CN109905247A - Digital signature method, device, equipment and storage medium based on block chain - Google Patents
Digital signature method, device, equipment and storage medium based on block chain Download PDFInfo
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Abstract
Digital signature method provided by the present invention based on block chain, it is related to electronic voting system technical field, this method is mainly by when node private key reaches the default update cycle using the time, determine new node private key, and present node private key is replaced with new node private key, data signature processing is carried out according to new node private key, each node regularly updates private key information, and delete present node private key, even if attacker obtains node current secret key information, also information before this can not be obtained, effectively prevent mobile attack, the safety of signing messages early period is ensured.The invention also discloses a kind of digital signature device based on block chain, equipment and a kind of readable storage medium storing program for executing, have above-mentioned beneficial effect.
Description
Technical field
The present invention relates to electronic voting system technical field, in particular to a kind of digital signature method based on block chain,
Device, equipment and a kind of readable storage medium storing program for executing.
Background technique
Block chain ballot system does not have trusted party, participates in safeguarding jointly by the whole network ballot node, can guarantee chain upslide
Ticket result can not the property usurped；The electronic voting system of application block chain, which has used, simultaneously can provide the timestamp of time-proven,
Time and the data for distorting or cheating ballot paper can be inquired in block chained record, trace back to interfering nodes；And it is each
Node can verify ballot history authenticity and integrity, it is ensured that voting records be it is genuine and believable, be not tampered with, drop
The low risk of ballot system；In addition, the open and clear and anonymous characteristic of block chain makes each ballot node it can be seen that throwing
Ticket is as a result, ensure that the privacy of voter, while have the result of ballot and disclosing just superperformance.Block chain electricity
Sub- ballot system is widely used in electronic voting scene as a kind of safe and efficient processing mode.
And during block chain electronic voting, block chain node automatically saves historical content, when have node by
When attack, then attacker can obtain the historical record of the node, and target of attack can be transferred to the nearly node of neck, until obtaining door
Limit value nodal information, attacker can distort or forge a signature information, influence system safety.
Therefore, the mobile attack in block chain ballot signature how is avoided, guarantees system security, is those skilled in the art
Member's technical issues that need to address.
Summary of the invention
The object of the present invention is to provide a kind of digital signature method based on block chain, this method can throw to avoid block chain
Mobile attack in ticket signature, guarantees system security；It is a further object of the present invention to provide a kind of numbers based on block chain
Signature apparatus, equipment and a kind of readable storage medium storing program for executing have above-mentioned beneficial effect.
In order to solve the above technical problems, the present invention provides a kind of digital signature method based on block chain, comprising:
It determines block chain node present node private key, and data signature processing is carried out according to the present node private key；
When the time using the present node private key reaches the default update cycle, new node private key is determined；
The new node private key is replaced into the present node private key, and deletes the present node private key；
Data signature processing is carried out according to the new node private key.
Optionally, the determining new node private key, comprising:
Determine random number as updating factor；
The updating factor and the present node private key are subjected to statistical calculation, using obtained result as described new
Node private key.
Optionally, the selection random number is as updating factor, comprising:
It is secret to be input to Asmuth-Bloom by each node for the first random number chosen respectively in block chain electronic voting system
In close shared secret shadow calculation formula, and using obtained calculated result as the node updates factor；
Each node broadcasts the node updates factor of generation respectively；
Correspondingly, the updating factor and the present node private key are subjected to statistical calculation, obtained result is made
For the new node private key, specifically: after the node to be updated receives the node updates factor of each node, by each section
The node updates factor of point and the statistical result of the present node private key are as the new node private key.
Optionally, using the node updates factor of each node and the statistical result of the present node private key as institute
State new node private key, comprising:
Read group total is carried out to each node updates factor, obtains updating factor statistical result；
Linear read group total carried out to the updating factor statistical result and the present node private key, and will be obtained
Summed result is as the new node private key.
Optionally, the digital signature method based on block chain further include:
Each node generates the verification information of the node updates factor respectively, and broadcasts the verification information；Wherein, described
Verification information is generated according to the node updates factor；
Correspondingly, using the node updates factor of each node and the statistical result of the present node private key as institute
Before stating new node private key, further includes: the node to be updated receives the verification information and node updates of each node
After the factor, the correctness of the verification information is verified according to the node updates factor；
When the authentication succeeds, by the node updates factor of each node and the statistical result of the present node private key
As the new node private key.
