CN109743166A - Multiple party signatures generation method and security information verification system - Google Patents
Multiple party signatures generation method and security information verification system Download PDFInfo
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- CN109743166A CN109743166A CN201811500619.3A CN201811500619A CN109743166A CN 109743166 A CN109743166 A CN 109743166A CN 201811500619 A CN201811500619 A CN 201811500619A CN 109743166 A CN109743166 A CN 109743166A
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- Y—GENERAL TAGGING OF NEW TECHNOLOGICAL DEVELOPMENTS; GENERAL TAGGING OF CROSS-SECTIONAL TECHNOLOGIES SPANNING OVER SEVERAL SECTIONS OF THE IPC; TECHNICAL SUBJECTS COVERED BY FORMER USPC CROSS-REFERENCE ART COLLECTIONS [XRACs] AND DIGESTS
- Y02—TECHNOLOGIES OR APPLICATIONS FOR MITIGATION OR ADAPTATION AGAINST CLIMATE CHANGE
- Y02D—CLIMATE CHANGE MITIGATION TECHNOLOGIES IN INFORMATION AND COMMUNICATION TECHNOLOGIES [ICT], I.E. INFORMATION AND COMMUNICATION TECHNOLOGIES AIMING AT THE REDUCTION OF THEIR OWN ENERGY USE
- Y02D30/00—Reducing energy consumption in communication networks
- Y02D30/50—Reducing energy consumption in communication networks in wire-line communication networks, e.g. low power modes or reduced link rate
Abstract
It include: the first private key that first party generates itself the invention discloses a kind of multiple party signatures generation method for security information verification, second party generates the second private key of itself, third party generates the third private key of itself, first party treats signature information and carries out eap-message digest, summary data and first part's signature are generated, and summary data and first part's signature are sent to second party；Second party generates signature value according to summary data and first part's signature, and second part signature is generated according to the second private key, signature value and second part signature are sent to third party, third party generates Part III signature according to the second private key and Part IV is signed, and first party generates full signature according to the first private key, signature value, Part III signature and Part IV signature and exports.The present invention is based on SM2 algorithms to be not required to multiple interactive correspondence, requires network environment low, to interact suitable for low latency, less network environment.
Description
Technical field
The present invention relates to computer fields, more particularly to a kind of multiple party signatures generation method based on SM2 algorithm.This hair
It is bright to further relate to a kind of security information verification system using the multiple party signatures generation method.
Background technique
Currently based on the security information verification of public key cryptography system be widely used in e-commerce, E-Government,
In the application such as authentication.As the important tool to ensure information security, being widely utilized that for private key guarantees that these applications are safe
Basis.
In order to ensure the safety of private key for user, the private key of user is usually to deposit in special cryptographic hardware, but this guarantor
Deposit it is trans- there are still centainly by attack possibility, to crack system peace by stealing private key original text or stealing the private key right to use
Entirely, it causes damages.
In order to improve the safety of private key, currently used technological means is that private key for user is passed through certain rule segmentation
At more parts, then every one's share of expenses for a joint undertaking private key share is stored in different physical equipments, to avoid directly depositing for whole private key informations
Storage and use.Such as the partition of private key exists in N number of varying environment again, only N number of member simultaneously cooperating could then without
Method completes a private key operation.But to generally require multiple interactive correspondence frequent for the realization of above-mentioned private key cutting techniques means, no
The demand for being able to satisfy low latency in current network environment, interacting less.The private key cutting techniques can not also be adapted for use with SM2 simultaneously
The system that private key is digitally signed.
Summary of the invention
The technical problem to be solved in the present invention is to provide a kind of there is greater security compared with prior art, is based on SM2
The multiple party signatures generation method of algorithm.
The present invention also provides a kind of security information verification systems using the multiple party signatures generation method.
In order to solve the above technical problems, the present invention is provided to the multiple party signatures generation methods of security information verification, including
Following steps:
First party generates the first private key D of itself1；
Second party generates the second private key D of itself2；
Third party generates the third private key D of itself3；
First party treats signature information M and carries out eap-message digest, generates summary data e and first part signature Q1, and will pluck
Want data e and first part signature Q1It is sent to second party；
Second party is according to summary data e and first part signature Q1Signature value r is generated, and raw according to the second private key D2
At second part signature Q2；
By signature value r and second part signature Q2It is sent to third party；
Third party is according to the second private key D2Generate Part III signature S1With Part IV signature S2；
First party is according to the first private key D1, signature value r, Part III sign S1With Part IV signature S2It has generated
Whole signature simultaneously exports.
