CN109831431B - Random number encryption method for service provider to initiate generation of access request - Google Patents
Random number encryption method for service provider to initiate generation of access request Download PDFInfo
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Abstract
The invention discloses a random number encryption method and a random number encryption system for a service provider to initiate and generate an access request, wherein the random number encryption method comprises a service provider H5 end, a service provider gateway server end and a service provider authentication end, and all the ends are interactive. The invention solves the problems of data leakage, uncontrollable data use, increased third party APP size, long access period, complex flow and higher development cost when a service provider service is accessed to a third party to initiate generation of an access request in the prior art, and provides the random number encryption method and the system for the service provider to initiate generation of the access request.
Description
Technical Field
The invention relates to a computer network security verification access technology, in particular to a random number encryption method for a service provider to initiate and generate an access request.
Background
Existing third party access service provider service methods can be roughly divided into two categories: (1) an interface access method. The service provider provides an interface, and a third party submits a request and acquires return data through a background request server interface; (2) and (3) an SDK access method. And the third party introduces the SDK of the service provider to join the own APP, and requests to call the service party interface to submit the request and acquire the returned data through a method provided by the SDK. The interface access method is characterized in that a request is initiated by a background service of a third party, but not a direct request of a front-end code of a foreground, a service provider interface is not exposed at the front end, and a back-end agreed encryption authentication flow is accessed at the back end, so that the interface safety of the service provider is guaranteed, even if an abnormal condition occurs, the service provider can timely limit the current or cut off the service to a certain third party, and great loss is avoided. However, this access method has a drawback that only the provided interface unconditionally returns a corresponding result as long as the third party initiates a request for passing authentication, but there is no restriction on the third party, and the third party can retain data to establish its second local library, modify and modify the data and return the modified data to the front-end user, and the service provider cannot control and identify such actions, which may bring a certain reputation risk to the service provider, especially in the financial industry, such a risk is particularly prominent in terms of competition in the same industry and financial compliance. For example, an APP with the name of a certain bank provides the service of opening two types of accounts on line, and is really cooperative with a certain bank, a certain bank provides two types of account opening interfaces, but the three-party APP retains sensitive information provided by the user registering the second class of users before requesting the interface, such as name, ID card, mobile phone number, and even the image data of the front and back sides of ID card, and the image data of hand-held ID card, the important information is retained by the third party but certain bank cannot be judged, because the information is sent by the third party, as for what certain bank can not be controlled before, the user also considers that the information of the user is given to certain bank, the important information which is not known to the user is also retained to the third party, the risk brought in the follow-up process is difficult to estimate, and if the information is leaked by the third party or utilized to do some illegal events, the reputation risk can be generated in certain bank. The SDK access method is divided into two types, one is the SDK without the front end page, and the other is the SDK with the front end page.
The principle of the access method without the front-end page SDK is that a service provider provides a native SDK to be added into a third-party APP, the third-party development front end calls a method in the SDK to carry out an encryption authentication process, the interface of the service provider is requested to acquire data through the authenticated interface request method provided by the SDK, the authentication is only put at a primary end but not at a back end, so that the interface of the service provider and the encryption and decryption authentication method can be found only by decompiling and cracking the APP of a third party and the primary SDK of the service provider in terms of safety, the conventional APP is generally reinforced and shelled, therefore, the security is still harder to break, but is slightly less secure than the interface access method, because the difficulty of breaking the decompilation of an APP is still smaller than the difficulty of breaking a back-end server, this method also risks third parties to retain data and modify data, as does the interface access method. The principle of the access method including the front-end page SDK is that the SDK provided by the service provider not only provides an authentication and request method, but also provides the front-end page in the SDK, the third party only needs to call up a starting method of the SDK, the subsequent pages and the data interaction of the pages are all self-owned by the service provider, the third party has no relation at all, and only one result is returned to the third party after the service flow of the service provider is completed, in this way, the self-help service system can be regarded as an independent service supply by the self, thereby avoiding the risk of three parties retaining data and modifying data in an interface access method and an access method without a front-end page SDK, because the third party does not know how you are interacting at all, the entire process is a black box for the third party unless the third