CN109902515B - True data verification method and system - Google Patents
True data verification method and system Download PDFInfo
- Publication number
- CN109902515B CN109902515B CN201910023880.7A CN201910023880A CN109902515B CN 109902515 B CN109902515 B CN 109902515B CN 201910023880 A CN201910023880 A CN 201910023880A CN 109902515 B CN109902515 B CN 109902515B
- Authority
- CN
- China
- Prior art keywords
- server
- key
- terminal
- audited
- client
- Prior art date
- Legal status (The legal status is an assumption and is not a legal conclusion. Google has not performed a legal analysis and makes no representation as to the accuracy of the status listed.)
- Active
Links
Images
Abstract
The embodiment of the invention provides a real data verification method and a system, wherein the method comprises the following steps: the method comprises the steps that a TLS/SSL connection between a client and a server is established, and the client is divided into a checked terminal and a checking terminal; creating a dialogue between the audited terminal and the auditing terminal, wherein the audited terminal generates a Key ServerwriteKey, a Key clientackey and a Key clientwritekey, and the auditing terminal only generates an identity authentication Key SeverMac Key; and the auditing terminal verifies that the data acquired by the audited terminal is consistent with the data of the server according to the SeverMac Key. The embodiment of the invention provides a method and a system for verifying real data, which verify the TLS/SSL connection between a server and a checked party through third-party verification. The auditor and the audited party communicate by using a specific protocol, and simultaneously start to connect to the server, and the auditor can affirmatively prove that the audited party provides data from the server after auditing.
Description
Technical Field
The embodiment of the invention relates to the technical field of data security, in particular to a real data verification method and a real data verification system.
Background
Scenarios requiring third parties for arbitration are very common in our daily lives. People routinely provide screenshots or printouts as proof of the occurrence of a transaction, or provide proof of funds in support of a visa application, or proof of residence using a hydroelectric charge account to establish an account. This requires third party auditors to prove that the data provided by people is authentic and has not been tampered with.
Therefore, a real data verification method is needed to verify the authenticity of data.
Disclosure of Invention
In order to solve the above problems, embodiments of the present invention provide a method and system for verifying real data, which overcome the above problems or at least partially solve the above problems.
In a first aspect, an embodiment of the present invention provides a method for verifying real data, including:
the method comprises the steps that a TLS/SSL connection between a client and a server is established, and the client is divided into a checked terminal and a checking terminal;
creating a dialogue between the audited terminal and the auditing terminal, wherein the audited terminal generates a Key ServerwriteKey, a Key clientackey and a Key clientwritekey, and the auditing terminal only generates an identity authentication Key SeverMac Key;
and the auditing terminal verifies that the data acquired by the audited terminal is consistent with the data of the server according to the SeverMac Key.
In a second aspect, an embodiment of the present invention provides an authenticity data verification system, including:
the connection establishing module is used for establishing TLS/SSL connection between the client and the server and splitting the client into a checked terminal and an auditing terminal;
the verification Key generation module is used for creating a dialogue between the audited terminal and the auditing terminal, the audited terminal generates a Key ServerwriteKey, a Key clientackey and a Key clientwritekey, and the auditing terminal only generates an identity verification Key SeverMac Key;
and the data verification module is used for verifying that the data acquired by the audited terminal is consistent with the data of the server according to the SeverMac Key by the auditing terminal.
Third aspect an embodiment of the present invention provides an electronic device, including:
a processor, a memory, a communication interface, and a bus; the processor, the memory and the communication interface complete mutual communication through the bus; the memory stores program instructions executable by the processor, and the processor calls the program instructions to execute the above real data verification method.
Fourth aspect embodiments of the present invention provide a non-transitory computer-readable storage medium storing computer instructions that cause the computer to perform the above-described method for verifying authenticity data.
According to the method and the system for verifying the real data, the TLS/SSL connection between the server and the audited party is verified through the third-party audit. The auditor and the audited party communicate by using a specific protocol, and simultaneously start to connect to the server, and the auditor can affirmatively prove that the audited party provides data from the server after auditing.
