CN109687963A - Anti- quantum calculation alliance chain method of commerce and system based on public key pond - Google Patents
Anti- quantum calculation alliance chain method of commerce and system based on public key pond Download PDFInfo
- Publication number
- CN109687963A CN109687963A CN201910036592.5A CN201910036592A CN109687963A CN 109687963 A CN109687963 A CN 109687963A CN 201910036592 A CN201910036592 A CN 201910036592A CN 109687963 A CN109687963 A CN 109687963A
- Authority
- CN
- China
- Prior art keywords
- public key
- user
- random number
- key
- pond
- Prior art date
- Legal status (The legal status is an assumption and is not a legal conclusion. Google has not performed a legal analysis and makes no representation as to the accuracy of the status listed.)
- Granted
Links
Classifications
-
- H—ELECTRICITY
- H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
- H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
- H04L9/00—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols
- H04L9/08—Key distribution or management, e.g. generation, sharing or updating, of cryptographic keys or passwords
- H04L9/0816—Key establishment, i.e. cryptographic processes or cryptographic protocols whereby a shared secret becomes available to two or more parties, for subsequent use
- H04L9/0852—Quantum cryptography
-
- H—ELECTRICITY
- H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
- H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
- H04L63/00—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security
- H04L63/08—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security for authentication of entities
- H04L63/0853—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security for authentication of entities using an additional device, e.g. smartcard, SIM or a different communication terminal
-
- H—ELECTRICITY
- H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
- H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
- H04L63/00—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security
- H04L63/10—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security for controlling access to devices or network resources
-
- H—ELECTRICITY
- H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
- H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
- H04L67/00—Network arrangements or protocols for supporting network services or applications
- H04L67/01—Protocols
- H04L67/10—Protocols in which an application is distributed across nodes in the network
- H04L67/1097—Protocols in which an application is distributed across nodes in the network for distributed storage of data in networks, e.g. transport arrangements for network file system [NFS], storage area networks [SAN] or network attached storage [NAS]
-
- H—ELECTRICITY
- H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
- H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
- H04L9/00—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols
- H04L9/08—Key distribution or management, e.g. generation, sharing or updating, of cryptographic keys or passwords
- H04L9/0861—Generation of secret information including derivation or calculation of cryptographic keys or passwords
- H04L9/0869—Generation of secret information including derivation or calculation of cryptographic keys or passwords involving random numbers or seeds
-
- H—ELECTRICITY
- H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
- H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
- H04L9/00—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols
- H04L9/32—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols including means for verifying the identity or authority of a user of the system or for message authentication, e.g. authorization, entity authentication, data integrity or data verification, non-repudiation, key authentication or verification of credentials
- H04L9/3234—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols including means for verifying the identity or authority of a user of the system or for message authentication, e.g. authorization, entity authentication, data integrity or data verification, non-repudiation, key authentication or verification of credentials involving additional secure or trusted devices, e.g. TPM, smartcard, USB or software token
-
- H—ELECTRICITY
- H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
- H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
- H04L9/00—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols
- H04L9/32—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols including means for verifying the identity or authority of a user of the system or for message authentication, e.g. authorization, entity authentication, data integrity or data verification, non-repudiation, key authentication or verification of credentials
- H04L9/3247—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols including means for verifying the identity or authority of a user of the system or for message authentication, e.g. authorization, entity authentication, data integrity or data verification, non-repudiation, key authentication or verification of credentials involving digital signatures
Landscapes
- Engineering & Computer Science (AREA)
- Computer Security & Cryptography (AREA)
- Computer Networks & Wireless Communication (AREA)
- Signal Processing (AREA)
- Computer Hardware Design (AREA)
- Computing Systems (AREA)
- General Engineering & Computer Science (AREA)
- Physics & Mathematics (AREA)
- Electromagnetism (AREA)
- Theoretical Computer Science (AREA)
- Financial Or Insurance-Related Operations Such As Payment And Settlement (AREA)
- Storage Device Security (AREA)
Abstract
The present invention relates to anti-quantum calculation alliance chain method of commerce and system based on public key pond, implement between the CA mechanism being in communication with each other and user, a portion user is as alliance chain member, each side is provided with the key card issued by CA mechanism, all key cards are stored with public key pond, one's own side's private key and CA public key pointer random number, public key corresponding with each side's private key difference is stored in the public key pond, the CA public key pointer random number is used to extract CA public key from public key pond；The user pointer random number for extracting one's own side's public key from public key pond is also stored in the key card of user；Coded communication is carried out using key card when each side communicates, further improves safety.
Description
Technical field
The present invention relates to alliance's chain field more particularly to a kind of anti-quantum calculation alliance chains based on public key pond.
Background technique
Block chain is a kind of completely new distributed basis framework and calculation paradigm, is stored using orderly linked data structure
Data ensure data safety using cryptological technique using common recognition algorithm more new data.In the transaction based on block chain, really
The privacy of the data safety and client of protecting transaction is the necessary condition that block chain can further develop.For this purpose, cryptological technique
Especially public-key cryptographic keys are widely used in block chain.And alliance's chain is a branch of block chain, so it
It itself is also distributed a, public database for decentralization, the difference with other chains is exactly that it is for special group
Member and limited third party, inside specify multiple preselected nodes for book keeping operation people, know together process by preselected node control
The block chain of system.
As most people is understood, quantum computer has great potential in password cracking.Mainstream is non-now
Symmetrically (public key) Encryption Algorithm, such as RSA cryptographic algorithms, it is most of to be all based in factorization or the finite field of big integer
The two difficult math questions of the calculating of discrete logarithm.Their difficulty that cracks also is dependent on the efficiency solved these problems.Tradition
On computer, it is desirable that solve the two difficult math questions, the cost time is the exponential time (to crack the time with the growth of public key length
Increased with exponential), this is unacceptable in practical applications.It and is that your elegant algorithm for making to measure of quantum computer can be with
In polynomial time (time is cracked as the growth of public key length is increased with the speed of k power, wherein k is long with public key
Spend unrelated constant) carry out integer factorization or discrete logarithm and calculate, thus for RSA, discrete logarithm Encryption Algorithm it is broken
Solution provides may.
Problem of the existing technology:
(1) in the prior art, alliance's chain stores and transmits equal unencryption.
(2) corresponding private key, existing alliance's chain counterparty are obtained quickly through public key due to quantum calculation function
Method is easy to be cracked by quantum computer.
(3) in the prior art, the outputting and inputting for digital signature based on public and private key can be known to enemy, in quantum meter
In the presence of calculation machine, it may be derived private key, alliance's catenary system is caused to be cracked by quantum computer.
Summary of the invention
The present invention provides a kind of safety higher anti-quantum calculation alliance chain method of commerce and system based on public key pond.
