CN109785139A - A kind of data sharing motivational techniques based on intelligent contract - Google Patents
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Abstract
The invention belongs to data sharing research fields, more particularly to a kind of data sharing motivational techniques based on intelligent contract, the following steps are included: the intelligent contract in the present invention can count the user's ratio P2 for participating in data sharing in the current game stage when user participates in data sharing；Judge to participate in whether cost collects maximum；Judge whether P2 reaches 95%, resetting participates in user's ratio of data sharing, into next game stage, and uses next orderly participation cost；The present invention proposes and analyzes the data sharing excitation model EGI based on evolutionary game theory, proposes excitation/participation cost parameter.By Evolutionarily Stable Strategy and dynamic replication dynamic analysis, excitation/influence of the participation cost parameter to Evolutionarily Stable Strategy is had found.To propose the template mechanism of the intelligent contract based on EGI model, it is intended to which dynamic adjustment excitation/participation cost, to motivate more users to participate in data sharing, experience data shares bring income.
Description
Technical field
The invention belongs to data sharing research fields, and in particular to a kind of data sharing excitation side based on intelligent contract
Method.
Background technique
Current data sharing method mainly includes traditional data-sharing scheme and centralized data-sharing scheme: tradition
Data-sharing scheme realize intra-sharing using traditional secret protection means, while refuse it is open and shared, it is sudden and violent to reduce
Reveal the risk of private data.Centralized data-sharing scheme is that the third-party institution is shared to the opening of data, each data institute
The person of having trusts the third-party institution and opens data to the third-party institution.Existing tradition secret sharing refusal opens, hidden to reduce
Private risk does not simply fail to the potential value of mining data, and cannot maximize its interests, leads to the lag of informatization；
Although centralized data-sharing scheme solves the problems, such as mutually mistrustful, it is caused by third-party institution's data set
Safety problem.The third-party institution, which not can guarantee absolute data safety, will generate serious consequence once leaking data occurs.Phase
The shared relationship formation mutually trusted is one of still unsolved problem of current data sharing.Block chain technology is in distributed environment
Under, solve the problems, such as Byzantium general, with unique fault tolerant mechanism, common recognition mechanism and cryptography make it have decentralization,
Collective maintenance, it is programmable and secure and trusted the features such as, the trust problem in effective solution distributed environment.It is with block chain
The data sharing system of basic platform has the innate advantage for solving trust problem.Data sharing based on block chain technology is not lost
For a completely new thinking.But the driving due to lacking economy, interests, cause the shared wish of user not high.And block
Any transaction of chain user needs to pay certain expense, and user sharing wish reduces again.
Summary of the invention
It is optimized integration it is an object of the invention to block chain technology, a kind of data sharing based on evolutionary game theory is provided
Motivational techniques.
A kind of data sharing motivational techniques based on intelligent contract, comprising the following steps:
(1) when user participates in data sharing, the intelligent contract in the present invention can count current game stage participation data
Shared user's ratio P2；
(2) judge to participate in whether cost collects maximum, if participating in cost reaches maximum, go to step (3), otherwise go to
Step (9)；
(3) judge whether P2 reaches 95%, if reaching 95%, for saturation state, go to step (4), otherwise go to step
It is rapid 5)；
(4) resetting participates in user's ratio of data sharing, into next game stage, and using next orderly
Participate in cost；
(5) the threshold values P1 of user's ratio of current game stage participation data sharing is calculated；
(6) judge the size of P2 and P1, if P2 is greater than P1, turn to step (7), otherwise turn to step (8)；
(7) current participation cost is returned；
(8) excitation is returned；
(9) number of users for participating in data sharing is updated；
(10) the return value for receiving intelligent contract of the invention needs to apply excitation to user or participates in cost.
