CN110086628B - Elliptic curve signature method under single-source network coding environment - Google Patents
Elliptic curve signature method under single-source network coding environment Download PDFInfo
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- H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
- H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
- H04L9/00—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols
- H04L9/32—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols including means for verifying the identity or authority of a user of the system or for message authentication, e.g. authorization, entity authentication, data integrity or data verification, non-repudiation, key authentication or verification of credentials
- H04L9/3247—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols including means for verifying the identity or authority of a user of the system or for message authentication, e.g. authorization, entity authentication, data integrity or data verification, non-repudiation, key authentication or verification of credentials involving digital signatures
- H04L9/3252—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols including means for verifying the identity or authority of a user of the system or for message authentication, e.g. authorization, entity authentication, data integrity or data verification, non-repudiation, key authentication or verification of credentials involving digital signatures using DSA or related signature schemes, e.g. elliptic based signatures, ElGamal or Schnorr schemes
Abstract
A method for elliptic curve signature under single-source network coding environment comprises the steps of system initialization, generation of a single-source network coding key pair, determination of a hash value of a message, elliptic curve signature of a source node, message combination, elliptic curve signature of an intermediate node and signature verification. The invention adopts elliptic curve signature and homomorphic hash function, simplifies the verification process of the intermediate node, reduces the calculation complexity, reduces the energy consumption, resists the pollution in generations, and simultaneously introduces the generation identifier to effectively resist the pollution between generations. The invention has the advantages of strong safety, high calculation efficiency and the like, and can be popularized and applied in single-source network coding.
Description
Technical Field
The invention belongs to the technical field of network information security, and particularly relates to an elliptic curve signature method and a homomorphic hash function in single-source network coding and cryptography.
Background
In a conventional communication network, intermediate nodes of the network can only forward incoming data packets without any processing of the data content. By adopting the network coding, not only can the network resources be greatly saved, but also the network transmission rate, the throughput and the reliability can be improved, and the energy consumption can be reduced. The method has great advantages in improving the comprehensive performance of the network, but brings a plurality of pollution threats. The system is polluted by the pollution of nodes or unstable network communication transmission and the like. The pollution information is combined with other effective messages through coding transmission, so that pollution is transmitted to other messages, and finally, a communication system is crashed to prevent a sink node from recovering original information. These insecurity factors greatly limit the application range of network coding, and prevent the application of the network coding in real life.
The traditional elliptic curve digital signature method can not resist the pollution in generations and the pollution between generations, the problem that the elliptic curve signature method in the single-source network coding environment is not adopted to resist the pollution in generations and the pollution between generations at present, and how to construct the elliptic curve homomorphic signature in the single-source network coding environment is a technical problem which needs to be urgently solved in the cryptology at present.
Disclosure of Invention
The technical problem to be solved by the present invention is to overcome the above drawbacks of the prior art, and to provide a method for elliptic curve signature in a single-source network coding environment, which has strong security and high computational efficiency, and can resist intra-generation pollution and inter-generation pollution.
The technical scheme adopted for solving the technical problems comprises the following steps:
A. system initialization
(A1) Trusted party defines a finite field FqUpper elliptic curve E:
y2≡x3+ax+b
wherein a, b ∈ FqQ is a large prime number in a finite positive integer satisfying 4a3+27b2Constant not equal to 0.
(A2) The trusted party sends an identifier I of the generation in the appointed single-source network code to the source node of the single-source network code through a secret channel:
I={I1,I2,…,In}
where n is a finite positive integer.
(A3) Selection of cryptographically secure Hash function H by trusted partyG:
{0,1}*→G1
Wherein G is1Is a group of addition cycles of order large prime d.
(A4) The trusted party selects a, a e (1,2, t), determining a private key S of a generation in the single-source network codingSKPrivate key K of elliptic curve signature, public key P of elliptic curve signature:
SSK=α·HG(I)
K=η·SSK
P=K·G
wherein eta is an secret random number selected by a trusted authority, G is a base point on an elliptic curve E, and HG(I) Is a hash value of the generation identity.