The present invention is based on the anti-quantum calculation alliance chain method of commerce in public key pond, implement in the CA mechanism and use being in communication with each other
Between family, for a portion user as alliance chain member, each side is provided with the key card issued by CA mechanism, all key cards
It is stored with public key pond, one's own side's private key and CA public key pointer random number, is stored in the public key pond and distinguishes with each side's private key
Corresponding public key, the CA public key pointer random number are used to extract CA public key from public key pond；It is also deposited in the key card of user
Contain the user pointer random number for extracting one's own side's public key from public key pond；
The anti-quantum calculation alliance chain method of commerce includes:
Wherein a user is User, and User proposes to trade to alliance chain member, and alliance chain member goes forward side by side in response to the transaction
Row corresponding operating, then Notice Of Transactions corresponding with transaction results is sent to user；User proposes transaction and receives to trade to lead to
When knowing, the ciphering signature and encrypted random number for using when verifying are carried in the message that interacts between alliance chain member；
The generating mode of the encrypted random number is to generate random number using key card, recycles the public key encryption of recipient
The random number；
The generating mode of the ciphering signature is to carry out operation for message to be signed, then be somebody's turn to do with the random number encryption
Signature.
It include that Endorser, Orderer and Committer of respective service, the anti-quantum are provided in alliance chain member
Alliance's chain method of commerce is calculated to specifically include:
User proposes to trade to Endorser；
Endorser receives the transaction of User proposition and accordingly executes, then sends transaction response to User；
After User receives transaction response, production endorses and endorsement is sent to Orderer；
It is ranked to be then forwarded to Committer after Orderer receives endorsement；
Committer carries out corresponding operating after receiving endorsement, and will generate corresponding Notice Of Transactions and be sent to User；
User is accordingly verified after receiving Notice Of Transactions.
Optionally, each user related data that storage alliance chain is traded by the way of symmetric cryptography, symmetric cryptography are adopted
Symmetric key is true random number, which generates and be stored in the key card of each user.
Optionally, after Endorser receives the transaction of User proposition, according to the User identity that has in transaction to CA
Validity is inquired by mechanism, after the verifying effectively of CA mechanism, then corresponding execution.
Optionally, it when User proposes to trade to Endorser, is signed using the private key of User, recycles key card raw
At the random number encryption signature obtain ciphering signature；Also obtained from public key pond using the identity of Endorser
The public key of Endorser obtains encrypted random number to encrypt the random number.
Optionally, it when Endorser sends transaction response to User, is signed, is recycled using the private key of Endorser
The random number encryption of the key card generation signature obtains ciphering signature；Also obtained from public key pond using the identity of User
Random number described in the public key encryption of User obtains encrypted random number.
Optionally, it when endorsement is sent to Orderer by User, is endorsed using the random number encryption that key card generates, also benefit
Random number described in the public key encryption of Orderer, which is obtained, from public key pond with the identity of Orderer obtains encrypted random number.
Optionally, ranked when being then forwarded to Committer after Orderer receives endorsement, using key card generate with
Endorsement after the encryption sequence of machine number, the public key for also being obtained Committer from public key pond using the identity of Committer are added
The close random number obtains encrypted random number.
Optionally, it when Notice Of Transactions is sent to User by Committer, is signed using the private key of Committer, then
Using the random number encryption of key card generation, the signature obtains ciphering signature；Also obtained from public key pond using the identity of User
It obtains random number described in the public key encryption of User and obtains encrypted random number.
The anti-quantum calculation alliance chain transaction system based on public key pond that the present invention also provides a kind of, including the CA being in communication with each other
Mechanism and user, a portion user is as alliance chain member, which is characterized in that each side be provided with issued by CA mechanism it is close
Key card, all key cards are stored with public key pond, one's own side's private key and CA public key pointer random number, are stored in the public key pond
Public key corresponding with each side's private key difference, the CA public key pointer random number are used to extract CA public key from public key pond；In user
Key card in be also stored with for from public key pond extract one's own side's public key user pointer random number；
The CA mechanism and with per family including memory and processor, is stored with computer program in memory, the processing
Device realizes the anti-quantum calculation alliance chain method of commerce based on public key pond when executing computer program.
The present invention uses public key pointer random number, is stored in key card.Key card is independent hardware isolated equipment, quilt
A possibility that Malware or malicious operation steal key substantially reduces.Since quantum computer is unable to get client public key, in
It is also to be unable to get corresponding private key.In addition, the digital signature based on public and private key is also further encrypted by key in the present invention.
Even if in the presence of quantum computer, it is also difficult to be derived private key.Therefore the program is not easy by quantum computer
It cracks.
Detailed description of the invention
Fig. 1 is system construction drawing provided in an embodiment of the present invention；
Fig. 2 (a) is the structure chart in user key card key area；
Fig. 2 (b) is the structure chart of CA key card key zone；
Fig. 3 is public key storage mode flow chart provided in an embodiment of the present invention；
Fig. 4 is public key reading manner flow chart provided in an embodiment of the present invention；
Fig. 5 is the flow chart that other side ID validity is inquired to CA.
Specific embodiment
Following will be combined with the drawings in the embodiments of the present invention, and technical solution in the embodiment of the present invention carries out clear, complete
Site preparation description, it is clear that described embodiments are only a part of the embodiments of the present invention, instead of all the embodiments.It is based on
Embodiment in the present invention, it is obtained by those of ordinary skill in the art without making creative efforts every other
Embodiment shall fall within the protection scope of the present invention.
In order to better describe and illustrate embodiments herein, one or more attached drawing can refer to, but attached for describing
The additional detail or example of figure are not construed as to present invention creation, current described embodiment or preferred side
The limitation of the range of any one in formula.
It should be understood that there is no stringent sequences to limit for the execution of each step unless expressly stating otherwise herein,
These steps can execute in other order.Moreover, at least part step may include multiple sub-steps or multiple ranks
Section, these sub-steps or stage are not necessarily to execute completion in synchronization, but can execute at different times, this
The execution sequence in a little step perhaps stage be also not necessarily successively carry out but can be with other steps or other steps
Sub-step or at least part in stage execute in turn or alternately.
Wherein in an embodiment, a kind of anti-quantum calculation alliance chain method of commerce based on public key pond is provided, is implemented in phase
Between the CA mechanism of mutual communication and user, as alliance chain member, each side is provided with to be issued a portion user by CA mechanism
Key card, all key cards are stored with public key pond, one's own side's private key and CA public key pointer random number, the public key Chi Zhongcun
Public key corresponding with each side's private key difference is contained, the CA public key pointer random number is used to extract CA public key from public key pond；?
The user pointer random number for extracting one's own side's public key from public key pond is also stored in the key card of user.
Process of exchange of the present embodiment in processing alliance's chain, general thought are carried out to each message in the transaction of block chain
Encryption, and the signature of message is encrypted accordingly.
The present embodiment system structure as shown in Figure 1, each alliance's chain member is equipped with key card, issued by CA by key card
Hair.Shown in key plot structure such as Fig. 2 (a) of the key card of alliance chain member, it is stored with public key pond in key card, also stores useful
Family private key, client public key pointer random number and CA public key pointer random number.
For alliance chain member also equipped with corresponding block chain service, each service has one or more public key pointer random numbers.
