CN109712731B - Nuclear power station diversity driving system and driving method - Google Patents
Nuclear power station diversity driving system and driving method Download PDFInfo
- Publication number
- CN109712731B CN109712731B CN201811492513.3A CN201811492513A CN109712731B CN 109712731 B CN109712731 B CN 109712731B CN 201811492513 A CN201811492513 A CN 201811492513A CN 109712731 B CN109712731 B CN 109712731B
- Authority
- CN
- China
- Prior art keywords
- protection
- diversity
- module
- instrument
- logic
- Prior art date
- Legal status (The legal status is an assumption and is not a legal conclusion. Google has not performed a legal analysis and makes no representation as to the accuracy of the status listed.)
- Active
Links
Images
Classifications
-
- Y—GENERAL TAGGING OF NEW TECHNOLOGICAL DEVELOPMENTS; GENERAL TAGGING OF CROSS-SECTIONAL TECHNOLOGIES SPANNING OVER SEVERAL SECTIONS OF THE IPC; TECHNICAL SUBJECTS COVERED BY FORMER USPC CROSS-REFERENCE ART COLLECTIONS [XRACs] AND DIGESTS
- Y02—TECHNOLOGIES OR APPLICATIONS FOR MITIGATION OR ADAPTATION AGAINST CLIMATE CHANGE
- Y02E—REDUCTION OF GREENHOUSE GAS [GHG] EMISSIONS, RELATED TO ENERGY GENERATION, TRANSMISSION OR DISTRIBUTION
- Y02E30/00—Energy generation of nuclear origin
Landscapes
- Testing And Monitoring For Control Systems (AREA)
Abstract
The invention provides a diversity driving system and a driving method for a nuclear power station, which are used for realizing the protection of a reactor by matching with a reactor protection system, and comprise an on-site instrument module, a driving cabinet assembly and an alarm indication module, wherein the driving cabinet assembly comprises diversity driving cabinets which are configured in multiple rows and are respectively and independently arranged, and the diversity driving cabinets comprise: the isolation module is used for collecting field instrument signals; the comparison processing module is used for comparing the collected field instrument signals with a preset protection parameter threshold value and generating protection action signals according to the comparison result; the comparison processing module is also used for receiving other column protection action signals except the current column, carrying out logic voting on all the column protection action signals, executing corresponding protection actions according to voting results, connecting the protection actions to the alarm indicating module and generating alarm indicating information. The system meets the evaluation requirement of a diversity drive system with the strictest examination, and further improves the availability, reliability and safety of the nuclear power plant.
Description
Technical Field
The invention relates to the field of digital instrument control systems of nuclear power plants, in particular to a nuclear power plant diversity driving system and a driving method for protecting a reactor by matching with a reactor protection system.
Background
For a Reactor Protection System (RPS) for realizing the safety function of a reactor, if the digital protection system cannot execute the key safety function of the RPS due to common cause failure when a design basis accident occurs, the accident is developed into an over-design basis accident and further the safety of the reactor is damaged. Therefore, in order to meet the requirements of 'nuclear power plants adopting digital instrument control systems' on particularly emphasizing the deep defense and the diversity of the nuclear power plants, a diversity means for coping with common cause failure of the digital protection system is required to be provided during design. Since diversified measures are considered to be one of the most effective methods for dealing with the common cause failure of the software, the countries pay special attention to dealing with the common cause failure of the software by means of diversified measures in design and evaluation. However, the evaluation requirements of each country are not completely consistent with the specific implementation details of the diversity requirements of the nuclear power plant.
The existing technologies for meeting the requirements of the nuclear power station diversity system mainly comprise two technologies: the first is to meet the diversity requirement of the nuclear power station by adopting a large number of relay circuits, so that important equipment on the site can still be operated by relay logic when the digital protection system is in failure. However, the following problems exist: 1) aiming at common cause failure of a digital protection system, no complete nuclear power station diversity driving measure is formed; 2) a large number of safety level instruments and hard hand operation increase the scale of the backup panel; 3) the over-range judgment is not realized, and the risk of false triggering can be caused when the over-range judgment is unavailable under the normal working condition; 4) due to the adoption of single-row realization, the single-row fault detection method cannot meet a single fault criterion and cannot meet the evaluation requirements of part of European countries; 5) the system adopts an instrument shared by the reactor protection system RPS, so that the diversity of functions cannot be realized, and the KDS and the reactor protection system RPS fail at the same time under the condition that the instrument fails due to common factors. The second method is to adopt diversified equipment in the digital protection system to meet the diversity requirement of the nuclear power station, so that the digital protection system is used for relieving the consequence of accidents when common cause failure occurs and design reference accidents are superposed, and the power station is maintained in a safe state. However, the following problems exist: 1) due to the adoption of single-row realization, the single-row fault detection method cannot meet a single fault criterion and cannot meet the evaluation requirements of part of European countries; 2) the over-range judgment is not realized, and the risk of false triggering can be caused when the over-range judgment is unavailable under the normal working condition; 3) the KDS adopts an instrument consistent with the RPS, so that the functional diversity cannot be realized, and the KDS and the RPS fail simultaneously under the condition that the instrument fails due to common cause; 4) and the KDS system is realized by adopting a complex hardware technology, and the technology does not meet the evaluation requirements of part of countries in Europe.
