CN109669443A - Natural gas line control system information security test device and method - Google Patents
Natural gas line control system information security test device and method Download PDFInfo
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- CN109669443A CN109669443A CN201811623678.XA CN201811623678A CN109669443A CN 109669443 A CN109669443 A CN 109669443A CN 201811623678 A CN201811623678 A CN 201811623678A CN 109669443 A CN109669443 A CN 109669443A
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- G—PHYSICS
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- G05B—CONTROL OR REGULATING SYSTEMS IN GENERAL; FUNCTIONAL ELEMENTS OF SUCH SYSTEMS; MONITORING OR TESTING ARRANGEMENTS FOR SUCH SYSTEMS OR ELEMENTS
- G05B23/00—Testing or monitoring of control systems or parts thereof
- G05B23/02—Electric testing or monitoring
- G05B23/0205—Electric testing or monitoring by means of a monitoring system capable of detecting and responding to faults
- G05B23/0218—Electric testing or monitoring by means of a monitoring system capable of detecting and responding to faults characterised by the fault detection method dealing with either existing or incipient faults
- G05B23/0221—Preprocessing measurements, e.g. data collection rate adjustment; Standardization of measurements; Time series or signal analysis, e.g. frequency analysis or wavelets; Trustworthiness of measurements; Indexes therefor; Measurements using easily measured parameters to estimate parameters difficult to measure; Virtual sensor creation; De-noising; Sensor fusion; Unconventional preprocessing inherently present in specific fault detection methods like PCA-based methods
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Abstract
The invention belongs to industrial control information security technology areas, in particular to a kind of natural gas line control system information security test device and method, the device includes: including control centre and programmable controller, control centre includes: engineer station, operator station and database server；Programmable controller is connected with natural gas line physical process simulation test stand, for receiving sensor data and controls actuator movement, wherein sensor includes at least the water level sensor and pressure gauge pipe pressure sensor of both reboiler and regenerator；Actuator includes at least the start stop switch of pumping unit of kowtowing, pipeline light, pressures cycle pump, inlet and outlet electrically operated valve, aerosol producer, cathodic protection and urban area light.The present invention can really restore industrial environment, enhance the fidelity of test process and the reliability of experimental data, and the network attack in natural gas line control system operational process is effectively relieved, improves the reliability and stability in its operational process.
Description
Technical field
The invention belongs to industrial control information security technology area, in particular to a kind of natural gas line control system information
Safety instrumentation and method.
Background technique
Industrial control system (Industrial control system, ICS) is a kind of computer based for monitoring
The system of physical process is widely used in the crucial base of multiple countries such as the energy, traffic, water conservancy, security protection, food and large-scale manufacture
Infrastructure industry.As the control equipment in industrial control system accesses internet, can only be generated in physical world originally
Actual influence can reach identical purpose by attacking network space now, lead to the information security in industrial control system
Problem is faced with formidable challenges.Safety test is carried out in industrial control system (ICS) helps to reduce network attack to system
Influence.The high availability of ICS requires to make it difficult to directly carry out in industry spot safety test, and the structure of ICS test envelope
Building is a basic work for studying ICS information security issue.
Currently, for Natural Gas system test envelope build there are mainly two types of: semi-hardware type simulation test bed, virtualization
Test envelope.University of New Orleans establishes the natural gas line test envelope an of HWIL simulation, as shown in Figure 1, using true
Programmable logic controller (PLC) (PLC) be connected to human-computer interaction interface (HMI) and during engineer interacts, for monitoring object
The state of reason process uses true sensor, and actuator, which simulates, simply simulates natural gas line physical process.The survey
It is higher to try bed fidelity, but test envelope physical process emulation is too simple, can not reflect the industry of true natural gas work
Business process.Alves et al. proposes novel expansible, the inexpensive virtualization test exclusively for the exploitation of SCADA test platform
Bed, has virtualized SCADA system component and has simulated natural gas line testboard, simulates HMI using ScadaBR simulation software, makes
With the virtual networked control systems of OpenPLC, object is waken up with a start to natural gas line using the simulation of the simulation softwares such as Matlab/Simulink
Reason modeling.The test envelope is at low cost, scalability is strong, but virtualization technology is only capable of virtualizing and configuring out in virtual machine
The controller and its related software in source, and it is difficult to the relevant loophole of mainstream controller in test and verification scene.