Optionally, each node generates the verification information of the node updates factor, comprising:
Each node generates the node updates according to the secret shadow calculation formula of the Asmuth-Bloom privacy sharing
The verification information of the factor.
Optionally, data signature processing is carried out according to the present node private key, comprising:
Data threshold signature is carried out according to the present node private key based on Chinese remainder theorem；
Correspondingly, data signature processing is carried out according to the new node private key, specifically:
Data threshold signature is carried out according to the new node private key based on Chinese remainder theorem.
The present invention discloses a kind of digital signature device based on block chain, comprising:
First private key processing unit, for determining block chain node present node private key, and it is private according to the present node
Key carries out data signature processing；
New private key determination unit, for when the time using the present node private key reaches the default update cycle, really
Determine new node private key；
New private key replacement unit for the new node private key to be replaced the present node private key, and is worked as described in deletion
Front nodal point private key；
Second private key processing unit, for carrying out data signature processing according to the new node private key.
The present invention discloses a kind of digital signature device based on block chain, comprising:
Memory, for storing computer program；
Processor realizes the step of the digital signature method based on block chain when for executing the computer program
Suddenly.
The present invention discloses a kind of readable storage medium storing program for executing, and program is stored on the readable storage medium storing program for executing, and described program is located
Manage the step of realizing the digital signature method based on block chain when device executes.
Digital signature method provided by the present invention based on block chain, by reaching default using the time in node private key
When the update cycle, determines and new node private key replaces present node private key, data signature processing is carried out according to new node private key, often
A node regularly updates private key information, and deletes present node private key, even if attacker obtains node current secret key information,
Information before this can not be obtained, mobile attack is effectively prevented, has ensured the safety of signing messages early period.
The secret shadow using Asmuth-Bloom privacy sharing is disclosed in an embodiment of the present invention and works as prosthomere
Point private key carries out the mode of the statistical calculation of new node private key, can be by being higher than thresholding in the case where certain node private key is lost
The node private key information of value lose the reduction of private key, has ensured the reusability of private key, has improved the stability of system.
The invention also discloses a kind of digital signature device based on block chain, equipment and a kind of readable storage medium storing program for executing, tools
There is above-mentioned beneficial effect, details are not described herein.
Detailed description of the invention
In order to more clearly explain the embodiment of the invention or the technical proposal in the existing technology, to embodiment or will show below
There is attached drawing needed in technical description to be briefly described, it should be apparent that, the accompanying drawings in the following description is only this
The embodiment of invention for those of ordinary skill in the art without creative efforts, can also basis
The attached drawing of offer obtains other attached drawings.
Fig. 1 is a kind of flow chart of the digital signature method based on block chain provided in an embodiment of the present invention；
Fig. 2 is a kind of block chain electronic voting system thresholding label based on Chinese remainder theorem provided in an embodiment of the present invention
Name flow diagram；
Fig. 3 is a kind of structural block diagram of the digital signature device based on block chain provided in an embodiment of the present invention；
Fig. 4 is a kind of structural schematic diagram of the digital signature device based on block chain provided in an embodiment of the present invention.
Specific embodiment
Core of the invention is to provide a kind of digital signature method based on block chain, and this method can be to avoid block chain electricity
Mobile attack in sub- ballot system signature, guarantees system security；Another core of the invention is to provide a kind of based on block
Digital signature device, equipment and a kind of readable storage medium storing program for executing of chain have above-mentioned beneficial effect.
In order to make the object, technical scheme and advantages of the embodiment of the invention clearer, below in conjunction with the embodiment of the present invention
In attached drawing, technical scheme in the embodiment of the invention is clearly and completely described, it is clear that described embodiment is
A part of the embodiment of the present invention, instead of all the embodiments.Based on the embodiments of the present invention, those of ordinary skill in the art
Every other embodiment obtained without making creative work, shall fall within the protection scope of the present invention.
When certain attacker successfully invades and control a node or server, then target of attack can be transferred to by attacker
On another node or server in system, this attack is known as mobile attack.Block chain node automatically saves historical record, false
If certain node is attacked by attacker, then attacker can obtain the historical record of the node, and it is close that target of attack can be transferred to neck
Node, until obtaining threshold value nodal information, attacker can be distorted or forge a signature information.Mobile attack is to being chronically at
System brings security threat very serious in operation.