Therefore, a new diversified driving system of the nuclear power plant is required to meet the evaluation requirements of the most strict examined european countries in the world on the diversified driving system of the nuclear power plant, and the availability, reliability and safety of the nuclear power plant are further improved.
Disclosure of Invention
Aiming at the technical problems, the invention provides a diversity driving system and a driving method for a nuclear power station, which solve the technical problems that the requirement of a single fault criterion cannot be met by adopting single-row implementation and the risk of false triggering possibly caused in the prior art.
The technical scheme for solving the technical problems is that the diversified driving system of the nuclear power station is used for being matched with a reactor protection system to protect a reactor, and comprises an on-site instrument module, a driving cabinet assembly and an alarm indication module, wherein the driving cabinet assembly comprises diversified driving cabinets which are configured in multiple rows and are respectively and independently arranged, and each row of the diversified driving cabinets comprises:
the isolation module is connected to the instrument of the field instrument module and is used for collecting a field instrument signal;
the comparison processing module is connected with the isolation module and used for comparing the collected field instrument signals with a preset protection parameter threshold value and generating protection action signals according to a comparison result;
the comparison processing module of each column is also used for receiving the protection action signals of other columns except the column, carrying out logic voting on the protection action signals of all the columns, executing corresponding protection actions according to voting results and connecting the protection action signals to the alarm indicating module to generate alarm indicating information.
Wherein the comparison processing module comprises:
the storage module is used for presetting and storing a protection parameter threshold according to the protection requirement of the nuclear reactor;
the comparison module is connected with the isolation module and used for calling a protection parameter threshold value, comparing the protection parameter threshold value according to a received field instrument signal, outputting a comparison result and generating a protection action signal, wherein the protection action signal is a trip signal;
the logic processing module is connected with the comparison module and used for receiving the trip signals of the self-column and other columns except the self-column, logically voting the trip signals of all the columns and generating automatic action signals according to the voting result; and executing corresponding protection actions on the shutdown or the drive special drive facilities.
The setting between the instrument A of the reactor protection system and the instrument B of the diversity drive system is designed by adopting functional diversity and keeps consistent, and the setting is used for triggering a diversity protection action by adopting any type of instrument of the instrument A and the instrument B.
Wherein the system further comprises: and the range judgment logic module is connected between the isolation module and the comparison processing module and is used for judging whether the instrument exceeds the range or not and determining whether the instrument is a real signal or not according to a judgment result so as to avoid false triggering caused by wrong judgment of the instrument exceeding the range under normal working conditions.
The upper and lower limit thresholds of the overrange judgment set in the range judgment logic module are smaller than the upper and lower limit thresholds of the overrange judgment set in the reactor protection system.
The driving cabinet assembly comprises 3 rows of diversified driving cabinets, and voting logic in each row adopts judgment logic of selecting 2 from 3;
the system is implemented using electrical and electronic component circuits.
In another aspect, the present invention further provides a diversity driving method for a nuclear power plant, including the following steps:
collecting a field instrument signal;
comparing the collected field instrument signal with a preset protection parameter threshold value, and generating a protection action signal according to a comparison result; carrying out logic voting on all protection action signals, and executing corresponding protection actions according to voting results;
and generating alarm indication information.
Comparing the collected field instrument signal with a preset protection parameter threshold value, and generating a protection action signal according to a comparison result; performing logic voting on all protection action signals, and executing corresponding protection actions according to voting results further comprises the following processing:
presetting and storing a protection parameter threshold according to the protection requirement of the nuclear reactor;
calling a protection parameter threshold value, comparing the protection parameter threshold value according to a received field instrument signal, outputting a comparison result, and generating a protection action signal, wherein the protection action signal is a trip signal;
receiving trip signals of the self-column and other columns except the self-column, carrying out logic voting on the trip signals of all the columns, and generating automatic action signals according to voting results; and executing corresponding protection actions on the shutdown or the drive special drive facilities.
The setting between the instrument A of the reactor protection system and the instrument B of the diversity drive system is designed by adopting functional diversity and keeps consistent, and the setting is used for triggering a diversity protection action by adopting any type of instrument of the instrument A and the instrument B.