Drawings
In order to more clearly illustrate the embodiments of the present invention or the technical solutions in the prior art, the drawings used in the description of the embodiments or the prior art will be briefly described below, and it is obvious that the drawings in the following description are some embodiments of the present invention, and those skilled in the art can also obtain other drawings according to the drawings without creative efforts.
Fig. 1 is a schematic flow chart of a method for verifying real data according to an embodiment of the present invention;
FIG. 2 is a schematic structural diagram of an actual data verification system according to an embodiment of the present invention;
fig. 3 is a block diagram of an electronic device according to an embodiment of the present invention.
Detailed Description
In order to make the objects, technical solutions and advantages of the embodiments of the present invention clearer, the technical solutions in the embodiments of the present invention will be clearly described below with reference to the drawings in the embodiments of the present invention, and it is obvious that the described embodiments are some embodiments, but not all embodiments, of the present invention. All other embodiments, which can be derived by a person skilled in the art from the embodiments given herein without making any creative effort, shall fall within the protection scope of the present invention.
Fig. 1 is a schematic flow chart of a method for verifying real data according to an embodiment of the present invention, as shown in fig. 1, including:
101. the method comprises the steps that a TLS/SSL connection between a client and a server is established, and the client is divided into a checked terminal and a checking terminal;
102. creating a dialogue between the audited terminal and the auditing terminal, wherein the audited terminal generates a Key ServerwriteKey, a Key clientackey and a Key clientwritekey, and the auditing terminal only generates an identity authentication Key SeverMac Key;
103. and the auditing terminal verifies that the data acquired by the audited terminal is consistent with the data of the server according to the SeverMac Key.
It should be noted that the method provided by the embodiment of the present invention is mainly applied to application environments of data service, certificate generation, and certificate verification, and can also be applied to special environments of risk management and investment management, traceability, infringement information in the entertainment and financial industries, and sensor information such as factory pollution emission. It is further described that the embodiment of the present invention may be combined with a blockchain, a connection channel between the blockchain and the real world is constructed, and trusted real world data is provided for the blockchain, and when the application is performed, external data may be written into the blockchain, and necessary conditions for running when contract terms are satisfied are set, so that the contract is automatically executed according to preset rules.
Specifically, in step 101, the embodiment of the present invention first establishes a TLS/SSL connection between the server and the audited party. It will be appreciated that the TLS protocol is intended to provide secure communications in a client-server model. Its most prominent use is to protect the HTTP protocol (HTTPs). In such an arrangement, only the (Web) server is authenticated, based on x.509 certificates, the current and recommended version of the protocol is TLS 1.2, but older versions, e.g. 1.0 and 1.1, are still widely supported. In order to prove that the data acquired by the client actually comes from the source server, the embodiment of the present invention divides the client into two parts, namely, an audited party and an auditor, namely, an audited terminal and an auditing terminal in the embodiment of the present invention. It can be understood that, in the embodiment of the present invention, the client side is divided into two parts, namely the executor and the supervisor, to complete the data acquisition work, and the TLS protocol does not need to be modified, so that the server side is not sensitive, and most of the current web pages support the TLS versions 1.0 and 1.1, so that the present invention can be applied to most of the websites.
Further, in step 102, different from the interaction process in the prior art, in the embodiment of the present invention, an interaction process between the audited party and the auditor is established when the session is created, and in the interaction process, in order to ensure security and prevent potential safety hazards such as collusion between the audited party and the auditor or tampering after the audited party obtains a complete key, the auditor sends a partial pre-master password of the auditor to the audited party after RSA encryption. The auditor multiplies the pre-master password with the auditor after the RSA encryption, and then transmits the result to the server, so that the server can decrypt the complete pre-master password through the private key according to the multiplication homomorphism of the RSA. Meanwhile, the auditor and the audited party generate the ServerMac Key and the other three session keys respectively. Wherein the Server Mac Key is a verification Key used by an auditor to verify data.
