CN109741073B - Block chain examination attack processing method and system, electronic equipment and storage medium - Google Patents
Block chain examination attack processing method and system, electronic equipment and storage medium Download PDFInfo
- Publication number
- CN109741073B CN109741073B CN201910023038.3A CN201910023038A CN109741073B CN 109741073 B CN109741073 B CN 109741073B CN 201910023038 A CN201910023038 A CN 201910023038A CN 109741073 B CN109741073 B CN 109741073B
- Authority
- CN
- China
- Prior art keywords
- verifier
- block
- honest
- information
- verifiers
- Prior art date
- Legal status (The legal status is an assumption and is not a legal conclusion. Google has not performed a legal analysis and makes no representation as to the accuracy of the status listed.)
- Active
Links
Images
Classifications
-
- Y—GENERAL TAGGING OF NEW TECHNOLOGICAL DEVELOPMENTS; GENERAL TAGGING OF CROSS-SECTIONAL TECHNOLOGIES SPANNING OVER SEVERAL SECTIONS OF THE IPC; TECHNICAL SUBJECTS COVERED BY FORMER USPC CROSS-REFERENCE ART COLLECTIONS [XRACs] AND DIGESTS
- Y02—TECHNOLOGIES OR APPLICATIONS FOR MITIGATION OR ADAPTATION AGAINST CLIMATE CHANGE
- Y02D—CLIMATE CHANGE MITIGATION TECHNOLOGIES IN INFORMATION AND COMMUNICATION TECHNOLOGIES [ICT], I.E. INFORMATION AND COMMUNICATION TECHNOLOGIES AIMING AT THE REDUCTION OF THEIR OWN ENERGY USE
- Y02D10/00—Energy efficient computing, e.g. low power processors, power management or thermal management
Landscapes
- Storage Device Security (AREA)
- Management, Administration, Business Operations System, And Electronic Commerce (AREA)
Abstract
The application discloses a method and a system for processing block chain censoring attack, electronic equipment and a computer readable storage medium, wherein the method comprises the following steps: receiving verification information of a target verifier between the generation of the first block and the generation of the second block, and judging whether a censoring attack occurs or not according to all verifier sets in all verification information and voting information contained in the second block; the verification set is a verifier set formed by verifiers corresponding to all reply voting information received by the target verifier, and the reply voting information is information returned to the target verifier after other verifiers receive the voting information of the target verifier on the first block; if yes, determining the verifier corresponding to the voting information which is not contained in the second block as an honest verifier; if not, determining honest verifiers by all verifiers; and constructing an honest chain according to the blocks generated by the honest verifier, and returning the reply verification information to the honest verifier, thereby improving the security of processing the inspection attack.
Description
Technical Field
The present invention relates to the field of computer technology, and more particularly, to a method and a system for processing a blockchain audit attack, an electronic device, and a computer readable storage medium.
Background
Censoring attacks are a variation of 51% attacks, generally meaning that a federation is made up of a large number of attackers, refusing to accept transactions or messages from other blockchain participants. However, given that the attacker is a complex, the network delay between them is smaller and more closely matched, while other honest verifiers are distributed around the world, the censoring attack can occur without the attacker occupying a large part of the world, can gain a great deal of benefit at low cost, and is more hidden.
In the prior art, the way to deal with the censoring attack is to set an acceptable time window for the voting message, and if the honest verifier's transaction is not included in a new block within a limited time, the chain in which this block resides is considered the censoring chain. However, since the formula model diagram with the time window has a long tail, the above manner has security holes.
Therefore, how to improve the security of handling the censoring attack is a technical problem that needs to be solved by the person skilled in the art.
Disclosure of Invention
The invention aims to provide a block chain audit attack processing method and system, electronic equipment and a computer readable storage medium, and the safety of processing audit attacks is improved.
To achieve the above object, the present application provides a method of censoring attack processing applied to an auxiliary verifier, the auxiliary verifier being a verifier selected from all verifiers of the blockchain at the beginning of a current checkpoint period, the method comprising:
receiving verification information of a target verifier between the generation of a first block and a second block, and judging whether a censoring attack occurs or not according to all verifier sets in all the verification information and voting information contained in the second block; the verification set is a verifier set formed by verifiers corresponding to all reply voting information received by the target verifier, the reply voting information is information returned to the target verifier after other verifiers except the target verifier in the blockchain receive the voting information of the target verifier on the first block, and the second block is the next block of the first block;
if yes, determining the verifier corresponding to the voting information which is not contained in the second block as an honest verifier;
if not, determining all verifiers in the blockchain to be the honest verifiers;
and constructing a honest chain according to the block generated by the honest verifier, and returning a reply verification message to the honest verifier, so that the honest verifier switches the current chain to the honest chain according to the identification information of the honest chain in the reply verification message.