Summary of the invention
For this purpose, the present invention provides a kind of natural gas line control system information security test device and method, it can be true
Industrial environment is restored, the fidelity of test process and the reliability of experimental data are enhanced, natural gas line control system is effectively relieved
Network attack in system operational process, improves the reliability and stability in its operational process.
According to design scheme provided by the present invention, a kind of natural gas line control system information security test device, packet
Containing the control centre for being equipped with natural gas line control system and for receive control centre instruct and trigger actuator movement
Programmable controller, the programmable controller are connect by interchanger with control centre, and the control centre includes: for soft
The engineer station of part programming, the database server for the operator station of human-computer interaction, and for storing data；It is described can
Programmable controller is connected with natural gas line physical process simulation test stand, for receiving sensor data and controls execution
Device movement, wherein sensor includes at least the water level sensor of both reboiler and regenerator and pressure gauge pipeline pressure passes
Sensor；Actuator include at least kowtow pumping unit, pipeline light, pressures cycle pump, inlet and outlet electrically operated valve, aerosol producer,
The start stop switch of cathodic protection and urban area light.
Above-mentioned, natural gas is simulated in the natural gas line physical process simulation test stand from exploiting to being delivered to family
Whole flow process at least exploits in the whole flow process, filters, purifies, transmitting, pressurizeing, storing and storage and transportation process.
Preferably, exploitation process is provided with the gas recovery well for natural gas extraction and the producing well for oil extraction；It crosses
Filter process is provided with the TEG dehydration system for grease filtering；Cleaning procedure is provided with the decarburization system for cleaning and desulfurization
System and desulphurization system；Transmission process is provided with the gas transmission station for transport；Pressurization operation is provided with pressurizing point；Storage and storage and transportation
Process is provided with air accumulator and substation tank car.
Above-mentioned, in programmable controller, digital output end is connect with actuator, and analog input end and sensor connect
It connects.
Above-mentioned, engineer station has by software programming foundation for the right feed channel control system information security of test days
Challenge model；The challenge model distorts natural gas line control system control logic or programmable controller by simulating interference
Input and output carry out fragile point analysis test in natural gas line control system control process.
Above-mentioned, the natural gas line physical process simulation test stand is the simulating table by building on sand table.
A kind of natural gas line control system information security test method is believed based on above-mentioned natural gas line control system
It ceases safety instrumentation to realize, realizes that process includes following content:
According to programmable controller inputoutput data and operator station control instruction data, building is used for natural gas line
The challenge model of fragile point analysis in control system control process；
According to challenge model, natural gas line control system control logic is distorted by interference or programmable controller inputs
Output obtains natural gas line control system control process loophole.
It in above-mentioned method, constructs in challenge model, carries out Denial of Service attack modeling and integrality according to supplemental characteristic
Attacking analysis, wherein supplemental characteristic includes at least: measurement value sensor, measurement value sensor bound, programmable controller
The sensor values and sensor values bound received, programmable controller output variable bound, actuator response shape
State, actuator response state mobility scale, operator station variable output, and attack duration.
In above-mentioned method, Denial of Service attack modeling process includes sensor Denial of Service attack, controller refusal clothes
Business attack establishes corresponding challenge model for three situations with actuator Denial of Service attack respectively.
In above-mentioned method, integrality attacking analysis process, comprising distorting sensor acquisition data and programmable controller
Variable data, forgery programmable controller is sent to the director data of actuator and operator station is sent to programmable controller
Director data；According to distorting and forging situation, corresponding challenge model is established respectively.
Beneficial effects of the present invention:
The present invention restores industrial environment using true PLC and control centre's host computer website, enhances the fidelity of test envelope
The reliability of degree and experimental data；It is low in order to solve natural gas line physical process fidelity, the problems such as industrial flow is simple,
Using the operation flow of true sensor and the reduction natural gas processing of brake combination pipe mould, can simulate by force about
To the Denial of Service attack of city gas pipeline control system and complete sexual assault under the conditions of beam, natural gas tube is effectively avoided
Network attack in road control system operational process, improves the reliability and stability in its operational process.