It is further improved the multiple party signatures generation method, the first private key D1, the second private key D2And third
Private key D3It is the random number in [1, n-1] section.
Wherein n is the elliptic curve parameter of SM2 algorithm, indicates elliptic curve point order of a group used in SM2 crypto-operation,
Namely the rank of the basic point G of elliptic curve point group used in SM2 crypto-operation, n are prime number, subsequent n is stated thus.
It is further improved the multiple party signatures generation method, the first private key D1, the second private key D2With
Three private key D3 meet following relationship, (1+D)-1=D1D2D3Modn, (1+D)-1Meet the mould n inverse of multiplication of 1+D, i.e. D
=(D1D2D-1-1)modn。
It is further improved the multiple party signatures generation method, first party public-key cryptography, second party public-key cryptography and third party
Public-key cryptography shares elliptic curve parameter E (Fq), G and the n of SM2 algorithm, and elliptic curve E is the ellipse being defined on finite field Fq
Curve, G are a basic point of elliptic curve E, rank n.
It is further improved the multiple party signatures generation method, first party calculates the first private key D1Inverse element D on Fq1 -1Modn, and calculate D1 -1[*] G, by calculated result P1Public-key cryptography as first party；
Second party calculates the second private key D2Inverse element D on Fq2 -1Modn, and calculate D2 -1[*]P1, by calculated result
P2Public-key cryptography as second party；
Third party calculates third private key D3Inverse element D on Fq3 -1Modn, and calculate D3 -1[*]P2, by calculated result
P3As third-party public-key cryptography；
Calculate P3[-] G, using calculated result P as public-key cryptography；
Wherein, [*] indicates elliptic curve point multiplication operation, and [-] indicates that elliptic curve point subtracts operation.
Be further improved the multiple party signatures generation method, the first party generate message M to be signed summary data e and
First part signature Q1Include:
First party calculates SM3Hash (M), and using calculated result as hash value e, wherein SM3Hash indicates to be pre-treated
SM3 digest calculations；；
First party generates a random number K between [1, n-1]l, and calculate Kl[*] G, using calculated result as Q1,
Wherein, [*] indicates elliptic curve point multiplication operation.
It is further improved the multiple party signatures generation method, second party generates a random number between [1, n-1]
K2, and calculate K2[*] G, obtains calculated result Q2。
It is further improved the multiple party signatures generation method, second party generates two random numbers between [1, n-1]
k3And k4, and calculate k3[*]Q1Obtain calculated result Q3, calculate k4[*]Q2Obtain calculated result Q4, by Q3-Q4Obtain (x1, y1),
And calculate (x1+ e) mod n, using calculated result as signature value r；
Wherein, [*] indicates elliptic curve point multiplication operation.
It is further improved the multiple party signatures generation method, if signature value r is not equal to 0, third party calculates D3*k3modn
Using calculated result as D3S1, third party's calculating D3* rmodn is using calculated result as D3S2, third party's calculating D3*k4Modn will be counted
Result is calculated as D3S3If D3S1、D3S2And D3S3Not equal to 0 and D3S1、D3S2And D3S3It is not mutually equal, then carries out subsequent calculating, it is no
Then regenerate k3、k4And it recalculates；
Second party is according to D2、r、D3S1、D3S2And D3S3It generates and calculates D2S1And D2S2；
Second party calculates D2*D3S1Modn is using calculated result as D2S1, second party calculating (D2*D3S2-D2*K2*D3S3)
Modn is using calculated result as D2S2If D2S1And D2S2Not equal to 0 while D2S1It is unequal in D2S2, otherwise regenerate k2And it moves back
It returns third party and recalculates D3S1、D3S2And D3S3。
It is further improved the multiple party signatures generation method, first party is according to D1、r、D2S1、D2S2It generates and calculates complete
Sign S；
First party calculates D1*K1*D2S1Modn, using calculated result as D1S1, first party calculating D1*D2S2Modn will be calculated
As a result it is used as D1S2, first party calculating D1S1+D1S2- r is using calculated result as S；
If S is not equal to 1 not equal to 0 and (s+r) modn, first party exports (r, S) as full signature, otherwise again
Generate k1And correlation step is recalculated.