The return excitation, comprising:
If the user interacted selects to be not involved in strategy:
The then excitation that each user is returned are as follows:
μln(1+R)
Wherein, μ ln (1+R) > 0, μ are zooming parameter, and R is cost of investment parameter；
If the user interacted selects to participate in strategy:
The then excitation that each user is returned are as follows:
γμln(1+R)-τ-C
If a part of user selects to participate in strategy and another part user selection is not involved in strategy:
The excitation for then selecting the user for participating in strategy to be returned are as follows:
μln(1+R)-τ-C
Then selection is not involved in the excitation that the user of strategy is returned are as follows:
μln(1+R)
Wherein, γ is shared income and γ > 1, μ are zooming parameter, and R is cost of investment parameter, and τ is sharing cost and τ >
0, C is excitation parameters.
The beneficial effects of the present invention are:
Data sharing motivational techniques of the present invention propose and analyze the data sharing excitation based on evolutionary game theory
Model E GI proposes excitation/participation cost parameter.By Evolutionarily Stable Strategy and dynamic replication dynamic analysis, have found sharp
Encourage/participate in influence of the cost parameter to Evolutionarily Stable Strategy.To propose the template mechanism of the intelligent contract based on EGI model,
It is intended to dynamic and adjusts excitation/participation cost, to motivate more users to participate in data sharing, experience data is shared bring and received
Benefit.
Detailed description of the invention
Fig. 1 is the Evolutionarily Stable Strategy tendency chart of EGI excitation model；
Fig. 2 is intelligent contract template mechanism choice；
Fig. 3 is EGI_GetCost () method flow diagram；
Specific embodiment
The present invention is described further with reference to the accompanying drawing.
Current data sharing method mainly includes traditional data-sharing scheme and centralized data-sharing scheme: tradition
Data-sharing scheme realize intra-sharing using traditional secret protection means, while refuse it is open and shared, it is sudden and violent to reduce
Reveal the risk of private data.Centralized data-sharing scheme is that the third-party institution is shared to the opening of data, each data institute
The person of having trusts the third-party institution and opens data to the third-party institution.Existing tradition secret sharing refusal opens, hidden to reduce
Private risk does not simply fail to the potential value of mining data, and cannot maximize its interests, leads to the lag of informatization；
Although centralized data-sharing scheme solves the problems, such as mutually mistrustful, it is caused by third-party institution's data set
Safety problem.The third-party institution, which not can guarantee absolute data safety, will generate serious consequence once leaking data occurs.Phase
The shared relationship formation mutually trusted is one of still unsolved problem of current data sharing.Block chain technology is in distributed environment
Under, solve the problems, such as Byzantium general, with unique fault tolerant mechanism, common recognition mechanism and cryptography make it have decentralization,
Collective maintenance, it is programmable and secure and trusted the features such as, the trust problem in effective solution distributed environment.It is with block chain
The data sharing system of basic platform has the innate advantage for solving trust problem.Data sharing based on block chain technology is not lost
For a completely new thinking.But the driving due to lacking economy, interests, cause the shared wish of user not high.And block
Any transaction of chain user needs to pay certain expense, and user sharing wish reduces again.
The object of the present invention is achieved like this:
1) for user when participating in data sharing, related intelligence contract calls the intelligent contract in the present invention, obtains to current
The excitation or participate in cost that user applies.Participation cost in the present invention is an orderly participation cost set；
2) when user participates in data sharing, the intelligent contract in the present invention can participate in data in the game stage current first
Shared user's ratio P2
3) judge to participate in whether cost collects maximum, if not reaching maximum, go to step 4), otherwise go to step
10)；
4) judge whether P2 has reached saturation, it is considered herein that 95% is saturation state, if reaching saturation state, turn
To step 5), step 6) is otherwise gone to；
5) resetting participates in user's ratio of data sharing, into next game stage, and using next orderly
Participate in cost；
6) the threshold values P1 of user's ratio of current game stage participation data sharing is calculated；
7) judge the size of P2 and P1, if P2 is greater than P1, turn to step 8), otherwise turn to step 9)；
8) current participation cost is returned；
9) excitation is returned；
10) number of users for participating in data sharing is updated；
11) the return value for receiving intelligent contract of the invention needs to apply excitation to user or participates in cost.