Detailed description of the invention:
Fig. 1 is information security test device schematic diagram in embodiment；
Fig. 2 is natural gas line physical process simulation test stand schematic diagram in embodiment；
Fig. 3 is natural gas line physical process simulation test stand control point bit distribution figure in embodiment；
Fig. 4 is information security test method flow chart in embodiment；
Fig. 5 is to attack control schematic diagram in embodiment；
Fig. 6 is analog sensor Denial of Service attack curve graph in embodiment；
Fig. 7 is programmable analog controller Denial of Service attack curve graph in embodiment；
Fig. 8 is analog sensor integrality attack curve figure in embodiment；
Fig. 9 is programmable analog controller integrality attack curve figure in embodiment.
Specific embodiment:
To make the object, technical solutions and advantages of the present invention clearer, understand, with reference to the accompanying drawing with technical solution pair
The present invention is described in further detail.
Existing Natural Gas duct size information safety test bed physical process simulates integrality and virtualization technology is supported
It is insufficient.Although virtualization test envelope can use the OpenPLC software virtualization controller increased income, to closing source task equipment
Deficiency is supported in virtualization, and comprising a large amount of proprietary hardware and software in control system, these proprietary hardware and softwares are difficult to
It is realized using virtualization technology.Existing matter emulation test envelope simulates integrality deficiency, physical process modeling to physical process
Mostly it is abstracted simplified industrial flow, it is difficult to the network relevant to physical process control under analog physical information fusion conditions
Attack.For this purpose, in the embodiment of the present invention, it is shown in Figure 1, a kind of natural gas line control system information security test is provided
Device instructs comprising being equipped with the control centre of natural gas line control system and for receiving control centre and triggers execution
The programmable controller of device movement, the programmable controller are connect by interchanger with control centre, control centre's packet
Contain: the database service for the engineer station of software programming, for the operator station of human-computer interaction, and for storing data
Device；The programmable controller is connected with natural gas line physical process simulation test stand, simultaneously for receiving sensor data
Control actuator movement, wherein sensor includes at least the water level sensor and manometer tube of both reboiler and regenerator
Road pressure sensor；Actuator includes at least pumping unit of kowtowing, pipeline light, pressures cycle pump, inlet and outlet electrically operated valve, cigarette
The start stop switch of fog generator, cathodic protection and urban area light.
It is shown in Figure 2, natural gas is simulated in natural gas line physical process simulation test stand from exploiting to being delivered to family
Whole flow process, at least exploit in the whole flow process, filter, purify, transmitting, pressurizeing, storing and storage and transportation process.Preferably, it opens
It adopts process and is provided with the gas recovery well for natural gas extraction and the producing well for oil extraction；Filter progress, which is provided with, to be used for
The TEG dehydration system of grease filtering；Cleaning procedure is provided with decarbonization system and desulphurization system for cleaning and desulfurization；Transmission
Process is provided with the gas transmission station for transport；Pressurization operation is provided with pressurizing point；Storage and storage and transportation process be provided with air accumulator and
Substation tank car.
Shown in Figure 3, in programmable controller, digital output end is connect with actuator, analog input end and biography
Sensor connection.Engineer station establishes the attack having for the right feed channel control system information security of test days by software programming
Model；The challenge model distorts natural gas line control system control logic or programmable controller input by simulating interference
Output carries out fragile point analysis test in natural gas line control system control process.Above-mentioned, the natural gas line object
Reason process simulation testing stand is the simulating table by building on sand table.