The method also comprises the following processing of judging the measuring range of the instrument, connecting the instrument with the isolation module and the comparison processing module, judging whether the instrument exceeds the measuring range, determining whether the instrument is a real signal according to a judgment result, and avoiding false triggering caused by judgment error of the instrument exceeding the measuring range under normal working conditions: the upper and lower limit thresholds of the overrange judgment set in the range judgment logic are smaller than the upper and lower limit thresholds of the overrange judgment set in the reactor protection system.
The driving cabinet assembly comprises 3 rows of diversified driving cabinets, no signal exchange logic exists between each row, and the voting logic in each row adopts judgment logic of selecting 2 from 3.
The technical scheme provided by the embodiment of the invention has the following beneficial effects: by establishing the nuclear power station diversity driving system, the technical problems that the evaluation requirements of parts of countries in European countries are not met, the risk of false triggering is possibly caused when the over-range judgment is unavailable under the condition of normal working conditions, and KDS and RPS fail simultaneously under the condition of common cause failure of instruments in the prior art are effectively solved. The diversity driving system and the driving method for the nuclear power station provided by the invention meet the single fault criterion, and the system adopts 3 rows to realize diversity logic, thereby meeting the most severe evaluation requirements of part of European countries; the instrument adopted by the diversity driving logic of the nuclear power station and the instrument adopted by the RPS are effectively identified according to the function diversity, so that the risk that the functions of the KDS and the RPS are simultaneously lost under the condition that the instruments have common cause failure is avoided; the over-range judgment is realized, and the risk of false triggering possibly caused by error over-range judgment under the normal working condition is avoided; the diversity of the technology is effectively identified, and the electronic and electric element technology is definitely adopted, so that the technology meets the most severe evaluation requirement of part of countries in Europe. The adoption of the technology further improves the availability, reliability and safety of the nuclear power plant.
Drawings
The invention will be further described with reference to the accompanying drawings and examples, in which:
FIG. 1 is a schematic structural diagram of a diversified driving system of a nuclear power plant according to an embodiment of the present invention;
FIG. 2 is a schematic structural diagram of a nuclear power plant diversity driving system according to an embodiment of the present invention;
FIG. 3 is a schematic structural diagram of a diversified driving system of a nuclear power plant according to an embodiment of the present invention;
FIG. 4 is a schematic structural diagram of an instrumentation module of a diversified drive system of a nuclear power plant according to an embodiment of the present invention;
FIG. 5 is a schematic structural diagram of an instrumentation module of a nuclear power plant diversity drive system having a range determination module according to an embodiment of the present invention;
FIG. 6 is a schematic diagram of over-range determination of a meter according to an embodiment of the present invention;
fig. 7 is a flowchart of a diversity driving method for a nuclear power plant according to a second embodiment of the present invention;
FIG. 8 shows exemplary steps of a nuclear power plant diversity driving method corresponding to FIG. 6;
FIG. 9 is a schematic diagram of a diversity technique.
Detailed Description
The method aims to solve the technical problems that the evaluation requirements of parts of European countries are not met, the risk of false triggering is possibly caused when the over-range judgment is unavailable under the condition of normal working conditions, and the diversity drive system and the reactor system of the nuclear power station fail simultaneously under the condition that the common cause of instruments fails in the prior art. In order to meet the single fault criterion, the system adopts a plurality of rows to realize diversity logic, and meets the most severe evaluation requirements of part of European countries; the instruments adopted by the diversity drive logic and the instruments adopted by the reactor system are effectively identified according to the functional diversity, so that the risk that the functions of the diversity drive system and the reactor system of the nuclear power station are simultaneously lost under the condition that the common cause of the instruments is invalid is avoided; the over-range judgment is realized, and the risk of false triggering possibly caused by error over-range judgment under the normal working condition is avoided; the diversity of the technology is effectively identified, the simple hardware technology is definitely adopted, and the technology meets the most severe evaluation requirement of part of European countries. The availability, reliability and safety of the nuclear power plant are further improved. The core idea is as follows: establishing a nuclear power station diversity drive system by providing a design scheme, wherein the method comprises the steps of collecting field instrument signals; presetting and storing a protection parameter threshold; carrying out logic voting on the tripping signal, and generating an automatic action signal according to a voting result; comparing the collected field instrument signal with a preset protection parameter threshold value, and generating a protection action signal according to a comparison result; carrying out logic voting on all protection action signals, and executing corresponding protection actions according to voting results; and executing corresponding protection actions on the shutdown or the drive special drive facilities. In one embodiment of the invention, through adopting the logic judgment of selecting two from three in 3 rows, the instruments adopted by the diversity driving logic and the instruments adopted by the reactor system are effectively identified according to the functional diversity, and the over-range judgment logic is set, so that the logic can respond to the over-range judgment result, avoid the field misoperation, effectively identify the technical diversity and definitely adopt the simple hardware technology. The design scheme meets the evaluation requirements of the European countries with the most strict examination in the world on the diversified driving systems of the nuclear power stations.