The verification set is a verifier set formed by verifiers corresponding to all reply voting information received by the target verifier within a preset time.
Before determining the verifier corresponding to the voting information not included in the second block as the honest verifier, the method further includes:
the second block is set as an invalid block.
Wherein, still include:
and when no censoring attack occurs, punishing the verifier corresponding to the voting information not contained in the second block according to a preset punishment mode.
And returning a reply verification message to the honest verifier, so that the honest verifier switches the current chain to the honest chain according to the identification information of the honest chain in the reply verification message, and the method comprises the following steps:
and returning the reply verification information to the honest verifier, so that the honest verifier determines the target identification information with the largest quantity according to all the received reply verification information, and switches the current chain to the honest chain corresponding to the target identification information.
Wherein determining whether a censoring attack occurs according to all verifier sets in all the verification information and voting information contained in the second block includes:
s1: calculating the similarity among all verifier sets in all the verification information, and judging whether the number of the similarity smaller than a preset value reaches a first preset number or not; if yes, entering S4; if not, entering S2;
s2: judging whether the number of verifiers corresponding to voting information contained in the second block exceeds a preset proportion of the total number of verifiers in the block chain; if yes, entering S5; if not, entering S3;
s3: judging whether the number of verifier sets of producers comprising the second block reaches a second preset number; if yes, entering S4; if not, entering S5;
s4: judging that an inspection attack occurs;
s5: it is determined that no censoring attack has occurred.
Wherein, still include:
and punishing the producer of the second block when the number of verifier sets comprising the producer of the second block does not reach the second preset number.
To achieve the above object, the present application provides a censoring attack processing system applied to an auxiliary verifier, the auxiliary verifier being a verifier selected from all verifiers of the blockchain at the beginning of a current checkpoint period, the method comprising:
the judging module is used for receiving verification information of a target verifier between the generation of the first block and the generation of the second block and judging whether a review attack occurs or not according to all verifier sets in the verification information and voting information contained in the second block; the verification set is a verifier set formed by verifiers corresponding to all reply voting information received by the target verifier, the reply voting information is information returned to the target verifier after other verifiers except the target verifier in the blockchain receive the voting information of the target verifier on the first block, and the second block is the next block of the first block;
the first determining module is used for determining a verifier corresponding to voting information which is not contained in the second block as an honest verifier when an examination attack occurs;
a second determination module that determines all verifiers in the blockchain to be the honest verifier when no censoring attack has occurred;
and the return module is used for constructing a honest chain according to the block generated by the honest verifier and returning the reply verification information to the honest verifier so that the honest verifier can switch the current chain to the honest chain according to the identification information of the honest chain in the reply verification information.
To achieve the above object, the present application provides an electronic device, including:
a memory for storing a computer program;
and a processor for implementing the steps of the above-described audit attack processing method when executing the computer program.
To achieve the above object, the present application provides a computer-readable storage medium having stored thereon a computer program which, when executed by a processor, implements the steps of the above-described attack-screening method.
According to the scheme, the method for processing the censoring attack comprises the following steps: receiving verification information of a target verifier between the generation of a first block and a second block, and judging whether a censoring attack occurs or not according to all verifier sets in all the verification information and voting information contained in the second block; the verification set is a verifier set formed by verifiers corresponding to all reply voting information received by the target verifier, the reply voting information is information returned to the target verifier after other verifiers except the target verifier in the blockchain receive the voting information of the target verifier on the first block, and the second block is the next block of the first block; if yes, determining the verifier corresponding to the voting information which is not contained in the second block as an honest verifier; if not, determining all verifiers in the blockchain to be the honest verifiers; and constructing a honest chain according to the block generated by the honest verifier, and returning a reply verification message to the honest verifier, so that the honest verifier switches the current chain to the honest chain according to the identification information of the honest chain in the reply verification message.
According to the examination attack processing method, the reply voting information, the verification information and the reply verification information are added, the information with three different functions and the role of an auxiliary verifier are added, the auxiliary verifier distinguishes the honest verifier and the attacker according to the difference of the verifier sets in the verification information of the honest verifier and the attacker, the honest verifier is automatically organized into the honest chain to achieve the purpose of accurately identifying the examination attack and the attacker, the honest verifier can be automatically organized into the honest chain, and the verifier does not need to pay attention to the safety form of the blockchain at any time. Therefore, compared with the scheme of setting the time window in the prior art, the inspection attack processing method improves the security of processing the inspection attack. The application also discloses a system for processing the examination attack, an electronic device and a computer readable storage medium, and the technical effects can be achieved.
It is to be understood that both the foregoing general description and the following detailed description are exemplary and explanatory only and are not restrictive of the application.