(A5) The trusted party selects a cryptographically secure Hash function h as:
{0,1}*→Zq
wherein Zq∈{1,2,...,q}。
(A6) The trusted party discloses a system parameter z:
z=(E,Fq,G,q,t,h,P,HG)
where t is the order of the trustable chosen base point G and is a prime number in the finite positive integer.
B. Generating a private key K for a single-source network code0And a public key P0
(B1) Determining a private key K of a source node of a single source network coding0And a public key P0:
K0=η0·SSK
P0=K0·G
Wherein eta0E {1, 2.. eta., t } is a secret random number chosen by the trusted party, t being a finite positive integer.
(B2) Determining a private key K of an intermediate node of a single-source network codeidAnd a public key Pid:
Kid=ηid·SSK
Pid=Kid·G
Wherein etaidIs 1, 2.. t, a secret random number chosen for the trusted party, id is 1, 2.. e, e is the number of intermediate nodes.
C. Determining hash value of message
Cancellation generated by source nodeThe message M is divided into M modules M1,M2,...,MmEach module is an n-dimensional vector, represented as:
expanding all modules into a vector V with m + n dimensionsi:
Vi=(vi,1,vi,2,...,vi,m+n)
Where i ∈ {1,2, …, m }, a message vector V is determinediHash function value of (1):
wherein R isjA set of base point sets on the elliptic curve is randomly selected for the source node and the order is t.
D. Elliptic curve signature on source node of single-source network coding
(D1) Credible side randomly selects K'0E {1,2, …, t }, determining X0:
X0=h(Vi,K′0)·G
In the formula X0Is a point (x) on the elliptic curve0,y0)。
(D2) Determining r of a source node0,S0:
r0=x0modt
S0=(h(Vi,K′0)+r0-h(Vi)K0)modt
(D3) Determining a signature σ of a source node0:
σ0=(r0,S0,HG(I))
(D4) Vector V of messagesiHash value h (V) of messagei) Message signature σ0And sending the data to an intermediate node or a sink node of the single-source network coding.
E. Message assembly
(E1) The intermediate node of the single source network coding combines the messages into:
where a is the global coding vector of the message, a ═ a1,a2,...,am) And i is a finite positive integer.
(E2) Determining a hash function value h (w) for the combined message w:
where m is a finite positive integer.
F. Elliptic curve signature on intermediate node of single-source network coding
(F1) Credible side randomly selects K'idE {1,2, …, t }, determining Xid:
Xid=h(w,K′id)·G
In the formula XidIs a point (x) on the elliptic curveid,yid)。
(F2) Determining an intermediate node rid,Sid:
rid=xidmodt
Sid=(h(w,K′id)+rid-h(w)Kid)modt
(F3) Signature σ of intermediate nodeid:
σid=(rid,Sid,H′G(I))
G. Signature verification by the receiver
(G1) Recipient verification HG(I)=H′G(I) And if the judgment result is true, the signature is accepted, and if the judgment result is true, the signature is rejected.
(G2) Determining U of receiver1,U2:
U1=(Sid-rid)modt
U2=h(w)modt
(G3) The recipient determines X:
X=U1G+U2Pid
x is a point (X ') on the elliptic curve'id,y′id)。
(G4) The recipient determines V':
V′=x′idmodt
(G5) receiver authentication V ═ ridIf the elliptic curve signature is established, the elliptic curve signature is successful; otherwise the elliptic curve signature fails.
The invention adopts elliptic curve signature and homomorphic hash function, simplifies the verification process of the intermediate node, reduces the calculation complexity, reduces the energy consumption, can resist the pollution in generations and can effectively resist the pollution between generations. The invention has the advantages of strong safety, high calculation efficiency and the like, and can be popularized and applied in single-source network coding.
Drawings
FIG. 1 is a flowchart of example 1 of the present invention.
Detailed Description
The present invention will be described in further detail with reference to the following drawings and examples, but the present invention is not limited to these examples.
Example 1
This embodiment uses an elliptic curve y2≡x3+ ax + b mod q, large prime q 1229388206666334394638158784063623508484129267643 as an example, the method for homomorphic signature of elliptic curve of single-source network coding consists of the following steps (as shown in fig. 1):
A. system initialization
(A1) Trusted party defines a finite field FqUpper elliptic curve E:
y2≡x3+ax+b
wherein a, b ∈ FqQ is a large prime number in finite positive integers, q is 1229388206666334394638158784063623508484129267643, and satisfies 4a3+27b2Constant not equal to 0.