party is going to crack the SDK provided by the decompiling service provider. The development amount is very small when the third party accesses, the access is fast, the third party is happy, and certainly, as with the access method without the front-end page SDK, if someone cracks the APP of the decompiling third party and further cracks the SDK of the service provider, the interface and the encryption and decryption authentication method of the service provider can be found out. However, the SDK access mode in the market at present has no interface access mode, and there are three points to the reason. First, what many third parties are not well able to accept is that joining the SDK can increase the size of their APP, because the APP is too large, can directly result in the user not being able to download the APP in time (apple APP store exceeds 150M and cannot be downloaded with traffic, many mainstream android application markets also have similar settings), meet a service and add an SDK, whichever APP now certainly does not meet a service provider more than, if each family is the mode that the SDK accesses, the size of this APP can certainly not be small, except for platform restriction, the APP too large user also is not willing to spend traffic and memory space to download, this can directly influence the installation rate and the rate of usage of this APP, influence its propagation and marketing. Second, issue the version problem, after the third party adds the SDK, APP will be updated after, new function just can be opened, will go to once to send the version flow, goes apple shop and android application market to go to upload the package again, wants the user to go to update this APP of installation on his cell-phone, and whole cycle is very long uncontrollable, and the flow is loaded down with trivial details, and the transmission conversion rate is lower, experiences also than the poor to the user. Third, many service providers are also reluctant to use SDK access because, in addition to being less acceptable by third parties, development and maintenance costs, one version of IOS, one version of Android, and the costs of maintaining and developing both versions are relatively large.
Therefore, although the access method comprising the front page SDK looks good, more service providers are willing to select a third party which believes cooperation and are not willing to use the method, the service providers sell own services after all, the third parties are clients of the service providers, and the clients are enabled to more conveniently access own services on the premise of safety by taking the benefits of the clients as starting points. Although the interface access method used by the third party has a small development amount, the data can be stored, the third party can master the data, and the third party can accept the data.
Disclosure of Invention
The invention solves the problems of data leakage, uncontrollable data use, increased third party APP size, long access period, complex flow and higher development cost when a service provider service is accessed to a third party to initiate generation of an access request in the prior art, and provides a random number encryption method for the service provider to initiate generation of the access request. The invention is realized by the following technical scheme: the random number encryption method for the service provider to initiate the generation of the access request comprises a service provider H5 end, a service provider gateway server end and a service provider authentication end, wherein the interaction of the service provider H5 end and the service provider gateway server end comprises the following steps: D. the method comprises the steps that a service provider H5 side initiates a request for generating an access key VT to a service provider through a service provider gateway server side, wherein parameters of the request comprise an access key AT, and the access key AT is encrypted by using a random number as a key; E. after receiving the request for generating the access key VT in the step D, the service provider authentication end in the service provider decrypts the request for generating the access key VT to decrypt the AT and check the authenticity of the AT, and when the AT is true, the access key VT is generated and returned to the service provider H5 end through the service provider gateway service end, and the function of the AT as the access key is disabled; F. the service provider H5 decrypts VT by random number, opens and renders H5 product page, and develops various external services for H5 products. Further, the service provider initiates a random number encryption method for generating an access request, in step D, the service provider H5 initiates a request for generating an access key VT to the service provider through the service provider gateway server, and request parameters of the request include an asymmetrically encrypted public key AK and an access key AT of the service provider gateway server. Further, the service provider initiates a random number encryption method for generating an access request, and after the access key AT in the request parameter is encrypted by using the random number as a key, the request is encrypted by using the asymmetric encryption public key AK of the gateway server of the service provider. Further, the specific process of decrypting the request for generating the access key VT by the service provider authentication end in the service provider after receiving the request for generating the access key VT in step E is as follows: and D, after receiving the request in the step D, the service provider authentication end decrypts the request by using a private key SK corresponding to the asymmetric encrypted public key AK of the service provider gateway server end, and then decrypts the AT by using the decrypted random number as a key. Further, the service provider initiates a random number encryption method for generating an access request, and in step E, the service provider authentication end stores the generated access key VT in correspondence with the previously registered account siteld of the third party AT the service provider, the account appId of the service provider H5 end, and the three-party account userId of the client of the third party when the AT request is generated.
