chemical compound C=1C=CC=CC=1C(C=1C=CC=CC=1)(Cl)C1=CC=CC=C1 JBWKIWSBJXDJDT-UHFFFAOYSA-N 0.000 claims abstract description 73
- 238000005259 measurement Methods 0.000 claims abstract description 30
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- 230000002452 interceptive effect Effects 0.000 description 2
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Classifications
-
- G—PHYSICS
- G06—COMPUTING; CALCULATING OR COUNTING
- G06F—ELECTRIC DIGITAL DATA PROCESSING
- G06F21/00—Security arrangements for protecting computers, components thereof, programs or data against unauthorised activity
- G06F21/50—Monitoring users, programs or devices to maintain the integrity of platforms, e.g. of processors, firmware or operating systems
- G06F21/57—Certifying or maintaining trusted computer platforms, e.g. secure boots or power-downs, version controls, system software checks, secure updates or assessing vulnerabilities
Abstract
The invention discloses a kind of security measure methods, it is combined including terminal device with the reliable computing technology of independent research, increase credible node metric in the motherboard, active safety measurement is carried out to chip firmware each in equipment and peripheral hardware by TPCM after device power, TPCM completes user identity identification and carries out security measure to BOOTLOADER after active safety is measured, equipment operates normally after measurement terminates, equipment can be enabled just to construct chain-of-trust using TPCM since powering on according to the technical solution of the present invention, guarantee safety when equipment operation and credible.
Description
Technical field
The present invention relates to information security fields, and in particular to a kind of security measure method.
Background technique
Trust computing is as one new developing direction of information security field by more and more companies and research institution
Pay attention to.The main target of credible accounting system is the calculating environment for constructing a user and being expected, to guarantee computing resource
It will not be maliciously tampered, steal.
The concept of trust computing has also obtained being widely recognized as and promoting for government, army, enterprise etc. at present.By many years
Other countries have been led in development, the research of domestic trust computing theory and technology, and having developed to has active control, active
3.0 epoch of trust computing of measurement.Trust computing 3.0 it is main innovation one of be to realize active metric function, TPCM exists
Central processing unit carries out integrity measurement, verification to firmware before running firmware code, it is ensured that firmware is not tampered with.TPCM mould
Agllutination, which closes TCM module, may be implemented the password support function to trusted software base.Product is ensured by TPCM in the motherboard
Safety will have practical use and profound significance.
The TPCM card of PCIE interface has the characteristics that hardware cost is high, and needs mainboard to provide individual PCIE slot and come
It supports, there is certain requirement to the space of equipment, interface.
It is common in such a way that cable connects main board power supply relative to other, dedicated power cable is utilized in the design
It powers first to TPCM, thereby may be ensured that TPCM is first powered up when booting.In contrast more to the compatibility of mainboard
Height, the stability of equipment are more preferable.
And current technology only highlights in start-up course and starts generation to cores such as equipment BMC, BIOS (or PNOR)
Code chip measurement, verification, to the peripheral apparatus such as PCIE lack should not monitoring.It does not support to recognize in the identity of firmware level yet
Card.
Summary of the invention
Based on the above-mentioned problems in the prior art, it is necessary to propose a kind of security measure method, pass through dedicated confession
Electric mode enables TPCM preferentially power in equipment starting, and the degree of safety to peripheral equipment is completed in the start-up course of equipment
Amount, thus based on the chain-of-trust based on TPCM is constructed.
A kind of security measure method, it is improved in that including the following steps:
The measurement to equipment firmware is completed by credible platform control module TPCM after device power, user identity is known
Not, to the security measure of BOOTLOADER, the security measure to OS LOADER and the security measure to OS KERNEL；
Be in response to above-mentioned measurement results it is normal, when the operating system of equipment is in normal operating condition, TPCM pairs
Operating system carries out real-time metrics, if measurement results are abnormal, equipment shutdown；Equipment enters just if being normally if measurement results
Normal working condition.
The metric operations call TCM to complete by the TPCM module in main control chip, and interval is completed at predetermined time intervals
To the security metrics of operating system.
After equipment enters normal operating conditions further include:
TPCM is configured by configuration interface to select one or more carry out safety degree to above-mentioned measurement item
Amount.
The invention discloses a kind of security measure method, the terminal device including X86/POWER/ARM or MIPS framework CPU
In combined with the reliable computing technology of independent research, increase credible node metric in the motherboard, pass through after device power
TPCM carries out active safety measurement to chip firmware each in equipment and peripheral hardware, and TPCM completes user after active safety is measured
Identification simultaneously carries out security measure to BOOTLOADER, and equipment operates normally after measurement terminates, technology through the invention
Since scheme can enable equipment just construct chain-of-trust using TPCM powering on, and guarantee stability and confidence level when equipment operation.