(A2) The trusted party sends an identifier I of the generation in the appointed single-source network code to the source node of the single-source network code through a secret channel:
I={I1,I2,…,In}
where n is a finite positive integer.
(A3) Selection of cryptographically secure Hash function H by trusted partyG:
{0,1}*→G1
Wherein G is1Is a group of addition cycles of order large prime d.
(A4) The credible party selects alpha, alpha E (1, 2.. eta., t) and determines the private key S of the generation in the single-source network codingSKPrivate key K of elliptic curve signature, public key P of elliptic curve signature:
SSK=α·HG(I)
K=η·SSK
P=K·G
wherein eta is an secret random number selected by a trusted authority, G is a base point on an elliptic curve E, and HG(I) Is a hash value of the generation identity.
(A5) The trusted party selects a cryptographically secure Hash function h as:
{0,1}*→Zq
wherein Zq∈{1,2,...,1229388206666334394638158784063623508484129267643}。
(A6) The trusted party discloses a system parameter z:
z=(E,Fq,G,q,t,h,P,HG)
where t is the order of the trustable chosen base point G and is a prime number in the finite positive integer.
B. Generating a private key K for a single-source network code0And a public key P0
(B1) Determining a private key K of a source node of a single source network coding0And a public key P0:
K0=η0·SSK
P0=K0·G
Wherein eta0E {1, 2.. eta., t } is a secret random number chosen by the trusted party, t being a finite positive integer.
(B2) Determining a private key K of an intermediate node of a single-source network codeidAnd a public key Pid:
Kid=ηid·SSK
Pid=Kid·G
Wherein etaidIs 1, 2.. t, a secret random number chosen for the trusted party, id is 1, 2.. e, e is the number of intermediate nodes.
C. Determining hash value of message
The message M generated by the source node is divided into M modules M1,M2,...,MmEach module is an n-dimensional vector, represented as:
expanding all modules into a vector V with m + n dimensionsi:
Vi=(vi,1,vi,2,...,vi,m+n)
Where i ∈ {1,2, …, m }, a message vector V is determinediHash function value of (1):
wherein R isjA set of base point sets on the elliptic curve is randomly selected for the source node and the order is t.
D. Elliptic curve signature on source node of single-source network coding
(D1) Credible side randomly selects K'0E {1,2, …, t }, determining X0:
X0=h(Vi,K′0)·G
In the formula X0Is a point (x) on the elliptic curve0,y0)。
(D2) Determining r of a source node0,S0:
r0=x0modt
S0=(h(Vi,K′0)+r0-h(Vi)K0)modt
(D3) Determining a signature σ of a source node0:
σ0=(r0,S0,HG(I))
(D4) Vector V of messagesiHash value h (V) of messagei) Message signature σ0And sending the data to an intermediate node or a sink node of the single-source network coding.
E. Message assembly
(E1) The intermediate node of the single source network coding combines the messages into:
where a is the global coding vector of the message, a ═ a1,a2,...,am) And i is a finite positive integer.
(E2) Determining a hash function value h (w) for the combined message w:
where m is a finite positive integer.
F. Elliptic curve signature on intermediate node of single-source network coding
(F1) Credible side randomly selects K'idE {1,2, …, t }, determining Xid:
Xid=h(w,K′id)·G
In the formula XidIs a point (x) on the elliptic curveid,yid)。
(F2) Determining an intermediate node rid,Sid:
rid=xidmodt
Sid=(h(w,K′id)+rid-h(w)Kid)modt
(F3) Signature σ of intermediate nodeid:
σid=(rid,Sid,H′G(I))
G. Signature verification by the receiver
(G1) Recipient verification HG(I)=H′G(I) And if the judgment result is true, the signature is accepted, and if the judgment result is true, the signature is rejected.
(G2) Determining U of receiver1,U2:
U1=(Sid-rid)modt
U2=h(w)modt
(G3) The recipient determines X:
X=U1G+U2Pid
x is a point (X ') on the elliptic curve'id,y′id)。
(G4) The recipient determines V':
V′=x′idmodt
(G5) receiver authentication V ═ ridIf the elliptic curve signature is established, the elliptic curve signature is successful; otherwise the elliptic curve signature fails.