Block chain service includes Peer service, Order service etc..Wherein Peer service is divided into Committer and Endorser；Order
Service is made of multiple Orderer.The public key pointer random number of each member can be used as ID use.
Shown in key plot structure such as Fig. 2 (b) of the key card of CA mechanism, it is stored with public key pond in key card, is also stored with
CA private key and CA public key pointer random number.
The storage mode of public key is as shown in Figure 3, the specific steps are as follows: takes public key pointer random number rk at random to some user
(i.e. the storage location parameter of public key, the public key pointer random number can be used as ID use), in conjunction with specific public key pointer function FP
It obtains public key pointer PPK and is stored in public key PK from the corresponding position in corresponding public key pond.Read key mode as shown in figure 4,
Mode is identical as storage key mode.
In the present invention, each user related data that storage alliance chain is traded by the way of symmetric cryptography, symmetric cryptography institute
For true random number, which generates and is stored in the key card of each user the symmetric key used.To the block of user
Chain client, alliance chain member block chain service in the related data of block chain that store carry out storage encryption and can further improve
Safety.
Wherein related data include block chain, the database stored in block chain service etc..The data point of block chain storage
With storage symmetric key, (such as the symmetric key is not stored in inside key card, is always maintained between constant and key card and is not weighed
Encryption again), is true random number, preferably quantum random number.Each block chain client, block chain service use block chain data
When first the related data of block chain of encryption are decrypted.
The CA mechanism (also abbreviation CA) of the present embodiment is different from classical CA system.Classical CA issues digital certificate, this reality
The CA for applying example does not issue digital certificate, only issues previously described key card.The key card of all users can use public key pointer
Random number or ID are referred to, and CA safeguards about the relevant information of each User ID.The CA of the present embodiment and classics CA has some total
Same point.For example, CA or user can safeguard the information of some ID, such as calcellation processing is carried out, is similar to CA certificate
Calcellation.For example, CA maintenance has validity period of some ID, calcellation processing can be carried out to ID by expiring, or from user to the Shen CA
The continuity of come in row validity period.In the digital certificate issued due to classical CA, public key and digital signature containing plaintext, therefore it is difficult
To resist the attack of quantum computer.By as above designing, the CA of the present embodiment does not expose the public key and digital signature of plaintext, because
This can resist the attack of quantum computer.
User is hereafter set, the label of Endorser, Orderer, Committer, CA are as follows:
(1) respective public key pointer random number, that is, ID is respectively IDU, IDE, IDO, IDC, IDCA；
(2) respective public key is respectively PKU, PKE, PKO, PKC, PKCA；
(3) respective private key is respectively SKU, SKE, SKO, SKC, SKCA；
According to transaction flow, wherein a user can be described as User, there are one or more block chain accounts, each account corresponding 1
The combination of a public/private keys/public key pointer random number.The alliance chain member for providing respective service can be used as Endorser,
Orderer or Committer.
The public key pointer random number of its other party can respectively be obtained ahead of time, for combining key card to generate corresponding public key, with
And the identity as relative users.
User proposes to trade to alliance chain member, and alliance chain member is in response to the transaction and carries out corresponding operating, then will be with
The corresponding Notice Of Transactions of transaction results is sent to user；When User proposes transaction and receives Notice Of Transactions, with alliance chain member
Between interaction message in carry the ciphering signature and encrypted random number that use when for verifying；
The generating mode of the encrypted random number is to generate random number using key card, recycles the public key encryption of recipient
The random number；
The generating mode of the ciphering signature is to carry out operation for message to be signed, then be somebody's turn to do with the random number encryption
Signature.
It include that Endorser, Orderer and Committer of respective service, the anti-quantum are provided in alliance chain member
Alliance's chain method of commerce is calculated to specifically include:
User proposes to trade to Endorser；
Endorser receives the transaction of User proposition and accordingly executes, then sends transaction response to User；
After User receives transaction response, production endorses and endorsement is sent to Orderer；
It is ranked to be then forwarded to Committer after Orderer receives endorsement；
Committer carries out corresponding operating after receiving endorsement, and will generate corresponding Notice Of Transactions and be sent to User；
User is accordingly verified after receiving Notice Of Transactions.
The detailed process for further describing the transaction of alliance's chain with regard to each step details is as follows:
Step 1:User proposes transaction.
Transaction tx consists of two parts, application proposal and signature userSig.Wherein, proposal includes chain code
ChaincodeID, i.e., using the number of intelligent contract function.It further include the txPayload i.e. parameter of function and a time
Stab timestamp.For userSig, that is, User to the signature of proposal, signature process is that User dissipates proposal progress individual event
Array function operation obtains an eap-message digest, reuse private key SKU it is digitally signed algorithm for encryption obtain signature SIGN
(proposal)。
This two parts is encrypted respectively.User generates a use using the randomizer in matched key card
In the random number R UP and random number R US for encrypting userSig of encryption proposal.Proposal is encrypted using RUP, is made
UserSig is encrypted with RUS.
The public key PKE of Endorser is extracted in public key pond according to IDE, process as shown in figure 4, verbal description and above
It is identical.RUP and RUS are encrypted respectively using PKE.IDU and IDE is added after the completion of encryption in tx and is sent to Endorser.Hair
The tx sent is represented by { IDU+IDE+ { { chaincodeID, txPayload, timestamp } RUP, { RUP } PKE }+{ { SIGN
(proposal) } RUS, { RUS } PKE } }.
Step 2:Endorser executes transaction.
After Endorser receives transaction, using oneself private key SKE decryption { RUP } PKE and { RUS } PKE obtain RUP and
RUS, then decrypt to obtain proposal and userSig.The public key PKU of User is extracted in public key pond according to IDU, process is as schemed
Shown in 4, verbal description is same as above.Hash is carried out with to proposal using after the public key PKU decrypted signature of User
The result of functional operation is compared, and as a result unanimously then trusts the transaction.
After Endorser trusts the transaction, which is handled, i.e., chaincode is executed according to chaincodeID,
Generate read-write operation collection readset and writeset.
Step 3:Endorser sends transaction response.
Transaction response rtx comprising read-write operation collection is returned to User by Endorser.Transaction response rtx includes that application is answered
Answer tran-proposal and signature epSig.Wherein, tran-proposal includes serial number tid (the generally transaction tx of transaction
Cryptographic Hash is represented by tid=HASH (tx)), the chaincodeID and txPayload received from User, and read-write behaviour
Make collection readset and writeset.Signature of the epSig, that is, Endorser to tran-proposal, signature process Endorser
Hash functional operation is carried out to tran-proposal and obtains an eap-message digest, reuse oneself private key SKE to its into
Row Digital Signature Algorithm encrypts to obtain signature SIGN (tran-proposal).
This two parts is encrypted respectively.Endorser generates one using the randomizer in matched key card
A random number R EP for the encrypting tran-proposal and random number R ES for encrypting epSig.Tran- is encrypted using REP
Proposal encrypts epSig using RES.