Random number K in above-mentioned steps1、K2、K3It is positive integer
The present invention provides a kind of security information verification system using multiple party signatures generation method described in above-mentioned any one,
Wherein, the security information verification system carries out signature verification using the multiple party signatures generation method.
Multiple party signatures generation method of the public affairs based on SM2 algorithm of the invention, it is multi-party to join by distinguishing storage section private key in many ways
Conjunction could carry out signature or decryption oprerations to message, and communication parties can not get other side's private key and relevant information, and multi-party
Private key is locally generated.It is logical not need repeatedly interaction for the multiple party signatures generation method based on SM2 algorithm through the invention
News require network environment low, to interact suitable for low latency, less network environment.Also, the present invention can be suitable for being based on
The system that SM2 private key is digitally signed.
Detailed description of the invention
Present invention will now be described in further detail with reference to the accompanying drawings and specific embodiments:
Fig. 1 is multiple party signatures generation method private key product process schematic diagram of the present invention.
Fig. 2 is multiple party signatures generation method signature product process schematic diagram of the present invention.
Specific embodiment
As shown in Figure 1, the present invention is provided to the multiple party signatures generation methods of security information verification, comprising the following steps:
First party generates the first private key D of itself1；
Second party generates the second private key D of itself2；
Third party generates the third private key D of itself3；
The first private key D1, the second private key D2With third private key D3It is random in [1, n-1] section
Number.
The first private key D1, the second private key D2Meet following relationship with third private key D3, (1+D)-1
=D1D2D3Modn, (1+D)-1Meet the mould n inverse of multiplication of 1+D, i.e. D=(D1D2D-1-1)modn。
First party treats signature information M and carries out eap-message digest, generates summary data e and first part signature Q1, and will pluck
Want data e and first part signature Q1It is sent to second party；
Second party is according to summary data e and first part signature Q1Signature value r is generated, and raw according to the second private key D2
At second part signature Q2；
By signature value r and second part signature Q2It is sent to third party；
Third party is according to the second private key D2Generate Part III signature S1With Part IV signature S2；
First party is according to the first private key D1, signature value r, Part III sign S1With Part IV signature S2It has generated
Whole signature simultaneously exports.
First party public-key cryptography, second party public-key cryptography and third party's public-key cryptography share the elliptic curve ginseng of SM2 algorithm
Number E (Fq), G and n, elliptic curve E are the elliptic curve being defined on finite field Fq, and G is the basic point of n rank on elliptic curve E.
Wherein, public-key cryptography calculates in the following ways:
First party calculates the first private key D1Inverse element D on Fq1 -1Modn, and calculate D1 -1[*] G, by calculated result P1
Public-key cryptography as first party；
Second party calculates the second private key D2Inverse element D on Fq2 -1Modn, and calculate D2 -1[*]P1, by calculated result
P2Public-key cryptography as second party；
Third party calculates third private key D3Inverse element D on Fq3 -1Modn, and calculate D3 -1[*]P2, by calculated result
P3As third-party public-key cryptography；
Calculate P3[-] G, using calculated result P as public-key cryptography；
Wherein, [*] indicates elliptic curve point multiplication operation.
The first party generates the summary data e and first part signature Q of message M to be signed1Include:
First party calculates SM3Hash (M), using calculated result as hash value e；
First party generates a random number K between [1, n-1]l, and calculate Kl[*] G, using calculated result as Q1,
Wherein, [*] indicates elliptic curve point multiplication operation.
Second party generates a random number K between [1, n-1]2, and calculate K2[*] G, obtains calculated result Q2。
Second party generates two random number ks between [1, n-1]3And k4, and calculate k3[*]Q1Obtain calculated result
Q3, calculate k4[*]Q2Obtain calculated result Q4, by Q3-Q4Obtain (x1, y1), and calculate (x1+ e) mod n, using calculated result as
Signature value r；
Wherein, [*] indicates elliptic curve point multiplication operation.