Evolutionary game theory describes the process and purpose that user participates in data sharing well.Construction is based on evolutionary game theory
Data sharing motivate model, and analyzed by Evolutionarily Stable Strategy and replica locating mechanics, it is determined that excitation parameters with
And influence of the initial user ratio of data sharing to Evolutionarily Stable Strategy is participated in, excitation is applied with the directional user that determines or is participated in
Cost.
For the present invention in the game incipient stage, the user's initial number for participating in data sharing is very small, can give and motivate, and
It is not to collect participation cost, to promote and motivate more users to develop to the direction for participating in strategy.Once participating in data sharing
User's ratio beyond a certain threshold value (just participate in data sharing number of users for), to user apply participation cost, at this moment
It still may insure the shared block platform chain of data-oriented self―sustaining in terms of participating in strategy, without any external drive.
And at this point, the block platform chain that data-oriented is shared can apply specific cost to user.Identical process is repeated with repeatedly
Generation ground applies one group of participation cost, until successfully collecting one group of participation cost or reaching the maximum stage in game stage.
Data sharing excitation model (abbreviation EGI motivates model) based on evolutionary game theory, which is one, quaternary array G=
One symmetrical user of (P, N, S, U) composition participates in data sharing evolutionary Game, in which: P indicates that a large amount of individuals (participate in data
Shared user) composition a population；N indicates the individual collections being made of user；S indicates that the strategy selected for user is empty
Between, wherein S=(S1, S2)=(participates in, and is not involved in).I.e. in gambling process, each user can choose participate in data sharing and
It is not involved in two kinds of strategies of data sharing.U: indicate that two users obtain the payoff matrix of income formation, such as table in one time game
Shown in 3-1.
The payoff matrix of table 3-1 user participation data sharing evolutionary Game
Each user can choose participation or be not involved in strategy in user's participation data sharing evolutionary Game.Selection participates in
Strategy mean the user participate in data sharing, i.e., active sharing data and can from data-oriented share block platform chain in
The shared data of other users are got, and selects to be not involved in strategy and will lead to user's neither sharing data and will not therefrom obtain
To remainder data.Various situations are discussed separately below.
Situation 1: two users interacted select to be not involved in strategy.It will lead to the shared block of data-oriented at this time
User in platform chain is without the shared of data.And when user is not engaged in data sharing, to the effectiveness income of the user
It is dependent only on themselves cost of investment, it is a certain amount of that the data obtained using its cost of investment can help user to obtain
Income, income are not necessarily money, can be and solve the problems, such as certain, such as network information service shared data using shared data
It can help that user solves certain network security problem, scientific shared data can help scientific research scholar to study a certain field
Problem etc..We calculate income using logarithmic return, it can use log gain function mu ln (1+R) Lai Tixian.Root
According to the requirement of reasonableness of reality, μ ln (1+R) > 0, otherwise user is reluctant to carry out any investment.Therefore, as two interactive users
All selections are when being not involved in strategy, their income is μ ln (1+R), and μ ln (1+R) > 0.
It the use of log gain function is that can motivate user by way of increasing investment.But return eventually with
Investment is gradually increased and is saturated.This is because further increase investment and can exceed that a certain threshold value, it later might not be with
High growth rate increases overall income, but limits remuneration obtained.In EGI excitation model, it will be assumed that each user
Fixed data are all shared, and are maximum amount of data obtained by user.
Situation 2: two users interacted select to participate in strategy.Each user's shared data at this time, and also
The shared data of other users can be got therefrom to help user to obtain more incomes.It in this way reduces and to solve the problems, such as
Difficulty, the income that user obtains will be bigger.Therefore, when user participate in data sharing when, obtained income not only from
Themselves investment, but also from the data sharing of other users.So both incomes are regarded as γ μ by we
Ln (1+R) invests and shares common income.Also according to the requirement of reasonableness of reality, income γ > 1 is shared, is otherwise used
Family does not have any shared motivation.When carrying out data sharing, it is desirable to provide sharing cost τ and sharing cost τ > 0.It is aobvious and
It is clear to, data sharing block platform chain can all provide excitation for all users, but this may cause this excitation most
Reach saturation eventually, it is also possible to cause the inflation of the ideal money in data sharing platform.Therefore, we provide an excitation
Parameter C, abbreviation excitation/participation cost.Therefore, two users interacted select to participate in strategy, the income of two users
It is γ μ ln (1+R)-τ-C.