Control centre can be equipped with the engineer station of Unity Pro programming software by one, and one is equipped with WinCC configuration software
Operator station and a historical database server.Field device can be completed by a Schneider 140PLC and control centre
Interaction and physical process control.Physical process include true sensor, electrically operated valve, heater, aerosol producer,
Light bulb, the real controllers such as pipe mould, sensor and actuator, Natural Gas pipeline physical simulation test platform can be by ruler
Very little is that 2.4 meters * 4 meters * 0.7 meter (wide * long * high) sand table is built, simulated in simulation test stand including gas transmission station, dewatering system,
The process sections such as decarbonization system, desulphurization system, pressurizing point, gas recovery well, air accumulator and structures, and from the exploitation in source until
It is conveyed to user and needs complete process and show.As shown in Fig. 2, Gas Industry needs to include main industry in testboard
Business: natural gas extraction, oil extraction, grease filtering technique, cleaning and desulfurization system, pressurizing point, substation tank car, gas transmission station, gas storage
Tank, TEG dehydration system, compressor assembly etc..It include motor, water pump, valve, air compressor machine, frequency converter, stepping in testboard
Motor etc., multiple physical sensors such as pressure gauge, liquidometer, flowmeter, thermometer and brake.City gas pipeline emulation
Testing stand can simulate natural gas from series of business such as exploitation, filtering, purification, transmission, pressurization, storage and storage and transportations, and
In the important service process of natural gas, when embodying operation flow generation industry control safety failure, caused serious consequence.Fig. 3
In include 13 digital quantity output signals (DO) and 5 analog input signals (AI), DO the and AI module of PLC and physics are imitated
The corresponding relationship of true testing stand is acquired by the start and stop of PLC control DO point and the data of AI point, and table 1 is the memory in PLC
The mapping relations of I/O point in address and sand table.
The mapping relations of I/O point in memory address and sand table in table 1:PLC
The input data of controller refers to from the control that the process data and outside HMI of internal sensor measurement are initiated
It enables, after the control algolithm of controller calculates, the output data of controller is sent to actuator, and attacker can be by dry
Disturb and distort the normal operation of the input and output influence production process of control logic or controller.
Based on above-mentioned natural gas line control system information security test device, the embodiment of the present invention also provides a kind of day
Right feed channel control system information security test method, it is shown in Figure 4, include following content:
S101, foundation programmable controller inputoutput data and operator station control instruction data, building is for natural
The challenge model of fragile point analysis in feed channel control system control process；
S102, foundation challenge model, distort natural gas line control system control logic or PLC technology by interference
Device input and output obtain natural gas line control system control process loophole.
It in above-mentioned method, constructs in challenge model, carries out Denial of Service attack modeling and integrality according to supplemental characteristic
Attacking analysis, wherein supplemental characteristic includes at least: measurement value sensor, measurement value sensor bound, programmable controller
The sensor values and sensor values bound received, programmable controller output variable bound, actuator response shape
State, actuator response state mobility scale, operator station variable output, and attack duration.
In above-mentioned method, Denial of Service attack modeling process includes sensor Denial of Service attack, controller refusal clothes
Business attack establishes corresponding challenge model for three situations with actuator Denial of Service attack respectively.
In above-mentioned method, integrality attacking analysis process, comprising distorting sensor acquisition data and programmable controller
Variable data, forgery programmable controller is sent to the director data of actuator and operator station is sent to programmable controller
Director data；According to distorting and forging situation, corresponding challenge model is established respectively.
In Fig. 5, the fragile point analysis of control process, (zi(k)): zi(k) indicate sensor i at the k moment to physical process
Real-time measurement values, andWhereinWithIt is the upper and lower of measurement value sensor
Limit.
(yi(k)): yi(k) sensor values that controller i is arrived in k reception is indicated,WhereinWithIt is the bound for the sensor values that controller receives.
(ui(k)): ui(k) output valve of the controller i at the k moment is indicated, andWhereinWithIt is the bound of the variable of controller output.
(vi(k)): vi(k) state that actuator response controller generates is indicated, andWhereinWithIt is the bound of actuator state mobility scale.
(xi(k)): xi(k) output valve of the operating process variable because of operator station i in moment k is indicated, and WhereinWithIt is the bound of the variable of controller output.
(Tτ): TτIndicate attack duration, ksAt the time of indicating that attack starts, keAt the time of indicating that attack terminates, institute
With Tτ=[ks,ke]。
It is easy to be denied service attack in communication process from sensor to actuator, attack A1, A2, A3 in Fig. 5
Respectively indicate to sensor, controller, actuator Denial of Service attack.yi' (k), ui' (k), vi' (k) respectively indicate sensing
The response policy of device, controller and actuator reply dos attack.