Drawings
In order to more clearly illustrate the embodiments of the present application or the technical solutions in the prior art, the drawings that are required in the embodiments or the description of the prior art will be briefly described below, it being obvious that the drawings in the following description are only some embodiments of the present application, and that other drawings may be obtained according to these drawings without inventive effort for a person skilled in the art. The accompanying drawings are included to provide a further understanding of the disclosure, and are incorporated in and constitute a part of this specification, illustrate the disclosure and together with the description serve to explain, but do not limit the disclosure. In the drawings:
FIG. 1 is a flow chart illustrating a method of censoring attack processing according to an exemplary embodiment;
FIG. 2 is a flow chart illustrating another method of censoring attack processing according to an exemplary embodiment;
FIG. 3 is a block diagram of a censoring attack handling system shown in accordance with an exemplary embodiment;
fig. 4 is a block diagram of an electronic device, according to an example embodiment.
Detailed Description
The following description of the embodiments of the present application will be made clearly and fully with reference to the accompanying drawings, in which it is evident that the embodiments described are only some, but not all, of the embodiments of the present application. All other embodiments, which can be made by one of ordinary skill in the art based on the embodiments herein without making any inventive effort, are intended to be within the scope of the present application.
The embodiment of the application discloses a method for processing censoring attacks, which improves the security of processing censoring attacks.
Referring to fig. 1, a flowchart of a method for processing a censoring attack according to an exemplary embodiment is shown, as shown in fig. 1, including:
s101: receiving verification information of a target verifier between the generation of a first block and a second block, and judging whether a censoring attack occurs or not according to all verifier sets in all the verification information and voting information contained in the second block; if yes, enter S102; if not, entering S103;
the verification set is a verifier set formed by verifiers corresponding to all reply voting information received by the target verifier, the reply voting information is information returned to the target verifier after other verifiers except the target verifier in the blockchain receive the voting information of the target verifier on the first block, and the second block is the next block of the first block;
the executing entity of this embodiment is an auxiliary verifier in the blockchain that is not a separate one, but is given additional responsibility to the normal verifier, selected from all verifiers in the blockchain at the beginning of the current checkpointing cycle. The present embodiment does not specifically limit the selection criteria of the auxiliary validators, and preferably, the validator that performs best in the previous checkpoint period may be selected as the auxiliary validator in the current checkpoint period, and the number of auxiliary validators depends on the total number of validators and a predefined ratio, i.e., a preset number of validators that have not been penalized in the previous checkpoint period are selected as the auxiliary validators.
Firstly, defining network fault as a state that communication can not work normally and mutual sending information can not reach normally. When a network failure occurs, there is no chance that only a relatively small number of verifiers cannot send messages to each other, and it is common that surrounding networks fail within a certain period of time of the verifier, not a large area of network paralysis. If one verifier encounters a network failure, it is considered that it and many other verifiers cannot send messages to each other. The attacker group can only launch the censoring attack on the block produced by the member as the verifier, and the attacker group needs to reach a certain scale and act consistently, but the maximum scale and the action strategy, such as the length of attack time and the height of the block, are not limited.
Each verifier in the blockchain (i.e., the target verifier in this step) votes on a latest block (i.e., the first block in this step), which may be generated by the honest verifier or by an attacker, and sends the voting information to the other verifier. In a normal network environment (i.e., no network failure occurs), the target verifier receives reply vote information from other verifiers, each of which may contain its generated verifier signature, and any reply vote information that exceeds the current network delay is deemed invalid. The verification set is a verifier set formed by verifiers corresponding to all reply voting information received by the target verifier within a preset time. After a new block (i.e., the second block in this step) is generated by the verifier, the target verifier sends a verification message to the auxiliary verifier, including the verifier set of sources of valid reply messages received by the target verifier.
After receiving the verification information of the target verifier, judging whether an inspection attack occurs according to all verifier sets in all verification information and voting information contained in the second block, if so, entering S102; if not, the process advances to S103.
S102: determining a verifier corresponding to voting information which is not contained in the second block as an honest verifier;
in this step, when the censoring attack occurs, it is indicated that the second block is generated by the attacker, which does not include the voting information of the honest verifier, so that the second block may be set as an invalid block, and the verifier corresponding to the voting information not included in the second block may be determined as the honest verifier.
S103: determining all verifiers in the blockchain to be the honest verifier;
in this step, when no censoring attack occurs, voting information of all verifiers is ideally contained in the second block, the set of verifiers in all verification information is nearly identical, all verifiers in the blockchain are honest verifiers, and no verifier is punished.
But even if no censoring attack occurs, there may be a reader error or listener error. For reader errors, the verifier does not vote or because the network failure voting message is not contained in the next block, even if it issues a verification message, the verifier set in its verification information differs greatly from that of other people, assisting the verifier in ignoring the verification information, which verifier will be penalized. Namely, as a preferred embodiment, the present embodiment further includes: and when no censoring attack occurs, punishing the verifier corresponding to the voting information not contained in the second block according to a preset punishment mode. The embodiment is not limited to a specific punishment mode, and preferably, a mechanism of caspersffg may be adopted, and a slow punishment mode may be used, for example, punishment of only 10% of deposit in the first time, punishment of 20% of deposit in the second time, and so on. The listener error will be described in detail in the following embodiments.