3: one users of situation select to participate in strategy and another user selection is not involved in strategy.Such case describes ginseng
With the risk of data sharing, selection participates in the user of strategy because data sharing block platform chain is added, and have shared oneself
Data, but obtain the data less than other users, so that it is taken part in the shared of data but any additional shared
Income, and it also requires the cost outside commitment.Another user is shared because of being not engaged in, therefore does not pay any cost,
Any income will not be obtained.Therefore, user selects to participate in strategy and another user selection when being not involved in strategy, selection ginseng
Income with the user of strategy is μ ln (1+R)-τ-C, and selects to be not involved in the income of the user of strategy to be μ ln (1+R).
If θ (t)=(θ1(t), θ2(t)) population mixed strategy locating for the t stage is indicated, wherein θ1(t) selection ginseng is indicated
With user's ratio of strategy, then there is θ2(t)=1- θ1(t), and it is the user's ratio for being not involved in strategy.For simplicity, with
Lower note θ1It (t) is θ.User the t stage select participate in strategy expected revenus for
u(s1, θ (t)) and=θ [γ μ ln (1+R)-τ-C]+(1- θ) [μ ln (1+R)-τ-C]
Select to be not involved in the expected revenus of strategy for
u(s2, θ (t)) and=θ (μ ln (1+R))-(1- θ) (μ ln (1+R))
Simplified:
u(s2, θ (t)) and=μ ln (1+R)
The average expectation income of population P is in the shared block platform chain of data-oriented
Therefore, the replica locating kinetics equation in the evolutionary Game of user's participation data sharing is
Simplified
F (θ)=0 is enabled, then replica locating kinetics equation (3-5) is up to 3 stable states.I.e.
When the state for being also able to maintain script under state subtle interference caused by dynamical system, according to evolutionarily stable plan
Fundamental property slightly is it is found that the state for being able to maintain this stability is known as stable state.In fact, such case can satisfy it is micro-
Divide the necessary condition needed for stability theorem is set up in equation, if θ*It is the stable state, then it must satisfy F ' (θ*) < 0.?
To four based on excitation/participation cost C condition Evolutionarily Stable Strategy.
If 10 < C < (γ -1) μ ln (1+R) of condition and (τ+C) < (γ -1) μ ln (1+R), thenWithIt is
User participates in the Evolutionarily Stable Strategy of data sharing evolutionary Game,It is not the evolution that user participates in data sharing evolutionary Game
Stable strategy.
If 20 < C < (γ -1) μ ln (1+R) of condition and (τ+C) >=(γ -1) μ ln (1+R), then only havingIt is only
One user participates in the Evolutionarily Stable Strategy of data sharing evolutionary Game, andItself is invalid.
If 3 C > 0 of condition and C >=(γ -1) μ ln (1+R),It is that unique user participates in data sharing evolutionary Game
Evolutionarily Stable Strategy,Itself is invalid.
If 4 C < 0 of condition and (τ+C)≤0,Be unique user participate in data sharing evolutionary Game evolution it is steady
Fixed strategy,Itself is invalid.
Therefore, it is not unique that ESS, which participates in data sharing evolutionary Game for user,.Participate in and be not involved in two kinds of strategies all
With stable potentiality of evolving, this depends on which condition above met.It is drilled to clearly demonstrate user's participation data sharing
Change game tool there are two types of the potential evolution balance policy for depending on above-mentioned specified conditions, Fig. 1 summarises the evolution of EGI excitation model
Stable strategy trend.It will be seen that when the condition that meets 2 or condition 3, population, which preferably selects, to be not involved in strategy and is drilled with stabilization
Change, and when the case where condition that meets 4, participating in strategy is precisely to stablize evolutionary strategy.Most interesting scene is item in the model
Part 1, wherein participating in and be not involved in strategy all may be ESS, but the user for depending on selection participation strategy in data sharing is initial
Ratio.These ESS can be used as the trigger condition of appropriate excitation/cost of data sharing.