Finally, in step 103, the auditor can verify the authenticity of the data obtained by the client by using the ServerMac Key. Specifically, the audited party is responsible for generating an attestation file after obtaining the data from the server. The certificate mainly comprises a hash value of data outside the server and a signature of an auditor. Since the ServerMacKey obtained by the auditor needs to be written in the certification file, but in order to ensure that the auditor cannot tamper with the external data after obtaining the complete key, the auditor needs to sign the hash value of the external data obtained from the server. This document provides the user with proof that the data we have provided indeed came from the origin server. Then, the embodiment of the present invention may also perform verification of the certification document, where the verification step is determined according to the generation step, and mainly focuses on verification of the public key, the hash value, and the signature.
According to the method for verifying the real data, the TLS/SSL connection between the server and the audited party is verified through the third-party audit. The auditor and the audited party communicate by using a specific protocol, and simultaneously start to connect to the server, and the auditor can affirmatively prove that the audited party provides data from the server after auditing.
On the basis of the above embodiment, the establishing, by the client, the TLS/SSL connection with the server includes:
the client sends the client random number and the encryption method supported by the client to the server, so that the server sends a digital certificate and the server random number to the client after confirming the encryption method;
after the digital certificate and the server random number sent by the server are received and the digital certificate is verified to be valid, a pre-master password is generated, and the pre-master password is encrypted by using a public key in the digital certificate and then sent to the server so that the server can decrypt the pre-master password according to a private key of the server;
and the server and the client generate a session key according to the encryption method to complete the establishment of the TLS/SSL connection.
As can be seen from the above description of the embodiments, the implementation of the embodiments of the present invention is based on the verification of the TLS/SSL connection between the server and the audited party by a third-party auditor. Then, the auditor and the audited party communicate by using a specific protocol, and simultaneously start to connect to the server, and the auditor can affirmatively declare that the audited party provides the data from the server after the auditor goes through the audit.
Then the specific TLS/SSL connection establishment process is: firstly, a Client gives a protocol version number, a generated random number (Client random) and an encryption method supported by the Client; then the Server confirms the encryption method used by both sides and gives out the digital certificate and a Server generated random number (Server random); the client side confirms that the digital certificate is valid, then a new pre-master password is generated, the random number is encrypted by using a public key in the digital certificate, and the random number is sent to the server; the server uses its own private key to obtain the premaster password sent by the client. The client and the server use the three random numbers to generate a 'conversation key' according to an agreed encryption method, and the 'conversation key' is used for encrypting the whole conversation process. The session Key comprises a Client Write Key, a Server Write Key, a Client MacKey and a Server MacKey. It should be noted that the data transmission process provided by the embodiment of the present invention is the same as the ordinary Http request, except that the data is encrypted by using the Client Write Key and the Server Write Key.
On the basis of the above embodiment, the creating a dialog between the audited terminal and the audited terminal includes:
after the first handshake of the transport layer security TLS protocol, the audited terminal receives a first pre-master password which is sent by the audit terminal and encrypted by RSA;
and the audited terminal multiplies the second pre-main password encrypted by the RSA by the first pre-main password encrypted by the RSA and then sends the multiplied result to the server so that the server can decrypt the complete pre-main password according to the multiplication homomorphism of the RSA.
As can be seen from the content of the above embodiment, the auditing party and the audited party interact with each other in the embodiment of the present invention, and during the interaction, both the auditor and the audited party are responsible for generating a part of the pre-master password. The auditor sends the encrypted pre-master password required by the audited party to the audited party, so that the audited party can generate a 'session key'. Meanwhile, the auditor will obtain the partial generation authentication Key (SeverMac Key) required to generate the authentication Key from the audited party. Thus, the auditor and the auditor do not know the Key of the other party, and the auditor cannot make false data to deceive the auditor under the condition that the auditor does not have the Server Mac Key. And finally, the auditor is responsible for transmitting the encrypted two-part secret key to the server according to the multiplication homomorphism attribute of the RSA.