If signature value r is not equal to 0, third party calculates D3*k3Modn is using calculated result as D3S1, third party's calculating D3*
Rmodn is using calculated result as D3S2, third party's calculating D3*k4Modn is using calculated result as D3S3If D3S1、D3S2And D3S3No
Equal to 0 and D3S1、D3S2And D3S3It is not mutually equal, then carries out subsequent calculating, otherwise regenerate k3、k4And it recalculates；
Second party is according to D2、r、D3S1、D3S2And D3S3It generates and calculates D1S1And D2S2；
Second party calculates D2*D3S1Modn is using calculated result as D2S1, second party calculating (D2*D3S2-D2*K2*D3S3)
Modn is using calculated result as D2S2If D2S1And D2S2Not equal to 0 and D2S1It is unequal in D2S2, otherwise regenerate k2And it retracts
Third party recalculates D3S1、D3S2And D3S3。
It is further improved the multiple party signatures generation method, first party is according to D1、r、D2S1、D2S2It generates and calculates complete
Sign S；
First party calculates D1*K1*D2S1Modn, using calculated result as D1S1, first party calculating D1*D2S2Modn will be calculated
As a result it is used as D1S2, first party calculating D1S1+D1S2- r is using calculated result as S；
If S is not equal to 1 not equal to 0 and (s+r) modn, first party exports (r, S) as full signature, otherwise again
Generate k1And correlation step is recalculated.
Random number K in above-mentioned steps1、K2、K3It is positive integer.
The present invention provides a kind of security information verification system using multiple party signatures generation method described in above-mentioned any one,
Wherein, the security information verification system carries out signature verification using the multiple party signatures generation method.
Above by specific embodiment and embodiment, invention is explained in detail, but these are not composition pair
Limitation of the invention.Without departing from the principles of the present invention, those skilled in the art can also make many deformations and change
Into these also should be regarded as protection scope of the present invention.
Claims (12)
1. a kind of multiple party signatures generation method is used for security information verification, which comprises the following steps:
First party generates the first private key D of itself1；
Second party generates the second private key D of itself2；
Third party generates the third private key D of itself3；
First party treats signature information M and carries out eap-message digest, generates summary data e and first part signature Q1, and by summary data
E and first part signature Q1It is sent to second party；
Second party is according to summary data e and first part signature Q1Signature value r is generated, and generates the according to the second private key D2
Sign Q for two parts2；
By signature value r and second part signature Q2It is sent to third party；
Third party is according to the second private key D2Generate Part III signature S1With Part IV signature S2；
First party is according to the first private key D1, signature value r, Part III sign S1With Part IV signature S2Generate complete label
Name simultaneously exports.
2. multiple party signatures generation method as described in claim 1, it is characterised in that: the first private key D1, the second secret it is close
Key D2With third private key D3It is the random number in [1, n-1] section；
Wherein n is the elliptic curve parameter of SM2 algorithm, indicates elliptic curve point order of a group used in SM2 crypto-operation, i.e.,
The rank of the basic point G of elliptic curve point group used in SM2 crypto-operation, n are prime number.
3. multiple party signatures generation method as claimed in claim 2, it is characterised in that: the first private key D1, the second secret
Key D2Meet following relationship with third private key D3, (1+D)-1=D1D2D3Modn, (1+D)-1The mould n multiplication for meeting 1+D is inverse
Operation, i.e. D=(D1D2D-1-1)modn。
4. multiple party signatures generation method as described in claim 1, it is characterised in that: first party public-key cryptography, second party disclose close
Key and third party's public-key cryptography share elliptic curve parameter E (Fq), G and the n of SM2 algorithm, and elliptic curve E is to be defined on finite field
Elliptic curve on Fq, G are a basic point of elliptic curve E, rank n；
Wherein n is the elliptic curve parameter of SM2 algorithm, indicates elliptic curve point order of a group used in SM2 crypto-operation, i.e.,
The rank of the basic point G of elliptic curve point group used in SM2 crypto-operation, n are prime number.
5. multiple party signatures generation method as claimed in claim 4, it is characterised in that:
First party calculates the first private key D1Inverse element D on Fq1 -1Modn, and calculate D1 -1[*] G, by calculated result P1As
The public-key cryptography of first party；
Second party calculates the second private key D2Inverse element D on Fq2 -1Modn, and calculate P2=D2 -1[*]P1, by calculated result P2
Public-key cryptography as second party；
Third party calculates third private key D3Inverse element D on Fq3 -1Modn, and calculate P3=D3 -1[*]P2, by calculated result P3
As third-party public-key cryptography；
Calculate P3[-] G, using calculated result P as public-key cryptography；
Wherein, [*] indicates elliptic curve point multiplication operation, and [-] indicates that elliptic curve point subtracts operation.