The present invention provides a kind of digital signature based on block chain, needs to regularly update private key information for each node, support
Anti- mobile attack can not also obtain information before this even if attacker obtains node present node private key information, it is ensured that
Early period signing messages safety, it is ensured that the safety of system.
Embodiment one:
Referring to FIG. 1, Fig. 1 is a kind of process of the digital signature method based on block chain provided in an embodiment of the present invention
Figure, this method mainly comprise the steps that
Step s110, it determines block chain node present node private key, and is carried out at data signature according to present node private key
Reason.
Step s120, when the time using present node private key reaches the default update cycle, new node private key is determined.
The setting of specific time of default update cycle T without limitation, can according to the period that practical private key is attacked come
Determine etc..
The generation method of new node private key is referred to the generation method of present node private key, it can referring to the relevant technologies
In the generation method of node private key redefine node private key；Parameter tune can also be carried out on the basis of present node private key
It is whole to generate new private key, in the present embodiment without limitation to the generation method of new private key.
Step s130, new node private key is replaced into present node private key, and deletes present node private key.
The relative recording information for deleting current secret key immediately after replacing current secret key with new private key, accordingly even when attacker
New private key is illegally obtained, the private key information before the period can not be also obtained, historical data can not be cracked, ensure that system
Safety.
Step s140, data signature processing is carried out according to new node private key.
Electronic voting endorsement method provided in this embodiment is any suitable for the electronic voting system based on block chain
Node, can be with the safety of safeguards system.
It should be noted that being digitally signed the process of processing according to node private key without limitation in the present embodiment,
Specifically it is referred to introduction in the related technology.Wherein it is preferred to can be carried out based on Chinese remainder theorem according to node private key
Data threshold signature.It is illustrated in figure 2 a kind of block chain electronic voting system Threshold Signature process based on Chinese remainder theorem
Schematic diagram, block chain Threshold Signature pass through the correctness for cooperating between node and generating secret shadow and calculating verification information,
When verification result is correct, generation group public key and group private key, each block chain node calculate personal private key.Block chain node utilizes
Personal private key generates the part signature of oneself, closes winner by signature and synthesizes signature, verifier verifies.It is fixed based on Chinese Remainder
The signature scheme calculation amount of reason is smaller, applied to improving the efficiency of system in block chain ballot system.Other digital signature sides
Details are not described herein for case, can refer to above-mentioned introduction.
In addition, the present embodiment is mainly used in electronic voting background system, other digital signature scenes based on block chain
Also applicable digital signature method provided by the invention, details are not described herein.
Based on the above-mentioned technical proposal, the digital signature method provided by the invention based on block chain, by node private key
When reaching the default update cycle using the time, determine and new node private key replace present node private key, according to new node private key into
The processing of row data signature, each node regularly updates private key information, and deletes present node private key, even if attacker obtains section
Point current secret key information, can not also obtain information before this, effectively prevent mobile attack, ensure signing messages early period
Safety.
Embodiment two:
In above-described embodiment without limitation for the mode of determining new node private key, it is private that the present embodiment introduces a kind of new node
The generating mode of key can simplify while new private key generates calculation amount and guarantee safety.Specifically, it is determined that new node private key
Process mainly includes following two step:
Step 1: determine random number as updating factor；
Step 2: updating factor and present node private key are subjected to statistical calculation, using obtained result as new node
Private key.
Updating factor refers to the part updated on the basis of original private keys, and random number here includes the number randomly selected,
And the obtained numerical value of operations are carried out to the number randomly selected, particularly for random number method of determination without limitation.
The randomness of new node private key can be increased as updating factor by choosing random number, increased and cracked difficulty.Meanwhile
Original private keys and updating factor are subjected to statistical calculation while guaranteeing the randomness of new private key, it is multiple to also ensure that private key is lost
A possibility that former, improves the stability of system, here statistics calculate specific calculation can choose summation, ask it is poor,
A variety of operation modes such as ratio are sought, it is not limited here.