After sensor refusal service, controller will be considered that the data of sensor maintain always yi(ks), yi(ks) indicate to pass
Sensor is rejected the numerical value at service attack moment, and before and after dos attack, the response signal of sensor is expressed as yi'(k)
After controller refusal service, actuator can keep being worked on by the manipulating variable value at dos attack moment, and HMI
Website and controller communication are interrupted, and before and after dos attack, the process variable value of controller can be expressed as ui' (k), HMI website
The output valve of operating process variable is xi'(k)。
Likewise, before and after dos attack, the response signal of actuator can be expressed as vi'(k)
The input and output of modification sensor, controller and actuator are passed through to reach shadow to the complete sexual assault of control system
Ring the purpose of physics controlled process.A4 is attacked in Fig. 5 indicates that attacker distorts the data acquired from sensor, and A5 is indicated
Attacker distorts the process variable value of controller, and A6 indicates that attacker forges controller and is sent to the instruction of actuator, A7 expression
Attacker forges the instruction that HMI website is sent to controller.
A4: attacker can distort numerical value in sensor, so that yi(k)≠zi(k), sensor signal is represented byIn order not to be detected by the Outlier Detection Algorithm in system, the numerical value of sensor should be maintained in constraint,It should be limited toαi(k) challenging dose introduced for attacker.
A5: attacker distorts the performance variable of controller, so that ui(k)≠F(zi(k)), controller signals can be expressed as It should be limited toαi(k) challenging dose introduced for attacker.
Similarly, A6, A7 can be represented asIt should be limited to
It should be limited toαi(k) challenging dose introduced for attacker.
Further to verify effectiveness of the invention, it is real that simulation is carried out below by the challenge model of triethylene glycol dewatering process flow
It tests, explanation is further explained to technical solution of the present invention:
The temperature of gas is affected to triethylene glycol dehydration efficiency, and the temperature sensor value for defining experimental bench absorption tower is y1
(k), poor glycol inlet temperature of stabilizer sensor values is y2(k), the temperature sensor value of triethylene glycol. solution is y in reboiler3(k), into
The natural gas temperature for entering absorption tower should be maintained at 15 DEG C -48 DEG C, i.e. y1(k) ζ should be limited to1=[15,48] DEG C, poor glycol into
Tower temperature should be lower than 60 DEG C, i.e. y2(k) ζ should be limited to2≤ 60 DEG C, triethylene glycol. solution temperature should be lower than 204 DEG C in reboiler, i.e.,
y3(k) ζ should be limited to3≤204℃。
Into the temperature y on absorption tower1(k)=13 DEG C, when the temperature on absorption tower is less than 15 DEG C, triethylene glycol can be the same as in gas
Liquid hydrocarbon class forms emulsion, so heating equipment need to be arranged before import separator, after heating equipment is started to work, such as Fig. 6 institute
Show, in H-hour kS=10Min is to sensor y1Initiate Denial of Service attack, y1Value y1(ks)=23.6 DEG C, and
Attack finish time kS=40Min, y1The value of sensor stills remain in y1(ke)=23.6 DEG C, in fact, terminating k in attacke
Moment has reached 53.4 DEG C into the true temperature for absorbing tower gas, and is more than when entering the temperature for absorbing tower gas
At 48 DEG C, the loss of triethylene glycol increases, and the vapor content in air increases, from fig. 6, it can be seen that (a) indicates time graph,
(b) temperature curve is indicated, the moisture content in attack finish time natural gas is significantly larger than the 112mg/ in constrained qualification
m3, dehydration efficiency decline in addition natural gas in the excessively high corrosion rate that will increase pipeline of water content.Likewise, attacker can
To poor glycol inlet temperature of stabilizer sensor y2With the temperature sensor y of triethylene glycol. solution in reboiler3Dos attack is carried out, so that
Sensor y2Value be greater than 60 DEG C, sensor y3Value be greater than 204 DEG C, can make that triethylene glycol loses or thermal decomposition is rotten.To
The production process of natural gas is interfered, product quality and productivity are reduced.