Detailed description of the invention
Fig. 1 is the motherboard circuit system block diagram in the present invention for realizing a kind of security measure method；
Fig. 2-4 is the interface communication figure in the present invention for realizing a kind of security measure method；
Fig. 5 is a kind of work flow diagram of security measure method in the embodiment of the present invention 1；
Fig. 6 is a kind of work flow diagram of security measure method in the embodiment of the present invention 2；
Fig. 7 is a kind of work flow diagram of security measure method in the embodiment of the present invention 3.
Specific embodiment
The present invention provides the implementation method and device of a kind of trust computing.To make the purpose of the present invention, technical solution and effect
Fruit is clearer, clear, and the present invention is described in more detail as follows in conjunction with drawings and embodiments.It should be appreciated that this place
Specific examples are only used to explain the present invention for description, is not intended to limit the present invention.
Description and claims of this specification and term " first ", " second ", " third " " in above-mentioned attached drawing
The (if present)s such as four " are to be used to distinguish similar objects, without being used to describe a particular order or precedence order.It should manage
The data that solution uses in this way are interchangeable under appropriate circumstances, so that the embodiments described herein can be in addition to illustrating herein
Or the sequence other than the content of description is implemented.In addition, term " includes " and " having " and their any deformation, it is intended that
Cover it is non-exclusive include, for example, containing the process, method, system, product or equipment of a series of steps or units need not limit
In step or unit those of is clearly listed, but may include be not clearly listed or for these process, methods, produce
The other step or units of product or equipment inherently.
A kind of security measure method provided by the invention can be applied to the terminal of X86/POWER/ARM or MIPS framework CPU
In equipment.
Fig. 1 is shown in the present invention for realizing a kind of motherboard circuit system block diagram of security measure method, in which:
TPCM by RST signal makes BMC be in reset state after powering on；After TPCM completion is actively measured, need to start
When BMC, RST signal is discharged.It should be noted that the default conditions of the RST signal (being controlled by GPIO) on TPCM are release
State；I.e. if the reset signal of BMC is that low level is effective, the GPIO control signal default situations that TPCM is provided are high electricity
It is flat.
TPCM accesses BMC SPI FLASH by communication bus, obtains BMC code and data.
Data interaction is carried out by communication bus between BMC and TPCM.
TPCM accesses BIOS SPI FLASH by communication bus interface, obtains bios code and data.
POWER processor realizes the communication between TPCM by PCIE interface.
TPCM is by calling TCM to realize the cryptographic functions such as storage encryption, authentication.
Fig. 2-4 is shown in the present invention for realizing a kind of interface communication figure of security measure method, including:
(1) PCIE interface:
As shown in Fig. 2, PCIE is used as PCIE device, it then follows the PCIE of standard is standardized.Host can pass through PCIE tune
With TPCM, the work such as verified, encrypted.Interface specification is PCI-e x2Gen2；Connector has reserved x8 interface, facilitates subsequent
Upgrading.PCIE communication interface between TPCM and CPU is MINI-PCIE interface.
Wherein:
VDD3.3V is input power；
PERST_N is reset signal；
REF_CLK_N and REF_CLK_P is differential clock signal；
TXD_P, TXD_N, RXD_P, RXD_N are differential data signals.
(2) USB interface:
USB is used as HOST, it then follows the USB specification of standard.It is 2A that interface, which reserves power supply capacity,.It, can by USB interface
To connect the thorough fares such as U-key extension or firmware upgrade.
(3) SPI interface:
As shown in figure 3, SPI interface is used as HOST, it then follows SPI specification.TPCM card is read by SPI interface.BMC/
BIOS (or PNOR) Flash content is measured, or carries out firmware update work.
Wherein MASTER end of the TPCM as SPI, SPI FLASH is as the end SPI SLAVE.
(4) I2C interface:
As shown in figure 4, I2C interface is communicated as Slave with BMC.Follow I2C specification.
Wherein MASTER end of the BMC as I2C, TPCM is as the end I2C SLAVE.
(5) GPIO interface:
Universal input/output interface, configuration flexibly, extend convenient for user.
Embodiment one
The present embodiment proposes a kind of security measure method, is realized by the motherboard circuit system in Fig. 1, and Fig. 5 is shown
The workflow of this method, comprising the following steps:
Step 1:TPCM is powered on and is completed to initialize.
It specifically, is that TPCM powers using power supply line dedicated on mainboard, guaranteeing equipment, TPCM is just in the standby state
It has powered.
Specifically, the standby mode refers to state when equipment has been powered on but user does not press power button also.
Specifically, if user directly presses power button progress electrifying startup after enabling equipment power-on, TPCM will
Control powers on order, again runs equipment normal boot-strap after first having executed active safety measurement to corresponding portion in equipment.