In above-mentioned introduction without limitation for the method for determination of random number, wherein preferably, Asmuth- can be based on
Bloom privacy sharing carries out the determination of random number, and Asmuth-Bloom secret sharing scheme has calculation amount small, high-efficient excellent
Point can realize that the reduction to node private key is lost specifically is chosen random under the situation known to the private key for being higher than threshold value
Number mainly includes following two step as updating factor:
Step 1: the first random number chosen respectively is input to Asmuth- by each node in block chain electronic voting system
In the secret shadow calculation formula of Bloom privacy sharing, and using obtained calculated result as the node updates factor；
Step 2: each node broadcasts the node updates factor of generation respectively.
Wherein, the secret shadow calculation formula of Asmuth-Bloom privacy sharing refers to: assuming that DC is secret distributor, P=
{P1, P2,…,PnIt is the set that n node forms, threshold value t, secret is s.DC selects Big prime q (q > s), integer A,
And strictly increasing positive integer sequence d={ d1,d2,…,dn, and d meets the following conditions:
(1)0≤A≤M/q-1；
(2)d1< d2< ... < dn；
(3)gcd(di,dj)=1, i ≠ j；
(4)gcd(di, q)=1, (i=1,2 ..., n)；
(5)
Enable z=s+Aq, zi=zmoddi, (i=1,2 ..., n).Secret distributor DC is by (zi, di) it is sent to Pi(i=1,
2 ..., n), as PiSecret shadow.
Determine the secret shadow for determining each node as updating factor according to the above rule.
Arbitrary node restores updating factor by being exchanged with each other secret shadow.Specifically, the answering method of updating factor can
Referring to introduced below.
Optional t node P1, P2,…,PtA group node as Restore Secret.By being exchanged with each other secret between node
Afterwards, arbitrary node PiFollowing congruence equations can all be established:
z≡z1(modd1)
z≡z2(modd2)
z≡zt(moddt)
By Chinese remainder theorem, which has unique solution:
Therefore, shared secret s=z-Aq namely s=zmodq can be found out.
Correspondingly, updating factor and present node private key are subjected to statistical calculation, using obtained result as new node
Private key, specifically: after node to be updated receives the node updates factor of each node, by the node updates factor of each node and
The statistical result of present node private key is as new node private key.Wherein, the statistical of each node updates factor can be selected directly
Connect summation, the modes such as ratio sums, averages, the statistics calculation of updating factor and present node private key can also be according to reality
Border calculates demand and is set, it is preferable that mode to simplify the calculation, while guaranteeing the diversity of data, by the node of each node
Updating factor and the statistical result of present node private key may include following two step as new node private key:
Step 1: read group total is carried out to each node updates factor, obtains updating factor statistical result；
Step 2: carrying out linear read group total to updating factor statistical result and present node private key, and will obtain
Summed result is as new node private key.
Wherein, updating factor statistical result is such as directly added by linear read group total with node private key, or will be updated
The factor is added with the node private key of integral multiple, it is not limited here.Linear summation can guarantee the randomness of updating factor, protect
Demonstrate,prove the safety of private key.
In addition, each node is directly broadcasted after generating the node updates factor in above-mentioned introduction, to avoid node updates
The factor is illegally distorted before broadcast to be caused to divulge a secret, and guarantees the safety of private key, it is preferable that each node can further generate section
The verification information of point updating factor, and verifying broadcasts information；Correspondingly, by the node updates factor and present node of each node
Before the statistical result of private key is as new node private key, further includes: node to be updated receive each node verification information and
After the node updates factor, according to the correctness of node updates factor authentication information；When the authentication succeeds, by the section of each node
Point updating factor and the statistical result of present node private key are as new node private key.
Wherein, verification information according to the node updates factor generate, node to be updated receive each node updates factor and
After corresponding verification information, the safety of updating factor is verified according to verification information first, if be proved to be successful, instruction
The node updates factor is not tampered with, if authentication failed, indicates that the node updates factor may be tampered, to ensure private key
Safety avoids the node updates factor using authentication failed as far as possible.
The process that each node generates the verification information of the node updates factor is referred to the life of verification information in the prior art
At method, wherein to realize the reduction after verification information loss, it is preferable that each node can be according to Asmuth-Bloom secret
Shared secret shadow calculation formula generates the verification information of the node updates factor.Asmuth-Bloom secret sharing scheme please join
According to introduction in the related technology, details are not described herein, it is of course also possible to select other verification information generation methods, herein not
It limits.