The random number encryption system for the service provider to initiate the generation of the access request comprises a service provider H5 terminal, a service provider gateway server terminal and a service provider authentication terminal, wherein: the service provider H5 terminal is used for initiating a request for generating an access key VT to a service provider through a service provider gateway server, wherein parameters of the request comprise the access key AT, the access key AT is encrypted by using a random number as a key, and is also used for receiving the access key VT generated by returning to a service provider authentication terminal through the service provider gateway server, and is also used for decrypting VT through the random number, opening and rendering an H5 product page and developing various external services for carrying out H5 products; and the service provider authentication end is used for decrypting the request for generating the access key VT after receiving the request for generating the access key VT initiated by the service provider H5 end, decrypting the AT and checking the authenticity of the AT, generating the access key VT and returning the access key VT to the service provider H5 end through the service provider gateway server end when the AT is true, and disabling the function of the AT as the access key. Further, a service provider initiates a random number encryption system for generating an access request, a service provider H5 initiates a request for generating an access key VT to the service provider through a service provider gateway server, and request parameters of the request further include an asymmetric encrypted public key AK of the service provider gateway server. Further, a service provider initiates a random number encryption system for generating an access request, and the specific process of decrypting the request for generating the access key VT by the authentication end of the service provider is as follows: and D, after receiving the request in the step D, the service provider authentication end decrypts the request by using a private key SK corresponding to the asymmetric encrypted public key AK of the service provider gateway server end, and then decrypts the AT by using the decrypted random number as a key. Compared with the prior art, the invention has the following advantages and beneficial effects: 1. when the method is applied, the service of the service provider is accessed to the third party to generate the access request, and the random number is used for encryption, so that data leakage is prevented. 2. The method is applied, the data use is controllable, and the size of the third-party APP is reduced. 3. The invention has short access period, simple flow and low development cost.
Drawings
The accompanying drawings, which are included to provide a further understanding of the embodiments of the invention and are incorporated in and constitute a part of this application, illustrate embodiment(s) of the invention and together with the description serve to explain the principles of the invention. In the drawings: FIG. 1 is a schematic structural view of the present invention; fig. 2 is a timing chart of the external output of H5 service in the present invention.
Detailed Description
In order to make the objects, technical solutions and advantages of the present invention more apparent, the present invention is further described in detail below with reference to examples and accompanying drawings, and the exemplary embodiments and descriptions thereof are only used for explaining the present invention and are not meant to limit the present invention.
Example 1
As shown in fig. 1 to fig. 2, the third party secure access method in the form of the application of the service provider H5 includes a third party backend, a service provider H5 terminal, a service provider gateway server terminal, a service provider authentication terminal, and a service provider backend, and each terminal interactively includes the following steps: A. a user of a client of a third party clicks an entrance request to enter a service application provided by a service provider and notifies a message to the back end of the third party; B. the third party back end initiates a request (Access Token, AT for short) for generating an Access key AT to the service provider through the gateway server of the service provider, and the service provider generates the Access key AT and transmits the Access key AT back to the third party back end through the gateway server of the service provider; C. after receiving the encrypted AT, the third party back end decrypts the AT, and the reverse AT obtains AK (AppKey, AK for short), wherein the AK is an asymmetric encrypted public key of a gateway server of a service provider, and the URL address of the H5 end of the service provider is opened in the webView of the third party with parameters of the AT and the AK, and the H5 end of the service provider temporarily stores the AT and the AK in a sessionStorage of an embedded browser of the APP of the third party; D. a service provider H5 initiates a request for generating an access key VT (Visit Token, VT for short) to a service provider through a service provider gateway, wherein parameters of the request comprise an access key AT, and the access key AT is encrypted by using a random number as a key; E. after receiving the request for generating the access key VT in the step D, the service provider authentication end in the service provider decrypts the request for generating the access key VT to decrypt the AT and check the authenticity of the AT, and when the AT is true, the access key VT is generated and returned to the service provider H5 end through the service provider gateway service end, and the function of the AT as the access key is disabled; F. the service provider H5 decrypts VT by using random numbers, opens and renders an H5 product page, and develops various external services for H5 products; G. a service provider H5 terminal initiates a service message request to a service provider rear terminal through a service provider gateway server, and request parameters of the service message request are firstly encrypted by random numbers, then encrypted by VT and then encrypted by AK; H. after receiving a service message request initiated by a service provider H5, the service provider authentication end decrypts the service message request to obtain an initial real service message parameter, initiates a service request to a service provider rear end by using the service message parameter, returns the data requested back, and encrypts and returns the returned message to the service provider H5 by using VT; I. the service provider H5 side receives the returned message, decrypts the message by VT and renders the returned data. And in the step B, the third party back end initiates a request for generating the access key AT to the service provider through the gateway server of the service provider, wherein the transfer parameters of the request comprise a registration account siteId of the third party on the service provider, an account appId of the H5 of the service provider and a three-party account userId of a client of the third party.