S104: and constructing a honest chain according to the block generated by the honest verifier, and returning a reply verification message to the honest verifier, so that the honest verifier switches the current chain to the honest chain according to the identification information of the honest chain in the reply verification message.
In a specific implementation, the auxiliary verifier constructs the honest chain according to the block generated by the honest verifier determined in the above steps, and returns a reply verification message to the honest verifier, where the reply verification message at least includes identification information of the honest chain. After receiving the reply verification information, the honest verifier produces a new area with the identification information of the honest chain.
And the honest verifier switches the current chain to the honest chain according to the identification information of the honest chain in the reply verification information. It will be appreciated that since there may be multiple auxiliary verifiers in the blockchain, the honest verifier may receive multiple reply verification information, and the honest verifier may determine the most numerous identification information in all reply verification information as the identification information of the honest chain.
According to the examination attack processing method, the reply voting information, the verification information and the reply verification information are added, the information with three different functions and the role of an auxiliary verifier are added, the auxiliary verifier distinguishes the honest verifier and the attacker according to the difference of the verifier sets in the verification information of the honest verifier and the attacker, the honest verifier is automatically organized into the honest chain to achieve the purpose of accurately identifying the examination attack and the attacker, the honest verifier can be automatically organized into the honest chain, and the verifier does not need to pay attention to the safety form of the block chain at any time. Therefore, compared with the scheme of setting the time window in the prior art, the method for processing the censoring attack improves the security of processing the censoring attack.
The embodiment of the application discloses a method for processing censoring attacks, which further describes and optimizes a technical scheme relative to the previous embodiment. Specific:
referring to fig. 2, a flowchart of another method for processing a censoring attack is shown according to an exemplary embodiment, as shown in fig. 2, including:
s201: receiving verification information of a target verifier between the generation of the first block and the generation of the second block, calculating the similarity between all verifier sets in all the verification information, and judging whether the number of the similarity smaller than a preset value reaches a first preset number or not; if yes, go to S204; if not, entering S202;
in this step, the similarity between all the verifier sets is calculated first, where the similarity between the verifier set a and the verifier set B may be defined as the ratio of the intersection of the verifier set a and the verifier set B to the union. When the number of similarities smaller than the preset value reaches the first preset number, the verifier set in the verification message of the honest verifier is indicated to not contain any member of the attacker group. Because the behavior of the attacker population is consistent, there is a great difference between the two verifier sets, whether or not the verifier sets in the attacker's verification message contain honest verifiers. The auxiliary verifier can clearly distinguish between the two populations of aggressors and honest verifiers and treat this significant population split as a censoring attack. When the number of the similarities smaller than the preset value does not reach the first preset number, there may be a need for further judgment of the inspection attack, and the process proceeds to S202;
s202: judging whether the number of verifiers corresponding to voting information contained in the second block exceeds a preset proportion of the total number of verifiers in the block chain; if yes, go to S205; if not, entering S203;
in this step, it is determined whether the number of verifiers corresponding to the voting information included in the second block exceeds a preset proportion of the total number of verifiers, where the preset proportion is preferably two-thirds, if so, it is indicated that no inspection attack has occurred, and S205 is entered; if not, it is indicated that the attacker returned a valid reply voting message but still did not include the honest verifier' S voting information into the second block, and the auxiliary verifier considers that a review attack may occur, and the process proceeds to S203.
S203: judging whether the number of verifier sets of producers comprising the second block reaches a second preset number; if yes, go to S204; if not, enter S205;
in this step, it is determined whether the number of verifier sets of the producer including the second block reaches a second preset number, if so, the producer of the second block is an attacker, and it is determined that an inspection attack has occurred, and S204 is entered; if not, the producer of the second block is informed of network failure, and the judgment that the examination attack does not occur is made.
Preferably, the producer of the second block is penalized when the number of verifier sets comprising the producer of the second block does not reach the second preset number. In this case, if the producer of the second block does not receive votes from many verifiers due to objective reasons such as network failure, the verifiers do not receive reply voting information from the producer of the second block, and most of the verification information received by the auxiliary verifiers does not include the producer, the producer will be punished, and a specific punishment mode may be to deduct rewards of the blocks generated by the producer.
S204: setting the second block as an invalid block, and determining a verifier corresponding to voting information which is not contained in the second block as an honest verifier;
preferably, when there is a censoring attack, if the attacker returns a valid reply voting message but still does not include the honest verifier's voting information into the next block, the honest verifier may obtain the attacker's deposit by virtue of the particular signature of the attacker in the reply voting message. If the attacker does not return the effective reply voting message, the deposit of the attacker is automatically destroyed, and the purpose of punishing the attacker is achieved.