Embodiment three:
Electronic voting system to deepen understanding to overall plan in embodiment, in the present embodiment to entirety based on block chain
System signature process is introduced, and mainly includes key generation, generation signature, verifying signature, private key update, node addition and section
Point exits six parts, wherein the signature process in the present embodiment uses block chain Threshold Signature, and private key, which updates, uses Asmuth-
Bloom privacy sharing principle, other way can refer to the introduction of the present embodiment.
Block chain Threshold Signature passes through the correctness for cooperating between node and generating secret shadow and calculating verification information,
When verification result is correct, generation group public key and group private key, each block chain node calculate personal private key.Block chain node utilizes
Personal private key generates the part signature of oneself, closes winner by signature and synthesizes signature, verifier verifies.
One, key generates
1. block chain electronic voting system initializes
Choose common parameter P, n, t, g, p, q, d, S, M.Wherein P={ P1,P2,…,PnIt is n participation block chain ballot
The node set of system signature, t are threshold value, and g is the generation member on finite field gf (p), and p, q are two Big primes and meet q/
(p-1), d={ d1,d2,…,dnBe one group of strictly monotone increasing positive integer sequence, q and d meet Asmuth-Bloom scheme,
Message to be signed is S,Open n, t, g, p, q, d and M.
2. cooperating generation secret shadow between block chain node:
Each block chain node PiRandomly select sub-secret λiWith integer Zi, for generating node private key and group key, and it is full
The following condition of foot:
PiCalculate secret shadow Xij:
Xij=(λi+Ziq)moddj (3)
Node PiRetain Xii, broadcastAnd by Xij(i ≠ j) sending node is to Pj。
Here, sub-secret λiWith integer ZiIt is chosen by block chain node secret, and is sent not over communication channel, other
People can not obtain.
3. block chain node PiCalculate verification information δi, μij, and the correctness of verification information:
θij=(λi+Ziq-Xij)/dj (5)
And δ is broadcasted in block chain networki, μij。
Node PjReceive the verification information δ that remaining n-1 node sends overiAnd XijAfterwards；It is verified and is believed by following equation
The correctness of breath:
4. generating block chain node private key:
According to the verifying of third step, if information is correct, node PjCalculate the private key of oneself:
5. generating group key:
According to the secret number λ of each block chain node selectioni, generation group public key and group private key, wherein group public key are as follows:
Group private key are as follows:
Two, signature is generated
Any t block chain node utilizes the private key of oneself, is signed according to the part that Chinese remainder theorem generates oneself, t
The signature of a part signature synthesis message S.
1. generating portion is signed
(1) node PiChoose random number hi∈ZP, it calculates and broadcasts:
PjReceive li, it calculates:
(2) node PiIt calculatesIt signs for generating portion, wherein
eiMeet:
(3) node PiCalculating section signature Wi:
Wi=lhi·S+HimodD (14)
And by part sign (S, l, Wi) it is sent to signature conjunction winner.
2. synthesis signature
Signature closes winner and receives the part signature W that t block chain node is sentiAfterwards, synthesis signature W:
Then the signature of message S is (S, l, W)
Three, verifying signature
After verifier receives signing messages (S, l, W), according to following equation, a group validity for public key ψ verifying signature is used:
gW≡lS·l·Ψmodp (16)
If above-mentioned equation is set up, illustrates group signature (S, l, W) effectively, receive signature.
Four, private key updates
If the update cycle is T, then detailed update algorithm steps are as follows:
1. block chain node PiRandomly select integerMeet primary condition；
2. node PiCalculate updating factor:
Wherein, h refers to hash function, has positive quick, reverse difficulty using the calculating that hash function is updated the factor,
Input is sensitive, the feature of conflict avoidance.
And by updating factorIt is sent to node Pj, broadcast
3. node PiCalculate verification information
Broadcast
Above-mentioned verification mode has the function of to be mutually authenticated, and the supervision, it can be achieved that node is mutually authenticated between node, prevention
The insincere behavior of node, at the same verify data in transmission process with the presence or absence of being tampered or forge.Guarantee that node is credible, number
According to credible.
4. node PjReceive node PiThe information of transmissionAndAccording to broadcast messageBy following two
A equation verifyingCorrectness:
5. node PjIt is in the private key of T-1 periodThe then private key of T period are as follows:
When node calculates current secret keyAfterwards, it deletes immediatelyAccordingly even when attacker obtainsAlso without
Method obtains the private key information before the period.