The public key PKU of User is extracted in public key pond according to IDU, process is as shown in figure 4, verbal description and phase above
Together.REP and RES are encrypted respectively using PKU.IDE and IDU is added after the completion of encryption in rtx and is sent to User.It sends
Rtx is represented by { IDE+IDU+ { { tid, chaincodeID, txPayload, readset, writeset } REP, { REP }
PKU }+{ { SIGN (tran-proposal) } RES, { RES } PKU } }.
Step 4:User sends endorsement (Endorsement) etx to Orderer.
User receive transaction response after, using oneself private key SKU decryption { REP } PKU and { RES } PKU obtain REP and
RES, then decrypt to obtain tran-proposal and epSig.The public key PKE of Endorser is extracted in public key pond according to IDE.
Using after the public key PKE decrypted signature of Endorser with to tran-proposal carry out hash functional operation result into
Row compares, and as a result unanimously then trusts the transaction response.
User receives multiple transaction responses and separately verifies by rear, by rtx (herein rtx be tran-proposal and
EpSig it) forms a set etx to endorse, is represented by ∑ rtx.Endorsement is encrypted.User uses matched key card
In randomizer generate one for encrypting the random number R UE of etx, use RUE to encrypt etx.
The public key PKO of Orderer is extracted in public key pond according to IDO, process as shown in figure 4, verbal description and above
It is identical.RUE is encrypted using PKO.IDU and IDO is added after the completion of encryption in etx and is sent to Orderer.The etx of transmission can
It is expressed as { IDE+IDO+ { ∑ rtx } RUE+ { RUE } PKO }.
Step 5:Orderer sends the etx set after sequence to Committer.
After Orderer receives endorsement, RUE is obtained using private key SKO decryption { RUE } PKO of oneself, then decrypt to obtain ∑
Rtx, that is, etx.After running up to a certain number of etx, Orderer is ranked up etx.By the etx after sequence after the completion of sequence
Set is sent to multiple Committer.
Etx set is sent to before Committer, and Orderer encrypts the etx set after sequence.Orderer makes
One is generated for encrypting the random number R O of etx set with the randomizer in matched key card, encrypts etx using RO
Set, encrypted part further includes the cryptographic Hash prevhash of sequence number seqno and last alliance's chain block.
Orderer extracts the public key of multiple Committer according to multiple IDC respectively in public key pond, i.e., multiple PKC,
Process is as shown in figure 4, verbal description is same as above.RO is encrypted respectively using multiple PKC.IDO and IDC is added after the completion of encryption
And it is respectively sent to multiple Committer.Send each etx set be represented by IDO+IDC+ seqno, prevhash,
∑etx}RO+{RO}PKC}。
Step 6: each Committer verifying transaction.
After each Committer receives etx set, RO is obtained using private key SKC decryption { RO } PKC of oneself, then decrypt
Obtain ∑ etx.Committer verifies etx set according to endorsement strategy, including checks etc. read-write operation collection.
After having checked, Committer is written and read the practical execution of collection to local alliance's chain database, and records each pen
The transaction results of transaction are into block chain.Indicate that Committer is finished after the completion.
Step 7:Committer sends Notice Of Transactions.
After Committer is finished, the notice of transaction results (success or failure) is sent to User.Committer
Generate Notice Of Transactions ntx, including tid, result (i.e. success or failure) and signature committerSig.committerSig
That is for Committer to the signature of result, signature process is that Committer obtains result progress hash functional operation
One eap-message digest, reuse private key SKC it is digitally signed algorithm for encryption obtain signature SIGN (result).
Signature is encrypted.Committer generates one using the randomizer in matched key card and is used for
The random number R C for encrypting committerSig encrypts committerSig using RC.
The public key PKU of User is extracted in public key pond according to IDU, process is as shown in figure 4, verbal description and phase above
Together.RC is encrypted using PKU.IDC and IDU is added after the completion of encryption in ntx and is sent to User.The ntx of transmission is represented by
{ IDC+IDU+ { { tid, result, committerSig } RC, { RC } PKU }.
After User is received, RC is obtained using private key SKU decryption { RC } PKU of oneself, then decrypt tid, result,
CommitterSig } RC obtains tid, result and committerSig.Committer is extracted in public key pond according to IDC
Public key PKC, process is as shown in figure 4, verbal description is same as above.Using after the public key PKC decrypted signature of Committer with
The result result for carrying out hash functional operation is compared, the Notice Of Transactions is as a result unanimously then trusted.
Block chain client and the service of block chain form alliance's catenary system.Alliance's catenary system various pieces are carried out by network
Connection.CA is attached with network.Network connection is to inquire determine whether other side ID is effective to CA for network members.
After Endorser receives the transaction of User proposition, inquired according to the User identity being had in transaction to CA mechanism
Validity, after the verifying effectively of CA mechanism, then corresponding execution.It is requested with User to Endorser, Endorser checks User's
For validity, detailed process is as shown in figure 5, verbal description is as follows:
Step 1:User initiates request.
User initiates request REQU to Endorser, and content includes IDU and IDE, be represented by M0=IDU, IDE,
REQU}.REQU is service request, and particular content is depending on business.For example, service request can be registering service, inquiry account
Family business, transferred account service, recharging service etc..
Step 2:Endorser initiates to inquire to CA.
If Endorser need to identify IDU whether validated user, Endorser to CA initiate inquiry ASK, inquiry IDU be
It is no effectively, and other useful informations such as can inquire validity period.Include IDE and IDCA in query information, is represented by M1=
{ IDE, IDCA, REQE={ IDU, ASK } }.ASK is inquiry request, and particular content is depending on the request demand of Endorser.
For example, Endorser can request to inquire the validity of certain ID, validity period, account public information etc..
Step 3:CA returns to response message.
After CA receives the inquiry of Endorser, a response ANS is generated, informs whether IDU is effective, may be used also to Endorser
To include validity period and other useful informations.CA generates the random number for being used for anti-replay-attack according to matched key card
NONCE is sent to Endorser as response return value RET with the REQE and ANS received.CA signs to RET, right
RET carries out hash functional operation and obtains an eap-message digest, reuses private key SKCA and is digitally signed algorithm to it and obtains
To signature SIGN (RET).
CA encrypts RET and its signature.A random number R CA is generated, encrypts RET and its signature using RCA.According to
IDE extracts the public key PKE of Endorser in public key pond, and process is as shown in figure 4, verbal description is same as above.It uses
The public key PKE of Endorser encrypts RCA.Be sent to Endorser together with IDCA and IDE, be represented by M2=IDCA,
IDE, { RET={ REQE, ANS, NONCE }, SIGN (RET) } RCA, { RCA } PKE }.
Step 4:Endorser is verified.