Furthermore, after the digital certificate of the server is verified, the audited party and the auditor respectively use the public keys transmitted by the server to carry out RSA encryption. In order to allow each party of the client to transmit a complete pre-master password to the server without sharing the two pre-master passwords, the embodiment of the invention utilizes the homomorphic property of RSA encryption:
(RSA(x1)×RSA(x2))mod n＝RSA(x1×x2)；
in order to obtain a string of 48bytes of random data, i.e. a spliced two-part pre-master password, after the server private key is decrypted, the special number of bits of the pre-master password 1(S1) and the pre-master password 2(S2) is defined as follows:
the first 24bytes is S1-48 bytes: 0301 | |12random bytes | |33bytes 00| |01
The last 24bytes is S2-48 bytes: 24bytes 00 < 9random bytes < 14bytes 00 < 01|
Meanwhile, since the RSA algorithm encryption specifies that a random padding string should be added before the message to be encrypted (if there is no padding, RSA encryption is not secure), the complete sequence of the auditor and auditor that is finally formed is:
the auditor: [39bytes P1| |00| | 0301 | |12random bytes | |33bytes 00| |01]
An auditor: [119bytes P2| | |25bytes 00| | |9random bytes | |14bytes 00| |01]
After multiplication of these two sequences, the last 48bytes of the resulting product is the concatenation of the previous S1 and S2, in the form:
00||02||...205bytes of padding...||00||S1||S2
the server receives the RSA-encrypted string of data and decrypts it with its own private key to obtain the complete pre-master password (S1| | S2).
On the basis of the foregoing embodiment, the generating an authentication Key SeverMac Key for the audit terminal includes:
and generating four keys according to a pseudo-random function, wherein one Key is the SeverMac Key and is used for authenticating whether the data comes from the server, and the other three keys are used for data capture and communication with the server.
As can be seen from the above description of the embodiments, the embodiments of the present invention generate the key to allow the auditor to perform authentication according to the key.
Specifically, the embodiment of the invention adopts a pseudo-random function for verification, and the audited party and the auditor use the pseudo-random function:
PRF(secret,label,seed)＝PMD5(S1,label+seed)⊕PSHA-1(S2,label+seed)
respectively and correspondingly generating four keys of a Server MacKey and a ClientWriteKey/Server Mac Key/Client Mac Key, wherein an auditor only generates the Server MacKey, and the SeverMac Key is used for authenticating whether the data comes from the Server; the audited party generates three other keys which are mainly used for data capture and communication with the server; the server side has the complete premaster secret itself so that the complete four session keys can be generated.
On the basis of the above embodiment, the verifying that the data acquired by the client comes from the server according to the SeverMac Key by the auditing terminal includes:
the auditing terminal verifies whether the data provided by the audited terminal is matched with the data provided by the server according to the SeverMac Key;
and if the data provided by the audited terminal is matched with the data provided by the server, verifying that the data acquired by the client comes from the server.
As can be seen from the above description, the embodiment of the present invention requires the auditor to verify the data, and the auditor is responsible for generating a certification document after obtaining the data from the server.
Then the specific verification process is: when an auditor receives a certification document, whether a public key of a certification server is matched with a public key of the certification document or not is determined, the verification method comprises two steps, wherein the first step is as follows: verifying whether the digital certificate has a credible CA signature; the second step is: the public key delivered by the server is extracted and compared with the public key contained in the certificate. After the public key is verified, the information contained in the certificate is verified in one step. A session of audited parties and auditors is first created and initialized. And extracting the certificate from the uploaded certification file, and verifying whether the auditor provides a valid auditor signature. After the valid signature is verified, the auditor verifies whether the data provided by the auditor is matched with the data provided by the Server by using the Server Mac Key. If the certificate is correctly stated to be credible, the data comes from the original server and is not tampered. Otherwise, the verification certificate fails and the data is not matched with the original server.