Example 2
This embodiment uses an elliptic curve y2≡x3+ ax + b mod q, large prime q 1449849246051449679173689466738734355356891578223 as an example, the method for homomorphic signature of elliptic curve of single-source network coding comprises the following steps:
A. system initialization
(A1) Trusted party defines a finite field FqUpper elliptic curve E:
y2≡x3+ax+b
wherein a, b ∈ FqQ is a large prime number in finite positive integers, q is 1449849246051449679173689466738734355356891578223, and satisfies 4a3+27b2Constant not equal to 0.
(A2) The trusted party sends an identifier I of the generation in the appointed single-source network code to the source node of the single-source network code through a secret channel:
I={I1,I2,…,In}
where n is a finite positive integer.
(A3) Selection of cryptographically secure Hash function H by trusted partyG:
{0,1}*→G1
Wherein G is1Is a group of addition cycles of order large prime d.
(A4) The credible party selects alpha, alpha E (1, 2.. eta., t) and determines the private key S of the generation in the single-source network codingSKPrivate key K of elliptic curve signature, public key P of elliptic curve signature:
SSK=α·HG(I)
K=η·SSK
P=K·G
wherein eta is an secret random number selected by a trusted authority, G is a base point on an elliptic curve E, and HG(I) Is a hash value of the generation identity.
(A5) The trusted party selects a cryptographically secure Hash function h as:
{0,1}*→Zq
wherein Zq∈{1,2,...,1449849246051449679173689466738734355356891578223}。
(A6) The trusted party discloses a system parameter z:
z=(E,Fq,G,q,t,h,P,HG)
the other steps were the same as in example 1.
Example 3
This embodiment uses an elliptic curve y2≡x3The + ax + bmdq and the large prime number q of 1366294046726635493399336680549214898319268492501 are taken as examples, and the method for homomorphic signature of the elliptic curve of the single-source network coding comprises the following steps:
A. system initialization
(A1) Trusted party defines a finite field FqUpper elliptic curve E:
y2≡x3+ax+b
wherein a, b ∈ FqQ is a large prime number in finite positive integers, q is 1366294046726635493399336680549214898319268492501, and satisfies 4a3+27b2Constant not equal to 0.
(A2) The trusted party sends an identifier I of the generation in the appointed single-source network code to the source node of the single-source network code through a secret channel:
I={I1,I2,…,In}
where n is a finite positive integer.
(A3) Selection of cryptographically secure Hash function H by trusted partyG:
{0,1}*→G1
Wherein G is1Is a group of addition cycles of order large prime d.
(A4) The credible party selects alpha, alpha E (1, 2.. eta., t) and determines the private key S of the generation in the single-source network codingSKPrivate key K of elliptic curve signature, public key P of elliptic curve signature:
SSK=α·HG(I)
K=η·SSK
P=K·G
wherein eta is an secret random number selected by a trusted authority, G is a base point on an elliptic curve E, and HG(I) Is a hash value of the generation identity.
(A5) The trusted party selects a cryptographically secure Hash function h as:
{0,1}*→Zq
wherein Zq∈{1,2,...,1366294046726635493399336680549214898319268492501}。
(A6) The trusted party discloses a system parameter z:
z=(E,Fq,G,q,t,h,P,HG)
the other steps were the same as in example 1.