Five, node is added
Assuming that there is new node Pi+1Block chain network is added, adition process is as follows:
1. newly added node Pi+1Select modulus dn+1, and make dn+1Meet Asmuth-Bloom secret sharing scheme.
2. by t block chain node Pi(i=1,2 ..., t) assist newly added node Pi+1Calculate pseudo- private key.
Node PiRandomly select t random number εij∈Zp(j=1,2 ..., t) is calculatedAnd by εijHair
Give Pj, PjCalculate ε 'j:
PiCalculate pseudo- private key:
And by K 'iIt is sent to node Pn+1。
3.Pn+1Receive t parts of pseudo- private key K 'iAfterwards, the private key of oneself is calculated:
When there is new node that block chain network is added, it is assisted to generate pseudo- private key by block chain node, newly added node exists
Receive the private key that oneself is calculated after the pseudo- private key of other t node.Public key, group private key and other nodes are organized in the whole process
Private key does not change, therefore does not influence on entire signature process.
Six, node exits
Assuming that block chain node PkBlock chain network, P are left in decisionkIts message left is broadcasted, other n-1 node is kicked
Except dk, no longer receive PkThe message of transmission.Node PkAfter leaving, other nodes timely update key, organize public key after update are as follows:
Group private key:
Node private key:
It should be noted that when the node number left simultaneously in block chain network is more than or equal to t, due to t node
Cooperation is restructural reconstruct secret shadow, causes signature algorithm dangerous, it is therefore desirable to which system re-initialization repeats (1)-
(11) formula operates, and block chain node recalculates key.
Block chain ballot system signature scheme provided in this embodiment is based on Chinese remainder theorem, and calculation amount is smaller, is promoted
The efficiency of system；Ballot technology based on block chain simultaneously, ensure that the reliability of voting records, improves practicability.No
It needs special maintenance and management to arrange ballot system and network, avoids the behaviors such as authority's fraud, ensure that the transparency of network,
Malice is prevented to vote or distort the cheating of fraud ballot paper；In addition, regularly updating node private key, movement can be effective against
Attack, improves the safety of system.
Example IV:
The digital signature device provided by the invention based on block chain is introduced below, referring to FIG. 3, Fig. 3 is this
A kind of structural block diagram for digital signature device based on block chain that inventive embodiments provide；The device mainly includes: first is private
Key processing unit 110, new private key determination unit 120, new private key replacement unit 130 and the second private key processing unit 140.
Wherein, the first private key processing unit 110 is mainly used for determining block chain node present node private key, and according to current
Node private key carries out data signature processing；
New private key determination unit 120 is mainly used for when the time using present node private key reaches the default update cycle,
Determine new node private key；
New private key replacement unit 130 is mainly used for new node private key replacing present node private key, and deletes present node
Private key；
Second private key processing unit 140 is mainly used for carrying out data signature processing according to new node private key.
Digital signature device provided in this embodiment based on block chain can be to avoid the movement in block chain ballot signature
Attack, guarantees system security.
Wherein, new private key determination unit may further include: it is single that updating factor determines that subelement and statistics calculate son
Member；
Updating factor determines that subelement is mainly used for determining random number as updating factor；
Statistics computation subunit is mainly used for updating factor and present node private key carrying out statistical calculation, by what is obtained
As a result it is used as new node private key.
Wherein, updating factor determines that subelement may further include: privacy sharing share determines subelement and update
The factor broadcasts subelement；
Privacy sharing share determines that subelement is mainly used for each node in block chain electronic voting system and will choose respectively
First random number is input in the secret shadow calculation formula of Asmuth-Bloom privacy sharing, and obtained calculated result is made
For the node updates factor；
Updating factor broadcast subelement broadcasts the node updates factor of generation for each node respectively；
Correspondingly, statistics computation subunit is specially multinode statistics subelement, and multinode counts subelement and is used for more
After new node receives the node updates factor of each node, by the node updates factor of each node and the system of present node private key
Result is counted as new node private key.
Wherein, multinode statistics subelement may further include: factor summation subelement and subelement of linearly summing；
Factor summation subelement is mainly used for carrying out read group total to each node updates factor, obtains updating factor statistics knot
Fruit；
Linear summation subelement is mainly used for linearly summing to updating factor statistical result and present node private key
It calculates, and using obtained summed result as new node private key.