After Endorser receives M2, decrypt to obtain RCA using the private key SKE of oneself, then with RCA decrypt to obtain RET and
SIGN(RET).If Endorser can not find IDCA in the CA public key pointer random number region of key card, illustrate the IDCA
It is the ID of illegal CA, abandons the processing of the message.If Endorser is looked in the CA public key pointer random number region of key card
To IDCA, then illustrates that the IDCA is the ID of legal CA, extract the public key PKCA of CA in public key pond according to IDCA, process is such as
Shown in Fig. 4, verbal description is same as above.Hash function is carried out with to RET using after the public key PKCA decrypted signature of CA
The result of operation is compared, and as a result unanimously then trusts the information.IDU validity is carried out to the particular content of ANS after trust
Verifying, carries out other operations if being verified.For example, further including the validity period for having IDU in the ANS that Endorser is received, then
Endorser saves the validity period, to be used for business relevant to IDU validity period.
In one embodiment, a kind of computer equipment, i.e., a kind of anti-quantum calculation alliance based on public key pond are provided
Chain transaction system, the computer equipment can be terminal, internal structure may include the processor connected by system bus,
Memory, network interface, display screen and input unit.Wherein, the processor of the computer equipment is calculated and is controlled for providing
Ability.The memory of the computer equipment includes non-volatile memory medium, built-in storage.Non-volatile memory medium storage
There are operating system and computer program.The built-in storage is operating system and computer program in non-volatile memory medium
Operation provides environment.The network interface of the computer equipment is used to communicate with external terminal by network connection.The computer
To realize above-mentioned anti-quantum calculation alliance chain method of commerce when program is executed by processor.The display screen of the computer equipment can be with
It is liquid crystal display or electric ink display screen, the input unit of the computer equipment can be the touch covered on display screen
Layer, is also possible to the key being arranged on computer equipment shell, trace ball or Trackpad, can also be external keyboard, touch-control
Plate or mouse etc..
Wherein in an embodiment, a kind of anti-quantum calculation alliance chain transaction system based on public key pond is provided, including mutual
The CA mechanism of communication and user, a portion user are provided with the key issued by CA mechanism as alliance chain member, each side
Card, all key cards are stored with public key pond, one's own side's private key and CA public key pointer random number, be stored in the public key pond with
Each side's private key distinguishes corresponding public key, and the CA public key pointer random number is used to extract CA public key from public key pond；User's
The user pointer random number for extracting one's own side's public key from public key pond is also stored in key card；
The CA mechanism and with per family including memory and processor, is stored with computer program in memory, the processing
Device realizes the anti-quantum calculation alliance chain method of commerce based on public key pond when executing computer program.
Each technical characteristic of embodiment described above can be combined arbitrarily, for simplicity of description, not to above-mentioned reality
It applies all possible combination of each technical characteristic in example to be all described, as long as however, the combination of these technical characteristics is not deposited
In contradiction, all should be considered as described in this specification.
The embodiments described above only express several embodiments of the present invention, and the description thereof is more specific and detailed, but simultaneously
The limitation to invention scope therefore cannot be interpreted as.It should be pointed out that for those of ordinary skill in the art,
Under the premise of not departing from present inventive concept, various modifications and improvements can be made, and these are all within the scope of protection of the present invention.
Therefore, protection scope of the present invention should be determined by the appended claims.
Claims (10)
1. the anti-quantum calculation alliance chain method of commerce based on public key pond is implemented between the CA mechanism being in communication with each other and user,
A portion user is as alliance chain member, which is characterized in that each side is provided with the key card issued by CA mechanism, Suo Youmi
Key card is stored with public key pond, one's own side's private key and CA public key pointer random number, is stored with and each side's private key in the public key pond
Corresponding public key respectively, the CA public key pointer random number are used to extract CA public key from public key pond；In the key card of user
Also it is stored with the user pointer random number for extracting one's own side's public key from public key pond；
The anti-quantum calculation alliance chain method of commerce includes:
Wherein a user is User, and User proposes to trade to alliance chain member, and alliance chain member is in response to the transaction and carries out phase
It should operate, then Notice Of Transactions corresponding with transaction results is sent to user；When User proposes transaction and receives Notice Of Transactions,
The ciphering signature and encrypted random number for using when verifying are carried in the message interacted between alliance chain member；
The generating mode of the encrypted random number is to generate random number using key card, is recycled described in the public key encryption of recipient
Random number；
The generating mode of the ciphering signature is to carry out operation for message to be signed, then with the random number encryption label
Name.
2. the anti-quantum calculation alliance chain method of commerce based on public key pond as described in claim 1, which is characterized in that alliance's chain
It include that Endorser, Orderer and Committer of respective service are provided in member, the anti-quantum calculation alliance chain transaction
Method specifically includes:
User proposes to trade to Endorser；
Endorser receives the transaction of User proposition and accordingly executes, then sends transaction response to User；
After User receives transaction response, production endorses and endorsement is sent to Orderer；
It is ranked to be then forwarded to Committer after Orderer receives endorsement；
Committer carries out corresponding operating after receiving endorsement, and will generate corresponding Notice Of Transactions and be sent to User；
User is accordingly verified after receiving Notice Of Transactions.
3. the anti-quantum calculation alliance chain method of commerce based on public key pond as described in claim 1, which is characterized in that each user
The related data that storage alliance chain is traded by the way of symmetric cryptography, symmetric key used by symmetric cryptography are truly random
Number, the true random number are generated and are stored in the key card of each user.
4. the anti-quantum calculation alliance chain method of commerce based on public key pond as claimed in claim 2, which is characterized in that
After Endorser receives the transaction of User proposition, validity is inquired to CA mechanism according to the User identity having in transaction,
After the verifying effectively of CA mechanism, then corresponding execution.
5. the anti-quantum calculation alliance chain method of commerce based on public key pond as claimed in claim 2, which is characterized in that User to
It when Endorser proposes transaction, is signed using the private key of User, recycles the random number encryption of the key card generation signature
Obtain ciphering signature；
The public key of Endorser is also obtained from public key pond using the identity of Endorser to obtain to encrypt the random number
Encrypted random number.
6. the anti-quantum calculation alliance chain method of commerce based on public key pond as claimed in claim 2, which is characterized in that
Endorser to User send transaction response when, signed using the private key of Endorser, recycle key card generate with
Machine number encrypts the signature and obtains ciphering signature；
Random number described in the public key encryption of User also, which is obtained, from public key pond using the identity of User obtains encrypted random number.
7. the anti-quantum calculation alliance chain method of commerce based on public key pond as claimed in claim 2, which is characterized in that User will
Endorsement is endorsed using the random number encryption that key card generates when being sent to Orderer, also using the identity of Orderer from
Random number described in the public key encryption of Orderer is obtained in public key pond obtains encrypted random number.
8. the anti-quantum calculation alliance chain method of commerce based on public key pond as claimed in claim 2, which is characterized in that
It is ranked when being then forwarded to Committer after Orderer receives endorsement, after the random number encryption sequence generated using key card
Endorsement, also obtain random number described in the public key encryption of Committer from public key pond using the identity of Committer and obtain
To encrypted random number.
9. the anti-quantum calculation alliance chain method of commerce based on public key pond as claimed in claim 2, which is characterized in that
It when Notice Of Transactions is sent to User by Committer, is signed using the private key of Committer, key card is recycled to generate
The random number encryption signature obtain ciphering signature；
Random number described in the public key encryption of User also, which is obtained, from public key pond using the identity of User obtains encrypted random number.