6. multiple party signatures generation method as described in claim 1, it is characterised in that:
The first party generate message M to be signed summary data e and first part signature Q1 include:
First party calculates SM3 Hash (M), and using calculated result as hash value e, wherein SM3 Hash indicates SM3 to be pre-treated
Digest calculations；
First party generates a random number K1 between [1, n-1], and calculates Kl[*] G, using calculated result as Q1,
In, [*] indicates elliptic curve point multiplication operation；
N is the elliptic curve parameter of SM2 algorithm, indicates that elliptic curve point order of a group used in SM2 crypto-operation, i.e. SM2 are close
The rank of the basic point G of elliptic curve point group used in code operation, n is prime number.
7. multiple party signatures generation method as described in claim 1, it is characterised in that:
Second party generates a random number K between [1, n-1]2, and calculate K2[*] G, obtains calculated result Q2；
Wherein n is the elliptic curve parameter of SM2 algorithm, indicates elliptic curve point order of a group used in SM2 crypto-operation, i.e.,
The rank of the basic point G of elliptic curve point group used in SM2 crypto-operation, n are prime number.
8. multiple party signatures generation method as described in claim 1, it is characterised in that:
Second party generates two random number ks between [1, n-1]3And k4, and calculate k3[*]Q1Obtain calculated result Q3, meter
Calculate k4[*]Q2Obtain calculated result Q4, by Q3-Q4Obtain (x1, y1), and calculate (x1+ e) modn, using calculated result as signature value
r；
Wherein, [*] indicates elliptic curve point multiplication operation；
N is the elliptic curve parameter of SM2 algorithm, indicates that elliptic curve point order of a group used in SM2 crypto-operation, i.e. SM2 are close
The rank of the basic point G of elliptic curve point group used in code operation, n is prime number.
9. multiple party signatures generation method as claimed in claim 8, it is characterised in that:
If signature value r is not equal to 0, third party calculates D3*k3Modn is using calculated result as D3S1, third party's calculating D3*rmodn
Using calculated result as D3S2, third party's calculating D3*k4Modn is using calculated result as D3S3If D3S1、D3S2And D3S3Not equal to 0
And D3S1、D3S2And D3S3It is not mutually equal, then carries out subsequent calculating, otherwise regenerate k3、k4And it recalculates；
Second party is according to D2、r、D3S1、D3S2And D3S3It generates and calculates D1S1And D2S2；
Second party calculates D2*D3S1Modn is using calculated result as D2S1, second party calculating (D2*D3S2-D2*K2*D3S3) modn general
Calculated result is as D2S2If D2S1And D2S2Not equal to 0 and D2S1It is unequal in D2S2, otherwise regenerate k2And retract third
Recalculate D in side3S1、D3S2And D3S3。
10. multiple party signatures generation method as claimed in claim 9, it is characterised in that:
First party is according to D1、r、D2S1、D2S2It generates and calculates full signature S；
First party calculates D1*K1*D2S1Modn, using calculated result as D1S1, first party calculating D1*D2S2Modn is by calculated result
As D1S2, first party calculating D1S1+D1S2- r is using calculated result as S；
If S is not equal to 1 not equal to 0 and (s+r) modn, first party exports (r, S) as full signature, otherwise regenerates
k1And correlation step is recalculated.
11. multiple party signatures generation method as claimed in claim 10, it is characterised in that: random number K1、K2、K3It is positive integer.
12. a kind of security information verification system using multiple party signatures generation method described in claim 1-11 any one,
Be characterized in that: the security information verification system carries out signature verification using the multiple party signatures generation method.
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| CN111010276A (en) * | 2019-10-25 | 2020-04-14 | 武汉大学 | Multi-party combined SM9 key generation and ciphertext decryption method and medium |
| CN111030801A (en) * | 2019-10-25 | 2020-04-17 | 武汉大学 | Multi-party distributed SM9 key generation and ciphertext decryption method and medium |
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| CN114285577A (en) * | 2021-04-27 | 2022-04-05 | 博雅中科(北京)信息技术有限公司 | Multi-party collaborative signature method and system |
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