Absorption tower operating pressure is bigger, and the water content in gas is lower, and dehydrating effect is better, the operating pressure value on absorption tower
It is generally kept in 2.5MPa-10.0Mpa, when operation is greater than 10.0MPa for a long time, equipment damage is will cause or even occurs quick-fried
It is fried.Controller u1Control absorption tower operating pressure pump valve v1, it is assumed that controller u1Current state is pressure in control absorption tower
Continue to increase state, ideally, when controller detect absorption tower side sit pressure after reaching the upper limit, pressure pump can be closed
And current pressure values are kept, as shown in fig. 7, attacker can be when operating pressure reaches maximum value to controller u1Initiation is refused
Exhausted service attack so that the operating pressure in absorption tower continues to increase, absorb tower pressure interior force it is excessive after, can make dewatering system into
Enter unsafe condition, may result in absorption tower damage or explosion.
Controller u1Control absorption tower operating pressure pump valve v1, v1It is u1Actuator, pressure pump valve v1Refusal service
Identical attack result in Fig. 7 is also resulted in, such as starts k in the attack of Fig. 7s, controller u1On detecting that operating pressure reaches
Limit, to actuator v1Initiate to close the instruction of pressure pump, but pressure pump is damaged and cannot respond to out code at this time, so inhaling
The pressure received in tower can continue to increase.
Assuming that u1Control absorption tower operating pressure pump valve v1, y4For pressure sensor, attacker is by introducing challenging dose α4
(k), so that y4(k)+α4(k)=0.Controller u1Absorption tower pressure pump valve can be opened, but since controller constantly receives
The false pressure data of 0MPa, controller can continue to increase pressure value.As shown in figure 8, in H-hour kS=1Hr, attack
Person distorts pressure sensor and is sent to controller u1Middle numerical value, so that y4(k)≠z4(k), controller can constantly increase pressure
Pressure in pump, and operating pressure in absorption tower is greater than 10MPa for a long time and will lead to absorption tower and enters unsafe condition, very
To equipment damage.
Attacker can also directly distort controller u1It is sent to actuator v1Order.The operating pressure on absorption tower is bigger,
Dehydrating effect is better.Assuming that the startup operation pressure on absorption tower is 2Mpa, in order to increase triethylene glycol dehydration efficiency, reduce natural
Water content in gas needs to increase the operating pressure on absorption tower, and under normal circumstances, operator passes through controller u1Open pressurization
It pumps and pressurizes to absorption tower, as shown in figure 9, attacker is in k after pressure pump is openedsTo controller u when=0.51Carry out integrality
Attack, distorts controller u1Performance variable so that actuator force (forcing) pump v1It closes, operating pressure is allowed to remain at 3MPa's
It under pressure, is dehydrated at this pressure, the water content in natural gas is greater than 112mg/m3, dehydration efficiency declines, in natural gas
The excessively high corrosion rate that can accelerate pipeline of water content, cause product quality and productivity to reduce, maintenance cost increases.
In the present invention control website that is extensive, easily configuring (packet can be built using the technology of virtualization in network layer
Include the websites such as engineer station, operator station, history server, opc server), it is combined using true sensor and brake
Some pipe moulds restore and simulate the operation flow that high simulative feed channel controls each link, improve the fidelity of test envelope
Degree enhances the reliability of experimental data in test envelope.And the operating process of control system is combined, pass through the defeated of handling controller
Enter output data source, the Denial of Service attack and complete sexual assault to control system model.By being dehydrated using triethylene glycol
Physical constraint condition in operation flow, building natural gas line control system and process control correlation attack scene, analyze day
Tender spots in right feed channel control system control process, so that the loophole in control system operating process is found out, it is further complete
It is apt to its natural gas line control system information security, the network in natural gas line control system operational process is effectively avoided to attack
It hits, improves the reliability and stability in its operational process.
Unless specifically stated otherwise, the opposite step of the component and step that otherwise illustrate in these embodiments, digital table
It is not limit the scope of the invention up to formula and numerical value.