Specifically, the TPCM powers on first self-test later in advance and carries out internal initialization.Self-test, initialize successfully it
After perform the next step work；Self-test, initialization are unsuccessful, and LED is lighted according to ad hoc fashion, buzzer is according to ad hoc fashion point
It is bright to pipe, prompt have exception.
Specifically, if TPCM module is not present after electrifying startup in discovering device, prove that TPCM is maliciously moved
It removes, then will this time equipment be forbidden to start.
Step 2:TPCM calls TCM to carry out security measure to each chip firmware in equipment, when measurement results are normal
Enter step 3.
Specifically, TPCM carries out security measure and verification to the firmware in BMC FLASH, wherein TPCM passes through BMC_
RESET signal line makes BMC be in RST state, and by communication bus switching to TPCM, TPCM accesses BMC.
Specifically, after BMC starting, the movement restarted may be put at any time, at this moment needs TPCM BMC again
RESET, and measured.Reset signal will be sent to TPCM by GPIO_M0, and reset signal is triggered with rising edge；When
When TPCM output is high, BMC RESET is effective；When TPCM output is low, BMC RESET is released；When TPCM_GPIO_3 exports height
When, BMC Flash is controlled by BMC；When TPCM_GPIO_3 output is low, BMC Flash is controlled by TPCM.
Specifically, TPCM calls TCM that the data in SBE and PNOR are successively measured and verified, and measures and successfully carries out
In next step, measurement is unsuccessful, and LED is lighted according to ad hoc fashion, buzzer is lighted according to ad hoc fashion and piped, and prompts have exception.
Step 3: device power-up is restarted, and enables CPU, and CPU loads BOOTLOADER to the firmware of peripheral hardware chip on mainboard
Data are measured, and measurement results enter step 4 when being normal.
Specifically, after the completion of the security measure in step 2, to CPU, for cable order, it is in enabled state, CPU load
Then BOOTLOADER enables TPCM that TCM is called to measure and verify the FLASH data in BOOTLOADER chip, measure
The measurement to peripheral hardware chip firmware data on mainboard in next step is carried out after success；Unsuccessful then LED is measured according to ad hoc fashion point
Bright, buzzer is lighted according to ad hoc fashion and is piped, and prompts have exception.
Specifically, when the measurement of BOOTLOADER core in-chip FLASH data and check results are normal, CPU runs institute
BOOTLOADER is stated, BOOTLOADER calls TCM chip by TPCM, successively to the Oprom chip of peripheral hardware each on mainboard
Firmware data is measured, is verified, measured one carry out again it is next, until all measurement, verification after the completion of carry out it is next
Step, measure it is unsuccessful, LED is lighted according to ad hoc fashion, buzzer lighted according to ad hoc fashion pipe, interactive interface can be shown
Show, prompts have exception.
Step 4: equipment enters normal operating conditions.
A kind of security measure method is present embodiments provided, the terminal including X86/POWER/ARM or MIPS framework CPU is set
It is combined in standby with the reliable computing technology of independent research, increases credible node metric in the motherboard, led to after device power
It crosses TPCM and active safety measurement is carried out to chip firmware each in equipment and peripheral hardware, TPCM completes to use after active safety is measured
Family identification simultaneously carries out security measure to BOOTLOADER, and equipment operates normally after measurement terminates, skill through the invention
Since art scheme can enable equipment just construct chain-of-trust using TPCM powering on, and guarantee stability and confidence level when equipment operation.
Embodiment two
The present embodiment provides another security measure methods.
Its with one technical solution of embodiment the difference is that:
It is TPCM power supply using the standby voltage of PCIE on mainboard, guarantees that TPCM has just been supplied equipment in the standby state
Electricity.
As shown in fig. 6, further including following safety after TPCM completes the security measure operation in one step 3 of embodiment
Metrology step:
Step 3.1:CPU loads OS LOADER；
Specifically, TPCM calls TCM to be measured, verified to OS LOADER, measures successfully then CPU and runs OS LOADER
And enter step 3.2；Measure unsuccessful, LED is lighted according to ad hoc fashion, buzzer is lighted according to ad hoc fashion and pipes, interacts
The mode of interface display has prompted exception.
Step 3.2:CPU loads OS KERNEL；
Specifically, TPCM call TCM OS KERNEL is measured, is verified, measure successfully then CPU operation OSKERNEL,
Load document system simultaneously enables equipment enter normal operating conditions；Measure unsuccessful, LED lights according to ad hoc fashion, buzzer by
Lighted according to ad hoc fashion pipe, the mode that interactive interface is shown has prompted exception.