10. the anti-quantum calculation alliance chain transaction system based on public key pond, including the CA mechanism being in communication with each other and user, wherein one
Certain customers are as alliance chain member, which is characterized in that each side is provided with the key card issued by CA mechanism, and all key cards are equal
It is stored with public key pond, one's own side's private key and CA public key pointer random number, is stored in the public key pond and distinguishes phase with each side's private key
The public key answered, the CA public key pointer random number are used to extract CA public key from public key pond；It is also stored in the key card of user
There is the user pointer random number for extracting one's own side's public key from public key pond；
The CA mechanism and with per family including memory and processor, is stored with computer program in memory, which holds
The anti-quantum calculation alliance chain counterparty according to any one of claims 1 to 9 based on public key pond is realized when row computer program
Method.
Priority Applications (1)
| Application Number | Priority Date | Filing Date | Title |
|---|---|---|---|
| CN201910036592.5A CN109687963B (en) | 2019-01-15 | 2019-01-15 | Anti-quantum computing alliance chain transaction method and system based on public key pool |
Applications Claiming Priority (1)
| Application Number | Priority Date | Filing Date | Title |
|---|---|---|---|
| CN201910036592.5A CN109687963B (en) | 2019-01-15 | 2019-01-15 | Anti-quantum computing alliance chain transaction method and system based on public key pool |
Publications (2)
| Publication Number | Publication Date |
|---|---|
| CN109687963A true CN109687963A (en) | 2019-04-26 |
| CN109687963B CN109687963B (en) | 2021-06-22 |
Family
ID=66193205
Family Applications (1)
| Application Number | Title | Priority Date | Filing Date |
|---|---|---|---|
| CN201910036592.5A Active CN109687963B (en) | 2019-01-15 | 2019-01-15 | Anti-quantum computing alliance chain transaction method and system based on public key pool |
Country Status (1)
| Country | Link |
|---|---|
| CN (1) | CN109687963B (en) |
Cited By (24)
| Publication number | Priority date | Publication date | Assignee | Title |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| CN110380845A (en) * | 2019-06-25 | 2019-10-25 | 如般量子科技有限公司 | Quantum secret communication alliance chain method of commerce based on group's pool of symmetric keys, system, equipment |
| CN110493005A (en) * | 2019-08-09 | 2019-11-22 | 如般量子科技有限公司 | Anti- quantum calculation public key pond update method and system based on alliance's chain |
| CN110519045A (en) * | 2019-07-02 | 2019-11-29 | 如般量子科技有限公司 | Anti- quantum calculation alliance chain method of commerce, system and equipment based on group's unsymmetrical key pond |
| CN110535872A (en) * | 2019-09-12 | 2019-12-03 | 腾讯科技（深圳）有限公司 | The method and apparatus of request of data are handled in block chain network |
| CN110545169A (en) * | 2019-07-16 | 2019-12-06 | 如般量子科技有限公司 | Block chain method and system based on asymmetric key pool and implicit certificate |
| CN110572788A (en) * | 2019-07-16 | 2019-12-13 | 如般量子科技有限公司 | Wireless sensor communication method and system based on asymmetric key pool and implicit certificate |
| CN110633328A (en) * | 2019-09-25 | 2019-12-31 | 腾讯云计算（北京）有限责任公司 | Information processing method and device and computer readable storage medium |
| CN110635897A (en) * | 2019-08-28 | 2019-12-31 | 如般量子科技有限公司 | Key updating or downloading method and system based on alliance chain and resisting quantum computing |
| CN110636050A (en) * | 2019-08-28 | 2019-12-31 | 如般量子科技有限公司 | Anonymous identity recognition method and system based on alliance chain and resisting quantum computation |
| CN110661613A (en) * | 2019-09-26 | 2020-01-07 | 如般量子科技有限公司 | Anti-quantum-computation implicit certificate issuing method and system based on alliance chain |
| CN110690957A (en) * | 2019-10-18 | 2020-01-14 | 如般量子科技有限公司 | Anti-quantum-computation private key backup, loss reporting and recovery method and system based on alliance chain and implicit certificate |
| CN110737915A (en) * | 2019-09-26 | 2020-01-31 | 如般量子科技有限公司 | Anti-quantum-computation anonymous identity recognition method and system based on alliance chain and implicit certificate |
| CN110740034A (en) * | 2019-09-26 | 2020-01-31 | 如般量子科技有限公司 | Method and system for generating QKD network authentication key based on alliance chain |
| CN110768781A (en) * | 2019-08-28 | 2020-02-07 | 如般量子科技有限公司 | Public and private key issuing and issuing method and system based on alliance chain and resisting quantum computation |
| CN110830244A (en) * | 2019-10-22 | 2020-02-21 | 如般量子科技有限公司 | Anti-quantum computing vehicle networking method and system based on identity secret sharing and alliance chain |
| CN110868295A (en) * | 2019-12-12 | 2020-03-06 | 南京如般量子科技有限公司 | Anti-quantum computing alliance chain system based on secret sharing and communication method |
| CN110881177A (en) * | 2019-10-22 | 2020-03-13 | 如般量子科技有限公司 | Anti-quantum computing distributed Internet of vehicles method and system based on identity secret sharing |
| CN110880969A (en) * | 2019-10-18 | 2020-03-13 | 如般量子科技有限公司 | Method and system for generating QKD network authentication key based on alliance chain and implicit certificate |
| CN110912688A (en) * | 2019-10-18 | 2020-03-24 | 如般量子科技有限公司 | Anti-quantum-computation private key backup, loss reporting and recovery method and system based on alliance chain |
| CN110929290A (en) * | 2019-12-04 | 2020-03-27 | 南京如般量子科技有限公司 | Private key threshold backup, loss reporting and recovery system and method based on alliance chain |
| CN110930251A (en) * | 2019-10-18 | 2020-03-27 | 如般量子科技有限公司 | Anti-quantum computing cloud storage method and system based on alliance chain and implicit certificate |
| CN111224776A (en) * | 2019-10-18 | 2020-06-02 | 如般量子科技有限公司 | Private key backup, loss reporting and recovery method and system based on alliance chain |
| CN111951006A (en) * | 2020-08-10 | 2020-11-17 | 链博(成都)科技有限公司 | Alliance chain consensus method, system and terminal |
| CN114362952A (en) * | 2020-10-13 | 2022-04-15 | 如般量子科技有限公司 | Sender offline digital currency quantum computation resistant transaction method and system |
Citations (9)
| Publication number | Priority date | Publication date | Assignee | Title |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| CN106209877A (en) * | 2016-07-19 | 2016-12-07 | 井创（北京）科技有限公司 | A kind of be certification core with block chain backstage false-proof authentication system |
| US20180123804A1 (en) * | 2016-10-27 | 2018-05-03 | Infinitekey, Inc. | System and method for authenticating and authorizing devices |