In order that those skilled in the art will more clearly understand the present invention, the present invention will be described in further detail with reference to the accompanying drawings and specific embodiments.
Example one
FIG. 1 is a schematic structural diagram of a diversified driving system of a nuclear power plant according to an embodiment of the present invention; as shown in fig. 1, the present invention provides a diversified driving system of a nuclear power plant, which is used for cooperating with a reactor protection system to protect a reactor, and the system includes an on-site instrument module 200, a driving cabinet assembly 100 and an alarm indication module 300, wherein the driving cabinet assembly 100 includes diversified driving cabinets configured in multiple rows and respectively and independently arranged, and each diversified driving cabinet includes: an isolation module 110 connected to the meters of the field meter module 200 for collecting field meter signals; the comparison processing module 120 is connected with the isolation module and is used for comparing the collected field instrument signal with a preset protection parameter threshold value and generating a protection action signal according to a comparison result; the comparison processing module 120 is further configured to receive protection action signals of other columns except the current column, perform logical voting on the protection action signals of all the columns, and execute corresponding protection actions according to a voting result. Wherein, the voting logic adopts the judgment logic of 2 out of 3. The alarm indication module 300 is connected to the comparison processing module 120, and is used for generating alarm indication information to remind an operator.
Fig. 2 is another schematic structural diagram of a diversified driving system of a nuclear power plant according to a first embodiment of the present invention, as shown in fig. 2: the system includes an isolation module 110, a comparison processing module 120, a field instrument module 200, and an alarm indication module 300. Wherein the field instrument module 200 includes a button and switch 201 and a sensor 202; the comparison processing module 120 includes three rows of diversity driver cabinet comparison processing modules, namely a diversity driver cabinet a comparison processing module, a diversity driver cabinet B comparison processing module and a diversity driver cabinet C comparison processing module. The alarm indication module 300 comprises an alarm 301, a parameter index 302 and a lamp 303. The button and switch 201 is used for transmitting button and switch signals to three rows of diversity driving cabinets respectively; the sensor 202 is used for collecting data; the isolation modules 110 are respectively connected to the sensors 202, and configured to receive signals from the sensors 202 and perform isolation distribution on the received signals, and output ends of the isolation modules are respectively connected to the rack comparison processing modules in the row and the other two rows of driving rack comparison processing modules. The diversity driving cabinet A comparison processing module is respectively connected with the field instrument module 200 and other two-column signals, the output end of the diversity driving cabinet A outputs voting signals to the executing mechanism of the A column and outputs signals to the alarm indicating module 300 to form indicating information for reminding personnel; the diversity driving cabinet B comparison processing module is respectively connected with the field instrument module and other two rows of signals, the output end of the diversity driving cabinet B comparison processing module outputs voting signals to the executing mechanism of the row B and outputs signals to the alarm indicating module 300 to form indicating information for reminding personnel; the diversity driving cabinet C comparison processing module is respectively connected with the field instrument module and the other two columns of signals, the output end of the diversity driving cabinet C comparison processing module outputs a voting signal to the executing mechanism of the column C and outputs a signal to the alarm indicating module 300 to form indicating information for reminding personnel; and the diversity driving cabinet comparison processing module of each row generates a protection action signal after performing threshold comparison on the automatic action parameters, performs voting logic processing of 2-out-of-3 on the protection action signal, specifically, compares each signal input into the diversity driving cabinet with a set protection parameter threshold, judges whether a protection action signal is generated, and outputs an automatic action signal to stop the pile or drive a special driving facility to act when at least two protection action signals are generated after comparison.
The invention designs a nuclear power station diversity driving system, and the overall functional requirements of the driving system need to meet the following conditions: when the digital protection system has common cause failure and is superposed with a design reference accident, the digital protection system is used for relieving the consequence of the accident, the power station is maintained in a safe state, and the availability, reliability and safety of the nuclear power plant are improved.
FIG. 3 is a schematic diagram of a specific configuration of another embodiment of the nuclear power plant diversity drive system corresponding to FIG. 1; referring to fig. 3, the comparison processing module 120 includes: the storage module 121 is configured to preset and store a protection parameter threshold according to a nuclear reactor protection requirement; the comparison module 122 is connected with the isolation module and used for calling a protection parameter threshold value, comparing the protection parameter threshold value according to the received field instrument signal, outputting a comparison result and generating a protection action signal, wherein the protection action signal is a trip signal; the logic processing module 123 is connected to the comparison module, and is configured to receive the trip signals of the self-column and the trip signals of the other columns except the self-column, perform logic voting on the trip signals of all the columns, and generate an automatic action signal according to a voting result; and executing corresponding protection actions on the shutdown or the drive special drive facilities. Wherein, the columns do not have any signal exchange logic between the columns, and the independence is ensured. And multiple rows are adopted to realize diversity logic, so that the single fault criterion meets the most severe evaluation requirement of part of European countries.