Claims (1)
1. A method for elliptic curve signature under single-source network coding environment is characterized by comprising the following steps:
A. system initialization
(A1) Trusted party defines a finite field FqUpper elliptic curve E:
y2≡x3+ax+b
wherein a, b ∈ FqQ is a large prime number in a finite positive integer satisfying 4a3+27b2A constant not equal to 0;
(A2) the trusted party sends an identifier I of the generation in the appointed single-source network code to the source node of the single-source network code through a secret channel:
I={I1,I2,…,In}
wherein n is a finite positive integer;
(A3) selection of cryptographically secure Hash function H by trusted partyG:
{0,1}*→G1
Wherein G is1Is an addition cycle group of order large prime q;
(A4) selecting alpha and alpha E (1, 2.. eta., t) by the credible party, wherein t is the order of the base point G selected by the credible party and is a prime number in the finite positive integer; determining private key S of generation in single-source network codingSKPrivate key K of elliptic curve signature and public key P of elliptic curve signature:
SSK=α·HG(I)
K=η·SSK
P=K·G
wherein eta is an secret random number selected by a trusted authority, G is a base point on an elliptic curve E, and HG(I) Is a hash value of the generation identity;
(A5) the trusted party selects a cryptographically secure Hash function h as:
{0,1}*→Zq
wherein Zq∈{1,2,...,q};
(A6) The trusted party discloses a system parameter z:
z=(E,Fq,G,q,t,h,P,HG);
B. raw materialPrivate key K of single-source network coding0And a public key P0
(B1) Determining a private key K of a source node of a single source network coding0And a public key P0:
K0=η0·SSK
P0=K0·G
Wherein eta0E {1, 2.. eta., t } is a secret random number selected by a trusted party;
(B2) determining a private key K of an intermediate node of a single-source network codeidAnd a public key Pid:
Kid=ηid·SSK
Pid=Kid·G
Wherein etaidSecret random number, η, chosen for trusted partyidE (1, 2.. eta., t), id is 1, 2.. eta., e, e is the number of intermediate nodes;
C. determining hash value of message
The message M generated by the source node is divided into M modules M1,M2,...,MmEach module is an n-dimensional vector, represented as:
expanding all modules into a vector V with m + n dimensionsi:
Vi=(vi,1,vi,2,...,vi,m+n)
Where i ∈ {1,2, …, m }, a message vector V is determinediHash function value of (1):
wherein R isjRandomly selecting a group of base point sets on an elliptic curve for a source node, wherein the order is t;
D. elliptic curve signature on source node of single-source network coding
(D1) Credible side randomly selects K'0E {1,2, …, t }, determining X0:
X0=h(Vi,K′0)·G
In the formula X0Is a point (x) on the elliptic curve0,y0);
(D2) Determining r of a source node0,S0:
r0=x0modt
S0=(h(Vi,K′0)+r0-h(Vi)K0)modt
(D3) Determining a signature σ of a source node0:
σ0=(r0,S0,HG(I))
(D4) Vector V of messagesiHash value h (V) of messagei) Message signature σ0Sending the data to an intermediate node or a host node of the single-source network coding;
E. message assembly
(E1) The intermediate node of the single source network coding combines the messages into:
where a is the global coding vector of the message, a ═ a1,a2,...,am) I is a finite positive integer;
(E2) determining a hash function value h (w) for the combined message w:
wherein m is a finite positive integer;
F. elliptic curve signature on intermediate node of single-source network coding
(F1) Credible side randomly selects K'idE {1,2, …, t }, determining Xid:
Xid=h(w,K′id)·G
In the formula XidIs a point (x) on the elliptic curveid,yid);
(F2) Determining an intermediate node rid,Sid:
rid=xidmodt
Sid=(h(w,K′id)+rid-h(w)Kid)modt
(F3) Signature σ of intermediate nodeid:
σid=(rid,Sid,H′G(I))
G. Signature verification by the receiver
(G1) Recipient verification HG(I)=H′G(I) If the answer is positive, the signature is accepted, otherwise, the signature is rejected;
(G2) determining U of receiver1,U2:
U1=(Sid-rid)modt
U2=h(w)modt
(G3) The recipient determines X:
X=U1G+U2Pid
x is a point (X ') on the elliptic curve'id,y′id);
(G4) The recipient determines V':
V′=x′idmodt
(G5) receiver authentication V ═ ridIf the elliptic curve signature is established, the elliptic curve signature is successful; otherwise the elliptic curve signature fails.
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Application publication date: 20190802 Assignee: Beijing Shengbang Saiyun Technology Co.,Ltd. Assignor: XI'AN University OF POSTS & TELECOMMUNICATIONS Contract record no.: X2022980018056 Denomination of invention: Elliptic Curve Signature in Single Source Network Coding Environment Granted publication date: 20220225 License type: Common License Record date: 20221012 |