Fig. 2 is a schematic structural diagram of an actual data verification system provided in an embodiment of the present invention, as shown in fig. 2, including: a connection establishing module 201, a verification key generating module 202 and a data verifying module 203, wherein:
the connection establishing module 201 is used for establishing TLS/SSL connection between a client and a server, and splitting the client into a checked terminal and an auditing terminal;
the verification Key generation module 202 is configured to create a dialog between the audited terminal and the auditing terminal, where the audited terminal generates a Key servermattekey, a Key clientackey, and a Key clientwritekey, and the auditing terminal only generates an authentication Key SeverMac Key;
the data verification module 203 is configured to verify, by the audit terminal, that the data acquired by the audited terminal is consistent with the data of the server according to the SeverMac Key.
Specifically, how to perform the real data verification through the connection establishing module 201, the verification key generating module 202, and the data verifying module 203 may be used to execute the technical solution of the real data verifying method embodiment shown in fig. 1, and the implementation principle and the technical effect are similar, which is not described herein again.
The real data verification system provided by the embodiment of the invention verifies the TLS/SSL connection between the server and the checked party through the third-party verification. The auditor and the audited party communicate by using a specific protocol, and simultaneously start to connect to the server, and the auditor can affirmatively prove that the audited party provides data from the server after auditing.
An embodiment of the present invention provides an electronic device, including: at least one processor; and at least one memory communicatively coupled to the processor, wherein:
fig. 3 is a block diagram of an electronic device according to an embodiment of the present invention, and referring to fig. 3, the electronic device includes: a processor (processor)301, a communication Interface (communication Interface)302, a memory (memory)303 and a bus 304, wherein the processor 301, the communication Interface 302 and the memory 303 complete communication with each other through the bus 304. Processor 301 may call logic instructions in memory 303 to perform the following method: the method comprises the steps that a TLS/SSL connection between a client and a server is established, and the client is divided into a checked terminal and a checking terminal; creating a dialogue between the audited terminal and the auditing terminal, wherein the audited terminal generates a Key ServerwriteKey, a Key clientackey and a Key clientwritekey, and the auditing terminal only generates an identity authentication Key SeverMac Key; and the auditing terminal verifies that the data acquired by the audited terminal is consistent with the data of the server according to the SeverMac Key.
An embodiment of the present invention discloses a computer program product, which includes a computer program stored on a non-transitory computer readable storage medium, the computer program including program instructions, when the program instructions are executed by a computer, the computer can execute the methods provided by the above method embodiments, for example, the method includes: the method comprises the steps that a TLS/SSL connection between a client and a server is established, and the client is divided into a checked terminal and a checking terminal; creating a dialogue between the audited terminal and the auditing terminal, wherein the audited terminal generates a Key ServerwriteKey, a Key clientackey and a Key clientwritekey, and the auditing terminal only generates an identity authentication Key SeverMac Key; and the auditing terminal verifies that the data acquired by the audited terminal is consistent with the data of the server according to the SeverMac Key.
Embodiments of the present invention provide a non-transitory computer-readable storage medium, which stores computer instructions, where the computer instructions cause the computer to perform the methods provided by the above method embodiments, for example, the methods include: the method comprises the steps that a TLS/SSL connection between a client and a server is established, and the client is divided into a checked terminal and a checking terminal; creating a dialogue between the audited terminal and the auditing terminal, wherein the audited terminal generates a Key ServerwriteKey, a Key clientackey and a Key clientwritekey, and the auditing terminal only generates an identity authentication Key SeverMac Key; and the auditing terminal verifies that the data acquired by the audited terminal is consistent with the data of the server according to the SeverMac Key.
Through the above description of the embodiments, those skilled in the art will clearly understand that each embodiment can be implemented by software plus a necessary general hardware platform, and certainly can also be implemented by hardware. With this understanding in mind, the above-described technical solutions may be embodied in the form of a software product, which can be stored in a computer-readable storage medium such as ROM/RAM, magnetic disk, optical disk, etc., and includes instructions for causing a computer device (which may be a personal computer, a server, or a network device, etc.) to execute the method according to each embodiment or some parts of the embodiments.