| WO2018143983A1 (en) * | 2017-02-01 | 2018-08-09 | Equifax, Inc. | Verifying an identity based on multiple distributed data sources using a blockchain to safeguard the identity |
| CN108683509A (en) * | 2018-05-15 | 2018-10-19 | 北京创世智链信息技术研究院 | A kind of method for secure transactions, apparatus and system based on block chain |
| CN108737418A (en) * | 2018-05-22 | 2018-11-02 | 飞天诚信科技股份有限公司 | A kind of identity identifying method and system based on block chain |
| CN108768652A (en) * | 2018-06-06 | 2018-11-06 | 杭州趣链科技有限公司 | It is a kind of can the attack of anti-quantum alliance's block chain bottom encryption method |
| CN109150519A (en) * | 2018-09-20 | 2019-01-04 | 如般量子科技有限公司 | Anti- quantum calculation cloud storage method of controlling security and system based on public keys pond |
| US10176418B1 (en) * | 2018-07-23 | 2019-01-08 | Capital One Services, Llc | System and apparatus for encrypted data collection using RFID cards |
| CN109167763A (en) * | 2018-08-16 | 2019-01-08 | 国网浙江省电力有限公司电力科学研究院 | A kind of power industry electronic data security method and system based on block chain |
-
2019
- 2019-01-15 CN CN201910036592.5A patent/CN109687963B/en active Active
Patent Citations (9)
| Publication number | Priority date | Publication date | Assignee | Title |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| CN106209877A (en) * | 2016-07-19 | 2016-12-07 | 井创（北京）科技有限公司 | A kind of be certification core with block chain backstage false-proof authentication system |
| US20180123804A1 (en) * | 2016-10-27 | 2018-05-03 | Infinitekey, Inc. | System and method for authenticating and authorizing devices |
| WO2018143983A1 (en) * | 2017-02-01 | 2018-08-09 | Equifax, Inc. | Verifying an identity based on multiple distributed data sources using a blockchain to safeguard the identity |
| CN108683509A (en) * | 2018-05-15 | 2018-10-19 | 北京创世智链信息技术研究院 | A kind of method for secure transactions, apparatus and system based on block chain |
| CN108737418A (en) * | 2018-05-22 | 2018-11-02 | 飞天诚信科技股份有限公司 | A kind of identity identifying method and system based on block chain |
| CN108768652A (en) * | 2018-06-06 | 2018-11-06 | 杭州趣链科技有限公司 | It is a kind of can the attack of anti-quantum alliance's block chain bottom encryption method |
| US10176418B1 (en) * | 2018-07-23 | 2019-01-08 | Capital One Services, Llc | System and apparatus for encrypted data collection using RFID cards |
| CN109167763A (en) * | 2018-08-16 | 2019-01-08 | 国网浙江省电力有限公司电力科学研究院 | A kind of power industry electronic data security method and system based on block chain |
| CN109150519A (en) * | 2018-09-20 | 2019-01-04 | 如般量子科技有限公司 | Anti- quantum calculation cloud storage method of controlling security and system based on public keys pond |
Cited By (44)
| Publication number | Priority date | Publication date | Assignee | Title |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| CN110380845B (en) * | 2019-06-25 | 2023-06-09 | 如般量子科技有限公司 | Quantum secret communication alliance chain transaction method, system and equipment based on group symmetric key pool |
| CN110380845A (en) * | 2019-06-25 | 2019-10-25 | 如般量子科技有限公司 | Quantum secret communication alliance chain method of commerce based on group's pool of symmetric keys, system, equipment |
| CN110519045B (en) * | 2019-07-02 | 2023-09-01 | 如般量子科技有限公司 | Anti-quantum computing alliance chain transaction method and system based on group asymmetric key pool |
| CN110519045A (en) * | 2019-07-02 | 2019-11-29 | 如般量子科技有限公司 | Anti- quantum calculation alliance chain method of commerce, system and equipment based on group's unsymmetrical key pond |
| CN110545169A (en) * | 2019-07-16 | 2019-12-06 | 如般量子科技有限公司 | Block chain method and system based on asymmetric key pool and implicit certificate |
| CN110572788B (en) * | 2019-07-16 | 2022-08-09 | 如般量子科技有限公司 | Wireless sensor communication method and system based on asymmetric key pool and implicit certificate |
| CN110572788A (en) * | 2019-07-16 | 2019-12-13 | 如般量子科技有限公司 | Wireless sensor communication method and system based on asymmetric key pool and implicit certificate |
| CN110545169B (en) * | 2019-07-16 | 2022-08-12 | 如般量子科技有限公司 | Block chain method and system based on asymmetric key pool and implicit certificate |
| CN110493005A (en) * | 2019-08-09 | 2019-11-22 | 如般量子科技有限公司 | Anti- quantum calculation public key pond update method and system based on alliance's chain |
| CN110493005B (en) * | 2019-08-09 | 2021-11-16 | 如般量子科技有限公司 | Anti-quantum computing public key pool updating method and system based on alliance chain |
| CN110636050A (en) * | 2019-08-28 | 2019-12-31 | 如般量子科技有限公司 | Anonymous identity recognition method and system based on alliance chain and resisting quantum computation |
| CN110768781A (en) * | 2019-08-28 | 2020-02-07 | 如般量子科技有限公司 | Public and private key issuing and issuing method and system based on alliance chain and resisting quantum computation |
| CN110635897A (en) * | 2019-08-28 | 2019-12-31 | 如般量子科技有限公司 | Key updating or downloading method and system based on alliance chain and resisting quantum computing |
| CN110635897B (en) * | 2019-08-28 | 2021-10-22 | 如般量子科技有限公司 | Key updating or downloading method and system based on alliance chain and resisting quantum computing |
| CN110768781B (en) * | 2019-08-28 | 2021-10-22 | 如般量子科技有限公司 | Public and private key issuing and issuing method and system based on alliance chain and resisting quantum computation |
| CN110535872A (en) * | 2019-09-12 | 2019-12-03 | 腾讯科技（深圳）有限公司 | The method and apparatus of request of data are handled in block chain network |
| CN110535872B (en) * | 2019-09-12 | 2021-06-01 | 腾讯科技（深圳）有限公司 | Method and apparatus for processing data requests in a blockchain network |
| CN110633328B (en) * | 2019-09-25 | 2024-03-22 | 腾讯云计算（北京）有限责任公司 | Information processing method, device and computer readable storage medium |
| CN110633328A (en) * | 2019-09-25 | 2019-12-31 | 腾讯云计算（北京）有限责任公司 | Information processing method and device and computer readable storage medium |
| CN110737915A (en) * | 2019-09-26 | 2020-01-31 | 如般量子科技有限公司 | Anti-quantum-computation anonymous identity recognition method and system based on alliance chain and implicit certificate |
| CN110740034B (en) * | 2019-09-26 | 2021-08-31 | 如般量子科技有限公司 | Method and system for generating QKD network authentication key based on alliance chain |
| CN110740034A (en) * | 2019-09-26 | 2020-01-31 | 如般量子科技有限公司 | Method and system for generating QKD network authentication key based on alliance chain |
| CN110661613A (en) * | 2019-09-26 | 2020-01-07 | 如般量子科技有限公司 | Anti-quantum-computation implicit certificate issuing method and system based on alliance chain |