S205: determining the honest verifiers by all verifiers in the block chain, and punishing the verifiers which do not contain voting information and correspond to the voting information in the second block according to a preset punishment mode;
s206: and constructing a honest chain according to the block generated by the honest verifier, and returning a reply verification message to the honest verifier, so that the honest verifier switches the current chain to the honest chain according to the identification information of the honest chain in the reply verification message.
In a specific implementation, the honest verifier switches the current chain to the honest chain according to the identification information of the honest chain in the reply verification information, and the specific manner may be: the honest verifier only accepts the new block with honest chain identification information, the producer of the new block directs the pointer of the father block to the previous block, if the examining attack or listener error occurs, the previous block is the first block, if the reader error or the normal condition exists, the previous block is the second block.
It follows that the prior art does not address the reader or listener problem of the distributed system and that even if no censoring attack occurs, a common verifier may be penalized. The embodiment can accurately punish the verifier who does not vote and the block producer who generates network faults, and solve the problems of readers or listeners of the distributed system.
A censoring attack processing system provided in an embodiment of the present application is described below, and a censoring attack processing system described below and a censoring attack processing method described above may be referred to with each other.
Referring to FIG. 3, a block diagram of a censoring attack handling system is shown according to an exemplary embodiment, as shown in FIG. 3, comprising:
a judging module 301, configured to receive verification information of a target verifier between generation of a first block and generation of a second block, and judge whether a censoring attack occurs according to all verifier sets in all verification information and voting information contained in the second block; the verification set is a verifier set formed by verifiers corresponding to all reply voting information received by the target verifier, the reply voting information is information returned to the target verifier after other verifiers except the target verifier in the blockchain receive the voting information of the target verifier on the first block, and the second block is the next block of the first block;
a first determining module 302, configured to determine, when an audit attack occurs, a verifier corresponding to voting information that is not included in the second block as an honest verifier;
a second determining module 303, configured to determine all verifiers in the blockchain to be the honest verifier when no censoring attack occurs;
and the return module 304 is configured to construct a honest chain according to the block generated by the honest verifier, and return reply verification information to the honest verifier, so that the honest verifier switches the current chain to the honest chain according to the identification information of the honest chain in the reply verification information.
According to the inspection attack processing system provided by the embodiment of the application, through adding the reply voting information, the verification information and the reply verification information, and the information with three different functions and the role of an auxiliary verifier, the auxiliary verifier distinguishes the honest verifier and the attacker according to the difference of the verifier sets in the verification information of the honest verifier and the attacker, and the honest verifier is automatically organized into the honest chain to achieve the purpose of accurately identifying the inspection attack and the attacker, and the honest verifier can be automatically organized into the honest chain without the verifier focusing on the safety form of the block chain at any time. Therefore, compared with the scheme of setting the time window in the prior art, the inspection attack processing system provided by the embodiment of the application improves the security of processing the inspection attack.
On the basis of the above embodiment, as a preferable mode, the verification set is a verifier set composed of verifiers corresponding to all reply voting information received by the target verifier within a preset time.
On the basis of the above embodiment, as a preferable mode, the above embodiment further includes:
and the setting module is used for setting the second block as an invalid block.
On the basis of the above embodiment, as a preferable mode, the above embodiment further includes:
and the first punishment module is used for punishing the verifier corresponding to the fact that the second block does not contain the voting information according to a preset punishment mode when no censoring attack occurs.
On the basis of the above embodiment, as a preferable mode, the return module 304 is specifically a module that constructs an honest chain according to the blocks generated by the honest verifier, and returns reply verification information to the honest verifier, so that the honest verifier determines the target identification information with the largest number according to all received reply verification information, and switches the current chain to the honest chain corresponding to the target identification information.
On the basis of the above embodiment, as a preferable mode, the judging module 301 includes:
a receiving unit for receiving authentication information of the target verifier between the first block and the second block generation,
the computing unit is used for computing the similarity between all verifier sets in all the verification information and judging whether the number of the similarity smaller than a preset value reaches a first preset number or not; if yes, starting the workflow of the first judging unit; if not, starting the working flow of the first judging unit;
the first judging unit is configured to judge whether the number of verifiers corresponding to voting information included in the second block exceeds a preset proportion of the total number of verifiers in the blockchain; if yes, starting the workflow of the second judging unit; if not, starting the working flow of the second judging unit;
the second judging unit is configured to judge whether the number of verifier sets of producers including the second block reaches a second preset number; if yes, starting the workflow of the first judging unit; if not, starting the workflow of the second judging unit;
a first determination unit configured to determine that an audit attack occurs;
and a second determination unit configured to determine that no censoring attack has occurred.