Fig. 4 is a schematic structural diagram of an instrument module of a diversified driving system of a nuclear power plant according to an embodiment of the present invention. Referring to FIG. 4: the arrangement between the instrument A500 of the reactor protection system and the instrument B200 of the diversity drive system is designed by adopting functional diversity and keeps consistent, and is used for triggering a diversity protection action by adopting any type of instrument of the instrument A500 and the instrument B200. The isolation module 110 is connected to an instrument A500 of the reactor protection system and an instrument B200 of the nuclear power plant diversity driving system and is used for collecting field instrument signals; the comparison processing module 120 is connected to the isolation module 110, and is configured to compare the acquired field instrument signal with a preset protection parameter threshold, and generate a protection action signal according to a comparison result; if the protection considers the diversified design of the function in the safety function of coping with the design reference working condition, the sensor equipment adopted by the diversified function also meets the diversified design requirement, namely two types of instruments are adopted for the same working condition protection system to trigger the protection action (for example, a pressure instrument or a water level instrument is adopted for the break working condition). In this case, the instruments used by the diversified driving system of the nuclear power plant are consistent with the instruments used by the reactor protection system, that is, the diversified driving system of the nuclear power plant can trigger diversified protection actions by using any type of instrument of the class a instrument 500 or the class B instrument 200. If the instruments adopted by the reactor protection system are not diverse, namely, the reactor protection system only adopts the A-type instrument 500 to trigger the protection action aiming at a certain type of working condition, the diverse driving must adopt the diverse instrument B200 to trigger the diverse driving logic, so that the risk that the accidents of one type of instrument cannot be responded to due to common cause failure is prevented.
Fig. 5 is a schematic structural diagram of an instrument module of a nuclear power plant diversity driving system having a range determination module according to an embodiment of the present invention, as shown in fig. 5: the meter system further comprises a range judgment logic module 700 connected between the isolation module 110 and the comparison processing module 120, and configured to judge whether the meter exceeds the range, and determine whether the meter is a real signal according to a judgment result, so as to avoid false triggering caused by an error in judgment of the meter exceeding the range under normal operating conditions. If the instrument of the signal collected by the nuclear power station diversity drive system does not set the over-range judgment, if the phenomenon of the over-range of the instrument occurs under partial normal working conditions, the over-range value of the instrument is defaulted by the system to be credible, and the misoperation is caused on site.
Fig. 6 is a schematic diagram of determining an over-measurement range of a meter according to an embodiment of the present invention, as shown in fig. 6: the upper and lower limit thresholds for the over-range judgment set in the range judgment logic module 700 are smaller than the upper and lower limit thresholds for the over-range judgment set in the reactor protection system. If the reactor protection system adopts the same instrument as the reactor protection system (namely the reactor protection system adopts two types of instruments to trigger the protection action aiming at the same working condition protection system, and the nuclear power plant diversity drive system only adopts any one of A/B type instruments), if the protection logic in the reactor protection system belongs to high value triggering, the upper limit value of the over-range judgment of the instrument in the nuclear power plant diversity drive system is required to be smaller than the upper limit value of the over-range judgment of the reactor protection system; if the protection logic in the reactor protection system belongs to low value triggering, the lower limit value of the over-range judgment of the instrument in the nuclear power station diversity driving system needs to be larger than the lower limit value of the over-range judgment of the reactor protection system. If the instruments adopted by the nuclear power plant diversity driving system and the instruments adopted by the reactor protection system have diversity (the reactor protection system adopts an A-type instrument, and the diversity driving system adopts a B-type instrument), the overrange setting of the instrument in the nuclear power plant diversity driving system needs to be set by referring to the characteristic parameters of the instrument.
The system realizes the over-range judgment logic, and can avoid the risk of false triggering caused by the error over-range judgment of the instrument under normal working conditions.
Example two
In order to implement the structure of the diversified driving system of the nuclear power plant, fig. 7 is a flowchart of a working method of the diversified driving method of the nuclear power plant provided by the second embodiment of the present invention, and mainly includes the following steps:
s100, collecting field signals;
s200, comparing the collected field instrument signal with a preset protection parameter threshold value, and generating a protection action signal according to a comparison result; carrying out logic voting on all protection action signals, and executing corresponding protection actions according to voting results;
and S300, generating alarm indication information.