The specific process that the service provider generates the access key AT and transmits the access key AT back to the third party back end through the gateway server of the service provider in the step B is as follows: and the service provider authentication end decrypts the check label and verifies the registered account siteId of the third party AT the service provider and the account appId of the service provider H5, and then returns the encrypted access key AT. The access key AT is reversible. The access key AT in the step B includes an asymmetrically encrypted public key AK of the gateway server of the service provider, and a secretekey (SK for short) stored in the authentication side of the service provider. In the step D, the service provider H5 initiates a request for generating the access key VT to the service provider through the service provider gateway server, where request parameters of the request include the asymmetric encrypted public key AK and the access key AT of the service provider gateway server. And after the access key AT in the request parameter is encrypted by taking the random number as a key, the request is encrypted by using the asymmetric encryption public key AK of the gateway server of the service provider. After receiving the request for generating the access key VT in step E, the specific process of decrypting the request for generating the access key VT by the authentication end of the service provider in the service provider is as follows: and D, after receiving the request in the step D, the service provider authentication end decrypts the request by using a private key SK corresponding to the asymmetric encrypted public key AK of the service provider gateway server end, and then decrypts the AT by using the decrypted random number as a key. In the step E, the service provider authentication end correspondingly stores the generated access key VT with the previously generated registration account siteId of the third party AT the service provider, the account appId of the service provider H5 and the three-party account userId of the client of the third party when the AT request is generated. The service message request in step G further includes a parameter AK, a siteld of a registered account of the third party at the service provider, an account appId of the service provider H5 side, and a three-party account userId of a client of the third party. After receiving the service message request initiated by the service provider H5 in step H, the specific process of decrypting the service message request by the service provider authentication end is as follows: the method comprises the steps of firstly decrypting a requested service message by using a private key SK corresponding to an asymmetric encrypted public key AK of a gateway server side of a service provider, then routing to a corresponding VT according to a registered account siteId of a third party at the service provider, an account appId of an H5 side of the service provider and a three-party account userId of a client of the third party, decrypting by using the VT, and then decrypting by using a decrypted random number to obtain an initial real service message parameter. When the method is applied, the service provider service is accessed to the third party to generate the access request, the random number encryption is used, data leakage is prevented, the data use is controllable, the size of the third party APP is reduced, the access period is short, the flow is simple, and the development cost is reduced.
Example 2
The random number encryption system for the service provider to initiate the generation of the access request comprises a service provider H5 terminal, a service provider gateway server terminal and a service provider authentication terminal, wherein:
a service provider H5 end for initiating a request for generating an access key VT to a service provider through a service provider gateway server end, wherein the parameters of the request include an access key AT, the access key AT is encrypted by using a random number as a key and also uses the random number as the key
After receiving an access key VT generated by a service provider gateway server end and returned to a service provider authentication end, the service provider gateway server end is also used for decrypting the VT through a random number, opening and rendering an H5 product page and developing various external services for carrying out H5 products; and the service provider authentication end is used for decrypting the request for generating the access key VT after receiving the request for generating the access key VT initiated by the service provider H5 end, decrypting the AT and checking the authenticity of the AT, generating the access key VT and returning the access key VT to the service provider H5 end through the service provider gateway server end when the AT is true, and disabling the function of the AT as the access key. The service provider H5 initiates a request for generating an access key VT to the service provider through the service provider gateway server, where the request parameters of the request further include an asymmetrically encrypted public key AK of the service provider gateway server. The specific process of decrypting the request for generating the access key VT by the service provider authentication end is as follows: and D, after receiving the request in the step D, the service provider authentication end decrypts the request by using a private key SK corresponding to the asymmetric encrypted public key AK of the service provider gateway server end, and then decrypts the AT by using the decrypted random number as a key.