Intelligent contract template mechanism of the invention is provided based on EGI excitation model, is provided in a manner of class figure below,
As shown in Figure 2.Need to initialize basic parameter com and orderly excitation/participation cost set costs when wherein disposing intelligent contract
[].Com includes four basic parameters: investCost, sharingCost, sharingIncome, zoom, they are respectively
EGI motivates cost of investment parameter R, sharing cost parameter τ, shared yield parameter γ, zooming parameter μ in model.costs[]
Comprising an excitation parameters cost [0] and one group of participation cost parameter costs [i] (i > 0), costs [0] indicates excitation parameters,
Costs [i] indicates to participate in cost parameter.According to EGI model it is found that excitation parameters cost [0] meet costs [0] < 0 and
Costs [0]+sharingCost < 0；And it participates in cost parameter costs [i] and meets sharingCost < cost [i] <
(sharingIncome-1)*zoom*log(1+sharingCost).And the global variable of Dynamic Maintenance is needed to have:
(1) number of users Users is registered；
(2) current game stage participating user's quantity participants；
(3) the index curIndex of cost set is participated in used in the current generation；
(4) stage tage locating for current game；
Method EGI_GetTage () is convenient for user query, can be adjusted at any time for obtaining the game stage being presently in
With.Method EGI_Registe () is called in user's registration, for updating to variable Users, realizes process such as following table institute
State algorithm.
Method EGI_GetCost () user participate in data it is shared when call, for dynamically adjust excitation/participation cost
Parameter, and the excitation/participation cost parameter that should apply to active user is returned, realize process algorithm as in the table below.
Data sharing motivational techniques of the present invention propose and analyze the data sharing excitation based on evolutionary game theory
Model E GI proposes excitation/participation cost parameter.By Evolutionarily Stable Strategy and dynamic replication dynamic analysis, have found sharp
Encourage/participate in influence of the cost parameter to Evolutionarily Stable Strategy.To propose the template mechanism of the intelligent contract based on EGI model,
It is intended to dynamic and adjusts excitation/participation cost, to motivate more users to participate in data sharing, experience data is shared bring and received
Benefit.
Claims (2)
1. a kind of data sharing motivational techniques based on intelligent contract, which comprises the following steps:
(1) when user participates in data sharing, the intelligent contract in the present invention can count current game stage participation data sharing
User's ratio P2；
(2) judge to participate in whether cost collects maximum, if participating in cost reaches maximum, go to step (3), otherwise go to step
(9)；
(3) judge whether P2 reaches 95%, if reaching 95%, for saturation state, go to step (4), otherwise go to step 5)；
(4) resetting participates in user's ratio of data sharing, into next game stage, and uses next orderly participation
Cost；
(5) the threshold values P1 of user's ratio of current game stage participation data sharing is calculated；
(6) judge the size of P2 and P1, if P2 is greater than P1, turn to step (7), otherwise turn to step (8)；
(7) current participation cost is returned；
(8) excitation is returned；
(9) number of users for participating in data sharing is updated；
(10) the return value for receiving intelligent contract of the invention needs to apply excitation to user or participates in cost.
2. a kind of data sharing motivational techniques based on intelligent contract according to claim 1, which is characterized in that described to return
Return excitation, comprising:
If the user interacted selects to be not involved in strategy:
The then excitation that each user is returned are as follows:
μln(1+R)
Wherein, μ ln (1+R) > 0, μ are zooming parameter, and R is cost of investment parameter；
If the user interacted selects to participate in strategy:
The then excitation that each user is returned are as follows:
γμln(1+R)-τ-C
If a part of user selects to participate in strategy and another part user selection is not involved in strategy:
The excitation for then selecting the user for participating in strategy to be returned are as follows:
μln(1+R)-τ-C
Then selection is not involved in the excitation that the user of strategy is returned are as follows:
μln(1+R)
Wherein, γ is shared income and γ > 1, μ are zooming parameter, and R is cost of investment parameter, and τ is sharing cost and τ > 0, C
For excitation parameters.
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Application publication date: 20190521 |