Referring to fig. 8, step S200 further includes the steps of:
s210, presetting and storing a protection parameter threshold according to the protection requirement of the nuclear reactor;
s220, judging the measuring range of the instrument, judging whether the instrument exceeds the measuring range, and determining whether the instrument is a real signal according to a judgment result;
s230, calling a protection parameter threshold value, comparing the protection parameter threshold value according to the received field instrument signal, outputting a comparison result, and generating a protection action signal, wherein the protection action signal is a trip signal;
s240, receiving the trip signals of the self-column and other columns except the self-column, carrying out logic voting on the trip signals of all the columns, and generating automatic action signals according to voting results; and executing corresponding protection actions on the shutdown or the drive special drive facilities.
Fig. 9 is a technical diagram of diversity, and the software and hardware classification in the prior art internationally is shown in fig. 9 according to the requirement of IAEA regulation. Electronic hardware technologies are divided into traditional electrical and electronic components and large-scale integrated circuits; traditional electrical and electronic components are divided into relays, analog electronic circuits, and digital logic circuits; the large scale integrated circuit comprises a programmable logic device, an application specific integrated circuit and a microprocessor; the programmable logic devices are divided into simple programmable logic devices, complex programmable logic devices and FPGA; simple programmable logic devices are divided into programmable logic arrays and programmable array logic. With different requirements for this diversity according to different regulatory authorities. Part of the regulatory authorities recognize that diversity exists between programmable logic units (complex hardware technology) and microprocessors; some regulatory authorities consider that there is diversity between the two technologies between microprocessors. At present, the three generations of nuclear power plants in China all adopt complex hardware technology to realize diversity logic. The most stringent worldwide diversity requires diversity between conventional electrical and electrical components (i.e., simple hardware technology) and large-scale integrated circuits (i.e., complex hardware and software technology). Therefore, the system adopts the most severe diversity certification requirement and is realized by adopting the traditional electric and electronic element circuit technology. The invention effectively identifies the technology diversity, and the diversity driving system comparison processing module 120 definitely adopts the traditional electric and electronic element circuit technology, and the technology meets the most severe evaluation requirements of part of European countries. The adoption of the technology further improves the availability, reliability and safety of the nuclear power plant.
It should be noted that: in the above embodiment, when the driving method is implemented, the system is only illustrated by dividing the functional modules, and in practical applications, the functions may be distributed by different functional modules according to needs, that is, the internal structure of the device is divided into different functional modules, so as to complete all or part of the functions described above. In addition, the system and method embodiments provided by the above embodiments belong to the same concept, and specific implementation processes thereof are described in detail in the method embodiments and are not described herein again.
The technical effects of the invention are as follows: by establishing the nuclear power station diversity driving system, the technical problems that the evaluation requirements of part of European countries are not met, the risk of false triggering is possibly caused when the over-range judgment is unavailable under the condition of normal working conditions, and KDS and RPS fail simultaneously under the condition that common cause failure of instruments occurs are effectively solved. In order to meet the single fault criterion, the diversity driving system and the driving method for the nuclear power station adopt 3 rows to realize diversity logic, and meet the most severe evaluation requirements of part of European countries; the instruments adopted by the diversity driving logic and the instruments adopted by the RPS are effectively identified according to the functional diversity, so that the risk that the functions of the KDS and the RPS are simultaneously lost under the condition that common cause failure of the instruments is avoided; the over-range judgment is realized, and the risk of false triggering possibly caused by error over-range judgment under the normal working condition is avoided; the diversity of the technology is effectively identified, the diversity driving system of the nuclear power station definitely adopts the simple hardware technology, and the technology meets the most severe evaluation requirement of part of countries in European countries. The adoption of the technology further improves the availability, reliability and safety of the nuclear power plant.
The above description is only for the purpose of illustrating the preferred embodiments of the present invention and is not to be construed as limiting the invention, and any modifications, equivalents, improvements and the like that fall within the spirit and principle of the present invention are intended to be included therein.
Claims (10)
1. The utility model provides a nuclear power station diversity actuating system for realize protecting the reactor with the cooperation of reactor protection system, the system includes on-the-spot instrument module, drive rack subassembly and warning indication module, its characterized in that, drive rack subassembly includes according to multiseriate configuration, and the diversity drive rack of independent setting respectively, and each is listed as the diversity drive rack all includes:
the isolation module is connected to the instrument of the field instrument module and is used for collecting a field instrument signal;
the comparison processing module is connected with the isolation module and used for comparing the collected field instrument signals with a preset protection parameter threshold value and generating protection action signals according to a comparison result;
the comparison processing module of each column is also used for receiving the protection action signals of other columns except the column, carrying out logic voting on the protection action signals of all the columns, executing corresponding protection actions according to voting results and connecting the protection actions to the alarm indicating module to generate alarm indicating information; the comparison processing module comprises:
the storage module is used for presetting and storing a protection parameter threshold according to the protection requirement of the nuclear reactor;
the comparison module is connected with the isolation module and used for calling a protection parameter threshold value, comparing the protection parameter threshold value according to a received field instrument signal, outputting a comparison result and generating a protection action signal, wherein the protection action signal is a trip signal;
the logic processing module is connected with the comparison module and used for receiving the trip signals of the self-column and other columns except the self-column, logically voting the trip signals of all the columns and generating automatic action signals according to the voting result; and executing corresponding protection actions on the shutdown or the drive special drive facilities.