Finally, it should be noted that: the above examples are only intended to illustrate the technical solution of the present invention, but not to limit it; although the present invention has been described in detail with reference to the foregoing embodiments, it will be understood by those of ordinary skill in the art that: the technical solutions described in the foregoing embodiments may still be modified, or some technical features may be equivalently replaced; and such modifications or substitutions do not depart from the spirit and scope of the corresponding technical solutions of the embodiments of the present invention.
Claims (5)
1. A method for authenticating authentic data, comprising:
the method comprises the steps that a TLS/SSL connection between a client and a server is established, and the client is divided into a checked terminal and a checking terminal;
establishing a dialogue between the audited terminal and the auditing terminal, wherein the audited terminal generates a Key Server Write Key, a Key Client Mac Key and a Key Client Write Key, and the auditing terminal only generates an identity verification Key Server Mac Key;
the auditing terminal verifies that the data acquired by the audited terminal is consistent with the data of the server according to the server Mac Key;
further, the creating a dialog between the audited terminal and the audited terminal includes:
after the first handshake of the transport layer security TLS protocol, the audited terminal receives a first pre-master password which is sent by the audit terminal and encrypted by RSA;
the audited terminal multiplies the second pre-master password encrypted by RSA with the first pre-master password encrypted by RSA and then sends the multiplied result to the server so that the server can decrypt the complete pre-master password according to RSA multiplication homomorphism;
further, the generating of the Key Server Write Key, the Key Client Mac Key and the Key Client Write Key by the audited terminal, the generating of the authentication Key Server Mac Key only by the audited terminal, includes:
according to a pseudo-random function: the method comprises the steps that PRF (secret, label, seed) ═ PMD5(S1, label + seed) & gt PSHA-1(S2, label + seed) is generated and correspondingly four keys of a Server Mac Key and a Client Write Key/Server Write Key/Client Mac Key are generated respectively, wherein an auditing terminal only generates the Server Mac Key which is used for authenticating whether the data come from the Server; the audited terminal generates three other keys for data capture and communication with the server;
wherein PRF () is the pseudo-random function; secret is the complete pre-master password; s1 is the first pre-master password; s2 is the second pre-master password; the table is a label of the pseudorandom function; seed is the seed number of the pseudo-random function; PMD5() and PSHA-1() are iterative operation functions;
further, the auditing terminal only generates a Server Mac Key, and the Server Mac Key is used for authenticating whether the data comes from the Server, and the method includes the following steps:
the auditing terminal verifies whether the data provided by the audited terminal is matched with the data provided by the server according to the Server Mac Key;
and if the data provided by the audited terminal is matched with the data provided by the server, verifying that the data acquired by the client comes from the server.
2. The method of claim 1, wherein the client establishing a TLS/SSL connection with a server comprises:
the client sends the client random number and the encryption method supported by the client to the server, so that the server sends a digital certificate and the server random number to the client after confirming the encryption method;
after the digital certificate and the server random number sent by the server are received and the digital certificate is verified to be valid, a pre-master password is generated, and the pre-master password is encrypted by using a public key in the digital certificate and then sent to the server so that the server can decrypt the pre-master password according to a private key of the server;
and the server and the client generate a session key according to the encryption method to complete the establishment of the TLS/SSL connection.