The above-mentioned embodiments are intended to illustrate the objects, technical solutions and advantages of the present invention in further detail, and it should be understood that the above-mentioned embodiments are merely exemplary embodiments of the present invention, and are not intended to limit the scope of the present invention, and any modifications, equivalent substitutions, improvements and the like made within the spirit and principle of the present invention should be included in the scope of the present invention.
Claims (6)
1. The random number encryption method for generating the access request initiated by the service provider is characterized by comprising a service provider H5 end, a service provider gateway server end and a service provider authentication end, wherein the interaction of the service provider H5 end and the service provider gateway server end comprises the following steps:
D. the method comprises the steps that a service provider H5 side initiates a request for generating an access key VT to a service provider through a service provider gateway server side, the parameters of the request comprise an access key AT, and after the access key AT is encrypted by using a random number as a key, the request is encrypted by using an asymmetric encryption public key AK of the service provider gateway server side;
E. after receiving the request for generating the access key VT in the step D, the service provider authentication end in the service provider decrypts the request for generating the access key VT to decrypt the AT and check the authenticity of the AT, and when the AT is true, the access key VT is generated and returned to the service provider H5 end through the service provider gateway service end, and the function of the AT as the access key is disabled;
F. the service provider H5 decrypts VT by random number, opens and renders H5 product page, and develops various external services for H5 products.
2. The method as claimed in claim 1, wherein in step D, the service provider H5 initiates a request for generating an access key VT to the service provider through the service provider gateway server, and the request parameters of the request include an asymmetrically encrypted public key AK and an access key AT of the service provider gateway server.
3. The random number encryption method for the service provider to initiate the generation of the access request according to claim 2, wherein after receiving the request for generating the access key VT in step E, the specific process of the service provider authentication end in the service provider for decrypting the request for generating the access key VT is as follows: and D, after receiving the request in the step D, the service provider authentication end decrypts the request by using a private key SK corresponding to the asymmetric encrypted public key AK of the service provider gateway server end, and then decrypts the AT by using the decrypted random number as a key.
4. The random number encryption method for generating an access request initiated by a service provider according to claim 1, wherein in the step E, the service provider authentication end correspondingly stores the generated access key VT with a registered account siteld of a third party AT the service provider, an account appId of a service provider H5 end, and a three-party account userId of a client of the third party when the AT request is generated before.
5. The random number encryption system for the service provider to initiate the generation of the access request is characterized by comprising a service provider H5 end, a service provider gateway server end and a service provider authentication end, wherein:
the service provider H5 is used for initiating a request for generating an access key VT to a service provider through a service provider gateway server, wherein parameters of the request comprise an access key AT and an asymmetric encrypted public key AK of the service provider gateway server, the access key AT is encrypted by using a random number as a key, and is also used for receiving the access key VT generated by passing back a service provider authentication end through the service provider gateway server, decrypting VT through the random number, opening and rendering an H5 product page, and developing various external services for carrying out H5 products;
and the service provider authentication end is used for decrypting the request for generating the access key VT after receiving the request for generating the access key VT initiated by the service provider H5 end, decrypting the AT and checking the authenticity of the AT, generating the access key VT and returning the access key VT to the service provider H5 end through the service provider gateway server end when the AT is true, and disabling the function of the AT as the access key.
6. The system as claimed in claim 5, wherein the specific process of the service provider authentication end decrypting the request for generating the access key VT is as follows: and D, after receiving the request in the step D, the service provider authentication end decrypts the request by using a private key SK corresponding to the asymmetric encrypted public key AK of the service provider gateway server end, and then decrypts the AT by using the decrypted random number as a key.
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