Optionally, updating factor determines that subelement may further include: verifying subelement, and verifying subelement mainly includes
Information generates subelement and Information Authentication subelement；Information generates subelement and is mainly used for controlling each node generates node respectively
The verification information of updating factor, and verifying broadcasts information；Wherein, verification information is generated according to the node updates factor；
Information Authentication subelement is mainly used for controlling the verification information that node to be updated receives each node and node more
After the new factor, according to the correctness of node updates factor authentication information；When the authentication succeeds, by the node updates of each node
The factor and the statistical result of present node private key are as new node private key.
Optionally, information generates subelement can generate subelement for privacy sharing information, and privacy sharing information generates son
Unit generates the node updates factor according to the secret shadow calculation formula of Asmuth-Bloom privacy sharing for controlling each node
Verification information.
Optionally, it is surplus based on China specifically to can be used for the digital signature device based on block chain for the first private key processing unit
Remaining theorem carries out data threshold signature according to present node private key；
Correspondingly, the second private key processing unit specifically can be used for being carried out based on Chinese remainder theorem according to new node private key
Data threshold signature.
Embodiment five:
The digital signature device provided by the invention based on block chain is introduced below, specifically to based on block chain
The introduction of digital signature device can refer to above-mentioned digital signature method and device based on block chain；The equipment specifically includes that
Memory, for storing computer program；
Processor, when for executing computer program the step of realization data flow theme feature extracting method.
Digital signature device provided by the invention based on block chain can attack to avoid the movement in block chain ballot signature
It hits, guarantees system security.
Referring to FIG. 4, a kind of structural schematic diagram of digital signature device based on block chain provided in an embodiment of the present invention,
The electronic voting signature device can generate bigger difference because configuration or performance are different, may include one or more
Processor (central processing units, CPU) 322 (for example, one or more processors) and memory
332, one or more storage application programs 342 or data 344 storage medium 330 (such as one or more sea
Amount storage equipment).Wherein, memory 332 and storage medium 330 can be of short duration storage or persistent storage.Storage is stored in be situated between
The program of matter 330 may include one or more modules (diagram does not mark), and each module may include to data processing
Series of instructions operation in equipment.Further, central processing unit 322 can be set to communicate with storage medium 330,
The series of instructions operation in storage medium 330 is executed on digital signature device 301 based on block chain.
Digital signature device 301 based on block chain can also include one or more power supplys 326, one or one
The above wired or wireless network interface 350, one or more input/output interfaces 358, and/or, one or more
Operating system 341, such as Windows ServerTM, Mac OS XTM, UnixTM, LinuxTM, FreeBSDTM etc..
Step in digital signature method described above based on block chain can be signed by the number based on block chain
The structure of name equipment is realized.
Embodiment six:
Readable storage medium storing program for executing provided in an embodiment of the present invention is introduced below, readable storage medium storing program for executing described below with
The above-described digital signature method based on block chain can correspond to each other reference.
A kind of readable storage medium storing program for executing disclosed by the invention, is stored thereon with program, base is realized when program is executed by processor
In the digital signature method of block chain the step of.
The readable storage medium storing program for executing be specifically as follows USB flash disk, mobile hard disk, read-only memory (Read-Only Memory,
ROM), the various program storage generations such as random access memory (Random Access Memory, RAM), magnetic or disk
The readable storage medium storing program for executing of code.
Each embodiment is described in a progressive manner in specification, the highlights of each of the examples are with other realities
The difference of example is applied, the same or similar parts in each embodiment may refer to each other.For device disclosed in embodiment
Speech, since it is corresponded to the methods disclosed in the examples, so being described relatively simple, related place is referring to method part illustration
?.
Professional further appreciates that, unit described in conjunction with the examples disclosed in the embodiments of the present disclosure
And algorithm steps, can be realized with electronic hardware, computer software, or a combination of the two, in order to clearly demonstrate hardware and
The interchangeability of software generally describes each exemplary composition and step according to function in the above description.These
Function is implemented in hardware or software actually, the specific application and design constraint depending on technical solution.Profession
Technical staff can use different methods to achieve the described function each specific application, but this realization is not answered
Think beyond scope of the present application.
The step of method described in conjunction with the examples disclosed in this document or algorithm, can directly be held with hardware, processor
The combination of capable software module or the two is implemented.Software module can be placed in random access memory (RAM), memory, read-only deposit
Reservoir (ROM), electrically programmable ROM, electrically erasable ROM, register, hard disk, moveable magnetic disc, CD-ROM or technology
In any other form of storage medium well known in field.