3. An authenticity data verification system, comprising:
the connection establishing module is used for establishing TLS/SSL connection between the client and the server and dividing the client into a checked terminal and an auditing terminal;
the verification Key generation module is used for creating a dialogue between the audited terminal and the auditing terminal, the audited terminal generates a Key Server Write Key, a Key Client Mac Key and a Key Client Write Key, and the auditing terminal only generates an identity verification Key Server Mac Key;
the data verification module is used for verifying that the data acquired by the terminal to be verified is consistent with the data of the server according to the server Mac Key by the verification terminal;
the creating of the dialog between the audited terminal and the auditing terminal includes:
after the first handshake of the transport layer security TLS protocol, the audited terminal receives a first pre-master password which is sent by the audit terminal and encrypted by RSA;
the audited terminal multiplies the second pre-master password encrypted by RSA with the first pre-master password encrypted by RSA and then sends the multiplied result to the server so that the server can decrypt the complete pre-master password according to RSA multiplication homomorphism;
the audited terminal generates a Key Server Write Key, a Key Client Mac Key and a Key Client Write Key, and the audited terminal only generates an identity verification Key Server Mac Key, including:
according to a pseudo-random function: the method comprises the steps that PRF (secret, label, seed) ═ PMD5(S1, label + seed) & gt PSHA-1(S2, label + seed) is generated and correspondingly four keys of a Server Mac Key and a Client Write Key/Server Write Key/Client Mac Key are generated respectively, wherein an auditing terminal only generates the Server Mac Key which is used for authenticating whether the data come from the Server; the audited terminal generates three other keys for data capture and communication with the server;
wherein PRF () is the pseudo-random function; secret is the complete pre-master password; s1 is the first pre-master password; s2 is the second pre-master password; the table is a label of the pseudorandom function; seed is the seed number of the pseudo-random function; PMD5() and PSHA-1() are iterative operation functions;
the auditing terminal only generates a Server Mac Key which is used for authenticating whether the data come from the Server or not, and the auditing terminal comprises the following steps:
the auditing terminal verifies whether the data provided by the audited terminal is matched with the data provided by the server according to the Server Mac Key;
and if the data provided by the audited terminal is matched with the data provided by the server, verifying that the data acquired by the client comes from the server.
4. An electronic device, comprising a memory and a processor, wherein the processor and the memory communicate with each other via a bus; the memory stores program instructions executable by the processor, the processor invoking the program instructions to perform the method of any of claims 1 to 2.
5. A non-transitory computer-readable storage medium storing computer instructions that cause a computer to perform the method of any one of claims 1-2.
Priority Applications (1)
| Application Number | Priority Date | Filing Date | Title |
|---|---|---|---|
| CN201910023880.7A CN109902515B (en) | 2019-01-10 | 2019-01-10 | True data verification method and system |
Applications Claiming Priority (1)
| Application Number | Priority Date | Filing Date | Title |
|---|---|---|---|
| CN201910023880.7A CN109902515B (en) | 2019-01-10 | 2019-01-10 | True data verification method and system |
Publications (2)
| Publication Number | Publication Date |
|---|---|
| CN109902515A CN109902515A (en) | 2019-06-18 |
| CN109902515B true CN109902515B (en) | 2021-07-20 |
Family
ID=66943584
Family Applications (1)
| Application Number | Title | Priority Date | Filing Date |
|---|---|---|---|
| CN201910023880.7A Active CN109902515B (en) | 2019-01-10 | 2019-01-10 | True data verification method and system |
Country Status (1)
| Country | Link |
|---|---|
| CN (1) | CN109902515B (en) |
Families Citing this family (1)
| Publication number | Priority date | Publication date | Assignee | Title |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| CN110674531B (en) * | 2019-10-11 | 2023-06-27 | 腾讯科技（深圳）有限公司 | Residential information management method, device, server and medium based on block chain |