2. The system of claim 1, wherein the arrangement between meter a of the reactor protection system and meter B of the diversity drive system is designed with functional diversity and is consistent for triggering a diversity protection action with either type of meter a and meter B.
3. The system of claim 2, further comprising: and the range judgment logic module is connected between the isolation module and the comparison processing module and is used for judging whether the instrument exceeds the range or not and determining whether the instrument is a real signal or not according to a judgment result so as to avoid false triggering caused by wrong judgment of the instrument exceeding the range under normal working conditions.
4. The system of claim 3, wherein the upper and lower thresholds for the over-range determination provided in the range determination logic are less than the upper and lower thresholds for the over-range determination provided in the reactor protection system.
5. The system of claim 1, wherein the driving cabinet assembly comprises 3 rows of diverse driving cabinets, and the voting logic of each row adopts a judgment logic of 2 out of 3;
the system is implemented using electrical and electronic component circuits.
6. A nuclear power plant diversity driving method, characterized in that, with the system of claim 1, the method comprises the steps of:
collecting a field instrument signal;
comparing the collected field instrument signal with a preset protection parameter threshold value, and generating a protection action signal according to a comparison result;
carrying out logic voting on all protection action signals, and executing corresponding protection actions according to voting results;
and generating alarm indication information.
7. The method according to claim 6, characterized in that the collected field instrument signal is compared with a preset protection parameter threshold value, and a protection action signal is generated according to the comparison result; performing logic voting on all protection action signals, and executing corresponding protection actions according to voting results further comprises the following processing:
presetting and storing a protection parameter threshold according to the protection requirement of the nuclear reactor;
calling a protection parameter threshold value, comparing the protection parameter threshold value according to a received field instrument signal, outputting a comparison result, and generating a protection action signal, wherein the protection action signal is a trip signal;
receiving trip signals of the self-column and other columns except the self-column, carrying out logic voting on the trip signals of all the columns, and generating automatic action signals according to voting results; and executing corresponding protection actions on the shutdown or the drive special drive facilities.
8. The method of claim 7, wherein the setup between meter A of the reactor protection system and meter B of the diversity drive system is designed with functional diversity and is consistent for triggering diversity protection actions with either type of meter A and meter B.
9. The method of claim 8, further comprising a process of determining the range of the meter, connected between the isolation module and the comparison processing module, for determining whether the meter is over-range, and determining whether the over-range is a true signal according to the determination result, so as to avoid false triggering caused by an error in determination of over-range of the meter under normal operating conditions: the upper and lower limit thresholds of the overrange judgment set in the range judgment logic are smaller than the upper and lower limit thresholds of the overrange judgment set in the reactor protection system.
10. The method of claim 9, wherein the drive cabinet assembly comprises 3 columns of diverse drive cabinets, and wherein the voting logic within each column employs a decision logic of 2 out of 3.