On the basis of the above embodiment, as a preferable mode, the above embodiment further includes:
and the second punishment module is used for punishing the producer of the second block when the number of the verifier sets of the producer of the second block does not reach the second preset number.
The specific manner in which the various modules perform the operations in relation to the systems of the above embodiments have been described in detail in relation to the embodiments of the method and will not be described in detail herein.
The present application also provides an electronic device, referring to fig. 4, and a block diagram of an electronic device 400 provided in an embodiment of the present application, as shown in fig. 4, may include a processor 11 and a memory 12. The electronic device 400 may also include one or more of a multimedia component 13, an input/output (I/O) interface 14, and a communication component 15.
The processor 11 is configured to control the overall operation of the electronic device 400 to perform all or part of the above-mentioned steps in the attack-censoring method. The memory 12 is used to store various types of data to support operation at the electronic device 400, which may include, for example, instructions for any application or method operating on the electronic device 400, as well as application-related data, such as contact data, messages sent and received, pictures, audio, video, and so forth. The Memory 12 may be implemented by any type or combination of volatile or non-volatile Memory devices, such as static random access Memory (Static Random Access Memory, SRAM for short), electrically erasable programmable Read-Only Memory (Electrically Erasable Programmable Read-Only Memory, EEPROM for short), erasable programmable Read-Only Memory (Erasable Programmable Read-Only Memory, EPROM for short), programmable Read-Only Memory (Programmable Read-Only Memory, PROM for short), read-Only Memory (ROM for short), magnetic Memory, flash Memory, magnetic disk, or optical disk. The multimedia component 13 may include a screen and an audio component. Wherein the screen may be, for example, a touch screen, the audio component being for outputting and/or inputting audio signals. For example, the audio component may include a microphone for receiving external audio signals. The received audio signals may be further stored in the memory 12 or transmitted through the communication component 15. The audio assembly further comprises at least one speaker for outputting audio signals. The I/O interface 14 provides an interface between the processor 11 and other interface modules, which may be a keyboard, mouse, buttons, etc. These buttons may be virtual buttons or physical buttons. The communication component 15 is used for wired or wireless communication between the electronic device 400 and other devices. Wireless communication, such as Wi-Fi, bluetooth, near field communication (Near Field Communication, NFC for short), 2G, 3G or 4G, or a combination of one or more thereof, the corresponding communication component 15 may thus comprise: wi-Fi module, bluetooth module, NFC module.
In an exemplary embodiment, the electronic device 400 may be implemented by one or more application specific integrated circuits (Application Specific Integrated Circuit, abbreviated as ASIC), digital signal processors (Digital Signal Processor, abbreviated as DSP), digital signal processing devices (Digital Signal Processing Device, abbreviated as DSPD), programmable logic devices (Programmable Logic Device, abbreviated as PLD), field programmable gate arrays (Field Programmable Gate Array, abbreviated as FPGA), controllers, microcontrollers, microprocessors, or other electronic components for performing the above-described method of auditing attack processing.
In another exemplary embodiment, a computer readable storage medium is also provided that includes program instructions that, when executed by a processor, implement the steps of the above-described audit attack processing method. For example, the computer readable storage medium may be the memory 12 described above including program instructions executable by the processor 11 of the electronic device 400 to perform the above-described method of auditing attack.
In the description, each embodiment is described in a progressive manner, and each embodiment is mainly described by the differences from other embodiments, so that the same similar parts among the embodiments are mutually referred. For the system disclosed in the embodiment, since it corresponds to the method disclosed in the embodiment, the description is relatively simple, and the relevant points refer to the description of the method section. It should be noted that it would be obvious to those skilled in the art that various improvements and modifications can be made to the present application without departing from the principles of the present application, and such improvements and modifications fall within the scope of the claims of the present application.
It should also be noted that in this specification, relational terms such as first and second, and the like are used solely to distinguish one entity or action from another entity or action without necessarily requiring or implying any actual such relationship or order between such entities or actions. Moreover, the terms "comprises," "comprising," or any other variation thereof, are intended to cover a non-exclusive inclusion, such that a process, method, article, or apparatus that comprises a list of elements does not include only those elements but may include other elements not expressly listed or inherent to such process, method, article, or apparatus. Without further limitation, an element defined by the phrase "comprising one … …" does not exclude the presence of other like elements in a process, method, article, or apparatus that comprises the element.