Family Cites Families (8)
| Publication number | Priority date | Publication date | Assignee | Title |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| CN102932350B (en) * | 2012-10-31 | 2016-06-15 | 华为技术有限公司 | A kind of method and apparatus of TLS scanning |
| CN102984127B (en) * | 2012-11-05 | 2015-06-03 | 武汉大学 | User-centered mobile internet identity managing and identifying method |
| CN103118027B (en) * | 2013-02-05 | 2016-01-20 | 中金金融认证中心有限公司 | The method of TLS passage is set up based on the close algorithm of state |
| US9184911B2 (en) * | 2014-04-08 | 2015-11-10 | Cloudflare, Inc. | Secure session capability using public-key cryptography without access to the private key |
| CN105827402B (en) * | 2016-05-18 | 2019-08-20 | 武汉理工大学 | A kind of distribution is open to can verify that random digit generation method |
| CN106790090A (en) * | 2016-12-23 | 2017-05-31 | 北京奇虎科技有限公司 | Communication means, apparatus and system based on SSL |
| KR101999209B1 (en) * | 2016-12-30 | 2019-07-11 | 홍익대학교 산학협력단 | A system and method for encryption of pointers to virtual function tables |
| CN107172056A (en) * | 2017-05-31 | 2017-09-15 | 福建中金在线信息科技有限公司 | A kind of channel safety determines method, device, system, client and server |
-
2019
- 2019-01-10 CN CN201910023880.7A patent/CN109902515B/en active Active
Also Published As
| Publication number | Publication date |
|---|---|
| CN109902515A (en) | 2019-06-18 |
Similar Documents
| Publication | Publication Date | Title |
|---|---|---|
| CN108092776B (en) | System based on identity authentication server and identity authentication token | |
| CN110832519B (en) | Improving integrity of communications between a blockchain network and external data sources | |
| CN109309565B (en) | Security authentication method and device | |
| CN110401615B (en) | Identity authentication method, device, equipment, system and readable storage medium | |
| CN111740844A (en) | SSL communication method and device based on hardware cryptographic algorithm | |
| CN103095456B (en) | The processing method of transaction message and system | |
| US10797868B2 (en) | Shared secret establishment | |
| CN111526023B (en) | Block chain uplink data security authentication method and system based on IPK | |
| CN109728909A (en) | Identity identifying method and system based on USBKey | |
| CN110099048B (en) | Cloud storage method and equipment | |
| CN112801663B (en) | Blockchain certification method, device, system, equipment and medium | |
| CN110519309A (en) | Data transmission method, device, terminal, server and storage medium | |
| CN111464315B (en) | Digital signature processing method, device, computer equipment and storage medium | |
| KR101879758B1 (en) | Method for Generating User Digital Certificate for Individual User Terminal and for Authenticating Using the Same Digital Certificate | |
| WO2015158172A1 (en) | User identity identification card | |
| CN109905384B (en) | Data migration method and system | |
| CN116582266B (en) | Electronic signature method, electronic signature system, and readable storage medium | |
| WO2015109958A1 (en) | Data processing method based on negotiation key, and mobile phone | |
| CN110611679A (en) | Data transmission method, device, equipment and system | |
| CN109902515B (en) | True data verification method and system | |
| WO2023284691A1 (en) | Account opening method, system, and apparatus | |
| CN111539032B (en) | Electronic signature application system resistant to quantum computing disruption and implementation method thereof | |
| Diaz et al. | On securing online registration protocols: Formal verification of a new proposal | |
| CN108768958B (en) | Verification method for data integrity and source based on no leakage of verified information by third party | |
| TWI576779B (en) | Method and Method of Payment Authentication System for Internet of Things |
Legal Events
| Date | Code | Title | Description |
|---|---|---|---|
| PB01 | Publication | ||
| PB01 | Publication | ||
| SE01 | Entry into force of request for substantive examination | ||
| SE01 | Entry into force of request for substantive examination | ||
| GR01 | Patent grant | ||
| GR01 | Patent grant | ||
| CB03 | Change of inventor or designer information |
Inventor after: Yang Wentao Inventor after: Wang Hu Inventor after: Chen Chang Inventor after: Tang Yiwen Inventor after: Tang Ling Inventor after: Xuan Songtao Inventor before: Wang Hu Inventor before: Yang Wentao Inventor before: Chen Chang Inventor before: Tang Yiwen Inventor before: Tang Ling Inventor before: Xuan Songtao |
|
| CB03 | Change of inventor or designer information |