Priority Applications (1)
| Application Number | Priority Date | Filing Date | Title |
|---|---|---|---|
| CN201811492513.3A CN109712731B (en) | 2018-12-07 | 2018-12-07 | Nuclear power station diversity driving system and driving method |
Applications Claiming Priority (1)
| Application Number | Priority Date | Filing Date | Title |
|---|---|---|---|
| CN201811492513.3A CN109712731B (en) | 2018-12-07 | 2018-12-07 | Nuclear power station diversity driving system and driving method |
Publications (2)
| Publication Number | Publication Date |
|---|---|
| CN109712731A CN109712731A (en) | 2019-05-03 |
| CN109712731B true CN109712731B (en) | 2020-05-15 |
Family
ID=66255501
Family Applications (1)
| Application Number | Title | Priority Date | Filing Date |
|---|---|---|---|
| CN201811492513.3A Active CN109712731B (en) | 2018-12-07 | 2018-12-07 | Nuclear power station diversity driving system and driving method |
Country Status (1)
| Country | Link |
|---|---|
| CN (1) | CN109712731B (en) |
Families Citing this family (3)
| Publication number | Priority date | Publication date | Assignee | Title |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| CN112764383B (en) * | 2020-12-22 | 2022-04-26 | 中国核电工程有限公司 | Method and system for displaying and alarming different pipeline signals |
| CN114038597B (en) * | 2021-10-29 | 2024-02-13 | 中广核陆丰核电有限公司 | Nuclear power unit protection and safety monitoring system, shutdown triggering system and method |
| CN115312211A (en) * | 2022-08-08 | 2022-11-08 | 中国核动力研究设计院 | Reactor protection system for preventing misoperation and input signal processing device and method thereof |
Family Cites Families (7)
| Publication number | Priority date | Publication date | Assignee | Title |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| CN102543234A (en) * | 2011-12-19 | 2012-07-04 | 中国核电工程有限公司 | Accident analysis method for digital control diversity protection system of million-kilowatt nuclear power station |
| CN103400623A (en) * | 2013-07-30 | 2013-11-20 | 中广核工程有限公司 | Protection method and system for digitalized instrument control diversity of nuclear power station |
| CN103700414B (en) * | 2013-12-10 | 2017-02-22 | 中广核工程有限公司 | Diversity driving system and method for nuclear power plant |
| CN104485142A (en) * | 2014-12-08 | 2015-04-01 | 中广核工程有限公司 | Diversified driving method, diversified driving device and diversified driving system for nuclear power station |
| CN204740870U (en) * | 2015-04-24 | 2015-11-04 | 北京广利核系统工程有限公司 | A digital variety drive appearance accuse device for PWR |
| CN105448368A (en) * | 2015-11-12 | 2016-03-30 | 中广核工程有限公司 | Nuclear power plant diversity driving system, nuclear power plant diversity driving method and diversity protection system |
| KR101858406B1 (en) * | 2017-09-29 | 2018-05-15 | 한국수력원자력 주식회사 | Apparatus for Diversity and Defense-in-Depth Safety in Nuclear Power Plants |
-
2018
- 2018-12-07 CN CN201811492513.3A patent/CN109712731B/en active Active
Also Published As
| Publication number | Publication date |
|---|---|
| CN109712731A (en) | 2019-05-03 |
Similar Documents
| Publication | Publication Date | Title |
|---|---|---|
| CN109712731B (en) | Nuclear power station diversity driving system and driving method | |
| US11728051B2 (en) | Nuclear reactor protection systems and methods | |
| CN107863169B (en) | Method and device for starting containment spraying system of nuclear power station | |
| KR100848881B1 (en) | Digital Security System for Nuclear Power Plant | |
| CN101964543A (en) | HVDC thyristor valve base electronic equipment system | |
| CN107015123B (en) | A kind of accurate determination method of transmission line malfunction based on recorder data | |
| WO2016160492A1 (en) | Safety system for a nuclear power plant and method for operating the same | |
| AU2007302649B2 (en) | Apparatus, systems and methods for reliably detecting faults within a power distribution system | |
| CN113688521B (en) | High-reliability reactor protection system test permission function design method and system | |
| CN108711459A (en) | A kind of diversified protective device for fast reactor | |
| CN108828344B (en) | Pressing plate detection warning method and device for transformer substation line protection device | |
| CN108471164B (en) | Intelligent detection and alarm method and device for pressing plate of transformer protection device | |
| US9681539B2 (en) | System and apparatus for plant monitoring and control | |
| JP3117283B2 (en) | Alarm display method for nuclear power plant and alarm display system | |
| CN112444742B (en) | Relay protection channel monitoring and early warning system | |
| CN107578835B (en) | A kind of monitoring system and method for nuclear power plant's protection system at regular intervals test | |
| CN111584299B (en) | Self-checking circuit and self-checking method for signal acquisition loop of vacuum degree monitoring device | |
| CN211874559U (en) | Bypass control system of steam turbine of nuclear power station | |
| Wood | Diversity strategies to mitigate postulated common cause failure vulnerabilities | |
| CN112562877A (en) | Logic control method for conventional island liquid level switch test of nuclear power plant | |
| Kumar et al. | Neural network based diagnostic system for accident management in nuclear power plants | |
| CN115312211A (en) | Reactor protection system for preventing misoperation and input signal processing device and method thereof | |
| Oh et al. | Single Point Vulnerability Analysis of Automatic Seismic Trip System | |
| Zhao et al. | The Failure Analysis and Processing of Digital Reactor Protection System | |
| CN117907885A (en) | Redundancy detection system and method for multi-voltage platform |
Legal Events
| Date | Code | Title | Description |
|---|---|---|---|
| PB01 | Publication | ||
| PB01 | Publication | ||
| SE01 | Entry into force of request for substantive examination | ||
| SE01 | Entry into force of request for substantive examination | ||
| GR01 | Patent grant | ||
| GR01 | Patent grant |