| CN110661613B (en) * | 2019-09-26 | 2021-10-22 | 如般量子科技有限公司 | Anti-quantum-computation implicit certificate issuing method and system based on alliance chain |
| CN110930251B (en) * | 2019-10-18 | 2023-09-29 | 如般量子科技有限公司 | Anti-quantum computing cloud storage method and system based on alliance chain and implicit certificate |
| CN110912688A (en) * | 2019-10-18 | 2020-03-24 | 如般量子科技有限公司 | Anti-quantum-computation private key backup, loss reporting and recovery method and system based on alliance chain |
| CN111224776B (en) * | 2019-10-18 | 2023-03-07 | 如般量子科技有限公司 | Private key backup, loss reporting and recovery method and system based on alliance chain |
| CN110880969B (en) * | 2019-10-18 | 2021-10-22 | 如般量子科技有限公司 | Method and system for generating QKD network authentication key based on alliance chain and implicit certificate |
| CN110880969A (en) * | 2019-10-18 | 2020-03-13 | 如般量子科技有限公司 | Method and system for generating QKD network authentication key based on alliance chain and implicit certificate |
| CN110690957A (en) * | 2019-10-18 | 2020-01-14 | 如般量子科技有限公司 | Anti-quantum-computation private key backup, loss reporting and recovery method and system based on alliance chain and implicit certificate |
| CN111224776A (en) * | 2019-10-18 | 2020-06-02 | 如般量子科技有限公司 | Private key backup, loss reporting and recovery method and system based on alliance chain |
| CN110930251A (en) * | 2019-10-18 | 2020-03-27 | 如般量子科技有限公司 | Anti-quantum computing cloud storage method and system based on alliance chain and implicit certificate |
| CN110690957B (en) * | 2019-10-18 | 2023-03-07 | 如般量子科技有限公司 | Anti-quantum computing private key backup, loss report and recovery method and system |
| CN110830244B (en) * | 2019-10-22 | 2023-06-06 | 如般量子科技有限公司 | Anti-quantum computing Internet of vehicles method and system based on identity secret sharing and alliance chain |
| CN110881177B (en) * | 2019-10-22 | 2022-12-06 | 如般量子科技有限公司 | Anti-quantum computing distributed Internet of vehicles method and system based on identity secret sharing |
| CN110830244A (en) * | 2019-10-22 | 2020-02-21 | 如般量子科技有限公司 | Anti-quantum computing vehicle networking method and system based on identity secret sharing and alliance chain |
| CN110881177A (en) * | 2019-10-22 | 2020-03-13 | 如般量子科技有限公司 | Anti-quantum computing distributed Internet of vehicles method and system based on identity secret sharing |
| CN110929290B (en) * | 2019-12-04 | 2022-03-18 | 南京如般量子科技有限公司 | Private key threshold backup, loss reporting and recovery system and method based on alliance chain |
| CN110929290A (en) * | 2019-12-04 | 2020-03-27 | 南京如般量子科技有限公司 | Private key threshold backup, loss reporting and recovery system and method based on alliance chain |
| CN110868295A (en) * | 2019-12-12 | 2020-03-06 | 南京如般量子科技有限公司 | Anti-quantum computing alliance chain system based on secret sharing and communication method |
| CN110868295B (en) * | 2019-12-12 | 2023-03-14 | 南京如般量子科技有限公司 | Anti-quantum computing union chain system based on secret sharing and communication method |
| CN111951006A (en) * | 2020-08-10 | 2020-11-17 | 链博(成都)科技有限公司 | Alliance chain consensus method, system and terminal |
| CN114362952A (en) * | 2020-10-13 | 2022-04-15 | 如般量子科技有限公司 | Sender offline digital currency quantum computation resistant transaction method and system |
| CN114362952B (en) * | 2020-10-13 | 2024-05-14 | 如般量子科技有限公司 | Anti-quantum computing transaction method and system for digital currency of sender offline |
Also Published As
| Publication number | Publication date |
|---|---|
| CN109687963B (en) | 2021-06-22 |
Similar Documents
| Publication | Publication Date | Title |
|---|---|---|
| CN109687963A (en) | Anti- quantum calculation alliance chain method of commerce and system based on public key pond | |
| CN111062716B (en) | Method and device for generating block chain signature data and block chain transaction initiating system | |
| Delgado-Segura et al. | A fair protocol for data trading based on bitcoin transactions | |
| US20240250808A1 (en) | Determining a common secret for the secure exchange of information and hierarchical, deterministic cryptographic keys | |
| CN109756485B (en) | Electronic contract signing method, electronic contract signing device, computer equipment and storage medium | |
| CN111242617B (en) | Method and apparatus for performing transaction correctness verification | |
| CN110874464A (en) | Method and equipment for managing user identity authentication data | |
| CN109728906B (en) | Anti-quantum-computation asymmetric encryption method and system based on asymmetric key pool | |
| CN109450843B (en) | SSL certificate management method and system based on block chain | |
| WO2020051710A1 (en) | System and process for managing digitized security tokens | |
| CN111160998B (en) | Comment data processing method and device based on block chain and comment system | |
| CN109919611B (en) | Quantum computation resistant blockchain transaction method and system based on symmetric key pool server | |
| CN109660345A (en) | Anti- quantum calculation block chain method of commerce and system based on unsymmetrical key pool server | |
| CN109921905B (en) | Anti-quantum computation key negotiation method and system based on private key pool | |
| CN109728905B (en) | Anti-quantum computation MQV key negotiation method and system based on asymmetric key pool | |
| CN110189184A (en) | A kind of electronic invoice storage method and device | |
| CN109919609A (en) | Anti- quantum calculation block chain secure transactions method and system based on public key pond | |
| CN110690957A (en) | Anti-quantum-computation private key backup, loss reporting and recovery method and system based on alliance chain and implicit certificate | |
| CN112470423A (en) | Computer-implemented system and method for asset blending | |
| CN116830523A (en) | threshold key exchange | |
| CN117240452A (en) | Plateau data safe sharing method based on block chain | |
| Cha et al. | A blockchain-based privacy preserving ticketing service | |
| CN110493005B (en) | Anti-quantum computing public key pool updating method and system based on alliance chain | |
| CN110519040B (en) | Anti-quantum computation digital signature method and system based on identity | |
| CN109687961B (en) | Quantum computation resistant blockchain transaction method and system based on symmetric key pool routing device |
Legal Events
| Date | Code | Title | Description |
|---|---|---|---|
| PB01 | Publication | ||
| PB01 | Publication | ||
| SE01 | Entry into force of request for substantive examination | ||
| SE01 | Entry into force of request for substantive examination | ||
| GR01 | Patent grant | ||
| GR01 | Patent grant |