Claims (10)
1. A method of processing a censoring attack of a blockchain, applied to an auxiliary verifier, the auxiliary verifier being a verifier selected from all verifiers of the blockchain at the beginning of a current checkpointing cycle, the method comprising:
receiving verification information of a target verifier between the generation of a first block and a second block, and judging whether a censoring attack occurs or not according to all verifier sets in all the verification information and voting information contained in the second block; the verifier set is a verifier set formed by verifiers corresponding to all reply voting information received by the target verifier, the reply voting information is information returned to the target verifier after other verifiers except the target verifier in the blockchain receive the voting information of the target verifier on the first block, and the second block is the next block of the first block;
if yes, determining the verifier corresponding to the voting information which is not contained in the second block as an honest verifier;
if not, determining all verifiers in the blockchain to be the honest verifiers;
and constructing a honest chain according to the block generated by the honest verifier, and returning a reply verification message to the honest verifier, so that the honest verifier switches the current chain to the honest chain according to the identification information of the honest chain in the reply verification message.
2. The method according to claim 1, wherein the verifier set is a verifier set composed of verifiers corresponding to all reply voting information received by the target verifier within a preset time period.
3. The method of claim 1, further comprising, before determining a verifier corresponding to voting information not included in the second block as an honest verifier:
the second block is set as an invalid block.
4. The blockchain auditing attack processing method of claim 1, further comprising:
and when no censoring attack occurs, punishing the verifier corresponding to the voting information not contained in the second block according to a preset punishment mode.
5. The method of claim 1, wherein returning the return verification information to the honest verifier so that the honest verifier switches the current chain to the honest chain according to the identification information of the honest chain in the return verification information, comprises:
and returning the reply verification information to the honest verifier, so that the honest verifier determines the target identification information with the largest quantity according to all the received reply verification information, and switches the current chain to the honest chain corresponding to the target identification information.
6. The method according to any one of claims 1 to 5, wherein determining whether or not a censoring attack has occurred based on all verifier sets in all the verification information and voting information contained in the second block, comprises:
s1: calculating the similarity among all verifier sets in all the verification information, and judging whether the number of the similarity smaller than a preset value reaches a first preset number or not; if yes, entering S4; if not, entering S2;
s2: judging whether the number of verifiers corresponding to voting information contained in the second block exceeds a preset proportion of the total number of verifiers in the block chain; if yes, entering S5; if not, entering S3;
s3: judging whether the number of verifier sets of producers comprising the second block reaches a second preset number; if yes, entering S4; if not, entering S5;
s4: judging that an inspection attack occurs;
s5: it is determined that no censoring attack has occurred.
7. The blockchain auditing attack processing method of claim 6, further comprising:
and punishing the producer of the second block when the number of verifier sets comprising the producer of the second block does not reach the second preset number.
8. A system for processing a censored attack of a blockchain, applied to an auxiliary verifier, the auxiliary verifier being a verifier selected from among all verifiers of the blockchain at the beginning of a current checkpointing cycle, the system comprising:
the judging module is used for receiving verification information of a target verifier between the generation of the first block and the generation of the second block and judging whether a review attack occurs or not according to all verifier sets in the verification information and voting information contained in the second block; the verifier set is a verifier set formed by verifiers corresponding to all reply voting information received by the target verifier, the reply voting information is information returned to the target verifier after other verifiers except the target verifier in the blockchain receive the voting information of the target verifier on the first block, and the second block is the next block of the first block;
the first determining module is used for determining a verifier corresponding to voting information which is not contained in the second block as an honest verifier when an examination attack occurs;
a second determination module that determines all verifiers in the blockchain to be the honest verifier when no censoring attack has occurred;
and the return module is used for constructing a honest chain according to the block generated by the honest verifier and returning the reply verification information to the honest verifier so that the honest verifier can switch the current chain to the honest chain according to the identification information of the honest chain in the reply verification information.
9. An electronic device, comprising:
a memory for storing a computer program;
a processor for implementing the steps of the blockchain audit attack processing method according to any of claims 1 to 7 when executing the computer program.
10. A computer readable storage medium, wherein a computer program is stored on the computer readable storage medium, which when executed by a processor, implements the steps of the blockchain audit attack processing method according to any of claims 1 to 7.