The technical solution provided through this embodiment is using TPCM successively to the firmware in equipment, BOOTLOADER, periphery
Firmware, OS LOADER and OS KERNEL in equipment carry out security measure, and equipment can be enabled just to utilize TPCM since powering on
Chain-of-trust is constructed, guarantees stability and confidence level when equipment operation.
Embodiment three
The present embodiment provides another more preferably a kind of security measure method, flow chart is as shown in Figure 7.
Step 3.3: after equipment completes the security measure to OS LOADER and OS KERNEL, i.e., as the behaviour of equipment
When making system and being in normal operating condition, TPCM carries out real-time metrics to operating system, if measurement results be it is abnormal, equipment is closed
Machine.
Specifically, the metric operations call TCM to complete by the TPCM module in main control chip, at predetermined time intervals between
Every completion to the security metrics of operating system.
Step 3.4: after equipment enters normal operating condition, TPCM can be configured to select by configuration interface
To one or more carry out security metrics of above-mentioned measurement item.
A kind of security measure method is present embodiments provided, the terminal including X86/POWER/ARM or MIPS framework CPU is set
It is combined in standby with the reliable computing technology of independent research, increases credible node metric in the motherboard, led to after device power
It crosses TPCM and active safety measurement is carried out to chip firmware each in equipment and peripheral hardware, TPCM completes to use after active safety is measured
Family identification simultaneously carries out security measure to BOOTLOADER, when measurement results are normal, using TPCM in equipment
Firmware, OS LOADER and OS KERNEL in BOOTLOADER, peripheral equipment carry out security measure, and in real time in operation
Operating system carry out security measure, equipment can be enabled just to construct using TPCM since powering on according to the technical solution of the present invention can
Believe chain, the risk point in timely discovering device, and makes a response rapidly.
In several embodiments provided by the present invention, it should be understood that disclosed method and terminal can pass through it
Its mode is realized.For example, the apparatus embodiments described above are merely exemplary, for example, the division of the module, only
Only a kind of logical function partition, there may be another division manner in actual implementation.
In addition, the technical solution in above-mentioned several embodiments can be combined with each other and replace in the case where not conflicting
It changes.
The module as illustrated by the separation member may or may not be physically separated, aobvious as module
The component shown may or may not be physical unit, it can and it is in one place, or may be distributed over multiple
In network unit.Some or all of the modules therein can be selected to realize the mesh of this embodiment scheme according to the actual needs
's.
It, can also be in addition, each functional module in each embodiment of the present invention can integrate in one processing unit
It is that each unit physically exists alone, can also be integrated in one unit with two or more units.Above-mentioned integrated list
Member both can take the form of hardware realization, can also realize in the form of hardware adds software function module.
It is obvious to a person skilled in the art that invention is not limited to the details of the above exemplary embodiments, Er Qie
In the case where without departing substantially from spirit or essential attributes of the invention, the present invention can be realized in other specific forms.Therefore, no matter
From the point of view of which point, the present embodiments are to be considered as illustrative and not restrictive, and the scope of the present invention is by appended power
Benefit requires rather than above description limits, it is intended that all by what is fallen within the meaning and scope of the equivalent elements of the claims
Variation is included in the present invention.Any attached associated diagram label in claim should not be considered as right involved in limitation to want
It asks.Furthermore, it is to be understood that one word of " comprising " does not exclude other units or steps, odd number is not excluded for plural number.It is stated in system claims
Multiple modules or device can also be implemented through software or hardware by a module or device.The first, the second equal words
It is used to indicate names, and does not indicate any particular order.
Finally it should be noted that the above examples are only used to illustrate the technical scheme of the present invention and are not limiting, although reference
Preferred embodiment describes the invention in detail, those skilled in the art should understand that, it can be to of the invention
Technical solution is modified or equivalent replacement, without departing from the spirit and scope of the technical solution of the present invention.
Claims (3)
1. a kind of security measure method, which comprises the steps of:
After device power by credible platform control module TPCM complete to the measurement of equipment firmware, user identity identification,
Security measure to BOOTLOADER, the security measure to OS LOADER and the security measure to OS KERNEL；
It is normally that, when the operating system of equipment is in normal operating condition, TPCM is to operation in response to above-mentioned measurement results
System carries out real-time metrics, if measurement results are abnormal, equipment shutdown；Equipment enters normal work if being normally if measurement results
Make state.
2. the method as described in claim 1, which is characterized in that further include:
The metric operations call TCM to complete by the TPCM module in main control chip, and interval is completed to behaviour at predetermined time intervals
Make the security metrics of system.
3. method according to claim 2, which is characterized in that after equipment enters normal operating conditions further include:
TPCM is configured by configuration interface to select one or more carry out security metrics to above-mentioned measurement item.
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| CN201810119481 | 2018-02-06 | ||
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Cited By (1)
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