Based on above-mentioned method, the embodiment of the present invention also provides a kind of server, comprising: one or more processors；It deposits
Storage device, for storing one or more programs, when one or more of programs are held by one or more of processors
Row, so that one or more of processors realize above-mentioned method.
Based on above-mentioned method, the embodiment of the present invention also provides a kind of computer-readable medium, is stored thereon with computer
Program, wherein the program realizes above-mentioned method when being executed by processor.
The technical effect and preceding method embodiment phase of device provided by the embodiment of the present invention, realization principle and generation
Together, to briefly describe, Installation practice part does not refer to place, can refer to corresponding contents in preceding method embodiment.
It is apparent to those skilled in the art that for convenience and simplicity of description, the system of foregoing description
It with the specific work process of device, can refer to corresponding processes in the foregoing method embodiment, details are not described herein.
In all examples being illustrated and described herein, any occurrence should be construed as merely illustratively, without
It is as limitation, therefore, other examples of exemplary embodiment can have different values.
It should also be noted that similar label and letter indicate similar terms in following attached drawing, therefore, once a certain Xiang Yi
It is defined in a attached drawing, does not then need that it is further defined and explained in subsequent attached drawing.
The flow chart and block diagram in the drawings show the system of multiple embodiments according to the present invention, method and computer journeys
The architecture, function and operation in the cards of sequence product.In this regard, each box in flowchart or block diagram can be with
A part of a module, section or code is represented, a part of the module, section or code includes one or more
A executable instruction for implementing the specified logical function.It should also be noted that in some implementations as replacements, box
Middle marked function can also occur in a different order than that indicated in the drawings.For example, two continuous boxes are actually
It can be basically executed in parallel, they can also be executed in the opposite order sometimes, and this depends on the function involved.Also it wants
It, can be with it is noted that the combination of each box in block diagram and or flow chart and the box in block diagram and or flow chart
It is realized, or with specialized hardware and can calculated with the dedicated hardware based system for executing defined function or movement
The combination of machine instruction is realized.
In several embodiments provided herein, it should be understood that disclosed systems, devices and methods, it can be with
It realizes by another way.The apparatus embodiments described above are merely exemplary, for example, the division of the unit,
Only a kind of logical function partition, there may be another division manner in actual implementation, in another example, multiple units or components
It can be combined or can be integrated into another system, or some features can be ignored or not executed.Another point, it is shown or
The mutual coupling, direct-coupling or communication connection discussed can be through some communication interfaces, device or unit
Indirect coupling or communication connection can be electrical property, mechanical or other forms.
The unit as illustrated by the separation member may or may not be physically separated, aobvious as unit
The component shown may or may not be physical unit, it can and it is in one place, or may be distributed over multiple
In network unit.Some or all of unit therein can be selected to realize this embodiment scheme according to the actual needs
Purpose.
It, can also be in addition, the functional units in various embodiments of the present invention may be integrated into one processing unit
It is that each unit physically exists alone, can also be integrated in one unit with two or more units.
It, can be with if the function is realized in the form of SFU software functional unit and when sold or used as an independent product
It is stored in the executable non-volatile computer-readable storage medium of a processor.Based on this understanding, of the invention
Technical solution substantially the part of the part that contributes to existing technology or the technical solution can be with software in other words
The form of product embodies, which is stored in a storage medium, including some instructions use so that
One computer equipment (can be personal computer, server or the network equipment etc.) executes each embodiment institute of the present invention
State all or part of the steps of method.And storage medium above-mentioned include: USB flash disk, mobile hard disk, read-only memory (ROM,
Read-Only Memory), random access memory (RAM, Random Access Memory), magnetic or disk etc. it is each
Kind can store the medium of program code.
Finally, it should be noted that embodiment described above, only a specific embodiment of the invention, to illustrate the present invention
Technical solution, rather than its limitations, scope of protection of the present invention is not limited thereto, although with reference to the foregoing embodiments to this
Invention is described in detail, those skilled in the art should understand that: any technology people for being familiar with the art
Member in the technical scope disclosed by the present invention, can still modify to technical solution documented by previous embodiment or
Variation or equivalent replacement of some of the technical features can be readily occurred in；And these modifications, variation or replacement, and
So that the essence of corresponding technical solution is detached from the spirit and scope of technical solution of the embodiment of the present invention, should all cover in the present invention
Protection scope within.Therefore, the protection scope of the present invention shall be subject to the protection scope of the claims.