Priority Applications (1)
| Application Number | Priority Date | Filing Date | Title |
|---|---|---|---|
| CN201910023038.3A CN109741073B (en) | 2019-01-10 | 2019-01-10 | Block chain examination attack processing method and system, electronic equipment and storage medium |
Applications Claiming Priority (1)
| Application Number | Priority Date | Filing Date | Title |
|---|---|---|---|
| CN201910023038.3A CN109741073B (en) | 2019-01-10 | 2019-01-10 | Block chain examination attack processing method and system, electronic equipment and storage medium |
Publications (2)
| Publication Number | Publication Date |
|---|---|
| CN109741073A CN109741073A (en) | 2019-05-10 |
| CN109741073B true CN109741073B (en) | 2023-05-09 |
Family
ID=66364252
Family Applications (1)
| Application Number | Title | Priority Date | Filing Date |
|---|---|---|---|
| CN201910023038.3A Active CN109741073B (en) | 2019-01-10 | 2019-01-10 | Block chain examination attack processing method and system, electronic equipment and storage medium |
Country Status (1)
| Country | Link |
|---|---|
| CN (1) | CN109741073B (en) |
Families Citing this family (2)
| Publication number | Priority date | Publication date | Assignee | Title |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| CN111628871B (en) * | 2020-05-28 | 2021-09-03 | 广东工业大学 | Block chain transaction processing method and device, electronic equipment and storage medium |
| CN114692149B (en) * | 2022-03-31 | 2023-06-27 | 北京九章云极科技有限公司 | Multiparty security calculation verification method and multiparty security calculation verification system |
Citations (2)
| Publication number | Priority date | Publication date | Assignee | Title |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| CN108537550A (en) * | 2018-04-20 | 2018-09-14 | 丁江 | Prevent method, block catenary system and the computer readable storage medium of 51% attack |
| CN108881233A (en) * | 2018-06-21 | 2018-11-23 | 中国联合网络通信集团有限公司 | anti-attack processing method, device, equipment and storage medium |
Family Cites Families (4)
| Publication number | Priority date | Publication date | Assignee | Title |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| CN106060036B (en) * | 2016-05-26 | 2019-07-16 | 布比（北京）网络技术有限公司 | Decentralization common recognition method and device |
| CN106447311B (en) * | 2016-09-26 | 2019-11-08 | 北京天德科技有限公司 | A kind of block chain of Byzantine failure tolerance algorithms of four communications builds block method |
| WO2018172439A1 (en) * | 2017-03-22 | 2018-09-27 | NEC Laboratories Europe GmbH | Method for operating a blockchain |
| CN108923909B (en) * | 2018-07-02 | 2021-07-20 | 上海达家迎信息科技有限公司 | Block chain generation method and device, computer equipment and storage medium |
-
2019
- 2019-01-10 CN CN201910023038.3A patent/CN109741073B/en active Active
Patent Citations (2)
| Publication number | Priority date | Publication date | Assignee | Title |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| CN108537550A (en) * | 2018-04-20 | 2018-09-14 | 丁江 | Prevent method, block catenary system and the computer readable storage medium of 51% attack |
| CN108881233A (en) * | 2018-06-21 | 2018-11-23 | 中国联合网络通信集团有限公司 | anti-attack processing method, device, equipment and storage medium |
Also Published As
| Publication number | Publication date |
|---|---|
| CN109741073A (en) | 2019-05-10 |
Similar Documents
| Publication | Publication Date | Title |
|---|---|---|
| US11636450B2 (en) | Blockchain system to which proof-of-transaction consensus algorithm is applied, and method therefor | |
| CN108848055B (en) | Block chain consensus method, accounting node and node | |
| CN111414373A (en) | Consensus method and consensus system | |
| CN111476571A (en) | Asset processing method, device, equipment and storage medium based on block chain | |
| CN107993053B (en) | Claims data auditing method and device, computer equipment and storage medium | |
| CN110060155B (en) | Intelligent contract execution method and device of block chain and electronic equipment | |
| US20230004657A1 (en) | Blockchain security system | |
| CN110400217B (en) | Rule change processing method and device for intelligent contract | |
| CN109345061B (en) | Method and device for identifying authenticity of evidence based on block chain evidence storage | |
| CN109741073B (en) | Block chain examination attack processing method and system, electronic equipment and storage medium | |
| US20220027357A1 (en) | Control method, server, and data structure | |
| TWI625703B (en) | Online voting and ballot counting system based on blockchain and method thereof | |
| CN110175833B (en) | Computer device, method, system and medium for binding bank card information | |
| CN112148353A (en) | Data processing method and device | |
| CN109741064B (en) | Method and system for processing censoring attack, electronic equipment and storage medium | |
| CN110879835B (en) | Block chain-based data processing method, device, equipment and readable storage medium | |
| CN110675136A (en) | Information processing method, device and equipment | |
| CN110910091A (en) | Data processing method, device and medium | |
| CN114124641B (en) | Block chain exception service processing method, device, equipment and readable storage medium | |
| CN110852864A (en) | Method and device for processing digital resource amount and storage medium | |
| CN116756226B (en) | File generation method, device, server, user equipment and storage medium | |
| CN111563096B (en) | Method, device, node and storage medium for creating entity portraits | |
| CN111711537B (en) | Method, device and equipment for updating standby main node list | |
| CN111008251B (en) | Data processing method and device | |
| CN110400041B (en) | Risk auditing method, risk auditing device, computer equipment and computer readable storage medium |
Legal Events
| Date | Code | Title | Description |
|---|---|---|---|
| PB01 | Publication | ||
| PB01 | Publication | ||
| SE01 | Entry into force of request for substantive examination | ||
| SE01 | Entry into force of request for substantive examination | ||
| GR01 | Patent grant | ||
| GR01 | Patent grant |