Above to the digital signature method based on block chain, device, equipment and readable storage medium storing program for executing provided herein
It is described in detail.Specific examples are used herein to illustrate the principle and implementation manner of the present application, the above reality
The explanation for applying example is merely used to help understand the present processes and its core concept.It should be pointed out that for the art
For those of ordinary skill, under the premise of not departing from the application principle, can also to the application, some improvement and modification can also be carried out,
These improvement and modification are also fallen into the protection scope of the claim of this application.
Claims (10)
1. a kind of digital signature method based on block chain characterized by comprising
It determines block chain node present node private key, and data signature processing is carried out according to the present node private key；
When the time using the present node private key reaches the default update cycle, new node private key is determined；
The new node private key is replaced into the present node private key, and deletes the present node private key；
Data signature processing is carried out according to the new node private key.
2. the digital signature method as described in claim 1 based on block chain, which is characterized in that the determining new node is private
Key, comprising:
Determine random number as updating factor；
The updating factor and the present node private key are subjected to statistical calculation, using obtained result as the new node
Private key.
3. the digital signature method as claimed in claim 2 based on block chain, which is characterized in that the selection random number conduct
Updating factor, comprising:
The first random number chosen respectively is input to Asmuth-Bloom secret and is total to by each node in block chain electronic voting system
In the secret shadow calculation formula enjoyed, and using obtained calculated result as the node updates factor；
Each node broadcasts the node updates factor of generation respectively；
Correspondingly, the updating factor and the present node private key are subjected to statistical calculation, using obtained result as institute
New node private key is stated, specifically: after the node to be updated receives the node updates factor of each node, by each node
The node updates factor and the statistical result of the present node private key are as the new node private key.
4. the digital signature method as claimed in claim 3 based on block chain, which is characterized in that by the node of each node
Updating factor and the statistical result of the present node private key are as the new node private key, comprising:
Read group total is carried out to each node updates factor, obtains updating factor statistical result；
Linear read group total, and the summation that will be obtained are carried out to the updating factor statistical result and the present node private key
As a result it is used as the new node private key.
5. the digital signature method as claimed in claim 3 based on block chain, which is characterized in that further include:
Each node generates the verification information of the node updates factor respectively, and broadcasts the verification information；Wherein, the verifying
Information is generated according to the node updates factor；
Correspondingly, using the node updates factor of each node and the statistical result of the present node private key as described new
Before node private key, further includes: the node to be updated receives the verification information and the node updates factor of each node
Afterwards, the correctness of the verification information is verified according to the node updates factor；
When the authentication succeeds, using the node updates factor of each node and the statistical result of the present node private key as
The new node private key.
6. the digital signature method as claimed in claim 5 based on block chain, which is characterized in that each node generates the node
The verification information of updating factor, comprising:
Each node generates the node updates factor according to the secret shadow calculation formula of the Asmuth-Bloom privacy sharing
Verification information.
7. the digital signature method as described in claim 1 based on block chain, which is characterized in that private according to the present node
Key carries out data signature processing, comprising:
Data threshold signature is carried out according to the present node private key based on Chinese remainder theorem；
Correspondingly, data signature processing is carried out according to the new node private key, specifically:
Data threshold signature is carried out according to the new node private key based on Chinese remainder theorem.
8. a kind of digital signature device based on block chain characterized by comprising
First private key processing unit, for determining block chain node present node private key, and according to the present node private key into
The processing of row data signature；
New private key determination unit is new for determining when the time using the present node private key reaches the default update cycle
Node private key；
New private key replacement unit for the new node private key to be replaced the present node private key, and works as prosthomere described in deletion
Point private key；
Second private key processing unit, for carrying out data signature processing according to the new node private key.
9. a kind of digital signature device based on block chain characterized by comprising
Memory, for storing computer program；
Processor realizes the number based on block chain as described in any one of claim 1 to 7 when for executing the computer program
The step of word endorsement method.
10. a kind of readable storage medium storing program for executing, which is characterized in that be stored with program on the readable storage medium storing program for executing, described program is located
Manage the step of realizing the digital signature method based on block chain as described in any one of claim 1 to 7 when device executes.
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