Claims (10)
1. a kind of natural gas line control system information security test device, the control comprising being equipped with natural gas line control system
Center processed and the programmable controller that actuator movement is instructed and triggered for receiving control centre, the programmable controller pass through
Interchanger is connect with control centre, which is characterized in that the control centre includes: for the engineer station of software programming, being used for
The operator station of human-computer interaction, and database server for storing data；The programmable controller and natural gas line
Physical process simulation test stand is connected, and for receiving sensor data and controls actuator movement, wherein sensor at least wraps
Water level sensor and pressure gauge pipe pressure sensor containing both reboiler and regenerator；Actuator includes at least pumping of kowtowing
Oil machine, pressures cycle pump, imports and exports opening for electrically operated valve, aerosol producer, cathodic protection and urban area light at pipeline light
Guard's valve.
2. natural gas line control system information security test device according to claim 1, which is characterized in that the day
The whole flow process at natural gas family from exploiting to being delivered to is simulated in right feed channel physical process simulation test stand, in the whole flow process
At least exploit, filter, purification, transmission, pressurization, storage and storage and transportation process.
3. natural gas line control system information security test device according to claim 2, which is characterized in that exploitation work
Sequence is provided with the gas recovery well for natural gas extraction and the producing well for oil extraction；Filter progress is provided with for grease mistake
The TEG dehydration system of filter；Cleaning procedure is provided with decarbonization system and desulphurization system for cleaning and desulfurization；Transmission process is set
It is equipped with the gas transmission station for transport；Pressurization operation is provided with pressurizing point；Storage and storage and transportation process are provided with air accumulator and substation tank
Vehicle.
4. natural gas line control system information security test device according to claim 1, which is characterized in that programmable
In controller, digital output end is connect with actuator, and analog input end is connect with sensor.
5. natural gas line control system information security test device according to claim 1, which is characterized in that engineer
It stands and the challenge model having for the right feed channel control system information security of test days is established by software programming；The challenge model is logical
It crosses simulation interference and distorts natural gas line control system control logic or programmable controller input and output, carry out natural gas line
Fragile point analysis test in control system control process.
6. natural gas line control system information security test device according to claim 1, which is characterized in that the day
Right feed channel physical process simulation test stand is the simulating table by building on sand table.
7. a kind of natural gas line control system information security test method, which is characterized in that any based on claim 1~6
Natural gas line control system information security test device described in is realized, realizes that process includes following content:
According to programmable controller inputoutput data and operator station control instruction data, building is controlled for natural gas line
The challenge model of fragile point analysis in system control process；
According to challenge model, natural gas line control system control logic is distorted by interference or programmable controller input is defeated
Out, natural gas line control system control process loophole is obtained.
8. natural gas line control system information security test method according to claim 7, which is characterized in that building is attacked
It hits in model, carries out Denial of Service attack modeling and integrality attacking analysis according to supplemental characteristic, wherein supplemental characteristic at least wraps
Contain: measurement value sensor, measurement value sensor bound, the sensor values and sensor values that programmable controller receives
Bound, programmable controller output variable bound, actuator response state, actuator response state mobility scale, operation
Member station variable output, and attack duration.
9. natural gas line control system information security test method according to claim 8, which is characterized in that refusal clothes
Be engaged in attacking analysis process, include sensor Denial of Service attack, controller Denial of Service attack and actuator Denial of Service attack,
For three situations, corresponding challenge model is established respectively.
10. natural gas line control system information security test method according to claim 8, which is characterized in that complete
Sexual assault modeling process forges programmable controller comprising distorting sensor acquisition data and programmable controller variable data
The director data and operator station that are sent to actuator are sent to the director data of programmable controller；Feelings are distorted and forged to foundation
Shape establishes corresponding challenge model respectively.
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